



REPUBLIC OF PINELAND (ROP) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PERIOD COVERED 1800R W+022 to W+028 (26)

Overall Classification of this INTSUM is:

//UNCLASSIFIED//

Classified by 9th Special Forces Group

Derived From: Multiple (EXERCISE ONLY)

Declassify on: W+10600

Wednesday, W+029



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(U) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

FIGURE 1: Composition and Disposition of United Provinces of Atlantica (UPA) forces (Red), Republic of Pineland (ROP) and United States (US) Forces (Blue) and Internal Security Corps (ISC) versus Resistance Activity

PRP Begins Gun Control Measures	Period		ROP Totals	
		#	SIGACTs	#
	SAFIRE	0	SAFIRE	22
	Complex Attacks	5	Complex Attacks	56
	IED/Mine Strikes	5	IED/Mine Strikes	61
	IED/Mine Finds	1	IED/Mine Finds	5
	Direct Fire	10	Direct Fire	137
	IDF	5	IDF	56
	Violent Protests	0	Violent Protests	20
	Detainments	40	Detainments	188

FIGURE 2: Significant Activity (SIGACTS) Summary of People's Republic of Pineland (PRP) Area of Operations (AO)

A. (UNCLAS//) GENERAL ASSESSMENT:

A number of unique developments occurred this week in the conflict. UPA military forces continue to improve their positions and are actively training and organizing the People's Republic of Pineland (PRP) 3rd Internal Security Corps (ISC) counter-guerrilla force. The UPA forces have also experienced a number of tactical setbacks due to violent acts perpetrated by suspected militants that oppose their presence as well as attacks by known ROP guerilla elements. Significant attacks on the UPA and PRP forces occurred in the Mountain and Coastal Territories. The most noteworthy occurred in the southern portion of the coastal territory where the local populace is suspected of providing support to the resistance. PRP Criminal Resistance Intelligence (CRI) is also increasing their level of activity in this region to counteract the recent spikes in kinetic activity against the PRP forces. This week, General Nicolas Christian also announced that the ISC command and control is fully operational. The UPA counter-insurgency (COIN) operation "Brush Fire," commenced this week to actively target known guerrilla strongholds in the Coastal Territory.

Progress on confiscation of privately owned weapons throughout the PRP is slow. Many PRP citizens are openly defying the measure or attempting to use loopholes to keep at least one weapon in their household. Since many weapons are unregistered, the PRP security forces have to rely on checkpoints to seize weapons. Many in rural areas are hiding their weapons underground or in secured caches that are also protected. In all, the measure appears to be alienating many, including some of the original supporters of the Liberal Progressive Party (LPP) takeover. An internal struggle also emerged this week between the PRP central government and the three appointed Territorial governors. This internal friction developed between the Governors, and General Nicolas Christian, Commander of the Internal Security Corps. The main point of contention is over the command structure of the Internal Security Divisions assigned to the three territories. The Territorial governors believe that overall command and

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control should reside with the President. However, UPA senior advisors and General Christian strongly disagree, and believe they should directly oversee these security organizations.

Analyst Notes: General Christian has also been conducting numerous high-level meetings with senior UPA officials both in the PRP as well as in the UPA. In addition, the UPA Ambassador is now taking a leading role in many of the security decisions that, at times, even exclude President Paton and LPP membership. It is assessed that the 3rd ISC is growing powerful and developing a number of ties with Iran, Russia, and China outside of the political context of the LPP.




FIGURE 3: Graphical depiction of SIGACTS

B. FORMER NPP TERRITORIAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARIES

1) (U) MOUNTAIN

The Mountain Territory has seen an uptick in kinetic activity, primarily targeting the Federal Border Patrol (FBP) outposts. Attacks like these are unusual and have not been seen here since the AWENASA and CUIA insurgency. A number of mortar attacks occurred targeting the PRP FBP checkpoints along the western border by God's Right Arm (GRA). Shortly after the attacks, an unidentified woman called the headquarters of the 3rd Internal Security Corps and claimed that GRA was responsible for the mortar attacks on the border. All the attacks along the southwestern border were initiated from within the Republic of Appalachia (ROA).

(SIGACT ROP-S065-NPWS-W+025), Reported by ROP Military Headquarters (HQ), Columbia, South Pineland Province (SPP), 0638 hours, Checkpoint North Pineland West South (NPWS) International Province Road143, .1 mile east of the PRP and the ROA border. Five 81mm mortar rounds caused light structural damage. 0 X killed in action (KIA); 1 X wounded in Action (WIA).

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(SIGACT ROP-S066-NPWS-W+025), Reported by ROP Military HQ, Columbia, SPP, 0845 hours, Checkpoint North Pineland West South (NPWS) International Province Road J Brown, .1 mile east of PRP and the ROA border. Sixteen 81mm mortar rounds caused heavy structural damage. 2 X KIA; 6 X WIA.

(SIGACT ROP-S067-NPWS-W+025), Reported by ROP Military HQ, Columbia, SPP, 0911 hours, Checkpoint North Pineland West South (NPWS) International Province Road 294, .1 mile east of PRP and the ROA border. Ten 82mm mortar rounds caused light to moderate structural damage. 0 X KIA; 4 X WIA.

(SIGACT ROP-S068-NPWS-W+025), Reported by ROP Military HQ, Columbia, SPP, 1011 hours, Checkpoint North Pineland West South (NPWS) International Province Road 64, 1.2 miles east of PRP and the ROA border. Ten 82mm mortar rounds caused moderate structural damage and wounded four. 0 X KIA; 4 X WIA.

(SIGACT JTF-30-011-LAR-W+026), Reported by JTF-30, 0123 hours. Two US Marines assigned to the 2nd MEF were involved in a vehicle accident in Laurinburg and are listed in critical condition. 0 X KIA; 2 X WIA.

(SIGACT JTF-30-013-ASH-W+028), Reported by JTF-30 and ROP Bureau of Investigation (RBI), 2223 hours. A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated late in the evening at the second precinct police department in Asheville, PRP. The explosion targeted UPA advisors just before night training. All the casualties were part of the UPA 15th Corps Civil Organization Resistance Development System (CORDS). Witnesses mentioned that the car was parked with no occupants. The GRA or other militant forces opposed to the PRP security forces are suspect. Additionally, the police headquarters and several police vehicles suffered heavy damage. 8 X KIA; 14 X WIA.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): IIR 26-178-76-991 WCNC Charlotte News, Weather Traffic, Charlotte, PRP “Car bomb devastates Asheville Police Station.” (W+029)

AP Charlotte, PRP – Unknown assailants attacked the second precinct headquarters late last night with a powerful car bomb. The blast caused numerous casualties to include likely UPA advisors. The Governor has announced that the perpetrators will be brought to justice. Sources close to the investigation stated that the bomb was actuated remotely, possibly with a cell phone.

2) (U) PIEDMONT

A number of events occurred in the Piedmont, but overall the level of violence was low. PRP forces conducted a number of cordon and search operations in the southern portion of the Territory, working off leads from the CRI and other informants. As a result, a number of suspected militants and anti-PRP regime supporters were arrested. The most significant event occurred in Raleigh after the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) headquarters was attacked with an improvised incendiary device (IID) launched from a rapidly moving vehicle. The attack wounded four LPP loyalist police officers and damaged two patrol cars. Immediately following this attack, the city police department received numerous leads that indicated this event was carried out by pro-ROP resistance forces. PRP security forces arrested over 200 suspected resistance members in the days following the attack. Three were

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


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


arrested in Durham in connection to this event and are believed to be members of the GRA. They are listed under ROP Joint Prioritized Effects Listing (JPEL):

JPEL: HJ-P90 - Michael Montgomery-Goodfellow, twenty-five years old, 1211 Lynn Rd, Raleigh



JPEL: JK-089 - Benjamin Godchild-Gordon, forty-three years old, 831 Church St, Wilmington.



Call Sign (C/S) Johnny, Objective GreySkull, JPEL: LK-067 - Jorge Scott-Hale, thirty-nine years old, 418 Pleasant Dr., Durham.



(Exercise Classified) ALL SOURCE Joint Task Force (JTF) Battle Watch Captain, US JTF-30, Fort Jackson, SPP US Information Data Network Exchange (USIDNE) (W+022 to W+028) Short Format: SIGACT Number, Report POC, Location, Time, Details, Comments.

(SIGACT ROP-S067-2MEF+026), Reported by JTF-30, Fort Jackson, SPP, 1124 hours. US 2nd MEF reports that the 120th guerrilla band ambushed a UPA Marine routine patrol at a chokepoint on province road 211. During the onset of the engagement, the lead vehicle struck a victim operated (VO) underbelly improvised explosive device (IED), killing three UPA Marines and wounding five. The other elements of the mounted patrol were then engaged with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire,

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which destroyed two other vehicles. A UPA Airborne Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was dispatched and engaged the guerrillas. The UPA QRF Marine attack helicopters killed eight guerrillas and wounded four guerrillas from the 120th guerrilla band. 3 X killed in action KIA (UPA Military); 5 X WIA (UPA Military); 8 X KIA (pro-ROP Guerrillas); 4 X WIA (pro-ROP Guerrillas).

(SIGACT ROP-S068-2MEF+026), Reported by JTF-30, Fort Jackson, SPP, 1145 hours. US 2nd MEF reports that the 430th guerrilla band ambushed a second UPA Marine patrol on province road 130. Six medium UPA logistics trucks were damaged after the firefight ignited munitions and fuel in vehicle #2 and #3. UPA Marine QRF responded and wounded five guerrillas from the 430th guerrilla band. 1 X KIA (UPA Military); 4 X WIA (UPA Military); 0 X KIA (pro-ROP Guerrillas); 5 X WIA (pro-ROP Guerrillas).

OSINT: IIR 26-17-76-KLJK1 ABN News “ROP militant resistance forces continue attacks on UPA Marines.” (W+027)

(CNN News) Wilmington, PRP. This week a number of engagements between UPA Marines and members of a growing resistance occurred in the Southern Coastal Territory. The attacks caused multiple injuries on both sides. Senior members of the PRP ISC dismissed the growing resistance as a potential threat to the sovereignty of the PRP.

3) (U) COASTAL

There are indications and warnings (I&W) that support for the resistance is growing in the Coastal Territory. It is possible that the recent instances of more complex attacks, utilizing IEDs signal an escalation in guerilla tactics for future attacks against the PRP security forces. The person borne IED (PBIED) event that occurred north of Wilmington at a police station on (W+027), likely targeted the chief of police; however, ten local nationals (LNs) were killed. It is probable that guerillas did not intend to inflict harm on a large number of LNs. However, it is also likely that resistance leaders accepted the risks associated with such an attack prior to approving the operation. It is probable that guerilla commanders concluded that a high number of LN fatalities would still allow accomplishment of their goal of discrediting the PRP and degrading the security situation.

This week the Coastal Territory governor announced an order to turn-in personal firearms. The conditions allow some of these weapons to be returned to their rightful owners once stability has been achieved in the Territory. Failure to comply with this order will result in a six-month jail sentence. By late mid-day, Coastal Territory residents showed their displeasure by hanging makeshift signs at their houses and at highway overpasses.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Analyst Comments: Residents indicated through the signs and multiple postings that these mandates were the first steps to a dictatorship and strongly believed that gun ownership was a given right in Pineland.

(Exercise Classified) All Source JTF Battle Watch Captain, US JTF 30, Fort Jackson, SPP USIDNE (W+022 to W+028) Short Format: SIGACT Number, Report POC, Location, Time, Details, Comments.

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(SIGACT ROP-S070-2MEF+027), Reported by JTF-30, Fort Jackson, SPP, 0545 hours. The US 2nd MEF reports multiple indirect fire (IDF) attacks on the UPA Marine headquarters. Coordinated mortar attacks carried out by the 120th and the 252nd guerrilla bands targeted UPA 1st and 2nd Battalions, 1st Regiment, 1st MEF. Approximately, one hundred rounds of high-explosive 81mm mortar rounds impacted the headquarters. The attack destroyed the 1st battalion's ammunition supply point, as well as both 1st and 2nd battalions' petroleum supply points. 1 X KIA (UPA Military); 10 X WIA (UPA Military).

SIGACT (ROP-S071-2MEF+027), Reported by JTF-30, Fort Jackson, SPP, 0645 hours. The US 2nd MEF reports multiple indirect fire (IDF) attacks on the UPA 1st MEF resupply convoys. Coordinated mortar attacks carried out by the 120th and the 430th guerrilla bands against UPA 1st MEF resupply convoys traveling from the Sunny Point Army terminal to the 1st MEF supply points in Whiteville, PRP. 0 X KIA (UPA Military); 2 X WIA (UPA Military).

SIGACT (ROP-S073-2MEF+027), Reported by JTF-30 HQ, Fort Jackson, SPP, 0234 hours. The US 2nd MEF reports an ambush on a re-supply convoy. Elements of the 120th guerrilla band ambushed a UPA Marine light truck convoy on the north side of the Waccamaw River on Province Road 211. Guerrillas destroyed eight of the ten vehicles and recovered Class I, Class II, and Class V. 8 X KIA (UPA Military); 7 X WIA (UPA Military).

SIGACT (ROP-S073-2MEF+028), Reported by JTF-30 HQ, Fort Jackson, SPP, 0456 hours. The US 2nd MEF reports an ambush on a re-supply convoy. Elements of the 120th guerrilla band ambushed a second UPA Marine light truck convoy south of the Waccamaw River on Province Road 211, two miles south of Honey Island. The ambush targeted a QRF force, accompanying a light truck convoy. Guerrillas recovered four M16A2 rifles, M203 launchers and ammunition. 3 X KIA (UPA Military); 6 X WIA (UPA Military).

(SIGACT ROP-S076-WIL-W+027), Reported by ROP Military HQ, Columbia, SPP, 0738 hours. The police precinct in North Wilmington, PRP was attacked with a PBIED. The assailant parked his motorcycle outside the police station and walked into the reception area. Moments later a loud explosion occurred during shift change in the room next-door to the reception area. The device carried in the assailant's backpack is estimated to hold at least 15 pounds of high explosive. 02 X KIA, 9 X WIA (ISC Security Force); 13 X KIA and 7 X WIA (Local nationals).

4) (Exercise Classified) OTHER (UPA):

High-level exchanges between PRP and UPA senior officials continued this week in the UPA capital. In a jointly hosted conference with Pakistan and Russia, the UPA hosted directors of the intelligence agencies for all nations present. The exchanges are encouraging a significant cooperation between many unaligned nations, such as China, Russia, Iran, and the UPA.

Tactical Report (TACREP)/GHT-H7789-6UU89 [Exercise Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Classified]
National Security Agency, (W+027) Sources indicate that talks between these intelligence agencies are paving the way for clandestine means to infiltrate an Iranian version of the SA-7 into Atlantica in

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order to shoot down ROP aircraft that are deemed as supporting resistance forces' efforts in PRP. The presence of the Iranian variant SA-7 has not been confirmed.

5) (U) OTHER (ROP):

The crisis in the former NPP is causing an increasing influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into the SPP. A great majority of these IDPs are ethnic minorities that are caught in the middle of the intensifying PRP COIN operations. This ethnic persecution is based on perception that some of these subgroups are supporting the resistance forces against the PRP. Other IDP flows are also occurring as the economic conditions in the former NPP continue to deteriorate.

(Exercise Classified) all source JTF Battle Watch Captain, US JTF 30, Fort Jackson, SPP US Information Data Network Exchange (USIDNE) (W+022 to W+028) Short Format: SIGACT Number, Report POC, Location, Time, Details, Comments.

(SIGACT JTF-30-012-2MEF-W+026), Reported by JTF-30, 0345 hours. CSX train 896 carrying military hardware (heavy equipment and tactical vehicles) derailed in Columbia, SPP at the intersection of Secondary Road 16 and the Norfolk southern switch yard. Four M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, two M1A2 Abrams tanks, and three MH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters were damaged, along with Class I and II. RBI suspects that the derailment was caused by an explosive device placed on the tracks.

C. ADDITIONAL REPORTING (SIGNIFICANT THREATS)

Air. Nothing Significant to Report

Paramilitary/Irregular/Other.

Recent multi-source intelligence reporting indicates that PRP security forces recently killed a very top IED bomb maker associated with the GRA movement. On (W+026), ISC forces in Fayetteville, PRP reported seeing four military aged males carrying Kalashnikovs, one PKM medium machine gun, and a ICOM hand-held radio out of an abandoned compound commonly used as a firing position (replete with firing holes). The Guerillas were tracked and heard speaking on the ICOMs. After identification with a police aerial armed Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform, they were engaged with a high-explosive missile, killing all instantly. This armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) version was most likely procured via Iranian channels and provided through a standing security agreement between UPA and the PRP.

D. CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPACTS

The power struggle that followed the secession continues to impact those with the least resources the most. Civilians in urban centers continue to adapt to the changing dynamics. The PRP government is also struggling to provide basic necessities, but if by default favoring those associated with the LPP. This is causing an enormous amount of resentment by groups that are deemed neutral in this conflict. The current political environment in PRP is especially dismal. Before the secession, the NPP was one of the

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lowest-ranked provinces in Atlantica in terms of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption, according to world governance indicators (WGI). The ongoing conflict has further lowered these rankings. The LPP of self-styled President David Paton is the only viable political organization.

On W-Day, military forces of the UPA crossed the northern border of the breakaway province, ostensibly to help defend the NPP against possible invasion by the ROP. Since the arrival of UPA forces, they have assumed the secondary role of assisting PRP officials in maintaining order. Currently the PRP has approximately 6,000 members of the military from an original ROP force of 13,000 in the former NPP. That number, including reserves, is among the lowest per capita allocation in the region and the forces are not considered to be of high quality. Officially, PRP maintains an above average police-per-capita ratio in the region. UPA military forces are also deployed frequently to maintain order. Before the current protests, PRP's per capita rates of domestic violence were low compared with those of the rest of the world; however, the current violence has dropped PRP to the bottom 10%, with an estimated rate of 42.2 violent deaths per 100,000 residents.

Approximate numbers of Internal Security Forces: 7th Internal Security Division (ISD): 7,867; 14th ISD: 7,989; 21st ISD: 6,720, which equate to approximately 246 sworn officers per each 20, 973 PRP residents.

Freedom of information, measured by Freedom House's Freedom of the Press index, paints a rather uninviting picture of access to information and press freedom in the former NPP. Compared to the "free" press in other areas, the PRP is "partly free." Overall the PRP has moderate to high literacy rates with an overall population literacy (87.4%), with male literacy (89%), higher than female literacy (79.4%).

Cellular networks dominate telephone usage in the PRP. Although cellular phones are more prolific in the region, landlines are still available and in use. Despite some restrictions and filters on Internet sites, Internet use is also a dominant source of information for residents of the PRP. Accordingly, there were approximately 6,809,315 Internet users with a total penetration of 71.8%. Facebook users were over 4 million with a penetration rate of 48%. In addition to having access to the Internet, the PRP has at least one government-run television site, in addition to satellite television, which provides news and information from foreign sources.

Analyst Notes: The PRP is a socially diverse region with a number of oftentimes conflicting ethnicities, religions, and languages. These dynamics are especially prevalent in Raleigh and Fayetteville but are now also increasingly prominent in other places as the secession continues. NPP's population in 2009 was comprised primarily of 67.2 percent White persons, not Hispanic; 21.6 percent Black persons; 7.4 percent Hispanic or Latino origin; 1.9 percent Asian persons; and 1.3 percent Native Atlantican persons. The population has almost double the proportion of African-Atlantican persons than the rest of the continent, who comprise a significant ethnic component of both rural and urban populations. PRP's population is 50% Christian Protestant, 20% Catholic, 15% Muslim (Sunni 5% and 10% Shia), 10% non-religious and 5% other (Includes Jewish and Mormon faiths). The pattern of skewed sociopolitical under representation accentuated by religious tension is an additional source of discord between the various ethno religious communities cohabitating in the former NPP. The PRP is

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varied in terms of its human development levels. The Human Development Index (HDI) is 0.75, which is high compared to other nations in Atlantica. The levels of infant mortality in the PRP stand at 15.32 deaths/1,000 live births, so they rank near numbers associated with most of modern Lebanon, and the greater Syria and areas also referred to as the Levant. Despite relatively low spending on education ranging from 2 to 6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), literacy rate in the overall PRP population is high.

E. NOTABLE TRENDS IN THREAT ACTIVITY [INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS (I&W)]

Nothing significant to report.

F. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA)

Nothing significant to report.

G. ENEMY SITUATION (Conventional Forces)

1) Composition and Disposition. (Derived from multiple sources)

(A) FORMER ROP MILITARY UNITS NOW LOYAL TO THE PRP (PRP LOYALIST UNITS)

No significant change from Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) 22

(B) ROP LOYALIST MILITARY UNITS

No significant change from INTSUM 22

(C) UPA MILITARY UNITS ASSISTING PRP REGIME (95% STRENGTH)

UPA Combined Joint People's Liberation Task Force (CJPLTF)-151 continued to strengthen its defensive posture along the north-south Pineland border, while the rear areas of the 1st MEF received more attacks and harassment from ROP loyalist guerrilla bands. Lieutenant General Tae Moes, Commander, 15th Corps asked UPA President Vacarro for additional Russian-made equipment and Class V supplies. Morale problems have surfaced with the younger enlisted soldiers in the 29th Mechanized Infantry Division (MID) due to the lack of activity and the long repeated deployments.

a. Ground- Internal Security Corps and UPA forces continued active patrolling in rear areas and along intermediate supply lines to locate and destroy forces loyal to ROP government. Guerrilla activity in 1st MEF area of responsibility (AOR) resulted in conflicting reports. In most cases, reports from the UPA marines are more accurate.

b. Air- no significant change to report (NSCTR)

c. Airborne- NSCTR

d. Paramilitary/irregular- Progressive arrests continue under the LPP government's internal defense and development programs. The 3rd ISC is actively combating threats of increased urban and rural guerrilla activity throughout the major cities of the former NPP. Hundreds of people were arrested

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over the last two weeks. Some elements associated with minority-based militant groups are now trained to secure and operate in the inner city communities as low visibility counter-guerrilla forces. A majority of the former pro-LPP 30th MID soldiers have returned to civilian life, or joined the 3rd ISC.

e. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Operations - NSCTR

f. Electronic Warfare (EW) - NSCTR

(D) **PRP 3rd INTERNAL SECURITY CORPS** (UPA military 90%; 3rd ISC UNKNOWN)

The 3rd ISC CRI teams continue to employ an aggressive campaign directed at suspected members of the pro-ROP population mass support base.

2) Strength.

(1) UPA military forces: replacements continue to arrive. Some units have reached 90% or better.

(2) PRP internal security forces: the 3rd ISC is recruiting volunteers to fill its ranks. The urban internal security guards, the Federal Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, the Air Force, and the Marine Special Air Land Sea Response Team (MSALSRT) continue to operate as normal, and have maintained their current strength.

3) Losses.

(a) UPA Army—KIA: 8/WIA: 16; UPA Marines KIA: 24/WIA: 26; missing in action (MIA): 11; UPA advisors KIA: 8

(b) PRP Counter-Insurgency Forces—3rd ISC: KIA- 16/WIA- 4; Urban Internal Security Guard: No reports; Federal Border Patrol: KIA- 10/WIA- 4; Coast Guard: No Reports; Air Force: No Reports; MSALSRT: No Reports.

4) Capabilities. full spectrum conventional and counter insurgency warfare.

H. WEATHER

Provided in separate update.

I. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIRs)

(Modified W+025) PIR 1. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W on Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating in ROP and the PRP.

(Modified W+025) PIR 2. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Notable presence of extremist factions of political organizations in ROP and the PRP.

(Modified W+025) PIR 3. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Locations of indigenous or foreign-based operational terrorist cells in ROP and the PRP.

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PIR 4. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Information of violent protests, hate groups, or violent gangs and individual leaders.

(Modified W+025) PIR 5. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Significant shifts in socio-economic status of any one ethnic group in the ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-080) (Modified W+025) PIR 8. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W on deteriorating combat effectiveness and morale of terrorists and VEOs operating in ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-080) (Modified W+025) PIR 9. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Number of members of each known operational terrorist cells in ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-080) (Modified W+025) PIR 10. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Suspicious purchases and known connections to political or VEOs operating in ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-080) (Modified W+025) PIR 11. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Methods of funding for known terrorist cells in ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-080) (Modified W+025) PIR 12. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Methods of recruitment for known terrorist cells in ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-080) (Modified W+025) PIR 13. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Evidence of cooperation between operational terrorist cells in ROP and the PRP.

(Added W-065) PIR 14. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W on VEOs training near the southern Piedmont areas.

(Added W-045) (Modified W+025) PIR 16. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W of economic indicators that could cause further instability and hardship on the population of the PRP.

(Added W-030) (Modified W+025) PIR 17. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W of stolen commercial or military explosives. Location of all commercial explosive manufacturing facilities in the PRP.

(Added on W-010) (Modified on W-005 and W+025) PIR 18. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) and other foreign military presence in PRP.

(Added W-005) PIR 19. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Movements of UPA Conventional Forces.

(Added W-005) PIR 20. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Identity of members of AWENASA (means "My Home" in Cherokee; believed to be a TCO) and Celtic Union Insurgent Army (CUIA) that failed to participate in the demobilization.

(Added W+005) PIR 21. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Identity of defectors from ROP military units.

(Added W+025) PIR 22. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) Significant changes to the morale of UPA forces.

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(Added W+025) (Modified W+025) PIR 23. (UNCLAS//REL TO ROP) I&W of foreign fighters from non-aligned nations in the PRP.

Deleted PIRs:

PIR 6. Deleted (W+030). See INTSUM 25 for more information.

PIR 7. Deleted (W+030). See INTSUM 25 for more information.

PIR 15. Deleted (W-001). See INTSUM 15 for more information.

PIR 20. Deleted (W+030). See INTSUM 25 for more information.

J. HIGH PAYOFF TARGET LIST (HPTL)/HIGH VALUE TARGET (HVT) LIST

Updated in separate reporting.

K. OVERALL ESTIMATE

As the mounting resistance against the LPP grows, the conditions in the former NPP worsen for its citizens. Citizens are also choosing sides in the conflict. The PRP anti-regime movement can be described as three principal modes of activism: *political*, *armed*, and *revolutionary*. At the moment, the predominant voice is being played by the *armed* organizations, exemplified in the resistance fighters or guerillas operating out of remote areas against the PRP security complex. The secession also created a number of *revolutionaries*, i.e., the local activist networks and non-organized demonstrators primarily operating out of the ROP who have been the driving force of the resistance from day one.

One of the original political activist groups that emerged prior to the secession was known as the Minority and Agrarian Reform Movement (MARM). The MARM was inspired by the imbalance created by the ROP government, which controlled almost every aspect of life. Under the ROP, wealthy landowners controlled state affairs and the economy, while the rural populations, including many ethnic minorities in the former NPP, endured semi-feudal socioeconomic conditions and were poorly represented in national politics. Sectarian political and agrarian mobilization and popular prejudice aggravated the situation of the minorities. As impoverished peasant communities, they endured a double socio-economic and politico-religious marginalization. After the secession, many of these activists joined the newly formed PRP regime in a number of leading capacities. Over time however, some of these pro PRP supporters shifted alliances away from the PRP since they viewed the presence of the UPA as an intrusion to their sovereignty. The activists were willing to fight for their rights, as they did in expelling the ROP during the secession. Some of these supporters in the PRP ended up aligning with the revolutionary and armed movements opposed to the PRP regime. Other political opposition groups are also forming in the ROP that believe in the more strict ideals of the Conservative Party (CP) and People's Protestant Party (PPP). These groups are organizing under the banner of the Pineland Freedom Coordination Committees (PFCCs) and are emerging as political voices that advocate for a full return to the status quo in the PRP.

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In the past week, the pro-ROP guerrilla forces have consolidated in the southern sector of the former NPP. This consolidation will allow integration of former ROP military officials into the guerrilla forces' command and control structure and may help synchronize overarching strategic objectives outlined by the Combined Joint Task Force-30 (CJTF-30).

PRP's newly established counter-guerrilla force is employing media operations to build legitimacy and attract the uncommitted local population base and the international community. Thus far, the information (media) operations campaign has proven effective in the former NPP and the international community. Once legitimacy is gained and the security conditions reverse, it is expected that the UPA will begin to withdraw. This will allow the 3rd ISC to assume its full role as the internal security force for the PRP.

On the international front, the United Nations continues to wrestle with commitment of troops even though, the LPP now draws legitimacy from governments that have recognized and promised future embassies in the PRP. During a UN press conference, Russian and Chinese representatives outlined their positions in the Atlantican crisis. They both announced that they fully support the sovereign nation of the PRP and highly discourage any external military action intended to induce a regime change.

L. POINTS OF CONTACT

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M. ACRONYMS:

- | | | |
|----|---------|--------------------------------------------------|
| a. | AO | Area of Operation |
| b. | AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| c. | AP | Associated Press |
| d. | AWENASA | Means "My Home" in Cherokee |
| e. | BDA | Battle Damage Assessment |
| f. | C/S | Call Sign |
| g. | CJPLTF | Combined Joint People's Liberation Task Force |
| h. | CJTF | Combined Joint Task Force |
| i. | COIN | Counter-Insurgency |
| j. | CORDS | Civil Organization Resistance Development System |
| k. | CP | Conservative Party |
| l. | CRI | Criminal Resistance Intelligence |
| m. | CUIA | Celtic Union Insurgent Army |
| n. | EKIA | Enemy Killed in Action |
| o. | EW | Electronic Warfare |
| p. | EWIA | Enemy Wounded in Action |

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q.	FBP	Federal Border Patrol
r.	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
s.	GRA	God's Right Arm
t.	HDI	Human Development Index
u.	HPTL	High Payoff Target List
v.	HQ	Headquarters
w.	HUMINT	Human Intelligence
x.	HVT	High Value Target
y.	I&W	Indications and Warnings
z.	ICOM	A 2-Way Radio
aa.	IDF	Indirect Fire
bb.	IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
cc.	IED	Improvised Explosive Device
dd.	IID	Improvised Incendiary Device
ee.	INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
ff.	IOC/JOC	Intelligence Operations Center / Joint Operations Center
gg.	IRGC	Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
hh.	ISC	Internal Security Corps
ii.	ISD	Internal Security Division
jj.	ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
kk.	JPEL	Joint Prioritized Effects Listing
ll.	JTF	Joint Task Force
mm.	KIA	Killed in Action
nn.	LN	Local National
oo.	LPP	Liberal Progressive Party
pp.	LT	Lieutenant
qq.	MAM	Military Aged Males
rr.	MARM	Minority and Agrarian Reform Movement
ss.	MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
tt.	MIA	Missing in Action
uu.	MID	Mechanized Infantry Division
vv.	MISO	Military Information Support Operations
ww.	MSALSRT	Marine Special Air Land Sea Response Team
xx.	NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
yy.	NPP	North Pineland Province
zz.	NPWS	North Pineland West South
aaa.	NSCTR	No Significant Change to Report
bbb.	OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
ccc.	PBIED	Person Borne IED
ddd.	PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
eee.	POC	Point of Contact

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fff.	PPP	People's Protestant Party
ggg.	PRP	People's Republic of Pineland
hhh.	QRF	Quick Reaction Forces
iii.	RBI	ROP Bureau of Investigation
jjj.	ROA	Republic of Appalachia
kkk.	ROP	Republic of Pineland
lll.	RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
mmm.	SAFIRE	Surface-to-Air Fire
nnn.	SIGACT	Significant Activity
ooo.	SPP	South Pineland Province
ppp.	SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
qqq.	SVOIP	Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol
rrr.	TACREP	Tactical Report
sss.	TCO	Transnational Criminal Organization
ttt.	UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
uuu.	UN	United Nations
vvv.	UPA	United Provinces of Atlantica
www.	US	United States
xxx.	USIDNE	US Information Data Network Exchange
yyy.	VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
zzz.	VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
aaaa.	VO	Victim Operated
bbbb.	WGI	World Governance Indicator
cccc.	WIA	Wounded in Action

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