



Anthropology Senior Theses

Department of Anthropology

Spring 2007

Between the Sword and the Wall: Inca and Modern Peruvian State Strategies of Control in Pomatambo-Vilcashumani

DI Hu
University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_seniortheses
 Part of the Anthropology Commons

Recommending Citation
Hu, Di, "Between the Sword and the Wall: Inca and Modern Peruvian State Strategies of Control in Pomatambo-Vilcashumani" (2007). Anthropology Senior Theses. Paper 88.


This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_seniortheses/88.
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Between the Sword and the Wall: Inca and Modern Peruvian State Strategies of Control in Pomatambo-Vilcashuaman

Disciplines

Anthropology

BETWEEN THE SWORD AND THE WALL: INCA AND MODERN PERUVIAN STATE STRATEGIES OF CONTROL IN POMATAMBO-VILCASHUAMAN.



Di Hu
Senior Thesis
Spring 2007

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Paula Sabloff for being a very patient advisor. I have been working with her since my freshman year and since spring of Junior year for my thesis. She has been central in my academic development and for that, I am very thankful. Never was she discouraging, but only skeptical (as she had every reason to be) about the high ambitions of my thesis. She continually engaged me in the theoretical framing of the thesis. I am not sure how many countless hours she spent on my thesis, but I am sure it was more time-intensive than one or maybe even two classes.

I would also like to thank Dr. Clark Erickson for his help on the ancient Andean side of the research. His continual advice cemented my interest in the Andes. His classes were very informative, and many of the conclusions of the thesis owed to the analyses done in class. Furthermore, I would not have noticed certain alignments of ancient sites without his suggestions.

The people of Pomatambo have been so kind to me these past few years, allowing me to talk to them and participate in their fiestas. I have never received such hospitality from any other city or village before. I would especially like to thank Quintin for getting me acquainted with the village and for persistently looking for ways to improve Pomatambo. I would like to thank Roberta for giving me baked maize and such a good interview. I would also like to thank Alejandra for letting me try her sling.

I would especially like to thank Sekov Canchari for being a wonderful research assistant, often doing more than he needed to help with my research. I would like to thank his family, the Castillo family, for first introducing me to Pomatambo and Vilcashuamán and hosting me on numerous occasions. Special thanks go out to Oscar, Fanny, Luis, Eddy, and Sayyid. I would especially like to express my appreciation to Aquillina Vilchez. You raised so many wonderful children and have been through so much, yet your spirit is not dampened. You all have made my stay in Peru a wonderful experience.

I would like to thank the NSF-REU Native Voices program for providing the funding needed to do the research. I would like to thank Dr. Janet Monge and Gerianne Kaufmann for helping me with the administrative details.

My roommate, Elaine, has been continually supportive of me these past two years: editing, cooking, cleaning, and being such a wonderful friend for me. I certainly would not have had so much energy to do my thesis without her tireless spirit.

Last but not least, I would like to thank Adam for a wonderful past three years. I never lost hope on such an unwieldy project because of you. In fact, you have helped me with all my unwieldy projects, continually encouraging me.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction, the Wall.....	1
<i>Research goals.....</i>	3
Theoretical Considerations.....	3
Why Study Pomatambo?.....	5
Background.....	6
Methodology.....	9
Outline of Research.....	13
Chapter 2: The Sword, Inca Conquest of Vilcashuamán.....	14
The Pre-Inca World.....	17
The Inca World.....	30
Chapter 3: Down and Out from the Pucarás: Inca State Strategies of Control in Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán.....	39
Settlements.....	40
Fortifications.....	48
Roads.....	55
Religion.....	65
Discussion of strategies of control in Vilcashuamán-Pomatambo.....	69
Chapter 4: Between the Sword and the Wall: Modern Peruvian State Strategies of Control in Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán (1980-Present)....	73
Purpose.....	74
Origins.....	74
Strategies of state control in Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán.....	78
First Vision.....	96
Second Vision.....	99
Chapter 5: Pomatamban Responses and Trends.....	104
Pomatamban Responses.....	104
Conclusion.....	113
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	116
Similarities.....	117
Differences.....	118
Implications.....	122
Bibliography	
Appendices 1,2,3	

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: THE WALL

A gigantic Inca wall stands in Pomatambo. Once intimidating and awesome, the wall is now a curiosity to passers-by and quarry for gravestones. The area surrounding the stones experienced much violence and upheaval in past half a millennium. Through it all, the stones stood and silently watched.

Here we begin the story of Pomatambo. A humble village of about two hundred people, it is situated 3,500 meters above sea level in the province of Vilcashuamán in the south central highlands of Peru. In the morning, the mist shrouds the tall mountains around Pomatambo. “Pomatambo” is the hispanicized pronunciation of the Quechua “Pumatampu.” “Pumatampu” means “Puma resting place” or “Puma wayside station.” The “tampu” system consisted of an extensive road network used by the Incas.

Coming into Pomatambo, one sees the main road beautifully paved with river stones of pink and blue. It took four months for the villagers to pave the 250 feet stretch of road. The stones were meticulously hauled from the Pampas River five miles away, and one mile down. The main street is lined on both sides by adobe houses, some of them whitewashed. Continuing on the main road, one comes to the corner of the plaza, a trapezoidal raised flat space of about 150 feet on each side. The church used to be on the plaza, but was torn down a year ago to make a new one. In the place of the old church is a gaping hole where the villagers have mined to make adobe bricks for the new church. There is no electricity in the village, and the government supplied potable water only a few years ago.

Pomatambo seems like any other highland Andean village: agricultural and quiet. For most of the day, the village is deserted except for a few chickens and hairy pigs milling about. One begins to wonder whether it had a notable past at all. However, with even a cursory inspection, one begins to unravel the many layers of its turbulent history. The plaza is situated at the end of a large rocky mound. This mound was an ancient cemetery dating to before the Incas. It fell into disuse after the Inca conquered the area. One can see on the surface many stone tools, pieces of pottery, and occasionally, bits of human bone, especially after the rains. On the mound, there is a covered-up cave. The locals covered the cave during the Shining Path violence in the 1980s in fear of the army “disappearing” people into it. The locals call the mound “Aya Orqo”, which means “Hill of the dead” in Quechua. The signs of the cycles of peace, violence, decline, and abandonment are everywhere in Pomatambo.

Throughout its long history, the people of Pomatambo and its surrounding areas have found themselves caught between different groups in violent conflict. These groups, whether it is the Incas or the Chankas, the modern Peruvian state or the Shining Path, had different political-geographical strategies of control.

In my thesis, I would like to compare the different methods of control employed by the Inca and the modern Peruvian state in Pomatambo and its surrounding area. My thesis will examine how the state related to the peasant populations of the periphery in the two time periods. I am comparing how the states suppressed uprisings, how they integrated smaller polities, and how they used military and economic methods to control the population of the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area. Specifically, I am comparing the Inca conquest and colonization of the area with how the modern state of Peru defeated the Shining Path and pacified the area. I will examine the political, economic, and military policies used by both entities in response to the

challenges of pacifying rebellions. Because the Vilcashuamán region has a long history of rebellion dating back to pre-Inca times, the physical signs of state control, ancient and modern, abound in the area. A comparison of state strategies of control reveals much about the relationship between the nature of the two states and the types of political-geographical policies they pursued. How did each use physical geography to control the populace? How did the state alter the social landscapes to their economic and strategic benefit in the two periods?

Research goals

Primarily, I am comparing the different political, military, and geographical manifestations of control in the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area. What similarities and differences exist between the Inca and the modern Peruvian state strategies of control in Pomatambo and its surrounding area? After the comparison, one could begin to give possible reasons for the similarities and differences. What do the different strategies reveal about the interaction between goals of the state and the role of the community? I would like to argue that the different state strategies of control depend on three main factors: the history of state presence in the Vilcashuamán area before the rebellions, technology limiting or furthering state capacity, and the economic base of the state.

Theoretical Considerations

Located at the intersection of two Inca roads, Pomatambo is also at a crossroad between the past and the present. With its long history, Pomatambo is a microcosm of the changing ways the state interacted with local communities. Because topography can be considered a relatively unchanging factor, Pomatambo and its surroundings lend themselves to a comparison of the state

strategies of control between the Inca and modern Peru. Any similarities or differences would derive from the different decision-making strategies and changes in society.

James Scott in his *Seeing like a State* remarked that the biggest changes in state-society relations accompanying modernity were the magnitude of the plans for the wholesale transformation of society and the deeply-penetrating capacity of the instruments of statecraft: censuses, cadastral maps, identity cards, statistical bureaus, schools, mass media, and internal security apparatuses. With these advances in technology, the modern state could take its schemes of standardization and increasing state capacity further along that road than ever before (Scott 1998: 343). To control the populace, the state has historically tried to make society more “legible” or organized for easy state intervention. However, the legibility projects before the industrial revolution had not been very successful. The technological advances allowed certain states to reach more deeply into people’s lives than ever before. How do these technological advances affect the decision-making strategies of the state?

Furthermore, the Inca and the modern nation-state are very different. Individuals in pre-modern societies, the Andean societies included, had multiple rights, obligations, allegiance, and memberships in their local village and lineage community and in the kingdom-wide institutions of the king, the state’s religious and military establishments (Dalton 1980). The modern nation-state, on the other hand, stresses one set of rights, obligations, allegiance, and membership based on the legal code. There is very little effective overlapping of authority, as the modern nation state is defined by having a monopoly of legitimate force (Weber 1964: 154). How do the fundamental differences in society inform the state strategies of control chosen?

Finally, Nugent discusses the importance of including bottom-up or community-initiated efforts in the traditional oppositional model of state-society relations. The traditional model

portrays the local communities as always on the defensive with state-initiated policies of eroding local identities, autonomy, and self-sufficiency. Nugent shows that often, communities actually reach out to the state to shape their futures, and that the state and the community are mutually interdependent. In a system of positive feedback, one creates the other (Nugent 1994). How has the local populace of Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán interacted with the state to shape the political, economic, and religious future of the area in the Inca and modern era?

Why Study Pomatambo?

Pomatambo is an ideal case study to explore these themes. Pomatambo as a concentration of population has a very long history dating back to at least a hundred years before the Spanish conquest. Therefore, one can compare Inca state strategies of control to modern Peruvian state strategies with sufficient comparability of units. Pomatambo and its surrounding area have been extremely important in Peruvian and Latin American history. It was an important battleground of the Chankas against the Incas, the Incas against the Spaniards, the indigenous against the Spanish state, and the Shining Path guerillas against the Peruvian state. Vilcashuamán, six miles away from Pomatambo, was an important political administrative center for the Chanka, the Inca, and the Spanish.

Pomatambo is also ideal due to the geo-strategic importance of its surrounding area. This ensured an eventful history of conquest and rebellion. The different ways that different actors utilized the geographical advantages of the area and tried to control it can be very revealing about the reasons why they chose different strategies. There have been studies done on Inca state strategies of control, and there have been studies done on the modern Peruvian state

strategies of control. However, as of yet, there has not been a study systematically comparing the two for a particular area. Therefore, the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area is more than ideal to carry out this comparison.

As Pomatambo is only a case study, the conclusions of this research do not profess to be universally applicable to all Andean communities. Furthermore, the research does not claim to treat the types of state policies enacted for Pomatambo in the Inca and modern times as universal. The Incas were very diverse in how they interacted with different communities and at different times in the history of the empire. Likewise, the modern Peruvian state's policies can vary substantially from one Andean village to another.

Background

Ayacucho

The department of Ayacucho is located in the south central sierra of Peru. To the north is the department of Junín, to the northeast Cuzco, to the east, Apurímac, to the southeast, Arequipa, to the southwest, Ica, and to the west, by Huancavelica. Ayacucho is home to a variety of microclimates due to its wide range of altitudes. These microclimates fall into three general categories: tropical forest, mountainous areas, and high-altitude grassy altiplano (Wust and Coronado 2003: 11). Ayacucho has a population of 620,000 people, of which 140,000 live in the departmental capital of the same name (INEI 2005). Ayacucho is one of the poorest departments of Peru, with 70% of the population living in poverty, and 35% in extreme poverty (INEI 2005). For the rural populace of Ayacucho in 1993, potable water was available for only 31%, and sewage and toilet sanitation facilities were available for only 3% (Wust and Coronado 2003: 34). The 2001 index for human development in Ayacucho averaged around .44, which is

very low considering that the rural areas are significantly below this number (Wust and Coronado 2003: 34).

The combination of extreme backwardness and centuries of armed conflict in Ayacucho has created a collective consciousness of suffering and millenialist hopes (Montoya 1988: 425). Perhaps the excerpt from *Huamanguino*, a poem written by Huamanguino (or Ayacuchano) Ranulfo Fuentes embodies the sadness and nostalgia that resulted from the Shining Path violence:

Months and years have passed
Where could he be?
Perhaps under the stony ground
 becoming earth
 or among the thorns
 budding like wild flowers

Soon he will return, he will come back
 like rain for the crops
 to make the seeds sprout
 like the sun at dawn
 that makes the flowers bloom.

Vilcashuamán

Vilcashuamán, in which Pomatambo is situated, is one of the poorest provinces of Ayacucho. Once an important and thriving regional center for the Inca, the province is now one of the most materially backward in all of Peru. It was the only province in Ayacucho to have no population growth from 1993 to 2002 (Wust and Coronado 2003: 28). It had the next to lowest index of development of .425 and the highest rate of illiteracy (44.6 percent in 2000) (Wust and Coronado 2003: 30-34). In 1993, only 3.3 percent of people in Vilcashuamán had adequate housing and 32.2 percent had high economic dependency, representing the worst in Ayacucho (Wust and Coronado 2003: 34).

The province is situated in the Pampas river basin 3,000-4,000 meters above sea level. The terrain is mountainous and sparsely vegetated by eucalyptus trees, shrubs, and short highland grass. According to agronomist Rosario Pérez Liu, Vilcashuamán has some of the least agriculturally productive land in Ayacucho (Pérez 1988: 523). This is due to a lack of workable land combined with a harsh climate with frequent droughts and frosts.

The capital of Vilcashuamán province is the town of Vilcashuamán, home to around 6,000 inhabitants. Vilcashuamán was considered the geographic center of the Inca Empire and was one of the most important regional centers in all of the empire. There are many Inca and pre-Inca remains in the town. The most notable are the Temple of the Sun and Moon and the *ushnu*, a ceremonial step-pyramid once used by Inca royalty.

Pomatambo

Pomatambo is a village in the province of Vilcashuamán. It has been self-governing since the 17th century but was not officially recognized by the government until the mid 1960s. Pomatambo has been relatively isolated from the state apparatus until recently. This was mainly due to the lack of navigable roads. To get to Vilcashuamán, the nearest substantial town, one had to walk for two and a half hours. More recently, the state has made much more effort to integrate or change Pomatambo. Contact with the state apparatus has increased in recent years.

In the 1970s, the population approached three hundred. After the violence, the population declined dramatically to 188. It is now home to around 200-250 people. At one time, Pomatambo considered itself a potential district capital because it was a hub for neighboring communities (Webb 1996: 10). The Shining Path violence and demographic decline dampeden these prospects, but the people of Pomatambo have recently made efforts to assume a primary

status among its neighboring communities. For example, they have petitioned the local government to build a high school in Pomatambo, which would elevate the village's status.

Methodology

The data for this research was collected in a one and a half month period in July and August 2006. My main affiliation was with Ayacucho's Universidad San Cristóbal de Huamanga. The reason I selected Pomatambo to do my field research was because I had already established connections there in the summer of 2004. I visited there and, through a friend, befriended a family who had ties to Pomatambo. At that time, a family member was a Pomatambo schoolteacher. This connection with the Castillo family proved immensely helpful, as one of the members, Sergio Sekov Canchari Castillo, an UNSCH student, became our research assistant. Because the majority of the residents in Pomatambo could not speak Spanish fluently enough to answer the type of questions I wanted to ask, my research assistant, Sekov, proved invaluable as a translator and survey administrator. However, he had another project in the Peruvian Amazon in the north of Peru, so he was unable to join us for the whole time. My friend who initially introduced me to Pomatambo is fluent in Spanish and was with me the time I was in Peru. His fluency in Spanish greatly aided the administration of my surveys.

Collection of the data involved four steps. The first part entailed going to the library at the Universidad San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho and collecting relevant data concerning the history, culture, and demographics of the Vilcashuamán region. The library had many archaeology and anthropology theses written by UNSCH undergraduates and graduate students. The wealth of unpublished ethnographic and archaeological data at the library is very helpful for any researcher interested in Andean communities in Ayacucho. At the library, I collected specifically the information about the archaeological remains in Vilcashuamán

province, ethnographic data of Vilcashuamán province and Pomatambo, and demographic data on Vilcashuamán province. The university officials and librarians were extremely helpful and enthusiastic, and I was able to collect over ten sources for my research.

The second part of the data collection was carried out in Vilcashuamán, the provincial capital of the province with the same name. Vilcashuamán served as my base of operations. I observed daily life, interviewed public officials, and explored archaeological remains. The bureaucracy in Vilcashuaman was a bit difficult to maneuver in. For even very simple information, such as the population of Pomatambo, we were referred to many different people in Vilcashuaman, and eventually had to get the information in Ayacucho, only to find out that they did not have accurate numbers. Furthermore, internal politics in Vilcashuamán sometimes impeded our interviews, making it difficult to find certain people.

At Vilcashuamán, we interviewed the mayor, the former governor, the police, and the education coordinator. In addition to interviewing officials, we explored Vilcashuamán thoroughly, including the outskirts. We often talked with the locals. This gave us a more salient picture of life here.

The third part of my research was done in Pomatambo. I commuted to Pomatambo daily to do ethnographic research. There, I observed and participated in daily life and conducted surveys and interviews. The schoolteacher of the village held a village meeting a few days after we arrived. He explained to the village authorities and villagers who we were and urged them to be welcoming to us. We explained our projects, and the schoolteacher translated into Quechua what we said for the villagers who did not have a strong grasp of Spanish. They were very hospitable and one invited us to a lunch of potatoes after the presentation.

Finding people to interview, however, had its difficulties. The villagers felt uncomfortable when asked for interviews. This was especially true when they were alone. Because the schoolteacher needed to teach each day, and was often away attending education or political meetings, he was not present most of the time to introduce us to the villagers. Furthermore, even when the villagers were willing to be interviewed, they went to work too early and came back from work too late. They would go out to work around 7:30 to 8:00 in the morning. In order to arrive before they went to work, we needed to wake up at 5:30. Even when we did get there early enough, the villagers were very eager to get to work, and we often had to do hurried interviews. We could not wait until they came back from work around six because it would already be dark by then. It would make them feel uncomfortable to be singled out from among the group. Concerning the work schedules of the villagers, we figured out that in order to interview the people we wanted, it was easier to set up an appointment with them. However, this method only allowed us to interview members who could speak and understand Spanish reasonably well. As a result, our early interviews and surveys were mostly of male villagers, as the female villagers mainly spoke Quechua. When our research assistant, Sekov, arrived, we were able to do interviews with the women and men of the village who did not feel confident enough with their Spanish.

For those who stayed in the village to work, we found that it was nearly impossible to interview them separately as they worked together. In such cases, we did group interviews, which were very revealing about how the community thought about certain issues. Group interviews also allowed us a glimpse into the daily life of the villagers. One group interview was done after the group finished castrating a group of unfortunate pigs. Participating in their daily life gave me a much more vivid understanding of village life than isolated individual interviews.

Furthermore, I did not use a tape recorder because that took away from the extemporaneous aspect of conversation. The villagers were often much more willing to talk when the conversation was more casual.

The surveys and interviews were done in a range of settings including the plaza, the school, people's homes and workplaces, and in the fields. In total, ten interviews and twenty-three surveys were done. In addition to the surveys, informal interviewing was done before or after each survey. Therefore, in total, thirty-three people were either formally or informally interviewed. The survey informants consisted of sixteen males and eight females. Median age was 43. The age and education level distributions are summarized in Chart 1. Generally, the amount of formal education decreases with age. Men tended to have more formal education than women. Men had an average of 7.6 years of education whereas women only had 2.9.




Chart 1: Education in years and corresponding number of informants for each age-group.

The last part of my data collection was to understand the geography around Pomatambo. This included finding and navigating ancient roads, informally surveying ancient sites, climbing

mountains to get a good panorama of the region, and asking the locals about the history of various sites. When we climbed the mountains around Pomatambo, we had a local curandero (healer/guide) with us to ensure a safe trip. I used the topographic maps of the area and a GPS device to help with navigation and map-making. The survey was not systematic due to time constraints and the nature of the research. My research is not an archaeological survey but rather an assessment of political geographical facets of Pomatambo and its immediate surroundings over time. Therefore, informally surveying the most relevant sites sufficed.

Outline of research

In chapter two, I will examine the social and historical contexts of the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area before the Inca conquest and the general strategies of control used by the Incas to conquer and keep peaceful the subject populations. In chapter three, I will show which strategies of control the Incas used in Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán and how they relate to the social and geographical world of the local populace. In chapter four, I will examine the rise and fall of the Shining Path in relation to the Peruvian government's evolution in counterinsurgency strategies and to the local social and geographical conditions of Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán. In chapter five, I will examine the social and economic changes that have occurred in the area as a direct or indirect result of the violence and governmental policies of control. In chapter six, I will compare the strategies of control employed by the Incas and the Peruvian government for the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area and give reasons for the similarities and differences. I will also discuss the implications for the future of peasantry given the current trends in governmental policies and the economy.

Chapter 2

THE SWORD: INCA CONQUEST OF VILCASHUAMAN


Introduction

In late July of every year, the town of Vilcashuamán holds a festival called the Vilcas Raymi. Unlike the more famous Inca Inti Raymi (Q. Inca Sun Festival) in Cuzco, which commemorates the conquest of the Inca by the Spanish conquistadors, the Vilcas Raymi commemorates the conquest of the Chankas by the Inca. People from all over Ayacucho throng to Vilcashuamán to see the drama unfold on top of the old Inca temple of the sun. For one day every year, the Catholic church, which stands atop the ruins of the Inca temple, is covered by a gigantic blue flag painted with a sun and a moon, representing the Inca dominion. The terraces are covered with grass huts. The drama starts with the Chanka women solemnly dancing in line, slowly filling up the terraces of the Inca temple. Then the Chanka men, equipped with maces, slings, and shields follow. The flutes, drums, and horns play the same musical phrase over and over. This particular day in 2006, the sky is cloudy, and it does not bode well for the Chankas.

The Chankas, dressed in brown, go about their usual business, sharing potatoes and relaxing with one another. Shortly after, the Incas arrive. They send a messenger to proclaim the might of the Incas and their wish to subdue the Chankas. The Chankas, from their elevated position on the terraces, hurl insults and drive the messenger back. The music changes tune, and the drums are more emphasized. The Inca army arrives, and the music stops. After a brief exchange of insults and challenges, the Incas and the Chankas begin to fight. They begin to hurl stones at one another, and the air is riddled with what sounds like gunfire. Then the Incas storm the terraces of the temple, and hand-to-hand combat ensues. There is screaming by the women,

martial yells by the men, and the steady beating of the drum. The Incas set fire to the huts of the Chankas, and soon the smoke obscures the whole area. There are people lying prostrate, representing the Chankas killed by the Inca. Soon the Chankas are defeated, the Incas raise their flags and dance to celebrate their victory. The Inca emperor makes a speech in Quechua, and the drama ends.

Every year, local students volunteer to put on this drama in Vilcashuamán. Intended or not, this drama echoes a specific siege of the “Chanka” ethnic groups by the Incas that took place over five hundred years ago. It took place on a rocky hill called Pilluchu or Qatun Urqu Pata near Vilcashuamán (Von Hagen 1955). Chroniclers Bernabé Cobo and Pedro Cieza de León described the famous battle. Guaman Poma de Ayala also drew a depiction of the battle (Figure 1).



El séptimo capitán Inga Maytac / ídolo Huarco / pucara, fortaleza / Andamarca y Lucana / Patinacochas, Suras, Poma Tambos, Andes / Changas, Yungas.

In it, the Chankas, Soras, Lucanas, Andamarca, Parinacochas, Pomatambos, and the Condes ethnic groups have taken refuge on top of a fortress. They are fighting against the Inca captain, Inca Maitac. According to Cieza de León, the Soras people fled there after they were defeated in a big battle against the Inca. In the words of Cieza:

Those who escaped being killed or taken prisoner returned howling and lamenting to their village, and removing such of their possessions as they could, and their women, they abandoned it and took refuge, so it is told, on a high peak close to the Vilcas River, where around the summit there were many caves and a spring of water. Many men and their women withdrew to this stronghold, providing themselves with all the supplies they could gather. And not only the Soras took refuge on this peak, but others from the region of Huamanga and the Vilcas River and other parts joined them, horrified at the thought that the Inca wished to make himself sole ruler of people (Cieza de León 1959 [1553]: 231).

Cieza de León describes the people of the Vilcashuamán area as willful and warlike. Therefore, it came as no surprise that they lost the siege only because the food supply ran out:

Formerly they were indomitable and so warlike that the Incas had great trouble conquering them. So much trouble, indeed, that they say that during the reign of Pachacuti, after he had defeated the Soras and Rucanas, provinces where the people were sturdy, and which also came under the jurisdiction of this city, a large force of Indians fortified themselves on a high cliff, and there were bitter fights before they were conquered.... For, rather than give up their freedom and become slaves of the tyrant, they paid no heed to the hunger they underwent and the repeated attacks they suffered. Whereupon Pachacuti, ambitious to dominate them and eager not to suffer in his reputation, besieged them and put them to great hardship for over two years, until finally, after holding out as long as they could, they surrendered to him (Cieza de León 1959 [1553]: 129).

Strangely, not all of the people around Vilcashuamán fled to the rocky fortress. While the Soras and other groups were being besieged atop Pillucho, some locals allied with the Incas:

Returning to the narrative, as the Inca strongly desired to have those who had taken refuge in the rocks in his power, he marched with his troops until he came to the river of Vilcas¹. The inhabitants, when they knew that he was there, came in great numbers to see him and to perform services, and they established friendship with the Inca. By his order they began to build great edifices, in the place which we now call Vilcas (Cieza de León 1883 [1553]: 150).

To understand this curious fact, one must first examine the pre-Inca past of region and trace it through the Inca conquest of the area. We will see that the Incas exploited ethnic tensions for

¹ Now called the Pampas River.

their own benefit. The anecdote also serves as a point of departure for the political geographical strategies of control employed by the Inca to pacify the region.


In this chapter, I will examine the Inca and pre-Inca history of the area and the state methods of control as manifested through fortifications, roads, imperial policies towards the local population, and religious-related sites and practices. In the next chapter, I will compare the methods of control used in the Vilcashuamán area to the methods of control employed by the Inca elsewhere. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the reasons behind certain decisions made by the Inca in controlling the local population and terrain.

The Pre-Inca World

The human landscape of the central highland Late Intermediate Period (LIP) was a mosaic of multiple ethnic groups organized as chiefdoms. The LIP is the period of time after the fall of the Wari Empire around 1000 A.D. and before the imperial expansions of the Inca Empire around 1460 A.D. Chiefdoms are political entities that organize regional populations in the thousands or tens of thousands. There is a continuum of socio-political complexity and number of people integrated in chiefdoms. They are “regionally organized societies with a centralized decision-making hierarchy coordinating activities among several village communities (Earle 1987: 288).” Another way of looking at chiefdoms is to treat them as polities above the village level but below the state level.

Settlements and Settlement Patterns

These ethnic groups were located in the present departments of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac. Map 1 shows some of the numerous ethnic groups and their locations.



Map 1. Ethnic groups of South-Central Sierra. From D'Altroy (2002): 42; Yaranga Valderrama (1995): 251.

There is a bit of uncertainty surrounding the ethnic groups that occupied the Pampas river valley.

According to Gonzalez Carré, this was the principal valley of the Chankas (Gonzalez Carré 1992: 17). However, the Pampas River valley, in which Vilcashuamán is located, also seemed to be an area settled by several ethnic groups: the Soras, Lucanas, Chankas², and the native

² The Villca, the Chankas that lived in the Vilcashuamán area, were also called the Hancohuallos. Hancohuallo was their captain in their historical rebellion against the Incas.

Tanquiwas. The Tanquiwas were the native inhabitants of the Vilcashuamán area (Carabajal 1965 [1586]: 219). Historian Huertas said that the Chankas conquered the Tanquiwas during their expansion from Huancavelica (Huertas 1983: X).

Warfare is a general characteristic of chiefdoms (Earle 1987, D'Altroy 1992), and the settlement patterns and settlement layout of these ethnic groups bear witness to this. Schreiber described the Late Intermediate settlements of the Lucanas as high-altitude hilltop fortifications. She said that most sites were in defensible locations and enclosed by a defensive wall. She speculated that the purpose of these settlements was to serve as temporary refuges in times of external threat. Therefore, the period following the collapse of the Wari Empire was one of increased warfare (Schreiber 1987: 274). D'Altroy characterized the settlement patterns of the Wankas in the Wanka II period (1350-1460 CE) as surrounded by defensive walls and located higher in altitude. They were located in defensible positions that commanded an amplified view of the region (D'Altroy 1992: 57-58). Valdez and Vivanco studied the LIP in the Qaracha River valley, immediately west of the Pampas river basin, where Vilcashuamán is located. They observed that after the collapse of the Wari, new fortified sites were built in strategic positions at higher elevations. The location of the sites commanded clear views of the river valley below (Valdez and Vivanco 1994: 149-151).

These settlement layouts and patterns are not specific to these ethnic groups. Gonzalez Carré defined “Chanka” as a cultural identification, not a political one. He maintained that the cultures of some of the ethnic groups of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac shared common cultural attributes such as religious beliefs, material culture, and settlement patterns (Gonzalez Carré 1992). In El área histórica chanka, Gonzalez Carré et al. compiled all the known “Chanka” affiliated sites in Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac surveyed by previous

archaeologists. The pattern of fortifying hilltop sites and circular buildings arranged in chaotic fashion was widespread in Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac (Gonzalez Carré et al. 1987). These places also shared similar material culture (Gonzalez Carré et al. 1988). This shows that the social conditions in the south central Andes were somewhat consistent.

Economic and Social Life of the LIP Ethnic Groups

The economic life of the LIP in the department of Ayacucho was characterized by the twin principles of self-sufficiency and community (Stern 1982: 4). The principle of self-sufficiency was manifested in what's called the “vertical archipelago” system first described by John Murra (1972). It is intimately tied to the unique geography of the Andes in which the alternation of damp and dry, sloping and horizontal, forested and unforested, and the presence or absence of human planning has created a rich and complex ecological mosaic based on a succession of tiers that are differentiated from each other by drops in temperature coupled with the rise in altitude. There are several hundred *basic* physical units called “geofacies” in the Andes. This mosaic, because of its complexity and richness, brings about a very large number of options in the ways to exploit it, some of which the different Andean societies in history have adopted (Dollfus 1986: 11). In this context, the most common form of exploitation of the land is called the “vertical archipelago” model, where cultures exploit complementary ecologies at different altitudes.

From an economic vantage point, the dispersal of people over different environmental pockets limited the effect of crop failures in one or two of the environmental pockets. It also provided access to a variety of different resources that thrive at different altitudes. By controlling as many of these environmental pockets as possible, the different groups could achieve self-sufficiency and not become dependent on barter with other communities. These

communities went to great lengths to secure these zones. According to Stern, “Ethnic groups situated in the Río Pampas region of Vilcashuamán competed with other communities for warm coca lands in the northern reaches of Lucanas. The Soras people of eastern Lucanas reached out well over 100 kilometers to mine salt near Huamanga to the northwest, and to cultivate ají in hot coastal lands to the southwest (Stern 1982: 5).”

This led to an interesting political territorial landscape. Instead of being characterized by clearly defined borders, the landscape looked more like dew-laden webs overlapping with one another, with each web representing a group or community and the dewdrops representing a settlement. This would explain the presence of so many ethnic groups in the Vilcashuamán region before the Incas. It was, and has always been, a strategic location, centrally situated between many environmental zones and defended by the wide Pampas River. Having a stake in this zone was crucial to the economic well-being of any ethnic group.

Divisions within Societies

The divisions within societies can reflect economic or social conditions. For the ethnic groups of Ayacucho, many were divided into three parts. For example, the Wankas were divided into the Hanan Wankas (Upper Wankas), the Hurin Wankas (Lower Wankas), and the Xauxa (D'Altroy 1992: 48). The Lucanas were divided into the Hanan Lucanas, Hurin Lucanas, and the Andamarca Lucanas (Schreiber 1993). The Soras were divided into the Hanan Soras, Hurin Soras, and Chalco (Zuidema 1966: 70). The Chankas were divided into the Hanan Chankas, centered in Andahuaylas, the Hurin Chankas, centered in Uranmarca, and the Hancohualla or Villca, centered in Vilcashuamán (Huertas 1983: IX; Zuidema 1966: 69). The origins of this curious feature may be found in the myth of the three brothers of Lake Choclococha.

The Unifying Myth

The myth explains the relationship between the Wankas, Chankas, and Pokcras and their origin at Lake Choclococha³. Navarro del Aguila summarizes it:

“En los primeros tiempos, cuando el caos reinaba sobre la tierra i los hombres luchaban entre ellos, quiso Dios que surgieran de la laguna de Chokcello Kcocha, tres hermanos dotados de sabiduría i poder, con el fin de pacificar i civilizar a los hombres que vivían en estado de barbarie. No se sabe a punto fijo cuáles hayan sido sus nombres; pero, es cierto que uno de ellos era de compleción atlética, cara redonda, ojos fosforescentes i de instintos sanguinarios; el segundo, tenía los ojos vivos i escrutadores, la nariz encorvada i de agilidad extraordinaria; i el tercero, de cara larga, boca grande, ojos dulces i apacibles, sagaz y astuto. Se repartieron la tierra en tres partes iguales i tomaron diferentes caminos en busca de un lugar apropiado para sentar sus reales; el primero, se estableció en la tierra de los chankas; el segundo, en la de los pokcras; i el tercero en la de los Wankas. Reinaron muchos años enseñando a los hombres las ciencias i las artes i lograron ordenar el mundo, i una vez terminada su misión, el que fuera padre de los Wankas se convirtió en un perro; el de los pokcras en halcón; i el de los chankas en león. Estos tres animales se convirtieron en tabú; i desde entonces, los pokcras divinizaron el águila india (el Waman), los Wankas el perro peruano (el atokc: zorro) i los chankas el león andino (el puma). De hecho se convirtieron en *apukuna* (dioses míticos) i se apellidaban: *Apu Waman* (dios halcón), *Apu Oskco* (dios león), i *Apu Atokc* (dios zorro) (Navarro del Aguila 1983 [1939]: 153-154).”

In the beginning, when chaos ruled over the earth and people fought amongst each other, God wanted to issue forth from Choclococha lake three brothers of wisdom and power, with the purpose of pacifying and civilizing the people who lived in barbarity. Their names are not exactly known; however, it is certain that one of them had an athletic build, round face, phosphorescent eyes and bloodthirsty instincts; the second, had lively and scrutinizing eyes, a curved nose and had extraordinary agility; and the third, a long face, big mouth, sweet and gentle eyes, sagacious and astute. They divided the land among themselves into three equal parts, and they took different paths in the search for an appropriate place to establish their kingdoms; the first was established in the land of the Chankas; the second, in the land of the Pokcras; and the third, in the land of the Wankas. They ruled for many years teaching people the sciences and the arts and managed to put the world in order. Once finished with their mission, the father of the Wankas turned into a dog; the father of the Pokcras into a falcon; and the father of the Chankas into a puma. These three animals turned into totems, and since then, the Pokcras deified the Indian eagle (the Waman/Huaman), the Wankas the Peruvian dog (the Atokc or fox), and the Chankas the Andean lion (the Puma). In fact they turned into apukuna (Q. “Lords” or mythic gods) and were called *Apu Waman* (Falcon God), *Apu Oskco* (Puma God), and *Apu Atokc* (Fox God). (translation mine)

³ Lake Choclococha (Q. Corn Lake) is located in the department of Huancavelica. It is the source of the Pampas River.

The myth explained how the Wankas settled in Huancavelica, how the Pokras⁴ settled in Ayacucho, and how the Chankas settled in Andahuaylas. The implications of this myth will be explained in the next section.

Differing Interpretations of Inter-ethnic Group Relations

There are different interpretations regarding the level of integration and the relationships these ethnic groups had with one another. The question of how the ethnic groups were related and how they interacted with each other politically has been the stumbling block of scholars. The question is unlikely to be resolved solely through historical sources, and only systematic archaeological work in the future can shed more substantive light on the issue. Perhaps the earliest attempt to resolve this problem was by Victor Navarro del Aguila.

In his famous dissertation written in 1939, Las Tribus de Anku Wallokc, he postulated that there was a grand confederation of the Wankas, Chankas, and Pokras. According to Navarro del Aguila and his sources, the Chanka captain Anku Wallokc⁵, led a grand army of Wankas, Pokras, and Chankas against the Incas in Cuzco (Navarro del Aguila 1983 [1939]: 23). To Navarro del Aguila, the three “nations” were politically allied at least to rebel against the Incas. According to him, the Pokras occupied the present day Ayacucho provinces of Huamanga, Huanta, La Mar, Cangallo and Victor Fajardo; the Chankas occupied the present day provinces of Andahuaylas in Apurimac, and Lucanas and Parinacochas in Ayacucho, and the Wankas the department of Huancavelica (Navarro del Aguila 1983 [1939]: 183). Navarro del

⁴ According to Gonzalez Carré in his *Los señoríos chankas*, there is no archaeological or colonial historical evidence of the existence of the “Pokras.” It seems, rather, that Navarro del Aguila and the scholars before him conflated the Wari with the Pokras. Taipe Campos affirms this by saying that the concept of the Pokras was probably created by Ayacucho intellectuals to project an Ayacucho-Huancavelica regional identity. Nevertheless, the concept of “Pokras” is accepted as a proxy for the ancient ethnic groups of the Ayacucho region (195). Interestingly, Garcilaso de la Vega mentioned that the province of Huamanga was also known as “Poc’ra (Garcilaso de la Vega 1989 [1609]: 295).” In the Relaciones Geograficas de Indias [1586], Quinua was also known as “Pokra.” Quinua is now the traditional ceramics making center of Ayacucho.

⁵ Also spelled “Ancohuallo,” “Hancohuallo,” “Hancohuallu,” “Anco Ayllo”, “Arco Aylu,” etc.

Aguila believed that there was a deep sense of unity between these three nations, as they were mythical brothers and had similar material culture. Due to these similarities, they were able to form a confederation, the Chanka confederation, against the Incas. In his thesis, he does not mention any warfare between these three nations, implying that their relations were highly integrated and peaceful.

Néstor Taipe Campos in his examination of the myth of the three brothers of Choclococha arrived at a different interpretation than Navarro del Aguila. He believed that the myth, among other purposes, served to facilitate interethnic relations. The geographical space that the different “nations” occupied all had important rivers that found their source in Lake Choclococha. However, he does not preclude warfare under “interethnic relations.” He says that wars are also forms of inter-human relations that establish alliances, dominions, and conquests (Taipe Campos 2003: 194). Therefore, the myth served to shape the inter-ethnic activities, which included war. Its logic also legitimized the alliances and conquests made by these ethnic groups because the myth elevated these activities to the role of civilizing the barbarians. In my opinion, perhaps it also served to limit interethnic violence between the three geographical areas. All the lands with rivers that found their source at Lake Choclococha were in their divine right to conquer. This would have created pressure for expansion outside of this core area. The component of brotherhood might have served to limit the constant re-conquest of the core areas by the same ethnic groups.

Steve Stern believed that inter-ethnic relations were not based on cultural similarity, but rather on economic needs of a community. He believed that each community tried to sustain self-sufficiency. Through pursuing this end, the ethnic groups developed a system of relations that served to help each community. The communities within these groups would try to extend

their kinship network, solidifying their access to a variety of microenvironments and their resources.

According to Stern, the basic kin unit of Andean culture was the *ayllu*. In general, it is a kin unit in which all of its members trace their ancestry back to a common ancestor, sometimes a mythical ancestor. The “extended web of ‘household’ relatives joined together with other such groups to make up a larger *ayllu* (Stern 1982: 6).” The *ayllu* was more flexible in practice than in theory. It could simultaneously denote smaller and larger kindreds (*ayllus* within *ayllus*), which allowed strategic exogamous marriages, which in turn might create new *ayllus* (Stern 1982: 6). This overlapping network of kin relationships allowed the Andean communities of Ayacucho to found their identity and means for survival. In Stern’s words:

The dispersed fields, pastures, waters, and animals at the disposal of Andean families belonged not to them as alienated property, but rather to the collective domains of their *ayllus*, communities, and ethnic groups. True, each household and *ayllu* within the community sought self-sufficiency and direct access to various microenvironments. But these units existed as dependencies of larger networks rather than as free, independent entities (6).

Ethnic and community bonds were reinforced in this context of reciprocal exchanges of labor. This in turn allowed an extensive network of cooperation, allowing each community, while still self-sufficient, to reach further outward for distant resources and to engage in collective endeavors such as irrigation, canal-building, or terracing. Thus, the capacity to mobilize labor was increased for each community under this system (Stern 1982: 7).

However, this system, while simultaneously creating and expanding society also generated structural conflicts between the duties to one’s closer household relatives or *ayllu*, and the need for cooperation with other ethnic groups and communities in a broader setting capable of exploiting a broader range of resources. The large and even small *ayllus* of the Soras and Lucanas peoples preserved their distinct identities and had different interests. They even spoke

differentiated local languages and dialects in addition to the common language of Aymara (Stern 1982:9; Carabajal 1965 [1586]; Monzón et al. 1965 [1586]). Thus, while the very ends of self-sufficiency led to equal interchange among relatives the preferred means of economic cooperation, it also led to conflict between unequal ayllu ‘brothers’ or households (Stern 1982:9). This reflects the complexity of social relationships within and between ethnic communities. In other words, they were “thickly” interconnected.

Under this scheme, political authority was decentralized and fragmented because people were fiercely loyal to their local ayllu relatives (Stern 1982: 12). Stern paints a picture of continual maneuvering between different autonomous groups, large and small, in a multi-ethnic setting to maximize each community’s access and control of different microenvironments. Thus, most economic inequality manifested between communities rather than within them, giving conflict a more ethnic tone. This was very precarious, and the archaeological remains attest to the continual wars among these groups (Stern 1982: 13).

Peruvian archaeologist Gonzalez Carré gives another interpretation. In the tradition of Navarro del Aguila, he calls the Chankas a “nation” which integrated certain ethnic groups of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac (Gonzalez Carré 1992: 9). His purpose was to see if the material cultures of the traditional Chanka ethnic groups were the same, which would show a common identity. However, unlike Navarro del Aguila, Gonzalez Carré places the unity in the cultural sphere, not the political or historical. Rather, he argues that the Chanka nation was a geographical area that shared the same cultural elements such as art, traditions, language, and the image of the world. He believes that the cultural similarity facilitated the social conduct and organizational structures of the people of these regions in different historical instances (Gonzalez

Carré 1992: 24). Therefore, any alliances would not be indicative of a higher political organization, but rather the expediencies of historical circumstance.

In his studies, Gonzalez Carré identified four related pottery styles that he attributed to the “Chanka nation.” They are Tanta Orqo, Qachisqo, Arqalla, and Aya Orqo. Tanta Orqo style is found with Qachisqo and Arqalla. The style is the oldest of the four, and is found in the department of Huancavelica and Huanta province of the department of Ayacucho. Qachisqo is found in Socos Vinchos, Huanta and Tambo en Ayacucho and a part of Huancavelica. Arqalla is the most popular style and is distributed in Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica. Aya Orqo is very scarce and found in Cangallo, Vilcashuamán, Huamanga, Tambo, and Parinacochas of Ayacucho, and Andahuaylas of Apurimac. It is found in association with Inka, Qachisqo, and Tanta Orqo ceramics. It is the youngest of the styles and incorporates some Inka elements (Gonzalez Carré 1992: 56-60). The interesting pattern that emerged from his studies is the geographical progression of the related styles from Huancavelica into northern Ayacucho, and then into southern Ayacucho and Apurimac. This is reminiscent of the historical accounts of the Chankas originating in Huancavelica and then conquering across Ayacucho and into part of Apurimac. Cieza de León said that the Chankas told him they, like the Xauxa ethnic group, originated from Lake Choclococha. They conquered eastward until finally conquering the Quechuas of Andahuaylas and settling it (Cieza de León 1959: [1553]: 207). It is also reminiscent of the myth of the three brothers of Lake Choclococha, lending some historical credibility to the myth.

Based on these different interpretations, and the help of certain chronicles, the nature of the relationships between the ethnic groups may lie somewhere between Stern’s and Gonzalez Carré’s interpretations, with elements of Taipe Campos’ interpretation of the function of the

origin myth. It seems that within each ethnic group, there were smaller groupings or chiefdoms, which allied or fought with one another in maneuvering to get access to a wide variety of resources. As society evolved and grew, large territorial domains were created from the linking of different ayllus, which in turn led to the creation of the ethnic groups. Some of these domains were very large, as with the Lucanas and Soras, while others were much smaller. As the societies expanded, there was a need to involve ayllus of other ethnic groups. Thus, three mythical ayllus, the falcon, dog, and puma, were created to adjust to these changes in society and encompass ever-growing networks of exchange. The origin myth stressed the common ancestry of each group, serving the function of making reciprocal labor exchanges or inter-ayllu wars a family affair. Therefore, economic needs in a geographically remarkable setting led to an economic system that was deeply intertwined with culture. One served to advance the other and vice versa in a system of positive feedback. Thus, what characterized the inter-ethnic relations was neither solely economic nor solely cultural, but both.

While an important first step in this field of research, there are serious shortcomings in Navarro del Aguila's thesis. Historian Lorenzo Huertas astutely pointed out that the idea of a political Chanka confederation had serious problems because the Incas later used the Chankas of Andahuaylas to defeat ethnic groups that were supposed to be a part of the confederation and under Chanka hegemony (Huertas 1983: X). This problem was also present in Cieza's account of the conquest of the province Vilcas, in which the Soras, Lucanas, and others fought against the Incas, but at the same time, some of the natives of the area allied with the Incas. However, under Stern's and Gonzalez Carré's theories, the possibility of warring amongst groups with similar culture is made possible by political decentralization. The Incas extensively used local antagonisms for their own ends, and the incorporation of Chanka tribesmen in the Inca army to

fight against its distant kinsmen is not antithetical to the theses put forth by Stern and Gonzalez Carré. According to Pedro de Carabajal's native informants in 1586, the villages of Vilcashuamán often fought with each other over land before the Inca conquest (Carabajal 1965 [1586]: 207).

Chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega's account is consistent with the views of Stern and Gonzalez Carré. He says that under the name "Chanka" were included other tribes such as the Hancohuallu and Villca, Utunsulla (Angaraes), Uramarca, and others (Garcilaso de la Vega 1989 [1609]: 218-219). Although the Incas called all these groups under the collective name of "Chanka," the tribes under "Chankas" would identify themselves according to their ayllus and tribes. When the Inca asked them to submit, the leaders of the tribes gathered to discuss the issue and were divided in two factions. In the words of Garcilaso:

Some said it was right that they should accept the Inca as their lord since he was the child of the Sun. Others, including the descendants of the lion, said on the contrary that they should not accept any foreign domination when they themselves were lords of so many subjects and children of a lion; they knew their own descent, and did not believe that the Incas were really descended from the Sun...The Chancas occupied many days in their dispute, at times tending to submit and at times to resist, without reaching agreement (233).

It seemed that the descendants of the lions, the Chankas of Andahuaylas and Uramarca, did not want to submit, having recently conquered the Quechuas. However, according to Garcilaso, the Inca learned of their debates and quickly mustered an army to the area and threatened to kill all of them. The Chankas did not have time to muster an army from all the different tribes. Under these terms, the Chankas submitted, but only out of fear. The disagreement showed that the groups were not unified politically even under the circumstances of being conquered. However, their forced submission would set the stage for one of the most pivotal events in late pre-Columbian history.

The Inca World

The Inca conquest of Vilcas

The historical data from the different early colonial chronicles differ greatly concerning which Inca emperor conquered the province of Vilcas⁶. In many of the chronicles, it is either implicitly or explicitly stated that the area had to be subdued many times over a long period. However, there does seem to be agreement that the final conquest and pacification of Vilcas occurred after the famous Chanka rebellion against the Incas, making it one of the first provinces to be conquered outside of the Inca heartland.

Cieza de León said that the Chankas were so brave that they even besieged Cuzco, and that after their defeat, their captain, Anco Huallo, disdained being under the yoke of the Incas and fled with some of his tribesmen and settled on the banks of a lake (Cieza de León 1959 [1553]: 131). After this, the Inca Pachacuti conquered the Vilcas region. Garcilaso de la Vega elaborates by saying that after the Incas subdued the Chanka tribes (including those of Vilcas) under the threat of annihilation the Chankas conspired to rebel. The tribes Chanka, Utunsulla, Hancohuanllu, Uramarca, and Villca and others of their neighbors rebelled and slew the Inca governors and royal officials and mustered an army of 30,000 to march against Cuzco. They chose as their captain general Hancohuanllu, twenty-six years old, and the other two commanders were Túmay Huaraca and Astu Huaraca. The Chankas were narrowly defeated and suffered heavy casualties (Garcilaso de la Vega 1989 [1609]: 282). The defeat of the Chanka rebellion marked the turning point in Inca conquest history. The Chankas, according to tradition, were their most formidable foes. It is after this event that the Incas expanded their empire greatly.

⁶ This is probably due to the ayllu biases of the native informants. For more information, see (The work about reading between the lines in the chronicles and comparing the different chronicles.)

According to Garcilaso de la Vega, Cieza de León, Bernabé Cobo, and Sarmiento de Gamboa, Hancohuanlu survived to eventually escape with a number of his men to the region of Chachapoyas⁷. After the flight of Hancohuanlu, the Inca emperor started a policy called *mit'maq* (Lorandi 1986: 35). It was a policy that transferred whole communities to different parts of the empire as colonists to further the economic and military ends of the Incas. In the words of Garcilaso de la Vega:

His first action was to promulgate laws that seemed necessary to prevent the recurrence of any risings similar to those of the past. To the Chanca provinces he sent people whom they called migrants. They numbered ten thousand heads of families and were to settle and fill the places of those who had died in the battle of Yahuarpana and those who had gone off with Hancohuanlu (303).

In effect, the whole region of Vilcashuamán and its neighboring areas were violently depopulated, with the exception of the native Tanquihuas, to make room for the colonists the Incas transplanted (Gonzalez Carré 1981: 37; Carabajal 1965 [1586]: 219). The Pampas river basin became an area of over a dozen ethnic groups transplanted from outside by the Inca. This was a radical departure from the previous state of social relations between the local ethnic groups and served to make a local society dependent on the Inca state. Figure 2 shows the ethnic groups present before and after the Inca conquest of the Pampas river basin.

⁷ According to Gonzalez Carré, recent work by ethnologists has located the descendants of Hancohuanlu and his 8,000 warriors plus their families. They call themselves "Motilones" or "Lamistas" and are located in the village of Lamas in the province of San Martín in the Mayo river valley. They speak a similar dialect of Quechua as those from Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac. They have a traditional story about their grandiose past and their escape from the Incas. Additionally, in the village of Lamas, there is a street and neighborhood traditionally called Anco Huallu in remembrance of their illustrious past (Gonzalez Carré 1992: 117).




Fig. 2: Ethnic groups before and after Inca conquest (Landa and López 2005: 42-43).

The Incas transformed Vilcashuamán into an important provincial center and considered it the geographical center of their empire. During the time of the Incas, Vilcashuamán's jurisdiction included Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and part of Junin and Andahuaylas. Concerning the number of inhabitants of the province, the 1586 census of Viceroy Toledo registered 36,000 tributaries (heads of family), which would roughly translate to 72,000 in the time of the Incas (Huertas 1983: XV).⁸ According to the 1586 declaration of *kuraka* Teófilo Willka of Wankaraylla (Huancaraylla), the population during the time of the Incas was 400,000 people (Yaranga Valderrama 1995: 244). The population of the provincial center Vilcashuamán is estimated to have been around 30,000 to 40,000. Its plaza at the time could easily fit 20,000 people (Carabajal 1965 [1586]: 218). Because Vilcashuamán was an important Chanka strategic center for controlling the Pampas river basin, it made sense for the Incas to transform

⁸ The epidemics, exploitation of labor, and forcible relocation policies of the Spaniards led to a demographic collapse in Peru. The population steadily declined until independence in the early 1800s, when there were less than one million natives alive, compared to the 9-15 million alive during the time of the Incas (Handbook of south American Indians, Demographic Collapse).

Vilcashuamán, one of the important seats of one of their most important enemies, into the geographic center for their empire (Gonzalez Carré 1992: 115).

General Political Geographical Strategies of the Incas

Before examining the specific policies enacted by the Inca in the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán region and specifically around Pomatambo, one must first have an understanding of the general strategies of control that the Incas employed in their conquests. Many scholars such as Schreiber, D'Altroy, and Stanish have remarked that the Incas changed their strategies according to the local conditions (Schreiber 1993; D'Altroy 1992; Stanish 1997). Therefore, they pursued different kinds of policies in different parts of the empire and at different times. In general, the strategies used by the Incas can be classified into two categories: indirect control and direct control (D'Altroy 1992). Indirect control involves leaving local economies largely intact and working through the local political system. Direct control involves substantial changes to the political economical organization of the conquered territory (Schreiber 1993: 14). D'Altroy pointed out that these strategies are linked to center-periphery considerations. When an empire expands, areas that were once peripheral and under indirect hegemonic control strategies can become centers that are under direct territorial control strategies. Therefore, these shifts can be better understood as stages in a process of consolidation of imperial holdings (D'Altroy 1992: 74).

The Incas used a combination of indirect and direct strategies to consolidate their empire. First, we shall return to the concept explained earlier about vertical complementarity of the ecological zones. The basic unit of complementarity in the Andes was a highland to coast unit, or lateral unit. “Islands” in between exchanged goods, ensuring the continual flow of goods up and down the mountains to the coast. When an empire is created, it integrates these lateral (east-

west) units intact into a larger vertical unit (north-south). Caravan routes between these units, both lateral and vertical, then, are of utmost importance, and whoever controlled them controlled the land (Murra 1986: 49). I want to argue that the main factors of Inca success had to do with how they manipulated the geography and human adaptation to the particular geography in the Andes to their economic and military advantage. They had the strategy of linking up self-sufficient lateral units through vertical roads, controlling the vital choke points in caravan routes, and solidifying their economic and political control through indirect means, which was much more efficient in light of their relatively primitive military technology. Thus, the north-south roads and the Inca political system linked self-sufficient east-west units.

The Incas' success was in a big part due to their economic strategies of undermining and softening resistance. In a pre-Inca chiefdom, the local lords had to manage complementarity effectively through alliances with outside permanently settled kinsmen. This was the mode of utilizing an east-west lateral economic unit when more than one chiefdom existed inside the self-sufficient unit. This strategy of colonizing outlier resources with kinsmen and forming alliances with them was an effective way of managing competing highland polities. Thus, the foundations of political and economic strategies that the Incas would later adopt in a more comprehensive form were already being laid down (Lorandi 1986: 50). This form of consolidation allowed a particular chiefdom access to resources outside the scope of its military control. Entering into an alliance with kinsmen ensured that the parties all gained access to goods, especially luxury food and ritual items, thus enhancing the prestige of each local lord.

When the Incas incorporated these chiefdoms, they employed similar strategies of control. The Andes can be seen as a series of east-west lateral economic units on a north south axis. I will call this set-up "peas in a pod." When the Incas expanded, they added these "peas"

pretty much intact both politically and economically. However, they incorporated these “peas” in such a way that the imperial structure became a north-south “pod.” The traditional mechanisms of east-west exchange in these peas were replicated north-south (Salomon 1986: 113). There are three ways that the traditional east-west structure was replicated along the north-south axis: through exchange of political and economic luxury items, through establishing kin-ties, and through the heavy construction of north-south highways. Thus, what were once chiefdoms operating east-west with villages and lesser chiefdoms as the “islands” in the economic framework, the chiefdoms themselves became the “islands” in the Inca economic framework. However, what was transported north-south were political and economic luxury items, and not so much agricultural products.

When the Inca first conquered and incorporated an area, they left the production techniques intact, so that the highland to lowland exchange continued to be responsible for the wealth of the local authorities. However, the Inca gave an outlet to this wealth: luxury items. The local lords could now use their wealth on prestige items provided by the Inca and their more sophisticated material and religious/political culture (Núñez 1986: 32). It became economically advantageous for the local lords to give up some of their political authority in exchange for prestige afforded by being integrated into a sophisticated civilization like the Incaic one. The local east-west political and economic unit became a mini-version of the north-south imperial one (Saloman 1986: 113). A mid-level Inca state apparatus managed the flow of goods and the control of the local communities. Therefore, there were provincial capitals that acted like mini-Cuzcos (Saloman 1986: 113). The Incas would get tribute in the form of allegiance, labor, soldiers, and foodstuffs, and in return would give luxury items such as fancy cloths, sophisticated ritual pottery and other paraphernalia, and royal Inca women to the local lords.

The age-old method of establishing strong kinship ties to the local communities was heavily employed by the Inca and served their purposes of turning the local communities into mini-versions of the imperial structure. Marriage alliances affirmed the personal ties of each local lord to the center. They would receive royal Inca women as wives, and also give their own daughters to the Inca emperor's harem. This form of indirect rule facilitated Inca expansion because of its relatively low cost and high effectiveness of forging real alliances based on blood to the center (Murra 1986: 51). However, this did not always work and there were often rebellions. How did the Inca use geography to solve this problem?

Rebellions usually happened at the far-flung frontiers of the Inca Empire, where it was harder to control the populations. The Inca therefore solved the problem of distance by transplanting *entire* communities of the rebellious chiefdoms closer to the center of the empire. They then populated the land of the rebellious chiefdoms with Inca settlers. Therefore, frontiers were no longer as hard to control because ethnic Incas or tribes loyal to the Inca populated them. This system was called the *mitmaq* in the Inca language (Lorandi 1986: 35). Furthermore, once the rebellious peoples were removed from their homeland, they were no longer self-sufficient and had to depend on the Inca imperial system to provide them with goods. How were the Inca able to transplant entire communities? They built extensive north-south highways that could handle the traffic of large populations, and transport them quickly.

The discussion of highways leads us to the other important factor in the rapid expansion of the Inca Empire: their military strategy. They relied heavily on the strategy of *potentially* controlling territory. This strategy was both efficient and necessary in light of the relatively primitive military technology they had. In order to control the vast stretches of land, they did not need to consolidate all of the land, but rather control key "choke points" in the caravan routes.

They did not even need to build city walls. Rather, they built fortresses on top or on the side of mountains next to the key choke points in the caravan routes. A good example of this strategy was how the Inca controlled the vast and long desert coast. The Inca from geographical-political loci in the highlands managed the control of these desert valleys. They built extensive military and political settlements in the highlands overlooking the valleys. They could, therefore, sweep down at any moment and subdue any rebellion without extensively occupying the conquered lowland territories (Dillehay 1977: 404). Furthermore, after conquering an area, they occupied all the strategic points used by the conquered peoples, so the conquered peoples could not use them in future rebellions.

The Incas also used the fragmentation of the chiefdoms to their advantage. Murra (1986) said:

“The Inka did not undertake the consolidation of each expansive step; given the dispersed nature of Andean settlement, their initial aim did not require a thorough control of every pocket and valley on their route. The striking force could move swiftly, leapfrogging over nuclei of resistance, particularly as ‘they did not have to face universal resistance, since each province defended its lands without receiving anyone’s help, because they were *vehetrias* (51).’”

The Inca were extremely effective militarily because they emphasized dealing with one group at a time. With their superior organization and military numbers, even the fiercest warrior-kingdoms could not resist the onslaught of the Inca juggernaut.

The economic system discussed previously also allowed the Incas to mobilize large numbers of troops quickly, move them quickly, and provide food and payment through luxury goods effectively. In addition to material tribute, the local lords also had to give labor tribute. Eventually, the Incas found that it was more efficient if they specify specialized labor tributes from different groups. This extended to the military. Some ethnic groups only provided fighters, and not laborers. They became even more specialized in that different groups would solely use

one weapon, for example, slings, maces, spears, or bows (Murra 1986: 55). This allowed the Inca more control over the military because the ethnic divisions and distrust of each other was kept intact.

The other labor groups would help build highways, storehouses, farm the land, and weave the clothes to fill the storehouses. The storehouses throughout the empire facilitated the nutritional and economic well being of the soldiers. They did not have to worry about protecting supply lines (Murra 1986: 52). The highways made it possible to move large armies at lightning speed. Furthermore, armies could always be raised and mobilized close to the area of conflict; this ensured that rebellions would be squashed quickly and also that the Incas did not have to worry as much about military overextension.

The overall strategy of the Inca provided a crucial advantage: that of self-sufficiency and difficulty to defeat the Inca completely. The system of relatively self-sufficient east-west units organized along a north-south axis was crucial in this scheme. Even if the Inca were defeated in battles and lost control of one area, they still had many self-sufficient units left to mobilize resources and troops from. Thus, they would keep trying until they defeated the resisting area, whereas the resisting area could only hope that the Inca would give up, since the resistance usually was loath to unify with other groups. For the most part, as long as the resistance did not have superior technology, the Inca were invincible.

Chapter 3

DOWN AND OUT FROM THE PUCARAS⁹: INCA STATE STRATEGIES OF CONTROL IN POMATAMBO-VILCASHUAMAN

Now that the general strategies of control of the Inca are explained, how were some of these strategies manifested in the control of the region of Vilcashuamán? Why did the Incas choose these strategies? I will address these questions by examining four features of the archaeological and cultural landscape of Pomatambo and its surrounding region of Vilcashuamán: changes in settlement pattern, fortifications, roads, and religious related practices and sites. Although the Inca province of Vilcashuamán had an extensive jurisdiction, I will only focus on the immediate area around the capital (Figure 3).



Fig. 3: Map of thesis area. Area darkened.

⁹ Quechua for “fortress”

Settlements

The broader archaeological evidence shows that after an Inca conquest, LIP sites located in defensive positions on hills or mountains were abandoned. The population centers in the Pampas river basin listed in the 1586 *Relaciones geográficas de Indias* for Vilcashuamán province were most likely Inca mitimae centers. The absence of Inca pottery at many of the LIP sites shows an abrupt abandonment. Cultural exchanges between the LIP groups and the Incas did not seem to be a precursor to the Inca conquest of the area. In many of the sites, instruments of war—maces, obsidian lances and arrowheads, etc.—could be found. The archaeological evidence corroborates the historical data concerning the depopulation of most of the native population in the Vilcashuamán region. Vilcashuamán was then transformed into an important provincial center and repopulated with Incas of privilege and non-native ethnic groups.

The Incas probably pursued this strategy in Vilcashuamán because of the presence of the hard to control ethnic groups there. The historical sources point to this region as one of the most difficult conquests by the Inca. The combination of a difficult population and an extremely important geo-strategic area may have been the primary reason the Incas decided to depopulate the region nearly completely. Giving the region a zone of safety from rebellions helps ensure that Vilcashuamán is hard to retake. Furthermore, because the “Chankas” of the area were considered by the Incas to be one of their most formidable foes, the depopulation of the area would have had a sobering demoralizing effect on the enemies of the Inca. Urnmarca, the capital of the Hurin Chankas, was totally depopulated and repopulated by *mitimae* (Von Hagen 1955: 152). An abandoned LIP fortress called Mollo Mollo stands above the mitimae settlement (Espinosa Reyes 2002:169). This policy demonstrated the political power and state capacity of the Incas to be able to depopulate a militarily capable population.

It is interesting that the Tanquihuas were allowed to remain. One could only speculate that the Incas did not think of them as a threat. The Tanquihuas may have been among the friendly groups that allied with the Incas against their former “Chanka” conquerors. During the Spanish conquest, the Tanquihuas were conspicuous in their absence in helping the Spaniards, whereas the Wankas, Soras, and Lucanas were quick to aid the Spaniards (D’Altroy 1992; Stern 1982: 30).

The Inca policy of establishing *mitimae* colonies had the effect of breaking the old economic and ethnic ties. The Incas left a landscape of extreme ethnic fragmentation and set up a government in which each ethnic group interacted directly with the state more than it did with other ethnic groups of the area. This ensured that the ethnic groups were dependent on the state, and the mistrust sowed between the ethnic groups by the Incas helped prevent rebellions.

Pre-Inca and *mitimae* settlements

Vilcashuamán society before and after Inca reorganization was very different. The Vilcashuamán area was totally depopulated by the Incas and repopulated by *mitimae*s, or colonists loyal to the Inca. Only the Tanquihuas were not removed from the area, and they settled in what are now Huambalpa, Guarcas, Huamanmarca, and Cochas (Carabajal 1965 [1586]: 219). The *mitimae*s came from nearly a dozen different ethnic groups from all over the empire. According to Von Hagen, 200,000 *mitimae*s were transplanted to the river basin after it was depopulated (Von Hagen 1955: 146). A compilation of archaeological surveys done in the region revealed at least thirty-four LIP-related sites in an area roughly ten miles in radius from Vilcashuamán (Gonzalez Carré et al 1987: 67-72). Of these thirty-four, twenty-three (68%) only had LIP-era pottery. Three of these had only Inca pottery, but were located near LIP sites. Six of these (18%) had both Inca and LIP-era pottery.

The fact that almost seven out of ten sites did not show any sign of Inca occupation reflects the Inca policy of depopulation of the local populace. The abandoned LIP sites were, for the most part, located in higher altitudes and in defensible locations like a peninsular hill or on the top of a mountain. They were surrounded by retaining and defensive walls. This is consistent with the archaeological remains of the Qaracha river basin directly west of Vilcashuamán. It shows that the time before the Incas was a time of warfare.

Two of the more remarkable sites are Aukimarka and Muqu Alto. Aukimarka has around 800 circular buildings and two rectangular buildings, which is typical of the LIP settlement plans (Gonzalez Carré et al 1988: 196). The rectangular buildings are usually at the center or the highest point of the settlements, perhaps denoting religious or political purpose. A wall divided Aukimarka in two zones (Gonzalez Carré 1988: 68).

Muqu Alto is located at the top of a very inaccessible and tall mountain east of Vilcashuamán. At the west and north sides of the mountain are precipitous drops and many immense boulders. Circular structures cover the entire area of the mountaintop that is approximately 300 meters long and 200 wide (Chahud Gutiérrez 1966: 7-8). Both of these sites were abandoned after the Inca conquest.

The sites that had both Inca and LIP-era pottery were located at lower altitudes. These sites are either mitimaes settling in previous LIP population centers or LIP populaces continuing into the Inca era. Two of these sites, called Pinkulluna and Usnopata, are located tens of meters away from each other behind the *ushnu* in Vilcashuamán. They were apparently part of a large trash field used by the Incas. Excavations at Ushnopata and Pinkulluna show that under the trash field were LIP pottery and large disordered stones (Chahud Gutiérrez 1996: 25-27). This

supports the historical sources that say Vilcashuamán used to be a LIP population center before the Incas.

The presence of large stones in disorder may point to a violent disruption of LIP life, or it may be the remains of the fallen down Inca storehouses. I visited the site, and found that it extended for hundreds of meters beyond this point. The sheer size of the trash field gives an idea of the former population of the Inca city. It also testifies to the performances and feasting that took place in Vilcashuamán as described by Cieza de León (1959[1553]). In Charles Weiner's Peru and Bolivia, he draws a plan of the site, showing that there were some ruins where the modern cemetery now stands. The modern cemetery, which dominates this site, apparently destroyed the site. From Weiner's description, the site was of different construction than the Inca *ushnu* and its compounds and in a worse state of preservation (Figure 4). He said the stonework was reminiscent of Huamachuco, which is now known as a Wari site (Weiner 1993 [1880]: 283). Because the stonework was different than the Inca stonework, the site may have been older.




Fig. 4: Plan of the ruins of Vilcashuamán by Weiner 1993 [1880].

After this initial area was a series of small hills on the main peninsular hill. Along the side of this peninsular hill was a pre-Hispanic road. At one point down the road, there was a very large boulder with unidentifiable pottery fragments to the right. Even further down were some more immense boulders. There was a pre-Hispanic tomb in a hole under one of them. On the left side of the road, some parts of the hill collapsed, leaving a nice stratigraphy. The remains I saw were consistent with the archaeological reports. From this peninsular hill, one could clearly see the *ushnu* and its surrounding compounds dominating the area. One also had a commanding view of the Vischongo River valley below and a clear view of Pillucho, the pre-Hispanic fortress. It seemed that this area used to be inhabited in the LIP. The *ushnu* and its associated compounds sealed this peninsular hill from the main part of town, perhaps intentionally.

The placement of the new Inca sites and the appropriation of Vilcashuamán's importance reflect a definite Inca state agenda of making the area an administrative center and the geographic center of the Inca Empire.

Storehouses

Vilcashuamán held a significant number of storehouses, which were vital for the supply of the army, redistribution, and regaling local elites, all crucial elements in maintaining control over the area. According to Cieza, on the side of a hill near the plaza were over 700 storehouses, in addition to numerous magazines (Cieza de León 1959: 127). The trash fields containing numerous animal bones behind the *ushnu* testify to the feasting carried out by the Incas. Storehouses played a pivotal role in the management of the Inca political economy. They were vital for the supply and maintenance of a mobile army, of administrative and religious personnel,

of specialists attached to the state (mostly *mitimae*s in Vilcashuamán area), and corvée laborers (D'Altroy 1992: 163). The sheer number of storehouses in Vilcashuamán showed the importance of this provincial center to the Inca.

Pre-Inca Pomatambo

For reference, Figure 5 shows the location of the places mentioned below. The plaza of Pomatambo is located at the end of a large and remarkable rocky promontory (Photo 1). The promontory is shaped like a peninsula and has immense stones of five to fifteen feet tall scattered at its base. It is about 400 meters long and 200 meters wide. The top surface of it is a distinctive reddish-orange color, and the sides of it are rocky and dark gray. There are various small caves at the east side of it, and a small cave on top. There are pottery fragments of utilitarian ware. These fragments are rude and do not have fine slip. They are the same make as the pottery seen in Vilcashuamán and on top of Pillucho. The most common color is orange, but there are also grey, grey/black, and reddish fragments. There is an abundance of obsidian flakes, and I saw three obsidian points. There are also quartz fragments, a red and smooth stone (possibly chert), and other unidentified stones used as tools.

The locals call this hill “Aya Orqo” meaning “Hill of the dead.” It seems to have been a LIP cemetery. According to the locals, the church was built over a *chullpa* in the 1920s. The church now stands at the end of the mound. In the 1970s, the plaza of Pomatambo was leveled and expanded. According to the locals and a schoolteacher who taught there at the time, this uncovered many intact pottery pieces, ashes, and human bones. Near the end of the hill is a small cave going down into the ground. One of the locals told me that his son once went down it before they covered it up. He said that it seemed like it was a Chanka temple. He said there were many stone tools, especially stones with a circular depression in them, perhaps mortar

stones. Because of the large size of this hill and its abundance of artifacts, it seems that there was a relatively large population in the surrounding area in the pre-Inca era. This hill, for its unusual shape and composition, seemed to have had a religious function. If the hill was a cemetery, it is not clear where the population center was. It may have been subsumed under modern Pomatambo. According to Navarro del Aguila, LIP cemeteries of the region were usually located a distance from the population center and located on a promontory (Navarro del Aguila 1983 [1939]: 160). The presence of so many ancient cultural elements in Pomatambo implies its importance in the pre-Inca era.

The number of abandoned fields around Pomatambo also testifies to it being a possible population center in the pre-Inca era. The tall mountains in front of Aya Orqo are almost completely covered with walled-in fields. The sheer number of them, about 190 just on one side of the mountain directly in front of the cemetery, points to a time where the area was more densely settled than it is now. At the bottom of the hill is a canal that runs for several miles. The age of the canal is not clear. The canal is directly above a small stream of Pomatambo. This steam feeds into the Pampas River. Not insignificantly, an Inca road runs along the side of Aya Orqo and connects with another Inca road less than half a mile away. The significance of the roads will be discussed later.




Fig. 5 Map of Pomatambo. Abandoned fields are south of river. Thin line that ends in the “i” is pre-Hispanic road.

Pomatambo does not seem to have been settled during the Inca era because of the absence of Inca pottery. Almost all the pottery, with the exception of a couple of sherds of fine slipped redware, was utilitarian and rude. Since the pottery corresponded to the LIP pottery seen elsewhere, I am pretty confident that the pottery sherds on Aya Orqo are from the LIP. In addition, there used to be a *chullpa* on top of the hill, lending more credence to the hypothesis that the hill is from the LIP. Furthermore, Pomatambo is not listed in the *Relaciones geográficas de Indias* of 1586, minimizing the probability that it was continuously inhabited since the LIP. It is also not listed in the census done in 1729. According to a history of the village done by the

head schoolteacher, archival records about Pomatambo go back to 1638, when it was a place to graze animals. It was the first possession of the Spanish military general Francisco Rudas and his wife Petronila Guillen de Mendoza, who was the sister of Diego Guillen de Mendoza (Najarro Quispe 2006: 1). This historical evidence shows that Pomatambo was not continuously inhabited, increasing the chances that it was not inhabited during the Inca era.

Fortifications

Fortifications, in general, were of utmost importance in defending the people and the area around it. In times of war, people flee to fortifications for three main reasons. The first is that it is very expensive and impractical for the assailant to maintain a siege for a long time, especially a distance away from supplies (D'Altroy 1992: 76). Supply lines were crucial to any pre-modern war, especially in successfully besieging a fortification. In medieval times in Europe, the general rule was that a siege went no longer than forty days due to the fact that soldiers were also farmers. They needed to farm, and a longer siege would encroach on time needed to plant (David Rousseau, personal communication 2005). As long as the socio-political mechanisms did not evolve to be able to accommodate standing armies, fortifications were reliable way to potentially control territory. The second reason was that a protracted siege quickly dampens the morale of the besieging soldiers (Sun Tzu 2002). The third reason was that a fortification concentrated the defending population in a small, and strategically advantageous space, making it harder for the enemy to divide and conquer. Therefore, as long as the enemy did not have the state capacity to sustain a prolonged siege, well-defended fortifications were almost sure defenses against permanent conquest. Fortifications placed near choke points served the function of potentially controlling the largest area possible. As long as the fortress held, the enemy could not permanently subdue the area that the fortress potentially controlled. A pre-

modern war was won not so much by valor as by skillful supply of the conquering army, the skillful defense of fortifications, and cutting of the enemy's supply lines by the defenders (Sun Tzu 2002).

Because the pre-Inca societies of Vilcashuamán were not specialized enough to afford a permanent standing army or a protracted siege, fortifications would have been the primary defense mechanism. The archaeological and historical evidence of Vilcashuamán resoundingly confirms this hypothesis. As stated before, Garcilaso de la Vega mentioned that Hancohuallo, the Villca Chanka captain, regretted abandoning the two famous fortresses his ancestors made, Suramarca and Challkumarca, more than the rest of his dominions. This shows the importance fortifications held in the pre-Inca societies of Vilcashuamán. The fact that these fortifications were usually located on top of a mountain doubled the value of these places. Hills, along with rivers, streams, and lakes, unusual stones, and ancestral mummies were considered *huacas* or *apus*: gods (Stern 1982: 14). Therefore, hilltop fortifications were both the residences of their gods and the fastnesses of their people. When the Incas conquered the area, they depopulated and ruined these fortifications (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1967 [1572]: 149). However, Pillucho was an exception, and continued to be used by the Incas and later by the early Spanish conquistadors.

Why was this?

Pillucho

The adoration of the mountain Pillucho, or Qatun Urqu Pata (Q. "Great hill mesa"), reflected in its importance as a *huaca* and as a fortress in the pre-Inca days. As the crow flies, it is three miles from Vilcashuamán and five miles by foot. On top are extensive ruins of collapsed defensive walls, hundreds of circular foundations, a rectangular foundation, and five relatively well-preserved *chullpas*. In 1586, Pedro de Carabajal described the fortress:

Hay en el pueblo viejo de Vilcas, questá una legua deste dicho pueblo, una fortaleza de cantería bien labrada, que solia servir de fuerte cuando era frontera de los ingas, aunque agora está deshecha una parte della (216).


There is in the old pueblo of Vilcas and one league from the said pueblo a well-made fortress, which used to habitually serve as a fastness when it was a frontier of the Incas, although now it is partially ruined (translation mine).

This is the same fortress described by Cieza de León as the one used by the Soras, Lucanas, and a number of other ethnic groups of the area against the Inca invasion (Cieza de León 1959 [1553]: 125). It has a very distinctive appearance, shaped like a falcon's beak. It dominates the skyline of Vilcashuamán.

It was obviously a very important fortress because even people as far as the province of Huamanga, more than thirty miles north, joined with the Soras, Lucanas, and other ethnic groups of the region. This was probably the case because of the prime location and constitution of the fortress. It is protected on three sides by deep river canyons and is only accessible by a very narrow and precarious route on the north side (Chahud Gutiérrez 1966:9). The hill acts as a natural fortress even without walls because of the rocky cliffs that are its slopes. Furthermore, Pillucho has a natural spring and many caves around the top (Cieza de León 1959: 231). The spring was crucial to hold against the sieges, and caves were sacred places for the LIP ethnic groups of the area, as they often interred their dead inside them (Navarro del Aguila 1983: 160).

One can see the entire town of Vilcashuamán, including the peninsular promontory extending from it, from Pillucho. The combination of being located in a strategic place, being a remarkable shape and constitution, having a natural spring on top, naturally only having one point of entrance, having many caves, and commanding a wide panorama made Pillucho an extremely ideal place for veneration. It was an extremely secure place due to the water supply on top. In fact, according to Cieza de León, the Incas besieged the place for two years until at last, food ran out and the defenders had to surrender.

The importance of Pillucho as a fortress and as a religious site is indubitable because of its association with the religious ruins on top of Qatun Cruz (Q. "Great Cross"), one of the peaks of Cerro Auquillana, some ten miles away. I traveled to Cerro Auquillana when the locals told me there were ruins on top. "Auquilla" means the princess of the stars, and refers to Venus (Jimenez de la Espada 1965: 241). On top of Qatun Cruz are the ruins of what appears to be a LIP sanctuary. It consists of a central structure and a series of stone pillars surrounding it. The structure is located at the highest elevation of Qatun Cruz. The central structure is circular and has very thick walls that have collapsed. The diameter of the inner area is about six meters, and the diameter of the total area of the ruin is twenty-two meters by twenty-two meters. The inside surface of the wall is concave. In the middle of this circular structure is a large stone, about four feet by five feet. It is partially buried, and may be larger. A series of stone pillars surround the structure. The entrance of the circular structure is relatively narrow, maybe only 1 meter wide, and faces approximately 30 degrees south of east. (Figure 6)



Rough Sketch of Qatun Cruz

Fig. 6: Rough plan of Qatun Cruz. Stone in the center of circular building has the highest elevation of 4122 m above sea level.

The entrance is notable because it is in direct alignment with and frames the hilltop of Pillucho. Cerro Auquillana has three peaks with archaeological ruins and is the most prominent mountain of the immediate region. From Qatun Cruz, the highest of the peaks, one can see many miles around (Figure 7).




Fig. 7: Diagram of comfortable visibility from Qatun Cruz (black "X")

One can see the old Inca road, the lagoon Ccochararacan, Aukimarka, Pomatambo's pre-Columbian cemetery, and many other important sites. The alignment of the entrance of Qatun Cruz and Pillucho is not coincidental and shows the past importance of Pillucho and of Cerro Auquillana. Archaeological investigations on Pillucho carried out by Lizandro Jorge Torres

Palomino in 1965 and 1966 revealed that both the Chankas and the Incas used the site, but the vast majority of the pottery was of the Chankas (Gonzalez Carré 1992:38). In fact, there is evidence that the caves in the cliffs of Pillucho were inhabited since at least 600 C.E. (Alvarez Quispe et al. 2003: 11). Also, Pillucho was used by Huascar's troops against Atahualpa's in the civil war (Cobo 1979 [1653]: 166). The continual occupation of this strategic place shows the level of veneration it held among the people.

Cerro Aquillana, with its pillars, may have served many functions: as a strategic site, as an astronomical and religious site, and as a *huaca*. The alignment could also be strategic, as the besiegers cannot see Auquillana's peaks from the base of Pillucho, only from the top of it. This allows fire or fire signals to be given to the defenders of Pillucho. Thus, the locals could prepare to fortify their position long before the enemy arrives. Given that the wall Sqi Rumi is exactly lined up with Qatun Cruz, there is a possibility Qatun Cruz may have been the center of a religious *ceque* system (Figure 8). This shows that there may have been a coherent religious system in the area before the Incas, giving Incas all the more reason to appropriate the region for state purposes.




Fig. 8: Sqi Rumi upper wall aligns perfectly with Qatun Cruz. Map adapted from Google Earth.

Settlements discussion

Why did the Incas depopulate most LIP population centers of the area and dismantle the fortifications, but re-inhabited Vilcashuamán and reused Pillucho? According to D'Altroy, the major provincial centers of the Inca Empire were located adjacent to natural conduits of travel and open valleys or plains, which would have facilitated bivouacking an army. They were positioned to reduce the threat of internal attack and supply armies that suppress insurrections (D'Altroy 1992: 80). Vilcashuamán, itself located at a strategic point, had an extra advantage of a natural fortress at Pillucho. Because Vilcashuamán had great significance for the LIP groups before the Inca, it made sense to establish a provincial center here. It also transformed the region from a peripheral and uncontrollable zone to a core and defensible zone. Vilcashuamán's ample storage facilities were able to supply the army that successfully besieged Pillucho for two years. The dismemberment of most of the fortifications, which also held great religious significance for the former local populace, demoralized the populace and also ensured that there would be a time lag in repairing the ruins and holding the fortification. This time lag would allow the Incas to strike swiftly and crush the insurrections of the area. Because Vilcashuamán was important to the Inca imperial agenda, they used highly direct methods of control: mass depopulation, open warfare, relocation of populations, and movement of settlements to lower places.

So far, we have investigated two facets of political geographical control of the Incas in Vilcashuamán: settlements and fortifications. Both can be geographically abstracted as points, with fortifications acting as a point that controls a potential area. Our next topic, roads, can be geographically abstracted as lines. After the discussion of roads, we will have examined the three basic units of geography: points, lines, and areas.

Roads

Roads connect points at which populations could be effectively governed. They have four main purposes: facilitate the movement, acquisition, management, and protection of labor (Hyslop 1984: 248). The policy of resettlement of subject populations discussed in the settlements section has a direct connection with Inca road building. Inca roads connected subject peoples whose labor formed the backbone and source of wealth and power for the Inca state (Hyslop 1984: 276). In Vilcashuamán, the road to Uranmarca bifurcates several times, possibly reflecting changing policies of the Inca over time. After much combing through various sources about the roads around Vilcashuamán and personally walking some parts of it, the Inca road network around Vilcashuamán shows much complexity and evidence of change over time. A history of the roads of any given area could reveal much about state policies of control. In this section, I will explore the various routes, control points, bridges, and other archaeological remains around Vilcashuamán in an attempt to form a picture of the road system's role in the strategies of control employed by the Incas.

Vilcashuamán was at the crossroads of two major Inca highways: the north-south Chinchasuyu highway, and the east-west highway down to the coast. The Inca roads were punctuated by *tambillos* and royal *tampus*, or wayside stations. *Tambillos* were located about a mile to a mile and a half from each other and were very simple and small houses. *Tampus*, on the other hand, were located about a day or day and a half's journey from each other. They were much larger and had extensive storage facilities (Hyslop 1984: 278-281). At various points, especially near population centers and bridges, control gates control the movement of people. These control gates were placed in natural choke points of movement of peoples: around population centers and at bridges.

In addition to the highways, there was a vast network of smaller branch and lateral roads that are not as well understood (Hyslop 1984: 256). The successive rebuilding of roads by different Inca rulers further complicates this. Cieza de León noted that the Inca emperors liked to outdo each other in the magnificence of their highways. They would, therefore, build wider roads and the old roads built by the previous emperor would no longer be used:

This was when such a king set out on some conquest, or to achieve something worthy of memory, that it might be said that the road prepared for him was larger than any made before. This is clearly the case, for I have seen three or four roads near Vilcas, and I even lost my way on one, believing that I was on the one which is now in use. These roads are called, one the road of the Ynca Yupanqui, another of Tupac Inca; and that which is now used, and always will be hereafter, is that of Huayna Ccapac, reaching to the river Ancasmayu in the north, and to the south far beyond what we now call Chile... (44)"

Hylsop confirms this when he observed that one could see the remains of an older, narrower, and more winding road next to a newer, wider, and straighter road (Hylsop 1984: 260). Sometimes, the Incas used pre-existing roads of the Wari Empire and probably the LIP roads also.

As Cieza de León said, there are three or four roads going in the direction of Cuzco around Vilcas. I found that there are three roads that branch off in Vilcashuamán itself going towards Cuzco. However, some of these roads bifurcate or merge along the way. Figure 9 shows the alternative routes. P1, P2, and P3 are the Puccas routes, and S is the Saurama route. Von Hagen in the 1950s traced the Saurama route, Espinoza Reyes (2002) traced the P2 route, Baldeón Malpartida et al. (2005) traced the P3 route, and my own experience traced the P1 route. P1, P2, and P3 become one route between the villages of Pomatambo and Pinchas. These routes constitute a part of the Chincha Suyu highway (Baldeón Malpartida et al. 2005: 129).




Fig. 9: Diagram of Inca roads going to Uran Marca. Map adapted from Espinoza Reyes 2002: 164.

Pucas Routes

My hypothesis is that the P1 is one of the oldest roads, if not the oldest, for the main reason that it is the only one that connects pre-Inca settlements. It originates on the northeast exit of Vilcas, goes through Chito, then to Ccollpapampa, then to Pomatambo, then to Pucas, and then to Uranmarca. P1 passes by a *chullpa* near Ccollpapampa and Pomatambo. It then passes by the LIP cemetery of Pomatambo. Under the road at one point is a cave with human remains, possibly from the LIP. A few hundred meters further along, it passes by a possible LIP-era sacred site Arteza Rumi. From there it connects to another Inca road to Pucas. On the

stretch of road from the cemetery to the merge with the main Puccas road, there is a ruin of two small rectangular structures made of stone. The walls are very thick and unlike the usual construction of the area. The ruin is located about 40 to 60 feet from the road. On the road below the ruin, there is a large stone with a hole and many wear-grooves. It was apparently a hitching post for animals (Photo 2). This ruin is strategically located in front of two promontories, one of which is the LIP cemetery. This ruin may have been a *tambillo* in the Inca era, but only archaeological investigation in the future can confirm this.

Along this road in Pomatambo, one can see gigantic stones stacked in disorder on the side of the road. Some of these stones were worked and broken off from elsewhere, possibly Arteza Rumi. It raises the possibility that the Incas broke off parts of the possible nearby LIP sanctuary and used the stones to line the road, making a strong religious and political statement. In 1966, Chahud Gutiérrez surveyed Arteza Rumi and found that under some of the stones, one can find human craniums and bones. The ceramic remains are abundant in the first twenty-five centimeters of earth, and appear to be “Chanka” pottery (Chahud Gutiérrez 1966: 27). Chahud Gutiérrez seemed pretty confident that there was no Inca pottery at the site. He also said that the bones were in a great disorder and very disturbed. Chahud Gutierrez noted that at Arteza Rumi, an unusual stone stood out because it had channels and holes carved into it, and had a very smooth surface. It measured 2.9 meters long and 1.9 meters wide (Chahud Gutierrez 1966: 6). Arteza Rumi is located a couple of hundred feet off the road, and many of the stones have either collapsed naturally or have been pushed down. My interpretation for this site is that it was a ritual area for the LIP people of the area. It is a natural rocky outcrop in the shape of an arc. It had a wall added to one side of it, giving it a “D” shape. There are many gigantic stones that

have been worked in some way. The Incas may have quarried stone from here to add to the retaining walls of their roads (Photo 3).

From Pucas, the road goes to Uranmarca, one of the royal Inca *tampus*. This road can be quite narrow at some points, maybe only five feet wide. At its widest, before it connects with the main Pucas (P2) road, it reaches about fifteen feet. The small Pomatambo River divides the promontories from the ruins. An old canal, which is still in use today, is located above the small stream on the side of the promontories. This canal, neatly lined with stones, stretches for approximately 2.7 kilometers.

The other Pucas roads are either contemporaneous with or younger than the first route. First, they are on average wider than the first route; and second, an Inca ruin called Sipi Rumi (Q. “Lined up stones”) with gigantic fitted stones overlooks these Pucas routes. P2 starts from Vilcashuamán, goes to Vizcachayoc, then to the south side of lagoon Ccochararacan, then to Huancapuquio, passes by Pomatambo, and then goes to Pucas. P3 also starts from Vilcashuamán, goes to Vizcachayoc, then to the north side of lagoon Ccochararacan, and then merges with P2 at Huancapuquio. At Huancapuquio, another road diverges going in the direction of Saurama. Where this leads to is uncertain, and only future research can confirm its destination.

Unfortunately, all the Pucas routes are badly preserved, and the main Pucas route, P2, the one that the Incas used early on, has been paved over with a modern road. Only a few short segments of it can be seen where the modern road could not pave over due to the uneven terrain. At Pucas, at a place called “Escalerayoc” or “Place of the stairs,” is a long staircase that takes one to the bottom of the valley and to the banks of the Pampas River. It is about one kilometer

down in terms of absolute height, but much longer, about three or four miles, by foot (Espinosa Reyes 2002: 166-167).

Siqi Rumi is a very impressive gigantic structure made of two walls in the form of a “D.” This cannot be seen from the earlier Pucas route that went through Ccollpapampa and Pomatambo, but only the main Pucas route, which passes by Pomatambo but does not go through it. It is located on a slope, and the wall located on the higher altitude is taller than the lower wall, which makes up the curved part of the “D.” The upper wall is about 225 meters long, and the lower wall is about 320 meters long (Figure 5). Unlike the stones in Vilcashuamán, these stones were removed from the rocky outcrops directly under it and are soft. From Pucas road P2, it looks much taller than viewed from behind. Viewed from behind, one cannot see the lower wall or the bottom layer of the upper wall. It has fallen into ruin, and many of the stones were displaced or broken up to make tombstones. At its highest point, which is in the upper wall, it measures over fifteen feet tall. It is most impressive when viewed from the Pucas roads, and probably served as a reminder to those passing on the road that the Incas were in control.

The Incas quarried from these rocks and fitted them on top of the former natural protuberance of rock. The natural protuberance was also shaped. This site is very close to and visible from the LIP cemetery in Pomatambo. The Incas modified the site by quarrying and shaping the stones to produce a very impressive enclosure. At first, I thought it may have been a fortress of some sort, but the fact that the walls are easy to scale and that there is no Inca pottery in the enclosed space led me to believe that the structure was built to make a political or religious statement. An Inca version of Arteza Rumi may have been intended at Siqi Rumi because of the similar shapes (“D”). Both the Incas and the LIP groups of the area revered stones and unusual rock formations as sacred. The sculpting and dominating of the old stone huacas by the Incas

would have served to establish the Incas' divine mandate in the area. This reflects the legend that the stones near Cuzco turned into Inca soldiers to aid them in the battle against the Chankas, leading to their defeat. It shows that the divine mandate fell in the hands of the Incas, giving them legitimate dominion over the land. The great visibility of the structure, its impressive scale, and probable former religious significance for the locals leads me to the conclusion that this structure had the primary purpose of impressing the local populace. In 1586, Pedro de Carabajal wrote that when the Incas conquered Vilcas, they mandated that the locals worship Inca gods. At the same time, they destroyed the stone huacas of the locals (Carabajal 1586: 218). This heavy-handed strategy was used to demoralize and to affirm the divine mandate of the rule of the Incas.

The evidence of Inca disruption of LIP sites on P1 and P2, especially religious ones, reflect the Inca strategy of elevating their own gods over the gods of the locals. Making the disruptions as visible as possible would have served as reminders of the Inca primacy in the area.

Saurama Route

Victor Von Hagen traced this route in the 1950s. It leaves from the southeast side of the plaza of Vilcashuamán. A bit further down this road was a control gate called "Pillau-ccasi." The ruins of garrison guard stations accompanied it. The road to Huambalpa, which leaves from the southwest side of the plaza, also has a control gate the same distance from the plaza. These stations were used to control the movement of people (Von Hagen 1955: 148). When the Incas depopulated the landscape and transplanted colonists, they planned new settlements and greatly reordered the population distributions of the area to their own economic and political needs. The Incas also heavily controlled the movement of these people in the immediate Vilcashuamán area through numerous control gates located near population centers and bridges.

The Saurama route had a very long staircase down to the banks of the Pampas, like the one at Puccas. Von Hagen, with a tone of awe, said:

There must have been at least three thousand consecutive stone steps. The distance was, as Don Pedro had said, ‘short,’ but it was a truly astonishing piece of engineering. Being all dry masonry, this necessitated elaborate terracing with retaining walls for which the rock had to be carried some distance before it could be faced and worked. It was—in this realm of astonishments—one of the most extraordinary of these amazing roads (151).

On the other side of the Pampas River, at Pariabamba, were the ruins of the immense towers that held the suspension bridge over the river. Cieza de León walked over the bridge that used to be there nearly five hundred years ago and said that it was one hundred and sixty-six paces long (Von Hagen 1955: 152).

I believe that this road is the most recent because it does not bifurcate as much as the Puccas routes, implying that its use had a shorter time frame. Secondly, it passes close to the Inca-era *mitimae* settlement of Carhuanca. Thirdly, it abandons the more straightforward route to Uranmarca, implying that its existence was due to the need to connect Inca *mitimae* settlements.

Roads discussion

Seeing the complex network of roads around Vilcashuamán, it is not a surprise that Cieza de León lost his way. He probably was traveling on of the Puccas routes when he realized he was on the wrong road. He said that the road to Cuzco in use was the one of Huayna Ccapac, the last of the emperors that built roads around Vilcashuamán. The other two were of Pachacuteq and Topa Inca. Because the Saurama route is probably the youngest, this might have been the one that Cieza de León eventually traveled on to get to Cuzco.

The evolution of these roads reflects a long history of consolidation of control of the immediate Vilcashuamán region. When dominance was first established, the Incas used the pre-

existing roads. However, they did make changes to these roads. In the case of P1, they apparently broke off worked stone from elsewhere and incorporated them into the retaining walls of the road. Then the Incas further established monuments to their dominance with P2 and P3 by the building of structures like Arteza Rumi. P2 and P3 were located on lower ground than P1 and would have connected some of the displaced settlements, which were moved from higher altitudes. It is not clear at the time of P2 and P3 that the *mitimae* policy was implemented. It is also a real possibility that these roads existed in the pre-Inca days, as they pass by Lagoon Ccochararacan, the biggest lagoon of the area. Also, there are literally thousands of walled in fields that are now abandoned close the P2 and P3. Some of these undoubtedly date from the pre-Inca as well as the Inca era (Photo 4). It is notable that these routes can be seen from Cerro Auquillana, a possible LIP religious and strategic site.

Later, the Saurama route totally abandoned the direction of the more straightforward Puccas routes to Uranmarca, the next royal *tampu*. The Saurama route connected what were certainly *mitimae* settlements such as Carhuanca. Interestingly, one cannot see this route from Cerro Auquillana, supporting my claim that this road was used later. Because Cieza de León said that the last royal road built by the Incas at Vilcas was the Huayna Ccapac road, the Saurama road may be this road, but this is only speculation. It was very expensive to make a completely new road, so the reasons for building it must have been very important. Connecting new population centers would have been very important.

According to the chronicles, specifically Cieza de León and Garcilaso de la Vega, the area was hard to subdue for many years. The “Chankas” of the region, along with those of Uranmarca and Andahuaylas, submitted at first under duress, but later revolted. However, Pachacutec subdued the region once and for all after the Chanka rebellion, and implemented the

mitimae policies. The evolution of these roads might hint at a more gradual evolution of policies leading up to the *mitimae* settlements. Instead of Pachacutec subduing and rebuilding Vilcashuamán, establishing new roads, and resettling the populations both downward and outside populations inward, these processes may have been spread out over several reigns.

The evolution of the roads reflect a three-prong strategy of consolidation of control of the area: 1) using pre-existing roads in military expeditions and establishing territorial dominance through the military defeat of the area, 2) resettling local populations to areas where they are more easily controlled, and building control point structures around these areas, and 3) transplanting foreign communities to repopulate the war-depopulated region for economic and security purposes. The fact that the people of Vilcas, Soras and Lucanas said in a 1586 *visita* that Topa Inca was the one who conquered them show that a deeper penetration of local populations did not happen until after Pachacutec (Carabajal 1586: 213). Another line of evidence that supports this theory is the presence of Cañari *mitimae*s in the Vilcashuamán area from far-flung Ecuador. Ecuador was not subdued until later during the reigns of Topa Inca and Huayna Capac (Gonzalez Carré 1992: 126). Even though the region may have been “conquered” militarily by Pachacutec, the control of the area was not consolidated, and the pre-Inca self-sufficiency of the local ayllus not yet disrupted, until later.

Religion

It should be no surprise that religion was so intimately tied to military, social, and economic life of the native peoples of the Vilcashuamán region because all those aspects of life were intimately tied to the landscape. Their *pacarinas*, or places of origin and creation, were the hills, the caves, the rivers, and the lakes. Their gods also resided or were these features of the

landscape. The landscapes helped shape the economic structure, and at the same time the social structure, of these peoples. The landscape also provided safety from one's enemies.

Just as their *pacarinas* and *huacas* were ranked in order of importance, so were the different *ayllus*. The Andean image of cosmos seemed plausible not only in internal logic and explanatory power, but also because it reflected real social relationships. "The kin groups within a hierarchy of households and *ayllus* paid homage to parallel networks of *huacas*, sacred beings or powers materialized in hills, waters, caves, stones, ancestor mummies, and so forth (Stern 1982: 14)." Religion and ritual had the effect of unifying these *ayllus*. By ritualizing hostility between *ayllu* "brothers" in the form of friendly teasing and taunts, antagonisms between these *ayllus* were controlled. Although there was still armed conflict every now and then, religion and ritual allowed antagonisms to be controlled to an extent that would allow cooperative efforts. Therefore, certain rituals acted as catharsis and expression for internal antagonisms, but in such a way that also unified the different *ayllus* (Stern 1982: 18). By moving local populations around, moving foreign *ayllus* in, and usurping their sacred places for Inca use, the Inca conquest represented a radical departure for the local societies of the Vilcashuamán area. The old relationships between the *huacas* and *pacarinas*, just as the old relationships between the different *ayllus* and ethnic groups, were effectively destroyed. New relationships were created between the local groups and the Incas, and the nature of self-sufficiency and autonomy changed drastically.

The changes described earlier with settlement patterns, fortifications, and roads all have an element of religious change. Old ties were broken, and new dependent ones created to the Inca state, just as old gods were subsumed under the new Inca gods. With the new ties came new roads to manifest the ties between groups and to the Inca state. The breakup of the

relationship between Cerro Auquillana and Pillucho is an example of the breaking of old ties, both divine and societal. The act of placing structures on top of sacred sites has always been a form of asserting religious dominance across cultures. The Catholic Church on top of the Inca temple in Vilcashuamán shows the irony of the Incas being subjugated relatively shortly after the Incas subjugated the local populations and modified their holy sites.

To subdue the peoples of the Vilcashuamán region, the Incas not only employed territorial control methods, but also acted purposefully to defeat hearts and minds through altering the religious landscape, affirming a parallel myth and religion that diminished the divine mandate of the local peoples, and capturing their ancestor mummies and idols. The Incas pursued similar strategies at Tiwanaku, by appropriating the sacredness of Tiwanaku and Lake Titicaca, turning the place into a sacred place of the Incas (Stanish 1997). In a sense, the Inca strategies of control in Vilcas encompassed all aspects of life: economic, social, military, and religious. The Incas used the common aspects of their religion and the Vilcashuamán people's religion, such as worship of stones and ancestors, to affirm the superiority of their own sacred stones and ancestors.

The intricate series of canals and waterworks in their relationship to temples and peoples at Vilcashuamán itself replicated a sacred landscape. The Temple of the Sun and Moon, the *ushnu*, the canals that divided the neighborhoods and issued from the temples, and the shape of Vilcashuamán in the form of a falcon reflected a new religious landscape of the Incas. By capturing the old idols and sending them far away, mandating the worship of Inca gods, and by systematically changing the landscape to suit the new religious ideology, the Incas created new relationships to sacred places and to the state from a *tabula rasa* that resulted from intensive disruption and depopulation.

Syncretism

Another way in which the Incas subdued the local peoples through religion was to incorporate elements of native myths into their own. This gave them more divine legitimacy in their supremacy over a conquered populace. Charles Stanish believes that the different origin myths of the Incas were not due to the error of the chroniclers, but rather reflective of the Inca strategy of tailoring versions of their myths to “suit the specific political and historical realities of areas being incorporated (Stanish 1997: 201).” Therefore, different myths about the origins of the Incas existed in the different parts of the empire.

In this light, it is interesting to note that one of the origin myths of the Incas echoes many elements of the origin myth of the Wankas, Chankas, and Pokcras. The origin myth emphasized water and the civilizing power of the three brothers. In a way, the myth reflects reality in that water and the ability to “civilize” it through agricultural works such as canals and terracing was crucial to the origins of these three societies. Likewise, the Inca myth of the Manco Capac and Mama Ocllo said that these founders of the Incas came forth from Lake Titicaca. The Ayar brothers, also founders, came from the three windows at Paqari Tambo (Q. *inn of dawn or place of origin*) near Cuzco (Taipe Campos 2003: 189). The Incas came from the middle window, or “Capac Toco” (Q. *rich window*). The Tambos came from the window Sutic Toco, and the Maras came from the window Maras Toco. These two nations were allied with the Incas. The three windows or three caves supposedly found their source at Lake Titicaca several hundred kilometers south of Cuzco, and the ancestors traveled from Titicaca to Paqari Tambo by the underground stream (Urton 1999:47). Comparing the two origin myths of the Incas and of the Wankas, Pokcras, and Chankas reveals a comparison of Lake Choclococha to Lake Titicaca, and a comparison of the three different nations of each group. The symmetry may hint that the Incas

used this myth to challenge the divine mandate and lineage of the Wankas, Pokras, and Chankas. Because the ancestors of the Incas had their origin in Lake Titicaca, a bigger and more sacred lake than Lake Choclococha, the Incas themselves were better fit to rule and civilize.

With this justification, local cults were subsumed under the Inca religion and took a second or third place in worship. The ethnic disruption of the Vilcashuamán region also affected many aspects of local worship (Huertas 1983: XVI).

Idol capture

Capturing the idols or the ancestor mummies of the enemy to receive allegiance is a strategy that pre-dates the Incas to at least the Middle Horizon 500 or so years before (Kolata 1993). As Vilcashuamán was a very important religious center for the Chankas, the capture of the idols there by the Incas helped to ensure a firm hold over the area. Without their idols and ancestor mummies, military morale was very low. Because the ancestor mummies were also the lifelines of a people's identity, to capture them would be to capture the whole group. According to Juan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti-Yamqui Salcamayhua, a descendant of principal chiefs of the province of the Canas and Canches, Pachacutec conquered Vilcas and then captured the sacred idols there:

He next marched to the country of the Chancas with fifty thousand men; and at Vilcas-huaman he found seven *huacas* in the form of very great Curacas, black, and very ugly. They were called *Ayssa-vilca*, *Pariacaca*, *Chinchacocha*, *Huallallu Chuquiracra*; and two others of the Cañaris. The prince took them and sent them to Cuzco, to work at the Sacsahuaman fortress, and also afterwards to labour at the look-out towers on the sea-shore, at Chincha and Pachacamac. Then Pachacuti Ynca Yupanqui conquered the provinces of the Angaraes, Chilqui-urpus, Rucanas, and Soras (Pachacuti-Yamqui 1873 [1613]: 93).

The Incas captured the idols of the Chankas and other groups, which allowed the Incas to make the idols "work" for them. It is interesting to note that Pachacuti-Yamqui does not make a distinction between the people and their *huacas*. The peoples who owed allegiance to these idols

had to obey the Incas and work for them in Cuzco. They were also incorporated into the army of the Incas to conquer other provinces in the north (D'Altroy 1992: 81).

Discussion of strategies of control in Vilcashuamán-Pomatambo

It seems that the Incas chose to use very direct methods of control due to three main, related reasons: the difficulty of co-opting the locals, the geographic importance of the area in strategic and economic terms, and the sacred nature of the area to its former inhabitants. The difficulty of using co-optation to pacify the locals was related to the geographic importance of the area, which was both militarily and economically strategic. The Pampas River and the surrounding high mountains naturally defend the Pampas River Basin, forming a huge natural moat and wall around the basin. The volcanic geology of the area resulted in many mesa-topped mountains hospitable for secure habitation and fortification (Baldeón Malpartida et al. 2005: 39).

The area was also a natural hub of many environmental zones and geological diversity. Therefore, it was also a natural hub of economic activity for the different ethnic groups. For example, the Quispisisa obsidian source, the source of over 90 percent of all obsidian artifacts in the Peruvian Andes, was located only forty kilometers west of Vilcashuamán. The true extent of the source probably extended even further outward, closer to Vilcashuamán (Burger et al. 2000: 258-265). The Vilcashuamán area was also the hub for access to salt to the north near Huamanga and south in the pre-Inca province of Pomatambo¹⁰ (Carabajal 1965 [1586]). Additionally, it was the hub of gold, silver, copper, wool, and human labor sources (Carabajal 1965 [1586]; Monzón et al. 1965 [1586]; Monzón et al.b. 1965 [1586]). Because the area was

¹⁰ This Pomatambo is not the same as the Pomatambo in my study. This Pomatambo was located in what is now the Province of Parinacochas in the department of Ayacucho. It was depopulated by Toledo's *reducciones* policy, and no longer exists. It used to be the head of a large province by the same name in the pre-Inca days and encompassed parts of modern day departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Arequipa. In Guaman Poma's drawing of the battle atop what is probably Pillucho, the Pomatambos fought alongside the other ethnic groups against the Inca.

such an important economic hub, many ethnic groups maneuvered and warred with each other for control of parts of the area. It is not surprising, then, that the Incas met fierce resistance in the area. To lose the geographical hub of so many important resources would have greatly disadvantaged the various ethnic groups that had a stake in the area.

In order to secure the area, the Incas depopulated the inhabitants through war and relocation and transplanted colonists from many different foreign ethnic groups there. The new ethnic groups were kept in check by mutual mistrust and total dependence on the Inca state. The old ties were broken to make way for new ties to the Inca state. The Incas, after an initial period of militarily pacifying the area, sought to make the area a new economic, political, religious, and military hub of the Inca Empire. Breaking the autonomy of this zone would have also disrupted the natural economic exchanges between the different ethnic groups who formerly used the zone as a hub. Thus, by deeply controlling a key zone, the Incas could significantly break the economic might of the other ethnic groups they conquered.

The Incas also played on pre-existing antagonisms between the various ethnic groups already in the area. As mentioned before, the Chankas conquered the Tanquihuas, and the Soras and Lucanas had presence in the area for strategic purposes. It seems more than possible that the Tanquihuas were the natives who helped the Incas conquer the area. It is also interesting to note that Guaman Poma's depiction of the siege atop a Pucara (fortress) against the Incas did not include the Tanquihua indians. Ironically, when the Incas later implemented the *mitimaes* program and moved about a dozen other ethnic groups into the area, the Tanquihuas lost whatever autonomy over the area they initially had right after the Incas drove out competing ethnic groups.

The Incas constantly changed the landscapes, physical and imagined, of those they conquered. However, the ways and speed in which they changed these landscapes depended on many factors, including individual Incas' preferences. Because it is hard to speculate on the internal reasons of those who left no written history, only the external reasons related to economic, political, and military-strategic can be analyzed with any degree of certainty. From the data concerning the Vilcashuamán area, it seems that the Incas chose to develop and integrate *centers* of control first rather than control a contiguous territory and spread their territory of control evenly from Cuzco. The Incas established points of control linked by roads, and these points exerted their influence on the surrounding areas. Vilcashuamán seemed to be one such center.

It seems that the Vilcashuamán area was integrated more fully before other areas that were closer to Cuzco because of its geographic-strategic importance. The evolution of imperial control, from indirect to direct, seemed to happen at a much quicker pace at Vilcashuamán than surrounding areas such as Lucanas and Soras. As said before, the reason why the people of the actual provinces of Soras and Lucanas cannot remember any Inca emperor before Topa Inca, even though according to historical sources, Pachacuteq Inca conquered the region, may be because it was not until Topa Inca (Tupac Inca, Thupa Inka) that the integration of the areas surrounding the Vilcashuamán area happened. Schreiber's (1987) study of the Carhuarazo valley at Andamarca, Lucanas showed that the Incas did not integrate the area very much and did not change much of the landscape or establish new roads. In fact, other than a few storage sites and a religious site, there were relatively few signs of the state. Both the historical and the archaeological evidence point to different rates of consolidation in different areas depending on local factors. For the Vilcashuamán area, the transition from indirect to direct control seems to

have happened after the “Chanka” rebellion which led to a strong military presence in the area which in turn led to a totally restructuring of the spatial and imagined landscapes of the Vilcashuamán area. Old spatial relationships between population centers and imagined spatial relationships between religious sites gave way to the new spatial and imagined spatial relationships brought and developed by the Incas.

Chapter 4

BETWEEN THE SWORD AND THE WALL: MODERN PERUVIAN STATE STRATEGIES OF CONTROL IN POMATAMBO VILCASHUAMAN (1980-PRESENT)

Introduction

The intervening years between the fall of the Inca Empire in 1536 and the Shining Path violence of the 1980s and 90s saw many changes in Peruvian society. Periodic rebellions against the Spanish and insurgencies against the Peruvian state punctuated the political-historical landscape. With the backdrop of these rebellions and insurgencies, the area that is now Pomatambo slowly evolved into a recognized community.

In the early 17th century Pomatambo served as grazing grounds for the Rudas estate. Sometime in the late 17th and early 18th century, Pomatambo became inhabited and started to evolve into a community. Antonio de Alcedo recorded “Pomatambo” as a pueblo in the province of Vilcashuamán in the mid 18th century (Alcedo 1967 [1786]: 173). In 1877, Pomatambo had 98 inhabitants (Felipe Paz 1877). By 1922, the population had grown modestly to 136 (Stiglich 1922). Until the early part of the 20th century, Pomatambo was part of a larger hacienda called “Pomatambo y Vilcapucro (Q. Sacred Hollow)” until it fragmented into smaller properties (Castillo Vílchez 1998: 4). In 1951 or 1952, Pomatambo was officially recognized as a community. The population of Pomatambo peaked around the 1960s and 70s, with an estimated population of 300 (Webb 1996: 10).

Although there were numerous insurgencies in Ayacucho before the 1980s, none of them affected the local populace of Pomatambo as deeply as the Shining Path violence. The modern nature of warfare, the advances in technology, the bloody ideology of the Shining Path, and the

brutal counterinsurgency methods initially used by the army all contributed to a conflict that affected the people on a very deep level. In the interviews, the general consensus was that the Shining Path violence was the worst period in Pomatambo history. Most of the informants had family members killed by both the Shining Path and the army. Due to the amount of data available for analysis and the importance of such a tragic event in Peruvian history, the Shining Path conflict serves as an ideal case study to examine the state methods of control in the modern era.

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to examine what strategies the state used to put down the Shining Path insurgency in the immediate area around Pomatambo and Vilcashuamán, and what strategies the state has used and is using to keep peace in the same area since the end of the insurgency. I will trace the evolution of state tactics during several stages of the Shining Path violence and show how those tactics affected the populations in question. I will show how the desires of the community and the desires of the state interacted and interact to inform strategies of keeping peace.

Origins

On May 17th, 1980, the eve of the first Peruvian democratic election in over a decade, four masked men entered the ballot room in Chuschi, Ayacucho and burned the ballots stored for election. Later that year, dogs were hung from lamp posts and traffic lights in Lima, Peru's capital, with the accompanying signs which proclaimed, "Deng Xiao Ping¹¹, Son of a Bitch." These two seemingly unrelated and innocuous events marked the beginning of a fifteen-year

¹¹ Deng XiaoPing started the liberalizing reforms and opening up of China after the death of Mao ZeDong.

“People’s War” that would result in nearly seventy thousand deaths and bring Peruvian democracy to its knees. In the province of Vilcashuamán alone, more than 1300 people were killed or disappeared, representing more than four percent of the population (Landa and López 2005: 92).

The Shining Path found its beginnings at the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga under Abimael Gúzman Reynoso, a philosophy professor at the time. In 1959, the university reopened after being closed since 1885. A group of professors signed up with Gúzman as the committee chair. Shining Path evolved from the clandestine Maoist Red Faction started by Gúzman (Iván Degregori 1994: 52). Gúzman was born in the town of Mollendo, south of Lima into a comfortable middle-class family. He visited China several times during the Cultural Revolution and was exposed to Maoist revolutionary practices and military training.

In 1968, a leftist military coup marked the beginning of Peru’s only long-term military government (1968-1980). Unlike most other leftist groups, the Shining Path actually vehemently opposed the reform initiatives of the Velasco military regime (Palmer 1994: 2). The regime saw itself as the champion of the poor and the peasants, and initiated a rigorous agrarian reform aimed at redistributing *hacienda* land, among other initiatives.

Ironically, it was the Velasco regime that consciously opened up space for leftist groups. The regime left behind a legacy of popular mobilization from which the Shining Path sprung. The Shining Path grew in a period of economic growth and government expansion (1963-1975). They developed public education and rural development initiatives and deepened their power and influence through the university power base. From the re-opening of the university onward, 70-75 percent of the students enrolled were from Ayacucho, and many were from the rural areas. These students were exposed to the increasingly influential Marxist and Maoist ideas in the

university. These ideas formed a worldview that exalted their own class and ethnic origins, not to mention give them practical training in assisting their own people. The first cadres of the Shining Path hailed from these students (Palmer 1986: 138).

After Velasco was ousted by a coup in 1975, economic woes hit Peru and most reform initiatives were either dropped or sharply curtailed. The combination of economic woes and unresponsiveness of the state led to widespread unrest and rural sympathy for the overthrow of the regime (Webb 1996: 58). The Communist Party amply exploited the political space consciously left open for leftist groups under Velasco. The new political left was more able to mobilize popular support than the government as evidenced in the strikes of the late 1970s organized by the Communist Party, which effectively shut down the government. Through strikes and other political protest, the new left challenged not only the policies but also the core legitimacy of the state apparatus and its accompanying economic system (Mauceri 1995: 15). While the new left was challenging the state *within* the system through protest and electoral activities, the Shining Path condemned them as sell outs and sought to challenge and topple the state from outside the system.

After losing elections in the university in the mid 1970s, the Shining Path turned its back on it and made no serious attempt to regain the lost positions. At this time, it formed popular schools in the countryside and set up more bases of support there. It constantly denounced the government and furthered its own agenda especially through teaching posts in rural and provincial public schools. It was expelled from the Maoist movement in Peru and formally began its armed struggle to topple the state as it transitioned to democratic rule (Palmer 1994: 2).

Ideologically, the Shining Path members believed themselves to be the true Marxists and purists. They were a party built from the top down and ideology out. They toed the party line:

“The line decides everything (Iván Degregori 1994: 54).” Most of their leaders came from elsewhere, usually coastal urban settings. The opportunity to put their university learned principles to practice in the countryside, with all of its rigors including learning Quechua, gave these *senderistas* a sense of superiority to their fellow teachers, students, and even Marxist colleagues who had not put their principles into practice in the rural areas. They believed that they were the true vanguard of the rural proletariat (Palmer 1986: 138). Gúzman and his Shining Path saw themselves as the platform for a worldwide Marxist revolution.

On April 19th, 1980, a month before the first Shining Path public actions, Abimael Gúzman Reynoso delivered the famous “We Are the Initiators” speech close to the Shining Path’s First Military School. He started the speech with “We are the initiators. We must recognize this deep in our souls. This is a historic meeting,” and ends with, “The future lies in guns and cannons! The armed revolution has begun! Glory to Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought! Let us initiate the armed struggle!”¹² The Shining Path instituted a “blood quota” which requires a certain amount of blood to be spilled before the revolution, Peruvian and worldwide, could succeed. A 1985 Shining Path manuscript explained the quota to the faithful:

About the quota: the stamp of commitment to our revolution, to world revolution, with the blood of the people that runs in our country...Most [of the deaths] are caused by the reaction [of the state] and fewer by us. They fill lakes while we only soak our handkerchiefs (Gorriti 2005: 340).

Another Shining Path document stated: “Blood makes us stronger and if it’s this ‘bath’ that the armed forces have made for us, the blood is flowing, it’s not harming us but making us stronger (Gorriti 2005: 340).” The quota glorified violence and bloodshed, because it was necessary to give life to the revolution. The blood spilled would fertilize the ground for the seeds of

¹² This speech appears in Luis Arca Borja, ed. *Guerra Popular en el Perú* (Brussels: Author, 1989) and was translated by Orin Starn, Carlos Iván Degregori, and Robin Kirk in *Peru Reader* (2005).

revolution. Death and its fascinating attraction held much sway over the senderistas as can be seen in this anonymous ballad written by a senderista in 1984:

On the way out of Aucayacu
there's a body, who could it be?
Surely it's a peasant
Who gave his life for the struggle
...Today the quota must be filled
If we have to give our blood
for revolution, how good it will be (Gorriti 2005: 341).

And thus began *chaqwa* (Q. “Violent Disorder”) and *Manchay Tiempo* (Q.+Sp. “Time of Fear”) that would grip Peru for the next fifteen or so years: Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology “purified” in a bath of blood, peasant blood.


Strategies of state control in Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán

In this section, I will trace the evolution of strategies of control involving the suppression of the Shining Path in the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area. The strategies could be characterized thus:

Time Period	Strategy/ies Used
1980-1982	Neglect
1983-mid 80s	Aggressive counterinsurgency and military repression
mid 80s-1990	Mix of repression and developmentalist approaches
1990-2000	Developmentalist approach combined with rondas campesinas

The graph below shows the intensity of violence through the number of locals dead from 1980-1997.

Vilcashuaman: dead and disappeared, 1980-1997



Source: Landa and López 2005: 92

Early years (1980-1982)

In the early years, the Shining Path had much leeway to do what it wanted because the state had very little presence in the areas where they were most active. The police then, as now, had very little presence in the countryside. This was mainly due to the lack of interest in developing the area and also the lack of paved roads. The city of Ayacucho was only finally connected to the coast in the mid 1960s with the building of the Via de los Libertadores (Palmer 1986: 134). By the late 1980s, only 10 percent of all Peruvian roads were paved, most of them on the coast and not in the highlands (Mauceri 1995: 12). Second of all, the Shining Path did not participate in the leftist protests of the late 1970s, so they were low on the state's radar. Third of all, the Shining Path did not start any military actions against the state in the province of

Vilcashuamán until the latter half of 1981 when they assassinated the mayor of Concepción district in Vilcashuamán (CVR 2003: 60).

The earliest violent actions taken by the Shining Path in the area were against *hacienda* owners and not the state. It is important to note that the first violent actions taken by SL (Shining Path) occurred near Pomatambo. Because SL believed that haciendas were representatives of the old oppressive order, the presence of two of the five remaining functioning medium-large sized haciendas in Cangallo province (which included Vilcashuamán before 1984)¹³ made Pomatambo and its immediate zone a logical choice to initiate the armed revolution against the old order. In August of 1980, the Shining Path assassinated hacendado Benigno Medina (CVR 2003: 60) in Pomatambo. Later that year, on Christmas Eve, they assassinated the administrator of *hacienda* San Augustín de Ayzarca, near Pomatambo. After torturing and killing the administrator of Ayzarca, they went on to attack other small haciendas in the valley. In March of 1981, SL returned and dynamited the abandoned *haciendas* (Castillo Vílchez 1998: 93). The haciendas in the area were very small-scale operations compared to larger haciendas on the coast of Peru. The locals were not sufficiently oppressed by them to feel liberated by SL assassinations, but rather apprehensive.

When SL first arrived in Pomatambo, they forced the villagers to meet and said that everyone was going to work together and that the *hacendados* were going to disappear. Some of the first actions of SL in Pomatambo included threatening and in some cases, killing authorities, organizing the children to insult their parents, carrying out summary executions of local thieves and other miscreants, preventing local authorities from carrying out their duties, establishing escuelas populares (Sp. “popular schools”), and holding regular meetings. SL would start village

¹³ The other haciendas were Ichocca, Rurunmarca, Vilcapucro (Pomatambo), Ayzarca (near Pomatambo), and Occenay (CVR 2003: 28).

assemblies by invoking Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought and then give talks (Castillo Vilchez 1998: 98). According to the local schoolteacher, when SL first arrived, they went from door to door telling people that the authorities (of the state) were going to disappear. Initially, some of the younger Pomatamban males supported SL because SL stressed the moderate vision of more land to each peasant and more education. The females were generally apathetic, partly due to being monolingual, for SL leaders were initially from the coast and spoke Spanish part of the time (Webb 1996: 75).

As opposed to the killing of the *haciendados*, which did not garner either support or opposition, the actions that did gain some initial sympathy for SL were the administering of justice against a wife-beater and cattle thieves. However, this sympathy was quickly lost once they started killing rich peasants that were not unpopular with their fellow villagers and had strong kinship ties (Webb 1996: 71). Because Pomatambo was isolated at that time to strong market forces outside, there was little class differentiation. What little economic disparity existed was tempered by the richer peasants hosting festivals and engaging in community rituals. Therefore, the rhetoric of class war did not resonate very much with Pomatambans (Webb 1996). A little later, they started to take the initial administering of justice to extremes, which decreased support among the villagers. Their punishments for petty crimes like cattle rustling would all be executions, which was abhorrent to the villagers who believed in “punish but don’t kill.”

The local schoolteacher related an event when he received a note from SL telling him to meet them on the outskirts of Pomatambo at 7pm. He went to the meeting shaking, unsure if they were going to kill him. Once there, SL told him there was evidence of cattle rustling and asked him to identify the perpetrators so they could execute them. The schoolteacher persuaded them to hold off and give them another chance because the perpetrators were only poor peasants.

Later, the schoolteacher gathered about twenty of the peasants and warned them, and they were grateful that he had convinced SL not to kill them. According to numerous informants, the Shining Path may have been more moral than the armed forces, but they did not respect life and freedom of opinion. If one did not want to cooperate with SL, they would execute. SL prohibited religion and community rituals. In this way, many of the traditional authorities were threatened and some even killed because they had occupied the political space that SL wanted to control.

Not only did SL want to control the political space, it also wanted to control the economic space of the village through limiting self-sufficient practices and mobility in and out of the village to do petty trading. Some of the practices they wanted to abolish were the decentralized household production of food and decentralized childrearing. They wanted to collectivize these activities, which in turn was met by hostility by the women, as they saw these efforts as encroachments to their power. The Shining Path had burned *varas* or staffs of office of the traditional *varayoc* authorities in many of the villages. Pomatambo's *vaca* escaped the fire because the villagers had hidden it. Many, if not most, villagers resented the loss of freedom that came with SL and went to great lengths to continue their commercial activities by taking circuitous routes to Vilcashuamán's market and concealing cash in their shoes (Webb 1996: 104). The Shining Path wanted to cut off Pomatambo from the state and from traditional authorities so that the villagers would depend on the Shining Path as the sole source of political authority.

This period of state neglect was due to the isolation of Pomatambo and also SL attacking hacendados, local authorities, and thieves, none of whom were state agents. The state had just reverted to civilian control, so these events went under the radar. This period abruptly ended

with Shining Path's first attack on the state in Concepción in July 1981. They had begun assassinating authorities of the state instead of just incapacitating non-state traditional authorities. They assassinated the mayor of Concepción. On December 10, 1981, the national government finally took notice and put under a state of emergency five of the seven Ayacucho provinces: Huamanga, Huanta, Cangallo (including Vilcashuamán), La Mar, and Víctor Fajardo. Early next year, in March, the Shining Path launched an all out war against the meager state police forces (the Civil Guard) in Vilcashuamán. President Belaúnde's visit to Vilcashuamán near the end of March 1982 probably set off the beginning of the attacks. On March 26, 1982, SL entered the *hacienda* Vilcashuamán and killed the owner. Five days later, on March 31, SL launched an attack on the Civil Guard in Vilcashuamán. Later that year, on July 28, they launched yet another attack. Less than a month later, on August 22, 1982, the Civil Guard and the Municipality building were completely destroyed by SL, and seven policemen died in the attack. Shortly after, the leader of the Civil Guard and the Minister of the Interior arrived to assess the crisis in the Vilcashuamán area (CVR 2003: 30). With these bold actions, SL initiated a period of immense suffering for the area, as the peasants became caught between SL and the army.

Middle years (1983-mid 1980s)

At the beginning of this period, the violence was concentrated in Ayacucho. However, as the aggressive military counterinsurgency picked up, the Shining Path was prevented from having permanent bases, and the violence spread to other parts of the country (Kent 1993: 445). Around 1984-1985, the Shining Path established bases elsewhere in the highland Andes. A comparison of the intensities of violence in different parts of Peru over time shows this geographical migration of the most intense violence.

The armed forces tried to root out SL by establishing military bases at key points and permanently headquartered in these relatively secure bases to prevent SL from taking full control of the area. The closest base to Pomatambo was the one on the outskirts of Vilcashuamán (8.5 kilometers away). It was located about a kilometer west of the Vilcashuamán plaza. It was located on a high plain from which it could see Vilcashuamán and westward easily. Other military bases in the province were in Concepción (13.5 kilometers away), Huambalpa (12.5 kilometers away), and Vischongo (19 kilometers away) (Figure 10) (CVR 2003: 30-38, 52-53). The military bases formed a clamp around the SL encampments to the east.




Figure 10: Military bases in Vilcashuamán province during SL violence.

Interestingly, the base at Vilcashuamán was situated near a road navigable only on foot, for vehicles could not easily handle the uphill climb from Vilcashuamán. This was probably to control the movements of SL into Vilcashuamán, since SL relied on foot traffic. With the strong

presence of the armed forces in the area, SL could no longer move about freely and only dared to do so at night, when the armed forces did not move. The types of transport that the armed forces used were trucks and helicopters, which are dangerous to navigate in the pitch darkness.

Although the aggressive counterinsurgency led to the migration of the main fronts of SL, SL's presence in the area was far from eradicated. Violence reached its highest levels at the end of this period, as SL fought to keep their bases of control, and the armed forces swooped into these areas and killed SL cadres. The army also broke their permanent bases of control through the indiscriminate killing of peasants. These acts instilled fear into the populace and made them even more reluctant to help SL, knowing that SL would abandon them to the onslaught of the armed forces by day. It was a lose-lose situation for peasants, as they were accused of being collaborators on both sides. One Pomatambo informant told me, "La comunidad no sabía con quién confiar." *The community did not know whom to trust.* During the violence, a Pomatamban couple was accused of being army informants. SL came into their house at night and shot them in front of their children, leaving orphans.

This was a very traumatic time for the villagers, as trust between villagers declined drastically, the traditional rituals were suppressed, and the number of dead soared. Very conservatively, seventeen Pomatambans died as a direct result of the violence, representing at least five or six percent of the total population at the time. I estimate that the total number of Pomatambans killed probably approached ten percent of the population. This was a time of chaos, as the armed forces swept in during the day and SL swooped in during the night. This was also the time when the villagers covered up the cave atop Aya Orqo in fear of the military disappearing people into it. After 1983, the initial leaders of SL moved to the new fronts of the conflict outside of Ayacucho, leaving new and inexperienced cadres in charge. According to

Castillo Vilchez, a native of Pomatambo, the lack of restraint shown by SL toward the peasants was due to the old leaders moving to the new fronts. Many of these new leaders would indiscriminately kill peasants, often to resolve age-old grudges and carry out revenge (Castillo Vilchez 1998: 90).

By the end of 1985, the vast majority of the old SL leaders had moved to the new fronts, and the worst violence was over in the area. However, in the more isolated areas of Vilcashuamán province, there was residual SL presence. This was when the state committed the worst massacres against civilians in the more isolated areas. In a push to purge the area of SL, the armed forces killed indiscriminately. It did not help that a significant portion of them came from the coast, where dominant stereotypes existed about the highlanders being terrorists, dirty and ignorant (Starn et al. 2005: 357). In a memoir of a soldier who fought against SL, he said “To be straight with you, the *cholo*¹⁴ is like an animal for me...He does it, and then he sleeps” (Starn et al. 2005: 361). In late 1985 through 1986, some of the most tragic incidents happened in the more isolated peasant communities near SL encampments. In Accomarca on August 14, 1985, the army shot and killed sixty-nine villagers. In Bellavista and Umaro on August 28, 1985, the army detained a number of villagers and then shot dead 59 of them as they tried to escape (CVR 2003: 61). The general responsible for these actions, Telmo Hurtado, is now wanted as a war criminal.

In October of 1986, disaster struck Pomatambo, Parcco, and Pujas. On October 8, as the villagers of Pujas were celebrating their *fiesta patronal* outside, an army helicopter came and shot dead thirty-two villagers. Very soon after, on the night of October 22, the army committed one of the worst atrocities during the violence at Pomatambo. It was around 7:30 P.M. when it

¹⁴ Derogatory term used for mestizos or Indians wanting to be white. Here, it is used against all peasants in the highland Andes.

happened. The village authorities were making *chicha*, the traditional fermented corn drink, in preparation for a sports event. Soldiers entered and were offered *chicha*. All was fine until there was some commotion in the plaza outside. The soldiers turned on their flashlights to find a senderista entering the plaza half-drunk on a horse. Machine gun shots rang out and the horse thrashed about injured. The soldiers captured the senderista to torture and interrogate him, but the senderista remained mute. Perhaps in frustration at the senderista's uncooperativeness, the soldiers hauled all the Pomatamban authorities out of the communal house and beat them. They were taken prisoner and marched toward Huaccaña and then to Parcco, the direction from which the senderista came. The prisoners arrived at Parcco 5 A.M. the next morning in a very bad state from cuts and beating. The soldiers took more prisoners at Parcco and shot two octogenarians in their bed. After two more hours of interrogating the prisoners of Pomatambo and Parcco, the soldiers took the prisoners out to the square one by one and hacked and shot them to death. Then they burned their bodies and threw them down a ravine, where they were found later (Castillo Vilchez 1998: 103-105).

It is not surprising that villagers were very disaffected with both SL and the army. While the aggressive counterinsurgency decreased violence near the centers in Ayacucho like Vilcashuamán, it increased violence in the outskirts where it was harder for the army to get to. The army first concentrated on controlling the centers by putting bases there and then extended their purges outward in the direction of SL encampments at Umara, Mayupampa, Huamanmarca, Parqocucho, and Lloqlapampa (CVR 2003: 55), leaving a trail of destruction behind.

The exodus years (mid 1980s-1990)

After the Pomatambo massacre of 1986, the exodus from Pomatambo accelerated greatly. By 1993, the population had declined from around 300 to 188 (INEI 1993). The provinces of

Cangallo and Vilcashuamán had the worst depopulation during the violence of all of Ayacucho, losing nearly half of the population (CVR 2003). Vilcashuamán province itself lost a third of its population from 1981 to 1993 (Gamarra Guillén 1998: 40). The number of dead and disappeared reached a low point during this time, but they were still frequent as the army swept over the area periodically disappearing people they suspected of being collaborators. By this time, the number of senderistas in the area probably did not exceed one hundred and were confined to the extremely isolated areas to the east and south banks of the Pampas River, where it was impossible for vehicles to travel and dangerous for helicopters to fly. Because the military bases were located often more than a day's round-trip walk from these hideouts, and not to mention the extremely difficult landscape and gasping high altitude, SL maintained a diminished although tenacious presence in the area. The most intense SL violence was stepped up in urban areas like Ayacucho and Lima.

In the national context, the military had been ineffectually alternating between the Argentine “repressive” approach and the “developmentalist” approach, which emphasized the need for economic development in the countryside (Mauceri 1995: 25). From 1982, the military was in charge of designing counterinsurgency strategy, but it was highly fragmented due to the differing opinions inside the military on which strand of strategy, repressive or developmentalist, was most effective in countering SL (Mauceri 1995: 25). The effectiveness and the character of counterinsurgency depended on the individual general in charge of a specific area, and gains made against SL could be as quickly lost due to change in leadership. For example, initially in the Upper Huallaga valley, the counterinsurgency was very successful due to a combination of good counterinsurgency and astute political tactics. The military had a working knowledge of political geography: they would pursue the insurgents aggressively, cut off and control the

mountain escape routes, and made it clear to the locals that they were only after SL and not the coca-farming peasants or the drug traffickers. This way, they were able to control the movements of SL and severely limit their effectiveness by undercutting local support. However, these gains were quickly lost with the change in military leadership (Gonzalez 1994: 134-135).

In the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area, the military leadership was inept so the presence of SL was never completely destroyed. The indiscriminate killing of peasants did not help the state's cause, as some people took up arms with SL to avenge family members killed. The unwillingness of the military to establish permanent encampments in the remote areas where SL had its presence also prolonged the violence, which caught the peasants in between. The small populations of the villages also prevented them from getting a permanent army or police station to protect the local populace from SL's presence at night. In the late 1980s and early nineties, the requests by peasants for garrisons to be established in their villages skyrocketed (Starn 1995: 562), but the smaller villages like Pomatambo were rarely if ever accommodated with one. Furthermore, the lower numbers of people dead during this era may be partly due to the massive migration to the cities, especially Ayacucho. In effect, the absolute number of dead may have been lower but the ratio may still have been comparable. The smaller rural communities were still effectively ignored by the state, prolonging the suffering from SL and state alike.

Later years: Rondas and Rounding up the Shining Path (1990-2000)

Since the beginning of the violence, Peru had gone through two ineffectual presidencies, Belaúnde and García. Under García, inflation had reached 1700 percent. Real wages in 1989 were half of what they were in 1980, which in turn were half of what they had been in the mid-1970s. In effect, people on average were four times poorer in 1989 than in the mid-1970s. (Mauceri 1995: 26). By the end of the decade, Peru no longer had any international credit due to

its inability to pay off the massive amount of foreign debt accumulated on top of the fifteen billion dollars spent on the counterinsurgency (Mauceri 1995: 25).

When it came time for elections in 1990, the people of Peru picked the political unknown Alberto Fujimori, an agronomist by trade. He is generally credited with the breaking of SL because he centralized the intelligence services and the military strategy, in addition to using developmentalist approaches to gain popular support. To further his objectives and consolidate power, he staged a “self-coup” against the legislature in 1992, bringing an end to the twelve years of turbulent civilian rule. Many of the practices he used against SL were already in existence, but were not centralized. To solve the problem of multiple counterinsurgency strategies within the institution, he reconstructed the military and kept only the personnel that agreed with him. He used troops to carry out state actions that were once the responsibilities of the ineffectual police: distribute food, obliterate SL graffiti, maintain public order, assert state authority, guard prisons, and accompany tax collectors (Mauceri 1995: 20). His policy of the expansion of military role to policing and organizing social groups to fight against SL was vigorously pursued.

Although both strategies were pursued during Belaúnde and García’s tenures to a limited extent, Fujimori made them the centerpiece of his administration (Mauceri 1995: 24). On the ground, this policy worked nicely with the increase of soldiers recruited from the highlands instead of the coastal areas in the late 1980s. This created new ties between the peasantry and the army, and contributed to a partial shift of the military’s image “from occupiers to protectors (Starn 1995: 562).” This convergence reflected a change in tone of state policy. Finally, the state became somewhat engaged with the rural populace in a positive fashion. Furthermore, this undercut some of the legitimacy SL had in the rural areas.

Perhaps the most effective social program extensively developed and encouraged during Fujimori's tenure was the *rondas campesinas*, self-defense committees established in the countryside and shantytowns. These rondas have their origins in totally autonomous rondas created by villagers in the north of Peru. These rondas were so successful in impeding SL that the rondas were self-organized with little prodding from the Peruvian military (Starn 1995: 563). Even though the peasants were supplied with simple rifles, the level of impotence felt by the peasants greatly diminished with their newfound ability to defend themselves. The military established rondas among peasants in Vilcashuamán in 1993 to have a permanent resistance against SL there (Starn 1995: 563). The rondas were being used at least until 1996 in the Vilcashuamán area. It also helped that in 1992, Abimael Gúzman was captured in Lima along with documents identifying the main leaders of SL. A government crackdown shortly after decapitated the leadership of SL and extremely limited their potency. Gúzman, who has asthma, could not hide out in the remote highlands and hid out in Lima instead. Ironically, this geographical limitation contributed to SL's downfall.

Fujimori also emphasized rural development programs on the ground. He improved roads, built water systems, established schools, and distributed food aid to the villages in Vilcashuamán, garnering much popular support. These programs effectively destroyed whatever sympathy was left for SL, who never delivered to the villagers such programs. In my surveys, two of the men, ages 26 and 21, cited the Fujimori era as the best in Pomatamban history because he stopped the terrorism, provided aid, and established the schools. A 74 year old said that Fujimori was better than Belaúnde and García because he actually visited the area and gave it some much needed development. Another man, who looks like he is in his thirties, said that he respects Fujimori because he stopped the terrorism and provided work for the countryside (in the

rural development projects). According to an expatriate of Pomatambo, a small portion of Pomatambans want Fujimori back because he provided visible benefits to the countryside: reforestation, schools, potable water, and so on. Only one Pomatamban interviewed had explicitly negative views about Fujimori. He was in his mid to late forties and remembers that things got worse under Fujimori because he had closed down and privatized the factories. As with their experiences with the Shining Path, Pomatambans do not decouple political ideology from actions. During the latter part of his presidency, some people even migrated back to the area.

By 1998, there was virtually no SL activity in Vilcashuamán province, and SL itself retreated to the eastern jungles greatly diminished in numbers. However, the years of violence had left their toll on the psychologies and the social connections of people in the area. Alcoholism and its accompanying social problems such as domestic abuse increased greatly. Trust between villagers decreased greatly, and the traditional authorities no longer existed. The Shining Path and the trauma that resulted from the violence had destroyed the *varayoq* system and greatly diminished the traditional reciprocity practices of *ayni* and *minka*. *Ayni* is reciprocity of labor between individuals, and *minka* is reciprocity between an individual and a group of individuals mobilized for a certain project, such as house-building. Pomatambo had also become dependent on food aid from the Fujimori administration, which cut into the necessity of having *ayni* and *minka* (Webb 1996: 112). Contact with outside became much more systematic and frequent, and the repairing of the road in 1996 allowed vehicle traffic to come into Pomatambo. James Scott wrote that war, revolution, and economic collapse often radically weaken civil society as well as make the populace more receptive to new ideologies and social structures (Scott 1998: 5). Certainly, the years of violence greatly weakened civil society in Pomatambo

and its surrounding area. It has also made the community more receptive to changes than before the violence.

Despite the generally positive views of Fujimori in Pomatambo, in the national context, Fujimori's strongest supporters were ironically the military, international financial agencies, and domestic business groups, hardly the traditional allies of the poor peasants (Mauceri 1995: 18). Fujimori and supporters forged a neo-liberal state-rebuilding project that emphasized a reduction in the state's direct role in productive functions through privatization, undercutting labor and actually increasing the state's power in the economy (Mauceri 1995: 28). All of Fujimori's actions, the increased militarization, developmentalist policies in the countryside, self-coup, and increased authoritarianism, served to further the neoliberal agenda by strengthening the state against autonomous resistance:

Fujimori's 'autogolpe' of April 1992 was the culminating response of an attempt to restructure the state and its relations with society through a combination of neoliberal economic reforms and authoritarian political methods. These efforts have been supported by a coalition of interests—including the technocratic elites, the military, business, and the international financial community—that coalesced around Fujimori to reverse the structural decline in state capabilities taking place in Peru for over a decade. Although each of these groups has its own agenda, the logic underlying the coalition and the administration it supports has been the necessity of strengthening the state in the areas required to carry out a neoliberal modernization of the economy and society (Mauceri 1995: 32).

The economic effects of these policies on Pomatambo were the increased dependence on cash and less self-sufficiency. The dependence on cash and the out-migration of the men to acquire it meant the decreasing importance of women's roles in bartering, agriculture, and ritual preparation of food and drink. It also decreased the necessity of the community to survive in the harsh Andean world. It is important to note that the Pomatambans who expressed positive views of Fujimori were men and not women. Even something as seemingly positive as better education is a double-edged sword due to the content of what is taught. Anthropologist Babb points out

that many Peruvian women resent the school system for usurping their traditional importance in the education of children and propagating a *mestizo* ideology of gender and hierarchy (Babb 1985: 191). The establishment of secondary schools outside of Pomatambo means that there is an out-migration of teenagers to Pujas and Vilcashuamán. According to the local nurse, this creates a lot of social problems because the teenagers rent rooms and live together with no parental supervision. Teen pregnancy has become a serious problem in the past decade in the area.

Another policy pursued by the state during this time was a sterilization program for rural women. There has been much controversy over the practice, and some estimate that up to 200,000 rural women were sterilized by the state, mostly against their will (BBC 2002). Women in rural villages like Pomatambo might see this as yet another encroachment of the state into their lives. These changes reflect a growing dependence on the state rather than the community. As a result of Fujimori's agenda to strengthen the national government, the state became more capable in delivering services and enforcing authority. This increase in state capacity also gave the state more economic and social leverage over rural communities.

Pomatambo and the Peruvian state today (2001-Present)

In 2000, Fujimori began his third term as president after circumventing the constitutional limit of two. However, a series of corruption scandals forced him out of office soon after. The next year, the first relatively fair presidential elections were held. The man elected was Alejandro Toledo, of humble origins and native appearance. In the next five years, Peru's economy grew by about five percent a year. Despite this growth, the state was still viewed as illegitimate by most Peruvians, and Toledo at one point had the lowest approval rating in all of Latin America: 9 percent (Emery 2005).

At the Vilcabuamán provincial level, state-society relations were changing in some important ways, and its isolated and neglected days were over. With the involvement of NGOs, local government officials, and the local community leaders, a dynamic dialectic between rival development visions played out at Vilcabuamán. Both visions seek to lessen the effects of SL violence and to prevent something like it from occurring in the future. The first vision falls into the Fujimori camp: decentralization of local political and economic power and centralization of national state power. The decentralization includes privatization of land by communities and individuals, and the centralization involves connecting the Vilcabuamán area into the national economic and political system. In effect, the area would be less likely to rebel because there would be less local political autonomy in the peasant communities and more dependence on the state government and economy to survive.

The second vision stresses democratic involvement with the local communities and engaging with the local traditions and culture, integrating the technological advantages of development with a respect for the local culture and customs. Under this vision, the area would be less likely to rebel because the state would become democratically responsive to local wishes and respect the values of the communities. Furthermore, an emphasis on reviving cultural practices through government facilitation and education would strengthen both state legitimacy and local capacity to resist “foreign” ideologies like the anti-tradition ones espoused by the Shining Path.

Both visions stress decentralization of some sort, education, road building, tourism, involvement with NGOs, and bringing modern technology to the area. However, the purposes behind these common general methods are very different. The main difference between these two visions is what role they see peasantry in having in the future. The first vision sees a

minimized role or a greatly changed role. The second vision sees a maximized role in terms of cultural renaissance and restoration of economic viability of the area without a drastic change in local values. Both visions welcome development and change. Some of the programs each emphasize overlap, but a mechanism is only secondary to the purpose. What are some of the specifics of each vision, and how is Pomatambo affected?

First Vision

In my experience, the mayor of Vilcashuamán and the government agricultural program PRONAMACHS reflect the ideals of the first vision. They both expressed distaste for peasant values and autonomy, and favored decentralization of power to the lowest official level but above the community level. The mayor, Otto Castro Mendoza, was born in Vilcashuamán but spent three years in Lima from 1989 to 1992. He said that the most difficult aspect of his job has been to change and put good sense in the backward peasants who resist change. He says, “...[N]o quieren cambiar en si mismos, no son progresistas, no tienen visión, no han viajado...”

They don't want to change themselves, they are not progressive, they don't have vision, they have not traveled. He said that it was difficult to develop the people. He has a fairly negative view of community customs: “...[E]stán acostumbrados a la ociosidad, trabajan sólo entre las 11 y las 3 cada día, deben trabajar más, deben captar mayores recursos para sus familias, no sólo para autoconsumo.” *They are accustomed to laziness, they work only between 11 and 3 each day, they need to work more, they should acquire more resources for their families and not just for subsistence.* The reality is that the peasants actually work from seven or eight in the morning to until an hour before sunset.

Regarding policies, the mayor says his main contributions have been in educational infrastructure, which is consistent with his belief that the biggest challenge is to change the

“backward” values of the peasants. He also favors other infrastructure: water, electricity, and employment. He says that the local population does not currently pay for water and electricity, and that this is bad because the habit of getting things free needs to be changed. Taxes would also give the local government more power over the rural communities. He believes that the state should clearly recognize private land titles because that would allow speculation and the increase in land values. Without these titles, he says, the people only want to sit on their land and subsist. He also says, somewhat wishfully, that the *minka* was formerly the mode of work, but now all people want to get paid. This is factually incorrect, as the rural communities and even people in the town Vilcashuamán still regularly employ *minka*, although less frequently than before the 1980s.

He favors trade-led rural development of rural areas and the exportation of agricultural goods internationally. In order for that to happen, he says, the free trade treaty needs to be ratified and agriculture mechanized. He also believes that tourism and agriculture could work together to develop the area. The development of mechanized agriculture would increase productivity, and the development of infrastructure (hotels, asphalted roads, good restaurants, internet access, etc) would encourage tourism. Most of his support, he says, comes from the urban areas. His views and the power he has show the influence of the first vision in the governmental policies of Vilcashuamán.

Other governmental programs like PRONAMACHS (Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hidrograficas y Conservación de Suelos) and JUNTOS reflect more of the first vision than the second. PRONAMACHS’s purpose is to improve agricultural yield and efficiency through teaching peasants more efficient agricultural methods, methods of conserving soil, and irrigation methods; it has a project MIMA-POMATAMBO in the Vilcashuamán area. JUNTOS

is a social program which gives 100 soles a month (U.S. \$31) to rural women in exchange for the women meeting specific goals each month (keeping children in school, etc).

PRONAMACHS attitude toward peasants was very evident in a 2006 PRONAMACHS report of the impact of the MIMA-POMATAMBO program (2000-present). Despite the reported misgivings of the peasants about the program, PRONAMACHS still insisted that the failures were not due to themselves. The general consensus of the villagers was that PRONAMACHS did not deliver the promised technical aid, had little rapport with the villagers, gave confusing technical advice, and sold equipment to the villagers that was overpriced relative to the market. They surveyed ten peasants from each of the eleven communities in the Pomatambo river basin. Despite the claims given by the villagers, PRONAMACHS attributed MIMA-POMATAMBO's lack of success to the peasants' passivity, poor organization, lack of dynamism, and having no market outlet to encourage production. PRONAMACHS often complained about the lack of respect and trust they got from the villagers (PRONAMACHS 2006). PRONAMACHS is part of a larger strategy by the government to advance agricultural techniques, and in the case of MIMA-POMATAMBO, without regard to the complaints by peasants.

Although JUNTOS was welcomed by several women in Pomatambo, our research assistant remarked that up until recently, the women had to travel to Huamanga, a five hour van ride away, to collect the money. Sometimes, the long lines would force them to stay overnight there. Because it costs 24 soles round trip, plus hotel fees, most of the 100 soles given per month had been wasted on transportation to and from Huamanga. While I was in Vilcashuamán, they allowed women from the local communities to collect the money in Vilcashuamán. At the end of each month, the women would wait in a line three blocks long to collect the money. Certainly, the program brings much needed economic aid to the women, and enables them to buy

necessities for their children like shoes. However, it also makes them more dependent on the state through the growing importance of cash and governmental institutions like the bank. Another effect is that they depend less on the community to provide the necessities for survival. Our research assistant remarked that 100 soles a month is not very much, and that the money could be spent more efficiently on infrastructure aimed at helping these women.

Second vision

The second vision has many of the same methods as the first: actively utilizing governmental agencies, NGOs, favoring decentralization, opening up the area to some form of global market, and improving education. However, the tone and purpose of the methods used are markedly different from the first vision. For one thing, the agents that subscribe to this vision tend to value traditional culture and see it as the starting point to meaningful development. The people who subscribe to this vision have revived the *varayoq* system, are involved with reviving traditional artisan skills, stress the importance of education infused with respect for their own culture, and see small local businesses as a way to bring economic support and dignity for the war-torn area. They stress that the strengthening of traditional authorities like the *varayoqs* and incorporating them into the official state apparatus combined with an education that arms the young vulnerable minds with toolkits to resist dangerous ideologies. It is a very productive way of preserving their valuable culture and keeping peace at the same time. It also gives an ethnographic element to tourism, instead of just focusing on archaeological sites. María Gutiérrez and the NGO Chirapaq are examples of this second vision. Generally, these people find their support in the rural areas.

María Gutiérrez is a local politician who served as *gobernadora* of Vilcashuamán province from 2002 to 2004. A charming woman in her 50s, her role was to implement laws

from above and was similar to that of a chief law enforcement official. She was born in Vilcashuamán but lived in Huamanga (Ayacucho) for 29 years. She came back because of her aged parents and because her husband retired. She has been involved in politics for only four years. She stresses the importance of reviving the customs of the area, as she sees them as an invaluable economic, cultural, and political asset for the better welfare of the people. Her way of carrying herself was very different than the mayor, Otto Castro Mendoza. Instead of interviewing her in her office, she came outside to speak to us, frequently greeting and talking to the locals in Quechua.

After the interview, she went to her local community Estancia Pata to celebrate a fiesta and to carry out her “cargo” or duty contributing to the fiesta. She says, “Nuestras comunidades han perdido sus costumbres.” *Our communities have lost their customs.* She is very keen on reviving them to restore dignity to her people. In fact, she was the main governmental actor in the revival of the *varayoq* (traditional authority) system in Vilcashuamán province. She saw the revival as a good way to counter the problems of petty crime, domestic abuse, and alcoholism in the communities. During her tenure as gobernadora, she began working with the older generation because she felt she could rely on them and their customs as a resource and not as a setback. She said that most people in Vilcashuamán applauded her for the revival, and the new *varayoqs* from the different communities had a *varayoq* parade in Vilcashuamán to show their solidarity.

In addition to reviving and making the *varayoq* system officially recognized by the state, María Gutiérrez applauds the work that NGOs have done in combating domestic abuse and alcoholism. After the violence, more and more distilled alcohol was drunk instead of the milder chicha prepared locally. The potency of the new alcohol combined with the trauma that resulted

from SL violence led to a very serious alcoholism problem in the area. María Gutiérrez cites alcoholism as the most difficult problem she is faced with. She also respects JUNTOS for enabling destitute women. To revive the economy of the area, she also believes that traditional customs could play a seminal role. She believes that the lost artisan skills need to be revived so that the economy could be diversified, and that the people could be more self-sufficient and acquire capital more easily, without losing any dignity and love for their own culture.

To achieve these goals, she believed that block grants from the government with no strings attached could be a very good solution. This way, the local people could resolve their own problems through the democratic political system. María Gutiérrez seemed to have a lot of faith in the political system, seeing it as a source of liberation rather than oppression. Despite her optimism, she told us that the future of the community would depend on who was in power. She says that sometimes subsequent officeholders undo previous good works. This brings us back to Otto Castro Mendoza, who seemed to be against María Gutiérrez, even denying she had any role in the revival of the *varayoq* system and telling us that she was not around. The clash of the two visions is very real, and the future of the community in Vilcashuamán will depend on who is in power. Naturally, one would think that in a democratic electoral system, the people decide. However, because the electoral laws are written so that a party with only 15 percent of the total votes could win all the seats in local government, the system clearly favors the first vision. It is a winner-take-all system where the party with the biggest absolute number of votes wins all the seats. Currently, the party in power is the same party as former presidential candidate Lourdes Flores, supporting business and urban development. This is paradoxical because the party had only won about 15 percent of the total votes.

Chirapaq is yet another example of the second vision. A woman from Pujas who wanted to help the community founded it in 1986. It is largely funded by its own resources and aid from the Netherlands. It has a variety of programs under its wing, but emphasizes continuing the tradition of crafts through elders teaching in the schools and a strong respect for Andean cultures. A representative from Chirapaq visited Pomatambo while we were there and talked with the local leaders about a new crafts program aimed at teaching children ceramic and art skills. The man told us that Chirapaq programs are started literally by biking to a community and talking with the neglected elders there. He described going to a fiesta and buying coca leaves to talk to the elders sitting in the corner of the plaza. The organization aims to have international ties through the export of locally made crafts. By doing this, local people, especially the young, could have a diversified economic base. It might also lessen the exodus of the young into the cities by providing reasonable paying jobs. This is crucial to the survival of these communities, as the age distributions are very skewed by the low numbers of young people. Young people are needed to continue the community traditions, participate in the *minkas* and other community projects, and giving dynamism and vigor to the community.

Other government policies that are neutral by themselves but could be used for either vision are the identification cards, which are mandatory and necessary for voting and receiving any health benefits, road building, electrification, and water infrastructure.

Whereas the first vision seeks to consolidate state control through the destruction of peasant civil society, the second vision sees increased state capacity as a means to revive the civil society badly damaged by the violence. James Scott in his *Seeing like a State* wrote that it had always been part of the state project to increase state capacity through making society more “legible” or accessible to state intervention. Most of the legibility state projects were the same as

espoused by the first vision: large commercial establishments, modern agriculture, private land titles, standardized education as opposed to informal education, and taxation (Scott 1998: 219-220). This comes as no surprise because the first vision abstracts out what they believe is important, and what they believe is important does not include local peasant cultures and political structures. Scott noted that peasants represented autonomous complex settlement patterns and social networks that had a logic far deeper than any factory floor, making state projects that solely focused on maximizing raw economic output hard to carry out. In Russia, “[o]ne purpose of collectivization was to destroy these economic and social units, which were hostile to state control, and to force the peasantry into an institutional straitjacket of the state’s devising...Given the quasi-civil war conditions of the countryside, the solution was as much of a product of military occupation and ‘pacification’ as of ‘socialist transformation (219).’”

The same kind of thinking is happening in Vilcashuamán. Because the local economic and political structures are not optimal for the first vision’s goals, the peasantry needs to be changed drastically to fit the goals. The second vision values local customs and cultures as one of the most important resources. Therefore, increased state capacity is a means to the preservation of peasant values and dignity.

Chapter 5

POMATAMBAN RESPONSES AND TRENDS

Introduction

So far, we have looked at the top-down implications of the two visions. However, as Nugent (1994) perspicaciously noted, the traditional oppositional model of the state always working to erode the community and the community always purposefully isolating itself from the negatives state belies the richer reality. The community is seen as a passive and defensive entity, whereas the state is seen as an active and offensive one. Missing from this model is “any sense of the mutual interdependence of concrete forms of state and community, of how each helps to create, construct, and enable (or not enable) the other according to specific material-political interests and cultural conceptions that are contingent in time and space.” There are many contexts in which states and communities, national and local identities, coexist peacefully and in mutual support of one another, in effect mutually constructing each other (Nugent 1994: 336). Increased state capacity by itself is neutral; it is what the purposes are that determines what changes happen (Scott 1998: 78). With Nugent’s and Scott’s qualifications in mind, we can look at the mutual dependence of the top-down and bottom-up manifestations of the two visions: How have the policies enacted by the two different visions affected the views of Pomatambans? What is the role of a community like Pomatambo in directing the goals of the state and the process of increased state capacity?

Pomatamban responses

The interview and survey results paint a general picture of Pomatambans feeling that the government should do more for them. They are reaching out to the state, especially at the



Vilcashuamán provincial level where they think the community could get the most. Most informants did not discriminate between PRONAMACHS and Chirapaq, often mentioning both of them as having done positive things for Pomatambo recently. They see the improvement of the roads as vital, allowing them easy access to Vilcashuamán, where Pomatambans go to pick up JUNTOS checks every month and go for market every Tuesday.

Among almost all of the informants, awareness of the different visions is lacking. If certain programs do not benefit or pertain to the informant, they usually say that the government has done nothing, despite the numerous activities. Many people, especially among the older cohort, applaud the revival of the *varayoq* system. The first two *varayoqs* elected after the violence all expressed optimism and confidence in the renewed importance of the post. In short, the views of the Pomatambans are dependent on the specific benefits or disadvantages posed by governmental activities, and not on the ultimate state purpose of those activities. Despite differing agendas, the organic interaction between the community members, the state, and NGOs has created a dynamic that strengthens community identification and at the same time weakens concrete community social ties. This seeming paradox is revealed by the survey results patterns concerning identification and political trust. The trends might reflect a nascent creation of national identity. Furthermore, the trends hint at larger processes in the Peruvian economy.

The surveys were done to gauge the effects of increased exposure to the state apparatus, especially in education and time spent negotiating the bureaucracy. The infrastructure that makes the increased contact with the state possible is primarily the roads and radios. The economic trend of out-migration of the young also increases state contact with the Pomatambans because their relatives send money to them and visit during certain times of the year. The surveys help put in context the two visions of state control. While the number of responses for

some of the questions was low, the general impression is what is important. The survey results are consistent with the informal interviewing that occurred before and after each survey.


Male vs. Female political trust and identification levels

Men strongly prefer to trust authorities in Pomatambo and Vilcashuamán over outsiders.

Women are less consistent but peak at the Pomatambo level or express apathy or neutrality. This may reflect a couple of things. First, in traditional Pomatamban society, women are not publicly involved in politics even though they may have strong indirect influence. Second, Pomatamban women tend to be non-committal in their answers, perhaps reflecting wariness of outsiders, especially in light of the Shining Path episode. Remaining non-committal helps one's survival. This trend was also evident in women's initial responses to SL in Pomatambo, peaking at apathy, whereas the men peaked at moderately strong initial support (Webb 1996). Chart 2 summarizes this.

The results for the levels of identification showed similar results. The men were much more committal in revealing how they identified themselves: in Pomatambo, Vilcashuamán, and as Quechua speakers. The women fluctuated much more and peaked at Pomatambo, Quechua-speaking, and especially the non-committal "depends" or "all equal." These women also tended to be older, with less formal education, and less contact with the outside, rendering them less able to articulate the practical differences between the different levels of identification. Chart 3 summarizes these results.

Male vs. Female political authority trust levels



15

Chart 2

Male vs. Female identification levels




Chart 3

¹⁵ Note: Frequencies for all graphs based on informants' lists, and does not represent the number of people who expressed each marker. For example, a person may put one, two, or none of the markers.

Education, political trust and identification levels

The results for the effects of education level on political trust and identification levels were not surprising. Generally, the more formally educated tended to trust Vilcashuamán level more than the Pomatambo level, whereas the less formally educated tended to trust Pomatambo political authority the most. This trend is probably due to the movement of people outside to either Pujas or Vilcashuamán to attend secondary school. These people needed to negotiate with the state apparatus (schools) in those places. Therefore, they have much more familiarity with the political workings of communities in Vilcashuamán outside of Pomatambo, which in turn leads to an increased sense of trust at the provincial level. Chart 4 summarizes these results.

The effects of education level on identification were similar. There was a wider range of identities that the more educated chose. Both the more and less educated peaked at Pomatambo, however the more educated also peaked at Quechua-speaking while the less educated did not. One may hypothesize that the reason why those with less education identified more consistently with Pomatambo and not the others is that they generally also spend less time outside. However, this was found to be untrue. Chart 6 shows that people who have spent more time outside of Pomatambo actually identify with Pomatambo the strongest. So what are alternative hypotheses?

One hypothesis is that with increased formal education, and therefore more exposure to national history and a sense of distinctiveness of the highlands as opposed to elsewhere, one has a *wider* sense of identity. The informants still identified very strongly with Pomatambo, but were also more likely to cite other identities, especially Quechua-speaking because it is a contrast to the national Spanish-speaking world. The abstract world, the knowledge of people, events, ideologies beyond one's personal direct experience, is heightened by more formal

education. In the Pomatambo primary school, children are taught Spanish as a second language in the later years, opening up a new world, a Spanish-speaking one, to them. They are also taught traditional customs and about the Incas and the founding heroes of Latin America, especially Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martín. This gives them a wider set of identifications to choose from. Indeed, the only people who mentioned the Incas as their ancestors were the younger educated people. Even the more educated older cohort did not mention the Incas as their ancestors. Rather, they mentioned grand or great grand parents. What we are seeing might be hints of a national folk ideology created by the educational curriculum. The creation of a national folk ideology is generally part of a larger *mestizaje* program trying to turn autonomous groups into a larger national identity (Mallon 1992). Under Velasco, such a program of *mestizaje* failed, but some of the elements have been revived: "One of the most popular posters of the agrarian reform made clear that the overall state project meant to idealise the Indian past, while incorporating and educating contemporary Indians (Mallon 1992: 48)."




Chart 4




Chart 5

Time spent outside of Pomatambo, Political trust and identification levels

The most surprising results came from an analysis of the relationship between time spent outside of Pomatambo and political trust and identification levels. One would expect that people who spent more time outside of Pomatambo would identify with it less or identify with other levels more. However, the opposite was true. In both political authority trust and identification, the people who spent more time outside of Pomatambo had stronger, narrower sympathies with Pomatambo. The people who spent less time outside Pomatambo also showed moderately strong sympathies for the more local levels, but also were much more non-committal, peaking at “depends” or “all equal” for identification. In terms of political authority trust, the people who spent less time outside of Pomatambo peaked at Vilcashuamán and neutral or apathetic. What does this mean? I propose that what we are seeing is the relationship between identity-formation and increased contact with worlds that are different from Pomatambo, heightening a sense of

distinctiveness. Those that spent less time outside of Pomatambo, less than five years, are less aware of a sense of opposition and contrast that result from practical experience of the “other.” A sense of identity is strengthened by the experience of difference. The time spent outside also served to decrease non-committal self-identifications. Charts 6 and 7 summarize these results.




Chart 6




Chart 7

Views on out-migration and the young

Generally, Pomatambans view the out-migration of the young as economically necessary but nevertheless undesired. With the better roads, vehicle traffic comes to Pomatambo daily. Generally, the young send money back to the family members that remained in Pomatambo. They sometimes also contribute financially to community building projects. Because the jobs they have in the cities, Ayacucho and Lima, are menial work, they are not able to visit the community regularly, maybe only once or twice a year. According to some informants, they still remember Pomatambo and come back occasionally for the fiestas. They also start Pomatambo clubs and organizations in their urban neighborhoods. In some ways, a new vertical complementarity has been created by the out-migration. Money and gifts are sent from long distances. The new vertical complementarity is different from the traditional vertical complementarity is that it is based on a cash economy, not agriculture. Also, the people who go elsewhere do not return seasonally. Their concrete roots are in the cities where they started families. According to a man who has lived in Lima for many years, whom I met during the Pomatambo festival, about twenty-percent of the people who migrate out remember Pomatambo while the rest try to distance themselves from it.

Despite the economic advantages of having children work in the cities, there does seem to be a general consensus that the time spent away from the community diminishes their community spirit and respect for community elders and customs. One of the elders of the community expressed that even the young people who live in the village and wield power do not respect the elders nowadays. According to him, they do not consult the elders. Another example of this apparent slackening of respect for Pomatambo customs among the young took place

during the fiesta patronal of Pomatambo in late August. During the fiesta, there was a soccer tournament between the local communities on the plaza of Pomatambo. During the soccer match, the villagers danced all around Pomatambo and arrived at the plaza. Instead of stopping the match momentarily to show respect, the players played on and even into the crowd of dancing villagers. It was not until after some chastisement that they paused the match momentarily.

Conclusion

Social bonds between community members were weakened as a direct result of the violence and ensuing out-migration. The evolution of state strategies of control during the violence depended very much on who was in power. Fujimori finally ended the violence through increasing state capacity, thus making rural Peru more “legible” or accessible to the state apparatus. SL violence in the area forced the state to pay attention and develop strategies to prevent such movements in the future.

However, the developmentalist policies pursued by Fujimori further eroded the importance of the community to its members. The ideology espoused by the first vision, the vision in line with Fujimori’s, is very similar to the numerous ideologies espoused by state-building regimes throughout history. Those regimes focused on breaking bonds between peasants to make them more manageable by the state. For example, in 19th century Russia, Count Sergei Witte and Petr Stolypin pursued the same agenda:

“...Third tableau: departing peasants, freed from restraints of strips, set up khutor [integral farmsteads with dwellings] on new fields and adapt latest methods. Those who remain, freed of village and family restraints, plunge into a demand economy—all are richer, more productive, the cities get fed, and the peasants are not proletarianized (Scott 1998: 43).”

The emphasis on “scientific agriculture” bringing about peasant prosperity was as much about decreasing peasant autonomy and the prevailing dogma about scientific agriculture as it was based on hard evidence (Scott 1998: 43). This prejudicial attitude toward peasants is very evident in the opinions of Otto Castro Mendoza.

However, due to the electoral character of the political system and sympathetic NGOs, communities like Pomatambo do have a say in policies that benefit the community. For example, they are active in trying to establish a secondary school in Pomatambo so that the young do not need to go to Pujas or Vilcashuamán, strengthening solidarity, preventing the social problems that accompany living alone away from parents, and helping the local labor-based economy. They are also very active in asking for aid from the local and departmental government. Furthermore, they applaud the works of people like María Gutiérrez, and are very receptive to initiatives that celebrate, revive, and respect the local customs and traditions. The interplay between the communities and local traditionally minded politicians show that the state is quite necessary for the survival of these peasant communities. However, it is a double-edged sword, as the state could also be an agent for the erosion of the same communities, depending on who is in power.

As of now, the cards seem to be stacked against Pomatambo and communities like it due to the inexorable pull of the national and global economy. As long as the young keep migrating out, the future of these communities looks dim. The first vision predominates in the national arena, but its interaction with the second vision, which emphasizes traditional culture, sets in motion a process of national identity formation. With increased exposure to and experience of the state apparatus, combined with an educational curriculum that teaches a folk culture, Pomatambans have a wider sense of identity while at the same time weaker links between each

other. The use of cash and reliance on state-produced goods, and indeed, the desire for state-produced goods, weakens the local economic and social structure. What we see might be the first steps in the national unifying process of *mestizaje*. If this were indeed the case, we would expect local identities to diminish and a national folk identity to emerge over the next few decades.

While the survey results are not statistically compelling due to the low numbers, the general impressions from the combination of interviews, participant observation, and surveys are what are important. They reveal that the community bonds based on economy and politics are weakening, while a general sense of identification is growing with more outside contact. Of course, these are based on Pomatamban responses. The results might look very different for Poamtambo expatriates who do not return at all. Nevertheless, both examples of the expatriates and the Pomatambans show one undeniable trend: the increased reliance on the state apparatus.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

In my thesis thus far, we have explored the ways that the Inca state changed the way Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán society was held together for state purposes of control. We have seen how the Incas depopulated the rebellious region to remake the sacred geography, social geography, and the political structures. They moved people from many different ethnic groups to repopulate the area as the Incas wished. In addition to creating a buffer zone of safety, these policies created an artificial society dependent on the Inca state, as the different ethnic groups did not traditionally have ties to each other. The Vilcashuamán area became a highly integrated island in a sea of relatively “illegible” conquered societies. The Incas used Vilcashuamán as the springboard to make the surrounding areas more “legible” to the state, but did not complete it before the Spaniards conquered the Incas. Likewise, the modern Peruvian state reacted to the Shining Path insurgency by implementing policies that made the Vilcashuamán region more “legible” and thus easier to control.

In many ways, the state legibility projects of the Inca and the modern Peruvian state were similar. Both involved military actions followed by society reorganization policies. However, the two projects were also fundamentally different. The biggest difference was that the Incas divided the people they conquered by maintaining distinctions between the ethnic groups, sometimes even creating them (D'Altroy 1992). On the other hand, the modern Peruvian state stresses policies that homogenize the diverse communities, creating a national identity. Why this fundamental difference? I want to argue that this fundamental difference is due to three main

factors: the history of state presence in the Vilcashuamán area before the rebellions, technology limiting or furthering state capacity, and the economic base of the state.

Similarities

Although there are fundamental differences between state strategies of control for the two different states, we must not overlook their similarities, which could tell us much about the general nature of state control. First of all, it is striking that both states emphasized movement of people and the control of that movement. For the Incas, they depopulated the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area and transplanted new ethnic groups in. They built control towers and gates outside of population centers and at bridges to control movement. The modern economy of Peru is creating an exodus of the young from Pomatambo into urban areas. The placement of paved roads also controls movement. The best roads are roads leading to centers: Vilcashuamán, Ayacucho, Lima, with Lima being at the top of the hierarchy. The roads between non-centers are in very bad condition. For example, it is faster to travel from Ayacucho to Cuzco by going down to the coast and then circling around rather than take the much more direct and unpaved route through the mountains. This focuses the economy on the coast because there is less non-center to non-center traffic.

Another similarity is that both the Inca state and the modern Peruvian state concentrated on breaking the territorial base of their enemies. The Incas did so by taking the fortresses and moving out the hostile populace. The Peruvian state did so by establishing military bases in the urban zones of Vilcashuamán and establishing the *rondas*, severely limiting the movement and the spread of SL in the area.

Finally, the two were similar in that their strategies involved the breaking of bonds between people and rearranging the disassociated units in new ways. The Incas

transplanted new ethnic groups and made them dependent on the state, whereas the modern Peruvian state through economic policies are breaking bonds between community members and making the disassociated members more economically dependent on the state rather than the community in addition to possibly creating an Andean national identity.

Differences

The modern Peruvian state was already the official political authority in the area for nearly two centuries before the Shining Path insurgency, whereas the Incas were not the official political authority before the conquest of the area. The Peruvian state already had a functioning political system, albeit somewhat irrelevant to the peasant communities, whereas the Incas were total foreigners. This means that the first steps of integration such as building roads, schools, and infrastructure were already implemented in the area before the Shining Path came on the scene. According to Mallon, the creation of a unifying national identity in Latin American countries involved several steps: the breaking of ethnic autonomy, the creation of a national folkloric identity, and lastly, a national identity without the folklore or with a diluted sense of it (Mallon 1992: 50). The Peruvian state inherited a social landscape that already had very weak ethnic autonomy, whereas the Incas did not. Therefore, the difference could possibly be attributed to which stage of the national identity-making process the two different states were at.

Ethnic identities had pretty much faded away in the Vilcashuamán area before Peru's independence (Silverblatt 1995). Differences between Vilcashuamán rural communities in the modern era do not rest on ethnic identities. The Incas were confronted with a very different social landscape, one populated by fiercely independent ethnic groups. Because the Incas lacked the state capacity (due to limitations in technology and the brief period of time they were in the area before the Spanish conquest) to totally destroy ethnic identities, they employed the old

“divide and conquer” strategy and played on inter-ethnic mistrust. They unified the local populace by creating a mosaic subject population dependent on the Inca state for economic, religious, and political functions. Whereas the Incas increased their political power by trying to prevent the populace from uniting and rebelling, the modern Peruvian state is doing so by breaking down the necessity of rural communities for their members. Rural communities, with their autonomy, are seen by the most powerful actors of the state as potential challengers to state control (Scott 1998). This difference in strategy can be attributed to the size of politically autonomous units in Vilcashuamán society at certain times. In the Inca period, they were chiefdoms or ethnic groups. In the modern period, they are rural communities. The policies of control, then, would be directed at these units. The Incas wanted to break up ethnic alliances by transplanting ethnic groups to different areas and creating mistrust between them. The modern Peruvian state implements policies that erode the necessity of the rural communities to their members, especially the young.

Furthermore, the modern Peruvian state created a hierarchy of political authority, with traditional village authorities as much lower than state officials. It was only due to the work of traditionally minded politicians like Maria Gutierrez that the village authorities survived at all. Society in the Inca era allowed for overlapping spheres of political and economic authority. However, with the modern nation-state, the state is the only source of legitimate control or force. To achieve this aim of being the sole source of legitimate force, states in Europe in the late 18th and 19th centuries broke bonds between people in villages by undercutting the economic necessity of a vibrant rural civil society. The Industrial Revolution necessitated people moving from the villages to the cities and work in factories, making them disassociated and “free” for the state to mold them into a “nation (Gellner 1983).” Likewise, in Vilcashuamán, the combination

of undercutting the necessity of the rural community to its members and economic forces that encourage people to move to the cities has favored the first vision of control.

Another reason for the fundamental difference is the availability of certain technology. While the Incas carried out the same legibility projects as the modern state—censuses, taxation, concentration of population, map-making, public media, language standardization, statistics, and internal security apparatuses—the degree and frequency to which they carried these out was limited by the technology available. The modern Peruvian state, with all the benefits of post-Industrial Revolution technology, had greater capacity to carry out these legibility projects. They have much greater capacity to affect large numbers of people within a very short time with technology such as vehicles, televisions, identification cards, paved roads, helicopters, telephones, etc. This means that they are much more able to create a unified identity based on the lowest denominator in society: the individual. The state, now more than ever, could penetrate deeply into the lives of individuals through advances in technology. The Incas had to work with the higher denominators in society—*ayllus* and ethnic groups—in their strategies of control because they did not have the state capacity to intrude so deeply and so often into the lives of individuals.

Furthermore, technology also changed the rules of war. Fortifications on top of mountains were no longer effective because of helicopters and the sophisticated supply lines of the modern Peruvian state ensured a permanently supplied army. The safer areas became mountain slopes of the river valleys because vehicle and air traffic had a harder time getting to those places. It also means that insurgents would have a hard time establishing territorial bases in the integrated zones, facilitating the spread of violence as in the case of SL.

Another implication of the advances in technology is that the actors with ample financial resources control what is shown on T.V. During Fujimori's tenure, the media was controlled by the national intelligence service (SNI) (Mauceri 1995: 24). When one turns on Peruvian television, very few if any T.V. personalities have Andean features. They all look white or light mestizo. When someone with Andean features does show up, it is often in a comedy ridiculing the "stupid cholo." The values transmitted by the media are also very different from traditional peasant values, further eroding the moral base of the countryside. The consumerist ideology transmitted by mass media, especially television, is aimed at the disconnected individual and not at politically autonomous communities. The bias of the media against rural indigenous appearance, values, culture, and way of life greatly favors the first vision.

Because the rural villages of Vilcashuamán lack funds to make their own television programs, they must rely on the national and international programming. A couple of years ago, Pomatambo wanted to do a T.V. program on the Inca road. However, they had to rent a camera, which ran out of battery once it got to Pomatambo effectively ending the venture. Without state support and block grants, rural civil society ventures such as this would not succeed. A lack of dynamism due to financial restrictions also makes rural communities less appealing to the young who overwhelmingly desire to follow the "bright lights" of the city.

Advances in technology also fuel the volatility of the domestic market because international market economy has much leverage due to fast and easy transport of goods and capital. While this may bring overall prosperity to Peru, the economic system marginalizes the economic importance of rural communities, which brings us to the last reason.

Lastly, the difference may also be attributed to the economic base of the two states. For the Incas, it was primarily herding and agriculture. It would not be economically advantageous

to destroy the political and economic structure of the rural community because they are needed to produce the much needed food and wool to sustain the state. With the modern Peruvian state, the economy shifted from agriculture to export of raw materials and foreign trade. This policy marginalizes the agricultural and herder communities of the mountains (Dollfus 1986: 22). Ironically, it was such a policy that led to the Shining Path insurgency, as the state generally ignored the Vilcashuamán area because it was not essential to the national economy. To the prevailing view in the state, rural communities may not be necessary for the economic prosperity of the country, but they are still welters of political autonomy that could fall prey to ideologies of groups like that of SL. While there are some actors in the state who wish to preserve rural communities, the majority, as evidenced in national policy, sees them as unnecessary, backward, and even potentially dangerous.

Implications

Both the Incas and the modern Peruvian state tried to remake local society and economy in the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area. They each try to weaken what they perceived as most dangerous to the state: for the Incas it was ethnic alliances, for the modern Peruvian state it was local, non-state autonomy. For the modern Peruvian state, this policy is somewhat ironic. After all, the SL brought a foreign ideology in, and was resisted by the rural elites, especially the traditional authorities. The SL tried to decapitate the political structures in the communities so that they could fill the vacuum. In areas like Puno and the Mantaro valley, where rural civil society was very strong, the SL had very little success in winning rural support (Kent 1993: 446).

A major reason for the decline of the SL was the state sponsoring rural patrol committees: the *rondas*. In fact, the SL was greatly helped by the state's initial unwillingness to combat SL influence in the Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán area. There was an insufficient number

of police (there are still only 7 policemen for all of Vilcashuamán province), and systematic abandonment of posts by the police only helped the SL. It seems quite convincing that rural civil society is not a threat to the state. In fact, as the second vision stresses, it can be an anchor against pernicious state-toppling ideologies like that of SL. Nevertheless, as Scott emphasized, many state policies are not so much about efficiency, or in the case of my thesis, about effective strategies of control, as about prevailing dogmas about “progress” and disdain for the peasant ways of life and autonomy

What does this mean for the future of Peru’s peasantry? Will it either disappear or change greatly, like the first vision hopes, or will it revive under its own values, as the second vision hopes? With current trends, the first vision will most likely win. However, if the rural communities realize that their survival is at stake and actively engage with the democratic system, there might be hope for a future countryside with traditional rural values: do not lie, do not steal, work hard. If Steve Stern is correct in his assertion that rural communities are masters of survival, there may be hope after all for rural communities such as Pomatambo. Nevertheless, they face a formidable challenge, as the advances in technology has allowed whoever controls the state agenda to intrude deeply into people’s lives and reorganize society with great efficiency. The two visions represent different agendas even though they have the same purpose of keeping peace and bringing prosperity to the countryside. The Peruvian state apparatus has never had more state capacity to carry out any vision. Whichever vision wins, one can be sure that peasant society in Vilcashuamán will not be the same. The nature of peasant society in Vilcashuamán, however, would be vastly different depending on which vision wins.

Bibliography

- Alcedo, Antonio de. "Diccionario Geografico de las Indias Occidentales o America." Tomo IV. Madrid: Real Academia Espanola, 1967. Vol. 208 of Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles. Ciriaco Perez Bustamante.
- Alvarez Quispe. Jorge L., García Gomez. Gilmer, and Palomino Vallejo. Efrain V., eds. Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo de Vilcashuamán al 2012. Vilcashuaman,2003.
- BBC. "Mass sterilisation scandal shocks Peru."
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2148793.stm>>; 07/24/2002.
- Babb, Florence. "Women and Men in Vicos, Peru: A Case of Unequal Development." Peruvian Contexts of Change. Stein, William. New Brunswick: Transaction Books; U2, 1985. 163-210.
- Baldeón Malpartida, Severo, Teófilo Allende Ccahuana, and Vivanco Pomacanchari. Proyecto Qhapaq Ñan: Proyecto Piloto Vilcashuamán. Análisis Territorial de Vilcashuamán (Volumen II). Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 2004.
- Burger, Richard L., and Michael D. Glascock. "Locating the Quispisisa Obsidian Source in the Department of Ayacucho, Peru." Latin American Antiquity. 11.3 (September 2000). 258-268.
- Carabajal, Pedro de. "Descripción Fecha de la Provincia de Vilcas Guaman Por el Ilustre Señor Don Pedro de Carabajal, Corregidor y Justicia Mayor Della, Ante Xristobal de Gamboa, Escribano de su Juzgado, en el Año de 1586." Relaciones Geográficas de Indias. Marcos Jimenez de la Espada. Jose Urbano Martinez Carreras. Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles, Tomo 183. Madrid: Real Academia Espanola; U2, 1965. 205-219.
- Castillo Vilchez, Oscar F. "Cambios Económicos-Sociales en la Comunidad Campesina de Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán." Pre-Profesional diss., Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga. 1998.
- Chahud Gutiérrez, Carlos. Investigación Arqueológica en Vilcashuamán. Ayacucho: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1966.
- Cieza de León, Pedro. The Incas. Victor Von Hagen. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959.
- Cobo, Bernabé. History of the Inca Empire an Account of the Indians' Customs and Their Origin, Together with a Treatise on Inca Legends, History, and Social Institutions. Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. Informe. "Tomo IV: Primera Parte: El Proceso, Los Hechos, Las Víctimas: La Región Sur Central." Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. Spanish.
<[Http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/libros/cv/iv/12.pdf](http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/libros/cv/iv/12.pdf)>,2003.

Dalton, George. "Editor's Preface." Economic Organization of the Inka State. John V. Murra. Connecticut: JAI Press Inc; U2, 1980.

D'Altroy, Terence N. Provincial power in the Inka empire. Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

Dillehay, Tom D. "Tawantinsuyu Integration of the Chillon Valley, Peru: A Case of Inca Geo-Political Mastery" Journal of Field Archaeology. 4.2. (Winter, 1977), 397-405.

Dollfus, Olivier. "The tropical Andes: a changing mosaic." Anthropological History of the Andean Polities. Ed. John V. Murra. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986.10-22.

D'Altroy, Terence N. The Incas. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002.

Earle, Timothy K. "Chiefdoms in Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Perspective." Annual Review of Anthropology. 16 (1987). 279-308.

Emery, Alex. "Peru President Approval Rises to 6-Month High, El Comercio Says." <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=aqd4c23.aG3s&refer=latin_america>: Bloomberg, May 15, 2005.

Espinosa Reyes, Ricardo. La Gran Ruta Inca: El Capaq Ñan. Lima: Petróleos del Perú, 2002.

Felipe Paz Soldan, Mariano. Diccionario Geográfico Estadístico de Perú. Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1877.

Gamarra Guillén, Carmen. "Estudio de la Realidad Socio-Económica de la Provincia de Vilcashuamán," Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga. 1998.

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Guaman Poma de Ayala, Felipe. Nueva Coronica y Buen Gobierno. Ayacucho: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1980.

Gonzalez, José. "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley." The Shining Path of Peru. David Scott Palmer. Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press; U2, 1994. 123-143.

González Carré, Enrique, Jorge Cosmópolis A., and Jorge Lévano P. La Ciudad Inca de Vilcashuamán. Ayacucho: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1981.

Gonzalez Carré, Enrique, Denise Pozzi-Escot, Muriel Pozzi-Escot, and Cirilo Vivanco Pomacanchari. Los chankas: cultura material. Ayacucho, 1987.

Gonzalez Carré, Enrique, Denise Pozzi-Escot, and Cirilo Vivanco Pomacanchari. El área histórica chanka. Ayacucho: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1988.

Gonzalez Carré, Enrique. Los Señoríos Chankas. Lima: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, Instituto Andino de Estudios Arqueológicos, 1992.

Gorriti, Gustavo. "The Quota." The Peru Reader. Starn, Orin; Carlos Iván Degregori; Robin Kirk. Second Edition. Durham and London: Duke University Press; U2, 2005. 331-342.

Gutiérrez, María. Interview. Vilcashuamán, August 2006.

Huertas, Lorenzo. "Estudio Preliminar." Las Tribus de Ancku Wallokc. Second edition. Lima: Impreso en el Perú; U2, 1983. I-XXVI.

Hyslop, John. The Inka Road System. Orlando: Academic Press, 1984.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. Estadísticas de Centros Poblados 1993.

Pomatambo-Vilcashuamán. Spanish.

http://www.inei.gob.pe/BancoCuadros/bancua09.asp?PARAMETRO=14051101&ndep=AYACUCHO&npro=VILCAS_HUAMAN&ndis=VILCAS_HUAMAN: INEI, 24 Mar 2006.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI). X Censo de Población y V de Vivienda 2005 (CPV). <http://www.inei.gob.pe>: 2005

Iván Degregori, Carlos. "The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views." The Shining Path of Peru. David Scott Palmer. Second edition. New York: St. Martin's Press.; U2, 2004. 51-62.

Jimenez de la Espada, Marcos. Relaciones Geográficas de Indias. Marcos Jimenez de la Espada. Jose Urbano Martinez Carreras. Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles, Tomo 183. Madrid: Real Academia Española; U2, 1965.

Kent, Robert B. "Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru." Geographical Review. 83.4., October 1993. 441-454.

Kolata, Alan. The Tiwanaku: Portrait of an Andean Civilization. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993.

Landa Vásquez, Ladislao, and Juan Alberto López Alarcón. Proyecto Qhapaq Ñan, Plan Piloto de Vilcashuamán, Informe Etnográfico 2004. Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 2005.

Lorandi, Ana María. "'Horizons' in Andean archaeology." Anthropological History of the Andean Polities. Ed. John V. Murra. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986. 35-45.

Mallon, Florencia E. "Indian Communities, Political Cultures, and the State in Latin America, 1780-1990." Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (1992): 35-53.

Mauceri, Philip. "Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 33.4 (Winter 1991). 83-109.

Mendoza Castro, Otto. Interview. Vilcashuamán, August 2006.

Montoya, Rodrigo. "Ayacucho: Una introducción necesaria." Peru: El problema agrario en debate. Eguren, Fernando; Hopkins, Raul; Kervyn, Bruno; Montoya, Rodrigo. Lima: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga; U2, 1988. 421-428.

Monzón, Luis de, Beltrán Saravia, Pedro de Frías, and Pedro. Taypimarca. "Descripción de la Tierra Del Repartimiento de Atunsora, Encomendado en Hernando Palomino, Jurisdicción de la Ciudad de Huamanga. Año de 1586." Relaciones Geográficas de Indias. Marcos Jimenez de la Espada. Jose Urbano Martinez Carreras. Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Tomo 183. Madrid: Real Academia Española; U2, 1965. 220-225.

Monzó [Monzón], Luis, Pedro Gonzalez, and Jhuan de. Arbe. "Descripción de la Tierra Del Repartimiento de Atunrucana y Laramati, Encomendado en Don Pedro de Cordova Jurisdicción de la Ciudad de Huamanga. Año de 1586." Relaciones Geográficas de Indias. Marcos Jimenez de la Espada. Jose Urbano Martinez Carreras. Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Tomo 183. Madrid: Real Academia Española; U2, 1965. 226-236.

Murra, John. "El 'control vertical' de un maximo de pisos ecologicos en la economía de las sociedades andinas." Visita de la Provincia de Leon de Huanuco en 1562. Huanuco: Universidad Nacional Hermilio Valdizan, 1972. p. 427-476.

Murra, John V. "The expansion of the Inka state: armies, war, and rebellions." Anthropological History of the Andean Polities. Ed. John V. Murra. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986. p.49-56.

Navarro Del Aguila, Victor. Las Tribus de Ancku Wallokc. 1939. Ediciones Atusparia. Cuzco; Impreso en el Peru, 1983.

Najarro Quispe, Quintin. Historia de Pomatambo. Unpublished manuscript, 2006.

Nugent, David. "Building the State, Making the Nation: The Bases and Limits of State Centralization in "Modern" Peru." American Anthropologist. 96.2 (June 1994). 333-369.

Pachacuti-Yamqui Salcamayhua, Juan de Santa Cruz. "An Account of the Antiquities of Peru." Markham, Clements. The Rites and Laws of the Yncas. Clements Markham. London; U2, 1873. 67-122.

Palmer, David Scott. "Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso." Comparative Politics 18.2 (January 1986): 127-146.

Palmer, David Scott. "Introduction: History, Politics, and Shining Path in Peru." The Shining Path of Peru. Palmer, David Scott. New York: St. Martin's Press; U2, 1994. 1-32.

Perez Liu, Rosario. "Violencia, migración, productividad: cuatro estudios de caso en las comunidades ayacuchanas." Peru: El problema agrario en debate. Eguren, Fernando; Hopkins, Raul; Kervyn, Bruno; Montoya, Rodrigo. Lima: Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga; U2, 1988. 515-536.

PRONAMACHS, "Impacto Social MIMA Pomatambo." Vilcashuamán, Unpublished manuscript.

Rousseau, David. Personal communication. Psci 252: Evolution of the International System, Spring 2005.

Salomon, Frank. "Vertical politics on the Inka frontier." Anthropological History of the Andean Polities. Ed. John V. Murra. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986. 89-115.

Sarmiento de Gamboa, Pedro. History of the Incas. Kraus Reprint Limited. Nendeln/Lietchenstein: Hakluyt Society, 1967.

Schreiber, Katharina J. "Conquest and Consolidation: A Comparison of the Wari and Inka Occupations of a Highland Peruvian Valley." American Antiquity 52.2 (1987): 266-284.

Schreiber, Katharina J. "The Inca Occupation of the Province of Andamarca Lucanas, Peru." Provincial Inca: Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Assessment of the Impact of the Inca State. Malpass, Michael A. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press; 1993. 77-116.

Scott, James. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Silverblatt, Irene. "Becoming Indian in the Central Andes of Seventeenth-Century Peru." After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements. Gyan Prakash. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1995. 279-298.

Stanish, Charles. "Nonmarket Imperialism in the Prehispanic Americas of the Titicaca Basin." American Antiquity. 8.3 (September 1997). 195-216.

Starn, Orin. "To Revolt against the Revolution: War and Resistance in Peru's Andes." Cultural Anthropology. 10.4., November 1995. 547-580.

Stern, Steve J. Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.

Stiglich, Germán. Diccionario Geográfico Del Peru. Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1922.

- Sun Tzu. Trans. Lionel Giles. On the Art of War: The oldest military treatise in the world. London: Keagan Paul, 2002.
- Taipe Campos, Néstor Godofredo. "El agua como operador simbólico: La laguna de Choclococha y la función civilizadora de los dioses puma, halcón y perro." Aqua, Revista de Cultura Andina. 1.1. Huancayo, 2003. 185-198.
- Urton, Gary. Inca Myths. Austin: University of Texas Press; U2, 1999.
- Valdez, Lidio M., and Cirilo Vivanco. "Arqueología de la Cuenca del Qaracha, Ayacucho, Peru." Latin American Antiquity. 5.2., June 1994. 144-157.
- Vega, Garcilaso de la. Royal Commentaries of the Incas, and General History of Peru. Texas: University of Texas Press, 1989.
- Von Hagen, Victor Von. Highway of the Sun. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1955.
- Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Trans. A.M. Henderson, Talcott Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- Webb, Adam. Community, Peasants, and the Shining Path Guerrillas: A Field Study in Ayacucho, Peru. Unpublished thesis. Cambridge, 1996.
- Weiner, Charles. Peru y Bolivia, Relato de Viaje. Lima: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 1993.
- Wust, Walter, and Germán Coronado. Atlas Departamental Del Peru: Ayacucho, Ica. Walter Wust; Germán Coronado. 8 vols. Lima: PEISA, 2003.
- Yaranga Valderrama, Abdón. "Las 'reducciones', uno de los instrumentos del etnocidio." Revista Complutense de Historia de América. 21., 1995. 241-262.
- Zuidema, Reiner T. "Algunos problemas etnohistóricos del Departamento de Ayacucho." Wamani. 1., 1966. 68-75.

Appendix 1: Photos




Photo 1: Pomatambo at the trees and to the left of the great flat hill in the background. Siqi Rumi in the foreground.



Photo 2: Hitching post below the possible ruins of an Inca tambo. Note the hole and the grooves above the hole. The hole goes through the stone. Handheld GPS for scale.



Photo 3: Arteza Rumi. Partly carved, partly natural. Inca road above where the row of horses is. Horses in the foreground show scale.



Photo 4: Fields near Pomatambo. Road at bottom is Puccas Route 2. It was an Inca road paved over in the 1970s.

Appendix 2: Survey questions

Edad ____

Sexo ____

Años de educación ____ (<3 → ¿Puede usted leer y escribir?)

Tipo de trabajo ____

Número de hijos ____

Número de entrevista ____

¿Ha vivido usted fuera de Pomatambo? ¿Cuánto tiempo y dónde?

¿Lee algunos libros o periódicos a menudo? ¿Qué tipo de libros y/o qué periódicos?

- 1) ¿Cuántas veces al mes viaja usted fuera de Pomatambo? ¿Adónde y para qué?
- 2) Cuando usted habla con las autoridades o los empleados del gobierno en Vilcashuaman, ¿qué idioma habla o qué idioma prefiere hablar?
- 3) ¿Cuántas veces al año vienen oficiales o autoridades de afuera a visitar Pomatambo? ¿Para qué vienen?
- 4) ¿Cuáles son unas ventajas o desventajas de tener un camino mejor entre Vilcashuaman y Pomatambo en los últimos años?
- 5) ¿Qué tipo de vehículos vienen a Pomatambo y para qué vienen?
- 6) ¿Cuáles son unas de las cosas o productos de fuera de Pomatambo que usted tiene en casa? ¿Cuáles son unas de las ventajas o desventajas de esas cosas?

- 7) ¿Cuál es la cosa más importante que el gobierno ha hecho para Pomatambo en los últimos años?
- 8) Hay autoridades de varios niveles: el gobierno nacional, el gobierno del departamento de Ayacucho, el gobierno de la provincia y el distrito de Vilcashuaman, y las autoridades en Pomatambo. ¿En cuál de estos niveles de gobierno tiene usted la más confianza? ¿En cuál de los niveles tienes menos confianza? ¿Por qué?
- 9) Podemos decir que, al mismo tiempo, usted es pomatambino/a, vilquino/a, ayacuchano/a, quechuahablante, peruano/a, y latinoamericano/a. ¿Cuál de estas identidades es más importante para usted y por qué? ¿Segundo? ¿La menos importante de todas?
- 10) ¿Qué significa para usted ser
pomatambino/a?
¿vilquino/a?
¿ayacuchano/a?
¿peruano/a?
- 11) ¿Cree usted que es importante aprender quechua y la cultura indígena en la escuela? ¿Muy importante? ¿No tan importante? ¿Por qué?
- 12) ¿Cuándo cree usted fue la mejor época en el pasado/en la historia aquí? ¿Por qué?
- 13) ¿Quiénes fueron sus antepasados?

Appendix 3: Summary chart of survey responses

el gobierno nacional (2), el gobierno del departamento de Ayacucho(1), neutral, apathetic or equal (0) el gobierno de la provincia y el distrito de Vilcashuaman (-1), y las autoridades en Pomatambo (-2)

pomatambino/a (0), vilquino/a (1), ayacuchano/a(2), quechuahablante (3), peruano/a(4), y latinoamericano/a(5), all equal, depends separate

						barbed wire, reforestation						
7	X3	15	F		Student	8	X2, VGC	N/A	Depends on context	Quechua and Spanish	Time of Abuelitos	N/A, use only for anecdotal evidence
8	MRT	55	F	8	Agric	27	X2, VGC	-2, -1	Depends, but 2 mainly	N/A	Abuelitos or before, less education then, but healthier food, cattle, harvests	No sabemos
9	MRP	26	M	4	Maest ro de music a	0	Potable water, health post	-2	0,3	Teach “pure” Quechua, combine with Spanish, English	Fujimori	Mama Ocllo and other Inka figures
10	ATN	21	M	10	Cuy farmer	11	At first, said no hay, but then health post and potable water	-2	0,3, birth	Teach “pure Quechua ” here and in Lima, also English and Spanish	Fujimori because of aid, colegios	Manco Capac, Atahualpa, et al. Conquistadores introduced Spanish
11	SNP	49	M	2	Agric . First new Varayo.	5	At first said “nada del gobierno, no hay apoyo” later said health post and potable water, casita social, cement	-2	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A
12	SRP	18	M	10	Agric	4	Road, Potable	-1, least with	1, least	Yes	Contemporar	Incas

						Water	Lima	with 5		y epoch	
13	EN M	27	M	5	Agric .	0	Road, Potable Water	-1, least Lima	1, least with 5	Yes	Contemporar y Epoch
14	RM G	21	M	13	Agric .	5, Pujas, study	Road, Potable water	-1, least in Lima	1, least with 5	Yes	Contemporar y Epoch
15	CVP	39	M	6	Agric .	12	Pronamachs, reforestation	Lima/Huamang a give most aid, but we don't trust either	0	Quechua and Spanish	Before the violence
16	WJR	27	F	6	Shop	0	Nada	No one has done anything	3	Quechua and Spanish	Don't know, but worst was violence
17		42	F	4	Agric .	7, Colpapampa	PRONAMACH S	-2	0	Quechua, Quechua writing	Before the violence when it was peaceful
18		84	F	0	Agric	.5-1month, Lima	No han hecho nada	None are bad, don't really know, not informed	2,1	No se	20 years before, all respected each other, didn't drink as much
19		60	F	0	Agric .	10, Antapite, Parcco	Ninguna obra	In none, don't really know	0	Yes	Is the same as now
20	RGH	75	F	0	Agric .	10-15, Huaccana	No ha hecho nada	-2 because speak with them	0 because where I live with my husband	Yes	When she was young
21	IPN	73	M	10	Agric .	10, Lima	N/A	-2, formerly village officer	0, also Lima, where his nephews are, helping with remittance	English too, Quechua, Spanish	Better before, with authorities, we worked together, now people work for themselves,

							s		not hospitable	
22	JRP	30	M	3	Road	7	Only roads	-2, -1	5, others equal	Quechua Better now compared to last 20 years
23	TNS	84	M	1	Agric	0		-2,-1	0	
24	AGN	85	M	1	Agric	5	(P needs to be its own district with own council, doesn't like being under Vilcas) Welcomes Pronamachs	-2	0	