Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Food, Culture & Society

An International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research

ISSN: 1552-8014 (Print) 1751-7443 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rffc20

Localization of the corporate food regime and the food sovereignty movement: taiwan's food sovereignty movement under "third regionalism"

Scott Y. Lin

To cite this article: Scott Y. Lin (2023) Localization of the corporate food regime and the food sovereignty movement: taiwan's food sovereignty movement under "third regionalism", Food, Culture & Society, 26:3, 621-642, DOI: 10.1080/15528014.2022.2030889

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15528014.2022.2030889

FOOD, CULTURE & SOCIETY
2023, VOL. 26, NO. 3, 621–642
https://doi.org/10.1080/15528014.2022.2030889

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Localization of the corporate food regime and the food sovereignty movement: taiwan's food sovereignty movement under "third regionalism"

Scott Y. Lin

Graduate Institute of Development Studies, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan

ABSTRACT

Third regionalism explains the liberalization of trade centered around the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. Under regionalism, domestic agricultural markets that formerly enjoyed national food-security policies have loosened. This caused traditional domestic farmers' organizations to become more regionally interconnected, forming a food sovereignty movement under the auspices of La Via Campesina. Localized food-production chains are promoted to mitigate the impact of regionalism on the Asia-Pacific agricultural sector. The Taiwan Rural Front (TRF) joined La Via Campesina and the food sovereignty movement in the 2010s. During the process of adopting regionalism, Taiwanese agricultural trade and technologies were protected by public agencies and state-owned enterprises. This context differs from that of Southeast Asia, where the food sovereignty movement has thrived. Therefore, the following question is raised: Why was it possible for the food sovereignty movement to originate in Taiwan? This paper describes the developmental characteristics of Taiwan's food-security governance mechanism as a state-guided corporate food regime amid third regionalism. Further, the TRF does not advocate for localized food-production chains. Due to the formation of a state-guided corporate food regime, the food sovereignty movement has become connected with farmland protection movements that set the Taiwanese sovereignty movement apart.

KEYWORDS

Third regionalism; food sovereignty; corporate food regime; food security; La Via Campesina; Taiwan

Introduction

A wave of regionalism began in continental Europe in the 1960s and became prominent in North America during the 1980s. By the early 21st century, it had begun to gradually make its way toward the Asia-Pacific region, forming a wave of "third regionalism" centered around the area (Hsieh 2017).

Amid the rise of third regionalism, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 2002. Building on the outcomes of the AFTA, the ASEAN then expanded into ASEAN+1 free trade agreements (FTAs), signing them with China, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand within the first decade of the 21st century (ASEAN 2011). Beginning in 2011, the ten

CONTACT Scott Y. Lin scottlin@nccu.edu.tw

ASEAN countries, including China, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand, entered talks for an even more expansive free trade agreement via the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). These discussions occurred over nine years, with the final negotiations completed in November 2019. Despite India backing out mid-way, the remaining 15 countries that signed the RCEP agreement toward the end of 2020 formed the largest free trade zone in the world. Finally, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) commenced talks in 2010 on Asia-Pacific free trade via the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which included plans for the "Global North," led by the US, and the "Global South," led by the ASEAN, to collaborate and form an Asia-Pacific regionalism regime.[1] However, when the US withdrew in 2017, the TPP became the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This partnership came into force in 2018. Although the CPTPP is relatively small in terms of trading capacity, the Asia-Pacific region's proactive pursuit of regionalism is evident.

Simultaneously, regionalism has been fruitful for transnational agricultural trade. Grant and Lambert (2008) discovered that in the early 21st century, regionalism led to a rapid growth rate of 149% in agricultural trade in countries that ratified agreements. Similar insights were evident in studies by Timsina and Culas (2020); Vollrath and Hallahan (2011); Lambert and Mckoy (2009); and Koo, Kennedy, and Skripnitchenko (2006), who showed that regionalism has resulted in rapid growth rates of between 95% and 153% in agricultural trade. Looking closely at the Asia-Pacific region, third regionalism has, unsurprisingly, also yielded growth in agricultural trade. The countries that ratified regionalism-related agreements were thus able to enjoy the rewards of growth in agricultural trade (Khurana and Nauriyal 2017; Lateef, Tong, and Riaz 2019; Jagdambe and Kannan 2020). However, some scholars found that countries in the Asia-Pacific region were often protective of the agricultural sector, listing the sector and its products as exceptions to regionalism. This caused regionalism-related measures in the Asia-Pacific region to be classified as limited-scope or shallow-integration agreements. However, the opening of other industries will eventually help increase agricultural investments (Grant 2013; Capling and Ravenhill 2011).

Cotula (2012) believed that regionalism comprised frameworks for regional trade agreements (RTAs) and investment treatments. These could provide international legal safeguards for large-scale agricultural and food-producing corporations when engaging in transnational agricultural investments. Lin (2017a) further discovered that between 2001 and 2016, agricultural and food-producing corporations in East Asia accounted for approximately half of foreign farmland investments globally. Among them, East Asian corporations tended to be partial toward farmlands in Southeast Asia, underlining the deep influence of regionalism on agricultural investments within the Asia-Pacific region. Investors have looked to farmlands in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure food security and cheap shipping costs back to their home countries. Investees have welcomed investors from similar food cultures, as their similarities have enabled them to plant similar crops and share the rewards of successful investments. In addition, the investment processes due to the aforementioned regionalism-related factors show that, since the beginning of the 21st century, foreign farmland investments had already shifted to a trend in agricultural and food-producing corporations in the Asia-Pacific region investing in farmlands in the Global South

countries, such as those in Southeast Asia. This differs greatly from the trend of the past two centuries, which revolved around agricultural and food-producing corporations from the Global North, investing heavily in farmlands in the Global South. South-South investments and South-South cooperation are already becoming the new characteristics of the Asia-Pacific agricultural sector in this century. The driving forces behind such novel developments are the East Asian agricultural and food-producing corporations that have benefitted from, and grown profitable, under the influence of third regionalism (Lin 2017d). For example, Zeng (2010) discovered from the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) that China had deemed crops such as rice, wheat, and corn "highly sensitive" products. Hence, the nation intervened by implementing customs and specified the East Asian agricultural and food-producing corporations that could engage in trade. Therefore, these corporations benefitted from third regionalism and prospered. Tso (2019) further revealed that, in the rice trade between China and Vietnam, protectionist customs mechanisms for import quotas were executed by a few state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Benefitting from the ACFTA framework, these enterprises became transnational corporations.

Although the third regionalism movement helped agricultural trade within the Asia-Pacific region to become more liberal, production chains become more secure, and agricultural investments become more transnational, it also loosened traditional domestic agricultural markets that formerly received state support as well as national food-security policies. This resulted in farmers' organizations within the Asia-Pacific region becoming more interconnected regionally, forming a food sovereignty movement under the auspices of La Via Campesina and advocating for localized food-production chains to mitigate the impact of third regionalism on traditional farming villages and farmers. Taiwan also participated in the third regionalism movement, resulting in the Taiwan Rural Front (TRF) joining the food sovereignty movement in the early 21st century. However, Taiwan's context under the influence of third regionalism differed greatly from that of Central and South America, which were the source of the food sovereignty movement. It also differed from those of Africa and Southeast Asia, where the food sovereignty movement was promoted. In Taiwan, there were public agencies, which protected the agricultural markets; SOEs, which developed agricultural technology; and Taiwanese enterprises, which held a grip on agricultural capital and investments. This paper therefore includes the following questions: How and why did the food sovereignty movement take root in Taiwan? What are the similarities and differences between the central themes of the Taiwanese food sovereignty movement and those of the global movement? The paper includes a description of the unique development of Taiwan's food-security governance mechanism amid the third regionalism movement. This paper also discusses how the TRF no longer merely advocates for localized food-production chains, and how, due to the formation of a state-guided corporate food regime, the food sovereignty movement has become connected with movements related to rural land protection, land equity, ecological protectionism, peasant economies, and food safety, marking the localized developmental characteristics of the Taiwanese sovereignty movement.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains how regionalism bolstered the growth of food sovereignty movement. Section 3 describes how Taiwan's food-security governance mechanism was adapted to third regionalism. Section 4

introduces how the TRF promoted the Taiwanese food sovereignty movement. Section 5 provides an overview of the developmental characteristics of the Taiwanese food sovereignty movement.

The food sovereignty movement amid regionalism

According to the food regime theory, the modern global political/economic system has undergone three food regimes: the British regime from 1870 to 1914, the US regime from 1945 to 1973, and the corporate food regime that began in the late 1980s and persists today (Friedmann and McMichael 1989; McMichael 2005, McMichael 2009a, McMichael 2009b, McMichael 2012). Capitalism entered farming societies through these three food regimes, resulting in the capitalization of agricultural production factors, leading traditional self-sufficient agrarian societies producing diverse crops in the Global South to rely on the agricultural products produced by corporations in the Global North. This then led to the international political economy of food, in which the Global South was reliant on the Global North, as well as the presence of dependency structures in the global food regime. Eventually, the movement of farmers in the Global South erupted in retaliation against the US and multinational corporations (MNCs).

As such, the food sovereignty movement can be traced back to the post-World War II farmers' movement that had, for a long time, objected to the US's dumping of agricultural products in Central and South American countries. The term "food sovereignty" first appeared in the National Food Program proposed by the Mexican government in 1983. The Mexican government hoped that the program could help achieve its goals of food sovereignty and autonomy (Edelman 2014, 964). In the mid-1980s, the term was gradually adopted by other farmers' organizations, movements, and appeals in Central America. On the one hand, it was hoped that food sovereignty movements could curb the demand for large imports of US agricultural goods. On the other hand, this was a way of asking Central American countries to resume protectionist policies in domestic agricultural markets (Edelman 1999, 102–103). However, as the understanding of food sovereignty movements was limited only to national food-security policies that advocated self-sufficiency, the countries were asked to reject all agricultural products that the US had dumped into the domestic markets with the aim of safeguarding the local farmers' right to earn an income from their crops.

Thereafter, neo-liberalism came to the forefront in the late 1980s. This notion, along with frameworks established under the first two waves of regionalism, including the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), aided the rise of agricultural corporations in the Global North and provided key ideas for the operation of corporate food regimes. These forces also enabled the food sovereignty movement to spread from Central America to the rest of the world. Within the operations of the corporate food regime, global food-security governance measures can be classified accordingly as mechanisms oriented toward the market and human rights (Schanbacher 2010; Farsund, Daugbjerg, and Langhelle 2015). The former are primarily led by the World Bank (WB), World Trade Organization (WTO), and large agricultural corporations. The latter are championed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The WB, WTO, and agricultural corporations adopted regionalism-related economic policies based on free trade, while the FAO set recommended human rights

indicators driven by social compassion (see Jarosz 2009; Pritchard 2009; Schanbacher 2010; Tilzey 2019; McMichael 2013a; Gaudreau 2019). Therefore, the WTO and WB's market-oriented principles typically overrode the FAO's human rights-oriented principles, giving rise to increasing dissatisfaction among farmers' organizations (Lin 2017c; Margulis 2017; Daugbjerg, Farsund, and Langhelle 2017); Margulis (2018) also found that the FAO has little capacity to influence WTO regulations. As they connected with one another under the FAO's food-security governance framework and international conventions, the global food sovereignty movement took shape. The farmers' advocacy network, La Via Campesina, established in 1993 has become the primary driving force behind the global food sovereignty movement.

Initially, La Via Campesina was solely a global advocacy network that united smallholder farms globally and voiced their interests. From 1996 onwards, however, La Via Campesina began borrowing the concept of food sovereignty to participate in international events (La Via Campesina 1996a). At the 1996 World Food Summit, La Via Campesina presented its first paper, *Food Sovereignty: A Future Without Hunger* (La Via Campesina 1996b), which equated food sovereignty to national food self-sufficiency. It was anticipated that this would counter the neo-liberalist and regionalist frameworks that continued to grow as large agricultural corporations increased food production because of the market approaches promoted by the WB and WTO, such as trade liberalization and the technological transformation of production. Although the concept of food sovereignty was not given much attention during the 1996 summit, La Via Campesina and its revised food sovereignty movement concept became the highlight of the 2002 World Food Summit. In that year, the food sovereignty movement concept included social justice-related and environmentally friendly ideas, engendering a shared language that united smallholder farmers' organizations. La Via Campesina has even become a platform to unite smallholder farmers' organizations against large agricultural corporations as well as regional trade liberalization (La Via Campesina 2002).

In 2007, La Via Campesina appealed to over 500 smallholder farmers' organizations in Central and South America, Africa, and Asia to gather in Nyéléni Village in the Republic of Mali. It proposed the Declaration of Nyéléni, which redefined food sovereignty movements according to the following six pillars: 1) focusing on food for people (and not agricultural corporations); 2) valuing food providers (and not agricultural traders); 3) localizing food systems (rather than globalizing); 4) promoting local control (rather than globalizing trade), 5) building knowledge and skills (rather than emphasizing the global trade mechanism), and 6) working with nature (rather than technology) (Nyéléni 2007). The goals for action under La Via Campesina's leadership and food sovereignty measures were reinforced by, and more widely promoted under, these six pillars. From 2007 to 2008, the global food crisis led the FAO to organize the 2009 World Food Summit, which significantly reformed the internal consulting system and decision-making mechanism of the FAO. Moreover, as La Via Campesina had already become the primary driving force of the global food sovereignty movement, the FAO's High-Level Panel of Experts acknowledged, for the first time, the rights of farmers' organizations to participate in and join the decision-making processes. La Via Campesina was listed as the primary consulting subject and policymaker, and the previously mentioned six pillars of food sovereignty were included in the FAO's agenda for food-security governance. The collaboration between the FAO and La Via Campesina also expanded the scope of

discussions about food sovereignty to include climate change and biodiversity, engendering a shared language for food sovereignty and environmental groups (La Via Campesina 2012b).

The spread of the food sovereignty movement into the Asia-Pacific region can be traced to South Korea's *Korean Peasants League* (KPL) and *Korea Women Peasants' Association* (KWPA), Japan's *Nouminren*, and the Philippines' *Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas* (KMP), all of which officially joined La Via Campesina's food sovereignty movement in 1996 (La Via Campesina 2007). During this period, these farmers' organizations mobilized against neo-liberal policies in each country; thus, there were no regional farmers' organizations at the time. In 2002, the AFTA was established, precipitating the rise of third regionalism and the formation of the Asia-Pacific Network on Food Sovereignty (APNFS) in Indonesia. APNFS, as a regional farmer organization in the Asia-Pacific region, spurred a transnational farmer's movement. The APNFS was established as an advocacy alliance to enable farmers' organizations in the Asia-Pacific region to participate in preparatory meetings (May 27 – June 7, 2002 in Bali, Indonesia) of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). The APNFS aimed to reject agricultural trade liberalization, believing that it had caused the Asia-Pacific region to lose opportunities to safeguard agriculture and food security. Hence, the APNFS has advocated for farmers in the Asia-Pacific region to be allowed to determine their agricultural policies and promote the idea that the process of promoting food sovereignty can contribute to the sustainable development of the Asia-Pacific agricultural sector. Initially, the participants of the APNFS came from eight countries: Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Within the next five years, its membership expanded to Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Members from these 12 countries therefore represented the Asia-Pacific region at the 2007 Nyéléni forum, and the groups forming the APNFS also gradually became members of La Via Campesina. The most representative Southeast Asian organizations include Indonesia's Indonesian Peasant Union (SPI), Malaysia's Borneo Indigenous Peoples Movement (PANGGAU), Cambodia's Farmer and Nature Network (FNN), Vietnam's Vietnam National Farmers' Union (VNFU), and Thailand's Northern Peasant Federation (NPF).

Additionally, as the ASEAN kept pushing for ASEAN+1 FTAs, it has become the most-active, influential regional economic body since the beginning of the 21st century. Hence, the APNFS members and their activities also turned their attention to the agricultural trade liberalization agenda in Southeast Asia. La Via Campesina's Southeast Asian members also participated in the ASEAN People's Forum via APNFS's advocacy network, leading Southeast Asian countries to reconsider the causes of the 2007–2008 food crisis and the agricultural trade liberalization process in Southeast Asia. Hence, since the 17th ASEAN Summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 2010, discussions on food sovereignty and smallholder farmers' interests have been part of the ASEAN Summit's agenda each year. Moreover, La Via Campesina's East Asian and Southeast Asian members subsequently visited Taiwan in 2012 and 2013. They worked closely with organizations such as the Taiwan Farmers' Union (TFU), TRF, and the Homemakers United Foundation (HUF) to promote the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan. At the recommendation of Indonesia's SPI, the TFU also officially represented Taiwan as

a member of La Via Campesina. The next section includes a description of Taiwan's food-security governance mechanism and food sovereignty movement under third regionalism.

Regionalism, the corporate food regime, and Taiwan's food-security governance

According to the corporate food regime, large agricultural corporations rose to prominence because of neo-liberal economic theories, the liberalization framework of regionalism, and market-oriented food-security governance mechanisms. These factors resulted in the development of the "ABCD" agricultural organizations: Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus, and the four major ag-biotech companies – BASF, Dow-Dupont, Bayer-Monsanto, and ChemChina-Syngenta. These companies have formed the foundation of the incumbent political and economic order of the food regime (Bratspies 2017; Clapp 2018). Concurrently, the progress of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region has slowed, while third regionalism-related developments such as free trade areas have become prevalent in the region since the early 21st century. Hence, regional agricultural corporations were formed, namely Japan's Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo; China's China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) and China National Chemical Corp (ChemChina); South Korea's LG Chem and Samsung C&T; and Singapore's Wilmar, among others (Lin 2022a). These large-scale agricultural corporations also began to participate in food-security governance mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region (Wang 2020, 2018; Lin 2017b, 2017c). Such agricultural corporations dominate the political and economic order of the corporate food regime today because regionalism caused agricultural production factors to undergo rapid capitalization. According to Bernstein's (2016) discovery, one could further consolidate capitalization's driving forces, such as liberalization, technologicalization, securitization, and accumulation. The following paragraphs describe how these four driving forces relate to the roles played by the government and corporations in Taiwan's food-security governance mechanism.

In terms of agricultural trade liberalization, although Taiwan, within third regionalism, is absent from the RCEP for the time being due to political factors, it signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in 2010. This was considered an important milestone for Taiwan in Asia-Pacific regionalism (Capling and Ravenhill 2011, 571). Under the ECFA framework, Taiwan did not open itself further to imports of agricultural goods from China. Critical food-security items such as rice, peanuts, garlic, tea leaves, potatoes, and animal products were listed under controlled imports and remained under the purview of the ECFA. Conversely, Taiwan's agricultural exports did not come under equivalent constraints in China; hence, goods of relatively high economic value, such as Taiwan's fruits, floral products, seafood, and tea leaves, benefitted from the ECFA's early harvest list. Large quantities were exported to China. Between 2010 and 2015, the total value of such exports doubled (Pan 2020). However, this situation did not result in the rise of large-scale agricultural corporations in Taiwan. Rather, dealers with good political connections, also known as *maiban* (compradors), became more prevalent (Jiao 2015). After the ECFA of 2010, two FTAs were concluded, including the agreement between Singapore and Taiwan on Economic Partnership

(ASTEP) and that between New Zealand and Taiwan on Economic Cooperation (ANZTEC) in 2013. Some investment treatments and economic cooperation agreements with Asia-Pacific countries, which had been signed in the 1990s, were upgraded or updated in the 2010s by the Taiwanese government, especially those with the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia (Hsiao 2019). Moreover, based on the "Trade for All" strategy, the EU in 2020 has been considering an FTA partnership with Taiwan (Hsieh 2022, 102). In addition, the US-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) was launched in 2020 to propose a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) or FTA framework between Taiwan and the US (Hsieh 2022, 191). In September 2021, Taiwan further delivered its application to join the CPTPP, which was then passed to all Asia-Pacific member states for consideration. Consequently, Taiwan opened its agricultural market in 2021 to import ractopamine-fed US pork and beef from cows older than 30 months. The opening of the animal-products market was also expected to lead to the rise of another group of dealers. However, with the perception of the potentially negative impacts of FTAs or BTAs on domestic produce markets, some food-security items, such as staple grains and related fertilizers and seeds, have limited openness to Taiwan's markets, according to an official from the Council of Agriculture (COA) of Taiwan.[2] As the staple grains, fertilizers, and seeds are controlled, FTAs or BTAs give little encouragement to the rise of large-scale agricultural corporations in Taiwan, said the COA official. For example, when participating in these third regionalism systems, the rice market in Taiwan did not become more open. Rice remained a controlled good. Especially in the ANZTEC case, not only the staple grain of rice but also the staple commodity of fresh dairy products is controlled, resulting in an insignificant rise in large-scale agricultural corporations.

In terms of technological transformation, the corporate food regime believes that the WTO's safeguarding of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS) encouraged the production and trade of genetically modified (GM) crops and food, such that interactions with natural ecology shifted from the commercialization of nature to the chemicalization of nature and then to the neo-liberalization of nature under the food regime (Otero 2012, 285; Jakobsen 2021, 2–3; Abergel 2011, 262; Pechlaner and Otero 2010, 190). Eventually, this led to the rise of agricultural corporations with bio-technological patent rights in the new bioeconomy (McMichael 2013a, 120–122). The recent growth of the ag-biotech corporates from East Asia, whose cultivated environment features small-scale planting and high farmland price, can help explain this trend. The seeding system in East Asian countries, such as China and South Korea, was a part of governmental services in the 20th century (Lin 2022b). Since the start of the 21st century, it has transformed into commercialization and capitalization that helped their related ag-biotech corporates to swiftly rise to power in the contemporary corporate food regime. Examples can be seen in the growth of ChemChina and Sinochem from China and LG Chem and Samsung C&T from South Korea. However, for Taiwan, traditional state apparatuses, especially the COA, still guided the development of agricultural biotechnology during the rise of third regionalism. The technology was then transferred to the farmers' organizations at low prices. Technological assistance was also provided to farmers to enable them to plant modified crops. Hence, there were no ag-biotech companies dominating the Taiwanese market. In terms of food-security governance, one can cite the case of the currently most-popular

"Taiken 9" rice seedling, which was researched, developed, and promoted by the Taichung District Agricultural Research and Extension Station of the COA. Farmers can obtain seedlings either through a three-step propagation system or through technological transfers. If farmers choose the three-step system, they must apply to the county/city government for a free rice seedling, which they can then breed and plant on their own. If they choose the latter, they must pay fees to the Taichung District Agricultural Research and Extension Station of the COA. However, the fees are not high and are charged for providing farmers with technological assistance. The packaging of the "Taiken 9" rice produced by the farmers also includes the logo of the Taichung District Agricultural Research and Extension Station of the COA and the other agents that have transferred the technology. This enables farmers to sell products at a higher price.[3] Finally, the government, by taking the lead in making technological transformations and transfers accessible to farmers, has prevented large ag-biotech companies from rising and monopolizing the market. Simultaneously, the peasant economy can continue to develop in Taiwan's farming areas, and the self-sufficiency of rice farmers can be ensured.

In terms of securitization, one could refer to the 2007–2008 food crisis, which resulted in East Asian countries with high food demand rushing to support large agricultural corporations through state apparatuses. The aim was to obtain critical agricultural production resources and to securitize agricultural production chains. These national food-security considerations have led to the rise of large agricultural corporations (McMichael 2009a, 281). Taiwan's food-security governance mechanism was also led by state apparatuses, which not only supported the growth of some agricultural SOEs but also enhanced the COA's food-security governance abilities. The following are some examples of this process. The state-owned Taiwan Fertilizer held a monopoly over the fertilizer used in Taiwan's agricultural production. The company that held the largest share of Taiwan's farmlands was another SOE, Taiwan Sugar; and the water supply for planting crops came under the management purview of the COA's Irrigation and Engineering Department. The essential equipment for planting crops was supported through the COA's research and development projects as well as subsidies; and the COA's Agriculture and Food Agency was responsible for the acquisition, transportation, and storage of rice. Therefore, with a high level of oversight from SOEs and public agencies, Taiwan's food-security governance did not move toward a corporate food regime led by private enterprises, as seen in Europe and the Americas. Rather, Taiwan developed its unique state-guided corporate food regime.

Finally, in terms of accumulation, the rise of neo-liberalism led to accumulation by dispossession by commercial entities to attract investments in the global capital markets. This resulted in trends of global farmland-grabbing and investments in agribusiness corporations as well as neomercantilistic behavior (McMichael 2013b). Although, after the 2001 amendment, Taiwan's Land Act moderately loosened its ban on foreigners from investing in Taiwan's farmlands, it is not a free trading market where foreigners can easily acquire and register. In other words, foreigners' acquisition process for farmlands requires the approval of the central authority under the consideration of Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the Land Act (The Taiwan Land Act 2021).[4] Consequently, some large publicly listed agricultural corporations flocked to neighboring Southeast Asian countries and China to invest in farmlands and agricultural businesses for more liberal trade and investment under the third regionalism framework. This was the case for both SOEs

such as Taiwan Fertilizer and Taiwan Sugar and private enterprises such as Uni-President, Master Kong, CP Taiwan/Charoen Pokphand Group, Dachan, and Namchow. These investments allowed Taiwan's agricultural corporations to flourish overseas and extend Taiwan's agricultural production chains.

The aforementioned analyses of liberalization, technologicalization, securitization, and accumulation can explain how the Taiwanese government not only implemented state-guided capitalism in the industrial and technological sectors for modernization (Wu, Yu-shan 2007; Wang, Chen, and Tsai 2012; Looney 2020) but also developed a unique state-guided corporate food regime in the agricultural sector within the third regionalism context. The government first considers Taiwan's food security before embarking on initiatives such as limiting the openness of its agricultural markets to satisfy the demands of external regionalism. The government also intervenes in the agricultural market through government bodies and SOEs to maintain food security within Taiwan. As such, the state-guided corporate food regime has struck a delicate balance between market- and human rights-oriented food-security governance mechanisms. In other words, driving forces such as liberalization, technologicalization, securitization, and accumulation, which were brought about by third regionalism, led to the rise of some Taiwanese agricultural corporations in the Asia-Pacific region. However, government bodies and SOEs directly took charge in areas that were critical to Taiwan's food-security governance, such as rice-trading and seedling technology, acquisition, transportation, and storage. Therefore, although Taiwan's overall food self-sufficiency rate reached only 34.6% (on a calorie-value basis) in 2018, the values were much higher for other indicators fundamental to food security: the self-sufficiency rate of rice was 120.1%, that of egg products was 100%, vegetables 88.25%, fruit 87.6%, meat products 73.6%, and seafood products 165.3% (Zheng 2020). These are associated with the developmental characteristics of Taiwan's state-guided corporate food regime.

Promoting the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan: the taiwan rural front

During the third regionalism, Taiwan's agricultural sector, seedling rights, agricultural investments, food-security governance, and other matters were protected by the public sector and controlled by SOEs and local enterprises. This resulted in the development of a state-guided corporate food regime. Taiwan's situation differed from the context of Central and South America, the source of the food sovereignty movement, where countries were reliant on foreign food enterprises. Taiwan also differed from Africa and Southeast Asia, where food sovereignty movement was promoted; these countries relied on foreign food assistance and trade. Nonetheless, the food sovereignty movement flourished in Taiwan. The TRF is currently the primary advocate of the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan. This section provides information on the TRF as an organization, its networks, and its activities, as well as explains the reasons for the development of the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan.

Organization

In terms of organization, the TRF is closely related to the development of Taiwan's agricultural reconstruction, rural regeneration, and peasant movement (Chen 2016). After joining the WTO at the beginning of the 21st century, Taiwan's agricultural markets, including the rice market, were forced to open. Although the opening of markets was limited, the government provided large subsidies to compensate farmers for the losses incurred after joining the WTO. Although these subsidies temporarily quelled the backlash of Taiwanese farmers, in the long term, they were unable to attract new investments in agriculture. After joining the WTO, Taiwan's agricultural sector declined, farms began becoming obsolete, and the farmers themselves continued to age. Simultaneously, youths who had grown up on farms but had been educated in cities began to worry about the sustainable development of Taiwan's agriculture. A smattering of small-scale social movements began to pop up. It was only after the Yang Ru-Men (Rice Bomber) incident in 2003–2004 that Taiwanese society officially began to focus on issues in the agricultural sector and more youths were inspired to care about farms.

In response to such concerns, the government passed the Rural Regeneration Act (RRA) in 2008, with plans to invest NT $150 billion (approximately US $5 billion) into regenerating farms. However, there was criticism that the RRA's position on farmland capitalization was causing farmland speculation. Notably, farmers were not the first to raise such criticism. Rather, the young generation of elites who had grown up on farms and been educated in cities, been inspired by the "Rice Bomber" incident, and had strong sentimental attachments to the farmlands and countryside – writers, scholars, and social workers, among others – voiced their criticisms of the RRA's farmland policies through e-mails, Internet platforms, and gatherings. These efforts eventually expanded into social advocacy for farmland protection (in place of farmland trade), improvements to the farming environment and ecology (in place of land development), and safeguards for food self-sufficiency (in place of imported food). These social elites who had set their sights on the RRA eventually established the TRF on February 20, 2009 forming a physical social organization that could push for refinements to the RRA. The government revised the section on farmland capitalization in 2010, complying with the advocacy goal of the TRF. While advocating for the revision, the TRF constantly encouraged youths to join farms, assisted older farmers in farmland surveys, and collaborated with other farmers' organizations to host public hearings. Such initiatives led to the TRF becoming the first social organization independent of the National Farmers' Association and National Fishermen's Association, which could unite actors such as farmland advocates, older farmers, city dwellers with a fondness for the countryside, and environmental ecology advocates.

However, in its early days, the TRF lacked a clear official organizational framework, a legally appointed leader, or formal working personnel. There were also no social media sites such as Facebook, LINE, or Twitter. The TRF could only rely on e-mails to invite various actors to participate in discussions. While such connections made under a flat hierarchy allowed the TRF to expand its influence quickly, internally, authority and responsibilities were not clearly delineated (Tsai 2010,

337). Those who were active in the group included Hsu Shih-Jung, Tsai Pei-Hui, and Wu Yin-Ning, who had voiced support for Yang Ru-Men. These individuals continued to contribute to TRF's organizational development.[5] Moreover, Wu, Yin-ning (2007, 121) was the first activist to use the term "food sovereignty" in Taiwan and introduced the food sovereignty slogan to the TRF movement. This made farmland protection the core concept of TRF. As such, preventing farmland speculation, improving the ecological environment of farms, increasing food-production chains, reducing imports of goods, and implementing other food sovereignty concepts have become the goals of the TRF's activism.

Networks

In terms of networks, the TRF has become an important organization that connects and unites actors concerned about Taiwan's farm development. Outside Taiwan, it is known as the first farm organization to proactively connect with international farmers' organizations, such as the Landless Workers Movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*, MST), Focus on Global South, and La Via Campesina, and engage in experience sharing, especially learning international norms of land equity from La Via Campesina's meetings. In other words, the TRF networks were originally more oriented toward social elites and international farmers' organizations, and it was only later that it expanded its network to include traditional farms and farmers in Taiwan. Therefore, while there had been some social movements preventing farmland expropriation independently occurring in Taiwan before the TRF's birth in 2009, the international network with La Via Campesina and theoretical framework with food sovereignty had introduced TRF to further equip the later farmland protection movements with knowledge, before the TRF's leadership in the Taiwanese local farmers' organizations.[6] For example, the TRF's members have been participating in La Via Campesina's Asia-Pacific regional meeting since 2010. They also exchanged local information on Taiwan's rural development with La Via Campesina members in Indonesia, South Korea, and Vietnam. The TRF first invited La Via Campesina members from Southeast and East Asia – the APNFS, SPI, and KWPA – to visit Taiwan in 2012. During the visit, the TRF specifically selected La Via Campesina's publication (2012a) of transnational farmland-grabbing survey reports as learning materials for TRF members to study the food sovereignty movement promoted by La Via Campesina. The TRF translated the report and conclusions from the La Via Campesina meeting held in Mali in November 2011 into Mandarin. The "Stop Land-Grabbing" idea emphasized at the Mali meeting thus related the TRF's advocacy against farmland expropriation to the theoretical foundation for defending food sovereignty. However, farmland in Taiwan was expropriated to expand industrial and science-park zones, enlarge factories, and boost local governments' finances, rather than bolster colonializing foreign MNCs. The Mali meeting concluded that foreign MNCs had bypassed national systems in countries receiving investments through neo-liberal frameworks, such as regionalism, and had freely purchased farmlands in such countries. This was a form of colonizing farming societies in the Global South and engaging in neo-mercantilism, which disrupted food sovereignty in these countries. As La Via Campesina's case study differed from Taiwan's situation, the TRF localized the food sovereignty concept for Taiwan. The former had stronger nationalist and Marxist

tendencies, while the latter highlighted farmland protection and land equity.[7] Given its close connection with La Via Campesina's members, TRF's localized interpretation of food sovereignty not only became its authority to solidify Taiwan's farmers' organizations but also constructed its legitimacy foundation to lead the following farmland protection movements in Taiwan.[8]

In addition, this close interaction between La Via Campesina and the TRF led to the TRF's collaborative organization – the TFU – officially joining La Via Campesina in 2013. This was the first time in history that a Taiwanese farmers' organization had joined an international non-governmental organization (INGO), signaling that Taiwanese farmers possessed both traditional domestic organizational abilities and novel abilities to connect internationally. Notably, the TRF originally wanted to join La Via Campesina as a Taiwanese representative. However, La Via Campesina requested that only farmers' organizations that truly worked in the sector could join the group. As most of the TRF's members were social elites that lived in the city, it was decided that the TFU would represent Taiwan instead. The role of the TRF thus assisted the TFU in participating in La Via Campesina's activities.[9] In doing so, the TRF also had closer interactions with La Via Campesina's Southeast and East Asian member organizations, especially APNFS and *Nouminren*, to learn broader topics on food sovereignty movements, such as food safety, alternative development models, and Global South developmental challenges.

Simultaneously, the TRF also maintained and continued its original connections and exchanges with MST, Focus on Global South, GRAIN, KPL, KWPA, *Nouminren*, People's Food Sovereignty (China), and *Navdanya* Foundation (India). This resulted in international media exposure of the flaws of Taiwanese farm capitalization and farmland expropriation so that the TRF could combine forces with external parties to exert pressure on the Taiwanese government and facilitate policy changes. These external network connections eventually trickled down to internal ones, while further solidifying TRF's leadership and legitimacy of social movements for protection of agricultural production resources and farming's ecological environment. Through outward-facing education and learning, particularly with *Nouminren* and People's Food Sovereignty, the TRF went beyond concern for Taiwanese farmlands and farms and explored issues such as food-safety education and the promotion of consumer responsibility and anti-genetically modified organisms (anti-GMOs) campaigns. Thus, the TRF began working closely with other social organizations, including middle-class members who advocated for peasant economies, ecologically sound environments, food safety, and fair consumption, especially the HUF.

Activities

Finally, the TRF's activities could be classified accordingly as ad hoc or regular. Besides the aforementioned hosting of representatives from La Via Campesina, its ad-hoc activities were primarily street protest campaigns against farmland and agricultural water expropriation. The most notable ones include the movements against farmland expropriation in Dapu, Miaoli, in June 2010, irrigation water being taken by the Central Taiwan Science Park in May 2012, and the land expropriation of Chang's Pharmacy in 2013. These incidents demonstrated the TRF's ability to mobilize resources, despite the ad-hoc nature of the activities.

Furthermore, the incidents have also been internationally reported and supported by La Via Campesina's media after 2010, when TRF was engaged with La Via Campesina. However, as the TRF had localized food sovereignty within the Taiwanese context, the campaigns targeted the government, which differed from how the other members of La Via Campesina were campaigning against the promoters of regionalism, such as MNCs, and the meetings of the WTO, ASEAN, and APEC. The campaigns launched by the TRF came in response to the Taiwanese government forcefully using heavy machinery to demolish homes to expropriate farmland or irrigation sources. Although these actions were done without warning, the members of the TRF were able to record videos of the situation immediately and quickly mobilize TRF members in other areas and their collaborative organizations to gather at the venue of demolition. These incidents were also publicly shared on La Via Campesina's website, and even instantly spread on La Via Campesina's social media channels, resulting in an international social campaign against Taiwan's local expropriation. Such ad-hoc and international abilities to mobilize were unprecedented in the aging, obsolescing Taiwanese farmlands; however, the TRF successfully captured the international limelight and brought Taiwanese youths back to farms to protect the land.[10] Simultaneously, the youths who had inadvertently collaborated in anti-expropriation social movements voiced their experiences, resulting in the TRF slogan "when one place is in trouble, help comes from all sides" [*yifang younan, bafang laiyuan*]. They also got to know Taiwanese farms, staying on after the end of the campaign, or returning to their farming villages to take on agricultural work. In other words, they became the source of youthful energy regenerating Taiwanese farmlands.[11]

As for its regular activities, the TRF has been organizing an annual "Summer Grassroots Farm Camp" [*xiayun nongcun caogen diaochaying*] since 2009 in the hope that such regular activities could educate young people about the value of the agricultural sector and farms. As each camp chooses different farms as its survey targets, young people can leave the city behind and experience a farming lifestyle. This provides youths with opportunities to connect directly and emotionally with farms, committing themselves further to the agricultural sector and farmland protection. This is how the TRF differs completely from preceding farmers' organizations and campaigns (Chen 2016, 113). Beginning in 2011, the TRF also began organizing "Bow to Land Farmers' Market" [*wanyao nongfu shiji*] monthly. This was a continuation of the silent agricultural campaign initiated after Yang was released from jail, which was instituted in place of earlier violent measures. The TRF hoped that such smallholder market approaches could bypass the influence of corporations and bring smallholder farming concepts and farm-friendly crops to urban consumers. By putting consumers into direct contact with agricultural producers, farmers can reap more rewards, while consumers can obtain nutritious and ethically produced food. Additionally, youths who began to take up agricultural work after participating in the Summer Grassroots Farm Camp or other campaigns could also participate in the Bow to Land Farmers' Market to continue building on the Taiwanese food sovereignty movement as interpreted by the TRF and boost the food self-sufficiency rate (Jiang 2020).

Conclusion: The Taiwanese food sovereignty movement – inheritance and change

Amid the third regionalism movement, the Taiwanese government limited opening of the agricultural sector to ensure Taiwan's food security and sovereignty; hence, the situation did not engender a corporate food regime that was monopolized by private enterprises. Rather, Taiwan developed a unique state-guided corporate food regime. This agricultural development context differed from the Global South countries of Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, where the food sovereignty movement was popular. Hence, the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan inherited international ideas but developed localized and different features.

In terms of the extension of ideas, McMichael (2014) believed that the history of food sovereignty movement could be divided into three stages. In the first stage, the movement represented a battle between smallholder farms and the dumping of US agricultural products into markets abroad. However, the prevalence of regionalism and the expansion of large agricultural corporations implied that the movement could not simply be a movement of smallholders but rather needed to "recognize and promote alternative socio-ecological relations to feed citizens rather than long-distance consumers" (2014, 938). As such, the movement brought together environmental protection groups and forces against neo-liberalism and developed rapidly in the Global South. The second stage was marked by the food sovereignty movement promoted by La Via Campesina. This stage, bolstered by the 2007–2008 food crisis, resulted in the movement flourishing in various parts of the world. In tandem with the issue of transnational land-grabbing, the movement evolved to counter state capitalization of farmland and foreign biotech MNCs that were polluting the ecological environment in farming villages. The food sovereignty movement thus became global (942–943). The third phase refers to contemporary times, in which MNCs' colonization of farming villages and exploitation of farmlands in the Global South has caused various types of environmental degradation, such as soil exhaustion, water pollution, and a reduction in biodiversity. Under such a premise, La Via Campesina believed that the central idea of food sovereignty in the Anthropocene Age could not simply be pitted against capitalization but should emphasize farming's ecological environment, stating "central to this project are knowledge-intensive practices that reduce chemical and other commercial inputs to farming, and restore local ecological knowledges as essential to both democratic and sustainable food systems" (949). Given that farming's ecological environment has become the central theme of the current food sovereignty movement, La Via Campesina believes that the capitalization of agricultural production resources such as soil and water, as well as the degradation of the production environment, will continue to necessitate the expansion of the movement. The latter will strengthen localized environmental ecological knowledge chains, engendering the unique, localized characteristics of the food sovereignty movement. It has also been recognized that "communities are developing adaptive strategies that intersect with food sovereignty visioning, whether they call it food sovereignty or not, ... but linked to global food sovereignty efforts" (952). Therefore, Taiwan's food sovereignty movement continues to draw on the central theme of the global movement, highlighting the protection of agricultural production resources and improvement of farming's ecological

environment. In terms of organization, the Taiwanese movement developed in a similar manner to the global ones, beginning with a cluster of social organizations concerned about the development of farming villages that later expanded. In terms of networks, the Taiwanese movement has similarly teamed up with other social organizations (including members of the middle class) that advocate for the maintenance of the peasant economy, protection of the ecological environment, food safety, and fair consumption, among other causes. Together, these organizations have promoted the food sovereignty movement. In terms of activities, there have been ad-hoc ones, such as hosting representatives from La Via Campesina and organizing protest campaigns. There have been regular activities, such as the summer grassroots farm camps and the Bow to Land Farmers' Market.

Additionally, there have been localized changes to the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan that make it different from the practices of the Global South. First, the developmental context of the state-guided corporate food regime was such that Taiwanese farms did not encounter the colonization and exploitation of Taiwanese farmers under regionalism. Hence, the Taiwanese food sovereignty movement did not emphasize nationalist slogans such as "Taiwanese land should be utilized by the Taiwanese." Rather, what was emphasized was an appeal to the public to use farmland and agricultural water for agricultural purposes and to protect the farming's ecological environment. Second, the organization that seeded the Taiwanese food sovereignty movement – the TRF – was not helmed by farmers but by a group of social elites who grew up in farming villages, were educated in cities, and had strong sentiments about and concern for farms and the countryside. As such, they could introduce and interpret the ideas of the food sovereignty movement that originated abroad. Third, the dynamics of the Taiwanese movement's networks did not begin in farming villages, but were instead led by social elites living in cities. They first established networks and

Table 1. Taiwan's food sovereignty movement – continuity and differences.

Food regimes	Taiwan's state-guided corporate food regime	
Facet	**Continuity and Inheritance** **Food Sovereignty Movements in the Global South**	**Differences and Changes** **Localized Characteristics and Differences of Taiwan's Food Sovereignty Movement**
Main ideas	This is a social movement that emphasizes the need for protection of agricultural production resources and farming's ecological environment.	Taiwan's agricultural production resources were not colonized by foreign MNCs; hence, the food sovereignty movement emphasizes utilizing farmland and agricultural water for agricultural purposes and protecting farming ecology.
Organization structure	It primarily includes organizations that care about the development of farming villages.	The ones organizing the movement are not farmers but the TRF and social elites who grew up on farms and were educated in cities.
Networks	It teams up with other social organizations with a middle-class membership base.	Those who facilitate the networks are not from farming villages but are instead social elites who live in cities and have connected with one another before connecting with farmers' organizations in farming villages.
Activities	It conducts ad-hoc protection campaigns and holds regular farm surveys and smallholder markets.	The TRF's main activities rarely include protests against corporations, FTAs, or other advocates of regionalism; instead, protests against the Taiwanese government and state-led farmland and agricultural water-expropriation policies are more common.

then connected them with international parties. Later, they connected with farmers' organizations in Taiwan to deepen their survey of Taiwanese farms and farmlands. Fourth, the TRF-led Taiwanese food sovereignty movement was rarely concerned with protesting the regionalism-oriented frameworks of corporations, the WTO, or FTAs. Conversely, the TRF often protested the actions of the Taiwanese central and local governments as well as state-led policies on farmland and agricultural water expropriation. Table 1 provides a systemic explanation of how the issues surrounding farmland policies and farming's ecological environment have led to the rapid development of the food sovereignty movement in Taiwan. The farmland policies and ecological environment were integral to the localized development of the movement there.

However, under the pretext of third regionalism, especially the growing influence of the CPTPP and RCEP in the Asia-Pacific region, foreign MNCs continue to promote their understanding of market-oriented food-security governance and science-based food-safety governance. The development of Taiwan's state-guided corporate food regime would adapt to this reality, and the ideas of the TRF and Taiwan's food sovereignty movement would change. It is worthwhile to consider these elements on an ongoing basis in the study of regionalism and food regime theory.

Notes

1. The "Global South" includes the Southern countries, especially decolonized countries after the Second World War, in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific regions; the "Global North" indicates the Northern industrialized countries in North America and continental Europe; see Gray and Gills (2016).
2. This was a finding from Interviewee-J during an interview conducted on August 18, 2021 in Taipei, Taiwan.
3. This was a finding from Interviewee-K during an interview conducted on July 31, 2020 in Taichung, Taiwan.
4. Further explanation of the Taiwan Land Act for the foreigners to invest in Taiwan's farmlands can be found at The Ministry of the Interior, Letter No. 0970052097 dated March 28, 2008. https://www.land.moi.gov.tw/law/explainlist/105?lid=44. (Accessed: November 18, 2021).
5. This was a finding from Interviewee-L during an interview conducted on August 16, 2020 in Taipei, Taiwan.
6. This was a finding from Interviewee-C during the second interview conducted on September 11, 2021 in New Taipei, Taiwan.
7. This was a finding from Interviewee-C during the first interview conducted on October 28, 2018 in New Taipei, Taiwan.
8. This was a finding from Interviewee-C during the second interview conducted on September 11, 2021 in New Taipei, Taiwan.
9. This was a finding from Interviewee-Z during an interview conducted on August 28, 2020 in Taipei, Taiwan.
10. This was a finding from Interviewee-C during the second interview conducted on September 11, 2021 in New Taipei, Taiwan.
11. This was a finding from Interviewee-T during an interview conducted on July 25, 2020 in Miaoli, Taiwan.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the support from the Ministry of Science and Technology in Taiwan through a grant: MOST 109-2628–H–004–003–MY3.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology in Taiwan through a grant: MOST 109–2628–H-004–003–MY3.

Notes on contributor

Scott Y. Lin is Chair, Associate Professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies and Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University (NCCU) at Taipei, Taiwan. He is also serving as Executive Editor for *Wenti Yu Yanjiu* (問題與研究季刊, TSSCI, Taiwan's highest-ranked IR journal since 1956) and Editor for the *Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs*. He received his Ph.D. from Rutgers University (USA) in 2012. He has contributed numerous articles to publications including *Journal of Contemporary Asia; Environment, Development and Sustainability; Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*; and more. He is currently working on research exploring Asia-Pacific food security issues, especially food regimes, green regionalism, governance mechanism, farmland investments, food sovereignty movements, and approaches to environmental degradation adaptation.

ORCID

Scott Y. Lin http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4442-0341

References

Abergel, E. A. 2011. "Climate-ready Crops and Bio-capitalism Climate-ready Crops and Bio-capitalism: Towards a New Food Regime?" *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food* 18 (3): 260–274.

ASEAN. 2011. "ASEAN Economic Community Factbook." Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat. Accessed 14 August 2020. https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2012/publications/ASEAN%20Economic%20Community%20Factbook.pdf

Bernstein, H. 2016. "Agrarian Political Economy and Modern World Capitalism: The Contributions of Food Regime Analysis." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 43 (3): 611–647. doi:10.1080/03066150.2015.1101456.

Bratspies, R. M. 2017. "Owning All the Seeds: Consolidation and Control in AG-Biotech." *Environmental Law* 47: 583–608.

Campesina, L. V. 1996a, "International Conference of the via Campesina Tlaxcala, Mexico," April 18–21,". Accessed 21 December 2020. https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/our-conferences-mainmenu-28/2-tlaxcala-1996-mainmenu-48/425-ii-international-conference-of-the-via-campesina-tlaxcala-mexico-april-18-21

Campesina, L. V. 1996b, "Food Sovereignty: A Future without Hunger," November 11–17. Accessed 21 August 2020. http://www.acordinternational.org/silo/files/decfoodsov1996.pdf
Campesina, L. V. 2002, "Declaration NGO Forum FAO Summit Rome+5," June 13. Accessed 21 December 2020. https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-38/398-declaration-ngo-forum-fao-summit-rome5
Campesina, L. V. 2007, "Tlaxcala Declaration of the via Campesina," September 20. Accessed 21 August 2020. https://viacampesina.org/en/ii-international-conference-of-the-via-campesina-tlaxcala-mexico-april-18-21/
Capling, A., and J. Ravenhill. 2011. "Multilateralising Regionalism: What Role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?" *The Pacific Review* 24 (5): 553–575. doi:10.1080/09512748.2011.634078.
Chen, J.-H. 2016. "以農之名:臺灣戰後農運的歷史考察, *Yinongzhiming: Taiwan Zhanhou Nongyun de Lishi Kaocha* [In the Name of the Farmer: A Historical Review of Agrarian Movements in Postwar Taiwan]." *Router: A Journal of Cultural Studies*. 22. 75–122. [陳瑞樺].
Clapp, J. 2018. "Mega-Mergers on the Menu: Corporate Concentration and the Politics of Sustainability in the Global Food System." *Global Environmental Politics* 18 (2): 12–33. doi:10.1162/glep_a_00454.
Cotula, L. 2012. "Land Grabbing in the Shadow of the Law: Legal Frameworks Regulating the Global Land Rush." In *The Challenge of Food Security: International Policy and Regulatory Frameworks*, edited by R. Rayfuse and N. Weisfelt, 206–230. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Daugbjerg, C., A. A. Farsund, and O. Langhelle. 2017. "The Resilience of Paradigm Mixes: Food Security in A Post-exceptionalist Trade Regime." *Journal of European Public Policy* 24 (11): 1698–1715. doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1334079.
Edelman, M. 1999. *Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Edelman, M. 2014. "Food Sovereignty: Forgotten Genealogies and Future Regulatory Challenges." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41 (6): 959–978. doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.876998.
Farsund, A. A., C. Daugbjerg, and O. Langhelle. 2015. "Food Security and Trade: Reconciling Discourses in the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Trade Organization." *Food Security* 7 (2): 383–391. doi:10.1007/s12571-015-0428-y.
Friedmann, H., and M. Philip. 1989. "Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present." *Sociologia Ruralis* 29 (2): 93–114. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9523.1989.tb00360.x.
Gaudreau, M. 2019. "State Food Security and People's Food Sovereignty: Competing Visions of Agriculture in China." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne D'études Du Développement* 41 (1): 12–28. doi:10.1080/02255189.2017.1410470.
Grant, J. H., and D. M. Lambert. 2008. "Do Regional Trade Agreements Increase Members' Agricultural Trade?" *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 90 (3): 765–782. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01134.x.
Grant, J. H. 2013. "Is the Growth of Regionalism as Significant as the Headlines Suggest? Lessons from Agricultural Trade." *Agricultural Economics* 44 (1): 93–109. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2012.00635.x.
Gray, K., and B. K. Gills. 2016. "South-South Cooperation and the Rise of the Global South." *Third World Quarterly* 37 (4): 557–574. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1128817.
Hsiao, M. 2019. "Indo-Pacific Development and Stability as Context for Taiwan's New Southbound Policy." *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, 468 (10 April). Accessed 18 October 2021. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb468_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=37101
Hsieh, P. L. 2017. "Reassessing the Trade – Development Nexus in International Economic Law: The Paradigm Shift in Asia-Pacific Regionalism." *Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business* 37 (3): 321–370.
Hsieh, P. L. 2022. *New Asian Regionalism in International Economic Law*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Jagdambe, S., and E. Kannan. 2020. "Effects of ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement on Agricultural Trade: The Gravity Model Approach." *World Development Perspectives* 19 (100212): 1–8. doi:10.1016/j.wdp.2020.100212.
Jakobsen, J. 2021. "New Food Regime Geographies: Scale, State, Labor." *World Development* 145 (105523): 1–7. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105523.
Jarosz, L. 2009. "The Political Economy of Global Governance and World Food Crisis: The Case of the FAO." *Review* 32 (1): 37–60.
Jiang, B. [江晨嵓]. 2020. "疫情之下, 誰替島嶼守住糧倉?台灣農運百年小史, *Yiqingzhixia, Shuiti Daoyu Shouzhu Liangcang? Taiwan Nongyun Bainian Xiaoshi* [The History of Taiwan's Peasant Movements]." *Initium* (April 19). Accessed 11 December 2020. https://theinitium.com/article/20200419-taiwan-peasant-movement/
Jiao, J. 2015. *Fruit Politics 水果政治學, Shuiguo Zhengzhixue [Fruit Politics]*. [焦鈞], Kaohsiung: Liwen Publishing Group.
Khurana, R., and D. K. Nauriyal. 2017. "ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement: Evaluating Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects." *Journal of East-West Business* 23 (3): 283–307. doi:10.1080/10669868.2017.1322548.
Koo, W. W., P. Lynn Kennedy, and A. Skripnitchenko. 2006. "Regional Preferential Trade Agreements: Trade Creation and Diversion Effects." *Review of Agricultural Economics* 28 (3): 408–415. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9353.2006.00306.x.
La Via Campesina. 2012a, "International Conference of Peasants and Farmers: Stop Land Grabbing!" Mali, Selingué. Accessed September 11 2020. https://viacampesina.org/en/new-report-international-conference-of-peasants-and-farmers-stop-land-grabbing/
La Via Campesina. 2012b, "The Committee on World Food Security (CFS): A New Space for the Food Policies of the World, Opportunities and Limitations." Accessed December 21 2020. https://viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/report-no.4-EN-2012-comp.pdf
Lambert, D., and S. Mckoy. 2009. "Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Preferential Trade Associations on Agricultural and Food Trade." *Journal of Agricultural Economics* 60 (1): 17–39. doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.2008.00184.x.
Lateef, M., G.-J. Tong, and M.-U. Riaz. 2019. "Exploring the Gravity of Agricultural Trade in China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement." *The Chinese Economy* 51 (6): 522–533. doi:10.1080/10971475.2018.1481008.
Lin, S. Y. 2017a. "An Asian Way to Safeguard Food Security – Transnational Farmland Investment." *Asian Perspective* 41 (3): 481–518. doi:10.1353/apr.2017.0022.
Lin, S. Y. 2017b. "State Capitalism and Chinese Food Security Governance." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 18 (1): 106–138.
Lin, S. Y. 2017c. "The Evolution of Food Security Governance and Food Sovereignty Movement in China: An Analysis from the World Society Theory." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 30 (5): 667–695. doi:10.1007/s10806-017-9694-3.
Lin, S. Y. 2017d. "Transnational Farmland Acquisition in the International Political Economy: Towards a Better Understanding of Theory, Approach, and Governance." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 29 (3): 273–292. doi:10.1080/14781158.2017.1384718.
Lin, S. Y. 2022a. "Restoring the State Back to Food Regime Theory: China's Agribusiness and the Global Soybean Commodity Chain." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*. doi:10.1080/00472336.2022.2032279.
Lin, S. Y. 2022b. "China's Food Security Governance from a Hydraulic Society to a Corporate Food Regime and COVID-19." *Issues & Studies*. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995945.
Looney, K. E. 2020. *Mobilizing for Development: The Modernization of Rural East Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Margulis, M. E. 2017. "The Forgotten History of Food Security in Multilateral Trade Negotiations." *World Trade Review* 16 (1): 25–57. doi:10.1017/S1474745616000410.
Margulis, M. E. 2018. "Negotiating from the Margins: How the UN Shapes the Rules of the WTO." *Review of International Political Economy* 25 (3): 364–391. doi:10.1080/09692290.2018.1447982.

McMichael, P. 2005. "Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime." In *New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development*, edited by F. H. Buttel and P. McMichael, 265–299. Bingley: Emerald Publishing.
McMichael, P. 2009a. "A Food Regime Analysis of the 'World Food Crisis.'" *Agriculture and Human Values* 26 (December): 281–295. doi:10.1007/s10460-009-9218-5.
McMichael, P. 2009b. "A Food Regime Genealogy." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 36 (1): 139–169. doi:10.1080/03066150902820354.
McMichael, P. 2012. "The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3–4): 681–701. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.661369.
McMichael, P. 2013a. *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions*. Halifax, NS: Fernwood.
McMichael, P. 2013b. "Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International Relations." *Globalization* 10 (1): 47–64. doi:10.1080/14747731.2013.760925.
McMichael, P. 2014. "Historicizing Food Sovereignty." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41 (6): 933–957. doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.876999.
Nyéléni. 2007. "Synthesis Report." Accessed August 21 2020. https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/31Mar2007NyeleniSynthesisReport-en.pdf
Otero, G. 2012. "The Neoliberal Food Regime in Latin America: State, Agribusiness Transnational Corporations and Biotechnology." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne D'études Du Développement* 33 (3): 282–294. doi:10.1080/02255189.2012.711747.
Pan, W.-T. [潘維庭]. 2020. "ECFA十年大限將至—政大教授示警:這件事影響對中農產品出口, *ECFA Shinian Daxian Jiangzhi—zhengda Jiaoshou Shijing: Zhejianshi Yingxiang Duizhong Nongchanpin Chukou* [The End of ECFA Will Have Impacts on Agricultural Exports to China]." *Storm Media* (July 5). Accessed 21 August 2020. https://www.storm.mg/article/2822719
Pechlaner, G., and G. Otero. 2010. "The Neoliberal Food Regime: Neoregulation and the New Division of Labor in North America." *Rural Sociology* 75 (2): 179–208. doi:10.1111/j.1549-0831.2009.00006.x.
Pritchard, B. 2009. "The Long Hangover from the Second Food Regime: A World Historical Interpretation of the Collapse of the WTO Doha Round." *Agriculture and Human Values* 26 (297): 297–307. doi:10.1007/s10460-009-9216-7.
Schanbacher, W. D. 2010. *The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict between Food Security and Food Sovereignty*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
The Taiwan Land Act. 2021. "Article Content." Accessed November 18 2021. https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0060001
Tilzey, M. 2019. "Food Regimes, Capital, State, and Class: Friedmann and McMichael Revisited." *Sociologia Ruralis* 59 (2): 230–254. doi:10.1111/soru.12237.
Timsina, K. P., and R. J. Culas. 2020. "Impacts of Australia's Free Trade Agreements on Trade in Agricultural Products: An Aggregative and Disaggregative Analysis." *Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics* 64 (3): 889–919. doi:10.1111/1467-8489.12377.
Tsai, P.-H. 2010. "真實是一場社會行動:反思台灣農村陣線的行動與組織, *Zhenshi Shi Yichang Shehui Hangdong: Fansi Taiwan Nongcun Zhenxian de Hangdong Yu Zuzhi* [The Truth Is a Social Action: The Reflection of the Action and Organization of Taiwan Rural Front]." *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*. 79. 319–339. [蔡培慧].
Tso, C.-D. 2019. "Business Groups, Institutions, and the China-Vietnam Rice Trade." *Asian Survey* 59 (2): 360–381. doi:10.1525/as.2019.59.2.360.
Vollrath, T., and C. Hallahan. 2011. "Reciprocal Trading Arrangements: Impacts on Bilateral Trade Expansion and Contraction in the World Agricultural Marketplace," in *Economics Research Report No. 113*, Economic Research Service. (United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.). Accessed 18 August 2020. https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=44822
Wang, J.-H., Y. C. Tsung, and J. T. Ching. 2012. "In Search of an Innovative State: The Development of the Biopharmaceutical Industry in Taiwan, South Korea and China." *Development and Change* 43 (2): 481–503. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2012.01769.x.

Wang, K.-C. 2018. "East Asian Food Regimes: Agrarian Warriors, Edamame Beans, and Spatial Topologies of Food Regimes in East Asia." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 45 (4): 739–756. doi:10.1080/03066150.2017.1324427.

Wang, K.-C. 2020. "Measuring the Reach of Asian Regional Food Regimes in the WTO Era." *Geographical Review*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1080/00167428.2019.1702428.

Wu, Yin-ning.2007. *江湖在哪裡?—台灣農業觀察, Jianghu Zai nali?—Taiwan Nongye Guancha [Where Is Jiang-hu? Observation on Taiwanese Agriculture]*. [吳音寧], Taipei, Taiwan: INK Press.

Wu, Yu-shan.2007. "Taiwan's Developmental State: After the Economic and Political Turmoil." *Asian Survey* 47 (6): 977–1001. doi:10.1525/as.2007.47.6.977.

Zeng, K. 2010. "Multilateral versus Bilateral and Regional Trade Liberalization: Explaining China's Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements (Ftas)." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19 (66): 635–652. doi:10.1080/10670564.2010.485400.

Zheng, W.-Z. [鄭萬助]. 2020. "我國糧食供需統計結果, *Woguo Liangshi Gongxu Tongji Jieguo* [Statistical Data on Food Supply and Demand of Taiwan]." *Agriculture Policy & Review* 331 (January). Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=2510007