

1.8 — Factor Markets

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Outline



Labor Supply Decisions

Labor Market for Competitive Firm

Labor Market for a Monopoly.

Monopsony Power

Monopoly Power in Labor Markets: Unions


Returning to Firms




- Recall a firm uses technology that buys inputs, transforms them, and sells output

$$q = f(k, l)$$

- We classified inputs into the **factors of production**: land, labor, capital
- We *assumed* fixed factor prices
 - show up in total cost $= wL + rK$
- Where do they come from? **Factor markets**



Circular Flow




Firms' Payments to Factors are Income To Households



| Income Type | Amount (2016) | Percent |
|--|---------------|---------|
| Salaries and wages | \$7217 Bn | 68.45% |
| Taxable pensions and annuities | \$694 Bn | 6.58% |
| Partnership and S corporation net income | \$629 Bn | 5.97% |
| Capital gains less losses | \$621 Bn | 5.89% |
| Business net income | \$389 Bn | 3.69% |
| Taxable Social Security benefits | \$286 Bn | 2.71% |
| Taxable IRA distributions | \$258 Bn | 2.45% |
| Ordinary dividends | \$254 Bn | 2.41% |
| Total rental and royalty net income | \$98 Bn | 0.93% |
| Taxable interest | \$97 Bn | 0.92% |


Source: [Tax Foundation, 2018](#)

Firms' Payments to Factors are Income To Households



Labor Income Greatly Exceeds Investment Income

Taxable Labor and Investment Income in the United States, 2016 (Billions of Dollars)




Source: IRS SOI Table 1.3

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Composition of Income Varies with Income Level

Sources of Personal Income by Income Bracket, 2016



Source: IRS SOI Table 1.4

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
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Source: [Tax Foundation, 2018](#)

Supply and Demand in Factor Markets



- The price of a factor is governed by the same market forces as output:
- **Supply of Factor**: willingness of factor owners to accept and sell/rent their services to firms
 - landowners, workers, capitalists, resource owners, suppliers
- **Demand for Factor**: willingness of firms to pay for/hire factor services



Factor Market Prices and Opportunity Costs



- **Factor price represents opportunity cost of hiring a factor for an alternative use**
 - Firms not only pay for direct use of a factor, but also indirectly for *not using* it in an alternate process!




Factor Market Prices and Opportunity Costs



- **Example:** a producer of hammers buys steel, pays (the opportunity cost) for "taking" the steel away from alternative uses



Factor Market Prices and Opportunity Costs



- **Example:** e.g. salary for a skilled worker must be high enough to keep them at their current firm, and not be attracted to other firms/industries



Example Factor Market: Labor Markets



- Empirically, about 70% of total cost of production comes from labor
- We'll focus just on the **market for labor** as an example factor market
- Can do the same for *any* factor market
 - (e.g. capital, land, materials, etc.)





Labor Supply Decisions

Labor Supply Decisions




- The **Supply of Labor** comes from **individual decisions to work**
- Labor is considered a **disutility** (a **bad**)
 - **Opportunity cost** of labor is **leisure**
 - But, labor generates **income** for **consumption** (a good)
- Tradeoff: if you work more, you get more income, but less leisure



Modeling Labor Supply Decisions: A Change In Wages




- We often see “backward-bending” labor supply curves
- Depends on whether income or substitution effect dominates




A Brief Digression on Economic Rents I




- Recall **market supply** is the **minimum willingness to accept**, the minimum price necessary to bring a resource to market (its opportunity cost)
- But all (equivalent) labor is paid the *market wage*, w^* determined by market labor supply and labor demand




A Brief Digression on Economic Rents II




- Some workers would have accepted a job for less than w^*
- These inframarginal workers earn **economic rent** in excess of what is needed to bring them into the market (their opportunity cost)



A Brief Digression on Economic Rents III



- Consider a factor (such as land) for which the supply is perfectly inelastic (e.g. a fixed supply)
- Then the **entire value of the land is economic rent!**
- The *less* elastic the supply of a factor, the *more* economic rent it generates!





Labor Market for a Competitive Firm

Derived Demand in Factor Markets



- Demand for factors is a “**derived demand**”:
 - Firm only demands inputs to the extent they **contribute to producing sellable output**
- Firm faces a **tradeoff** when **hiring more labor**, as more labor ΔL creates:
 1. **Marginal Benefit**: Increases output and thus revenue
 2. **Marginal Cost**: Increases costs



Marginal Revenue Product (of Labor)



- Hiring more labor increases new output (i.e. labor's MP_L)
 - Recall: $MP_L = \frac{\Delta q}{\Delta L}$, where q is units of output
- Additional output generates new revenues (i.e. labor's $MR(q)$)
 - Recall: $MR(q) = \frac{\Delta R(q)}{\Delta q}$, where $R(q)$ is total revenue
- Hiring more labor, on the **margin**, generates a **benefit**, called the **marginal revenue product of labor, MRP_L** :

$$MRP_L = MP_L * MR(q)$$

- i.e. the number of new products a new worker makes times the revenue earned by selling the new products

Marginal Revenue Product for *Competitive* Firms




- This is the **Firm's Demand for Labor**:

$$MRP_L = MP_L * MR(q)$$

- For a firm in a **competitive (output) market**, firm's $MR(q) = p$, hence:

$$MRP_L = MP_L * p$$

where p is the price of the firm's *output*




Marginal Revenue Product for *Competitive* Firms





$$MRP_L = MP_L * p$$

- Marginal benefit of hiring labor, MRP_L **falls** with more labor used
 - production exhibits **diminishing marginal returns to labor!**
- **Choke price for labor demand:** price too high for firm to purchase any labor



A Competitive *Factor* Market




- If the **factor market is competitive**, labor supply available to an individual firm is *perfectly elastic* at the market price of labor (w^*)

Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor




- We've seen a falling MRP_L , the marginal benefit of hiring labor
- **Marginal cost of hiring labor**, w , remains constant
 - so long as firm is not a big purchaser (has no market power) in the labor market




Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor




- At low amounts of labor, **marginal benefit** $MRP_L > w$ **marginal cost**
- Firm will hire more labor



Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor




- At high amounts of labor, **marginal benefit** $MRP_L < w$ **marginal cost**
- Firm will hire less labor





Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor





- Firm hires L^* optimal amount of labor where $w = MRP_L$
- i.e. **marginal cost** of labor = **marginal benefit** of labor



Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor




Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor



- If market supply of labor decreases (increases), wages increase (decrease) & firms hire fewer (more) workers

Example




Example: Victoria's Tours is a travel company that offers guided tours of nearby mountain biking trails. Its marginal revenue product of labor is given by $MRP_L = 1,000 - 40l$, where l is the number of tour-guide weeks it hires and MRP_L is measured in dollars per tour-guide week. The going market wage for tour guides is \$600 per tour-guide week.

1. What is the optimal amount of labor for Victoria's Tours to hire?
2. At and above what market wage would Victoria's Tours not want to hire *any* labor?
3. What is the *most* labor Victoria's Tours would ever hire, given its marginal revenue product?





Labor Demand for a Monopoly

Labor Demand for Competitive vs. Monopolist Firm





- Recall a firm's demand for labor:
$$MRP_L = MP_L * MR(q)$$
- A firm in a **competitive *output* industry** has its $MR(q) = p$
 - So we saw its **Labor Demand**,
$$MRP_L = MP_L * p$$

Labor Demand for Competitive vs. Monopolist Firm



- Recall if firm is a **monopolist** in its **output** industry, its $MR(q) < p$
 - So its **Labor Demand**,
$$MRP_L = MRP_L * MR(q)$$
- Since $MR(q) < p$, **a monopoly in its output industry will always have lower demand for labor**, and thus, **hire less labor than a competitive firm**
 - Monopoly produces less output, so wants fewer inputs!

Labor Demand for Competitive vs. Monopolist Firm



- This is about the competitiveness of the **output** or “**downstream**” market
- Here, both competitive firm and monopolist in downstream markets face the same perfectly elastic **labor supply**
 - We've assumed no market power in the **input** or “**upstream**” market (for labor)
- We next consider market power in the upstream (labor) market...



Monopsony Power


Monopsony



- What if the firm has **market power in a factor market**?
- Consider extreme example: **monopsony**: a factor market with a **single buyer**




Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor




- Market power in *hiring* labor implies that the firm faces the **whole market factor supply curve** for labor
- Market supply is upward sloping
- **Factor (inverse) supply** describes minimum price workers are willing to accept to work

Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor




- As firm chooses to hire more L , must raise wages on *all* workers to hire them

Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor




- As firm chooses to hire more L , must raise wages on *all* workers to hire them
- **Output effect:** increased cost from increased number of workers

Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor



- As firm chooses to hire more L , must raise wages on *all* workers to hire them
- **Output effect**: increased cost from increased number of workers
- **Price effect**: increased cost from raising wage for all workers

Monopsony and Marginal Cost of Labor I



- If monopsonist wants to hire more labor, ΔL , its labor cost $C(L)$ would change by:

$$\Delta C(L) = w\Delta L + L\Delta w$$

- **Output effect**: increases number of labor hired (ΔL) times wage w per worker
- **Price effect**: raises wage per worker (Δw) on *all* workers hired (L)
- Divide both sides by ΔL to get **Marginal Cost of Labor, $MC(L)$** :

$$\frac{\Delta C(L)}{\Delta L} = MC(L) = w + \frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L} L$$

- Compare: supply for a **price-taking** firm is perfectly elastic: $\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L} = 0$, so we saw $MC(L) = w$!

Monopsony and Marginal Cost of Labor II



- If we have a linear inverse supply function for labor of the form

$$w = a + bL$$

- a is the choke price (intercept)
 - b is the slope
- Marginal cost of labor again is defined as:

$$MC(L) = w + \frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L} L$$


- Recognize that $\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}$ is the slope, b , $\left(\frac{\text{rise}}{\text{run}}\right)$

$$MC(L) = w + (b)L$$

$$MC(L) = (a + bL) + bL$$

$$MC(L) = a + 2bL$$

Monopsony and Marginal Cost of Labor IV




$$w(L) = a + bL$$
$$MC(L) = a + 2bL$$

- Marginal cost of labor starts at same intercept as Supply (average cost of labor) (a) with twice the slope ($2b$)


Note: If these past few slides have sounded familiar, this is the exact same process by which we derived a *monopolist's* marginal *revenue* curve!

Monopsony's Hiring Decisions




- Optimal quantity is where $MC = MR$
 - Firm's $MC(L) = MRP_L$

Monopsony's Hiring Decisions



- Optimal quantity is where $MC = MR$
 - Firm's $MC(L) = MRP_L$
- Monopsonist faces *entire* **market supply**
 - Can lower wages as low as workers' minimum WTA (Supply)

Monopsonist's Hiring Decisions




- Optimal quantity is where $MC = MR$
 - Firm's $MC(L) = MRP_L$
- Monopsonist faces *entire* **market supply**
 - Can lower wages as low as workers' minimum WTA (Supply)
- Compared to a competitive labor market (L_c, w_c) , **monopsonist hires fewer workers and pays them lower wages** (L_m, w_m) ; creates **deadweight loss**

Monopsony Depends on Price Elasticity of Supply




The more (less) elastic labor supply, the less (more) monopsony power (and DWL)

Less Elastic Labor Supply Curve





More Elastic Labor Supply Curve






Monopoly Power in Labor Markets: Unions

Monopoly Power in Labor Markets: Unions



- If **seller**/s of labor (workers) has market power, can act like a **monopolist** on the labor market
- **Example**: A labor union
- Faces entire market demand for labor, and thus its marginal revenue curve too
- Acts like a monopolist, restricts $L_u < L_c$ to push up $w_u > w_c$

The Problem of Bilateral Monopoly



- What if **both** sides of the market **have market power**?
 - A downstream **monopsonist buyer** vs. an upstream **monopolist seller**
- This is the problem of **bilateral monopoly**
 - We'll examine later this semester
 - One solution is **vertical integration**: merge into a single firm across both markets

