

# 3.4 — Politicians

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# Major Players in a Liberal Democracy



- **Voters** express preferences through elections
- **Special interest groups** provide additional information and advocacy for lawmaking
- **Politicians** create laws reflecting voter and interest group preferences
- **Bureaucrats** implement laws according to goals set by politicians
- **Judges** interpret laws to settle individual disputes



# *Politicians in a Liberal Democracy*



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# ***Politicians*** in a Liberal Democracy



- **Politicians** create laws reflecting voter and interest group preferences
- The politician's problem:
  1. **Choose:** < a platform >
  2. **In order to maximize:** < votes >
  3. **Subject to:** < being re/elected >




# How to Model Legislators and Legislation



- How do legislators choose which policies (or bills) to support?
  - What voters want
  - What special interests want
  - What the politician honestly believes
- How do legislators interact with each other to produce policy?
- How do institutions affect legislative outcomes?



# Politician's Incentives: Who's Interests To Represent?



- Recall the **Median Voter Theorem**: politicians are trying to get close to what they believe the median voter wants
- Politicians may have their own honest convictions about issues
- Tradeoff: honest convictions vs. winning (adopting median voter's preferences)
  - Leslie Knope/Josiah Bartlet vs. Frank Underwood
  - **Only winners get to enact their policies!**

# Politician's Incentives: Who's Interests To Represent?



# Politician's Incentives: Who's Interests To Represent?



- Rationally ignorant voters pay little attention to actual substance or policy-making; more to TV-friendly spectacles
- Big speeches, ribbon cutting ceremonies, attack ads on rivals, etc
- Platforms more about broad platitudes than substance "family values," "tough on crime," "change," "drain the swamp" etc.

# Politician's Incentives: Who's Interests To Represent?



# Politician's Incentives





# The Industrial Organization of Congress

# The Constitutional Framework




## **U.S. House of Representatives:**

- Direct election of *all* representatives every 2 years
  - All revenue (tax) bills must start in the House
  - House votes for President in event of an electoral college tie, has power to impeach

See U.S. Constitution, Article I


# The Constitutional Framework



## U.S. House of Representatives:

- One rep. for each district (of 435), allocated to the 50 States according to population (decennial U.S. Census)
- The House at the time has the power to redraw districts
- Benefit of cleverly drawing districts: keep incumbent politicians from competing with one another!
- Like a market cartel: more profitable for firms to not compete with one another and agree to have exclusive territories

# Gerrymandering: When Politicians Choose Voters




- "**Gerrymandering**": drawing districts for political benefits
- Has been used to both dilute and strengthen the power of political minorities
- Also used to create "safe seats" for incumbents

See [U.S. Constitution, Article I](#)

MA Governor Elbridge Gerry redrew districts in 1812  
to benefit his party

# Gerrymandering: When Politicians Choose Voters



## Modern Gerrymanders

These newly drawn congressional districts are among the most contorted in the nation. In some places, their appendages are not much wider than a highway.

Florida 14th



Illinois 4th



Illinois 7th



Maryland 2nd



Maryland 3rd



North Carolina 1st



North Carolina 12th



Ohio 9th



Pennsylvania 7th




Texas 35th



Graphic by: PETER BELL

Source: State redistricting officials

# The Constitutional Framework




## U.S. Senate:

- Each U.S. State gets 2 senators
- Originally appointed by State legislatures, 17<sup>th</sup> amendment (1913) changed to direct at-large election
- Each term is 6 years, and staggered elections so  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Senate is elected every 2 years
- President's federal appointments must obtain "advice and consent" of the Senate
- Votes to convict in impeachment trials

# Recall: District Voting



- Election to Congress involves (1) aggregating individual votes in State (**districts**) and then (2) taking the majority vote of those districts
- Party winning most seats not necessarily the party that wins the most votes
- **Example:** in 2012, Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives earned 50.59% of the popular vote but only attained 46.21% of the seats




# More on District Voting



- For House races, each State is split into  $n$  districts, each electing their own rep.
  - Senate: State is one "at-large" district
- Suppose within a State  $\frac{3}{4}$  of voters like Yellow party and  $\frac{1}{4}$  like Green party
- Suppose the State has 4 districts, and each district elects a Member
  - State sends 3 Yellows, 1 Green to Congress

Four District State




# More on District Voting



- Compare "At-Large" voting:
  - Yellow party candidate would win, goes to Senate
  - Minority parties do better under district voting than at-large voting

Four District State



# The Geographic Distribution of Interests



- Each Member of Congress represents a geographic district (or State, for Senate)
- Special interests are often distributed geographically
  - Farming in rural areas
  - Flooding in coastal areas
  - Urban areas
  - Military bases

# The Geographic Distribution of Interests



- The function of each Member is to benefit their district
- Voters & special interests with strong geographic concentration tend to flock to those legislators
- But how can a legislator get their constituents' agenda passed if they are just 1/435 (or 1/100)?

# Politics and the Coase Theorem



- Recall the (simple) **Coase Theorem** with low transaction costs and clearly defined property rights, parties can bargain to reach the socially efficient outcome
- Does a legislature bargain to reach the efficient outcome?

# Politics and the Coase Theorem



- Consider politics as a market for votes
- Imagine two groups:
  - Group 1 prefers policy  $A \succ B$
  - Group 2 prefers policy  $B \succ A$
- In theory, 1 can persuade 2 to support  $A$  in exchange for some **side payment**, i.e. **1 buys 2's vote**

# Politics and the Coase Theorem



- That transaction would be a **Pareto improvement!** (Or at least, a **Kaldor-Hicks improvement**)
- Both groups are better off: 1 gets policy  $A$ , 2 is **compensated** by 1
- This is the **Coase theorem** in politics: parties can bargain to a socially efficient outcome
  - Like the doctor (or baker) paying off the baker (or doctor)

# Politics and the Coase Theorem



- However, in many cases in politics, this is less likely to happen because of **high transaction costs**
- How would such a vote contract be enforceable?
  - No property rights in politics!
  - Public opinion could change between the votes
  - No way to credibly commit to upholding promise

# Politics and the Coase Theorem




- Easier for smaller groups with **low transaction costs**, like legislatures

# Secret vs. Public Voting



- Votes in Congress are often publicly recorded
- This actually enhances the market for vote trading in Congress
  - provides verification that each side held up their end of the bargain
- **Secret ballots** raise transaction costs and prevent agreements or vote trades
  - no way to verify, easier to renege

# Pork Barrel Legislation



- "**Pork barrel**" legislation: law that only benefits a narrow regional interest at taxpayer expense, solely for representative to bring money to their district
  - e.g. subsidies for "bridges to nowhere"
  - sometimes called "**earmarks**"
- This legislation would never pass as a bill on its own!

# Park Barrel Legislation



# Park Barrel Legislation



# Logrolling



- One way these bills get enacted is **logrolling** or a **quid-pro-quo**: exchange of votes between legislators

"You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours"

# Logrolling



- **Example:** suppose you have a national Senate with 5 districts: A, B, C, D, E, each with 1 Senator
  - Voters in district A want a military base
  - Voters in district B want a dam
  - Voters in district C want a monument
  - Each must be paid for by country's taxpayers

# Logrolling



Senator	Base	Dam	Monument
A	+10	-3	-3
B	-3	+10	-3
C	-3	-3	+10
D	-3	-3	-3
E	-3	-3	-3
TOTAL	-2	-2	-2

- If each bill (A, B, C) was voted on separately For/Against, each would fail
  - A 4:1 majority against

# Logrolling



Senator	Base	Dam	Monument	COMBINED
A	+10	-3	-3	+4
B	-3	+10	-3	+4
C	-3	-3	+10	+4
D	-3	-3	-3	-9
E	-3	-3	-3	-9
TOTAL	-2	-2	-2	-6

- If the three were combined in a single **omnibus bill**:
  - A, B, C form coalition to vote FOR
  - D, E vote AGAINST

# In General, Politics as Exchange



# Congressional Committees



# Congressional Committees



- Legislative agenda is a **commons**, easily congested!
- Committees create "property rights" to enclose portions of the agenda to exclusive committees

# Congressional Committees



- Relevant committee must approve a bill to bring it to the full Congress to debate and vote
  - Most Committee members have similar interests
  - Easier for Committee to make amendments, attach "riders", that satisfy most members of Committee
  - i.e. easier logrolling to earmark money for each Member's district

# Most Bills Die in Committee



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