Table 5: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic sanctions, 1971-2000

| Model | 1.3 | | 1.4 | | 1.5 | | 1.6 | | 1.7 | |
|-----------------------------|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | 0.651 | † | 0.665 | * | 0.729 | * | 0.589 | † | 0.703 | * |
| | 0.339 | | 0.339 | | 0.321 | | 0.355 | | 0.359 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | | 0.159 | | 0.180 | | | | 0.218 | |
| | | | 0.561 | | 0.529 | | | | 0.567 | |
| 5 Year Revolutionary Period | 0.310 | | | | | | 0.455 | | | |
| • | 0.430 | | | | | | 0.440 | | | |
| Population, log | 1.836 | *** | 1.734 | *** | 1.807 | *** | 3.864 | *** | 3.950 | *** |
| | 0.330 | | 0.333 | | 0.329 | | 0.685 | | 0.720 | |
| Polity | -0.055 | * | -0.071 | * | -0.055 | * | -0.054 | † | -0.067 | * |
| • | 0.028 | | 0.029 | | 0.028 | | 0.029 | | 0.029 | |
| Interregnum | 1.973 | ** | 1.480 | * | 1.905 | * | 1.615 | ** | 1.143 | † |
| - | 0.617 | | 0.639 | | 0.616 | | 0.595 | | 0.612 | |
| Transition | 0.538 | | 0.458 | | 0.549 | | 0.534 | | 0.318 | |
| | 0.459 | | 0.476 | | 0.464 | | 0.464 | | 0.477 | |
| Democracy | -2.182 | *** | -1.841 | *** | -2.184 | *** | -2.240 | *** | -1.931 | *** |
| · | 0.412 | | 0.426 | | 0.412 | | 0.423 | | 0.436 | |
| Cold War | -0.998 | *** | -1.022 | *** | -1.008 | *** | -0.348 | | -0.341 | |
| | 0.216 | | 0.220 | | 0.216 | | 0.270 | | 0.277 | |
| Major Power | -4.358 | * | -4.229 | * | -4.244 | * | | | | |
| • | 2.021 | | 1.984 | | 1.980 | | | | | |
| GDP_PC | -0.006 | | 0.002 | | -0.006 | | -0.002 | | 0.006 | |
| | 0.012 | | 0.012 | | 0.012 | | 0.012 | | 0.012 | |
| Civil War | | | 1.410 | *** | | | | | 1.288 | *** |
| | | | 0.274 | | | | | | 0.283 | |
| Muslim | | | | | 1.211 | | | | | |
| | | | | | 1.520 | | | | | |
| Arab | | | | | -2.622 | | | | | |
| | | | | | 2.479 | | | | | |
| Fixed Effects | No | | No | | No | | Yes | | Yes | |
| N | 3149 | | 3002 | | 3149 | | 1353 | | 1303 | |
| chi2 | 148.35 | | 162.88 | | 148.17 | | 172.94 | | 193.98 | |
| CHIZ | 140.33 | | 102.00 | | 140.1/ | | 1/4.74 | | 120.20 | |

All models use logit regression analysis for time-series panel data (xtlogit). Standard errors are below coefficients.

† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

Regional dummies included in random-effects model but not shown.

Table 6: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic sanctions, 1971-2000

| | Model: | 1.8 | | 1.9 | | 1.10 | | 1.11 | |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | | 0.405 | | 0.405 | | 0.798 | * | 0.766 | * |
| | | 0.328 | | 0.342 | | 0.342 | | 0.351 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | 0.522 | 2 | 0.574 | | 0.085 | | 0.157 | |
| | | 0.435 | | 0.537 | | 0.572 | | 0.567 | |
| Population, log | | 1.757 | *** | 3.580 | *** | 2.431 | *** | 4.580 | *** |
| | | 0.326 | | 0.695 | | 0.457 | | 0.763 | |
| Polity | | -0.065 | * | -0.062 | * | -0.095 | ** | -0.094 | ** |
| | | 0.029 | | 0.030 | | 0.030 | | 0.031 | |
| Interregnum | | 2.103 | ** | 1.697 | ** | 1.893 | ** | 1.539 | * |
| | | 0.642 | | 0.616 | | 0.630 | | 0.598 | |
| Transition | | -0.101 | | -0.206 | | 0.542 | | 0.420 | |
| | | 0.490 | | 0.489 | | 0.478 | | 0.472 | |
| Democracy | | -2.398 | *** | -2.505 | *** | -2.226 | *** | -2.245 | *** |
| | | 0.442 | | 0.454 | | 0.439 | | 0.447 | |
| Cold War | | -1.015 | *** | -0.451 | | -1.402 | *** | -0.726 | * |
| | | 0.218 | | 0.274 | | 0.257 | | 0.311 | |
| Major Power | | -4.413 | * | | | -5.094 | | | |
| | | 2.073 | | | | 3.790 | | | |
| GDP_PC | | -0.007 | | -0.002 | | -0.006 | | -0.002 | |
| | | 0.012 | | 0.012 | | 0.013 | | 0.013 | |
| Fixed Effects | | No | | Yes | | No | | Yes | |
| N | | 3009 | | 1302 | | 3149 | | 1145 | |
| chi2 | | 141.56 | | 167.88 | | 150.07 | | 210.07 | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

All independent and control variables lagged 1 year in models 1.8 and 1.9; models 1.10 and 1.11 use the more restrictive "sanctions" dependent variable. All models use logit regression analysis for time-series panel data (xtlogit). Standard errors are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in random-effects model but not shown.

Table 7: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic growth, 1971-1999

| | Model: | 2.5 | | 2.6 | | 2.7 | | 2.8 | |
|--|---------|---------|-----|--------|-----|---------|-----|--------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | wiodei. | -0.570 | | -0.934 | * | -0.745 | | -1.439 | ** |
| Revolutionary Leader | | 0.472 | | 0.432 | | 0.524 | | 0.488 | |
| 5 Year Revolutionary Period | | -1.092 | t | -1.578 | ** | -1.256 | * | -1.849 | ** |
| 0 1001 110 1010 1010 1011 | | 0.588 | 1 | 0.583 | | 0.597 | | 0.599 | |
| Population, log | | 0.026 | | 0.081 | | -3.358 | *** | 0.158 | |
| 1 , 0 | | 0.204 | | 0.183 | | 0.900 | | 0.986 | |
| Polity | | -0.015 | | -0.069 | * | 0.015 | | -0.101 | ** |
| , and the second | | 0.038 | | 0.035 | | 0.042 | | 0.039 | |
| Interregnum | | -11.067 | *** | 0.771 | | -10.183 | *** | 2.363 | |
| | | 1.066 | | 1.319 | | 1.095 | | 1.520 | |
| Transition | | -2.865 | *** | -1.397 | * | -2.968 | *** | -1.331 | * |
| | | 0.743 | | 0.658 | | 0.753 | | 0.671 | |
| Democracy | | -0.545 | | 0.230 | | -0.925 | | 0.383 | |
| | | 0.574 | | 0.487 | | 0.626 | | 0.540 | |
| Cold War | | -0.047 | | -0.058 | | -0.722 | * | -0.286 | |
| | | 0.257 | | 0.219 | | 0.320 | | 0.265 | |
| Major Power | | -0.592 | | -0.382 | | | | | |
| | | 1.283 | | 0.952 | | | | | |
| Civil War | | -2.133 | *** | -1.162 | ** | -1.646 | ** | -0.594 | |
| | | 0.433 | | 0.368 | | 0.488 | | 0.425 | |
| Postwar Economy | | 2.587 | *** | 0.661 | | 3.491 | *** | 1.617 | ** |
| | | 0.563 | | 0.529 | | 0.604 | | 0.586 | |
| Oil | | -0.821 | | -1.019 | * | -0.936 | | -0.390 | |
| | | 0.559 | | 0.470 | | 0.697 | | 0.594 | |
| Working Age Population | | 0.002 | | 0.042 | | 0.013 | | -0.038 | |
| | | 0.047 | | 0.039 | | 0.060 | | 0.056 | |
| Secondary School Enrolled | | | | 0.066 | † | | | 0.048 | |
| | | | | 0.034 | *** | | | 0.035 | *** |
| Gross Fixed Capital | | | | 0.126 | ^^^ | | | 0.126 | ^^^ |
| | | | | 0.005 | | | | 0.005 | |
| Fixed Effects | | No | | No | | Yes | | Yes | |
| N | | 2959 | | 2194 | | 2959 | | 2194 | |
| R-sq | | 0.105 | | 0.302 | | 0.002 | | 0.221 | |

All models use OLS regression analysis for time-series panel data (xtreg). Standard errors are below coefficients; † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

Regional dummies included in all random-effects models but not shown.

Table 8: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic growth, 1971-1999

| Model: | 2.9 | | 2.10 | | 2.11 | | 2.12 | | 2.13 | | 2.14 | |
|-----------------------------|---------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | 0.454 | | -0.539 | | -0.316 | | -0.256 | | -0.585 | | -0.910 | * |
| | 0.450 | | 0.411 | | 0.425 | | 0.373 | | 0.494 | | 0.464 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | -2.305 | *** | -4.407 | *** | -2.059 | ** | -4.052 | *** | -2.092 | ** | -4.457 | *** |
| | 0.656 | | 0.674 | | 0.689 | | 0.675 | | 0.693 | | 0.680 | |
| Population, log | 0.054 | | 0.073 | | 0.073 | | 0.095 | | -3.827 | ** | 0.145 | |
| | 0.204 | | 0.166 | | 0.166 | | 0.132 | | 1.222 | | 1.147 | |
| Polity | -0.014 | | -0.066 | | -0.006 | | -0.032 | | 0.016 | | -0.078 | * |
| | 0.038 | | 0.034 | | 0.037 | | 0.032 | | 0.041 | | 0.038 | |
| | | | | | - | | | | | | | |
| Interregnum | -11.014 | *** | 1.279 | | 10.887 | *** | -0.014 | | -9.9 2 3 | ** | 2.736 | |
| | 1.067 | | 1.317 | | 1.047 | | 1.228 | | 1.079 | | 1.504 | |
| Transition | -2.716 | *** | -0.926 | | -2.355 | ** | -0.892 | | -2.410 | ** | -0.655 | |
| | 0.745 | | 0.656 | | 0.737 | | 0.655 | | 0.745 | | 0.662 | |
| Democracy | -0.508 | | 0.196 | | -0.432 | | -0.017 | | -0.983 | | 0.299 | |
| | 0.573 | | 0.482 | | 0.547 | | 0.449 | | 0.617 | | 0.532 | |
| Cold War | 0.036 | | -0.059 | | 0.929 | | 0.266 | | 0.937 | | 1.300 | |
| | 0.257 | | 0.218 | | 0.829 | | 1.093 | | 0.971 | | 1.166 | |
| Major Power | -0.694 | | -0.462 | | -0.401 | | 0.069 | | | | | |
| | 1.284 | | 0.945 | | 1.083 | | 0.716 | | | | | |
| Civil War | -2.067 | *** | -1.017 | ** | -1.887 | *** | -1.146 | *** | -1.537 | ** | -0.417 | |
| | 0.434 | | 0.367 | | 0.408 | | 0.330 | | 0.479 | | 0.416 | |
| Postwar Economy | 2.637 | *** | 0.756 | | 2.153 | *** | 0.029 | | 3.249 | *** | 1.439 | * |
| · | 0.563 | | 0.524 | | 0.545 | | 0.499 | | 0.595 | | 0.572 | |
| Oil | -0.794 | | -0.956 | * | -0.496 | | -0.870 | * | -0.415 | | 0.300 | |
| | 0.558 | | 0.465 | | 0.506 | | 0.396 | | 0.692 | | 0.593 | |
| Working Age Population | -0.005 | | 0.030 | | 0.040 | | 0.082 | * | -0.014 | | 0.010 | |
| | 0.047 | | 0.039 | | 0.045 | | 0.035 | | 0.063 | | 0.061 | |
| Secondary School Enrolled | | | 0.057 | | | | 0.062 | | | | 0.035 | |
| • | | | 0.034 | | | | 0.034 | | | | 0.034 | |
| Gross Fixed Capital | | | 0.127 | *** | | | 0.125 | *** | | | 0.124 | *** |
| • | | | 0.005 | | | | 0.005 | | | | 0.005 | |
| Muslim | -1.777 | | -2.516 | ** | | | | | | | | |
| | 1.186 | | 0.935 | | | | | | | | | |
| Arab | 1.091 | | 0.999 | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1.883 | | 1.460 | | | | | | | | | |
| Country Fixed Effects | No | | No | | No | | No | | Yes | | Yes | |
| Year Fixed Effects | No | | No | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | |
| N | 2959 | | 2194 | | 2959 | | 2194 | | 2959 | | 2194 | |
| R-sq | 0.107 | | 0.314 | | 0.147 | | 0.344 | | 0.004 | | 0.276 | |
| N-54 | 0.107 | | 0.514 | | 0.14/ | | 0.344 | | 0.004 | | 0.270 | |

All models use OLS regression analysis for time-series panel data (xtreg). Standard errors are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

Regional dummies included in all random-effects models but not shown.

Table 9: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic growth, 1971-1999

| M. 1.1 | 2.15 | | 216 | | 0.17 | | 2.10 | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-----|---------------|-----|---------------|-----|------------------|---------|
| Model: | 2.15 0.232 | *** | 2.16 0.134 | *** | 2.17 0.171 | *** | 2.18 0.076 | *** |
| GDP per capita | 0.232 | | 0.134 | | 0.171 | | 0.076 | |
| (1 year lag) GDP per capita | 0.019 | * | 0.019 | * | -0.003 | | -0.002 | |
| ± ± | 0.037 | | 0.044 | | 0.003 | | 0.019 | |
| (2 year lag) | | * | | ** | | | | |
| GDP per capita | 0.044 0.019 | | 0.050 | | 0.001 | | 0.010 | |
| (3 year lag) | | ** | 0.018 | | 0.020 | *** | 0.018 | |
| GDP per capita | -0.059 | | 0.015 | | -0.099 | | -0.017 | |
| (4 year lag) | 0.019 | | 0.017 | | 0.019 | *** | 0.018 | |
| GDP per capita | -0.030 | | 0.020 | | -0.084 | *** | -0.016 | |
| (5 year lag) | 0.018 | | 0.017 | | 0.019 | | 0.017 | |
| Revolutionary Leader | -0.476 | | 0.064 | | -0.664 | | -1.043 | * |
| | 0.320 | | 0.300 | | 0.490 | | 0.467 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | -1.853 | ** | -4.330 | *** | -1.777 | * | -4.863 | *** |
| | 0.682 | | 0.694 | | 0.715 | | 0.734 | |
| Population, log | -0.027 | | -0.000 | | -3.268 | *** | -0.252 | |
| | 0.084 | | 0.081 | | 0.905 | | 0.986 | |
| Polity | -0.010 | | -0.018 | | 0.023 | | -0.067 | |
| | 0.029 | | 0.026 | | 0.041 | | 0.038 | |
| Interregnum | -8.530 | *** | 1.105 | | -9.250 | *** | 5.208 | *** |
| | 0.992 | | 1.108 | | 1.081 | | 1.576 | |
| Transition | -2.115 | ** | -1.088 | | -2.451 | *** | -0.834 | |
| | 0.701 | | 0.635 | | 0.735 | | 0.657 | |
| Democracy | -0.516 | | -0.272 | | -1.009 | | 0.124 | |
| | 0.426 | | 0.364 | | 0.607 | | 0.523 | |
| Cold War | 0.030 | | -0.046 | | -0.641 | * | -0.221 | |
| | 0.219 | | 0.190 | | 0.313 | | 0.257 | |
| Major Power | 0.520 | | 0.418 | | | | | |
| | 0.543 | | 0.420 | | | | | |
| Civil War | -0.579 | * | -0.492 | * | -1.326 | ** | -0.200 | |
| | 0.293 | | 0.251 | | 0.482 | | 0.419 | |
| Postwar Economy | 1.304 | * | 0.346 | | 1.499 | ** | 0.547 | |
| , | 0.511 | | 0.468 | | 0.619 | | 0.586 | |
| Oil | -0.399 | | -0.330 | | -0.528 | | -0.301 | |
| | 0.308 | | 0.274 | | 0.657 | | 0.562 | |
| Working Age Population | 0.037 | | 0.048 | * | 0.031 | | -0.021 | |
| | 0.029 | | 0.024 | | 0.058 | | 0.055 | |
| Secondary School Enrolled | 0.02 | | 0.021 | | 0.000 | | 0.014 | |
| Secondary Series Enterior | | | 0.033 | | | | 0.034 | |
| Gross Fixed Capital | | | 0.126 | *** | | | 0.124 | *** |
| Gross rixed Capital | | | 0.005 | | | | 0.005 | |
| Fixed Effects | No | | No | | Yes | | Yes | |
| N | 2787 | | 2092 | | 2787 | | 2092 | |
| R-sq | 0.171 | | 0.359 | | 0.006 | | 0.247 | |
| - 1 | | | 3.00 | | 2.000 | | - · - - · | |

All models use OLS regression analysis for time-series panel data xtreg). Standard errors are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in all random-effects models but not shown.

Table 10: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic growth, 1971-1999

| | Iodel: 2.19 | | 2.20 | | 2.21 | | 2.22 | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | -0.472 | | -0.250 | | -0.564 | | -0.552 | |
| | 0.40 | | 0.421 | | 0.507 | | 0.525 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | -1.59 | | -2.023 | * | -1.713 | * | -2.496 | ** |
| | 0.69 | | 0.756 | | 0.705 | | 0.775 | |
| Population, log | -0.05 | | -0.000 | | -4.217 | *** | -2.115 | |
| | 0.13 | | 0.151 | | 0.907 | | 1.093 | |
| Polity | -0.02 | | -0.005 | | 0.003 | | -0.014 | * |
| | 0.03 | | 0.036 | | 0.042 | | 0.043 | |
| Interregnum | -5.94 | | -0.012 | | -5.161 | *** | 2.787 | |
| | 1.04 | | 1.376 | | 1.115 | | 1.702 | |
| Transition | -0.66 | | -2.646 | ** | -0.763 | | -2.885 | |
| | 0.75 | 2 | 0.736 | | 0.772 | | 0.756 | |
| Democracy | -0.16 | | -0.420 | | -0.296 | | -0.375 | |
| | 0.52 | 7 | 0.505 | | 0.623 | | 0.600 | |
| Cold War | -0.010 |) | -0.182 | | -0.948 | ** | -0.697 | * |
| | 0.24 | 1 | 0.234 | | 0.325 | | 0.295 | |
| Major Power | 0.07 | L | -0.043 | | | | | |
| | 0.90 | L | 0.819 | | | | | |
| Civil War | -1.173 | 3 ** | -1.281 | *** | -0.635 | | -0.627 | |
| | 0.382 | 2 | 0.370 | | 0.495 | | 0.472 | |
| Postwar Economy | 1.56 | 1 ** | 0.199 | | 2.529 | *** | 1.227 | ** |
| | 0.533 | 3 | 0.558 | | 0.608 | | 0.649 | |
| Oil | -0.92 | ó * | -1.147 | * | -1.008 | | -0.467 | |
| | 0.45 | l | 0.447 | | 0.709 | | 0.660 | |
| Working Age Population | 0.049 |) | 0.044 | | 0.064 | | 0.003 | |
| | 0.039 |) | 0.037 | | 0.061 | | 0.062 | |
| Secondary School Enrolled | | | 0.056 | | | | 0.027 | |
| | | | 0.038 | | | | 0.027 | |
| Gross Fixed Capital | | | 0.042 | *** | | | 0.038 | *** |
| - | | | 0.005 | | | | 0.005 | |
| Fixed Effects | No |) | No | | Yes | | Yes | |
| N | 2982 | 2 | 2195 | | 2982 | | 2195 | |
| R-sq | 0.06 | 7 | 0.113 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | |

All independent and control variables lagged 1-year in all models. All models use OLS regression analysis for time-series panel data (xtreg). Standard errors are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in all random-effects models but not shown.

Table 11: Additional models - monadic analysis of economic growth

| | Model: | 2.23 | | 2.24 | | 2.25 | | 2.26 | |
|-----------------------------|--------|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | | -0.080 | | 0.110 | | -0.427 | | -0.484 | |
| • | | 0.357 | | 0.340 | | 0.410 | | 0.448 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | -1.641 | * | -3.815 | *** | -1.528 | * | -1.724 | ** |
| | | 0.666 | | 0.673 | | 0.599 | | 0.605 | |
| Population, log | | -0.000 | | 0.090 | | -0.027 | | -3.085 | |
| | | 0.108 | | 0.104 | | 0.199 | | 0.706 | |
| Polity | | -0.017 | | -0.026 | | -0.014 | | 0.009 | |
| | | 0.035 | | 0.031 | | 0.035 | | 0.037 | |
| Interregnum | | -8.835 | *** | -0.055 | | -11.349 | *** | -10.603 | *** |
| | | 1.103 | | 1.286 | | 1.017 | | 1.039 | |
| Transition | | -2.735 | *** | -1.016 | | -2.726 | *** | -2.853 | |
| | | 0.699 | | 0.641 | | 0.700 | | 0.708 | |
| Democracy | | -0.501 | | -0.670 | | -0.662 | | -1.031 | |
| | | 0.526 | | 0.415 | | 0.517 | | 0.553 | |
| Cold War | | 0.165 | | -0.121 | | 0.052 | | -0.655 | * |
| | | 0.267 | | 0.234 | | 0.246 | | 0.297 | |
| Major Power | | 0.216 | | 0.108 | | -0.985 | | | |
| | | 0.859 | | 0.618 | | 1.255 | | | |
| Civil War | | -1.479 | *** | -1.111 | *** | -2.119 | *** | -1.709 | *** |
| | | 0.353 | | 0.289 | | 0.397 | | 0.434 | |
| Postwar Economy | | 1.819 | *** | -0.330 | | 2.347 | *** | 3.065 | *** |
| | | 0.523 | | 0.455 | | 0.511 | | 0.540 | |
| Oil | | -0.384 | * | -0.780 | * | -0.545 | | -0.188 | |
| | | 0.384 | | 0.306 | | 0.504 | | 0.594 | |
| Working Age Population | | 0.029 | | 0.052 | | -0.010 | | 0.017 | |
| | | 0.039 | | 0.030 | | 0.040 | | 0.050 | |
| Secondary School Enrolled | | | | 0.042 | | | | | |
| | | | | 0.030 | | | | | |
| Gross Fixed Capital | | | | 0.120 | *** | | | | |
| | | | | 0.005 | | | | | |
| N | | 2955 | | 2192 | | 3325 | | 3325 | |
| Chi2 | | 245.55 | | 981.38 | | 3323 | | 3323 | |
| | | 2 4 3.33 | | 901.36 | | 0.103 | | 0.001 | |
| R-sq | | | | | | 0.103 | | 0.001 | |

Models 2.23 and 2.24 use GLS regression analysis with panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure (xtgls) Models 2.25 and 2.26 use OLS regression analysis for time-series panel data (xtreg) and include observations from 1962-1999. Standard errors are below coefficients; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in all random-effects models but not shown.

Table 12: Additional models - dyadic analysis of alliance onset, 1946-2004

| | Model: | 3.4 | | 3.5 | | 3.6 | | 3.7 | | 3.8 | |
|---|--------|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | | | | -0.800 | *** | -0.378 | *** | | | -0.647 | *** |
| | | | | 0.087 | | 0.057 | | | | 0.075 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | | | | | | | 0.273 | *** | 0.852 | *** |
| | | | | | | | | 0.081 | | 0.105 | |
| 5 Year Revolutionary Period | | 0.151 | * | 0.882 | *** | | | | | | |
| | | 0.069 | | 0.106 | | | | | | | |
| Polity | | 0.010 | ** | 0.002 | | 0.005 | | 0.008 | ** | 0.002 | |
| | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.003 | | 0.003 | | 0.003 | |
| Interregnum | | -3.378 | *** | -3.436 | *** | -3.416 | *** | -3.370 | *** | -3.427 | *** |
| | | 0.998 | | 0.998 | | 0.998 | | 0.998 | | 0.998 | |
| Transition | | 0.859 | *** | 0.084 | *** | 0.908 | *** | 0.844 | *** | 0.819 | *** |
| | | 0.089 | | 0.089 | | 0.088 | | 0.090 | | 0.089 | |
| Alliance Reputation | | 4.668 | *** | 4.610 | *** | 4.700 | *** | 4.650 | *** | 4.567 | *** |
| | | 1.203 | | 1.200 | | 1.229 | | 1.198 | | 1.199 | |
| Alliance History | | 9.898 | * | 10.124 | * | 9.849 | * | 9.800 | * | 9.933 | * |
| • | | 4.832 | | 4.800 | | 4.792 | | 4.816 | | 4.793 | |
| Portfolio Similarity | | 4.883 | *** | 4.887 | *** | 4.901 | *** | 4.881 | *** | 4.896 | *** |
| • | | 0.180 | | 0.180 | | 0.180 | | 0.179 | | 0.180 | |
| Interaction Score (IIS) | | 0.205 | | 0.158 | | 0.177 | | 0.197 | | 0.160 | |
| ` , | | 0.211 | | 0.214 | | 0.213 | | 0.210 | | 0.213 | |
| Joint Enemy | | 0.306 | *** | 0.312 | *** | 0.304 | *** | 0.307 | *** | 0.312 | *** |
| • | | 0.043 | | 0.043 | | 0.043 | | 0.043 | | 0.043 | |
| Distance | | -0.036 | *** | -0.036 | *** | -0.036 | *** | -0.036 | *** | -0.036 | *** |
| | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | |
| Major Power | | 0.578 | *** | 0.587 | *** | 0.595 | *** | 0.575 | *** | 0.588 | *** |
| , | | 0.053 | | 0.054 | | 0.054 | | 0.053 | | 0.054 | |
| Polity Difference | | -0.019 | *** | -0.019 | *** | -0.017 | *** | -0.016 | *** | -0.016 | |
| | | 0.003 | | 0.003 | | 0.003 | | 0.003 | | 0.003 | |
| Joint Democracy (5) | | 0.075 | | 0.064 | | | | | | | |
| <i>y</i> (<i>y</i> | | 0.063 | | 0.003 | | | | | | | |
| Joint Democracy (7) | | | | | | 0.163 | ** | 0.182 | ** | 0.172 | *** |
| ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | | | | | | 0.058 | | 0.058 | | 0.059 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| N | | 724470 | | 724470 | | 734470 | | 734470 | | 734470 | |
| | | | | | | | | 0 | | 0 | |

All models use logistic regression analysis (logit).

Robust standard errors clustered by directed dyad are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in all models but not shown.

Table 13: Additional models - dyadic analysis of alliance onset, 1946-2004

| | Model: | 3.9 | | 3.10 | | 3.11 | |
|-----------------------------|----------|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | iviouei. | -0.285 | *** | 0.10 | | -0.573 | *** |
| nevolutionally bedder | | 0.058 | | | | 0.073 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | 0.000 | | 0.420 | *** | 0.925 | *** |
| , | | | | 0.081 | | 0.103 | |
| Polity | | 0.009 | * | 0.013 | ** | -0.008 | * |
| | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | |
| Interregnum | | -2.663 | *** | -2.621 | *** | -2.675 | *** |
| O | | 0.702 | | 0.702 | | 0.702 | |
| Transition | | 0.711 | *** | 0.624 | *** | 0.601 | *** |
| | | 0.097 | | 0.100 | | 0.099 | |
| Alliance Reputation | | 3.988 | * | 3.918 | * | 3.840 | * |
| • | | 1.915 | | 1.854 | | 1.854 | |
| Alliance History | | 0.289 | | 0.127 | | 0.362 | |
| · | | 4.023 | | 3.945 | | 4.016 | |
| Portfolio Similarity | | 1.775 | *** | 1.769 | *** | 1.767 | *** |
| · | | 0.142 | | 0.142 | | 0.142 | |
| Interaction Score (IIS) | | 0.576 | * | 0.594 | * | 0.557 | * |
| | | 0.236 | | 0.234 | | 0.236 | |
| Joint Enemy | | 0.453 | *** | 0.455 | *** | 0.461 | *** |
| | | 0.044 | | 0.044 | | 0.044 | |
| Distance | | -0.042 | *** | -0.042 | *** | -0.042 | *** |
| | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | |
| Major Power | | 0.437 | *** | 0.424 | *** | 0.432 | *** |
| | | 0.053 | | 0.052 | | 0.053 | |
| Polity Difference | | -0.026 | *** | -0.026 | *** | -0.026 | *** |
| | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | |
| Joint Democracy | | -0.148 | * | -0.139 | * | -0.150 | * |
| | | 0.068 | | 0.068 | | 0.068 | |
| N | | 734470 | | 734470 | | 734470 | |
| Chi2 | | 6950.40 | | 7000.49 | | 6899.38 | |

All independent and control variables lagged 1 year in all models.

All models use logistic regression analysis (logit).

Robust standard errors clustered by directed dyad are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

Regional dummies included in all models but not shown.

Table 14: Alternative models - dyadic analysis of alliance change, 1947-2000

| Model: | 4.4 | | 4.5 | | 4.6 | | 4.7 | | 4.8 | | 4.9 | |
|-----------------------------|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | | | -0.567 | *** | -0.035 | | | | -0.433 | *** | -0.494 | *** |
| | | | 0.099 | | 0.065 | | | | 0.088 | | 0.089 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | | | | | | 0.788 | *** | 1.164 | *** | 1.353 | *** |
| | | | | | | | 0.084 | | 0.114 | | 0.106 | |
| 5 Year Revolutionary Period | 0.590 | *** | 1.094 | *** | | | | | | | | |
| | 0.077 | | 0.117 | | | | | | | | | |
| Polity | -0.001 | | -0.004 | | 0.003 | | 0.004 | | 0.000 | | 0.010 | * |
| | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.005 | |
| Interregnum | -1.454 | * | -1.498 | * | -1.499 | * | -1.487 | * | -1.527 | * | -1.533 | * |
| | 0.608 | | 0.607 | | 0.607 | | 0.608 | | 0.608 | | 0.606 | |
| Transition | 0.701 | *** | 0.697 | *** | 0.809 | *** | 0.625 | *** | 0.621 | *** | 0.598 | *** |
| | 0.108 | | 0.108 | | 0.104 | | 0.109 | | 0.109 | | 0.106 | |
| Alliance Reputation | 10.606 | *** | 10.606 | *** | 10.852 | *** | 10.495 | *** | 10.487 | *** | 8.759 | *** |
| | 2.184 | | 2.182 | | 2.311 | | 2.180 | | 2.188 | | 1.139 | |
| Alliance History | -11.913 | * | -11.584 | * | -12.018 | * | -12.134 | * | -12.063 | * | -20.012 | *** |
| | 4.830 | | 4.846 | | 4.849 | | 4.852 | | 4.911 | | 6.048 | |
| Portfolio Similarity | 6.115 | *** | 6.110 | *** | 6.161 | *** | 6.135 | *** | 6.138 | *** | 1.148 | *** |
| | 0.287 | | 0.288 | | 0.289 | | 0.287 | | 0.289 | | 0.162 | |
| Interaction Score (IIS) | 0.849 | * | 0.820 | * | 0.872 | ** | 0.871 | ** | 0.851 | * | 1.102 | ** |
| | 0.331 | | 0.335 | | 0.336 | | 0.334 | | 0.338 | | 0.356 | |
| Joint Enemy | 0.772 | *** | 0.779 | *** | 0.766 | *** | 0.777 | *** | 0.783 | *** | 0.809 | *** |
| | 0.057 | | 0.057 | | 0.057 | | 0.057 | | 0.057 | | 0.055 | |
| Distance | -0.031 | *** | -0.031 | *** | -0.031 | *** | -0.031 | *** | -0.031 | *** | -0.041 | *** |
| | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.001 | |
| Major Power | 0.919 | *** | 0.927 | *** | 0.950 | *** | 0.928 | *** | 0.939 | *** | 0.572 | *** |
| | 0.078 | | 0.079 | | 0.079 | | 0.079 | | 0.080 | | 0.074 | |
| Polity Difference | -0.030 | *** | -0.031 | *** | -0.036 | *** | -0.035 | *** | -0.035 | *** | -0.039 | *** |
| | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.004 | | 0.005 | |
| Joint Democracy | -0.029 | | -0.043 | | | | | | | | -0.346 | |
| | 0.089 | | 0.089 | | | | | | | | 0.088 | |
| Joint Democracy (7) | | | | | -0.265 | ** | -0.244 | ** | -0.254 | ** | | |
| | | | | | 0.093 | | 0.093 | | 0.093 | | | |
| N | 730559 | | 730559 | | 73559 | | 730559 | | 730559 | | 711854 | |
| Chi2 | 4509.01 | | 4501.24 | | 4424.42 | | 4628.49 | | 4608.13 | | 5242.47 | |

All independent and control variables lagged 1 year in model 4.9

Robust standard errors clustered by directed dyad are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in all models but not shown.

All models use logistic regression analysis (logit).

Table 15: Additional models - dyadic analysis of stronger/weaker alliance, 1947-2000

| | Model: | 4.10 | | 4.11 | |
|-----------------------------|--------|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| Revolutionary Leader | | -0.555 | *** | -0.049 | |
| · | | 0.096 | | 0.138 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | | 1.049 | *** | 1.338 | *** |
| · | | 0.132 | | 0.166 | |
| Polity | | -0.005 | | 0.001 | |
| • | | 0.005 | | 0.010 | |
| Interregnum | | -2.592 | ** | -0.416 | |
| | | 0.992 | | 0.584 | |
| Transition | | 0.796 | *** | -0.704 | |
| | | 0.111 | | 0.451 | |
| Alliance Reputation | | 11.563 | *** | 4.691 | |
| - | | 2.549 | | 3.006 | |
| Alliance History | | 4.144 | | -33.535 | *** |
| • | | 3.859 | | 4.824 | |
| Portfolio Similarity | | 9.380 | *** | -0.251 | |
| · | | 0.453 | | 0.287 | |
| Interaction Score (IIS) | | 1.017 | * | 0.314 | |
| | | 0.406 | | 0.575 | |
| Joint Enemy | | 0.951 | *** | -0.014 | |
| · | | 0.059 | | 0.114 | |
| Distance | | -0.026 | *** | -0.045 | *** |
| | | 0.001 | | 0.002 | |
| Major Power | | 0.888 | *** | 1.109 | *** |
| | | 0.084 | | 0.110 | |
| Polity Difference | | -0.026 | *** | -0.048 | *** |
| | | 0.005 | | 0.008 | |
| Joint Democracy | | -0.354 | *** | 0.890 | *** |
| - | | 0.090 | | 0.167 | |
| N | | 730559 | | 730559 | |
| Chi2 | | 3983.80 | | 2241.16 | |

DV in model 4.10 "stronger alliance"; DV in model 4.11 "weaker alliance."

All models use logistic regression analysis (logit).

Robust standard errors clustered by directed dyad are below coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) Regional dummies included in all models but not shown.

Table 16: Descriptive Statistics of Variables of Interest (Monadic Analysis)

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | |
|--|------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|--|
| - vuitable | 000. | TYTCATT | ota. Bev. | 171111 | TVICA | |
| Independent Variables | | | | | | |
| Revolutionary Leader | 5123 | 0.166 | 0.372 | 0 | 1 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period | 5972 | 0.028 | 0.164 | 0 | 1 | |
| Dependent Variables | | | | | | |
| Sanction | 4098 | 0.161 | 0.368 | 0 | 1 | |
| Economic Growth (% change in GDP per capita) | 4939 | 1.856 | 6.389 | -50.290 | 92.586 | |
| Voy Control Variables | | | | | | |
| Key Control Variables Population (log) | 4027 | 16.015 | 1.493 | 12.283 | 20.956 | |
| Democracy | 5972 | 0.326 | 0.469 | 0 | 1 | |
| Polity | 5897 | -0.064 | 7.545 | -10 | 10 | |
| Civil War | 5061 | 0.158 | 0.365 | 0 | 1 | |
| Postwar Economy | 4383 | 0.046 | 0.210 | 0 | 1 | |
| Working Age Population | 5972 | 57.549 | 6.374 | 44.792 | 78.387 | |
| Year | 5972 | 1983.76 | 12.588 | 1961 | 2004 | |

Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of Variables of Interest (Dyadic Analysis)

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|--------------|--------|---------|--|
| | | | | · | | |
| Independent Variables | | | | | | |
| Revolutionary Leader (state 1) | 922244 | 0.133 | 0.340 | 0 | 1 | |
| Revolutionary Leader (state 1) |) <u>ZZZII</u> | 0.133 | 0.340 | O | 1 | |
| 3 Year Revolutionary Period (state 1) | 922244 | 0.027 | 0.162 | 0 | 1 | |
| Dependent Variables | | | | | | |
| Alliance Onset | 1221602 | 0.006 | 0.077 | 0 | 1 | |
| Amance Onset | 1221602 | 0.006 | 0.077 | U | 1 | |
| All: CI | 1007000 | 0.004 | 0.050 | 0 | 4 | |
| Alliance Change | 1037092 | 0.004 | 0.059 | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Key Control Variables | | | | | | |
| Alliance Reputation | 1221602 | 0.000 | 0.008 | -0.318 | 0.229 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Alliance History | 1187435 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.333 | 0.267 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Portfolio Similarity | 1075296 | 0.750 | 0.191 | -0.188 | 1.000 | |
| · | | | | | | |
| Interaction Score (IIS) | 1056326 | 0.002 | 0.044 | -0.944 | 0.421 | |
| , | | | | | | |
| Joint Enemy | 1221602 | 0.086 | 0.281 | 0 | 1 | |
| John Erenty | 1221002 | 0.000 | 0.201 | O | 1 | |
| Distance | 1220342 | 65.672 | 22.486 | 0 | 111.333 | |
| Distance | 1220342 | 63.672 | 22.400 | U | 111.333 | |
| | 1001.00 | 0.070 | 2.262 | 0 | | |
| Major Power | 1221602 | 0.073 | 0.260 | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Polity Difference | 962360 | 7.942 | 6.487 | 0 | 20 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Joint Democracy | 1221602 | 0.132 | 0.339 | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Year | 1221602 | 1983.58 | 14.649 | 1946 | 2004 | |

Table 18: Comparisons of model specifications for likelihood information

| Model | Obs | df | Chi2 | AIC | BIC | |
|---------------------------|--------|----------|---------|----------|----------|--|
| | | | | | | |
| Economic Sanctions | | | | | | |
| 1.1 | 3149 | 19 | 148.14 | 1458.94 | 1573.99 | |
| 1.2 | 1353 | 9 | 210.07 | 929.30 | 976.19 | |
| 1.1 (baseline) | 3479 | 17 | 154.24 | 1551.01 | 1655.63 | |
| 1.2 (baseline) | 1457 | 7 | 165.47 | 1008.11 | 1045.10 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Alliance Onset | | | | | | |
| 3.3 | 734470 | 22 | 6277.23 | 43218.81 | 43471.97 | |
| 3.3 (baseline) | 842249 | 20 | 7224.65 | 48516.33 | 48749.21 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Alliance Change 4.3 | 730559 | 22 | 4504.70 | 28817.96 | 29070.99 | |
| 4.0 | 730339 | <i>_</i> | 4304.70 | 20017.90 | 23070.33 | |
| 4.3 (baseline) | 837961 | 20 | 4746.19 | 31907.26 | 32140.03 | |
| | | | | | | |