

FROM CHECKBOX TO CHECKMATE

WINNING THE GAME FOR SECURITY BUDGETS

WITH SOME PURPLE TEAM STUFF AT THE BEGINNING



\$

WHOAMI

I have worn a lot of hats:

» PREVIOUSLY, BLUE TEAM

IT support

Sysadmin


vCISO

Compliance

» ALSO, PREVIOUSLY LED A PENETRATION TESTING PRACTICE

» NOW: CONSULTANT AT BISHOP FOX, RED TEAM

You can call me Ryan. Let's talk about a pet peeve of mine *real quick*.





“Hackers like nothing more
than to **shit on compliance.**”

- me

LOOK,
I GET IT OKAY?

Compliance gets all the attention

compliance



Here's your SOC 2 report,
happy to jump on a call with your
Fortune 100 prospect if you'd like.
A lot of these controls will work
for ISO 27001, too, so that should
help with breaking into other market segments.

imgflip.com

pentesting



stop allowing tls 1.1

PENTESTING AND RED TEAMING

» Pentests are often limited in scope

- Won't be comprehensive
- Findings can make you look bad
- People get fired
 - Usually the wrong move, but it unfortunately happens
- Reports are checklists of non-contextual findings for someone to fix

» Red team exercises: advanced, but...

- Not about coverage
- Systemic issues that are much harder to fix

THE COMMON DENOMINATOR HERE IS
A LACK OF CONTEXT

THIS WILL BE A LOT OF INFORMATION

IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TWO TALKS

- » What is a purple team?
- » How do purple team exercises work?
- » How can purple teaming help me beyond improving security?
 - Wait what

THESE ARE MY IDEAS FOR

A FULL SECOND TALK

- » Business Strategy and Political Maneuvering for Painfully Technical People
- » I Am Machiavelli and So Can You
- » 💰💰💰💰 How to Win Money and Influence Money 💰💰💰💰
- » "how to get the CEO to notice me reddit"
- » Making Shareholders Smile: A **STAR WARS** Story



01

WHAT IS A PURPLE TEAM?

THINK THEY ARE

- » A dedicated team with an entirely different skillset compared to a red team or blue team OR people who are experts at both
 - Kind of, but not really
- » A pentesting team that does a pentest while the blue team just sort of watches
 - Kinda weird
- » A red team that does a red team while the blue team just sort of watches
 - Also weird
- » Let's make our own definition:

**A JOINT, COLLABORATIVE EFFORT
BETWEEN ATTACKERS AND DEFENDERS
TO TEST DETECTION CAPABILITIES
AND IMPROVE SECURITY**

ACTUALLY ARE

- » A joint, collaborative effort between attackers and defenders to test detection capabilities and improve security
 - Not just a pentest where the blue team rides shotgun
 - Not an exercise in “seeing what’s possible”
 - In consulting (like with Bishop Fox), the defenders are our customers, and the attackers are us, the red team
- » Test if things are **detected**
- » Test if what is detected **alerts someone**
- » Test if that alert can be **actioned**



02

HOW DO EXERCISES WORK?

HERE'S HOW THEY

ACTUALLY WORK

» The blue team has a TTP they want to test


- Penetration test report results
- Scary news headline
- Intel from a threat report
- Anything counts!

» What is a TTP?

- “Tactic, Technique, or Procedure”
- Basically, any action an attacker takes

HERE'S HOW THEY


ACTUALLY WORK



LET'S WORK THROUGH AN EXAMPLE

- » The red team runs a port scan of a network segment from a company Linux server that is "assumed to be compromised"
- » The blue team realizes they can't detect port scans, and analyzes network traffic to identify patterns of activity that indicate a port scan is taking place
- » The blue team configures their IDS/IPS to shut down hosts from which those patterns are originating
- » The red team runs a port scan again and to see if they are blocked by the new defensive controls
- » The initial test results, changes, and results of improvement are all recorded and documented


PUTTING IT ALL
IN CONTEXT




PUTTING IT ALL
IN CONTEXT



PUTTING IT ALL
IN CONTEXT



PUTTING IT ALL IN CONTEXT



THE REPORT

»» WHAT WAS DONE

- Commands executed, payloads run, etc.

»» WHAT THE INITIAL RESULT WAS

- Did the blue team detect it? Can they do anything about it?

»» WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE

- What improvements were made? Was a detection written? Alerts turned on?

»» WHAT THE RETEST RESULT WAS


- Did the changes matter?

»» NEXT ACTIONS

- Can we improve the changes? Can we implement the same or similar improvements in more areas?

PURPLE TEAM

ALL DAY EVERY DAY





03

GOING BEYOND SECURITY

a.k.a getting that *bag*

NAMES AREN'T IMPORTANT BUT

IMAGINE THAT YOU ARE A REALLY BIG CASINO/HOTEL



SCRATCH THAT

IMAGINE THAT YOUR BOSS OWNS A LOT OF CASINOS AND HOTELS

MGM Expects \$100 Million Q3 Earnings Ding Due to Ransomware Attack

Posted on: October 5, 2023, 06:12h. Last updated on: October 7, 2023, 12:38h.



Todd Shriber @etfgodfather
Expertise: Financial, Gaming Business, Mergers and Acquisitions.

Shares of MGM Resorts International (NYSE: MGM) traded slightly lower after the casino operator said it expects third-quarter earnings before in amortization, and restructuring or rent costs (EBITDAR) to be trimmed by a ransomware attack.

VICI Properties Inc. (VICI)
NYSE - NYSE Delayed Price. Currency in USD


Follow

Visitors trend 2W ↑ 10W ↑ 9M ↑

Quote Lookup

28.94 +0.06 (+0.21%) 28.85 -0.09 (-0.31%)

At close: 04:01PM EDT After hours: 07:54PM EDT



THE BOSS IS

VERY CONCERNED

- ☑ You already tested a bunch of ransomware TTPs
 - Ransomware group tactics are not complicated and are well documented (see Conti playbook)

- ☑ You restricted password reset capability to specific individuals
 - They must be escalated beyond the first tier of support

- ☑ You require verification steps to be completed that are difficult to bypass
 - Call the individual at their contact number, require an MFA token entry

NICE



HERE ARE SOME

EXAMPLE METRICS

» Percentage of MITRE ATT&CK TTPs detected/blocked

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement
10 techniques	8 techniques	9 techniques	14 techniques	19 techniques	13 techniques	42 techniques	17 techniques	31 techniques	9 techniques
Active Scanning (3)	Acquire Access	Drive-by Compromise	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (5)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)	Adversary-in-the-Middle (3)	Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of Remote Services
Gather Victim Host Information (4)	Acquire Infrastructure (8)	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Command and Scripting Interpreter (9)	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Brute Force (4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing
Gather Victim Identity Information (3)	Compromise Accounts (3)	External Remote Services	Container Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (5)	Browser Information Discovery	Lateral Transfer
Gather Victim Network Information (6)	Compromise Infrastructure (7)	Hardware Additions	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for Credential Access	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking
Gather Victim Org Information (4)	Develop Capabilities (4)	Phishing (3)	Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Service
Phishing for Information (3)	Establish Accounts (3)	Replication Through Removable Media	Inter-Process Communication (3)	Compromise Client Binary	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Deploy Container	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Service Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media
Search Closed Sources (2)	Obtain Capabilities (6)	Supply Chain Compromise (3)	Native API	Create Account (3)	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture (4)	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Software Deployment Tools
Search Open Technical Databases (5)	Stage Capabilities (6)	Trusted Relationship	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Escape to Host	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Modify Authentication Process (8)	Container and Resource Discovery	Taint Source Content
Search Open Websites/Domains (3)		Valid Accounts (4)	Serverless Execution	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Execution Guardrails (1)	Multi-Factor Authentication Interception	Debugger Evasion	Use Alternate Authentication Material
Search Victim-Owned Websites			Shared Modules	External Remote Services	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation	Device Driver Discovery	
			Software Deployment Tools	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	File and Directory Permissions Modification (2)	Network Sniffing	Domain Trust Discovery	
			System Services (2)	Implant Internal Image	Process Injection (12)	Hide Artifacts (10)	OS Credential Dumping (8)	File and Directory Discovery	
			User Execution (3)	Modify Authentication Process (8)	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Steal Application Access Token	Group Policy Discovery	
			Windows Management Instrumentation	Office Application Startup (6)	Valid Accounts (4)	Impair Defenses (10)	Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates	Network Service Discovery	
						Indicator Removal (9)		Network Share Discovery	
						Indirect Command Execution		Network Sniffing	
						Masquerading (8)		Password Policy Discovery	
						Modify Authentication Process (8)		Peripheral Device	



HERE ARE SOME

EXAMPLE METRICS

- » Percentage of MITRE ATT&CK TTPs detected/blocked
- » Average intruder detection rates over time
- » Efficacy of detecting data exfiltration
- » Number of data encryption methods used by ransomware groups tested and stopped

THE PART WHERE I GET DAY DREAMY AND IDEALISTIC

Infrastructure audit completed by Radically Open Security

9 August 2023 EXTERNAL AUDITS

We tasked the Netherlands based security firm Radically Open audit towards our VPN infrastructure.

We asked them to focus solely on VPN servers that run from R/ server.

MLL-019 - LPE to root using systemd timers and insecure directory permissions (Elevated)


To quote RoS: "Low-privileged system accounts can elevate their privileges to root by manipulating systemd timer script content."

Our comments:


It became obvious after consulting with RoS that the primary issue here is the use of nested home directories, and the addition of administrator users being part of the `mad` group.

The usage of the nested `/home/mad` directory structure is a legacy remnant of pre-RAM VPN servers, which is going to be removed in the upcoming updates to our infrastructure. In the short-term we have removed all administrator users from being part of the `mad` group, but we have also moved all related scripts to `/opt/local_checks` which RoS acknowledged as resolving the issue.

HERE'S SOME
FREE STUFF



HERE'S SOME FREE STUFF



HERE'S SOME

FREE STUFF

<https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/>

<https://atomicredteam.io/>

<https://docs.vectr.io/>