AllJoyn™ Security 2.0 Feature

High-Level Design Document

Draft Rev 1 Update 6

March 17, 2015

Contents

1 Introduction 5

1.1 Purpose and scope 5

1.2 Revision history 5

1.3 Acronyms and terms 5

2 System Design 8

2.1 Overview 8

2.2 Premises 9

2.3 Typical operations 11

2.3.1 Claim a factory-reset application 11

2.3.2 Define a security group 15

2.3.3 Example of building a policy 15

2.3.4 Install a policy 15

2.3.5 Add an application to a security group 16

2.3.6 Add a user to a security group 16

2.3.7 Security Manager 17

2.3.8 Certificate revocation (not fully designed) 25

2.3.9 Distribution of policy updates and membership certificates (not fully designed) 26

2.3.10 Application Manifest 27

2.4 Access validation 30

2.4.1 Validating a producer policy 30

2.4.2 Validating a consumer policy 31

2.4.3 Exchanging membership certificates during session establishment 32

2.4.4 Anonymous session 34

2.4.5 Validating an admin user 35

2.4.6 Emitting a session-based signal 35

2.5 Authorization data format 36

2.5.1 The format is binary and exchanged between peers using AllJoyn marshalling 36

2.5.2 Format Structure 37

2.5.3 Policy Templates 41

2.6 Certificates 41

2.6.1 Main Certificate Structure 41

2.6.2 Identity certificate 42

2.6.3 Membership certificate 42

2.7 Sample use cases 43

2.7.1 Users and devices 43

2.7.2 Users set up by Dad 44

2.7.3 Living room set up by Dad 45

2.7.4 Son's bedroom set up by son 46

2.7.5 Master bedroom set up by Dad 47

2.7.6 Son can control different TVs in the house 48

2.7.7 Living room tablet controls TVs in the house 49

3 Enhancements to Existing Framework 50

3.1 Crypto Agility Exchange 50

3.2 Permission NotifyConfig Announcement 51

4 Future Considerations 52

4.1 Broadcast signals and multipoint sessions 52

Figures

Figure 2‑1. Security system diagram 9

Figure 2‑2. Claim a factory-reset application without out-of-band registration data 12

Figure 2‑3: Claim a factory-reset application without using out-of-band registration data and install admin security group 13

Figure 2‑4. Claiming a factory-reset application using out-of-band registration data 14

Figure 2‑5. Install a policy 15

Figure 2‑6. Add an application to a security group 16

Figure 2‑7. Add a user to a security group 17

Figure 2‑8. Distribution of policy update and certificates 27

Figure 2‑9: Building Policy using manifest 29

Figure 2‑10. Validating a producer policy 31

Figure 2‑11. Validating a consumer policy 32

Figure 2‑12. Exchange membership certificates 33

Figure 2‑13. Anonymous access 34

Figure 2‑14. Validating an admin user 35

Figure 2‑15. Validating a session-based signal 36

Figure 2‑16: Authorization Data Format Structure 37

Figure 2‑17. Use case - users set up by Dad 44

Figure 2‑18. Use case - living room set up by Dad 45

Figure 2‑19. Use case - son's bedroom set up by son 46

Figure 2‑20. Use case - master bedroom set up by Dad 47

Figure 2‑21. Use case – Son can control different TVs in the house 48

Figure 2‑22. Use case - Living room tablet controls TVs 49

Tables

Table 2‑1. Security 2.0 premises 9

Table 2-2: Action Mask Matrix 39

# Introduction

## Purpose and scope

This document captures the system level design for the enhancements to the AllJoyn™ framework to support the Security 2.0 feature requirements. Related interfaces and API design is captured at a functional level. Actual definition for interfaces and APIs is outside the scope of this document. Features and functions are subject to change without notice.

## Revision history

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Revision | Date | Change Log |
| Rev 1 Update 0 | August 8, 2014 | Update with new format and comments |
| Rev 1 Update 1 | August 27, 2014 | Update with comments from the collaboration meeting |
| Rev 1 Update 2 | September 8, 2014 | Update with comments and agreement from the technical conference call on September 3, 2014. |
| Rev 1 Update 3 | October 30, 2014 | Update the authorization data section based on agreement from the technical conference call on October 14, 2014. |
| Rev 1 Update 4 | December 23, 2014 | Update the Certificate section and changes listed in JIRA tickets ASACORE-1170, 1256, 1259, 1260. |
| Rev 1 Update 5 | January 15, 2015 | Update the rule enforcing table after the conference call on Janurary 13, 2015 by the Security2.0 working group. |
| Rev 1 Update 6 | March 17, 2015 | Update the authorization data after the conference call on Janurary 20, 2015 by the Security2.0 working group. Updated the permission matrix to reflect the concept of Provide permission.  Updated based on review comments by the Security 2.0 working group on March 6, 2015.  Add the updated information on Security Group equivalence and manifest from the Wiki |

## Acronyms and terms

| Acronym/term | Description |
| --- | --- |
| About data | Data from the About feature. For more information, refer to the [About Feature Interface Spec](https://allseenalliance.org/docs-and-downloads/documentation/alljoyn-about-feature-10-interface-specification). |
| ACL | Access Control List |
| AES CCM | The Advanced Encryption Standard 128-bit block cypher using Counter with CBC-MAC mode. Refer to [RFC 3610](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3610) for more information. |
| Producer | An AllJoyn application providing services on the AllJoyn network. |
| Consumer | An AllJoyn application consuming services on the AllJoyn network. |
| Device | A physical device that may contain one or more AllJoyn applications. In this document, whenever the term “device” is used, it indicates the system application of the given physical device. |
| AllJoyn framework | Open source peer-to-peer framework that allows for abstraction of low-level network concepts and APIs. |
| DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm |
| ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
| ECDHE | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral key exchange |
| ECDHE\_ECDSA | ECDHE key agreement with asymmetric DSA based authentication. |
| ECDHE\_NULL | ECDHE key agreement only. No authentication. |
| ECDHE\_PSK | ECDHE key agreement with symmetric key/pin/password based authentication. |
| User | The person or business entity interacting with AllJoyn applications. |
| Factory-reset device | A device is restored to the original configuration. |
| Friend | A user who has a trusted relationship with the owner |
| Grantee | The application or user who is the subject of a certificate. |
| GUID | Globally Unique Identifier. A 128 bit identifier generated randomly in a way that the probability of collision is negligible. |
| Security Group | A logical grouping of devices, applications, and users. It is identified by a group ID which is a GUID and the group authority public key. An application can be installed with a policy to expose services to members of the security group. An application or user holding a membership certificate is in fact a member of the security group. Any member of the security group can access the services exposed to the group by the applications with ACLs defined for that group. |
| Security Group Authority | A security group authority is the user or application that defines the security group and grant membership certificates to other. The security group authority is the certificate authority for that group. |
| Holder | The application or user possessing a certificate. |
| OOB | Out Of Band |
| Permission Management module | The AllJoyn Core module that handles all the permission authorization. |
| PermissionMgmt | A set of AllJoyn interfaces to manage the permissions for the AllJoyn application. The implementation is provided by the Permission Management module |
| Security Manager | An application used to manage cryptographic keys, and generate and distribute certificates. |
| Security Appliance | A security appliance is a type of Security Manager that is always on. |
| Peer | Application participating in the AllJoyn messaging. |
| SHA-256 | Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 with digest size of 256 bits or 32 bytes. |
| Trust profile | Information used by peers to introduce themselves when contacting each other. |
| Certificate Authority (CA) | Entity that issues a digital certificate |
| Keystore | A repository of security keys and certificates. An application has one keystore. Multiple applications can share the same keystore, but they are considered as the same application using the same security principal. |
| Authentication GUID | The Authentication GUID is a GUID assigned to an application for authentication purpose. This GUID is persisted in the key store and provides a long-term identity for the application. Typically, this GUID is associated with a single application. In the scenario where a group of related applications share a given key store, they also share the same authentication GUID.  This GUID is used as a mapping key for storing and accessing authentication and encryption keys. All key materials associated with another peer is stored in the key store with the peer’s authentication GUID as the mapping key. |

# System Design

## Overview

The goal of the Security 2.0 feature is to allow an application to validate access to interfaces or secure objects based on policies installed by the owner. This feature is part of the AllJoyn Core library. It is not an option for the application to enforce permission. It is up to the user to dictate how the application performs based on the access control lists (ACLs) defined for the application. The AllJoyn Core Permission Management component does all the enforcement including the concept of mutual or one-way authorization before any message action can be taken.

The Security Manager is a service that helps the user with key management and permission rules building. Using policy templates defined by an application developer, the Security Manager builds the application manifest to let the end-user authorize which interactions the application can do. An application developer does not have to build a security manager. The permission can be installed by another application or another security manager.

In addition to the encrypted messaging (using AES CCM) between the peers, the Security 2.0 Permission Management module manages a database of access credentials and the Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Figure 2‑1 shows the system architecture of the Security 2.0 feature.



Figure 2‑1. Security system diagram

## Premises

Table 2‑1 lists the premises for the Security 2.0 features.

Table 2‑1. Security 2.0 premises

| Topic | Definition | Premises |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Identity | The application security principal | Each peer is identified by a keystore identity GUID and a cryptographic public key |
| Admin | An admin (or administrator) is a peer with administrator privilege for the application | * An admin has full access to any object and interface in the application * An admin becomes a certificate authority * An admin can be a public key or a security group |
| Claiming | Incorporate a factory-reset device with the Permission Management | * A factory-reset device has no list of certificate authorities for AllJoyn security. * A factory-reset device has no admin * Anyone can claim as an admin for a factory-reset device. |
| Policy | A policy is a list of rules governing the behavior of an application  A policy template is a list of rules defined by the application developer to guide the user for policy building.  A signed policy is a policy signed by an admin | * An admin can install, update, or remove a policy. * A newer policy can be installed by any authorized peer. Developers can define policy templates to help the user with policy building. * Security group specific policy specifies the permissions granted to members of the group. The security group authority becomes a certificate authority for that particular group. * A policy may exist at the producer or consumer side. Policy enforcement applies wherever it resides. * A policy is considered private. It is not exchanged with any peer. * An application has at most one policy. * An admin can query the existing policy installed in the application |
| Membership certificate | A membership certificate is the proof of a security group membership | * Membership certificates are exchanged between peers. The authorization data signed by this certificate are used for mutual authorization purposes. * An application trusts the membership certificate if the issuer or any subject in the issuer’s certificate chain matches any of the application’s certificate authorities. * A membership certificate holder can generate additional membership certificate for the given security group with the same or more restrictive permissions if the delegate flag is enabled. This type of membership certificate will not allow further delegation. * A membership certificate must have a security group ID. * An application can accept the installation of any number of membership certificates |
| Authorization data | The permission rules | * Authorization data are not present in the membership certificate * The membership authorization data is signed by the membership certificate issuer * Authorization data can be requested from the certificate holder. |
| Security group equivalence | The instruction on the policy on an application that allows applications from a different security manager to get the same access as a local security group | * An admin can add a security group equivalence instruction to the application. * Such instruction includes the public key of the other security manager. That public key becomes a certificate authority for authentication purpose. * Such instruction also includes the ID of the local security group. * All peer applications authenticated by this public key can get the same access to the ACLs defined by the specified security group. |
| Identity certificate | Certificate that signs the identity information. | * Certificate with a digest of the actual identity data. The identity data can be delivered out of band. * The Certificate has an alias field for that identity * An application trusts identity certificate issued by any of the application’s certificate authorities and security group equivalence authorities. |
| Security Manager |  | * Security Manager can push policy and certifcates to application |

## Typical operations

The following subsections describe the typical operations performed by a user.

### Claim a factory-reset application

Using the Security Manager any user can claim any factory-reset application. Claiming is a first-come, first-claim action. That user becomes the admin. The user can also install an admin security group. The procedure to make the application to become claimable again is manufacturer-specific. There will be an API call that allows the application to make itself claimable again.

#### Claim factory-reset application without out-of-band registration data



Figure 2‑2. Claim a factory-reset application without out-of-band registration data



Figure 2‑3: Claim a factory-reset application without using out-of-band registration data and install admin security group

The identity certificate will be used for authentication in the ECDHE\_ECDSA key exchange.

#### Claim factory-reset application using out-of-band registration data

An application manufacturer can provision a key to support the claiming process. The key is provided to the user out of band. An example is a QR code or a token delivered via email or text messaging. The user is prompted for the key when establishing a connection with the factory-reset application.



Figure 2‑4. Claiming a factory-reset application using out-of-band registration data

### Define a security group

Any user can define a security group (logical grouping of applications and users) using the Security Manager. When the user specifies a security group name (for display purpose), the Security Manager creates the security group ID (a GUID value).

### Example of building a policy

A user uses a Security Manager application to build a policy. The application queries the AllJoyn About feature data and the list of policy templates from the device. The Security Manager application can do further introspection of the device for the detailed information of secured interfaces and secured objects, and prompts the user to select the permissions to include in the policy.

A policy may contain a number of ACLs. Please refer to the section *Authorization data format* for more information.

### Install a policy

An admin can install a policy for the application.



Figure 2‑5. Install a policy

### Add an application to a security group

An admin signs a membership certificate with the given security group ID and installs it in the application. This act adds the application to the security group.



Figure 2‑6. Add an application to a security group

### Add a user to a security group

The security group authority uses the Security Manager to generate the membership certificate for the user for the given security group ID. The security group authority can remove some ACLs for this user.



Figure 2‑7. Add a user to a security group

### Security Manager

#### Introduction

The AllJoyn security 2.0 ecosystem consists of many applications and devices. Those applications and devices are deployed in various setups and for them it is impossible to know up front what other peers they will see around them let alone know how they should interact with them. Which peers can be trusted, which rights do those peers have… So after being deployed, applications and devices have to be configured. The people in charge of configuring the system, the administrators need a tool for this. Such a tool is called a security manager.

Depending on your setup, you need a different tool. A large enterprise has different requirements than a home does. Not all administrators have a strong technical background. A tool for home users should have a straightforward, understandable user interface (hiding the more complex features). These simplifications should be done inside the security manager, so it is transparent for applications and devices in which setup they are deployed. Application developers should make no distinction between enterprise and small home.

A security configuration consists of two parts:

1. Certificates: certificates provide proof that an application is managed by a security manager. They can be used to gain access to resources of other peers or to provide resources themselves to others. The certificates describe the rights the holder has.
2. Policy: A policy is a list of Access Control Lists (ACLs). These ACLs describe how other peers can access the holder of the policy.

Security managers use AllJoyn to transfer this configuration to applications and devices they manage.

#### Security Manager Architecture

A security manager is a tool that can take multiple forms. For a home setup it can be a single application accessed by one person. For an enterprise setup, multiple administrators need to use it, so its core can run on a server, with some local application talking to it. When discussing the functional blocks of the security manager, it is important to understand that those blocks can reside on different machines and that for some of these we even have multiple instances.

* The manager provides certificates. In order to generate and sign certificates, it needs to have a certificate authority (CA).
* Configuration storage: The security manager should keep track of what the configuration looks like. To do so, it should persist the configuration data.
* UI: The administrator needs to interact with the security manager in order to make configuration changes. The user interfaces doesn't need to be part of the manager itself. It could be running in a web browser or it could offer a REST API, so that custom UI can be built on top.
* AllJoyn Agent (security manager agent): Configuration updates are sent using AllJoyn as the communication protocol. The agent is the component which does the interaction with the managed peers.

The following assumptions are made:

* The four functional blocks of the security manager can be combined into a single application, but it should be possible to run them in different applications or even on different hosts.
* A security manager can have multiple security manager agents acting on its behalf.
* The security manager topology is transparent for AllJoyn applications.
* A security manager is identified by the public key of its CA. We call this the key of the security manager.

The Alliance envisions multiple implementations of security managers and does not provide implementation specifications. The alliance does specify how security managers need to interact with AllJoyn security 2.0 based applications and devices.

* org.allseen.Security.PermissionMgmt.Notification: a session-less signal sent by the applications. This can be used to discover applications and devices.
* org.allseen.Security.PermissionMgmt: For changing the configuration of applications.

#### What the Security Manager manages

We already mentioned a number of times that a security manager manages applications and devices. But what does it mean and do we really manage applications and devices? The security manager agent will use AllJoyn security features to set up a secure connection to a peer. The only way it has to identify this peer is by the looking at that peer's public key. Since we hand out certificates granting rights to this key, in fact it means we are managing keys. So when asking what are we managing, we should ask ourselves who has access to a key? There is no easy answer to this questions. It all depends on the OS and platform the software is running on.

* On a plain Linux or Windows machine, applications can choose to protect data on a per-user basis, making it hard to protect the key from other applications running as the same user. On the other hand, the key is also not application-specific. When the same application runs as a different user, it can't access the key anymore.
* Operating systems on smartphone do a better job at sandboxing applications. The link between key and application is stronger there.

How many keys you need per device depends on the device:

* A single-function device (e.g., a temperature sensor) is considered as one big Application. One key to do all operations.
* Every app on a smartphone is considered as an app on its own, so one key per application.
* The built-in firmware of a smart TV is also considered as a single app. Applications installed on top of the firmware of the TV are separate apps and should have their own key.

##### What we can trust

The AllSeen alliance offers software stack that runs on top of some hardware within an OS. The stack can be embedded in an application which is installed on a device or could be integrated in a firmware of a device. The security manager cannot distinguish this. He only sees a remote peer. Furthermore the security manager cannot assume applications are running on trustworthy systems. If an application runs on a compromised or malicious system, there is little we can do inside the app to protect. A genuine application running on malicious system, should be treated as malicious. We should protect the ecosystem by:

1. Being able to revoke the rights granted to an application.
2. Make sure compromised or even malicious applications are limited to rights they were given. Since we can't trust the OS or hardware the applications is running on, these checks must be done at the remote peer side.

The protective measure should be defined so that a well-behaving app on a well behaving system can protect itself from any unwarranted access. If both peers are malicious, then there is little we can do. But then they don't need AllSeen to malicious things. There is a risk though that 2 malicious applications team up. Each individual app gets a small acceptable set of rights, but then combining their rights to launch an attack.

When claiming an application two considerations must be made:

1. Can I trust the application?
2. Can I trust the device and it is running on? But not only the device and it OS, but for desktops systems as well which other applications are there? These apps might to try get access to the keystore of the genuine app. This is not something we can fix within the AllSeen alliance. This remains an integration aspect.

##### Sharing Keystores

When an application is claimed, it will store its certificates inside a keystore. This keystore can be shared. The security manager nor the system can prevent applications from doing this. Is it recommended to share keystores? It has the advantage that you only have to claim one application, while multiple applications can use it. However the certificates in the store will only grant a limited set of permission to it users. Sharing the store only makes sense if it was granted all permissions required by its users. Sharing keystore can be allowed if the applications granted access to it are known upfront and the union of rights is known.

Sharing keystores does have some side effects, every app using the keystore will appear as a manageable application. The security will be able to manage one keystore via multiple apps. Adding an extra layer of complexity to get concurrent access right.

We also partially lose the ability to sandbox applications, as applications using a shared keystore get full set of rights linked to the store and not necessarily the ones they strictly need.

##### Applications integrated in firmware

The firmware of a device could consist of multiple smaller AllSeen applications. From end-user perspective you only want to claim this device once. Those applciations are allowed to share their keystore, but only of them should provide the PermissionMgmt interface. So only one application is seen from security manager perspective. When expressing the permission required for this application, it should request all permission required by the apps on that device.

##### Standalone applications

Standalone applications are apps downloaded and installed on a desktop computer, tablet or smart phone or something similar. Standalone applications should not share their keystore with other applications. If such an application is built out of separate sub-applications (each of them a using separate bus attachment), then they should follow the same rules as applications integrated in firmware.

#### Security Manager Operations

The security manager allows the following operations:

* security group management: create, update and delete security groups
  + allow grouping of applications. A group is uniquely defined by GUID and the public key of a security manager. Applications can become members of a group when they are issued a membership certificate for that group
* identity management: create, update and delete identities
  + Identities are used to define the users of application. Users can map to physical persons, but they could also a more conceptual meaning. An identity is represented by a GUID and the public key of the defining security manager. Applications can act on behalf of a user when they receive an identity certificate for that user. Applications should only have one identity certificate.
* application/key management:
  + Claim applications: make it managed by this security manager
  + manage AllJoyn certificates for these applications
  + manage policy (ACL's) of applications
  + force application to become un-managed again

#### Inter Security Manager Interaction

When applications interact with each other, they check if the interaction is allowed by their policies as previously set by their security manager. In practice, a peer must present a certificate (chain) signed by its security manager public key. Meaning that with the basic features we created silos, you can only talk to applications managed by your own security manager. In practice applications managed by different security managers need to interact with each other as well. We provide 2 ways to do this: Delegation and Group equivalence.

##### Delegation

###### Use case

I’m the administrator of my home ecosystem. I claim appliances in the home and provide them with configuration. I as administrator am the only person having access to the security manager. When my kids want to get access to an appliance, then they have to ask me to get approval for each application they want to use. This is not workable. With delegation, my security manager gives a membership certificate with delegation rights to the security manager of each of my kids. With this certificate, they can delegate these rights to their applications. They only need to ask one time and then they can make any of their applications part of my group. Even though my kids did not interact directly with each other, with these delegated certificates they interact with each other in the scope of this group.

###### Limitations

The followings are the limitations of using delegation.

* You can only authenticate members of the group. Mutual authenticated requests can only be done between members of the group.
* My kids get Remote-control rights for the TV by giving them a membership certificate with delegation rights for my TV Group. Their remote control applications become member of the TV group. If I give my TV a policy for the TV group, then the TV will allow the request from the RC apps of my kids. This requires my kids to define an ANY-USER policy for TV operations for their apps. This is ok for TVs RC operations. If mutual authentication is required, the TV must become member of the TV group as well.
* For a chat use case you need to know who is sending a message and to whom you’re sending messages to. So mutual authentication is required and all participants have to be in that group.
* As policy is defined on group level, it is impossible to differentiate between kids and parents within the scope of a single group. It would require separate groups to achieve this.

###### Delegating membership certificate Flow

In the X.509 membership certificate, the delegate concept is represented by the basicConstraints extension CA flag. If a grantee receives a membership certificate with the X.509 basicConstraints extension CA flag equal to true, the grantee can issue a membership certificate to others with the same authorization or more restrictive authorization. Any peer validating a certificate chain verifies that no further delegation has been done, or the chain is considered invalid.



Figure 2‑8. Reissue membership certificate

##### Security Group Equivalence

Group equivalence tries to address the same problem as delegation but takes a different approach to solve it. With delegation, you give a certificate to an application. With that certificate the application can prove it is allowed access to a group. With group equivalence, we do the other way around. We define a policy on our managed applications that allows applications from a different security manager to get access. This would be as if we would pre-install the delegated membership certificate on all our managed applications. So when the peer comes around, he doesn't need to send the proof, the application already has it. Since policy comes from a trusted source, we don't need to distribute certificates, we can define a more compact ACL.

In practice, the security manager defines a group equivalence ACL for all applications that need to interact with the applications of the peer security manager. This ACL maps applications of that security manager into a local group. Those applications don’t need to be members of that group, but they need to prove that they are owned with an identity or membership certificate. If they can, the policy for the local group will be applied on them.

The group equivalence rule allows one-way authentication. For a mutual authenticated session, the peer security manager should install group equivalence for your security managers’ public key. The main advantage of group equivalence is that these rules do not require any knowledge of the groups owned by the peer security manager. In case of delegation, the receiver of membership certificates needs to know what the scope is of that group. Group equivalence is not transitive. If A declares group equivalence rules for B and C, that does not mean that a group equivalence exists between B and C. They have to explicitly install it themselves.

Group equivalence works very nice in a setup where every security manager represents a single user. Every person takes up the role of end-user as well and administrator. Then group equivalence easily allows you to express an ACL for another user. Users with similar rights can be mapped into the same group.

As example use case: Suppose we have a real-estate agent. When showing a house to clients, he'd like to show-off the AllSeen-enabled home automation system. This can be achieved with either delegation or group equivalence. The advantage of group equivalence is that if he potentially needs to show 100 homes, he can do it based on 1 certificate instead of 100 for the delegation scenario. There is less risk for information disclosure. If someone could get hold of the 100 certificates, then he can learn who the home sellers are. In the group equivalence case, the seller's public keys are in the policy of the agent's app and policy is never shared.

###### Add a security group equivalence instruction to an application

An admin can update the permission policy in an application to add a security group equivalence instruction so the certificates issued by other certificate authorities (like friends) can be trusted. These friend’s applications would only have access to permissions assigned to the local security group specified in the instruction.



Figure 2‑9. Add a security group equivalence instruction to an application

### Certificate revocation (not fully designed)

The application will validate the certificate using a revocation service provided by the Security Manager. The revocation service is a distributed service.

The Certificate Revocation Service is expected to provide a method call that takes in the certificate and return whether the given certificate is revoked.

The application looks in the “self” section of its installed policy for the peer that provides the Certificate Revocation Service. If the application can’t locate any of the Certificate Revocation Service, the certificate revocation check will be skipped.

If a membership certificate is revoked, all signed authorization data related to the membership certificate is no longer valid.

### Distribution of policy updates and membership certificates (not fully designed)

The Distribution Service is a service provided by a Security Manager. This service provides persistent storage and high availability to distribute updates to applications.

An admin uses the Security Manager to generate updated policy and membership certificates, encrypt the payload with a session key derived from a nonce value and the master secret for the <sender, recipient> pair. The package including the sender public key, recipient public key, nonce, and encrypted payload is sent to the Distribution Service to delivery to the recipient. The recipient uses the information in the package to locate the master secret to generate the corresponding session key to decrypt the payload. Once the decryption is successful, the recipient signs the hash of the package and provide the signature in the reply.



Figure 2‑8. Distribution of policy update and certificates

### Application Manifest

When considering where AllSeen enabled applications will run, smartphones are an obvious target. A lot of applications are available in various the app stores. Unfortunately not all of these applications are trustworthy. Example the flashlight app which asked for access to phonebook, network, etc. Same as the application is sandboxed on the smartphone, we would like to sandbox applications within the AllSeen security 2.0 context. If I install an AllSeen TV remote control app, then I would like it only to have rights to do TV operations. Nothing more. Since we can't trust the application, we can't assume it will behave properly. So these restrictions must be enforced by the peers. For the RC example, the TV must check the app has permissions. When remote control app tries to open the door, then the door must reject the call.

The main goal of an application manifest is to inform an admin which interfaces an application will produce and consume. Once the admin accepts the manifest, the manifest is signed and installed on the application. The signed manifest will be used to enforce the application cannot produce or consume any unwarranted interfaces.

A signed application manifest limits the potential interfaces a malicious application can access within a set of well-behaving applications.

The goal of an application manifest is similar application manifests on Android, in which an end-user has to accept a list of permissions when installing a new application on his phone which are enforced by Android. The implementation is however different, as described below.

#### Requirements

##### Manifest Format

The manifest must be expressed at the interface level. It may be expressed at the member level, but this is not recommended as this increases the complexity that needs to be handled by the admin.

##### Manifest Acceptance

The manifest must be presented to the admin in a user-friendly way. As the interface names might not be very informative, they must be mapped to a user-friendly description.

The descriptions of the interfaces must be trustworthy. As a malicious application can by definition not be trusted, the descriptions must be provided by a trusted third party.

The descriptions of the interfaces should be localized to the admin.

The AllSeen Alliance must provide descriptions for any standard AllSeen interface, as reviewed and accepted by the Interface Review Board (IRB).

The application developer must provide the descriptions of any application specific interfaces.

If a manifest is defined at the member level, a description for each listed member must be available.

##### Manifest Enforcement

When an application tries to produce or consume without a signed manifest granting him to do so, the AllSeen framework must return an authorization failure error.

The accepted manifest must be enforced by the peer application, as a malicious application may not be trusted to enforce it locally.

##### Manifest Update

Whenever an application is updated and does not require additional rights, it may still use the previously signed manifest. Only when the update requires additional rights, the admin must accept a new manifest for that application.

#### Implementation Scenario

When an administrator wants to add an application to one of his security groups, he needs to accept a manifest of the application. When he accepts the manifest, its contents will be encoded in a membership certificate.

1. The security manager discovers the remote application through the NotifyConfig signal.
2. The admin adds the application to one of his security groups.
3. The security manager retrieves the manifest of the application.
4. The security manager contacts a server to retrieve the human readable description of the interfaces and presents them to the admin.
5. The admin accepts (or rejects) the description of the manifest. When the admin rejects the manifest, the application will not receive a membership certificate.
6. The security manager encodes the requested (& accepted) permissions in a membership certificate.
7. The security manager installs the generated certificate on the application.

#### 

Figure 2‑9: Building Policy using manifest

##### Application

The application developer needs to embed the manifest in his application. There should be a platform specific callback function to retrieve the manifest that belongs to an application. For Android, it could be based on convention, providing the manifest as a file inside the application package. For small embedded devices, the manifest could be part of the application.

To ease the generation of membership certificates by the security manager, the manifest format should line up with the format that is used to express access rules in the membership certificates.

##### Interface Description Server

The server serving the descriptions of the interfaces can either be:

1. Hosted by the application developer for application specific interfaces. To prevent spoofing attacks, the URL of this server MUST be based on the reverse domain name of the interface name.
2. Hosted by the AllSeen Alliance for common AllSeen interfaces. This server MUST be hosted on a predefined URL. This server MUST be contacted over HTTPS.

##### Manifest Enforcement

As the manifests are encoded in the membership certificates, no additional enforcement mechanisms need to be implemented.

When applying security group specific policy rules, the remote peer will enforce the rules in the membership certificate, effectively enforcing the manifest of the application within that security group.

As no membership certificates can be applied for ANY-USER policy rules, manifests cannot be enforced for such policies.

## Access validation

### Validating a producer policy

This is a typical producer validation of the consumer permissions when the consumer makes a method call on a secure interface.



Figure 2‑10. Validating a producer policy

### Validating a consumer policy

This is a typical consumer policy validation when the consumer application calls a secure method call.



Figure 2‑11. Validating a consumer policy

### Exchanging membership certificates during session establishment

During the AllJoyn session establishment, the peers exchange all membership certificates. There is a potential information disclosure vulnerability. It is desired to have a more intelligent selection algorithm to provide membership certificates on demand and need-to-know basis. This algorithm needs to take into account of the latency of the certificate exchange during the method call invocation.



Figure 2‑12. Exchange membership certificates

### Anonymous session

In scenarios when there is no trust established between two peers such as when a guest comes into the user's home, the guest’s consumer application can still control certain applications if and only if there are ACLs specified for ANONYMOUS\_USER installed on these devices.

Note that ANY\_USER refers to authenticated peers while ANONUMOUS\_USER refers to unauthenticated peers.



Figure 2‑13. Anonymous access

### Validating an admin user



Figure 2‑14. Validating an admin user

### Emitting a session-based signal

Before emitting a session-based signal to existing connections, the producer verifies whether it is allowed to emit the given signal to any authorized party. Upon receipt of the signal, the consumer checks whether it has the authorization to accept the given signal. If the authorization is based on a security group, the consumer verifies the producer’s membership ACLs for proper authorization.



Figure 2‑15. Validating a session-based signal

## Authorization data format

### The format is binary and exchanged between peers using AllJoyn marshalling

The authorization data will be in binary format. The following guidelines are used for exchanging and persisting the authorization data:

1. The authorization data will use AllJoyn marshalling to exchange with other peers.
2. The AllJoyn marshalling will be used to generate buffer to be signed.
3. The AllJoyn marshalling will be used to serialize the data for persistence.
4. The parser will ignore any field that it does not support.

### Format Structure

The following diagram describes the format structure of the ACL data.



Figure 2‑16: Authorization Data Format Structure

#### Authorization data field definition

Root level

| Name | Data type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| version | number | yes | The specification version number. The current spec version number is 1. |
| serialNumber | number | yes | The serial number of the policy. The serial number is used to detect of an update to an older policy. |
| ACLs | Array of ACLs | yes | List of access control lists. |

Access Control List

| Name | Data type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| peers | array of objects | no | List of peers. There are multiple types of peers. A peer object has the following fields:   |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Name** | **Data**  **Type** | **Required** | **Description** | | type | number | yes | The peer type. The followings are the valid type of peers:   * ANONYMOUS (unauthenticated peer) * ANY\_USER (authenticated peer) * PUBLIC\_KEY * SECURITY\_GROUP | | keyInfo | structure of Authentication GUID and Public Key | no | The peer key info data. Depending on peer type, the keyInfo is:   * ANONYMOUS – not applicable * ANY\_USER – not applicable * PUBLIC\_KEY – the authentication GUID and public key of the peer * SECURITY\_GROUP – the authentication GUID and the public key of the security group authority | | sgID | GUID | No | Security group ID. This is application only the type SECURITY\_GROUP. | |
| rules | array of rules | no | List of allowed rules. The application is allowed to perform the actions specified in the given rules.  The default rule is to allow nothing. |

Rule Record

| Name | Data type | Required | List of values | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| obj | string | no |  | Object path of the secured object. A \* indicates a prefix match. When there is no \*, it is an exact match. |
| ifn | string | no |  | Interface name. A \* indicates a prefix match. When there is no \*, it is an exact match. |

Interface Member Record

| Name | Data type | Required | List of values | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| mbr | string | no |  | Member name. A \* indicates a prefix match. When there is no \*, it is an exact match. |
| type | number | no | * 1: method call * 2: signal * 3: property | Message type.  Default is method call. |
| action | byte | no |  | The action mask flag. The list of valid masks:   * 0x01: Denied * 0x02: Provide – allows sending signal, exposing method calls and producing properties * 0x04: Observe – allows receiving signals and getting properties * 0x08: Modify – set properties and make method calls |
| mutualAuth | boolean | no |  | Mutual authorization required. Both peers (local and remote) are required to be authorized. Specifying a no value means enabling a one-way authorization.  Default is yes. |

#### Enforcing the rules at message creation or receipt

The following table lists the required action mask base on the message.

Table 2-2: Action Mask Matrix

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Message Action** | **Local Policy**  **If there is no local policy, the default action is denied. Admin user has full access.** | **Remote peer’s membership ACL data.**  **Check when the authorization is security group specific.** |
| send GetProperty | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this property | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this property |
| receive GetProperty | Remote peer has OBSERVE permission for this property | Remote peer has OBSERVE permission for this property |
| send SetProperty | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this property | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this property |
| receive SetProperty | Remote peer has MODIFY permission for this property | Remote peer has MODIFY permission for this property |
| send method call | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this method call | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this method call |
| receive method call | Remote peer has MODIFY permission for this method call | Remote peer has MODIFY permission for this method call |
| send signal | Remote peer has OBSERVE permission for this signal | Remote peer has OBSERVE permission for this signal |
| receive signal | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this signal | Remote peer has PROVIDE permission for this signal |

#### Search Algorithm

Whenever an encrypted message is created or received, the authorization rules are searched using the message header data (object path, interface name, and member name) and the requested permission listed in Table 2-2: Action Mask Matrix.

#### Matching Algorithm within a Policy ACL

The following matching algorithm is used to find a match within a policy ACL. Once a match is found within the rules, the search stops.

* If the rule specifies both object path and interface name, the message must match both.
* If the rule specifies object path, the message must match the object path.
* If the rule specifies interface name, the message must match the interface name.
* If the rule specifies member name, the message must match the member name
* Verify whether the requested permission is allowed by the authorization mask at the member.
  + When a member name has an exact match and is explicitly denied access then the access is explicitly denied.
  + When a member name has an exact match and is authorized then the rule is a match
  + When a member name has a prefix match and is explicitly denied access then the rule is explicitly denied.
  + When a member name has a prefix match and is authorized then the rule is a match

#### Search Priorities for Policy ACLs

Policy ACLs are searched in this order. Once a match or an explicit deny is found, the search stops.

1. All public key policy ACLs
2. All security group policy ACLs are applied in undefined order. Per security-group-in-common, the materialized authorization rules are the intersection of the authorization rules between the consumer and producer.
3. The any-user policy ACLs.
4. The anonymous policy ACLs

### Policy Templates

An application developer can define policy templates to help the Security Manager to build consumer and producer policies. A policy template provides the following data in:

* Specification version number
* List of permission rules

## Certificates

The following subsections detail the supported certificates. The certificate format is X.509 v3. The certificate lifetime will be considered in order to avoid having to revoke the certificate. However, certain devices do not have access to a trusted real time clock. In such cases, the application on those devices will not be able to validate the certificate lifetime, thus relying on certificate revocation.

### Main Certificate Structure

All AllSeen X.509 certificates have the following ASN.1 structure. Currently only the ECDSA (prime256v1) certificates are supported.

Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {

tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,

signatureAlgorithm SEQUENCE { 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 (ecdsa-with-sha256) },

signatureValue BIT STRING

}

TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {

version v3(2),

serialNumber INTEGER,

signature SEQUENCE { 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 (ecdsa-with-sha256) },

issuer SEQUENCE { 2.5.4.3 (commonName), UTF8 STRING },

validity Validity,

subject Name,

subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE { 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (id-ecPublicKey), 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (prime256v1), BIT STRING },

issuerUniqueID IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,

subjectUniqueID IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,

extensions EXPLICIT

}

#### Security 2.0 Custom OIDs

All Security 2.0 custom OIDs will start with 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1 where 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924 is the registered AllSeen Alliance Private Enterprise Number.

### Identity certificate

The identity certificate is used to associate application, user or device with an identity alias.

The alias is encoded in the SubjectAltName field in the extensions.

The extensions include the following fields:

* CertificateType: the type of certificate within the AllSeen ecosystem. An identity certificate has certificate type equal to 1.
* SubjectAltName: the alias for the identity.
* AssociatedDigest: the digest of the associated identity data. For example, an identity VCard.

Both the CertificateType and AssociatedDigest have custom OIDs under the Security 2.0 root.

SubjectName ::= SEQUENCE { 2.5.4.3 (commonName), UTF8 STRING },

Extensions ::= SEQUENCE {

BasicConstraints SEQUENCE { 2.5.29.19 (basicConstraints), BOOLEAN (FALSE) },

CertificateType SEQUENCE { 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.1 (AllSeen Certificate Type), INTEGER (1) },

SubjectAltName SEQUENCE { 2.5.29.17 (subjectAltName), OCTET STRING },

AssociatedDigest SEQUENCE { 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.2 (AllSeen Certificate Digest), 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 (sha-256), OCTET STRING }

}

### Membership certificate

The membership certificate is used to assert an application, user or device is part of a security group.

The security group identifier is encoded with a 16 network byte order octets in the Organization Unit Name within the Subject Distinguished Name field.

The extensions include the following fields:

* CertificateType: the type of certificate within the AllSeen ecosystem. A membership certificate has certificate type equal to 2.
* AssociatedDigest: the digest of the associated authorization data.

Both the CertificateType and AssociatedDigest have custom OIDs under the Security 2.0 root.

SubjectName ::= SEQUENCE { 2.5.4.11 (organizationalUnitName), UTF8 STRING, 2.5.4.3 (commonName), UTF8 STRING },

Extensions ::= SEQUENCE {

BasicConstraints SEQUENCE { 2.5.29.19 (basicConstraints), BOOLEAN default FALSE },

CertificateType SEQUENCE { 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.1 (AllSeen Certificate Type), INTEGER (2) },

AssociatedDigest SEQUENCE { 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.2 (AllSeen Certificate Digest), 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 (sha-256), OCTET STRING }

}

## Sample use cases

The solution listed here for the use cases is just a typical solution. It is not intended to be the only solution.

### Users and devices

Users: Dad, Mom, and son

| Room | Devices | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Living room | TV, Set-top box, tablet, Network-attached Storage (NAS) | * All devices owned by Dad * All devices are accessible for the whole family * Tablet is managed by Dad, but the whole family can use it |
| Son’s bedroom | TV | * Owned and managed by son * Devices are allowed to interact with living room devices but the parent al control feature is denied. |
| Master bedroom | TV, tablet | * TV used by Mom and Dad only * Tablet used by Dad only * Devices can interact with living room devices |

### Users set up by Dad



Figure 2‑17. Use case - users set up by Dad

### Living room set up by Dad



Figure 2‑18. Use case - living room set up by Dad

### Son's bedroom set up by son



Figure 2‑19. Use case - son's bedroom set up by son

### Master bedroom set up by Dad



Figure 2‑20. Use case - master bedroom set up by Dad

### Son can control different TVs in the house



Figure 2‑21. Use case – Son can control different TVs in the house

### Living room tablet controls TVs in the house



Figure 2‑22. Use case - Living room tablet controls TVs

# Enhancements to Existing Framework

## Crypto Agility Exchange

In order to provide the AllJoyn peers to express the desire to pick some particular cryptographic cypher suite to use in the key exchange and the encryption of the messages, new key exchange suite identifiers will be added to the framework to express the choice of cypher and MAC algorithms. The new identifiers may come from the list of TSL cipher suites specified in [Appendix A.5 of TLS RFC5246](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#page-75) , [RFC6655](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655), and [RFC7251](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7251).

The following table shows the list of existing key exchange suites:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **AllJoyn Key Exchange Suite** | **Crypto Parameters** | **Availability** |
| ALLJOYN\_ECDHE\_NULL | * Curve NIST P-256 (secp256r1) * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 * SHA256 | * Standard Client * Thin Client |
| ALLJOYN\_ECDHE\_PSK | * Curve NIST P-256 (secp256r1) * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 * SHA256 | * Standard Client * Thin Client |
| ALLJOYN\_ECDHE\_ECDSA | * Curve NIST P-256 (secp256r1) * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 * SHA256 * X.509 certificate | * Standard Client * Thin Client |
| ALLJOYN\_RSA\_KEYX | * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 * SHA256 * X.509 certificate | * Standard Client |
| ALLJOYN\_PIN\_KEYX | * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 | * Standard Client * Thin Client version 14.02 or older |
| ALLJOYN\_SRP\_KEYX | * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 | * Standard Client |
| ALLJOYN\_SRP\_LOGON | * AES\_128\_CCM\_8 | * Standard Client |

The following table shows the potential list of TLS cipher suites to be supported. Other suites will be added as codes are available.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **TLS cipher suite** | **Additional Crypto Parameters** | **Availability** | **RFC** |
| TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 | * Curve NIST P-256 (secp256r1) * SHA256 * X.509 certificate | * Standard Client * Thin Client | [7251](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7251) |
| TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 | * SHA256 * X.509 certificate | * Standard Client | [6655](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655) |

## Permission NotifyConfig Announcement

The Permission module provides a session-less signal to allow the Security Manager discovering the applications to claim or to distribute updated policy or certificates. The signal provides the following information:

1. A number field named **claimable** to show the claim state of the application. The possible values of this field are:
   * + 0 -- not claimable
     + 1 – claimable
     + 2 - claimed
2. The authentication GUID and public key
3. The permission policy serial number
4. The list of acceptable key exchange suites for claiming

This signal is emitted when

1. The bus attachment is enabled with peer security using ECDHE key exchanges
2. The application is claimed or do a factory reset
3. The application has a permission policy installed
4. The application has its permission policy removed

# Future Considerations

## Broadcast signals and multipoint sessions

All security enhancements for broadcast signals and multipoint sessions will be considered in future releases of Security 2.0.