

Phonetic and Visual Priors for Decipherment of Informal Romanization

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Carnegie Mellon University
Language
Technologies
Institute




In a Nutshell...

- Decoding transliteration in social media
- Inductive bias: character similarity
- Unsupervised finite-state approach
- New dataset of romanized Russian
- Performance on par with supervised!


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
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


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


Q	W	E	R	T	Y	U	I	O	P	l	J
я	р	е	р	т	и	у	и	о	п	и	щ
CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A (a) U+0430	CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BE (б) U+0431	...	LATIN SMALL LETTER A (a) U+0061	DIGIT SIX (6) U+0036	...						





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


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




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Informal Romanization



Russian Speaker

2 hours ago

Kanikyli v Al'pax.... 4to mowet bit' ly4we 😊🎈😋!!!

Informal Romanization



Russian Speaker

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Kanikyli v Al'pax.... 4to mowet bit' ly4we 😁🎈😋!!!

What they type (Latin): Kanikyli v Al'pax

What they mean (Cyrillic): Каникулы в Альпах

English translation: Vacation in the Alps

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Visual and Phonetic Patterns

- Some character substitutions are **phonetic**...

Latin:

Kanikyli v Al'пах

Cyrillic:

Каникулы в Альпах

/n/

/p/

+ Arabic ش /ʃ/ → sh, Russian м /m/ → m, etc.

Visual and Phonetic Patterns

- Some character substitutions are **phonetic**...
- ...and some are **visual**

Latin:

Kanikyli v Al'pax

Cyrillic:

Каникулы в Альпах

/u/

/x/

+ Arabic ﻫ /h/ → 3, Russian в /v/ → B, etc.

Visual and Phonetic Patterns

- Some character substitutions are **phonetic**...
- ...and some are **visual**
- It is a **many-to-many** cipher that also **varies across users**

Latin:

Kanikulyi v Al'pax

Cyrillic:

Каникулы в Альпах

/i/ /ɨ/

+ Arabic ص → s ← س, Russian 8 ← в → В, etc.

Problem

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- Despite user variation, we can assume that the **notions of similarity are shared**


Problem

- Parallel data does not occur naturally ⇒ **unsupervised learning**
- Despite user variation, we can assume that the **notions of similarity are shared**
- **Hypothesis:** **inductive bias** encoding these similarity notions provides signal that **can approximate human supervision**

Noisy Channel Model

$$p(l) = \sum_o p(o; \gamma) \cdot p(l|o; \theta) \cdot p_{\text{prior}}(\theta; \alpha)$$


/ | \
 o emission probabilities prior on parameters
 transition probabilities



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Inductive Bias

- Phonetic prior: read mappings off **phonetic keyboard layouts**



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Inductive Bias

- Visual prior: read mappings off **Unicode confusable symbols list**

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
- Designed to combat spoofing attacks:

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


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- Designed to combat spoofing attacks:



- No Arabic—Latin mappings due to script dissimilarity

Inductive Bias

- Use mappings of similar characters as **priors on emission parameters**

$$c_l | c_o \sim \text{Mult}(\theta_{c_o})$$

$$\theta \sim \text{Dir}(\alpha)$$

	b	o	l	6
б				
о				
ы				
ю				


6→б ю→ло
6→б ы→бл
б→Б ...
о→о
...

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




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
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
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
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
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Representing latent alignment via **insertions and deletions**


WFST Cascade

- Transition model: original script n-gram LM
- Emission model: WFST supporting deletions and insertions, with limited delay




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
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- Trained with EM algorithm + stepwise training, curriculum learning, pruning...


Data

- Arabic: LDC BOLT dataset
(SMS / chat dialogs)




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


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человек → 4elovek, chelovec, 4eJloBek, ...


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
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
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
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
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
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
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- Supervised **skyline** compares effect of annotation vs. priors




Other Baselines

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- Nothing beats **commercial hand-built** systems



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- We show that similarity **priors induce a substantial amount of supervision** contained in human annotation
- **Future work**
 - Explicitly operationalizing character similarity
 - User-specific substitution preferences

Questions?

Q&A sessions:

- July 8, 17:00 UTC+0 (1pm EDT)
- July 8, 21:00 UTC+0 (5pm EDT)



github.com/ryskina/romanization-decipherment



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