Conquering the Extensional Scalability Problem for Value-Flow Analysis Frameworks

Qingkai Shi
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Hong Kong, China
qshiaa@cse.ust.hk

Rongxin Wu
Xiamen University
Xiamen, China
wurongxin@xmu.edu.cn

Gang Fan
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Hong Kong, China
gfan@cse.ust.hk

Charles Zhang
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Hong Kong, China
charlesz@cse.ust.hk

ABSTRACT

Modern static analyzers often need to simultaneously check a few dozen or even hundreds of value-flow properties, causing serious scalability issues when high precision is required. A major factor to this deficiency, as we observe, is that the core static analysis engine is oblivious of the mutual synergy among the properties being checked, thus inevitably losing many optimization opportunities. Our work is to leverage the inter-property awareness and to capture redundancies and inconsistencies when many properties are considered at the same time. We have evaluated our approach by checking twenty value-flow properties in standard benchmark programs and ten real-world software systems. The results demonstrate that our approach is more than 8× faster than existing ones but consumes only 1/7 of the memory. Such substantial improvement in analysis efficiency is not achieved by sacrificing the effectiveness: at the time of writing, thirty-nine bugs found by our approach have been fixed by developers and four of them have been assigned CVE IDs due to their security impact.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Software and its engineering → Software verification and validation**.

KEYWORDS

Static bug finding, demand-driven analysis, compositional program analysis, value-flow analysis.

ACM Reference Format:
Qingkai Shi, Rongxin Wu, Gang Fan, and Charles Zhang. 2020. Conquering the Extensional Scalability Problem for Value-Flow Analysis Frameworks. In *42nd International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE '20), May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea.* ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3377811.3380346

ICSE '20, May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea

ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7121-6/20/05…$15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3377811.3380346

1 INTRODUCTION

Value-flow analysis [12, 30, 38, 41], which tracks how values are stored and loaded in a program, underpins the inspection of a very broad category of software properties, such as memory safety (*e.g.*, null dereference, double free, etc.), resource usage (*e.g.*, memory leak, file usage, etc.), and security properties (*e.g.*, the use of tainted data). In addition, there are a large and growing number of domain-specific value-flow properties. For instance, mobile software requires that the personal information cannot be passed to an untrusted code [2], and, in web applications, tainted database queries are not allowed to be executed [43]. Fortify,[1] a commercial static code analyzer, checks nearly ten thousand value-flow properties from hundreds of unique categories. Value-flow properties exhibit a very high degree of versatility, which poses great challenges to the effectiveness of general-purpose program analyzers.

Faced with such a massive number of properties and the need of extension, existing approaches, such as Fortify, CSA,[2] and Infer,[3] provide a customizable framework together with a set of property interfaces that enable the quick customization for new properties. For instance, CSA uses a symbolic-execution engine such that, at every statement, it invokes the callback functions registered for the properties. These callback functions are overwritten by the property-checker writers to collect the symbolic-execution results, such as the symbolic memory and the path conditions, so that we can judge the presence of any property violation at the statement. Despite the existence of many CSA-like frameworks, when high precision like path-sensitivity is required, existing static analyzers still cannot scale well with respect to a large number of properties to check, which we refer to as the *extensional scalability issue*. For example, our evaluation shows that CSA cannot path-sensitively check twenty properties for many programs in ten hours. Pinpoint [38], another recent analyzer, exhausted 256GB of memory for only eight properties.

We observe that a major factor for the extensional scalability issue is that, in the conventional extension mechanisms, such as that of CSA, the core static analysis engine is oblivious to the properties being checked. Although the property obliviousness gives the maximum flexibility and extensibility to the framework,

[1] Fortify Static Analyzer: https://microfocus.com/products/static-code-analysis-sast/.
[2] Clang Static Analyzer: https://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/.
[3] Infer Static Analyzer: http://fbinfer.com/.

it also prevents the core engine from utilizing the property-specific analysis results for optimization. This scalability issue is slightly alleviated by a class of approaches that are property-aware and demand-driven [5, 25, 28]. These techniques are scalable with respect to a small number of properties because the core engine can skip certain program statements by understanding what statements are relevant or irrelevant to the properties. However, in these approaches, the semantics of properties are also opaque to each other. As a result, when the number of properties grows very large, the performance of the demand-driven approaches will quickly deteriorate because property-irrelevant program statements become fewer and fewer, such as in the case of Pinpoint. To the best of our knowledge, the number of literature specifically addressing the extensional scalability issue is very limited. Readers can refer to Section 7 for a detailed discussion.

In this work, we advocate an inter-property-aware design to relax the property-property and the property-engine opaqueness so that the core static analysis engine can exploit the mutual synergy among different properties for optimization. To check a value-flow property, instead of conforming to conventional callback interfaces, property-checker writers of our framework need to explicitly declare a simple property specification, which picks out source and sink values, respectively, as well as the predicate over these values for the satisfaction of the property. For instance, for a null deference property, our property model only requires the checker writers to indicate where a null pointer may be created and where the null dereference may happen using pattern expressions, as well as a simple predicate that constrains the propagation of the null pointer. Surprisingly, given a set of properties specified in our property model, our static analyzer can automatically understand the overlaps and inconsistencies of the properties to check. Based on the understanding, before analyzing a program, we can make dedicated analysis plans so that, at runtime, the analyzer can share the analysis results on path-reachability and path-feasibility among different properties for optimization. The optimization allows us to significantly reduce redundant graph traversals and unnecessary invocations of the SMT solver, two critical performance bottlenecks of conventional approaches. We provide some examples in Section 2 to illustrate our approach.

We have implemented our approach, named Catapult, which is a new demand-driven and compositional static analyzer with the precision of path-sensitivity. Like a conventional compositional analysis [45], our implementation allows us to concurrently analyze functions that do not have calling relations. In Catapult, we have included all C/C++ value-flow properties that CSA checks by default. In the evaluation, we compared Catapult to three state-of-the-art bug-finding tools, Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer, using a standard benchmark and ten popular industrial-sized software systems. The experimental results demonstrate that Catapult is more than 8× faster than Pinpoint but consumes only 1/7 of the memory. It is as efficient as CSA and Infer in terms of both time and memory cost but is much more precise. Such promising scalability of Catapult is not achieved by sacrificing the capability of bug finding. In our experiments, although the benchmark software systems have been checked by numerous free and commercial tools, Catapult is still



Figure 1: Path overlapping and contradiction among different properties. Each edge represents a value flow.

able to detect many previously-unknown bugs, in which thirty-nine have been fixed by the developers and four have been assigned CVE IDs. In summary, we make the following contributions:

- An inter-property-aware design for checking value-flow properties, which mitigates the extensional scalability issue.
- A series of cross-property optimization rules that can be made use of for general value-flow analysis frameworks.
- A detailed implementation and a systematic evaluation that demonstrates our high scalability, precision, and recall.

2 OVERVIEW

The key factor that allows us to conquer the extensional scalability problem is the exploitation of the mutual synergy among different properties. In this section, we first use two simple examples to illustrate this mutual synergy and then provide a running example used in the whole paper.

2.1 Mutual Synergy

We observe that the mutual synergy among different properties are primarily in the forms of path overlapping and path contradiction.

In Figure 1a, to check the memory-leak bug, we need to track value flows from the newly-created heap pointer a to check if the pointer will be freed.[4] To check the free-global-pointer bug, we track value flows from the global variable b to check if it will be freed.[5] As illustrated in the figure, the value-flow paths to search for these two bugs overlap from the vertex $c{=}\phi(a,b)$ to the vertex $^*c{=}1$. Being aware of the overlap, when traversing the graph from the vertex $a{=}malloc()$ for the memory-leak bug, we record that the vertex $c{=}\phi(a,b)$ cannot reach any "free" operation. Therefore, when checking the free-global-pointer bug, we can use this recorded information to immediately stop the graph traversal at the vertex $c{=}\phi(a,b)$, thereby avoiding redundant graph traversals.

In Figure 1b, to check the memory-leak bug, we track value flows from the newly-created pointer a to where it is freed. To check the null-dereference bug, considering that the function *malloc* may return a null pointer when the memory allocation fails, we track the value flows from the same pointer a to where it is dereferenced. The two properties have an inconsistent constraint: the former requires $a{\neq}0$ for a to be a valid heap pointer while the latter requires

[4] In the paper, we say a pointer p is "freed" if it is used in the function call *free(p)*. We will detail how to use the value-flow information to check bugs later.
[5] Freeing a pointer pointing to non-heap memory (e.g., memory allocated by global variables) is buggy. See details in https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/590.html.



Figure 2: The workflow of our approach.



Figure 3: An example to illustrate our method.

a=0 for a to be a null pointer. Being aware of this inconsistency, when traversing the graph for checking the null-dereference bug, we check and record if the path condition γ of the path from the vertex *a=malloc()* to the vertex *b=a* conflicts with the null pointer condition a=0. If the path condition γ is satisfiable but conflicts with the null pointer condition a=0, i.e., the conjunction $\gamma \wedge a$=0 is unsatisfiable, we can conclude that the conjunction $\gamma \wedge a \neq 0$ must be satisfiable without an expensive constraint-solving procedure when checking the memory-leak bug.

2.2 A Running Example

Figure 3 shows a running example using the value-flow graph where we check the null-deference and the free-global-pointer bugs following the workflow illustrated in Figure 2. Given a program, we first follow the previous work [12, 38, 42] to build the value-flow graph in order to check the two properties with the precision of path-sensitivity. Here, path-sensitivity means that when searching paths on the value-flow graph, we invoke an SMT solver to solve path conditions and other property-specific constraints to prune infeasible paths.

The Property Specifications. The users of our framework need to declaratively specify the value-flow properties, which consists of the simple descriptions of the sources, the sinks, and the predicates for triggering the bug. For instance, the specifications of the aforementioned two properties are described by the following two quadruples, respectively:

$$\text{prop } \textit{null-deref} := (v = \textit{malloc}(\_); \_ = *v, *v = \_; v = 0; \text{never})$$

$$\text{prop } \textit{free-glob-ptr} := (\textit{glob}; \textit{free}(v); \textit{true}; \text{never})$$

Separated by the semicolons, the first and second components denote the descriptors of the source and the sink, respectively, specified using pattern expressions to represent the values used or defined in some program statements. The "don't-care" values are written as underscores. In the running example, the source values of the properties *null-deref* and *free-glob-ptr* are the return pointer of the function *malloc* and the global pointer g, respectively. The sink value of the property *null-deref* is the dereferenced value c at the statement $*c$=1. The sink values of the property *free-glob-ptr* are the freed values at the statements *free(b)* and *free(d)*.

The third component is a property-specific constraint, representing the triggering condition of the bug. In our example, the constraint of the property *null-deref* is $v = 0$, meaning that the value on a value-flow path should be a null pointer. The constraint of the property *free-glob-ptr* is *true*, meaning that the value on a value-flow path is unconstrained.

The built-in predicate "never" means that value-flow paths between the specified sources and sinks should never be feasible. Otherwise, a bug exists.

The Core Static Analysis Engine. Given these declarative specifications, our core engine automatically makes analysis plans before the analysis begins, including both the graph traversal plan and the optimization plan. In the example, we make the following optimization plans: (1) checking the property *free-glob-ptr* before the property *null-deref*; (2) when traversing the graph for the property *free-glob-ptr*, we record the vertices that cannot reach any sink vertex of the property *null-deref*. The graph traversal plan in the example is trivial, which is to perform a depth-first search on the value-flow graph from every source vertex of the two properties.

In Figure 3, when traversing the value-flow graph from the global pointer g to check the property *free-glob-ptr*, the core engine visits all vertices except the vertex p to look for "free" operations. According to the optimization plan, during the graph traversal, we record that the vertices b and d cannot reach any dereference operation.

To check the property *null-deref*, we traverse the value-flow graph from the vertex p. When visiting the vertex b and the vertex d, since the previously-recorded information tells us that they cannot reach any sink vertices, we prune the subsequent paths from the two vertices.

It is noteworthy that if we check the property *null-deref* before the property *free-glob-ptr*, we only can prune one path from the vertex c for the property *free-glob-ptr* based on the results of the property *null-deref* (see Section 4.2.1). We will further explain the rationale of our analysis plans in the following sections.

3 VALUE-FLOW PROPERTIES

This section provides a specification model for value-flow properties with the following two motivations. First, we observe that many property-specific constraints play a significant role in performance optimization. The specific constraints of one property can be used to optimize checking of not just the property itself, but also of other properties being checked together.

Second, despite many studies on value-flow analysis [12, 30, 38, 41, 42], we still have a lack of general and extensible specification models that can maximize the opportunities of sharing analysis results across the processes of checking different properties. Some of the existing studies only focus on checking a specific property (*e.g.*, memory leak [42]), while others adopt different specifications to check the same value-flow property (*e.g.*, double free [12, 38]).

Table 1: Pattern expressions used in the specification.

p	::=	:: **patterns**
	$\mid p_1, p_2, \cdots$	:: **pattern list**
	$\mid v_0 = sig(v_1, v_2, \cdots)$	:: **call**
	$\mid v_0 = *v_1$	:: **load**
	$\mid *v_0 = v_1$	:: **store**
	$\mid v_0 = v_1$	:: **assign**
	$\mid glob$	:: **globals**
v	::=	:: **symbol**
	$\mid sig$	:: **character string**
	$\mid \_$	:: **uninterested value**

Examples:

$v = malloc(\_)$	ret values of any statement calling *malloc*;
$\_ = send(\_, v, \_, \_)$	the 2nd arg of any statement calling *send*;
$\_ = *v$	dereferenced values at every load statement;

Preliminaries. In a similar style to existing approaches [29, 38, 42], we assume that the code of a program is in static single assignment (SSA) form, where every variable has only one definition [17]. Also, we say the value of a variable a flows to a variable b (or b is data-dependent on a) if a is assigned to b directly (via assignments, such as b=a) or indirectly (via pointer dereferences, such as *p=a; q=p; b=*q). Thus, a value-flow graph can be defined as a directed graph where the vertices are values in the program and the edges represent the value-flow relations. A path is called value-flow path if it is a path on the value-flow graph.

Property Specification. As defined below, we model a value-flow property as an aggregation of value-flow paths.

Definition 3.1 (Value-Flow Property). A value-flow property, x, is a quadruple: prop x := (src; sink; psc; agg), where

- src and sink are two pattern expressions (Table 1) that specify the sources and the sinks of the value-flow paths to track.
- psc is a first-order logic formula, representing the property-specific constraint that every value on the value-flow path needs to satisfy.
- agg $\in$ {never, never-sim, must, $\cdots$} is an extensible predicate that determines how to aggregate value-flow paths to check the specified property.

In practice, we can use the quadruple to specify a wide range of value-flow properties. As discussed below, we put the properties into three categories, which are checked by aggregating a single, two, or more value-flow paths, respectively.

Single-Path Properties. We can check many program properties using a single value-flow path, such as the properties, *null-deref* and *free-glob-ptr*, defined in Section 2.2, as well as a broad range of taint issues that propagate a tainted object to a program point consuming the object [21].

Double-Path Properties. A wide range of bugs happen in a program execution because two program statements (*e.g.*, two statements calling the function *free*) consecutively operate on the same value (*e.g.*, a heap pointer). Typical examples include the use-after-free bug, a general form of the double-free bug, as well as the ones that operate on expired resources such as a closed file descriptor or a closed network socket. We check them using two value-flow paths from the same source value. As an example, the specification for checking the double-free bugs can be specified as

$$\text{prop } \textit{double-free} := (v = \textit{malloc}(\_); \textit{free}(v); v \neq 0; \text{never-sim})$$

In the specification, the property-specific constraint $v \neq 0$ requires the initial value (or equivalently, all values) on the value-flow path is a valid heap pointer. This is because $v = 0$ means the function *malloc* fails to allocate memory and returns a null pointer. In this case, the "free" operation is harmless. The aggregate predicate "never-sim" means that two value-flow paths from the same pointer should never occur simultaneously. In other words, there is no control-flow path that goes through two different "free" operations on the same heap pointer. Otherwise, a double-free bug exists.

In Figure 3, for the two value-flow paths from the vertex p to the two "free" operations, we can check the constraint $(\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_2) \wedge (\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_4) \wedge (p \neq 0)$ to find double-free bugs. Here, $(\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_2)$ and $(\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_4)$ are the path conditions of the two paths, respectively.

All-Path Properties. Many bugs happen because we do not properly handle a value in all program paths. For instance, a memory-leak bug happens if there exists a feasible program path where we do not free a heap pointer. Other typical examples include many types of resource leaks such as the file descriptor leak and the socket leak. We check them by aggregating all value-flow paths from the same source value. As an example, we write the following specification for checking memory leaks:

$$\text{prop } \textit{mem-leak} := (v = \textit{malloc}(\_); \textit{free}(v); v \neq 0; \text{must})$$

Compared to the property *double-free*, the only difference in the specification is the aggregate predicate. The aggregate predicate "must" means that the value-flow path from a heap pointer must be able to reach a "free" operation. Otherwise, a memory leak exists in the program.

In Figure 3, for the value-flow paths from the vertex p to the two "free" operations, we can check the disjunction of their path conditions, *i.e.*, $\neg((\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_2) \vee (\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_4)) \wedge \gamma_1 \wedge (p \neq 0)$, to determine if a memory leak exists. Here, $(\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_2)$ and $(\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_4)$ are the path conditions of these two paths, respectively. The additional γ_1 is the condition on which the heap pointer is created.

4 INTER-PROPERTY-AWARE ANALYSIS

Given a number of value-flow properties specified as the quadruples (src; sink; psc; agg), our inter-property-aware static analyzer searches the value-flow paths and checks bugs based on the path conditions, the property-specific constraint psc, and the predicate agg. In this paper, we concentrate on how to exploit the mutual synergy arising from the interactions of different properties to improve the searching efficiency of value-flow paths.

4.1 A Naïve Static Analyzer

For multiple value-flow properties, a naïve static analyzer checks them independently in a demand-driven manner. As illustrated by Algorithm 1, for each value-flow property, the static analyzer traverses the value-flow graph from each of the source vertices. At each step of the graph traversal, we check if the property-specific

```
Input: the value-flow graph of a progam to check
Input: a set of value-flow properties to check
Output: paths between sources and sinks for each property
foreach property in the input property set do
    foreach source v in its source set do
        while visit v' in the depth-first search from v do
            if psc cannot be satisfied then
                stop the search from v';
            end
        end
    end
end
```

Algorithm 1: The naïve static analyzer.

constraint psc is satisfiable with respect to the current path condition. If it is not satisfiable, we can stop the graph traversal along the current path. This path-pruning process is illustrated in the shaded part of Algorithm 1, which is a critical factor to improve the performance.

The key optimization opportunities come from the observation that the properties to check usually introduce overlaps and inconsistencies during the graph traversal, which cannot be exploited if they are independently checked as in the naïve approach.

4.2 Optimized Intra-procedural Analysis

As summarized in Table 2, given the property specifications, our inter-property-aware static analysis engine carries out two types of optimizations when traversing the value-flow graph: the first aiming at pruning paths and the second focusing on sharing paths when multiple properties are being checked. Each row of the table is a rule describing the specific precondition, the corresponding optimization, as well as its benefit. For the clarity of the discussion, we explain the rules in the context of processing a single-procedure program, followed by the discussion on the inter-procedural analysis in the next subsection.

4.2.1 Optimization Plan. Given the property specifications, we adopt Rules 1 – 4 in Table 2 to facilitate the path pruning.

Ordering the Properties (Rule 1). Given a set of properties with different source values, we need to determine the order in which they are checked. While we leave the finding of the perfect order that guarantees the optimal optimization to our future work, we observe that a random order can significantly affect the effectiveness of the path pruning and must be circumvented.

Let us consider the example in Figure 3 again. In Section 2.2, we have explained that if the property *free-glob-ptr* is checked before the property *null-deref*, we can prune the two paths from the vertex b and the vertex d when checking the latter. However, if we flip the checking order, only one path from the vertex c can be pruned. This is because, when checking the property *null-deref*, the core engine records that the vertex c cannot reach any sinks specified by the property *free-glob-ptr*.

Intuitively, what causes the fluctuation in the number of prunable paths is that the number of the "free" operations is more than the dereference operations in the value-flow graph. That is, the more sink vertices we have in the value-flow graph, the fewer paths we can prune for the property. Inspired by this intuition, the order of checking the properties is arranged according to the number of sink vertices. That is, the more sink vertices a property has in the value-flow graph, the earlier we check this property.

Recording Sink-Reachability (Rule 2). Given a set of properties $\{\text{prop}_1, \text{prop}_2, \cdots\}$, when checking the property prop_i by traversing the value-flow graph, we record if each visited vertex may reach a sink vertex of the property $\text{prop}_j (j \neq i)$. With the recorded information, when checking the property $\text{prop}_j (j \neq i)$ and visiting a vertex that cannot reach any of its sinks, we prune the paths from the vertex. Section 2.2 illustrates the method.

Recording the Checking Results of Property-Specific Constraints (Rules 3 & 4). Given a set of properties $\{\text{prop}_1, \text{prop}_2, \cdots\}$, when we check the property prop_i by traversing the value-flow graph, we record the path segments, *i.e.*, a set of edges, that conflict with the property-specific constraint psc_j of the property $\text{prop}_j (j \neq i)$. When checking the property $\text{prop}_j (j \neq i)$, we prune the paths that include the path segments.

Let us consider the running example in Figure 3 again. When traversing the graph from the vertex g to check the property *free-glob-ptr*, the core engine records that the condition of the edge from the vertex a to the vertex c, *i.e.*, $a \neq 0$, conflicts with the property-specific constraint of the property *null-deref*, *i.e.*, $a = 0$. With this information, when checking the property *null-deref*, we can prune the subsequent path after the vertex c.

Thanks to the advances in the area of clause learning [6], we are able to efficiently compute some reusable facts when using SMT solvers to check path conditions and property-specific constraints. Specifically, we compute two reusable facts when a property-specific constraint psc_i conflicts with the current path condition pc.

When $\text{pc} \wedge \text{psc}_i$ is unsatisfiable, we record the unsatisfiable core [22], which is a set of Boolean predicates in the path condition pc, *e.g.*, $\{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \cdots\}$, such that $\gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_2 \wedge \cdots \wedge \text{psc}_i = \mathit{false}$. Since the path condition pc is the conjunction of the edge constraint on the value-flow path, each predicate γ_i corresponds to the condition of an edge ϵ_i on the value-flow graph. Thus, we can record an edge set $E = \{\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \cdots\}$, which conflicts with the property-specific constraint psc_i. When checking the other property with the same property-specific constraint, if a value-flow path contains these recorded edges, we can prune the remaining paths.

In addition to the unsatisfiable cores, we also can record the interpolation constraints [14], which are even reusable for properties with a different property-specific constraint. In the above example, assume that the property-specific constraint psc_i is $a = 0$ and the predicate set $\{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \cdots\}$ is $\{a + b > 3, b < 0\}$. In the constraint solving phase, an SMT solver can refute the satisfiability of $(a + b > 3) \wedge (b < 0) \wedge (a = 0)$ by finding an interpolant γ' such that $(a + b > 3) \wedge (b < 0) \Rightarrow \gamma'$ but $\gamma' \Rightarrow \neg(a = 0)$. In the example, the interpolant γ' is $a > 3$, which provides a detailed explanation why the γ set conflicts with the property-specific constraint $a = 0$. In addition, the interpolant also indicates that the γ set conflicts with many other constraints such as $a < 0$ and $a < 3$. Thus, given a property whose specific constraint conflicts with the interpolation constraint, it is sufficient to conclude that any value-flow path passing through the edge set E can be pruned.

Table 2: Rules of making analysis plans for a pair of properties.

Optimization Plans

prop $x := (\text{src}_1; \text{sink}_1; \text{psc}_1; \text{agg}_1)$ and prop $y := (\text{src}_2; \text{sink}_2; \text{psc}_2; \text{agg}_2)$, $\text{src}_1 \neq \text{src}_2$

ID	Rule Name	Precondition	Plan	Benefit
1	property ordering	$\#\text{sink}_1 > \#\text{sink}_2$	check x before y	more chances to prune paths
2	result recording	check x before y	record vertices that cannot reach sink_2	prune paths at a vertex
3		check x before y, $\text{psc}_1 = \text{psc}_2$	record unsat cores that conflict with psc_2	prune paths if going through a set of edges
4		check x before y, $\text{psc}_1 \neq \text{psc}_2$	record interpolants that conflict with psc_2	

Graph Traversal Plans

prop $x := (\text{src}_1; \text{sink}_1; \text{psc}_1; \text{agg}_1)$ and prop $y := (\text{src}_2; \text{sink}_2; \text{psc}_2; \text{agg}_2)$, $\text{src}_1 = \text{src}_2$

ID	Rule Name	Precondition	Plan	Benefit
5	traversal merging	-	search from src_1 for both properties	sharing path conditions
6	psc-check ordering	$\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 = \text{psc}_1$	check psc_1 first	if satisfiable, so is psc_2
7		$\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 \neq \mathit{false}$	check $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2$	if satisfiable, both psc_1 and psc_2 can be satisfied
8		$\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 = \mathit{false}$	check any, *e.g.*, psc_1, first	if unsatisfiable, psc_2 can be satisfied



Figure 4: Merging the graph traversal.

4.2.2 Graph Traversal Plan. The graph traversal plan is to provide strategies of sharing paths among different properties.

Merging the Graph Traversal (Rule 5). We observe that many properties actually share the same or a part of source vertices and even the same sink vertices. If the core engine checks each property one by one, it will repetitively traverse the graph from the same source vertex for different properties. Therefore, our graph traversal plan merges the path searching processes for different properties.

As an example, in Figure 3, since the vertex p may represent either a heap pointer or a null pointer, checking both the property *null-deref* and the property *mem-leak* needs to traverse the graph from the vertex p. Figure 4 illustrates how the merged traversal is performed. That is, we maintain a property set during the graph traversal to record what properties the current path contributes to. Whenever visiting a vertex, we check if a property needs to be removed from the property set. For instance, at the vertex d, we may remove the property *null-deref* from the property set if we can determine the vertex d cannot reach any of its sinks. When the property set becomes empty, the graph traversal stops immediately.

Ordering the Checks of Property-Specific Constraints (Rules 6 – 8). Since the graph traversals are merged for different properties, at a vertex, *e.g.*, a in Figure 4, we have to check multiple property-specific constraints, *e.g.*, $a \neq 0$ for the property *mem-leak* and $a = 0$ for the property *null-deref*, with respect to the path condition. In a usual manner, we have to invoke an expensive SMT solver to check each property-specific constraint, significantly affecting the analysis performance when there are many properties to check. We mitigate this issue by utilizing various relations between the property-specific constraints, so that we can reuse SMT-solving results and reduce the invocations of the SMT solver.

Given two property-specific constraints, psc_1 and psc_2, we consider all three possible relations between them: $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 = \text{psc}_1$, $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 \neq \mathit{false}$, and $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 = \mathit{false}$. Since the property-specific constraints are often simple, these relations are easy to compute. These relations make it possible to check both psc_1 and psc_2 by invoking an SMT solver only once.

The first relation, $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 = \text{psc}_1$, implies that any solution of the constraint psc_1 also satisfies the constraint psc_2. In this case, we first check if the constraint psc_1 conflicts with the current path condition pc by solving the conjunction, $\text{pc} \wedge \text{psc}_1$. If it is satisfiable, we can conclude that the conjunction, $\text{pc} \wedge \text{psc}_2$, is also satisfiable.

The second relation, $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 \neq \mathit{false}$, implies that there exists a solution that satisfying both the constraint psc_1 and the constraint psc_2. In this case, we first check the conjunction, $\text{pc} \wedge \text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2$. If it is satisfiable, we can conclude that both of the constraints, psc_1 and psc_2, are satisfiable with respect to the path condition.

The third relation, $\text{psc}_1 \wedge \text{psc}_2 = \mathit{false}$, implies that there does not exist any solution that satisfies both the constraint psc_1 and the constraint psc_2. In this case, we check any of the constraints, psc_1 and psc_2, first. If the current path is feasible but the conjunction $\text{pc} \wedge \text{psc}_1$ is not satisfiable, we can conclude that the conjunction $\text{pc} \wedge \text{psc}_2$ can be satisfied without invoking SMT solvers.

4.3 Modular Inter-procedural Analysis

Scalable program analyses need to exploit the modular structure of a program. They build function summaries, which are reused at different calling contexts [16, 45]. In Catapult, we can seamlessly extend our optimized intra-procedural analysis to modular inter-procedural analysis by exploring the local value-flow graph of each function and then stitching the local paths together to generate complete value-flow paths. In what follows, we explain our design of the function summaries.

In our analysis, for each function, we build three kinds of value-flow paths as the function summaries. They are defined below and, in a longer version of this paper [37], we formally prove the soundness of generating these function summaries. Intuitively, these summaries describe how function boundaries, i.e., formal parameters and return values, partition a complete value-flow path. Using the property *double-free* as an example, a complete value-flow path from the vertex p to the vertex *free(b)* in Figure 5 is partitioned to a sub-path from the vertex p to the vertex *ret p* by the boundary of the function *xmalloc*. This sub-path is an output summary of the function *xmalloc* as defined below.

Definition 4.1 (Transfer Summary). A transfer summary of a function f is a value-flow path from one of its formal parameters to one of its return values.

Definition 4.2 (Input Summary). An input summary of a function f is a value-flow path from one of its formal parameters to a sink value in the function f or in the callees of the function f.

Definition 4.3 (Output Summary). An output summary of a function f is a value-flow path from a source value to a return value of the function. The source value is in the function f or in the callees of the function f.

After generating the function summaries, to avoid separately storing them for different properties, each function summary is labeled with a bit vector to record what properties it is built for. Assume that we need to check there properties, *i.e.*, *null-deref*, *double-free*, and *mem-leak*, in Figure 5. We assign three bit vectors, $0b001$, $0b010$, and $0b100$, to the three properties as their identities, respectively. As explained before, all three properties regard the vertex p as the source. The sink vertices for checking the properties *double-free* and *mem-leak* are the vertices *free(b)* and *free(u)*. There are no sink vertices for the property *null-deref*. According to Definitions 4.1–4.3, we generate the following function summaries:

Function	Summary Path	Label	Type
xmalloc	$(p, ret\ p)$	$0b111$	output
xfree	$(u, ret\ u)$	$0b111$	transfer
	$(u, free(u))$	$0b110$	input

The summary $(p, ret\ p)$ is labeled with $0b111$ because all three properties regard p as the source. The summary $(u, ret\ u)$ is also labeled with $0b111$ because the path does not contain any property-specific vertices and, thus, may be used to check all three properties. The summary $(u, free(u))$ is only labeled with $0b110$ because we do not regard the vertex $free(u)$ as a sink of the property *null-deref*.



Figure 5: An example to show the inter-procedural analysis.

When analyzing the main function, we concatenate its intra-procedural paths with summaries from its callees to generate a complete path. For example, a concatenation is illustrated below and its result is labeled by $0b110$, meaning that the resulting path only works for the property *double-free* and the property *mem-leak*.

$$\begin{aligned}(p, ret\ p)^{0b111} \circ (a) \circ (u, free(u))^{0b110} \\ = (p, ret\ p, a, u, free(u))^{0b111 \& 0b110} \\ = (p, ret\ p, a, u, free(u))^{0b110}\end{aligned}$$

We observe that using value-flow paths as function summaries has a significant advantage for checking multiple properties. That is, since value flow is a common program relations, it can be reused across different properties. This is different from existing approaches that utilize state machine to model properties and generate state-specific function summaries [18, 25]. Since different properties usually have different states, compared to our value-flow-based function summaries, such state-specific function summaries have fewer opportunities to be reused across properties.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we present the implementation details as well as the properties to check in our framework.

Path-sensitivity. We have implemented our approach as a prototype tool called Catapult on top of Pinpoint [38]. Given the source code of a program, we first compile it to LLVM bitcode,[6] on which our analysis is performed. To achieve path-sensitivity, we build a path-sensitive value-flow graph and compute path conditions following the method of Pinpoint. The path conditions in our analysis are first-order logic formulae over bit vectors. A program variable is modeled as a bit vector, of which the length is the bit width (e.g., 32) of the variable's type (e.g., int). The path conditions are solved by Z3 [19], a state-of-the-art SMT solver, to determine the path feasibility.

Properties to check. Catapult currently supports twenty C/C++ properties, briefly introduced in Table 3, defined by CSA.[7] These

[6] LLVM: https://llvm.org/.
[7] More details of the properties can be found on https://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/.

Table 3: Properties to check in Catapult.

ID	Property Name	Brief Description
1	core.CallAndMessage	Check for uninitialized arguments and null function pointers
2	core.DivideByZero	Check for division by zero
3	core.NonNullParamChecker	Check for null passed to function parameters marked with nonnull
4	core.NullDereference	Check for null pointer dereference
5	core.StackAddressEscape	Check that addresses of stack memory do not escape the function
6	core.UndefinedBinaryOperatorResult	Check for the undefined results of binary operations
7	core.VLASize (Variable-Length Array)	Check for declaration of VLA of undefined or zero size
8	core.uninitialized.ArraySubscript	Check for uninitialized values used as array subscripts
9	core.uninitialized.Assign	Check for assigning uninitialized values
10	core.uninitialized.Branch	Check for uninitialized values used as branch conditions
11	core.uninitialized.CapturedBlockVariable	Check for blocks that capture uninitialized values
12	core.uninitialized.UndefReturn	Check for uninitialized values being returned to callers
13	cplusplus.NewDelete	Check for C++ use-after-free
14	cplusplus.NewDeleteLeaks	Check for C++ memory leaks
15	unix.Malloc	Check for C memory leaks, double-free, and use-after-free
16	unix.MismatchedDeallocator	Check for mismatched deallocators, e.g., new and free()
17	unix.cstring.NullArg	Check for null pointers being passed to C string functions like strlen
18	alpha.core.CallAndMessageUnInitRefArg	Check for uninitialized function arguments
19	alpha.unix.SimpleStream	Check for misuses of C stream APIs, e.g., an opened file is not closed
20	alpha.unix.Stream	Check stream handling functions, e.g., using a null file handle in fseek

properties include all CSA's default C/C++ value-flow properties. All other default C/C++ properties in CSA but not in Catapult are simple ones that do not require a path-sensitive analysis. For example, the property security.insecureAPI.bcopy requires CSA report a warning whenever a program statement calling the function *bcopy* is found.

Parallelization. Our analysis is performed in a bottom-up manner, in which a function is always analyzed before its callers. After a function is analyzed, its function behavior is summarized as function summaries, which can be reused at different call sites. Thus, it is easy to run in parallel by analyzing functions without caller-callee relations independently [45]. Our special design for checking multiple properties together does not prevent the analysis from this parallelization strategy.

Soundness. We implement Catapult in a soundy manner [31]. This means that the implementation soundly handles most language features and, meanwhile, includes some well-known unsound design decisions as previous works [4, 12, 38, 42, 45]. For example, in our implementation, virtual functions are resolved by classic class hierarchy analysis [20]. However, we do not handle C style function pointers, inline assembly, and library functions. We also follow the common practice to assume distinct function parameters do not alias with each other [30] and unroll each cycle twice on the call graph and the control flow graph. These unsound choices significantly improve the scalability but have limited negative impacts on the bug-finding capability.

6 EVALUATION

To demonstrate the scalability of our approach, we compared the time and the memory cost of Catapult to three existing industrial-strength static analyzers. We also investigated the capability of finding real bugs in order to show that the increased scalability is not at the cost of sacrificing the bug-finding capability.

Table 4: Subjects for evaluation.

ID	Program	Size (KLoC)	ID	Program	Size (KLoC)
1	mcf	2	13	shadowsocks	32
2	bzip2	3	14	webassembly	75
3	gzip	6	15	transmission	88
4	parser	8	16	redis	101
5	vpr	11	17	imagemagick	358
6	crafty	13	18	python	434
7	twolf	18	19	glusterfs	481
8	eon	22	20	icu	537
9	gap	36	21	openssl	791
10	vortex	49	22	mysql	2,030
11	perlbmk	73			
12	gcc	135	**Total**		5,303

Baseline approaches. We first compared Catapult to Pinpoint, a most recent value-flow analyzer with the precision of inter-procedural path-sensitivity [38]. In addition, we also compared Catapult to two widely-used open-source bug finding tools, CSA and Infer. All these tools in our evaluation were configured to use fifteen threads to take advantage of parallelization.

We also tried to compare Catapult to other static bug detection tools such as Saturn [45], Calysto [4], Semmle [3], Fortify, and Klocwork.[8] However, they are either unavailable or not runnable on the experimental environment we are able to set up. The open-source static analyzer, FindBugs,[9] was not included in our experiments because it only works for Java while we focus on the analysis of C/C++ programs. We did not compare Catapult to Tricoder [36], the static analysis platform from Google. This is because it uses CSA as the C/C++ analyzer, which is included in our experiments.

[8]Klocwork: https://www.roguewave.com/products-services/klocwork/.
[9]Findbugs Static Analyzer: http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/.

Subjects for evaluation. To avoid possible biases on the benchmark programs, we included the standard and widely-used benchmarks, SPEC CINT2000[10] (ID = 1 ∼ 12 in Table 4), in our evaluation. Meanwhile, to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of Catapult on real-world projects, we also included ten industrial-sized open-source C/C++ projects (ID = 13 ∼ 22 in Table 4), of which the size ranges from a few thousand to two million lines of code.

Environment. All experiments were performed on a server with eighty "Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2698 v4 @ 2.20GHz" processors and 256GB of memory running Ubuntu-16.04.

6.1 Comparing to Static Value-Flow Analyzer

We first compared Catapult to Pinpoint, the state-of-the-art value-flow analyzer. To quantify the effect of the graph traversal plan and the optimization plan separately, we also configured Catapult* to only contain the graph traversal plan.

In this experiment, we performed the whole program analysis by linking all compilation units of a project into a single file for the static analyzers to perform the cross-file analysis. Before the analysis, both Pinpoint and Catapult need to build the value-flow graph as the program intermediate representation. Since Catapult is built on top of Pinpoint, the pre-processing time and the size of value-flow graph are the same for both tools, which are almost linear to the size of a program [38]. Typically, for MySQL, a program with about two million lines of code, it takes twenty minutes to build a value-flow graph with seventy million nodes and ninety million edges.

Efficiency. The time and memory cost of checking each benchmark program is shown in Figure 6a. Owing to the inter-property-awareness, Catapult is about 8× faster than Pinpoint and takes only 1/7 of the memory on average. Typically, Catapult can finish checking MySQL in 5 hours, which is aligned with the industrial requirement of finishing an analysis in 5 to 10 hours [7, 32].

When the optimization plan is disabled, Catapult* is about 3.5× faster than Pinpoint and takes 1/5 of the memory on average. Compared to the result of Catapult, it implies that the graph traversal plan and the optimization plan contribute to 40% and 60% of the time cost reduction, respectively. Meanwhile, they contribute to 70% and 30% of the memory cost reduction, respectively. As a summary, the two plans contribute similar to the time cost reduction, and the graph traversal plan is more important for the memory cost reduction because it allows us to avoid duplicate data storage by sharing analysis results across different properties.

Using the largest subject, MySQL, as an example, Figure 6b illustrates the growth curves of both the time and the memory overhead when the properties in Table 3 are added into the core engine one by one. Figure 6b shows that, in terms of both time and memory overhead, Catapult grows much slower than Pinpoint and, thus, scales up quite gracefully.

It is noteworthy that, except for the feature of inter-property-awareness, Catapult follows the same method of Pinpoint to build value-flow graph and perform path-sensitive analysis. Thus, they have the similar performance to check a single property. Catapult performs better than Pinpoint only when multiple properties are checked together.

[10]SPEC CINT2000 benchmarks: https://www.spec.org/cpu2000/CINT2000/.

Effectiveness. Since both Catapult and Pinpoint check programs with the precision of inter-procedural path-sensitivity, as shown in the left part of Table 5, they produce a similar number of bug reports (# Rep) and false positives (# FP) for all the real-world programs except for the programs that Pinpoint fails to analyze due to the out-of-memory exception.

6.2 Comparing to Other Static Analyzers

To better understand the performance of Catapult in comparison to other types of property-unaware static analyzers, we also ran Catapult against two prominent and mature static analyzers, CSA (based on symbolic execution) and Infer (based on abductive inference). Note that Infer does not classify the properties to check as Table 3 but targets at a similar range of properties, such as null dereference, memory leak, and others.

In our experiment, CSA was run with two different configurations: one is its default configuration where a fast but imprecise range-based solver is employed to solve path conditions, and the other uses Z3 [19], a full-featured SMT solver, to solve path conditions. To ease the explanation, we denote CSA in the two configurations as CSA (Default) and CSA (Z3), respectively. Since CSA separately analyzes each source file and Infer only has limited capability of detecting cross-file bugs, for a fair comparison, all tools in the experiments were configured to check source files separately, and the time limit for analyzing each file is set to 60 minutes. Since a single source file is usually small, we did not encounter memory issues in the experiment but missed a lot of cross-file bugs as discussed later. Also, since we build value-flow graphs separately for each file and do not need to track cross-file value flows, the time cost of building value-flow graphs is almost negligible. Typically, for MySQL, it takes about five minutes to build value-flow graphs for all of its source code. This time cost is included in the results discussed below.

Note that we did not change other default configurations of CSA and Infer. This is because the default configuration is usually the best in practice. Modifying their default configuration may introduce more biases.

Efficiency (Catapult vs. CSA (Z3)). When both Catapult and CSA employ Z3 to solve path conditions, they have similar precision (i.e., full path-sensitivity) in theory. However, as illustrated in Figure 6c, Catapult is much faster than CSA and consumes a similar amount of memory for all of the subjects. For example, for MySQL, it takes about 36 hours for CSA to finish the analysis while Catapult takes only half an hour, consuming a similar amount of memory. On average, Catapult is 68× faster than CSA at the cost of only 2× more memory space. Both analyses can finish in 12GB of memory, available in common personal computers.

Efficiency (Catapult vs. CSA (Default) and Infer). As illustrated in Figure 6c, compared to both Infer and the default version of CSA, Catapult consumes a similar, sometimes a little higher, amount of time and memory. For instance, for MySQL, the largest subject program, all three tools finish the analysis in 40 minutes and consume about 10GB of memory. With similar efficiency, Catapult, as a fully path-sensitive analysis, is much more precise than the other two. The lower precision of CSA and Infer leads to many false positives as discussed below.



Figure 6: (a) Comparing Catapult to Pinpoint. (b) The growth curves of the time overhead and the memory overhead. (c) Comparing Catapult to CSA and Infer.

Table 5: Effectiveness (Catapult vs. Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer).

Program	Catapult		Pinpoint	
	# Rep	# FP	# Rep	# FP
shadowsocks	9	0	9	0
webassembly	10	2	10	2
transmission	24	2	24	2
redis	39	5	39	5
imagemagick	26	8	-	-
python	48	7	48	7
glusterfs	59	22	59	22
icu	161	31	-	-
openssl	48	15	-	-
mysql	245	88	-	-
% FP	26.9%		20.1%	

Program	Catapult		CSA (Z3)		CSA (Default)		Infer†	
	# Rep	# FP	# Rep	# FP	# Rep	# FP	# Rep	# FP
shadowsocks	8	2	24	22	25	23	15	13
webassembly	4	0	1	0	6	2	12	12
transmission	31	10	17	12	26	21	167*	82
redis	19	6	15	7	32	20	16	7
imagemagick	24	7	34	21	78	61	34	18
python	37	7	62	40	149*	77	82	63
glusterfs	28	5	0	0	268*	82	-	-
icu	55	11	94	67	206*	69	248*	71
openssl	39	19	44	26	44	26	211*	85
mysql	59	20	271*	59	1001*	79	258*	80
% FP	28.6%		64.9%		75.7%		78.6%	

* We inspected one hundred randomly-sampled bug reports.
† We fail to run the tool on glusterfs.

Effectiveness. In addition to the efficiency, we also investigate the bug-finding capability of the tools. The right part of Table 5 presents the results. Since we only perform file-level analysis in this experiment, the bugs reported by Catapult is much fewer than those in the left part of Table 5. Because of the prohibitive cost of manually inspecting all of the bug reports, we randomly sampled a hundred reports for the projects that have more than one hundred reports. Our observation shows that, on average, the false positive rate of Catapult is much lower than both CSA and Infer. In terms of recall, Catapult reports more true positives, which cover all those reported by CSA and Infer. CSA and Infer miss many bugs due to the trade-offs they make in exchange for efficiency. For example, CSA often stops its analysis on a path after it finds the first bug.

Together with the results on efficiency, we can conclude that Catapult is much more scalable than CSA and Infer because they have similar time and memory overhead but Catapult is much more precise and able to detect more bugs.

6.3 Detected Real Bugs

We note that the real-world software used in our evaluation is frequently scanned by commercial tools such as Coverity SAVE[11] and, thus, is expected to have very high quality. Nevertheless, due to the high efficiency, precision, and recall, Catapult still can detect many deeply-hidden software bugs that existing static analyzers, such as Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer, cannot detect.

At the time of writing, thirty-nine previously-unknown bugs have been confirmed and fixed by the software developers, including seventeen null pointer dereferences, ten use-after-free or double-free bugs, eleven resource leaks, and one stack-address-escape bug. Four of them even have been assigned CVE IDs due to their significant security impact. We have made an online list for all bugs assigned CVE IDs or fixed by their original developers.[12]

[11] Coverity Scan: https://scan.coverity.com/projects/.
[12] Detected real bugs: https://qingkaishi.github.io/catapult.html.



Figure 7: A null-dereference bug in ImageMagick.

As an example, Figure 7 presents a null-deference bug detected by Catapult in ImageMagick, which is a software suite for processing images. This bug is of high complexity, as it occurs in a function of more than 1,000 lines of code and the control flow involved in the bug spans across 56 functions over 9 files.

Since both CSA and Infer make many unsound trade-offs to achieve scalability, neither of them detects this bug. Pinpoint also cannot detect the bug because it is not memory-efficient and has to give up its analysis after the memory is exhausted.

7 RELATED WORK

To the best of our knowledge, a very limited number of existing static analyses have studied how to statically check multiple program properties at once, despite that the problem is very important at an industrial setting. Goldberg et al. [26] make unsound assumptions and intentionally stop the analysis on a path after finding the first bug. Apparently, the approach will miss many bugs, which violates our design goal. Different from our approach that reduces unnecessary program exploration via cross-property optimization, Mordan and Mutilin [33] studied how to distribute computing resources, so that the resources are not exhausted by a few properties. Cabodi and Nocco [9] studied the problem of checking multiple properties in the context of hardware model checking. Their method has a similar spirit to our approach as it also tries to exploit the mutual synergy among different properties. However, it works in a different manner specially designed for hardware. In order to avoid state-space explosion caused by large sets of properties, some other approaches studied how to decompose a set of properties into small groups [1, 10]. Owing to the decomposition, we cannot share the analysis results across different groups. There are also some static analyzers such as Semmle [3] and DOOP [8] that take advantage of datalog engines for multi-query optimization. However, they are usually not path-sensitive and their optimization methods are closely related to the sophisticated datalog specifications. In this paper, we focus on value-flow queries that can be simply specified as a quadruple and, thus, cannot benefit from the datalog engines.

CSA and Infer currently are two of the most famous open-source static analyzers with industrial strength. CSA is a symbolic-execution-based, exhaustive, and whole-program static analyzer. As a symbolic execution, it suffers from the path-explosion problem [27]. To be scalable, it has to make unsound assumptions as in the aforementioned related work [26], limit its capability of detecting cross-file bugs, and give up full path-sensitivity by default. Infer is an abstract-interpretation-based, exhaustive, and compositional static analyzer. To be scalable, it also makes many trade-offs: giving up path-sensitivity and discarding sophisticated pointer analysis in most cases. Similarly, Tricoder, the analyzer in Google, only works intra-procedurally in order to analyze large code base [35, 36].

In the past decades, researchers have proposed many general techniques that can check different program properties but do not consider how to efficiently check them together [4, 5, 11, 13, 15, 23, 24, 34, 38, 41, 45]. Thus, we study different problems. In addition, there are also many techniques tailored only for a special program property, including null dereference [30], use after free [46], memory leak [12, 25, 42, 44], and buffer overflow [28], to name a few. Since we focus on the extensional scalability issue for multiple properties, our approach is different from them.

Value-flow properties checked in our static analyzer are also related to well-known type-state properties [39, 40]. Generally, we can regard a value-flow property as a type-state property with at most two states. Nevertheless, value-flow properties have covered a wide range of program issues. Thus, a scalable value-flow analyzer is really necessary and useful in practice. Modeling a program issue as a value-flow property has many advantages. For instance, Cherem et al. [12] pointed out that we can utilize the sparseness of value-flow graph to avoid tracking unnecessary value propagation in a control flow graph, thereby achieving better performance and outputting more concise issue reports. In this paper, we also demonstrate that using the value-flow-based model enables us to mitigate the extensional scalability issue.

8 CONCLUSION

We have presented Catapult, a scalable approach to checking multiple value-flow properties together. The critical factor that makes our technique fast is to exploit the mutual synergy among the properties to check. Since the number of program properties to check is quickly increasing nowadays, we believe that it will be an important research direction to study how to scale up static program analysis for simultaneously checking multiple properties.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Dr. Yepang Liu for their insightful comments. This work is partially funded by an MSRA grant, as well as Hong Kong GRF16230716, GRF16206517, ITS/215/16FP, and ITS/440/18FP grants. Rongxin Wu is partially supported by the NSFC Project No. 61902329 and is the corresponding author.

REFERENCES

[1] Sven Apel, Dirk Beyer, Vitaly Mordan, Vadim Mutilin, and Andreas Stahlbauer. 2016. On-the-fly decomposition of specifications in software model checking. In *Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering*. ACM, 349–361.

[2] Steven Arzt, Siegfried Rasthofer, Christian Fritz, Eric Bodden, Alexandre Bartel, Jacques Klein, Yves Le Traon, Damien Octeau, and Patrick McDaniel. 2014. Flowdroid: Precise context, flow, field, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware taint analysis for android apps. In *Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI '14)*. ACM, 259–269.

[3] Pavel Avgustinov, Oege de Moor, Michael Peyton Jones, and Max Schäfer. 2016. QL: Object-oriented Queries on Relational Data. In *30th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP '16)*. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2:1–2:25.

[4] Domagoj Babic and Alan J. Hu. 2008. Calysto: Scalable and precise extended static checking. In *Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE '08)*. IEEE, 211–220.

[5] Thomas Ball and Sriram K. Rajamani. 2002. The SLAM project: Debugging system software via static analysis. In *Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL '02)*. ACM, 1–3.

[6] Paul Beanie, Henry Kautz, and Ashish Sabharwal. 2003. Understanding the power of clause learning. In *Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI '03)*. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1194–1201.

[7] Al Bessey, Ken Block, Ben Chelf, Andy Chou, Bryan Fulton, Seth Hallem, Charles Henri-Gros, Asya Kamsky, Scott McPeak, and Dawson Engler. 2010. A few billion lines of code later: using static analysis to find bugs in the real world. *Commun. ACM* 53, 2 (2010), 66–75.

[8] Martin Bravenboer and Yannis Smaragdakis. 2009. Strictly declarative specification of sophisticated points-to analyses. In *Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Object Oriented Programming Systems Languages and Applications (OOPSLA '09)*. ACM, 243–262.

[9] Gianpiero Cabodi and Sergio Nocco. 2011. Optimized model checking of multiple properties. In *2011 Design, Automation, and Test in Europe Conference (DATE '11)*. IEEE, 1–4.

[10] P Camurati, C Loiacono, P Pasini, D Patti, and S Quer. 2014. To split or to group: from divide-and-conquer to sub-task sharing in verifying multiple properties. In *International Workshop on Design and Implementation of Formal Tools and Systems (DIFTS), Lausanne, Switzerland*. Springer, 313–325.

[11] Sagar Chaki, Edmund M Clarke, Alex Groce, Somesh Jha, and Helmut Veith. 2004. Modular verification of software components in C. *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering* 30, 6 (2004), 388–402.

[12] Sigmund Cherem, Lonnie Princehouse, and Radu Rugina. 2007. Practical memory leak detection using guarded value-flow analysis. In *Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI '07)*. ACM, 480–491.

[13] Chia Yuan Cho, Vijay D'Silva, and Dawn Song. 2013. BLITZ: Compositional bounded model checking for real-world programs. In *Proceedings of the 28th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE '13)*. IEEE, 136–146.

[14] Alessandro Cimatti, Alberto Griggio, and Roberto Sebastiani. 2010. Efficient generation of Craig interpolants in satisfiability modulo theories. *ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)* 12, 1 (2010), 7.

[15] Edmund Clarke, Daniel Kroening, and Karen Yorav. 2003. Behavioral consistency of C and Verilog programs using bounded model checking. In *Proceedings of the 40th annual Design Automation Conference*. ACM, 368–371.

[16] Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot. 2002. Modular static program analysis. In *International Conference on Compiler Construction (CC '02)*. Springer, 159–179.

[17] Ron Cytron, Jeanne Ferrante, Barry K Rosen, Mark N Wegman, and F Kenneth Zadeck. 1991. Efficiently computing static single assignment form and the control dependence graph. *ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)* 13, 4 (1991), 451–490.

[18] Manuvir Das, Sorin Lerner, and Mark Seigle. 2002. ESP: Path-sensitive program verification in polynomial time. In *Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2002 Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI '02)*. ACM, 57–68.

[19] Leonardo De Moura and Nikolaj Bjørner. 2008. Z3: An efficient SMT solver. In *International conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems*. Springer, 337–340.

[20] Jeffrey Dean, David Grove, and Craig Chambers. 1995. Optimization of object-oriented programs using static class hierarchy analysis. In *European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming*. Springer, 77–101.

[21] Dorothy E. Denning. 1976. A lattice model of secure information flow. *Commun. ACM* 19, 5 (1976), 236–243.

[22] Nachum Dershowitz, Ziyad Hanna, and Alexander Nadel. 2006. A scalable algorithm for minimal unsatisfiable core extraction. In *Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT '06)*. Springer, 36–41.

[23] Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, and Alex Aiken. 2008. Sound, complete and scalable path-sensitive analysis. In *Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI '08)*. ACM, 270–280.

[24] Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, Alex Aiken, and Mooly Sagiv. 2011. Precise and compact modular procedure summaries for heap manipulating programs. In *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI '11)*. ACM, 567–577.

[25] Gang Fan, Rongxin Wu, Qingkai Shi, Xiao Xiao, Jinguo Zhou, and Charles Zhang. 2019. Smoke: scalable path-sensitive memory leak detection for millions of lines of code. In *Proceedings of the 41st ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE '19)*. IEEE, 72–82.

[26] Eugene Goldberg, Matthias Güdemann, Daniel Kroening, and Rajdeep Mukherjee. 2018. Efficient verification of multi-property designs (The benefit of wrong assumptions). In *2018 Design, Automation, and Test in Europe Conference (DATE '18)*. IEEE, 43–48.

[27] James C King. 1976. Symbolic execution and program testing. *Commun. ACM* 19, 7 (1976), 385–394.

[28] Wei Le and Mary Lou Soffa. 2008. Marple: a demand-driven path-sensitive buffer overflow detector. In *Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of software engineering*. ACM, 272–282.

[29] Lian Li, Cristina Cifuentes, and Nathan Keynes. 2011. Boosting the Performance of Flow-sensitive Points-to Analysis Using Value Flow. In *Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT Symposium and the 13th European Conference on Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE '11)*. ACM, 343–353.

[30] Benjamin Livshits and Monica S Lam. 2003. Tracking pointers with path and context sensitivity for bug detection in C programs. In *Proceedings of the 9th European Software Engineering Conference Held Jointly with 11th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE '11)*. ACM, 317–326.

[31] Benjamin Livshits, Manu Sridharan, Yannis Smaragdakis, Ondřej Lhoták, J Nelson Amaral, Bor-Yuh Evan Chang, Samuel Z Guyer, Uday P Khedker, Anders Møller, and Dimitrios Vardoulakis. 2015. In defense of soundiness: a manifesto. *Commun. ACM* 58, 2 (2015), 44–46.

[32] Scott McPeak, Charles-Henri Gros, and Murali Krishna Ramanathan. 2013. Scalable and incremental software bug detection. In *Proceedings of the 2013 9th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE '13)*. ACM, 554–564.

[33] Vitaly O Mordan and Vadim S Mutilin. 2016. Checking several requirements at once by CEGAR. *Programming and Computer Software* 42, 4 (2016), 225–238.

[34] Thomas Reps, Susan Horwitz, and Mooly Sagiv. 1995. Precise interprocedural dataflow analysis via graph reachability. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL '95)*. ACM, 49–61.

[35] Caitlin Sadowski, Edward Aftandilian, Alex Eagle, Liam Miller-Cushon, and Ciera Jaspan. 2018. Lessons from building static analysis tools at Google. *Commun. ACM* 61, 4 (2018), 58–66.

[36] Caitlin Sadowski, Jeffrey Van Gogh, Ciera Jaspan, Emma Söderberg, and Collin Winter. 2015. Tricorder: Building a program analysis ecosystem. In *Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE '15)*. IEEE, 598–608.

[37] Qingkai Shi, Rongxin Wu, Gang Fan, and Charles Zhang. 2019. Conquering the Extensional Scalability Problem for Value-Flow Analysis Frameworks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.06878* (2019).

[38] Qingkai Shi, Xiao Xiao, Rongxin Wu, Jinguo Zhou, Gang Fan, and Charles Zhang. 2018. Pinpoint: Fast and precise sparse value flow analysis for million lines of code. In *Proceedings of the 39th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI '18)*. ACM, 693–706.

[39] Robert E. Strom. 1983. Mechanisms for Compile-time Enforcement of Security. In *Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL '83)*. ACM, 276–284.

[40] Robert E Strom and Shaula Yemini. 1986. Typestate: A programming language concept for enhancing software reliability. *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering* SE-12, 1 (1986), 157–171.

[41] Yulei Sui and Jingling Xue. 2016. SVF: Interprocedural static value-flow analysis in LLVM. In *International Conference on Compiler Construction (CC '16)*. ACM, 265–266.

[42] Yulei Sui, Ding Ye, and Jingling Xue. 2014. Detecting memory leaks statically with full-sparse value-flow analysis. *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering* 40, 2 (2014), 107–122.

[43] Omer Tripp, Marco Pistoia, Patrick Cousot, Radhia Cousot, and Salvatore Guarnieri. 2013. Andromeda: Accurate and scalable security analysis of web applications. In *International Conference on Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering*. Springer, 210–225.

[44] Yichen Xie and Alex Aiken. 2005. Context- and path-sensitive memory leak detection. In *Proceedings of the 10th European Software Engineering Conference Held Jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE '05)*. ACM, 115–125.

[45] Yichen Xie and Alex Aiken. 2005. Scalable error detection using Boolean satisfiability. In *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL '05)*. ACM, 351–363.

[46] Hua Yan, Yulei Sui, Shiping Chen, and Jingling Xue. 2018. Spatio-temporal context reduction: a pointer-analysis-based static approach for detecting use-after-free vulnerabilities. In *2018 IEEE/ACM 40th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE '18)*. IEEE, 327–337.