Blockchain & Bitcoin Network

CS 5158/6058 Data Security and Privacy
Spring 2018

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Trans. ID	Sender	Receiver	Amount	Time
t1	Alice	Bob	\$20	03/10/2018
t2	Alice	David	\$100	03/15/2018
t3	Bob	David	\$50	03/21/2018

- A bank has a number of transactions
- Bank wants to ensure all the trans are correct.
 - Trans could be changed by hacker on server
 - Trans could be changed by attacker on channel

Use Hash Function


- Assume a bank has transactions: {t1, t2, t3}
 - Can use a hash function (e.g., SHA256)
 - Take all trans. as input, compute one hash value
 - E.g., H(t1, t2, t3) = h
- Bank publishes h, anyone can verify {t1, t2, t3}
 - Given {t1, t2, t3}, Alice checks H(t1,t2, t3) ?= h
 - If identical, all trans are correct;
 - otherwise, some trans is not correct

Trans. ID	Sender	Receiver	Amount	Time
t1	Alice	Bob	\$20	03/10/2018
t2	Alice	David	\$100	03/15/2018
t3	Bob	David	\$50	03/21/2018
t4	David	Alice	\$80	03/22/2018
t5	Charlie	David	\$10	03/23/2018

- Bank has <u>new</u> transactions every day
- Bank wants to ensure all the trans are correct.

Update Hash Value

- Bank has new transactions: {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}
- Recompute/Update a hash value
 - Take all trans. as input, compute one hash value
 - E.g., H(t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) = h
 - Bank publishes h, anyone can verify all trans
- Inefficient: bank needs to take all the trans as input
 - E.g., reading 1,000,000 trans. takes long time




Hash chain:


- Given a new trans, bank computes a hash value of new trans with the current hash value
 - h1 can prove {t1} is correct
 - h2 can prove {t1, t2} are correct
 - h3 can prove {t1, t2, t3} are correct
- Bank always updates the latest hash value

Trans. ID	Sender	Receiver	Amount	Time
t1	Alice	Bob	\$20	03/10/2018
t2	Alice	David	\$1000	03/15/2018
t3	Bob	David	\$50	03/21/2018
t4	David	Alice	\$80	03/22/2018
t5	Charlie	David	\$10	03/23/2018

- Bank has new transactions every day.
- Bank updates old transactions.
- Bank wants to ensure all the trans are correct.




- Bank updates using Hash chain:
 - If t3 is updated to t3'
 - recompute h3, if still has a copy of h2; otherwise, recompute h1, h2, h3
 - If t1 is updated to t1',
 - recompute h1, h2, h3
- Recompute O(N) hashes, not very efficient
 - E.g., N=1,000,000




- Bank updates t2 to t2'
 - Recomputes <u>h2', h12', h'</u> in the tree
 - Assume bank maintains all the non-leaf nodes
 - O(logN) hashes v.s. O(N) in hash chain
- Bank publishes h', anyone can verify all trans


- Practice: if bank has 5 trans, {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}
 - How to compute the root hash?
 - Leave h6, h7, h8 as null (easy to implement, all the leaf nodes are at the same level)




- Practice: if bank has 5 trans, {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}
 - How to compute the root hash?
 - Another possible solution (also works, as long as verification algo. is <u>consistent</u>)




- Bank has 5 trans {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}
 - Bank has a new trans t6
 - Bank needs to update h6, h56, h5678, h
 - O(logN) v.s. O(1) in hash chain




- Practice: Bank has 6 trans {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6}
 - Bank has a new trans t7
 - Which hash values need to be recomputed?




- Practice: Bank has 6 trans {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6}
 - Bank has a new trans t7
 - Update h7, h78, h5678, h






- Membership testing
- Alice wants to prove t2 is a member of all trans without knowing other trans.
- Alice gets t2, h1, h34 from bank, recompute h
 - 1 trans + 2 hashes, in total O(logN)




- Alice wants to prove t3 is a member of all trans without knowing other trans.
- Practice: what information does Alice need?
- Alice gets t3, h4, h12 from bank, recompute h




- Proving t3 is a member of all trans with Merkle tree
 - only need to get all the gray nodes O(logN)
 - 1 trans + 3 hash values
- Hash chain needs to get all trans O(N)
 - need t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8
 - 8 trans

Comparison

	Hash Chain	Merkle Tree
Compute Proof	N hashes	2N-1 hashes
Size of Proof	1 hash value	1 hash value
Append	O(1)	O(logN)
Update	O(N)	O(logN)
Proof of Membership	O(N)	O(logN)




- Use Merkle tree in P2P networks, e.g., BitTorrent
 - Alice downloads t3, a piece of movie
 - Alice needs to check whether this t3 is correct while other pieces have not been downloaded
 - Alice retrieves all the hashes of gray nodes
 - Alice computes root hash h', compare with h




- Without using Merkle tree
 - Alice needs to wait the entire movie is downloaded (e.g., several hours later)
 - Waste bandwidth if the movie data (e.g., a small piece of the entire data) is not correct.

The Blockchain

- Bitcoin network has a large number of transactions.
 - About 196,000 trans per day
 - Bitcoin uses the blockchain to maintain integrity
- Blockchain includes <u>Hash chain + Merkle tree</u>
 - Each block has 1MB limit (1000~2000 trans)
 - Trans in one block form one Merkle tree
 - All the root hash values form a hash chain
 - Total blocks: 512,169 (as of 3/5/2018)




- Example: Assume each block has 8 transactions
 - 3 blocks, 24 transactions in total
 - Hash value h3 proves all the 24 transactions



- Attacker wants to change 1 trans. (t24 to t24')
 - Needs to find a collision s.t. H(t24) == H(t24')
 - Happens with a negligible probability

Changes in Blockchain

- t24: Alice pays 2 bitcoins to Bob
- There is a later trans related to t24
 - t26: Bob pays (the) 2 bitcoins to Charlie
 - t26 also includes info of t24
- Attacker changes t24 to t24'
- Attacker also needs to change t26 to t26'




- Attacker wants to change 1 trans. (t24 to t24')
 - t26 is associated with t24, needs to be changed
 - Needs to find 2 collisions s.t.
 - H(t24) == H(t24') AND H(t26) == H(t26')

Changes in Blockchain


- Attacker changes t24 to t24'
 - If there are n-1 later trans associated with t24
 - Assume the prob. of finding a collision is p
 - p is negligible
 - Total prob. of success: pⁿ
 - A trans is more secure if it is older.
- Blockchain can be used distributed scenario
 - E.g., Supply chain, Internet of Things

Bitcoin Network


- Bitcoin network is a <u>peer-to-peer</u> network
 - No central authority
 - All nodes are equal
 - Forget non-responding nodes after 3 hrs




Can join anytime




• Find one node, and get its neighbors



• Based on neighbors, find neighbors' neighbors



Connect to nodes (some response, some not)



- Two types of nodes
 - Bitcoin users (use Bitcoins)
 - Miners (use & generate Bitcoins)
- Each node has a public key and a private key
- Use hash value of public key as <u>account number</u>
 (e.g., routing number on your check)
 - SHA256: H(pk), then convert to base56

1BvBMSEYstWetqTFn5Au4m4GFg7xJaNVN2 1JBonneauruSSoYm6rH7XFZc6Hcy98zRZz

- Alice has 25 bitcoins
 - Transaction: Alice pays Bob 17 bitcoins
 - Alice signs this trans with her private key
 - Others can verify this trans with Alice's public key
- Transactions are <u>coin-based</u>
 - 1 trans destroys old "coins" and create new ones
 - E.g., Alice destroys its old coin with 25 bitcoins, create a new coin with 17 bitcoins for Bob, and create a new coin with 8 bitcoins for herself

- Transactions are coin-based
 - E.g., coin #1 —> coin #2 & coin #3

```
Create: #1 to Alice (25 coins)

Input: #1

Output: #2 to Bob (17), #3 to Alice (8)

Input: #2

Output: #4 to Charlie (8), #5 to Bob (9)

Input: #3

#6 to David (6)

Output: #6 to David (16), #7 to Alice (2)

SIGNED(ALICE)
```

- A coin is related to its previous coin
 - E.g., Check coin #3 needs to check coin #1

Create: #1 to Alice (25 coins)

Input: #1

Output: #2 to Bob (17), #3 to Alice (8)

Input: #2

Output: #4 to Charlie (8), #5 to Bob (9)

Input: #3

Output: #6 to David (16), #7 to Alice (2)

SIGNED(ALICE)


is this valid?

- Bob can merge two coins into 1 coin
 - E.g., coin #2 and coin #5 —> coin #6

```
time
        Input: #1
        Output: #2 to Bob (17), #3 to Alice (8)
                                                           SIGNED(ALICE)
        Input: #3
        Output: #4 to Charlie (6), #5 to Bob (2)
                                                         SIGNED(CHARLIE)
        Input: #2, #5
        Output: #6 to Bob (19)
                                                            SIGNED(BOB
```


Transaction Propagation

 Each trans will be propagated to (almost) the entire network



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