# Monetary Transmission Through the Housing Sector


Daniel Albuquerque Thomas Lazarowicz Jamie Lenney

**BoE Macro Brownbag** 


18 September 2024

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent those of the Bank of England.

# Rents ↑ & house prices (?) since Nov/2021



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- 1. What is the impact of monetary policy on the housing sector?
- 2. Can we rationalise it in a HANK framework?

#### **Motivation**

- Housing/rents are usually either the biggest investment or biggest expense
  - → an important channel of the monetary transmission mechanism
- Extensive literature has looked at house prices ...
- ▶ ... but other dimensions, in particular the rental sector, remain underexplored
  - especially in HANK models

### **Contributions**

- 1. Empirical results for monetary policy shock in the UK:
  - i house prices are slow to fall, but magnitude is large
  - ii **rents are stable** for 1-2 years, then fall

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  - renter / owner-occupier / private landlord
  - match the model to the data
  - sticky house price expectations → i & ii

#### **Contributions**

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- 2. Build upon canonical HANK model: housing tenure
  - renter / owner-occupier / private landlord
  - match the model to the data
  - sticky house price expectations → i & ii
- 3. Answer policy questions
  - quantify the housing channel of monetary policy
  - private landlords vs commercial rental housing
  - ongoing: optimal policy response to rental market supply shock

## **Outline**

- 1. Empirical strategy
- 2. Empirical results
- 3. HANK model with housing



#### **SVAR**

- Estimate a monthly VAR from 1997-2023, with dummies for the Covid period
- ▶ Baseline VAR with 6 variables: GDP, CPI core ex-rent, bank rate, mortgage spread, FTSE and house prices
  - → whenever there is need for another variable, it's 6 + 1 VAR
- ▶ Use target factor from Braun et al. (2024) as instrument for bank rate

**∢** baseline IRFs



# House prices: prolonged decline; rents: stable for at least year






Figure IRFs to 1p.p. monetary policy shock



# Regional responses: some variation, mostly robust




# **Dwelling types: similar co-movement**



 $\rightarrow$  prices across regions and types react in the same way  $\rightarrow$  single  $p_h$ 

# Sales and stocks: reduced activity for at least one year



prices fall, but not as much to keep activity in housing market





## **Housing market**

- ► HANK model, with 2 assets: financial wealth and housing
  - $\rightarrow$  flats  $H_1$  and houses  $H_2$ ,  $H_2 > H_1$ , only flats can be rented
  - → renters r, owner occupiers oo, or landlords ll
  - → borrowing against your home(s) subject to LTV/LTI constraints
  - → short-run analysis: fixed housing supply
  - ightarrow sticky rental transitions with probability  $heta_r = ext{0.25}$

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  - ightarrow sticky rental transitions with probability  $heta_r =$  0.25
- Equilibrium in the housing market

$$\bar{H} = H_1(s_{r,t} + s_{ooF,t}) + H_2(s_{oo,t} + s_{ll,t})$$

Equilibrium in the rental market

$$H_1 S_{r,t} = H_1 S_{ll1,t} + 2H_1 S_{ll2,t} + \overline{HA}$$

 $\rightarrow$  Passive price taking housing association  $\overline{HA}$  to match the share of renters

#### **Households**

- ► Choose their transition  $h_t$ :  $\{r, oo, ll\} \rightarrow \{r, oo, ll\}$  subject to:
  - 1. costs to each transition (financial & utility) → match transition rates
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- ▶ Get utility from consumption c, from the house they live in H, disutility from labour l, and extra utility  $\omega_{oo}$  if owner of their home

$$u(c, H, l) = \frac{(c^{1-\phi_h}x(H)^{\phi_h})^{1-\sigma_c}}{1-\sigma_c} - \phi_l \frac{l^{1+\psi_l}}{1+\psi_l}, \quad x(H) = H(1+\omega_{oo}\mathbf{1}_{oo})$$

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Constraints:

$$a_{t+1} + c_t + C_h(p_{h,t}, p_{r,t}, h_t) = (1 + r_t + \mathbf{1}_{\mathbf{a_t} < \mathbf{0}} \bar{r}) a_t + z_{i,t} w_t l_t (1 - \tau) + \Pi(z_t)$$

$$a_{t+1} \geqslant \bar{a}(h_t, p_{h,t}, z_t, w_t, l_t)$$

## **Expectations**

- lacktriangle Sticky information: households readjust their forecasts of prices with prob.  $heta_{
  m SE}$ 
  - long literature: Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims (2003)
  - Auclert at al. (2020), Carroll et al. (2020): key for matching IRFs of macro variables
- ► Contribution: specific probability  $\theta_{SE,p_h}$  for house prices  $p_h$ 
  - ↑ households pay more attention to prices that are more important
  - ↓ behavioural traits due to their purchase prices and capital gains expectations

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  - † households pay more attention to prices that are more important
  - ↓ behavioural traits due to their purchase prices and capital gains expectations
- Evidence on expectations on house prices?
  - a lot evidence that house price expectations are not rational
  - expectations (short-term) seem to be sluggish: Adam et al. (2024), Armona et al. (2018), Case et al. (2012)
  - lack of evidence on what happens after monetary policy shock
  - estimate through IRF matching

## **House price expectations: RICS - professional surveyors**




Figure 3 months house price growth: expected vs actual

- ► RICS net balance measure: % that think ↑ % that think ↓
  - → measure of extensive rather than intensive margin of price expectations
- both variables are normalised for comparison

#### **Rest of the model**

- 1. Monopolistic competition for intermediate goods firms, with:  $y_{i,t} = n_{i,t}$
- 2. Phillips curve for prices/wages, due to adjustment costs of firms/unions
- 3. Taylor rule for monetary policy
- 4. Labour tax adjusts to keep debt to gdp ratio stable in the long run










- 1. Estimated labour income process with transitory and persistent components
- 2. Internally calibrated parameters

Targeted Moment	Model	Data	Parameter	Source
Ann. Debt to GDP	0.69	0.65	β	ONS
Share of Renters	0.38	0.33	$\phi_h, \omega_{oo}, p_{r,ss}$	EHS (97-23)
Share of Flat Owners	0.08	0.10	$\phi_h, \omega_{oo}, p_{r,ss}$	EHS (97-23)
Share of Landlords	0.06	0.06	$\phi_h, \omega_{oo}, p_{r,ss}$	WAS (08-20)
Annual rate $oo \rightarrow r$	0.008	0.008	$\eta_m$	EHS (97-23)
Annual rate $LL(n) \rightarrow LL(n-1)$	0.16	0.10	$\eta_{ll}$	EPLS (97-23)

3. Untargeted Moments:


Moment	Model	Data	Source
Housing Wealth to Financial Net Worth	7.2	7.0	WAS (08-20)
Top 10 pct. Total Wealth Share	0.30	0.48	WAS (08-20)
Share of Homeowners with Mortgage	0.48	0.53	EHS (97-23)
Share of Landlords with Mortgage	0.12	0.57	WAS (07-20)
Avg Rent to Renter Disposable Income	0.28	0.33	EHS (97-23)

# **IRF Matching**




lacktriangledown  $heta_{SE}=$  0.08 > 0.01 =  $heta_{SE,p_h}$ : house prices are updated less frequently

## **Untargeted IRFs**




## Housing market equilibrium after interest rate shock




- ► Partial equilibrium response:  $\bar{H} = \uparrow H_1(s_{r,t} + s_{ooF,t}) + \downarrow H_2(s_{oo,t} + s_{ll,t})$
- ► To close the gap **house prices dominate** → lower cost + capital gains

## Rental market equilibrium after interest rate shock



- ▶ Partial equilibrium response:  $\uparrow H_1 s_{r,t} = \downarrow H_1 s_{ll1,t} + \downarrow 2H_1 s_{ll2,t} + HA$
- ► House prices still dominate in GE → high price/income + lumpy investment


# **Role of sticky expectations**



- ▶ RE: transaction costs, borrowing constraints, heterogeneity are not enough
- Sticky house price expectations:
  - → key to generate slow response of prices and rent
  - → house prices fall less because they are expected to increase by more




# **Policy I: consumption decomposition**



housing channel is less relevant with sticky house price expectations

# **Policy II: commercial vs private landlords**




- ightharpoonup Commercial sector borrows from banks and purchases rental housing  $H_{CR,t}$
- Rents have limited impact on the (non-rental) housing market
- Higher pass-through of interest rates to rents


#### **Conclusion**

- 1. empirical evidence on the response of UK housing market to monetary policy shock
  - house prices show prolonged fall
  - rents are stable for a year
- 2. built a HANK + housing tenure model
  - housing tenure, including private landlords
  - sticky house price expectations
- 3. policy exercises:
  - housing channel less strong with sticky expectations
  - commercial rental sector increases pass-through to rents
  - optimal monetary policy to rental shock


## IRFs for baseline VAR (Dack)



# House prices and rents: 2005-2023









(B) Rents



#### House prices and rents: 1997-2019




(A) House prices



(B) Rents



#### Renter share in the LFS (back)



# Housing consumption costs: details

Transition	$C_h$	ā
OOH - OOH	$-\delta_h H_2$	$min(a, max(-\kappa_h p_h H_2, -\kappa_y y))$
OOH - OOF	$-p_h(H_1 - H_2) - 2F - \delta_h H_1$	$max(-\kappa_h p_h H_1, -\kappa_v y)$
OOH - Rent	$p_h H_2 - F - p_r^*$	0
OOH - LL	$-p_h H_1 - F + p_r^* - \delta_h (H_1 + H_2)$	$max(-\kappa_h(p_h(H_1 + H_2), -\kappa_y y - \kappa_h H_1 p_h))$
OOF - OOF	$-\delta_h H_1$	$min(a, max(-\kappa_h p_h H_1, -\kappa_y y))$
OOF - OOH	$-p_h(H_2-H_1)-2F-\delta_hH_2$	$max(-\kappa_h p_h H_2, -\kappa_y y)$
OOF - Rent	$p_h H_1 - F - p_r^*$	0
Rent - OOF	$-p_hH_1-F-\delta_hH_1$	$max(-\kappa_h p_h H_1, -\kappa_y y)$
Rent - Rent	$-p_{r,i}$	0
LL - OOH	$H_1p_h - F - \delta_hH_2$	$min(a + p_h H_1 - F, max(-\kappa_h p_h H_2, -\kappa_y y))$
LL - LL	$p_{r,i} - \delta_h(H_2 + H_1)$	$min(a, max(-\kappa_h p_h(H_1 + H_2), -\kappa_h p_h H_1 - \kappa_y y))$
LL - LLx2	$-H_1p_h + 2p_{r,i} - F - \delta_h(H_2 + 2H_1)$	$min(a, max(-\kappa_h p_h(2H_1 + H_2), -\kappa_h 2p_h H_1 - \kappa_y y))$
LLx2 - LLx2	$2p_{r,i} - \delta_h(H_2 + 2H_1)$	$min(a, max(-\kappa_h p_h(2H_1 + H_2), -\kappa_h 2p_h H_1 - \kappa_y y))$
LLx2 - LL	$H_1p_h + p_{r,i} - F - \delta_h(H_2 + H_1)$	$min(a + H_1p_h - F, max(-\kappa_h p_h(H_1 + H_2), -\kappa_h p_h H_1 - \kappa_y y))$

# **Externally calibrated parameters**

Parameter	Value	Source	
Frisch	0.5	Auclert et al. (2021)	
EIS	0.5	Auclert et al. (2021)	
Steady state markup	1.2	Auclert et al. (2021)	
Borrowing wedge $\bar{r}(ann)$	0.0126	EHS (97-23) 2yr 75pct LTV	
Transaction cost	0.02p <sub>h,ss</sub>	Halifax	
$\overline{H}$	$\frac{p_{h,ss}}{\bar{v}} = 6.3$	EHS (97-23)	
Loan to value max $\kappa_h$	0.90	PSD 90 <sup>th</sup> pctile; FTB	
Loan to income max $\kappa_y$	4.5	PSD 90 <sup>th</sup> pctile; FTB	
Rental price adj. prob $\theta_r$	0.25	1 year contract	

## **Parameters used for IRF matching**

Parameter	IRF matched value	
Price Philips Curve $\kappa_p$	0.199	
Wage Philips Curve $\kappa_w$	0.046	
Fiscal rules (debt stab.)	0.034	
Taylor rule $\left(oldsymbol{\phi}_{\pi},oldsymbol{\phi}_{y},oldsymbol{ ho}_{m} ight)$	2.42, 0.028, 0.96	
Price forecast adj. prob $ heta_{ extit{SE}}$	0.08	
House price forecast adj. prob $\theta_{\mathit{SE},p_h}$	0.01	

### **Estimated labour income parameters**

Persistent  $z_{1,i}$  and transitory  $z_{2,i}$  components


$$z_i' = z_{1,i} + z_{2,i}$$

where

$$z_{j,i}' = 
ho_{j,z} z_{j,i} + \epsilon_{j,z}, \quad \epsilon_{j,z} \sim N(o, \sigma_{j,z}^2)$$


Moment	Value	Parameter	Source
Cross sectional labour income std. dev	0.66	$\rho_{z,1}, \rho_{z,2}, \sigma_{z,1}^2, \sigma_{z,2}^2$	Bell et al. (2022)
One year earnings change std. dev	0.19	$\rho_{z,1}, \rho_{z,2}, \sigma_{z,1}^2, \sigma_{z,2}^2$	Bell et al. (2022)
Five year earnings change std. dev	0.38	$\rho_{z,1}, \rho_{z,2}, \sigma_{z,1}^2, \sigma_{z,2}^2$	Bell et al. (2022)
90-10 ratio	4.66	$\rho_{z,1}, \rho_{z,2}, \sigma_{z,1}^2, \sigma_{z,2}^2$	Bell et al. (2022)

#### **Transition Probabilities**






## **Average Household iMPCs**





## IRF Matching: macro variables





#### **Commercial Sector Pricing**


- Commercial sector can borrow from bank and purchase rental housing.
- Subject to fixed costs to make price same in steady state
- Same contract constraints as private landlords.
- Any profits (unexpected capital gains on housing) distributed with aggregate dividends
- Sets marginal price as follows.

$$Vr_{1,\tau,t} = H_{1}\delta_{h} + \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}} \left( r_{t+1}p_{h,\tau} + (p_{h\tau} - p_{h,t+1})\theta_{r} \right) H_{1} + \frac{1-\theta_{r}}{1+r_{t+1}} Vr_{1,\tau,t+1}$$

$$Vr_{2,\tau,t} = 1 + \frac{1-\theta_{r}}{1+r_{t+1}} Vr_{2,\tau,t+1}$$


$$p_{r,t} = \frac{Vr_{1,\tau,t}}{Vr_{2,\tau,t}} + F_{cm}$$
(1)

#### Sticky expectations mute the effects of future prices **Clack**



- need to add text
- ► However, higher  $p_h$  today  $\rightarrow \uparrow$  rental demand, with a higher multiplier than that of future rents:  $\rightarrow \uparrow$  rents for market clearing

### **Do expectations matter? [NOT USED ANYMORE]**



▶ Panel Local Projection, interacting regional house price expectations  $(x_{i,t})$  with monetary policy shock  $(s_t)$ , for  $y_{i,t}$  = house prices, rents.

$$y_{i,t+h} - y_{i,t} = \alpha_{i,h} + \alpha_{t,h} + \beta_h s_t x_{i,t} + \sum_{p=0}^{12} \delta_{p,h} x_{i,t-p} + \sum_{p=1}^{12} \phi_{p,h} y_{i,t-p} + u_{i,t,h}$$