

# SURF: Eavesdropping on Underwater Communications from the Air

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## Abstract

This paper investigates how an airborne node can eavesdrop on the underwater acoustic communication between submerged nodes. Conventionally, such eavesdropping has been assumed impossible as acoustic signals do not cross the water-air boundary. Here, we demonstrate that underwater acoustic communications signals can be picked up and (under certain conditions) decoded using an airborne mmWave radar due to the minute vibrations induced by the communication signals on the water surface. We implemented and evaluated a proof-of-concept prototype of our method and tested it in both controlled (pool) and uncontrolled environments (lake). Our results demonstrate that an airborne device can identify the modulation and bitrate of acoustic transmissions from an *uncooperative* underwater transmitter (victim), and even decode the transmitted symbols. Unlike conventional over-the-air communications, our results indicate that the secrecy of underwater links varies depending on the modulation type and provide insights into the underlying reasons behind these differences. We also highlight the theoretical limitations of such a threat model, and how these results may have a significant impact on the stealthiness of underwater communications, with particular concern to submarine warfare, underwater operations (e.g., oil & gas, search & rescue, mining), and conservation of endangered species. Finally, our investigation uncovers countermeasures that can be used to improve or restore the stealthiness of underwater acoustic communications against such threats.

## CCS Concepts

- Networks → **Cyber-physical networks; Sensor networks; Mobile networks;**
- Security and privacy → **Mobile and wireless security;**

## Keywords

Wireless, Cross-Medium Communications, Security, Subsea Internet of Things

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


Figure 1: SURF’s system overview.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Over the years, acoustic wireless communication networks have gained widespread acceptance and adoption by the naval and oceanic communities [8, 15]. Generally, acoustic frequencies are preferred, compared to optical and RF, for long-range communications due to their superior propagation characteristics under the water [16, 42]. These acoustic waves act as pressure waves that diverge as they propagate underwater. When these waves hit the water’s surface, they cause minuscule vibrations, which can be sensed and decoded using an airborne radar receiver. This phenomenon has been recently exploited to establish a direct underwater-to-air communications link between two trusted cooperative parties [42]. Yet, the security implications of such cross-medium sensing are left unexplored. In other words, what if an air-borne non-cooperative eavesdropper attempts to intercept underwater communication links by picking up and extracting patterns in such vibration signatures?

In this paper, we investigate the vulnerabilities of underwater acoustic communication against airborne adversaries. Specifically, we design, implement, and evaluate Snooping Underwater communications using Radio Frequency (SURF), the first eavesdropping framework that

allows for intercepting acoustic underwater communication links from the air. Our system overview is captured in Fig. 1. An out-of-medium eavesdropper can be very concerning as its presence remains concealed from the victim, potentially even when equipped with the most advanced sonar techniques. Indeed, because of the acoustic impedance mismatch between the two mediums of water and air, emitted sound by the underwater node reflects from the water-air interface [42]. Hence, SONAR techniques cannot be used to detect airborne nodes. There are two key threats: First, the water vibrations caused by the legitimate acoustic transmitter may be picked up by adversary radars and successfully decoded (under certain conditions). Not only that, by picking up these vibrations, an adversary radar may, in principle, identify the rough location of the underwater transmitter. This is particularly important in the context of naval assets since submarine locations are closely regarded as trade secrets and even in conservation efforts where scientific expeditions want to preserve the privacy of the location of endangered species.

To understand these vulnerabilities, we first provide a comprehensive model of surface vibration as a function of the speaker's geometric and physical layer (PHY) parameters, as well as by taking into account how the displacement at one point propagates outward in the form of gravity-capillary waves.<sup>1</sup> Our model indicates that the spatial footprint of an acoustic signal is non-negligible on the water surface and indeed the area of vibration expands as the underwater speaker is submerged deeper into the water. This suggests that an airborne receiver may pick up vibrations from an underwater acoustic source over a wider area than was previously considered possible.

While our model demonstrates that the region of detection may be wide, an eavesdropper still faces several challenges in decoding messages sent from an uncooperative underwater acoustic transmitter (Alice). First, because the adversary (Eve) is outside of the medium and since Alice is uncooperative, extracting the underlying PHY layer parameters (including carrier frequency, modulation type, and symbol rate) is not straightforward for the adversary. Additionally, it is difficult to synchronize Eve with Alice's underwater speaker due to a lack of knowledge of the preamble and training sequence. All of this makes it challenging for Eve to identify and decode the underwater transmissions.

To address these challenges, we exploit the fundamental properties of the cross-medium channel. Specifically, we exploit that the underwater communication channel, the in-air RF propagation, and the water-air (translational) boundary are all linear. This means that the end-to-end channel acts as a linear system, preserving the spectral properties of

<sup>1</sup>The same phenomenon causes rings of ripples when throwing a rock in a calm pond.

the transmitted waveforms. Using this observation, we apply techniques from communications theory that aim to classify and determine the PHY properties of communication signals from uncooperative sources using spectral and temporal features, all achieved without any training data or prior knowledge. Adapting such past approaches to this cross-medium communication link requires SURF to take into account unique properties and constraints. For example, we show how the (significantly) higher sampling rate of millimeter-wave chirp signals transmitted from the airborne radar enables higher-resolution measurements that can be used to infer the PHY parameters of the underlying acoustic communication. Our approach includes identifying the modulation and bitrate of the underwater acoustic transmissions, estimating empirical decision boundaries, as well as decoding the transmitter packets. Additionally, we quantify the secrecy metrics of different underwater acoustic modulation schemes.

A second challenge in eavesdropping on the underwater acoustic transmissions is that Eve does not know the location of the transmitting source (Alice). This is problematic because in order to obtain high signal-to-noise (SNR) of the underwater (acoustic) communication signals, it needs to hone in on the area of the surface where the induced vibrations are strongest. To address this challenge, SURF exploits the beamforming capabilities of the millimeter-wave radars and combines them with our derived model of the underwater-to-air channel. In particular, to maximize the SNR, SURF performs a beam search (using antenna array beamforming) to identify the location on the surface that has the highest vibration caused by the incident acoustic signals. Note that doing so requires first mitigating the impact of the naturally occurring surface waves (which are often 4-5 orders of magnitude higher than the induced vibrations); it also requires performing a range-vibration search over this surface, which SURF achieves using 2D FFTs.

We designed and built a prototype of SURF and evaluated it in different settings, including, controlled lab settings, in a swimming pool, and in a natural lake. Our prototype was built using a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) millimeter-wave 77 GHz FMCW radar<sup>2</sup> and an underwater acoustic speaker. Our choice of COTS radar aimed to demonstrate how such eavesdropping may be feasible even without custom-designed high-end equipment. We have also demonstrated the feasibility of SURF when the radar is mounted on a flying drone. We measure and compare the bit error rate (BER) at the legitimate underwater hydrophone receiver (Bob) against the

<sup>2</sup>The choice of mmWave band for the radar is explained in more detail in [42]. A larger wavelength, such as those used in WiFi or cellular, leads to smaller phase variations, reducing robustness against noise. Conversely, a very small wavelength, like those in THz or optical frequencies, causes quick phase wrapping, which hinders the tracking of surface vibrations.

airborne radar. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the following:

- SURF can accurately identify the underlying PHY layer properties of the victim. Specifically, SURF classifies the victim's modulation type with an accuracy of 97.58% and estimates the symbol rate with a root mean square error of 9 bps, without any prior knowledge.
- Different modulation types exhibit different resilience against a cross-medium eavesdropper. This has important new implications for enhancing the security of underwater links.
- SURF hints at the location of the underwater speaker based on the area of vibration caused on the water's surface.

Our results and observations provide interesting insights for securing the underwater communication channels against out-of-medium eavesdroppers: *(i)* The likelihood of eavesdropping is not the same for all modulations. In fact, frequency modulation is the most adopted modulation for underwater links and is also the least secure. Amplitude modulation exhibits the best secrecy property as natural environmental factors (e.g., surface waves and wind) mask the minute fluctuation in magnitude of vibration. *(ii)* the underwater link is more secure under certain data rates and transmit power levels, and *(iii)* the link secrecy improves if Alice transmits her data in several short intervals with idle times in between that are longer than the channel coherence time. This way, the eavesdropper does not have sufficient samples to estimate the PHY parameters and decision boundaries. Albeit, the enhanced secrecy is achieved at the cost of hindering communication goodput.

**Contributions:** Contrary to the established belief that underwater acoustic communication is secure from airborne eavesdroppers, this paper demonstrates a first-of-its-kind eavesdropping attack on such communication systems. It also contributes to a prototype implementation and experimental evaluation of such an attack in a lake, demonstrating the ability to sense, identify, and decode transmissions from an underwater acoustic source. The paper highlights the implications of such a threat, particularly on the stealthiness of underwater links, and identifies countermeasures that may restore - or at least improve - the security of these communication systems against airborne eavesdroppers.

## 2 SURF's DESIGN

### 2.1 Threat Model

Underwater communication mainly relies on acoustic signals that can travel long distances underwater [5, 21]. Recently, NATO's Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation introduced JANUS, a standardized protocol for transmitting digital information underwater using sound [31]. Because of the limited bandwidth under the water, JANUS packets can only be 64 bits in size. This means that traditional encryption

methods like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cannot be used effectively.


We consider an underwater acoustic communication link between an underwater transmitter (Alice) and a legitimate underwater receiver (Bob). We assume that a portion of the acoustic power aimed at Bob reaches the water's surface. This is reasonable as many underwater nodes deploy omnidirectional or quasi-omnidirectional antennas for SWaP-C constraints [29, 35, 38]. Even with deploying directional beams, the low attenuation of acoustic frequencies [32] and their large beam divergence [26] make it possible for at least a portion of the acoustic wave energy to reach the water's surface. However, we note that highly directional sound waves may necessitate a different model of vibration for their detection, interpretation, and positioning.

Upon reaching the surface, the energy in pressure waves causes minute displacement of the water. The magnitude and frequency of such displacements contain information about the underlying communication link between Alice and Bob. The attacker, Eve, is an airborne node located outside the water with radar-sensing capabilities and aims at mapping the vibration patterns to the stream of transmitted symbols by Alice. We highlight that a naive eavesdropper can in principle carry a tethered hydrophone from a drone and float it in the water (or very close to the water surface) for direct eavesdropping. However, such a setup is more challenging to implement (particularly in mobile settings) and easier to detect, e.g., using an underwater SONAR that detects the hydrophone.

We assume Eve has no prior knowledge about the PHY-layer parameters of the underwater nodes, including carrier frequency, modulation type, and symbol rate. Additionally, the eavesdropper is not cooperating nor synchronized with the legitimate underwater nodes. Furthermore, since the eavesdropper is not inside the medium (water), she cannot directly measure the channel conditions, i.e., dense vs. sparse multipath, delay spread, channel coherence time, etc. This imposes interesting new challenges and tradeoffs that often do not exist in typical threat models in which all parties belong to the same wireless medium.

### 2.2 Vibration Model

To infer the underlying modulated bit sequence through the vibration pattern on the water's surface, the first step is to systematically model the water vibration as it interacts with pressure waves. The amount of pressure is determined by the characteristics of the transmitter, including the transmitted power  $P_{tx}$  and directivity pattern  $D(\theta)$ . The wave attenuation due to expansion and absorption losses depends on the propagation distance to the water surface, as well as the medium properties: water density  $\rho$  and speed of sound  $c_w$  in the water. As shown in Fig. 2, we can model the amount of



**Figure 2: Modeling of water-air interface.** The pressure waves emitted from the acoustic Tx hit the water's surface at the point of impact  $(x_i, y_i)$ . The resulting displacement travels outward as gravity-capillary waves.

acoustic pressure at the impact point  $i$  on the water's surface with coordinates  $(x_i, y_i)$  as [34]:

$$p_i = \frac{D(\theta)}{d_i} \sqrt{\frac{P_{tx}\rho c_w}{4\pi}} e^{-\alpha d_i}, \quad (1)$$

where  $d_i$  is the distance between the speaker and point  $(x_i, y_i)$ ,  $\alpha$  is the attenuation coefficient. The amplitude of the water displacement  $\delta_i$  caused by the incident pressure  $p_i$  can be derived as:

$$\delta_i = \frac{p_i \cos \theta_i}{\omega \rho c_w}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\cos \theta_i$  represents the normal component of the pressure wave hitting the surface, and  $\omega$  is the angular frequency of the acoustic signal. Note that the tangential component does not contribute to the vibrations on the water's surface.

The displacement created at the impact point propagates outward in the form of exponentially decaying gravity-capillary waves which propagate outward in a circular pattern. The wave number of these waves, denoted by  $k_{gc}$ , can be obtained by solving the dispersion relation [34]. We define  $r_i(x, y)$  as the distance between point  $i$  and an arbitrary point  $(x, y)$  on the water surface. Hence, the displacement at  $(x, y)$  caused by the vibration originated from point  $i$  is:


$$\eta_i(x, y, t) = \delta_i e^{-\beta r_i(x, y)} e^{j(k_{gc} r_i(x, y) + k d_i - \omega t)}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\beta$  represents the surface wave attenuation, and  $k$  is the wave number of the acoustic waves underwater.

Finally, Eq. (3) only considers the capillary waves generated by a single point, namely, point  $i$ . However, all the points that are displaced due to underwater pressure will be a source of capillary waves. Therefore, the total displacement is the superposition of all these complex forces:

$$R(x, y, t) = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \eta_j(x, y, t). \quad (4)$$

Since the displacement caused by capillary waves exponentially decays in space, in practice, only a fraction of spatial points  $j$  in close proximity of  $(x, y)$  will play a role in



**Figure 3: Illustrating SURF's scheme for localizing the vibration area on the water's surface.**


the overall displacement profile.

### 2.3 Vibration Detection

When the pressure waves emitted from the speaker reach the water's surface, it impacts some area of the surface, depending on the speaker's location and its radiation pattern. It is advantageous for Eve to place herself directly over the vibration area to boost her SNR and increase her chances of eavesdropping. We assume that the vibration area is within the field of view (FOV) of the radar. If that is not the case, trajectory planning is needed, which can be addressed with mission-oriented path planning (well-studied in UAV and robotics). As shown in Fig. 3, when the radar is positioned directly above the speaker, it senses vibration frequency ( $f_c$ ) with a considerably higher amplitude compared to when it is not directly above.

Eve can employ conventional beamforming techniques to find a rough estimate of area of vibration and position herself strategically. Specifically, Eve uses a multi-antenna radar system with  $N$  virtual antennas<sup>3</sup> (number of transmit antennas  $\times$  number of receive antennas) and uses the spatial diversity of these channels to localize the vibration area. Note that merely comparing the reflected power captured by the radar under different beam conditions would not result in vibration localization. Instead, SURF exploits the fact that the vibration caused by acoustic signals falls within a certain frequency band  $B$ . Thus, it performs a 3D beam search – over angle  $\phi$ , distance  $h$ , and frequency  $f_c$  – and localizes the vibration area. This can be formulated as 3D FFT (range FFT via FMCW signal processing, angle FFT, and Doppler FFT for vibration frequency) and can be performed using standard techniques [41, 42]. Mathematically, the angular location of vibration relative to the radar (denoted as  $\phi^*$ ) can be described

<sup>3</sup>Low-cost COTS mmWave radar provides 8 to 12 virtual antennas [17, 18].



**Figure 4: SURF’s processing pipeline.** First, we exploit FMCW signal processing for vibration detection. The middle blocks show the extraction of unknown PHY information. Finally, we implement detection and decision making.

as:

$$\phi^* = \arg \max_{\phi} [\max_{h, f_c \in B} \Psi(\phi, f_c, h)]. \quad (5)$$

where  $\Psi(\phi, f, h)$  denotes the 3D FFT over vibration frequency, distance, and angle.

One challenge is that at angles other than normal, the reflected signal off the surface will not be pointed back to Eve’s receiver as the water acts as a smooth mirror that obeys Snell’s law. Hence, this implies that the amount of reflected power decreases at higher angles  $\phi^*$ . While this trend is generally true, in practice, the presence of natural waves causes uneven surface levels and diversifies the reflection angle of chirps, leading to some power being reflected to the radar at incident angles other than normal. Additionally, Eve can average over several transmissions to improve the localization performance as she is primarily interested in tracking the phase of multiple chirps and not decoding any data at this stage.

As shown in Fig. 3, we denote the diameter of vibration as  $D_v$  by considering the distance at which the vibration amplitude drops by 3 dB from its peak. Since  $D_v$  is related to the receiver depth, Eve can potentially infer the depth of the speaker by measuring  $D_v$ .

## 2.4 PHY Inference and Demodulation Pipeline

The overall system architecture of SURF is shown in Fig. 4. There are three main components: Preprocessing, extracting PHY layer information, and non-coherent detection and decision-making.

*Preprocessing.* First, Eve combines the signal received by  $N$  virtual antennas to enhance her SNR. The consequent steps are standard FMCW radar processing steps that include deriving the range-FFT matrix, calculating the phase at the distance bin of maximum power, and unwrapping the phase, as shown in the first block of Fig. 4. The resulting phase pattern contains strong low-frequency components that stem from natural surface waves (typically in the range of 0-10 Hz [22]) that can mask the phase profile. Hence, Eve removes such unwanted low-frequency components using a high pass filter. The resulting phase profile contains information about the transmitted bit sequence by Alice. However, interpreting such information is not straightforward as Eve is unaware of the

underlying PHY-level parameters including the modulation type, symbol boundaries, and rate.

### 2.4.1 PHY Information Extraction

*Modulation Classification:* A fundamental challenge for Eve is the unknown modulation used between Alice and Bob. To tackle this, Eve leverages two characteristics of the underwater channel: linearity and large channel coherence time<sup>4</sup>. Given that the underwater channel is linear [34, 42], Alice’s carrier frequency is directly seen as a peak in the Doppler-FFT heat map. The presence of multiple dominant peaks suggests a multi-carrier modulation, e.g., FSK or OFDM. Furthermore, any temporal variation in the amplitude and phase at each carrier frequency is a sign of amplitude and phase modulation, respectively. Observing these features is possible because the long coherence time guarantees that such fast-changing variations in phase/amplitude are solely a function of Alice’s transmission and not the channel.

The general strategy in identifying the modulation type involves examining the amplitude and phase variations of each carrier frequency in the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) of the filtered unwrapped phase. Our pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 1. Specifically, by comparing the noise level with the peak vibration, we infer whether there is any ongoing acoustic transmission in that interval or not. Noise can be calculated from the power received at other ranges of frequency bins in the Doppler-FFT plot.

When the presence of surface vibration due to data-modulated symbols is confirmed, SURF proceeds to detect the modulation type. We denote  $x[n]$  as the filtered unwrapped phase, and  $X[f]$  as its FFT. Firstly, Eve runs a peak detection algorithm on  $X[f]$  to identify the peaks in the frequency domain. The amplitude of these peaks is denoted by  $a_k$  and their frequency by  $f_k$ . The number of peaks at a given instant, denoted by  $K$ , determines whether the underlying modulation is single-carrier or multi-carrier (e.g., OFDM or FSK). Distinguishing between OFDM and FSK is straightforward as in FSK only one dominant peak exists in STFT intervals while OFDM has several sub-carriers.

<sup>4</sup>Coherent time of a few hundred milliseconds reported in prior work [3]

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**Algorithm 1** Modulation Classification Algorithm

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Require: The filtered unwrapped phase,  $x[n]$ .
Require: Peak detection algorithm  $g$ 
Require: Noise level  $a_n$ , Hyper parameters  $SNR_{min}$ .
Ensure: Predicted class of  $x[n]$ 
1:  $X[f] \leftarrow$  FFT of  $x[n]$ 
2:  $\tilde{X}[f, t] \leftarrow$  STFT of  $x[n]$ 
3:  $(a_1, \dots, a_K, f_1, \dots, f_K) \leftarrow g(X[f])$  {Sorted peaks in the descending order,  $a_1 > a_2 > \dots$ }
4: if  $\frac{a_1}{a_n} < SNR_{min}$  then
5:   return No Data
6: else if  $K > 1$  then
7:    $A_k[t] \leftarrow$  Amplitude of  $(\tilde{X}[f_k, t])$ 
8:   if  $\exists(i, j, t)$  ( $i \neq j$ ) :  $\frac{A_i[t]}{a_n} > SNR_{min}$  and  $\frac{A_j[t]}{a_n} > SNR_{min}$  then
9:     return OFDM
10:  else
11:    return FSK
12:  end if
13: else
14:    $P_1[t] \leftarrow$  Phase of  $(\tilde{X}[f_1, t])$ 
15:   if  $P_1[t]$  is linear function of  $t$  then
16:     return ASK
17:   else
18:     return PSK
19:   end if
20: end if

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For a given carrier frequency  $f_k$ , Eve assesses the temporal phase and amplitude variations (note that for single-carrier modulation,  $K = 1$ ). This is achieved by computing the STFT of  $x[n]$  and extracting the unwrapped phase at the frequency of interest. Therefore, Eve determines the modulation type by observing the variation in the unwrapped phase at the detected vibration frequency over consecutive chirps.<sup>5</sup>

*Packet Detection:* Another key challenge for an asynchronous eavesdropper is finding the start time of a symbol sent by the underwater Alice. Conventionally, the coarse and fine synchronization between wireless nodes is achieved via known preambles [43]. Unfortunately, Eve may not know the period and content of such preambles between Alice and Bob and hence cannot rely on conventional techniques. Instead, Eve exploits the fundamental discrepancy between the hardware capabilities of acoustic transmitters and high bandwidth mmWave radars. Specifically, the chirp transmission rate at a mmWave radar is often drastically higher than the symbol time. Hence, Eve can track abrupt changes in the vibration profile and find the beginning of a symbol. In practice, we define a threshold for the minimum amount of vibration fluctuations and we use this threshold to determine the beginning of a packet. We highlight that the accuracy of this coarse and non-cooperative method is a function of radar's hardware, carrier (or vibration) frequency, and symbol rate.

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<sup>5</sup>The inference and measurement of QAM are reserved for future work.

*Symbol Rate Estimation:* Finally, Eve needs to estimate Alice's symbol rate to be able to correctly segment the temporal vibration into symbol intervals. A common approach is auto-correlating the baseband signal and assessing its local peaks and troughs [6]. This approach, however, proves less effective for Eve since these typically work well in low noise (high SNR) conditions. Distortion due to surface waves adds significant noise to the extracted phase data and accurate inference of symbol rate is difficult.

To address this challenge, SURF employs a new strategy that involves finding the optimal symbol period ( $T_s^*$ ) such that the segmented symbols with that period have the maximum variance in terms of their information-carrying parameter (phase, amplitude, or spectral content depending on the modulation). Our rationale is that under the accurate value of symbol period ( $T_s^*$ ), the time-domain segmented signals of  $s(t, t + T_s)$  would only contain the information of one symbol. Hence, the variance of the measured phase/amp/spectral features across all symbols would be maximized.

More specifically, SURF estimates the symbol rate (i.e.  $\frac{1}{T_s^*}$ ) through the following process: First, SURF finds a range of possible candidates for  $T_s$ . Next, it divides the baseband waveform into individual symbols  $s_i$  and extracts the parameter of interest (phase/frequency/amplitude) according to the estimated modulation type. SURF searches for the symbol period that maximizes the *variance* of the modulation-specific parameter  $V$  as follows:

$$T_s^* = \arg \max_{T_s} \text{var}\{V(s_i, T_s)\}, \quad (6)$$

where  $\text{var}$  denotes the variance operation and  $V$  represents the phases of  $s_i$  for PSK, the energy of  $s_i$  for ASK, and for FSK it encompasses the frequency of each symbol.

#### 2.4.2 Non-Coherent Detection and Decision Making

Utilizing the previously estimated PHY layer information, SURF aims to empirically estimate the decision boundaries for detection in the absence of channel knowledge. Conventionally, such boundaries are estimated at the receiver through channel sounding to remove all sorts of non-idealities like multipath. Without channel information, SURF has no choice but to infer such boundaries by observing the temporal variations of the water vibration profile in a given observation window. Assume the decision boundaries are estimated after obtaining  $L$  symbols at Eve. There exists one fundamental trade-off: When  $L$  is very large, it is likely to have an equal number of symbols from each constellation point (i.e.,  $L/M$  for  $M$  constellation points). This enables Eve to calculate  $M$  uniformly distributed boundaries. However, the caveat is that the channel might not remain coherent during this time hindering the accuracy of the estimated boundaries. In contrast, with a short observation time, only a few symbols will be obtained. While the channel is likely stable during short intervals, all symbols might not

appear equally likely and it is more difficult to eliminate the noise due to a limited number of symbols. We will evaluate the impact of the observation window in §4.3.


For M-ASK modulation, let us denote the average value of the baseband signal in the  $i$ -th symbol period by  $Q_i$ . Eve finds the decision boundaries by computing the  $100k/M - th$  percentile of the ordered  $Q_i$  values, when  $k = \{1, \dots, M - 1\}$ . A similar approach is used for M-PSK modulation, however, in this case,  $Q_i$  is defined as the phase of carrier frequency at the  $i$ -th symbol. It is important to note that FSK does not require boundary selection in a conventional sense. Instead, Eve only needs to compare the averaged baseband power at all carrier frequencies relative to each other. While it is evident from Eq. (2) that the vibration magnitude is inversely related to frequency, this relationship is deterministic and known a priori. Hence, Eve can equalize the power accordingly before detection and decision-making.

Since FSK does not require absolute decision boundary estimation, we expect it to be more prone to eavesdropping. Interestingly, due to the inherent robustness of FSK against channel fluctuations and its superior performance at low SNR regimes, it is often the modulation of choice in long-range underwater communications [31]. We will compare the security vulnerabilities under different modulations in §??.

## 2.5 Eavesdropping Regimes and Bounds

Intuitively, the likelihood of successful eavesdropping would depend on Alice's PHY layer parameters (carrier frequency, symbol rate, etc) as well as Eve's hardware specifications. Here, we explain this dependency with the goal of determining the range of PHY layer parameters which may lead to secure underwater communication. Fig. 5 summarizes the relevant FMCW parameters including the fast sampling frequency of radar's ADC ( $F_s$ ), the chirp slope ( $s$ ), chirp duration ( $T_c$ ), idle time ( $T_i$ ), and the number of ADC samples per chirp ( $N_s$ ).

First, vibration estimation is achieved by tracking the phase of multiple consecutive chirps, and the phase sampling rate is  $f_s = \frac{1}{T_i + T_c}$ . To maximize  $f_s$ , we need to either reduce  $T_i$  or  $T_c$ . Yet,  $T_i$  is not very flexible as it should be greater than the transient phase time as shown in Fig. 5. Further, we cannot make  $T_c$  arbitrarily small. This is because, if  $T_c$  is set too low, it will yield insufficient samples after de-chirping leading



**Figure 5: Illustrating important chirp parameters.**

to poor range estimation. This is because, at a fixed ADC sampling rate of  $F_s$ , the number of samples ( $N_s$ ) is determined by the chirp time, i.e.,  $N_s = T_c F_s$ .

Second, for a center frequency of  $f_c$  and a bandwidth of  $W$ , according to Nyquist's criterion,  $\frac{f_s}{2} \geq f_c + W/2$  must hold. Thus, the maximum detectable vibrating frequency is bounded by  $f_s$ . Furthermore, to avoid ambiguity and aliasing in vibration estimation, the phase evolution over several chirps should observe at least one complete period of the vibration and ideally many more. Due to hardware constraints, there is a limit on the number of continuous chirps that can be recorded, which we call  $N_p$ . Hence, for a vibration frequency  $f_c$ , we have:  $\frac{1}{f_c} \ll \frac{N_p}{f_s}$ . Lastly, generalizing this inequality to the data bandwidth of  $W$  and combining it with Nyquist's criterion, we can find the range of detectable vibrations at an airborne radar as:

$$\frac{f_s}{N_p} + \frac{W}{2} \ll f_c \leq \frac{f_s}{2} - \frac{W}{2}. \quad (7)$$

Eq. (7) suggests that if Alice chooses an extremely high or extremely low center frequency  $f_c$ , or employs a very high data rate/bandwidth  $W$ , she can prevent her information from being detected on the water surface. However, increasing the center frequency would cause high path loss at Bob and may hinder his successful reception. On the other hand, utilizing very low frequencies limits the achievable data rate at Bob.

## 2.6 Security Metrics


To quantify the ability of SURF to eavesdrop, we exploit well-known security metrics: (i) *Eve's BER*: We use BER at Eve as a measure of her ability to extract the correct bit sequence from the vibration signatures on the water. (ii) *Secrecy Capacity*: We look at Eve's eavesdropping *relative to* Bob's reception. In other words, high BER at Eve might, at first glance, suggest a secure channel, however, this security matters only if Bob can successfully decode his message. Therefore, for comparison purposes, we define secrecy capacity (SC) as:

$$SC = \log(1 + SNR_{Bob}) - \log(1 + SNR_{Eve}) [\text{bits/sec/Hz}], \quad (8)$$

where  $SNR_{Bob}$  and  $SNR_{Eve}$  are SNR at Bob and Eve in linear scale, respectively. Secrecy capacity is a well-known metric in information theory and refers to the maximum rate at which confidential or private information can be transmitted over a communication channel [24]. A higher secrecy capacity means the channel is more secure and vice versa.

## 3 EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM

We evaluate the vulnerabilities of underwater communications through extensive measurements in controlled environments and in the wild: (i) we perform controlled experiments in the lab using a  $120 \times 45 \times 60$  cm fish tank and motorized translational stages to precisely adjust and vary the position of the eavesdropper (radar); (ii) we run experiments in a natural



**Figure 6: Experimental platform:** (a) different components of our setup shown in the lake experiments; (b) showing the underwater speaker (Alice - elevated for better visibility), hydrophone (Bob), and mmWave radar (Eve); (c) our pool setup.

lake to evaluate the performance of SURF in real-world settings. The experiments were conducted across different days, time of the day, and weather conditions; and (iii) we perform additional experiments in a swimming pool during the presence of other swimmers to test greater depths. The key components of our setup are shown in Fig. 6a.

**Acoustic Transmitter (Alice).** We use an Electro-Voice UW30 underwater speaker [12], which is connected to a Pyle PT270AIU amplifier [33]. To feed signals to the amplifier and the speaker, we use a combination of SIGLENT SDG 1032X waveform generator [39] for single-tone signals and the 3.5 mm jack on the Windows laptop for modulated data.

**Acoustic Receiver (Bob).** We use an Ambient ASF-2 hydrophone [2] connected to a MOTU M2 audio interface [27] to mimic the functionality of an acoustic receiver. All the recordings are done with a sampling rate of 48 KHz.


**mmWave Radar (Eve).** We use a low-cost commercial radar (TI IWR1642BOOST radar [17] and a DCA1000EVM [19]) for sensing the vibration signatures from the water surface. The recording of radar files is done through TI mmWave Studio software [20]. We set the radar parameters as follows: chirp time =  $50\mu s$ , total number of chirps =  $2.56 \times 10^5$ , and total frame time = 12.8s. These values were empirically obtained to satisfy the bounds derived in §2.5.

The experiments in the wild were conducted in the presence of standard conditions of wind and surface waves which represents a practical scenario where SURF would be used. Additionally, the radar was attached to a tripod that stood on top of a floating dock.

## 4 EVALUATION

### 4.1 Inferring PHY Parameters of the Legitimate Underwater Link

First, we explore SURF’s capability to identify PHY parameters of underwater communication systems, notably




**Figure 7: SURF’s performance in (a) detecting the modulation type and (b) estimating the symbol rate.**

without cooperation of the underwater node. Our investigation specifically encompasses the classification of modulation schemes and the estimation of symbol rates. We conducted lake-based experiments spanning various transmission modulations and symbol rates, ranging from 50 to 150 symbols per second. The speaker was submerged at a shallow depth (20 cm) beneath the water’s surface. Experiments in §4.2 and §4.3 use the same setup. Fig. 7a presents the result of modulation detection via a confusion matrix encompassing four classes: ASK, FSK, PSK, and No Data. Eve achieves a classification accuracy of 97.58%. Misclassification errors, primarily mistaking FSK for ASK, are attributed to noise overshadowing one of the FSK tones in low SNR environments, thus resembling an ASK signal.

Next, we evaluate the performance of SURF in estimating the symbol rate. Fig. 7b illustrates the estimated versus actual data rates across modulation types, with error bars representing the 25th and 75th percentiles. Eve obtains an RMSE of 9 bps across the spectrum of data rates while the auto-correlation method has an RMSE of 72 bps.<sup>6</sup> This analysis demonstrates the improved accuracy of our symbol rate detection compared to traditional auto-correlation methods.

<sup>6</sup>Increased error at 150 bps is mainly due to significant intersymbol interference (ISI).



**Figure 8:** (a) BER at Bob and Eve under different modulation schemes and data rates; (b) secrecy capacity under different modulation schemes and data rates.


## 4.2 SURF’s Eavesdropping Performance

In this section, we evaluate SURF’s efficacy in intercepting underwater communications between Alice and Bob. Our experiments, conducted in a lake, explored a range of modulations and data rates, transmitting  $10^4$  bits per configuration and recording the BER using both a hydrophone and our radar. The results are illustrated in Fig. 8a. As expected, higher data rates correlate with increased BER for both Bob and Eve, attributed to reduced samples per symbol and subsequent SNR decrease.

Note that the rate of increase for BER varies between the radar and hydrophone across different bit rates, forming three separate data rate regimes. At lower data rates (50 and 75 bps), both Bob and Eve demonstrate low BERs with FSK and PSK modulations which means that the channel is not secure. Increasing the data rate to 100 bps significantly increases Eve’s BER without affecting Bob’s, making this as the optimal range for maximizing link secrecy. Further increases in data rate compromise Bob’s reception quality, narrowing the performance gap with Eve and degrading link secrecy. Fig. 8b demonstrates that the secrecy capacity peaks at 100 bps for PSK and FSK, with a decline observed at both higher and lower rates, suggesting that Alice can optimize data rates to hinder Eve’s eavesdropping attempts.

The eavesdropping performance for ASK is poor, especially at lower bit rates, where Eve’s detection accuracy suffers due to environmental factors (i.e. wind, surface waves, etc) affecting vibration magnitude which is where the information is encoded. Despite employing high-pass filters to mitigate surface wave effects, the significant magnitude of environmental noise compared to acoustic vibrations degrades Eve’s detection capability which means that ASK offers enhanced secrecy at lower data rates.

Interestingly, we observe an increase in secrecy capacity at 150 bps for all modulation schemes (which does not follow the general trend). This is because when Bob’s reception is poor, the value of the secrecy rate is not an informative metric for evaluating the vulnerabilities of the system. In other words, even if the theoretical value of secrecy is high, operating in



**Figure 9:** Demonstrating BER at Eve for (a) ASK and (b) PSK modulation as a function of the duration of continuous transmission at Alice.


this regime is not desirable because of Bob’s poor reception. Indeed, this is why we explain the secrecy capability alongside the exact values of BER in Fig. 8a

This comprehensive analysis reveals that by strategically adjusting data rates and modulation schemes, Alice can effectively minimize the risk of eavesdropping by Eve, with ASK modulation presenting a particularly intriguing option for enhancing communication secrecy at lower data rates.

## 4.3 Enhanced Secrecy with Bursty Transmission

We explained in §2.4.2 that Eve has to empirically estimate the decision boundaries by collecting several samples. Here, we evaluate eavesdropping performance as a function of the total duration of Alice’s transmission (i.e., the number of available samples). To this end, we vary the duration of transmission at Alice. With smaller transmission time (bursty traffic) fewer symbols are available at Eve for inference and decision making. Note that we consider long idle times in between consecutive transmissions. Hence, data cannot get aggregated across transmissions as the idle time is much longer than the channel coherence time, meaning the same decision boundaries would not apply.

Fig. 9 plots the BER for both PSK and ASK (we explained in §2.4 that FSK does not require absolute decision boundaries) as a function of the duration of the transmission. We observe that when the transmission duration is very short, Eve struggles with finding the correct threshold due to random noise and the potential difference between the number of 0 and 1 bits in that duration. Hence, Eve’s BER improves when she is able to accumulate more symbols before forming the decision boundaries. Interestingly, the rate at which the BER changes depends on the data rate at Alice. In the low data rate regimes, even slightly increasing the transmission duration makes a big impact, whereas, for high data rates, there are already ample samples to make a reasonable estimate of the decision boundary. A key security implication of this result is that Alice can enhance the security of its transmission by transmitting “bursty” traffic. Specifically, Alice can send a small chunk of data, so that Eve cannot estimate the decision boundary



**Figure 10: Effect of depth on eavesdropping performance.**

correctly, and then wait for the channel to change before sending another packet. The tradeoff is that Alice sacrifices the achievable goodput for communication.

#### 4.4 Effect of Speaker’s Depth

To understand the impact of depth on SURF’s performance, we evaluated the system in a swimming pool setting and varied the depth of the underwater speaker from 25 cm to 2.7 m. We powered the speaker with the Crown XLi 2500 amplifier and configured it to transmit BFSK modulated data (both coded<sup>7</sup> and uncoded) at a rate of 50 bps.


Fig. 10 shows our results. This figure plots the interception probability (defined as the ratio of the number of bits correctly decoded by Eve to the total number of data bits) as a function of depth. This metric represents Eve’s likelihood of successfully intercepting messages from Alice/Bob. The error bars in the figure represent the 25th and 75th percentiles. As expected, Eve’s ability to eavesdrop worsens as the speaker’s depth increases because of the reduced vibration amplitude. However, it can be observed that SURF can reliably intercept with a probability of 93.6% when the speaker is at a depth of 1 m (for the uncoded case) and can intercept with a probability of 95% even when the depth of the speaker is increased to 2.7 m (coded case).<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that even a small information leakage (or even detecting that there is a communication link) can have significant consequences for the victim in many sensitive underwater communication settings.

Given the limitations of our setup, we cannot extend the depth beyond 2.7 m in the pool. To understand how this eavesdropping approach would perform in a more practical real-world scenario, we simulated the performance at a larger depth and a higher transmit power.

We first use the Sound Pressure Level (SPL) as a metric to characterize the power of our underwater transducer. SPL measures the pressure generated by an acoustic transducer at a distance of 1 meter, relative to a reference pressure, such as 1  $\mu\text{Pa}$ , for a given input voltage. Specifically, our underwater speaker has an SPL of 157.1 dB re 1  $\mu\text{Pa}$  when driven with an

<sup>7</sup>The coded data was transmitted with a code rate of 0.1.

<sup>8</sup>In standard underwater communication protocols, coding is applied to packet headers, which is known [31].



**Figure 11: Effect of speaker orientation on SURF:** (a) the setup; (b) BER at Eve.

input voltage of 36.11  $V_{rms}$  [1]. In comparison, marine sonars transmit with an SPL ranging from 210 to 240 dB re 1  $\mu\text{Pa}$  [46]. Since marine sonars are significantly more powerful, they can be submerged much deeper while producing the same pressure at the water’s surface as our underwater speaker, which operates at a shallower depth.

To be more precise, two speakers with SPL values of  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , submerged at depths  $d_1$  and  $d_2$ , would generate the same pressure at the water’s surface if  $S_1 - S_2 = 20 \log_{10}(d_1/d_2)$ .<sup>9</sup>


For example, according to Fig. 10, SURF can intercept underwater communication with a probability of 93.6% for uncoded data at a depth of 1 meter. Assuming a submarine transmits with an SPL of 220 dB re 1  $\mu\text{Pa}$ , we can calculate using the previous equation that this submarine’s communication link can be intercepted with the same probability of 93.6% when it is submerged 1.4 km deep in the water. Furthermore, SURF can intercept underwater communication with a probability of 95% for coded data at a depth of 2.7 meters. Using a similar calculation, we can show that SURF can achieve a 95% interception probability when the submarine transmits coded data at a depth of 3.8 km.

#### 4.5 Effect of Speaker Orientation

In previous experiments, the speaker faced towards the surface of the water. Here, we evaluate the impact of speaker’s orientation. In principle, if the speaker’s transmissions are truly omnidirectional, orientation of the speaker has little to no impact on the vibration patterns on the surface. However, in practice, tilting the speaker may yield a reduction of the vibration magnitude detected by Eve’s radar. For this experiment, we positioned the speaker at a depth of 1 m and transmitted  $2 \times 10^3$  BFSK modulated random bits at a rate of 50 bps. The measurements were repeated under the speaker’s tilt angle of 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, and 75 degrees, as illustrated in Fig. 11a.

The resulting BER at Eve is plotted against the tilt angle in Fig. 11b. We observe a gradual increase in BER as the speaker is oriented away from the water’s surface. This is due

<sup>9</sup>We use  $20 \log_{10}(\text{depth})$  because acoustic power decays as a function of  $\frac{1}{r^2}$  with depth [42].



**Figure 12: Effect of drone on SURF:** (a) the setup; (b) large-scale drone movements over time; (c) vibration spectrum before processing; (d) vibration spectrum after processing.

to the speaker’s imperfect omnidirectional pattern causing a decrease in the amplitude of vibrations on the water’s surface, hindering Eve’s ability to extract data from the vibration profile. We emphasize that this data was collected under a fixed radar position (directly above the speaker). This means Eve is decoding vibrations from the area directly above the speaker and not the maximum point of vibrations (which is moving on the surface as the speaker rotates). Indeed, Eve could increase her interception likelihood by finding the location of maximum vibrations using the procedure discussed in §2.3 and by positioning herself strategically to maximize her SNR. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a narrow beamwidth at Alice may impede eavesdropping performance. Further insights into this matter are discussed in §6.

#### 4.6 Effect of Drone Vibrations

So far we have only considered cases where the radar is perfectly stabilized using a tripod. However, in practical scenarios, the radar is mounted on an airborne vehicle, say a drone. The random movements of a hovering drone in the air (due to wind) and the airflow generated by propellers create new challenges for SURF. Namely, since motion is relative, the drone displacement can distort the phase readings of the radar, as if the water is vibrating instead. Additionally, as the propellers of the drone push the air down to stay afloat, they might disturb the water’s surface, further destroying the speaker’s vibration signature. The amount of such disturbances is a function of the drone’s speed.

To remove such drone-related non-idealities, we exploit two key insights: First, the large-scale movement of the drone consists of much lower frequency components than the speaker’s carrier frequency and hence can be mitigated using signal processing techniques. Second, the propeller effect on the water surface is negligible when the drone’s altitude relative to the water is sufficiently high (i.e., above a certain minimum altitude threshold). Note that such minimum altitude threshold is a function of propeller’s speed and can be known by Eve in advance.

We placed a speaker in an inflatable outdoor pool filled with water at a depth of 15 cm. The speaker transmitted a single-tone signal with a frequency of 140 Hz. The airborne node (Eve) consists of a cheap COTS drone, DJI Phantom 4 Pro [11], carrying a LattePanda delta 3 processor [23] that communicates with the same radar as before. The setup is depicted in Fig. 12a. The drone is manually controlled to hover around 5-6 meters to minimize the effect of propellers on the water’s surface. To prove that Eve can detect vibrations while flying, we also repeated the same experiment while the speaker was turned off.

The results of this experiment are plotted in Fig. 12. Firstly, we can see the effect of drone movement on the unwrapped phase in Fig. 12b. The slow time-varying signal is tracking how the drone is moving as its distance to the water’s surface changes. It also has the speaker vibrations added on top of it but it is not immediately visible. Note that the visible difference between the two cases of “On” and “Off” is mainly due to the different trajectories of the drone and not the speaker’s vibration. The normalized frequency spectrum of these signals are plotted in Fig. 12c. As illustrated, the two cases share similar spectral contents with most of the power concentrated in low frequencies. We use signal-processing techniques to separate the speaker vibrations from the unwanted movements of the drone. Specifically, by exploiting a moving average filter, we first extract the movement of the drone and remove it from the time domain signal. Hence, we are left with the speaker’s vibrations. The spectrum of the signal after post-processing is depicted in Fig. 12d. Clearly, the speaker vibrations at 140 Hz show a pronounced peak at the correct frequency and hence can be used by Eve for further demodulation and decoding.

It is interesting to note that, although the speaker was placed at a shallow depth of 15 cm, we transmitted at low power using a signal with an RMS voltage of 3.8 V, which corresponds to an SPL of 137.6 dB re 1  $\mu$ Pa [1]. As discussed at the end of §4.4, a real submarine transmits with much higher acoustic power. Consequently, its vibrations can be detected at much greater depths than the 15 cm we tested with our system. A similar analysis to the one presented at the end of §4.4 suggests that the depth at which we could achieve comparable detection of the center frequency from marine sonars is around 2 km. This implies that it is possible to detect the vibration profile

from a drone hovering at a height of 5 meters in real-world underwater scenarios.


The key takeaway from this proof-of-concept experiment is that an airborne node equipped with an FMCW mmWave radar can decode messages by detecting the frequency of vibrations with post-processing techniques. Once this frequency is found, the temporal variation of the carrier frequency can be monitored to demodulate the transmitted bits, as demonstrated in §4.2. It is important to note that this experiment utilized inexpensive COTS equipment. Without specialized hardware, such as more powerful radar systems and drones capable of carrying heavier payloads, decoding messages would pose significant challenges. We leave this aspect for future research. Moreover, employing more advanced hardware could potentially extend the eavesdropper’s operating range beyond the reported 5-6 meters, further reducing the visibility of the airborne node.

#### 4.7 Potential for Node Localization

Finally, we show the feasibility of pinpointing the area of vibration from the air through a combination of radar beamforming and mobility. We positioned the radar at a height of 1 m above the water’s surface where the speaker was submerged 10 cm below the surface in the fish tank setup described in §3. The speaker transmits a single tone and we move the radar by 15 cm in both the positive and negative directions along the  $x$  axis with 1 mm increments using a motorized translational stage. At each point, the radar measures the amplitude of speaker vibrations on the water surface. We repeat the same experiment at different speaker depths and power levels.

First, Fig. 13a plots the *normalized* magnitude of vibration as a function of radar’s position for two speaker depths and two transmit power levels. We observe that the diameter of vibration is solely a function of speaker depth and not the transmitted power. As expected, the diameter of vibration (shown with green arrows) increases with speaker depth because the acoustic beam impacts a larger area on the surface. This implies that one could create a one-to-one relationship between Alice’s depth and the diameter of the vibration as seen by Eve. We emphasize that although the vibration magnitude depends on both the depth of the speaker and its transmitting power, normalized vibration magnitude is solely a function of depth. Such a model can be leveraged by the adversary for node localization. Fig. 13b depicts the estimated depth (extracted from the vibration diameter) and the ground truth speaker’s depth in a controlled lab setting showing reasonable agreement.

Similarly, through beamforming, Eve can estimate the angular location of the center of the vibration relative to herself. In particular, we implement our beam search algorithm described in §2.3 and estimate the angle of vibration. Fig. 13c



**Figure 13: Localization performance:** (a) normalized vibration magnitude at different speaker depths and power levels; (b) estimated depth vs. ground truth depth; (c) accuracy of angular localization. The dotted line in (b) and (c) represents the ideal case, i.e., no error.

shows that the estimated angles match ground truth. While these initial results look promising, we acknowledge that more detailed modeling and comprehensive measurements are needed to evaluate the performance and limits of this technique for underwater localization from the air. We leave this topic for future investigation.

## 5 RELATED WORK

**Cross-Medium Communication.** Various approaches establish communication links between air and water mediums, such as visible light methods [4, 7]. Closest to our work are TARF-based systems [34, 36, 42], utilizing mmWave radars to capture underwater speaker vibrations. Unlike prior works assuming transmitter-receiver cooperation, we adopt an adversarial perspective, unveiling eavesdropping tactics for non-cooperative entities. We evaluate the security performance under various PHY parameters and suggest appropriate countermeasures. Finally, we test cross-medium communication in a lake for the first time.

**Vibration-Based Eavesdropping.** Many researchers have taken advantage of the fact that acoustic signals vibrate their surrounding objects and have used sensors to pick up these vibrations and eavesdrop on potential victims [44, 45, 47]. However, in all existing efforts, the communication parties and adversary belong to the same medium (air) and do not account for the challenges of out-of-medium eavesdropping.

**Cross-Medium Eavesdropping.** Conventional systems for cross-medium eavesdropping required deploying passive sonobuoys on the water surface to listen to messages underwater using hydrophones then relay them to an aircraft using an RF transceiver [13]. Later approaches relied on (large) metamaterial patches which are also deployed on the water surface and aim to amplify underwater vibrations to be picked up by a remote airborne receiver [25, 37, 48]. The challenge with these systems is that the eavesdropper itself becomes detectable (much more detectable than a drone that is above the surface) from an underwater transceiver. Moreover, these approaches have a limited coverage area of eavesdropping in comparison to drones that can, in principle, fly over and scan wider areas of the surface.

## 6 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

**Effect of Radar’s Height.** Our experiments were performed at radar heights ranging from 1 m to 5 m (in the drone study of §4.6). As the research evolves, it will be important to evaluate SURF at different heights and RF power levels. For example, our radar, which has a transmit power of 12.5 dBm, could accurately measure vibrations with a negligible error (about  $3.174 \mu\text{m}$ ) at 5 meters height when measuring a vibration amplitude of  $100 \mu\text{m}$  [14]. Navy radars are much more powerful (having more than 10 kW of transmit power [9, 10]), and thus would be expected to detect these vibrations from significantly greater distances above the water.

**Potential Counter Measures.** The secrecy of underwater communications can be improved through several strategies: First, Alice and Bob could form a null toward the water surface to block pressure waves. However, this requires real-time orientation estimation and complex arrays, increasing complexity and power use. Null forming might not fully stop distant waves due to beam divergence. Another rather counter-intuitive approach is to place Alice close to the water surface to minimize the area of impact (area of vibration on the water) hoping that Eve’s radar cannot pick it up. We will investigate effective countermeasure strategies in the future.

**Impact of Encryption:** Although encryption could potentially complicate the eavesdropping process of SURF, it is often impractical in underwater communication due to the unique challenges posed by the underwater environment. Encryption schemes are generally divided into two categories: asymmetric (no shared key) and symmetric (shared key). Asymmetric encryption requires significant computational power, leading to high energy consumption, which is unsuitable for the resource-limited devices commonly used in underwater environments [28]. Additionally, underwater sensor nodes often rely on batteries that are difficult to recharge or replace in harsh conditions [30], making asymmetric encryption impractical for many underwater applications. Symmetric

encryption, such as AES, uses a pre-shared key among nodes for the encryption and decryption of messages. However, due to the ad-hoc nature of underwater communications, a significant challenge is presented when a new node without a pre-shared key attempts to join the network. Conventional solutions from terrestrial networks either require a pre-shared secret or impose communication overhead [40] or require a third party that is trusted by both nodes which might not always be available. As a result, symmetric encryption is also often not used in underwater communications. Additionally, even with encryption, traffic pattern analysis enabled by SURF can reveal sensitive information, such as packet length, timestamps, message frequency, and the identities of communicating parties. This makes encryption less effective in protecting communication between underwater nodes, especially in contexts involving naval assets.

**Scaling to Real Naval Settings.** In this paper, we have demonstrated the feasibility of a novel eavesdropping methodology targeting acoustic underwater nodes. However, deploying this technique in real-world naval scenarios presents a multitude of challenges that remain unresolved. Among these are the mobility of underwater nodes (that can cause Doppler shifts to the transmitted data, further complicating the demodulation process for the eavesdropper), large natural waves in the ocean, the challenge of operating at greater depths, and the need to accommodate increased data rates (e.g. Eve could use a radar with a higher sampling rate to eavesdrop on higher data rates - as discussed in §2.5), frequencies, and higher-order and more complex modulation schemes. Moreover, as the research evolves, more sophisticated techniques and hardware can be developed that allow for joint drone-based localization and detection during flight to enable efficient eavesdropping of subsea transmitters.

## 7 CONCLUSION

This paper presents SURF the first system that demonstrates eavesdropping of underwater links with an out-of-medium non-cooperative adversary. We demonstrate the feasibility of such attack using low-cost COTS mmWave radar. By sensing subtle surface disruptions, SURF intercepts underwater communication signals, without prior knowledge of channel and PHY parameters. Our rigorous evaluation validates its efficacy in diverse settings, including natural lakes. This paper holds important insights for securing underwater communication links, from maritime defense and submarine warfare to oil and gas exploration, search and rescue, mining, and aquatic species conservation.

## 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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