



IRANIANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A 2022 SURVEY REPORT

**The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN
(GAMAAN)**

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Survey Summary

- The survey titled “Iranians’ Attitudes toward Political Systems” was carried out between February 17-27, 2022. Over 20 thousand respondents participated in this study. The final sample used in this report consisted of 16,850 Iranians living inside Iran. The study’s findings reflect the views of literate Iranian residents aged above 19, who comprise 85% of the Iranian adult population. The results can be generalized to the target population with a 95% credibility level and credibility intervals of 5%.
- The results show that 88% of the population consider “having a democratic political system” to be “fairly good” or “very good”. On the other hand, while 67% of the population consider “having a system governed by religious law” to be “fairly bad” or “very bad”, around 28% evaluate such a system as “good”. Moreover, 76% of the population are against “having the army rule”.
- When asked about their preferred regime type, 34% chose a “secular republic”, 22% the “Islamic republic”, 19% a “constitutional monarchy”, and 3% an “absolute monarchy”. Also, over 21% declared that they are “not sufficiently informed to answer this question”.
- With respect to the political structure, 37% favor a “unitary and centralized state”, 15% opt for a “unitary and decentralized state”, and 12% chose a “federal state”. Approximately 6% chose “I support the secession and independence of my ethnic group [milliyat-i khvud]”. About 30% declared that they are “not sufficiently informed to answer this question”.
- About the head of state, around 78% opposed this function being passed down through heredity, 72% opposed the head of state being a (Shia) religious authority, and 66% think the head of state should not appointed/elected for life. Also, 56% oppose the head of state being an Atheist.
- Asking about political parties and ideologies that people may vote for in free elections, constitutionalist (pro-monarchy), social democrat, Religious-Nationalist, environmentalist, and National Front leanings are among the most popular political parties and ideologies.
- From a list of civil and political figures given in this survey, Reza Pahlavi was the most popular with 39% followed by Ebrahim Raisi with 17%, Narges Mohammadi and Nasrin Sotoudeh with 15%, Masih Alinejad with 13%, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Nourizad, and Kaveh Madani with 12% of support. The latter are followed by Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Javad Zarif and Mohammad Khatami in that order of popularity.
- In response to a question about respondents’ favorite design for the national flag, 46% chose the three-colored flag with the lion and sun symbol, while around 30% opted for the current flag of the Islamic Republic, and approximately 19% preferred



a three-colored flag without any symbols; 5% did not choose any of the given options.

- Asking about the political leaders of Iran's modern history, 66% have a positive view of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878-1944), while 23% evaluate him negatively. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980) is viewed positively by 64%, while 28% judge him negatively. Mohammad Mossadegh's (1882-1967) popularity is similar, with 64% positive responses and 27% negative. In contrast, 28% have a positive view of Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), while 64% evaluate him negatively. Finally, approximately 26% of the population evaluate Iran's current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei (b. 1939), positively, while 66% judge him negatively.
- With respect to bringing about political change in the current milieu of Iran, about 65% favors "nationwide strikes", 65% "protest campaigns in social media", 52% "engaging in civil disobedience", and around 50% is positive about "street demonstrations and protests". Nearly 19% of the society say they support an "armed uprising", while 68% disapprove of this strategy.
- Respondents were also asked their opinion about frequently-chanted slogans in recent years. 65% of the population are in favor of "Reformists, Principlists, the game is over!", about 58% agree with "What a huge mistake, our revolution was!", and 53% approve of "Reza Shah, may you rest in peace!". On the other hand, 21% sympathize with "Khamenei, we are all your soldiers; we're ready to take action under your command!", while 67% disagree with this slogan. Only 5% agrees with "Ya Hussain, Mir-Hosseini", while 76% oppose it.
- Regarding the official and native languages, 85% consider Farsi as the most appropriate official or common language for Iran and 65% agree that schools should teach native languages in addition to Farsi, while 19% disapprove of this option. On the other hand, 61% disagree with the statement "I prefer my child to receive higher education in their native language rather than in Farsi", while 18% agree.
- Ebrahim Raisi's performance as president is evaluated positively by 20% and negatively by 69%. Discontent with Raisi's administration is stronger among urban-dwelling citizens with an academic background. Also, dissatisfaction with him tends to be higher among women.
- Regarding Iranians' political orientation, 41% want the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, 21% prefer structural changes and a transition from the Islamic Republic, while 18% want to preserve the principles and values of the revolution, and 8% seek reforms within the Islamic Republic; 11% selected none of these options. Comparison with previous surveys reveals no drastic changes occurring over the past year.



Section 1: Sampling methods and sample characteristics

1.1 Survey and raw sample characteristics

- The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) conducted the survey titled “Iranians Attitudes toward Political Systems” from February 17 to 27, 2022. This survey was conducted online using a specialized and secure platform.
- The sampling method was multiple chain-referral sampling through Psiphon VPN and social media (Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Twitter). Around 20,000 respondents living inside and outside Iran participated in the study (see Section 3 for more methodological information).
- According to [The World Bank](#), more than 84% of Iran’s population used the Internet in 2020. According to the [Iranian Students Polling Agency \(ISPA\)](#), in August 2021 more than 70% of Iranians over 18 used at least one social media platform. It is therefore possible to reach a substantial percentage of Iranians through the Internet and ask about their views.
- In the survey, in addition to main questions about political systems, several demographic questions (sex, age group, education level, province, urban/rural region, employment status, household income level, language at home, and voting behavior) have been asked. Some questions from the [World Values Survey](#) were also asked for verification purposes.
- Respondents took part in the survey anonymously, feeling safer to express their real opinions than in telephone surveys or surveys conducted at respondents’ residence.
- Approximately 90% of the respondents reported that they live in Iran. Multiple verification methods showed that less than 5%, either intentionally or unintentionally, might give false information about being inside or outside Iran.
- Iranians living inside Iran who responded to the survey were from all provinces, all socioeconomic strata, and from both urban and rural areas (see Section 3 for sample characteristics).

1.2 Preparing the refined sample

- One survey question was designed to detect random responses and bot submissions. The samples with a wrong response to this question and samples with contradictory answers were excluded from the sample (for example, those who declared that they had not reached voting age in the 2017 presidential election but also chose their age as over 30, or those who declared that they live in Iran in one question but selected outside Iran in another question).



- Having taken into account the standard age groups as outlined in the 2016 Census report, the refined sample included only respondents above 19 years old who lived in Iran.
- The **refined sample size for respondents inside Iran was 16,850 respondents**. All results in this report are extracted from this refined sample.
- The target population consisted of literate Iranian residents above 19 years old (who were capable of using the Internet and reading the survey questions). As reported by the 2016 National Population and Housing Census, around 47 million Iranians are literate and above 19 years old. This accounts for 85% of the adult population of Iran.
- In this report, the term “sample” refers exclusively to the refined sample, not the original raw sample. The term “population” refers only to the “target population,” not the total population of Iran.
- Samples obtained from online surveys generally do not properly overlap with the target population’s characteristics. Weighting is used to obtain a representative sample. This technique balances the sample in accordance with characteristics of the target population in question. The results were also verified through the sample matching method. Section 3 discusses the employed sample balancing, weighting methods, and reliability checks as well as the characteristics of the sample demography and the target population.




Section 2: Main findings

All results and tables presented here are based on the “weighted sample” extracted from the respondents inside Iran. The findings can be generalized to the whole population of literate Iranian residents above 19 years old, who account for 85% of the total adult population of Iran, with the respective credibility level and credibility intervals of 95% and 5% (which replace the margin of error and the confidence level in online polling).

2.1 Political systems and ways of governing the country

The World Values Survey’s standard questions about the favorability of various types of political systems were asked in this survey. As Figure 1 shows, over 88% of the population evaluate “having a democratic political system” as “very good” or “fairly good”.

Figure 1






About 37% of the population think positively about “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”, while nearly 53% think such power negatively affects governing the country. Moreover, 67% of the population consider “having a system governed by religious law” as “fairly bad” or “very bad”, while 28% evaluate such a system as good. 76% are against the idea of “having the army rule”, while 16% believe that to be good.

2.2 Regime types

When asked “Which of these regime types do you find the most suitable for Iran?”, about 34% chose a “secular republic”, 22% an “Islamic republic”, 19% a “constitutional monarchy”, and 3% an “absolute monarchy”. Also, more than 21% declared that they are “not sufficiently informed to answer this question”.

Figure 2






2.3 Political structures

In response to the question “Which of these political structures do you find the most suitable for Iran?”, about 37% chose a “unitary and centralized state”, 15% a “unitary and decentralized state”, and 12% a “federal state”. Around 6% chose the option “I support the secession and independence of my ethnic group [milliyat-i khvud]”. A large group of 30% declared they are “not sufficiently informed to answer this question”.

Figure 3






2.4 The head of state

A majority of 78% opposed the function of head of state being passed down through heredity. Also, 72% were against the head of state being a (Shia) religious authority [marja'-i mazhabī] and 66% were against the head of state to be elected/appointed for life. Also, 56% think the head of state should not be an Atheist.


Figure 4



A stratification of people's opinions regarding different political systems reveals that 47% of those who opted for "the Islamic Republic" as their preferred political system agree with the head of state being in power for life. Moreover, 47% of those who chose "absolute monarchy" also believe the head of state's function is for life. On the other hand, 27% of the proponents of "constitutional monarchy" are in favor of giving life tenure to the head of state, while 61% of this population are against it. Finally, 95% of those who opted for a "secular republic" are against life tenure for the head of state (Figure 4-1).



Figure 4-1






2.5 Political parties and ideologies

Participants were also asked which political parties and ideologies they tend to side with and would vote for should there be a free election in Iran. Figure 5 illustrates the popularity of each of the political parties and ideologies.

Figure 5



In answering this question, the respondents could choose up to two options. Table 5-1 shows which two parties or ideologies share the highest number of supporters. The (imaginary) social-democratic party, for example, is frequently the second choice for those who support the constitutionalists (pro-monarchists). Also, most of the proponents of the social-democratic party tend to opt for the social-liberal party as their second choice.



Table 5-1

The preferred party	The most common second choice
Constitutionalists (pro-monarchists)	Social-democrats
Social-democrats	Social-liberals
Social-liberals	Social-democrats
Religious-Nationalists	Principlists
The National Front of Iran	Social-democrats
Principlists	Religious-Nationalists
Right-wing liberals	Constitutionalists (pro-monarchists)
Reformists	Religious-Nationalists
Parties advocating for ethnic demands	Social-democrats
Greens (environmentalists)	Social-democrats
People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MEK)	Social-democrats
Marxists	Social-democrats


2.6 Civil and political figures

Respondents were presented with a list of civil and political figures of a wide array of positions on the political and ideological spectrum and were asked which they would vote for should there be a free election in Iran. Besides these names, participants were given the choice to name a figure who was not mentioned in the list or to choose no one at all.

Figure 6 shows that Reza Pahlavi is the most popular figure with 39% of the votes, followed by Ebrahim Raisi with 17%, Narges Mohammadi and Nasrin Sotoudeh with 15%, Masih Alinejad with 13%, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Nourizad, and Kaveh Madani with 12%. Moreover, 16% chose "None of the above", while 5% chose people outside the survey question's list.



Figure 6






2.7 Political leaders of Iran's modern history

Respondents were asked for their opinion about political leaders in Iran's modern history and the present. As illustrated in Figure 7, about 66% of the population evaluate Reza (Shah) Pahlavi (1878-1944) positively, while 23% evaluate him negatively. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980), is viewed positively by 64% of the population, while 28% evaluate him negatively. Around 64% approve of Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882-1967), while 27% evaluate him negatively. The Islamic Republic's founder, Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), is viewed positively by 28%, while 64% evaluate him negatively. Finally, about 26% of the population judge Ali Khamenei (b. 1939), the current leader of the Islamic Republic, positively, while 66% evaluate him negatively.

Figure 7






2.8 National flag

As a response to a question regarding participants' favorite design for the national flag, 46% of the population chose the three-colored flag with the lion and sun symbol, while around 30% opted for the current official flag with the emblem of Allah, and around 19% preferred the three-colored flag without any symbols. Also, 5% did not choose any of the given options.

Figure 8






2.9 Means of bringing about political change

In response to a question about the means for bringing about political change in contemporary Iran, approximately 65% favored and 25% opposed nationwide strikes. A further 65% agreed with and 22% opposed social media protest campaigns; 52% support and 30% do not support civil disobedience, and around 50% approve of “street demonstrations and protests” while 34% disapprove. About 19% say they support an “armed uprising”, while around 68% disagreed with this strategy.

Figure 9






2.10 Political slogans

In response to a question about common slogans in recent years, 65% of the population approved of “Reformists, Principlists, the game is over!” versus 15% who disapproved. Around 58% sympathized with “What a huge mistake, our revolution was!”, while 27% disapproved. Around 53% agreed with “Reza Shah, may you rest in peace!”, while 29% disagreed. In response to “Khamenei, we are all your soldiers; we’re ready to take action under your command!”, 21% sympathized with this slogan while 67% did not. About 5% agreed with “Ya Hussain, Mir-Hosseini”, while 76% opposed it.

Figure 10






2.11 Official and native languages

Respondents were asked to share their view about the status of Iran's official and various native languages. As illustrated by Figure 11, 84% of the population consider Farsi as the most appropriate official or common language for Iran. Moreover, 65% think that schools should teach native languages in addition to Farsi, while 19% disagree with this option. On the other hand, 61% disagree and 18% agree with the statement "I prefer my child to receive higher education in their native language rather than in Farsi".

Figure 11






2.12 Political orientations

As in previous GAMAAN surveys, one of the questions concerned respondents' political orientations. According to the latest survey results, 41% are "proponents of regime change as a precondition for change", 21% favor "structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic", 18% are in favor of "the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader", while 8% sympathize with "gradual reform within the framework of the Islamic Republic". Moreover, around 11% did not show support for any of these views.

Figure 12 shows the popularity of these views in Iran according to three GAMAAN surveys conducted between spring 2021 and winter 2022. (The June 2021 survey did not have the "None of the above" option.)

Figure 12






2.13 Ebrahim Raisi's approval rating

This survey shows that nearly 20% of the population evaluate Ebrahim Raisi's performance in the role of president positively, while around 69% are discontent with his performance. Discontent with Raisi is even more prevalent among urban-dwelling citizens people with an academic background and also especially among women.


Figure 13





In a summer 2021 survey, Gallup, the American global analytics firm, had asked their respondents a similar question regarding Ebrahim Raisi's approval rate. As Figure 13-1 shows, there is a significant difference between the results from this survey and Gallup's results, which had been obtained through phone interviews. However, the results from both surveys are substantially similar when it comes to satisfaction with Ebrahim Raisi's performance if Gallup's results are compared with only the Principlists and Reformists in GAMAAN's sample.

Figure 13-1






Section 3: Methodology

3.1 Sampling method

This study aimed to measure and document attitudes and opinions in a closed society, which cannot be obtained using conventional methods. Studies employing opt-in online surveys face methodical challenges that are inherent to online sampling methods, which are nevertheless becoming the norm. These shortcomings include the so-called network effect, which means that the survey is more likely to reach respondents who hold beliefs similar to those held by the organizers, as well as self-selection, which means that those with a special interest in the survey topic are more likely to participate.

To reduce these effects, the survey was spread through Psiphon VPN as well as social-media groups, channels, and pages representing radically diverse social layers of society and political perspectives (Figure 14 shows on which social-media platform respondents encountered the survey). Using multiple chain-referral sampling to reach a diverse audience, the survey was shared with and by online pages and channels belonging to specific groups, such as minorities' and pro-regime groups' networks, as well as a mass audience consuming social, political, and entertainment contents. The targeted Instagram pages and Telegram channels ranged between 10 and 100 thousand followers. These measures also increased the sample size, further minimizing bias.

Figure 14



In response to one of the survey questions, about 23% said they participated in GAMAAN's previous surveys. This is a promising indication that the survey circulation strategy among diverse groups has reached individuals outside GAMAAN's social network.



3.2 Balancing and weighting methods

A weighting method, raking with interlocking targets, was employed to generate a representative sample from the refined sample. As a study conducted by the [PEW Research Center](#) shows, this weighting method is among the most effective and reliable for samples derived from online surveys. As suggested by PEW, a variable reflecting respondents' political behavior was introduced in the survey and used for weighting. This decreases the sampling bias while increasing generalizability. Sample balancing and weighting were carried out using the tools of the Dutch company, [Spinnaker Research](#).

To obtain a representative sample, the refined sample drawn from respondents living inside Iran was weighted based on seven factors of sex, age group, education level, province, urban/rural areas and respondents' voting behavior. The interlocking weights were used for the combination of age group, education level, urban/rural areas and respondents' voting behavior. The data from the Islamic Republic of Iran's reports, [Selected Findings of the 2016 National Population and Housing Census](#) and [A Selection of Labor Force Survey Results – Fall 2021](#), were used to extract the target population characteristics.

Having run the weighting computations based on the mentioned variables, **a satisfactory effective sample size of 1,498** was estimated.

3.3 Weighting results

The target population of this survey is literate Iranian residents above 19 years old. As the data from the 2016 National Population and Housing Census shows, this population comprise 85% of the adult population of Iran.

The following tables compare the demographic variables of the refined sample and the target population. The demographic characteristics of the weighted sample are consistent with those of the target population.

Table 1: Sex Distribution

Sex	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Population of literate individuals above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)
Female	18,6% (3,126)	47%	47%
Male	81,4% (13,724)	53%	53%



Table 2: Urban/Rural Distribution

Region	Refined sample (Number of samples)	Weighted sample	Population of literate individuals above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)
Rural Areas	4.3% (723)	20.4%	21.2%
Urban Areas	95.7% (16,127)	79.6%	78.8%

Table 3: Province Distribution

Province of Residence	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Population of literate individuals above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)
East Azerbaijan	4.2% (701)	4.8%	4.8%
West Azerbaijan	2.3% (381)	3.6%	3.6%
Ardabil	1.0% (172)	1.5%	1.5%
Isfahan	6.0% (1,007)	6.9%	6.9%
Alborz	5.1% (861)	3.8%	3.8%
Ilam	0.5% (78)	0.7%	0.7%
Bushehr	0.9% (159)	1.5%	1.5%
Tehran	36.9% (6,225)	19.1%	19.1%
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	0.6% (109)	1.1%	1.1%
South Khorasan	0.5% (92)	0.9%	0.9%
Razavi Khorasan	7.9% (1,332)	7.8%	7.8%
North Khorasan	0.7% (112)	0.9%	0.9%
Khuzestan	3.7% (616)	5.4%	5.4%
Zanjan	1.0% (162)	1.3%	1.3%
Semnan	0.7% (124)	1.0%	1.0%
Sistan and Baluchistan	0.9% (155)	2.1%	2.1%
Fars	5.2% (870)	6.3%	6.3%
Ghazvin	1.2% (206)	1.6%	1.6%
Qom	1.5% (249)	1.6%	1.6%
Kurdistan	1.6% (271)	1.8%	1.8%
Kerman	1.4% (244)	3.6%	3.6%
Kermanshah	1.8% (309)	2.4%	2.4%
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad	0.6% (107)	0.8%	0.8%
Golestan	1.1% (182)	2.2%	2.2%
Gilan	3.1% (526)	3.5%	3.5%
Lorestan	1.3% (223)	2.0%	2.0%
Mazandaran	3.2% (537)	4.5%	4.5%
Markazi	1.3% (224)	1.8%	1.8%
Hormozgan	0.9% (153)	2.0%	2.0%
Hamadan	1.4% (240)	2.1%	2.1%
Yazd	1.3% (223)	1.4%	1.4%



Table 4: Age Group Distribution

Age groups	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Population of literate individuals above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)
Between 20 and 29 years old	15.6% (2,635)	30.4%	30.1%
Between 30 and 49 years old	62.7% (10,577)	51.6%	51.1%
At least 50 years old	21.8% (3,668)	18.0%	18.8%

Table 5: Education Level Distribution

Education level	Refined sample (Number of samples)	Weighted sample	Population of literate individuals above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)
High school diploma and lower education	19.1% (3,215)	72.0%	72.3%
University degree	80.9% (13,635)	28.0%	27.7%

Apart from demographic variables, the respondents' voting behavior in the 2017 Iranian presidential election was also used for sample weighting (considering that this election's results were not controversial and the reliability of the final, formally declared numbers).

Table 6: Political Voting Behavior Distribution

Voted for candidate in the 2017 presidential election	Refined sample (Number of samples)	Weighted sample	Official results of the 2017 presidential election
Hassan Rouhani (+ Hashemitaba)	46.3% (7,798)	44.5%	42.2%
Ebrahim Raisi (+ Mir-Salim)	8.1% (1,372)	26.2%	28.8%
I did not vote (+ blank vote)	45.6% (7,680)	29.3%	29.0%

3.4 Reliability checks

3.4.1 Comparing distributions of socio-economic factors

One of the methods for examining the reliability and generalizability of a weighted sample is to compare the results from the weighted sample against external evidence. Table 7 compares the status of economic activity (percentage of employed individuals) in the weighted sample with that of the target population on both urban and rural levels. While the weighted sample includes only literate individuals above 19 years old, [the recent statistic of those formally employed](#) reflects both literate and illiterate individuals above 15.

As reported, the employment rates of illiterate people and the age group between 15 and 19 are lower than that of the literate population. Taking this into account, Table 7 shows that the employment rate of the weighted sample is consistent with that of the target population.



Table 7: Employment Rate Distribution

Employment status	Refined sample	Weighted sample (literate individuals above 19 years old)	Workforce statistics for individuals above 15 years old (Fall 2021)
Whole country	61.2%	40.7%	37.3%
Urban areas	61.9%	40.2%	36.0%
Rural areas	46.6%	42.5%	40.0%

The respondents were also surveyed with respect to their household income. This facilitates a comparison between the respondents' economic situation and that of the target population. Table 8 shows the household income distribution of the weighted sample. By definition, ten percent of the Iranian households belong to each income decile. As shown in the following table, the household income distribution of the weighted sample show a good overlap with that of the target population. Each [income decile](#) of the target population is covered by the weighted sample.

Table 8: Household Income Distribution (based on the official exchange rate, i.e. 1 USD=42000 Rials)

Income level of different deciles according to the Statistical Center of Iran in 2021	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Distribution of wealth in the society
First decile (household monthly income below USD 738)	10.2%	23.1%	10%
Second decile (between USD 738 and USD 952)	8.2%	14.1%	10%
Third decile (between USD 952 and USD 1142)	7.2%	9.5%	10%
Fourth decile (between USD 1142 and USD 1309)	7.4%	8.8%	10%
Fifth decile (between USD 1309 and USD 1452)	7.8%	7.9%	10%
Sixth decile (between USD 1452 and USD 1667)	7.5%	6.2%	10%
Seventh decile (between USD 1667 and USD 1905)	8.9%	7.0%	10%
Eight decile (between USD 1905 and USD 2262)	10.1%	7.5%	10%
Ninth decile (between USD 2262 and USD 3214)	13.6%	7.5%	10%
Tenth decile (above USD 3214)	19.2%	8.4%	10%

In this survey, participants were also asked what language they usually speak at home. As Table 9 shows, the distribution of colloquial languages in the weighted sample is highly consistent with the statistics published by [Ethnologue](#).



Table 9: Home Language Distribution

What language do you normally speak at home?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Ethnologue statistics (2021, 24 th ed.)
Farsi	74.2%	63.2%	63.3%
Azerbaijani / Turkic	10.2%	12.8%	13,6%
Kurdish	4.7%	5.6%	5,8%
Luri	3.7%	6.5%	3,6%
Arabic	0.7%	1.6%	3,5%
Gilaki	1.3%	1.4%	3.0%
Mazandarani	1.2%	2.1%	2.8%
Balochi	0.5%	1.4%	1.5%
Laki	0.6%	0.9%	1.5%
Turkmeni	0.2%	0.3%	0.9%
Armeni	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Tati	0.2%	0.6%	0.1%
Other	2.5%	3.6%	0.3%

3.4.2 Reliability check using questions of the World Values Survey

In 2020, the [World Values Survey](#) (WVS), which is an international research program, released a new survey of Iran which had been conducted through on-site interviews. Several WVS questions were incorporated in this survey by GAMAAN. The aim was to evaluate the measurement method and weighted sample validity by comparing the results from both (probability and non-probability, on-site and online) surveys. Both “non-sensitive” and “sensitive” questions were asked to test the hypothesis that there should be a discrepancy with the latter and an overlap with the former.

Table 10: Comparison of “importance in life” questions in WVS and GAMAAN surveys

For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life.		Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not Know
Family	WVS 2020	93.9%	5.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0.0%
	GAMAAN 2022	89.5%	8.8%	1.0%	0.3%	0.5%
Friends	WVS 2020	28.6%	54.4%	11.2%	5.7%	0.0%
	GAMAAN 2022	28.7%	54.3%	13.6%	2.5%	0.8%
Work	WVS 2020	78.0%	18.6%	1.9%	1.3%	0.2%
	GAMAAN 2022	81.7%	15.0%	2.2%	0.4%	0.8%
Religion	WVS 2020	69.4%	22.8%	3.5%	4.2%	0.1%
	GAMAAN 2022	30.8%	13.9%	14.1%	39.3%	1.9%

As shown in Table 10, a comparison of both surveys shows the low difference between responses to non-sensitive questions (such as the importance of family, friends, and occupation), while, given the current political and social situations in Iran, the responses to a sensitive question, in this case about religion, are significantly different. This comparison shows the validity of GAMAAN’s weighted sample. It also confirms the hypothesis that measuring people’s real opinions regarding sensitive questions



using conventional polling methods (such as telephone or in-person interviewing) faces serious challenges in closed societies like Iran.

3.4.3 Replicating results using the sample matching method

To estimate the reliability of the results drawn from the weighted sample, computations were run once again using the [matching method](#), and the results were compared against the original results. A random sample including 700 respondents was extracted from the refined sample of 16,850 respondents. This sample was extracted so that it matches with the demographic and political variables of the target population. Similar to the weighting approach, two demographic (sex and province) and four interlocking variables – a combination of age group, education level, urban or rural region, and voting behavior – were used as targets for matching. Having carried out a comparative analysis, the results obtained from this new sample were consistent with those obtained from the weighted sample, with less than 2.5% differences in estimates.

On balance, the weighted sample adequately represents the target population (literate individuals above 19 years old) and the results obtained can be generalized to a substantial majority of the Iranian population (that is, 85% of the adult population) with a 95% credibility level and credibility intervals of 5%.

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We at the non-profit research foundation GAMAAN would like to express our sincere gratitude to all of those who took their time to contribute to this survey.

GAMAAN commits itself to ethical guidelines with regard to protecting respondents' submitted data. We are professionally committed to sparing no effort in collecting the opinions and attitudes of Iranians from all levels of society and all walks of life.

GAMAAN strives to employ scientific methods in extracting representative samples. We pledge to be transparent to the public and in explaining probable error levels.

Our team gladly receives any comments, suggestions, and criticisms at info@gamaan.org.