

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING														
		SECRET	INFO INDEXED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED												
TO	Chief, Task Force W			MARKED FOR INDEXING													
INFO				NO INDEXING REQUIRED													
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>QXR</i>			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING													
SUBJECT GYROSE/Operational O AMDENIN-1 Progress Report - 13 August 1962				ABSTRACT													
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES				INDEXED													
REF: UFGA-4425 dated 19 June 1962																	
<p>1. SUMMARY: In the period since ref progress report AMDENIN-1 has been primarily encased in keeping his fences mended with the various exile groups in the area in anticipation of moving into a position in the AMBUD-1 organization in which he will be responsible for coordinating the selection of paramilitary candidates from these groups. In addition to this he has prepared a number of reports providing background information, and on current activities in the local PBRUMEN community and mounting Operation Antonico I, an effort to establish contact with PBRUMEN fishermen thru his own fisherman contacts. Details follow:</p> <p>OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS</p> <p>2. In response to a Station request subject provided an estimate of the current situation in PBRUMEN. This report stressed the points that the farmers and the fishermen in PBRUMEN are the most willing and capable of providing support to resistance activities as a result of their having suffered the most at the hands of the current administration after being largely responsible for its obtaining power. He also provided a general strategic plan of Oriente Province in which he defined the main areas in which guerrilla elements can survive and how they can be reached from coastal resupply points. His ability to do this is based upon his being a native of the area and one who has been primarily interested in its geography due to his former large agriculture holdings there.</p> <p>3. He has had one meeting with AMBUD-1 for the purpose of maintaining contact. His main question to AMBUD-1 was with regard to the latter's ability to actually control the people on his staff. He was disappointed by the reply which though positive could not be supported with an example of where AMBUD-1 had actually brought</p>																	
Distribution: 3 - Addressee			<div style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</div> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>DATE TYPED</td> <td>DATE DISPATCHED</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13 Aug. 62</td> <td>AUG 20 1962</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">UFGA-5212</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">201-251853</td> </tr> </table>			DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED	13 Aug. 62	AUG 20 1962	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		UFGA-5212		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER		201-251853	
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UFGA-5212

about the dismissal of anyone who had proved to be ineffective. AMDENIM-1 is a good friend of AMBUD-1 as a result of his father's long standing relationship with him, but at this point has very little respect for him as a result of, as he says, AMBUD-1's failure to actually make his organization into an effective body and to engage in activities which actually detract from the success of the current PBRUMEN regime. It remains that he is willing to join AMBUD-1's organization and attempt to create unity among the military sections of the member groups at such time as KUBARK gives him the go ahead.

4. Following his belief that the most important job at hand is the development and maintenance of maritime reception points along the north coast of PBRUMEN, AMDENIM-1 has devoted considerable time to readying assets among his exiled fisherman friends to make contact with their former fisherman associates still based in PBRUMEN. The foundation for this activity is quite tenuous as a result of a variety of factors which make it difficult to arrange sea rendezvous in the absence of radio contact. Several trips have been made to the Anguilla Key area for this purpose, the last of which was supported by KUBARK and was called Operation Antonico I. This attempt was unsuccessful due to the failure of the inside contact to appear. It developed that the woman and child who were to be exfiltrated on this operation appeared in the JMWAVE area two days later, having obtained permission to leave PBRUMEN by air. They carried the message that someone had stolen the port chief's personal boat as a result of which the inside contact was unable to depart on schedule due to the implementation of temporary restrictions until the theft had been investigated. She said the next rendezvous was scheduled for 12 August, however imminent bad weather forestalled any chance of making this rendezvous. The effort to establish contact continues on the basis that, once a commo system can be set up, it will be comparatively easy to establish further rendezvous and thus develop ratlines into the north coast.

5. Coincidentally with the above AMDENIM-1 is continuing his efforts to come up with radio operator candidates and to obtain candidates for infiltration. Based upon past experience this effort is being made more selective in that the need for more self sufficient personnel is greater than ever. The increasing difficulty of covering people inside makes it necessary to reduce the size of the infiltration parties and to have people who can withstand the rigors of existing on minimum supplies until they can establish themselves with natives who are willing to provide them with a base of operations. Most of the people who are willing to infiltrate at this point are of the type who want immediate action and are unwilling to take the time to establish a clandestine base from which they can methodically develop the assets in place who are essential to the growth and refinement of a resistance base. He has a number of people on tap who are qualified as candidates for small guerrilla teams, but who are not capable of maintaining themselves clandestinely until the time for guerrilla action arrives.

## 6. FUNDS EXPENDED:

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a. \$200. was given to [Heriberto SARDINAS Campo] as maintenance until his clearance comes through. It is intended that [SARDINAS] will be an investigator of operational leads and an assistant to AMDENIM-1 in the handling of his fishermen and operational candidates.

b. \$300. was given to AMDENIM-1 for passage to the widow of AMGLAD-1. He is the channel for this payment until such time as HQs arrives at a settlement figure and this obligation can be disposed of.

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c. 5325. was given to AMDENIM-1 in support of Operation Antonico I, which operation is described under paragraph 4.

7. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: AMDENIM-1 has provided a number of memoranda on developments within the various exile groups in the JMWAVE area, none of which qualify as intelligence information but all of which contribute to the Station's better understanding of the local politics. Specifically, he has provided info on the political beliefs and background of most of the PBRUMEN exiled labor leaders and the activities of the Bequer group. He has also been helpful in clarifying the picture as to the movements within the UR at this time while the Station is trying to determine how best to organize this group in order to be able to take over its more worthwhile features without becoming unduly committed to giving it special prominence in the exile community. He is being counted on to help bring the UR into the AMBUD-1 organization as a means of creating the appearance of greater unity among the exile community.

8. COMMENTS AND PLANS: While no spectacular achievements are resulting from AMDENIM-1's efforts at this point he is steadily becoming more and more susceptible to KUBARK control and more professional in his efforts. A recent example is the critique he gave his fishermen for not realizing more information out of the refugees they met at Anguila Key while waiting for their inside contact. They had failed to adequately debrief two young men, who had succeeded in surviving in PBRUMEN for over two months on their own, on the basis that they were too young to be knowledgeable. As it turned out the two refugees had used the cover of sponge salesmen and had been able to travel from Havana to Santiago de Cuba without being stopped once. On learning of this, AMDENIM-1 was reminded of a good cover he has heard about, namely fighting cock fanciers, which activity seems to be on the increase as a result of the greater amount of spare time available to the people. The sport is actually becoming a year around proposition rather than being restricted to the winter months as in the past. It is planned to have AMDENIM-1 continue his present pursuits on the basis that he is free to move as the Station desires and can have an overall constructive effect on the AMBUD-1 organization at the time desired. He will continue his efforts with the fishermen and will provide candidates for infiltration as they become available and can be accepted by the Station. Operation Antonico III is scheduled for 27 August using a Magnolia (boat) to establish contact with fishermen living on a key in the Caibarien area. There is a possibility that he will journey to Jamaica to make contact with an old associate who is now a prominent member of the PBRUMEN government as a means of eliciting information on current regime policy and plans.

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