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TO :

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DATE : 00/00/1963
PAGES : 123

SUBJECTS :

EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND
CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

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JFK Assassination Records

Department of the Army EO 13526

Declassify Exclude Exempt

Authority _____

Refer To _____

Review Date 12/18/2015 By K. Estman

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 (SECRET-NOFORN)	17 Jan 63
2	Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS); 3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)	22 Jan 63
3	Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe)	23 Jan 63
4	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
5	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	23 Jan 63
6	DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba; Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1 Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm, Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
7	Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63. (TOP SECRET)	24 Jan 63
8	National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Closed) (TOP SECRET)	Undtd
9	Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- tion of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	4 Feb 63

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February 4, 1963

TO : ARA - Mr. Gottrell
FROM : S/P - John W. Ford
Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy
and Contingency Planning on Cuba

In accordance with your instructions, over the week-end I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem as I define it as follows:

The Problem:

Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work had been done on Cuba, both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine if any of the work previously done will be of value to the officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.

Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:

The principal sources of policy and contingency planning which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee are as follows:

1. The National Security Action Memoranda emanating from the White House.
 2. The Actions of the National Security Council.
 3. The Basic National Security Policy of the U.S.
(now awaiting final stages of formal clearance before presentation to National Security Council).
4. The Records

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4. The Records of Action of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council as they pertain to Cuba.
5. The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM - during the Cuban Crisis.
6. The Resolutions of the Organization of American States and the Punta del Este Conference.
7. Public Statements of Government Officials, in Particular Press Conference of President Kennedy of September 13, 1962.
8. Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministers of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.
9. Recently Approved New Policy Statement and Objectives as Drews Up by the Interdepartmental Committee of Cuban Affairs.
10. Cuban Guidelines Paper.
(A guidelines paper as such does not exist on Cuba as is the case in a majority of other countries.)

CONCLUSIONS:

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with Cuba, particularly that generated during the recent October crisis. This review is nearing completion, and I am segregating particular reports which may be of value to the members of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and objectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregated those National Security Council decisions and National Security Action Memoranda which are carried as pending or closed in the files of the Department of State. Where action on a particular NSC decision or NASAW has been transferred to EXCOM, action responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within the purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my review

to date,

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
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to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions which have already been considered by your Committee. You will note that in some instances action responsibility on an NSC decision or WASAM has been transferred to the Special Group (Mr. Alexia Johnson).

Attachment:

List of Pending and Closed
NSC and WASAM decisions
concerning Cuba.

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
(PENDING AND CLOSED)

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<u>NSC Action No.</u>	<u>Substance</u>	<u>Status</u> (Pending)
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	Agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro regime.	According to files, out of this NSC directive grew a policy paper, to be handled differently from regular guidelines papers on each country. As of 9/4/61, White House was informed that action on this NSC directive would be reported in compliance with NSAM 181 which transferred certain NSC & NASAM actions to special group (Alexis Johnson).
483 NSC 2422d 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to obtaining adequate intelligence on Cuban military capabilities.	(Pending) Action to be reported in compliance with NASAM 181 (Johnson channel)
483 NSC 2422e 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to publication in free world press of terrorist actions of Castro regime, etc. and to possible political action to end current terror.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422g 5/5/61	Relations with Cuban Revolutionary Council should be improved.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422i 5/5/61	Cuban refugees to be given refugee status; refugees in Miami to be relocated; refugees to be eligible to apply for travel privileges.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422k 5/5/61	Initiation of negotiations to enlarge willingness of other American states to join in action against Castro.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM

<u>NSC Action No.</u>	<u>Substance</u>	<u>Status</u>
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	USIA will expand L.A. program, but not initiate electronic warfare against Castro; means of propaganda should be made available to non-US groups.	(Pending) Action transferred to Johnson channel Per NASAM #181.
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	US military officers under general guidance to be prepared by Dept of State, would discuss Castro threat to all L.A. with L.A. officers.	(Closed) completed action as of 11/28/61.
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	Dept of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.	(Closed) S/P paper "possible new Basis for Anti-Communist Action" 7/24/61
483 NSC 2422p 5/5/61	Robert Woodward's assumption of responsibility of Task Force on Cuba on announcement of appointment.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422b 5/5/61	No US military intervention now. Do nothing which would foreclose possibility military intervention in future.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422c 5/5/61	No naval blockade or airwar against Cuba.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422d 5/5/61	Detailed study to be made by CIA with other Departments of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in elements which control Cuba.	Closed. Bissell memo to Achilles 11/21/61 re: "Situation and Prospects in Cuba" by Sherman Kent 11/3/61.

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
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<u>NSC Action No.</u>	<u>Substance</u>	<u>Status</u>
483 NSC 2422b 5/5/61	No separate Cuban military forces should be organized in U.S. Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in US Armed Forces.	Closed. DEW recommended to Pres. draft program be terminated 6/30/62 due to modest results.
483 NSC 2422j 5/5/61	No immediate trade embargo on Cuba. declaring total embargo on trade with Cuba with exception medicine and food on humanitarian grounds.	Closed, with President's action of 2/3/62
483 NSC 2422l 5/5/61	Alliance for Progress to be strengthened.	Closed. Weekly report now from AID to White House.
NASAM 194 10/2/62	Policy Toward non-bloc ships in Cuban trade (Action US Government proposes to take with regard to shipping to Cuba.)	Pending. Action transferred to EXCOM.
NASAM 100 10/3/61	Contingency Planning for Cuba.	Pending Action transferred to Johnson channel.
CUBA NASAM #31 3/11/61	US Government must have ready a White Paper on Cuba and be ready to give assistance to Cuban Patriots in similar effort.	Closed. Paper prepared and translated: "The Castro Regime in Cuba" 9/61
CUBA NASAM #181 8/24/62	Eyes only - Limited Distribution. Reporting to be through another channel and handled personally by Deputy USEcy Johnson (understand this authorized response on certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru Johnson channel)	Closed.

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<u>NSC Action No.</u>	<u>Substance</u>	<u>Status</u>
CUBA NASAM 196 10/22/62	Establishment of NSC Executive Committee	Closed.
CUBA NASAM 208 12/6/62 EYES ONLY	Cuba Overflights. (This Presidential directive approved an attached Guidelines for the Planning of Cuban Overflights, and requested CIA to come up with an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on assumption it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.)	Report Submitted.
CUBA NASAM 213 1/8/63	Interdepartmental Organization of Cuban Affairs - with responsibility vested in a Coordinator of Cuban affairs in Department of State.	Closed.

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee
Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States" and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."


William H. Brubeck

Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

As stated.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

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Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

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7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

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actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
 - a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
 - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may:
 - 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
 - c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

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2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
 4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
 - c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
 - a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
 - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

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- 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
- 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.
8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

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B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

- a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
- b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
- c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
- d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
- e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
- f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

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being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

- g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
- h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
- i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
- j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

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action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

- a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
- b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

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The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p. m. The revision consists essentially of what is now denominated as "ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supplemented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This supplemental material is derived from portions of the text of "ALTERNATIVE II" in the original paper.

At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed him the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to include the supplemental material referred to above. He, in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will thereafter be in touch with you. If possible, will you let me know by noon tomorrow where you and he stand with regard to the revised paper.

Enclosure

SIGNAL

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

cc: Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Yarmolinsky

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DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

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2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;
6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

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9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
 - c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

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and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.
7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping cut of Elsc-Cuba trade.
9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
 - a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;
 - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

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a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

- c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.


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In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.



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23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Department of Defense Representative on the Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

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Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U. S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

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To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological

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and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

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This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective.

It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

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Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. The objectives stated in the Coordinator's paper do not sufficiently commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. The Coordinator's paper depends too much upon events outside the control of the U. S. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/Communist regime. The specific actions recommended in the Coordinator's paper are consistent with the policy recommended in this paper and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy.

Recommendation

I recommend that the policy stated above be adopted as the United States policy toward Cuba.

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DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

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2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;
6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

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9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
 3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
 - c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
4. At the conclusion of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:
 - a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
 - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend
 - 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

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and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.
7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
 - a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;
 - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

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a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

- c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

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In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

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ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

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Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in [redacted] support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

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effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may

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eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

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
COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

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23 JAN 63

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

ALTERNATIVE I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States Policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and

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and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose.
6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS;
8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

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9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
 3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
 - c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:
 - a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
 - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

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and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.
7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
8. ← In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
 - a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;
 - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

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a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

- c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

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United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective must be the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by ones compatible with the objectives of the United States. This must be done in the aims of our ally, Mexico. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support, frustrate its subversive activities; reduce its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through a number of methods, feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support (and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression of other Castro/Communist Cuba/or

Soviet

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Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To this end, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific operational support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda, sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect

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A second alternative to the policy of peaceful negotiation, carrying the United States on its usual non-retaliatory basis, would, as appropriate, include the imposition of a U.S. blockade; the use of military aircraft and other armaments; diversion of commercial shipping; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as UN sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "Intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and especially the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adequately these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and courses of action under it may

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Opposing bases and impossible neutrals. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

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COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 10 p.m.)
FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

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1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the Hemisphere other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

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8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

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opportunities

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*until the
regime is
overthrown*

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
 - a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
 - b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

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a political base of popular opposition to
the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

- c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability
to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other
propaganda materials from international waters
into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been established.

- WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIONS LISTED BELOW, THE*
2. *Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations*
with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
FIRST SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED.
prisoners *Any of the actions listed below, If these*
actions are taken before the conclusion of the negotiations, they
could jeopardize their release of the detainees
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders.
(The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
- a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
- b. ~~ccc~~

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- b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
- c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
- 5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
 - a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
 - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food

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- and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ~~Ax~~ ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Bràzil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.
8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

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to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment
to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to ^{the} four point shipping resolutions, and
action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
continue to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise
either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the
Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or
bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are now/inside Cuba; more extensive air activity
including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward
surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

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ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the meeting of Tuesday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words :

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are :

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1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the Hemisphere and other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

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8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities

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opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
 - a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
 - b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

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- a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
- c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.
 2. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Any of the actions listed below, if taken before the conclusion of the negotiations could jeopardize their release.
 3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
 4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b.

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- b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
- c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- c. Permit any cargo sponsored by the Department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or other representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
- a. An OAS resolution condemning C.I.A. for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, concerning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
 - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend an extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food

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- and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.
8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

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to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of ^W Cubans who are not inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

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ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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(WITH REVISIONS)

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CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

January 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McCandless Murphy
SUBJECT: All Members of the NSC Executive Committee
SUBJECT: CUBA - Back-up Papers and a Summary of
Recommendations of the Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization
of American States.
4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be
considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on
Thursday, January 24.


William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

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(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

- a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
- b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
- c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
- d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
- e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
- f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

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being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

- g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
- h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
- i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
- j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

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action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

- a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
- b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

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The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

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Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

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7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

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actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
 - a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
 - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may:
 - 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
 - c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

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2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
 - c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
 - a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplored refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
 - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

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- 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
- 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.
8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

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B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of American States.

PROBLEM.

To determine the future course of action which the U.S. should seek in the OAS with respect to Cuba.

DISCUSSION.

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962 put the problem of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context. In that meeting the Foreign Ministers excluded Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, declared an arms embargo, and directed vigilance against Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

The U.S. invoked the Rio Treaty on October 22, 1962. Pursuant thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action, including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prevent continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. instituted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Consultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken.

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COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis. If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed circumstances.

- (2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would represent one feasible, appropriate, immediate step following the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insurrection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemisphere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to the Soviet Union.

- (3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este (which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the further suspension of trade.)

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

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Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are continuing our surveillance.

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive weapons)

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the COAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3). Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accompanied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic sanctions.

(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

Considerations:

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able to obtain a substantial majority.

Such action would give a better basis for urging such additional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement action.

(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force, to bring about the withdrawal of soviet troops in Cuba if the OAS call is not heeded.

Considerations:

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Considerations:

This action should be seriously considered only if we are determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet troops.

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority for authorization of the use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11)).

Considerations:

This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained for this.

(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11)).

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies. Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel with the Cuban people.

A number of telecommunications between Latin America and Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be maintained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national interest and those for humanitarian reasons.

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These considerations would make it extremely difficult to obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

- (a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);
- (b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
- (c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps.

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet flights to Cuba.

(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action under Rio Treaty.

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unanimous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because of the reference to the Rio Treaty.

It is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps. (11)

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(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued subversive activities.

Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs. the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be necessary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveillance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, insufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under way.)

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This could be done:

- (a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to the IADB;
- (b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or
- (c) having the OAS member governments designate their representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover, amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.

As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be difficult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the Council of the desirability of such action.

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As to (c), member governments could take this course on an individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that "exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this action under the OAS Charter.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.

Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would involve minimum adverse international effects. We could probably obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except (10) and (12).

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11) particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would involve adverse international effects, including a probable acute confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best interests at this time.

I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and (b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suspension of trade.

Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

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- (b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
- (c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.
- (d) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar actions.

Rationale

The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our objective, carrying the OAS with us, without committing us to any further action.

After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which may be opened to us by events.

I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradually, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate additional measures.

I do not believe we should take a track now which will break hemispheric unity. We may need unity later in an emergency.

Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the Cuban Brigade (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its

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politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed.

COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear feasible with respect to the Brigade's future.

- (1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area (approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to \$100 per month for a family and up to \$60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides up to \$1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of entry into the U. S.

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DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides 20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A two week period for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestically as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the Free World concerning the determination of the United States

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to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence with the Castro regime.

(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community.

It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a

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risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U. S. .

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flying Tigers". Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve component which other U. S. militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special employment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds \$1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be undertaken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States; an expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure of \$2,500 per person per year would be about \$2.5 million.

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Establishment of additional programs, after a Presidential determination, would increase costs even more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" privileges for Brigade members.

COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members.
2. I recommend against a Presidential determination providing broader privileges for Brigade members.
3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.
4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the future desire the presence in the U. S. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade members to enlist in the existing military training program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit thereafter.

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Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to a U. S. citizen.
4. Cuban subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.
5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan. *-Proposed mix*
6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime.
7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. ~~X~~
9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia flights to Cuba.

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COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS DB-3/652,924
SUBJECT	Analysis of the Cuban Situation by the Italian Embassy in Habana	DATE DISTR.	17 January 1963
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of Content: 2, that the document is genuine.

The following is a translation of a report dated 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the considerations regarding the consequences which the recent crisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been reported by some members of our representations.

1) The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me to be nil at this time. The fact that the talks with Mikoyan were long and difficult and that Castro expressed in private his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce that Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance cannot be replaced by the Chinese.

Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspection). Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me that China can furnish more than it has furnished to date, which consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather shoddy

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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; field distribution by "#").

wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores in Habana are full. As for machinery and spare parts, China⁷ is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined as pro-Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in such a way that he cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations, he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations."

Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a good resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by Moscow. b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a grave blow particularly in Latin America.

2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that the revolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into a "Titoist" regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some Latin American countries desire such a change and are doing everything possible to provoke it. It is also possible that some Cubans share these sentiments. But, in my opinion, it is impossible that such a change can take place while Castro is in power. As I pointed out in my previous report, it is not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned", to imitate anyone, and even less to take Tito as a model. Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this possibility seems very remote.

3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so.

It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in

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Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The countries which could do it do not have the necessary material means. A partial solution would worsen the situation and a definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. I think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by material strength can obtain results in Cuba.

In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United States. It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example for other Latin American countries. This would not take into account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly their chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another path. As Guevara said the other day in an interview for the Daily Worker, "this is a battle to the death with the United States in which the most possible damage must be done to the adversary."

Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November, Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this descent will last no one can say today. The only certain thing is that the economic situation is getting worse every day and therefore the revolutionary regime needs the assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who heads the most important institution of the country - the Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits, to permit the Cubans to last through 1963, which will certainly be the most difficult year.

But economic assistance can permit this country to survive, not resolve its problems. For a definitive solution it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the machines which they have. Agricultural production, principally sugar cane, as has been recognized even by the fanatics of industrialization, constitutes the basis of the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary which should last ten years are unusable after two years?

It is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But for another year they will find a way to get by.

Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent policy followed by the United States in the recent months is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the danger of strategic weapons has been eliminated, the wisest measure is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will

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present some more "headaches" to the United States; but the atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the hypothetical coup d'etat of Castro which would force the solution of the problem - one can hope for a perhaps not too distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the Cubans insist on the known five points and the United States refuses any guarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to feed Castro to permit his survival, the less uncomfortable position appears to me to be that of the Government in Washington.

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