

3/17/17

# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**SECRET**  
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  
**NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

|   |  |                  |                 |
|---|--|------------------|-----------------|
| COUNTRY   | CUBA   | REPORT NO.       | TDCS -3/490,978 |
| SUBJECT   | STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT              | DATE DIST.       | 24 OCTOBER 1961 |
| DATE OF INFO.   | OCTOBER 1961   | PRECEDENCE       | ROUTINE         |
| PLACE & DATE ACQ.   | ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)  | REFERENCES       | DN11257         |
| APPRAISAL   | 3  | FIELD REPORT NO. | OEL-30,995      |
| THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. |  |                  |                 |
| SOURCE  | (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".<br>24 |                  |                 |

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.
2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO, HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

**NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

|       |          |      |     |     |          |     |     |      |     |             |     |     |    |     |     |
|-------|----------|------|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|------|-----|-------------|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|
| STATE | ARMY/ACD | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF   | NSA | NIC | USIA | OCI | ONE         | OCR | OSR | OG | EXD | FBI |
| T&S   |          |      |     |     | TREASURY |     |     |      |     | REC INCLANS |     |     |    |     |     |

# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

TDCS -3/490,978

IN 11257

PAGE 2

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL