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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

DATE: 1 July 1963

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension 6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials, including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concerning the "new program" for the exiles.

2. Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed in the house to monitor their comments.

3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days. The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt also said that the house would be retained for several more months and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably be requested for these latter visits also.

4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr. Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:

	DSS/IGS
	ADSS/IGS
	ASST/IGS
	C/IR
2	C/ASST
	C/IR
	C/IR
	C/IR
	C/IR
1	C/S B
4	Hart
3	C/S B
	A&TS
	FILES

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- (a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, basement, or garage, and using a voice-operated relay to actuate the recorder.
- (b.) With the use of directories, search the environs of the safehouse for the purpose of locating a potential listening post where radio transmissions could be monitored.

5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief, Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of a transmitter and a nearby listening post.

83 6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the covert site through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas, Jr. (#57 328), of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee. Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas at the Langley Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. Thomas the fact that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to "bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house. Mr. Thomas explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, Pakistan, on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS, and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the

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audio surveillance appeared to be technically feasible since I had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter" to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive equipment; Mr. Halpern must arrange for TSD to transfer this equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem after he would make a few telephone calls. I then returned to my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to contact in TSD to obtain it.

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7. After checking with Mr. (H. T. Bent) of the Audio Operations Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after checking through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD, I selected the following:

Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2, \$1,100 each	\$2,200.00
Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 - 140 MCS, SRT-6H, @ \$275 each	550.00
Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., UWB-7, \$25 each	50.00
Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F \$. 54 each	1.08
One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A-30 \$1.87 each	1.87
TOTAL	<hr/> \$2,802.95

8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from Mr. John W. McBee, extension 2481, of TSD, who told me that everything had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any

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equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that I fill out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88, listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach, who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had ever had any experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr. Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.

9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the \$2,802.95 for the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr. Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment with the Form #88, but that if we needed anything else, I would contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse, but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee. If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor Arttime was going to be the only person living in the house after each day's discussions were completed - no Staff employee would be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Arttime would be

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holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a microphone installation to cover the whole house if possible.

10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters. It was suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to be used to communicate during the installation between the listening post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them and relied solely on telephonic communications. The "A" and "B" batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4 receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of the DFO agents.

11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the receiver, 2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post, and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.

12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr. Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up. An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because Mr. [Thomas] was having foreign visitors in for cocktails ~~that afternoon~~ that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily.

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13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Headquarters to announce that one SRT-7 transmitter had been installed in the ceiling over the bar and telephone in the basement of the safehouse and that the SRR-1 receiver was picking up the transmissions satisfactorily in Mr. ⁰³Thomas's basement. The QSC-2 voice-operated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse. The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating range is supposed to be approximately one mile.

14. The DFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive discussions and to turn it on when they leave.

15. Mr. ⁰³Thomas and his wife have consented to do most of the operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement. With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will be almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a day by a field office agent should be necessary to pick up the day's take and to make minor adjustments, repairs, or corrections to the receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. ⁰³Thomas is well-known to his friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment in his basement would not raise the eyebrows on any of his visitors, some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries - Mr. ⁰³Thomas will be going to Karachi under Department of State cover.


Ramon R. Hart

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