

Date:09/30/93

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## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

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SUBJECTS :  
OPERATION MONGOOSE  
ROSELLI, JOHNNY  
CASTRO  
ASSASSINATION  
POISON PILLS  
CUBA  
MCCONE, JOHN  
CIA  
BISSELL, RICHARD  
WHITE HOUSE  
MAFIA  
ROWAN, DAN  
GIANCANA, SAM

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Box 245  
Folder 14

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

HARVEY EX 1 R371

6/25/75

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Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~per~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~not~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement of foreign and cyber materials in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the National Security Agency~~. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~of the operational requirements of foreign and cyber materials~~, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements ~~from NSA~~ became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, ~~which~~ ~~in direct touch with NSA on personnel requirements~~, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

#### 4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 ~~through the Chief of the Birmingham T.R. by~~ ~~the Chief of Station, Birmingham~~, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half ~~he~~ was contacted ~~in~~ & sporadically ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~Chief of Station, Birmingham~~, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~September~~ <sup>October</sup> 1960,

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Q Jwin annual salary: 7,200  
Travel + ops expenses for  
Q Jwin + other agents & agent candidates: 2,000  
Fees for services by and  
standby of agents and  
agent candidates: 2,000  
Travel of staff employees  
engaged in Jwifile activity: 2,500  
Hire of safehouses, automobiles  
and other operational expenses: 1,000  
\$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political: non-attributionality.

2) Our own experience (~~English~~) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (~~Concept, handling, training, etc.~~) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + adjust to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, <sup>with high regard for operational security</sup> assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kuba only (e.g., what does ~~the agency~~ know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kuba, one focal point for control, search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially denied?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-station) commo. Word of mouth + no backchannel re troops

d. No PA's, <sup>(except for search)</sup> or intermediaries; rigid case-officing, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govt.

f. No use of <sup>JUN 24 1975</sup> any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would need.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., ~~Marshall~~) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubaers who can

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretext: ~~Not to be~~ secret; this established by ~~law~~.  
 j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.  
 4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who were obtained U.S. visas.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning house or checks in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have plan, 20 min to backstop this, all documents, plan, report, backstop, should be able to act on file.

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~to be done~~.

Keeping of files.

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freedom to travel

Legal, operational + ethical  $\rightarrow$  moral problems.

Kishore case.

7. Leg 2 not secure enough.

- Non-attributability:

- 5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

- 6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

- 7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Quinn) has been examined.

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- 8) Planning should include provision for blowing Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

- 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.



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10) ~~Confidential~~ recommended. ~~Working with the~~  
~~Major~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS  
archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each  
selectee.

13) <sup>all</sup> ~~any~~ Cuban personnel involved should have some CE  
experience.

14) ~~Stability~~ + stable ~~in~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sel-~~  
selected? No "team" until ready to go.


16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

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red 1 - 25/1 - spec. section  
 — "The Magic Button"  
 Narcotics Büro ~~4~~ 

"for a living" - RIS 201 Cover  
Curtain - Banbury - No Star  
eyes - Jim A. / Contradict  
not a TSD problem from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &  
a confession of weakness. —

- El Benefactor - assumptions -

Example 3 "mou"

Fragment of [redacted] job. [redacted]  
[redacted] Memo. [redacted]

[REDACTED]

Year

~~REC'D - 11/11/44~~

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Anaesthesia —

~~CIA~~

26/1 - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - Matter -

No file Perren -

1. Select proper open to run —

2. [REDACTED]

May 2

### 3. Security Rules

B-WITH-AS-3

4. *Amor levis*

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - Kasser

Id:32281946

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Report - Rinkes -

Febr. 2 to 6 - 50 - 60.

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6. No [REDACTED]
7. No projects or papers  
except per cones. 9
8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] -  
[REDACTED] Program Chief LCH -  
Ticket 1500 - from MB -  
Mark spot again. Chief of  
project - the Diako
9. Disposed -
10. Targets who & where -  
Must know before  
we can spot -
11. Case officering
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
- Fd I list - Remember

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