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793 and 79

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT

WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE

DATE DISTR.

COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF

1 AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES

INFO.

LDC2-31370751
VIETNAM

PLAC

1965 LEE AG IN LEE SWIGON

THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE () ()
FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE

VAN

CH I VIGORAL

COMMUNICATED OFFICER OF THE CIVILIAN INFORMATION COORDINATING BOARD INTERVIEWED
1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THISCURRENT REGION MULTIPLE SECURITY SERVICE (W22) ADVISED LEE V. CHAN V. LEE
REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING2. W. VALUATION 5500 HOURS ON 1 VIGORAL. CIVILIAN BOARD CHIEF OF THE
DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE

THREATENED: HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE REASON OF HIS CONCERN.

A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN

RE THREATENED: CHAN COMMENTED LEE V. LEE WOULD HAVE TWO MORE HYPOTHESIS ARE
PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.1. CHAN COMMENTED ALTHOUGH LEE V. LEE WOULD HAVE TWO MORE HYPOTHESIS ARE
2. ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THEINDICATED LEE V. LEE WOULD HAVE TWO MORE HYPOTHESIS ARE
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED3. CHAN COMMENTED LEE V. LEE WOULD HAVE TWO MORE HYPOTHESIS ARE
AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINHAND WIFE: CHAN WOULD STATED LEE V. LEE WOULD HAVE TWO MORE HYPOTHESIS ARE
DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT4. CHAN COMMENTED LEE V. LEE WOULD HAVE TWO MORE HYPOTHESIS ARE
OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR

DIA

VIE

COMBAT EVACUATION

14

S-E-C-R-E-T

ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

PAGE TWO

A.T.S.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466
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WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

10-10-68 1230-1 930215000 123 CUBA

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF

REF ID: A66666
 SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG

VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU

CHAU, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU

GLANT OF THE RELEVANCE OF ALEXANDER (XUAN) LIAISON OFFICER 'WANG' ZHAOJIE' STATED
INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INTERFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

45- ~~THE T. WIGGINT. DOES FURTHERMORE COMMENT AGAINST AMERICAN AND CHINESE CHIEF OF THE~~
~~CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO~~

BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE

W. ARTHUR BOY, A FORMER COOS VETERAN, LEE DREW KECIAE. THE BIRTH VERBVIEW IN INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE

INFORMED DID NOT CHECK ON THE NICHOLAS J-S VIOLET TAGS' WHICH BELONG TO BEING CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-

1. ~~REDACTED~~ ~~COMMUNIST~~ ~~VIETNAMESE~~ ~~THE~~ ~~COMB~~ ~~DETAIL~~ ~~DESCRIBED~~ ~~IN~~ ~~THIS~~
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED

ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO US

2: VN OFFICERS OF THE RESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C) AND TO
TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO

PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT - MAJOR

LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: R

REF ID: A66744
TDCS-3/518-127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE CONSPIRING

ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP

D'ETAT.) 0005 D. EATON ON WHEEL OF T-S VEHICLE 1985

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE

GOVERNMENT-ON-25-JULY-1962-THAT-HIS-INTELLIGENCE-SECTION-HAD-INTERCEPTED-A

VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE MONTH

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T	CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS	TDCS DB-3/650,938	INFO
	NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY		PAGE THREE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.) MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

85. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.) THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

FIELD COMMENT. CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INsofar as DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

S-E-C-R-E-T	CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS	TDCS DB-3/650,938	INFO
	NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY		

CLASSIFICATION -- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		INX	
S-E-C-R-E-T	NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO-DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY	TDCS DB-3/650,938	PAGE FOUR

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

FIELD COMMENT.

12. AT 102000 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPE'S CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE OF CINCPAC ARPAC TO PACAF PAFTT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION -- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		INX	
S-E-C-R-E-T	NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO-DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY	TDCS DB-3/650,938	