

When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance

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- When and why do states comply with economic sanctions?

Previous literature has suggested sanctions “work” by destabilizing leaders (Marinov 2005; Lektzian and Souva 2003) and focus on domestic factors that influence the effectiveness of sanctions. In addition, such work has often utilized a duration modeling approach to capture the time dependent nature of sanction dynamics (Bolks Al-Sowayel 2000; McGillivray and Stam 2004).

While domestic conditions are important, another vein of literature suggests cross-cutting relationships and network dynamics should play a key role in understanding sanction outcomes (Martin, 1993; Drezner, 2000; Bapat and Morgan, 2009, Cranmer and Heinrich 2013).

The importance of multilateral coordination and network dynamics are intuitive given the broader work on networks in international relationships (Hoff and Ward 2004, Cranmer and Desmarais 2012).

NETWORK GRAPH HERE. Say we are combining duration + network effects + consideration of domestic factors.

We suggest that present duration approaches fail to incorporate the network pressures intrinsic to international sanction processes.

- Target states face a network of sanctioners, not just an individual sender state. We present a duration model that incorporates the interdependent nature of the international system.
- In addition, we draw on previous literature to explore how network pressures matter inform sanction compliance, as well as interact with domestic conditions of the target state.

Network Pressure Hypotheses

- **H1** Connectivity: The specific type of relationships between senders and receivers influence sanction compliance: the greater connectivity between senders and receivers in other network types (trade, alliance) the shorter the duration of the sanction.
- **H2** Network Members: The greater the number of sanctioning sender states, the shorter the duration of the sanction.

Sanctions impose costs on groups within the country. Affected groups will try to lobby the government to reach an accommodation with sanctioning states.

- **H3** Target states with stronger democratic institutions will more quickly comply than those with weaker democratic processes.

Constructing Network Measures

Table: Model 1: Network Effects

	β	$\sigma_{\hat{\beta}}$	P-value
Number of Senders	0.600	0.177	0.001
Distance	-264.0	13.00	0.020
Polcon	-2.660	1.190	0.025
GDP per Capita (lagged)	-0.001	0.001	0.390
Internal Conflict	0.039	0.100	0.690
Trade Network	0.615	0.987	0.530
Ally Network	1.370	0.568	0.016
IGO Network	-0.023	0.014	0.110
Received Sanctions	-0.098	0.107	0.360
Religious Similarity	-1.250	0.500	0.012

Table: Model 2: Network Effects & Institutions

	β	$\sigma_{\hat{\beta}}$	P-value
Number of Senders	1.200	0.412	0.004
Distance	-251.0	112.0	0.024
Polcon	-0.669	1.74	0.700
GDP per Capita (lagged)	-0.001	0.001	0.350
Internal Conflict	0.0469	0.099	0.630
Trade Network	0.638	0.965	0.510
Ally Network	1.420	0.579	0.014
IGO Network	-0.023	0.014	0.140
Recieved Sanctions	-0.119	0.106	0.260
Religious Similarity	-1.340	0.493	0.007
Senders * Polcon	-1.620	1.040	0.120

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In this presentation we have demonstrated the necessity of incorporating network dynamics into predictive models of sanction compliance. We have shown that the connectivity between target and sender states— in terms of cultural similarities, geographical proximity, and alliance patterns— plays an important and previously overlooked role on sanction outcomes.