Inferential Approaches for Network Analysis: ⁵ AMEN for Latent **Factor Models**

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Many network approaches have been developed in descriptive fashion, but attention to inferential approaches to network analysis has been growing. We introduce a new approach that models interdependencies among observations using additive and multiplicative effects (AME). This approach can be applied to binary, ordinal, and continuous network data, and provides a set of tools for inference from longitudinal networks as well. The AME approach is shown a) to be easy to implement; b) interpretable in a general linear model framework; c) computationally straightforward; d) not prone to degeneracy; e) captures 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order network dependencies; and f) notably outperforms multiple regression quadratic assignment procedures, exponential random graph models, and alternative latent variable approaches on a variety of metrics both in- and out-ofsample.

networks | latent variable models

etwork analysis provides a way to represent and study "relational data", that is data which defines characteristics between pairs of actors. Data structures that extend beyond the actor level are common across many fields in the social sciences. In the study of international relations, for instance, the focus often rests on how countries conflict or cooperate with one another. Yet, the dominant paradigm in international relations for dealing with such data structures is not a network approach but rather a dyadic design, in which an interaction between a pair of countries is considered independent of interactions between any other pair in the system. The implication of this assumption is that when, for example, Vietnam and the United States decide to form a trade agreement, they make this decision independently of what they have done with other countries and what other countries in the international system have done among themselves.

A common defense of the dyad-only approach is that many events are only bilateral (1), thus alleviating the need for an approach that incorporates interdependencies between observations. The network perspective asserts that even bilateral events and processes take place within a broader system. At a minimum, we do not know whether independence of events and processes characterizes what we observe, thus we should at least examine this assertion.

The potential for interdependence among observations poses a challenge to theoretical as well as statistical modeling since the assumption made by standard approaches used across the social sciences is that observations are, at least, conditionally independent (2). The consequence of ignoring this assumption has been frequently noted already.* Just as relevant is the fact that a wealth of research from other disciplines suggests that carrying the independence assumption into a study with relational data is misguided and leads to biased inferences.

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A variety of empirical frameworks have been developed to deal with the interdependencies inherent in relational data. A prominent class of approaches involves the use of latent variable models. The most cited latent variable model is the framework presented by Hoff et al. (13), here each actor is assigned a position in a lower-dimensional social space and the Euclidean distance between actors corresponds to their probability of a tie. This approach has received much attention but has two important problems. First, this approach is only able to capture a particular set of dependence patterns that arise in relational data, which substantially limits the class of networks that it can be used to study. Second, due to the construction of the random variables used to characterize the latent space, using this approach as a regression tool complicates parameter interpretation.

A variety of empirical frameworks have been developed to deal with the interdependencies inherent in relational data. In this article, we introduce the additive and multiplicative effects model (AME). To illustrate the contrasts between AME, earlier latent variable models, and other approaches such as ERGM we apply each to studying a cross-sectional network measuring collaborations during the policy design of the Swiss CO_2 act. By doing so we are able to show that AME provides a superior goodness of fit to the data than alternative approaches, both in terms of ability to predict linkages and capture network dependencies.

Significance Statement

Authors must submit a 120-word maximum statement about the significance of their research paper written at a level understandable to an undergraduate educated scientist outside their field of speciality. The primary goal of the Significance Statement is to explain the relevance of the work in broad context to a broad readership. The Significance Statement appears in the paper itself and is required for all research papers.

^{*}For example, see (3-5).

[†] From Computer Science see: (6, 7). From Economics see: (8, 9). From Psychology see: (10, 11). From Statistics and Sociology see: (12, 13).

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Addressing Dependencies in Dyadic Data

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Relational, or dyadic, data provide measurements of how pairs of actors relate to one another. The easiest way to organize such data is the directed dvadic design in which the unit of analysis is some set of n actors that have been paired together to form a dataset of z directed dyads. A tabular design such as this for a set of n actors, $\{i, j, k, l\}$ results in $n \times (n-1)$ observations, as shown in Table ??.

Table 1. Structure of datasets used in canonical design.

Sender	Receiver	Event	
$\phantom{aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa$	j	y_{ij}	
	k	y_{ik}	
:	l	y_{il}	
j	i	y_{ji}	
	k	y_{jk}	
:	l	y_{jl}	
k	i	y_{ki}	
:	j	y_{kj}	
į	l	y_{kl}	
l	i	y_{li}	
:	j	y_{lj}	
<u> </u>	k	y_{lk}	

Table 2. Adjacency matrix representation of data in Table ??. Senders are represented by the rows and receivers by the columns.

	i	j	k	l
i	NA	y_{ij}	y_{ik}	y_{il}
j	y_{ji}	NA	y_{jk}	y_{jl}
k	y_{ki}	y_{kj}	NA	y_{kl}
l	y_{li}	y_{lj}	y_{lk}	NA

When modeling relational data, scholars typically employ a generalized linear model (GLM). An assumption we make when applying this modeling technique is that each of the dyadic observations is conditionally independent. However, this is a strong assumption to make given that events between actors in a network are often interdependent. The dependencies that tend to develop in relational data can be more easily understood when we move away from stacking dyads on top of one another and turn instead to a matrix design as shown in Table ??. Operationally, this type of data structure is represented as a $n \times n$ matrix, Y, where the diagonals are typically undefined. The ij^{th} entry defines the relationship sent from i to j and can be continuous or discrete.§

The most common type of dependency that arises in networks are first-order, or nodal dependencies, and these point to the fact that we typically find significant heterogeneity in activity levels across nodes. The implication of this across-node heterogeneity is within-node homogeneity of ties, meaning that values across a row, say $\{y_{ij}, y_{ik}, y_{il}\}$, will be more similar to each other than other values in the adjacency matrix because each of these values has a common sender i. This type of dependency manifests in cases where sender i tends to be 187 more active or less active in the network than other senders. 188 Similarly, while some actors may be more active in sending ties 189 to others in the network, we might also observe that others 190 are more popular targets, this would manifest in observations 191 down a column, $\{y_{ii}, y_{ki}, y_{li}\}$, being more similar. Last, we 192 might also find that actors who are more likely to send ties in a 193 network are also more likely to receive them, meaning that the 194 row and column means of an adjacency matrix may be corre- 195 lated. Another ubiquitous type of structural interdependency 196 is reciprocity. This is a second-order, or dyadic, dependency 197 relevant only to directed datasets, and asserts that values of y_{ij} and y_{ij} may be statistically dependent. The prevalence of these types of potential interactions within directed dyadic data also complicates the basic assumption of observational independence.

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The presence of these types of interdependencies in re- 203 lational data complicates the a priori assumption of obser- 204 vational independence. Accordingly, inferences drawn from 205 misspecified models that ignore potential interdependencies between dyadic observations are likely to have a number of 207 issues including biased estimates of the effect of independent 208 variables, uncalibrated confidence intervals, and poor predictive performance. By ignoring these interdependencies, we ignore a potentially important part of the data generating process behind relational data.

Social Relations Model: Additive Part of AME. The relevance of modeling first- and second-order dependencies has long been recognized within some social sciences particularly in psychology. Warner et al. developed the social relations model (SRM), a type of ANOVA decomposition technique, that facilitates this undertaking (14). The SRM is of particular note as it provides the error structure for the additive effects component of the AME framework that we introduce here. The goal of the SRM is to decompose the variance of observations in an adjacency matrix in terms of heterogeneity across row means (out-degree), heterogeneity along column means (indegree), correlation between row and column means, and correlations within dyads. Wong and Li & Loken and provide a random effects representation of the SRM (15, 16):

$$y_{ij} = \mu + e_{ij}$$

$$e_{ij} = a_i + b_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$\{(a_1, b_1), \dots, (a_n, b_n)\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} N(0, \Sigma_{ab})$$

$$\{(\epsilon_{ij}, \epsilon_{ji}) : i \neq j\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} N(0, \Sigma_{\epsilon}), \text{ where}$$

$$\Sigma_{ab} = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_a^2 & \sigma_{ab} \\ \sigma_{ab} & \sigma_b^2 \end{pmatrix} \quad \Sigma_{\epsilon} = \sigma_{\epsilon}^2 \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

In the above, μ provides a baseline measure of the density 239 or sparsity of a network, and e_{ij} represents residual variation. 240 The residual variation decomposes into parts: a row/sender effect (a_i) , a column/receiver effect (b_i) , and a within-dyad effect (ϵ_{ij}) . The row and column effects are modeled jointly to account for correlation in how active an actor is in sending and receiving ties. Heterogeneity in the row and column means 245 is captured by σ_a^2 and σ_b^2 , respectively, and σ_{ab} describes the 246 linear relationship between these two effects (i.e., whether 247 actors who send [receive] a lot of ties also receive [send] a 248

2 | Minhas et al.

[‡]See the online appendix for a longer discussion on the limitations of using GLM to study relational data.

[§]Relations between actors in a network setting at times does not involve senders and receivers Networks such as these are referred to as undirected and all the relations between actors are symmetric, meaning $y_{ij} = y_{ij}$.

249 lot of ties). Beyond these first-order dependencies, secondorder dependencies are described by σ_{ϵ}^2 and a within dyad correlation, or reciprocity, parameter ρ .

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
The SRM covariance structure described in Equation 1 can 253 be incorporated into the systematic component of a GLM framework to produce the social relations regression model (SRRM): $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\top} \mathbf{X}_{ij} + a_i + b_j + \epsilon_{ij}$, where $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\top} \mathbf{X}_{ij}$ accommodates the inclusion of dyadic, sender, and receiver covariates (17). The SRRM approach incorporates row, column, and withindyad dependence in way that is widely used and understood by applied researchers: a regression framework and additive random effects to accommodate variances and covariances often seen in relational data.


Latent Factor Model: Multiplicative Part of AME. Missing from the framework provided by the SRM is an accounting of thirdorder dependence patterns that can arise in relational data. The ubiquity of third-order effects in relational datasets arises from the presence of some set of shared attributes between nodes that affects their probability of interacting with one another.

For example, one finding from the gravity model of trade that neighboring countries are more likely to trade with one another; in this case, the shared attribute is simply geographic proximity. A finding common in the political economy literature is that democracies are more likely to form trade agreements with one another, and the shared attribute here is a country's political system. Both geographic proximity and a country's political system are examples of homophily, which captures the idea that the relationships between actors with similar characteristics in a network are likely to be stronger than nodes with different characteristics.*

A binary network where actors tend to form ties with others based on some set of shared characteristics often leads to a network graph with a high number of "transitive triads" in which sets of actors $\{i, j, k\}$ are each linked to one another. The left-most plot in Figure 1 provides a representation of a network that exhibits this type of pattern. The relevant implication of this when it comes to conducting statistical inference is that—unless we are able to specify the list of exogenous variable that may explain this prevalence of triads—the probability of j and k forming a tie is not independent of the ties that already exist between those actors and i.

Fig. 1. Graph on the left is a representation of an undirected network that exhibits a high degree of homophily, while on the right we show an undirected network that exhibits stochastic equivalence.





304 \P Furthermore, this handles a diversity of outcome distributions. In the case of binary data this can be done by utilizing a latent variable representation of a probit regression model.

 $306\,$ \parallel Another reason why we may see the emergence of third-order effects is the "sociology" explanation: that individuals want to close triads because this is putatively a more stable or preferable social situation (18).

Homophily can be used to explain the emergence of patterns such as transitivity ("a friend of a friend is a friend") and balance ("an enemy of a friend is an enemy"). See (19) for a more detailed discussion on the concept of homophily

Another third-order dependence pattern that cannot be accounted for in the additive effects framework is stochastic equivalence. A pair of actors ij are stochastically equivalent if the probability of i relating to, and being related to, by every other actor is the same as the probability for j. This refers to the idea that there will be groups of nodes in a network with similar relational patterns. The occurrence of a dependence pattern such as this is not uncommon in the social science applications. Recent work estimates a stochastic equivalence structure to explain the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between countries (20). Specifically, they suggest that PTA formation is related to differences in per capita income levels between countries. Countries falling into high, middle, and low income per capita levels will have patterns of PTA formation that are determined by the groups into which they fall. Such a structure is represented in the right-most panel of Figure 1, here the lightly shaded group of nodes at the top can represent high-income countries, nodes on the bottom-left middle-income, and the darkest shade of nodes low-income countries. The behavior of actors in a network can at times be governed by group level dynamics, and failing to account for such dynamics leaves potentially important parts of the data generating process ignored.

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To account for third-order dependence patterns within the context of the SRRM we turn to latent variable models, which have become a popular approach for modeling relational data in fields as diverse as biology to computer science to the social sciences. These models assumes that relationships between nodes are mediated by a small number (K) of node-specific unobserved latent variables. One reason for their increased usage is that they enable researchers to capture and visualize thirdorder dependencies in a way that other approaches are not able to replicate. Additionally, the conditional independence assumption facilitates the testing of a variety of nodal and dyadic level theories, and provides a range of computational advantages.

A number of latent variable approaches have been developed to represent third-order dependencies in relational data, we focus on two here: the latent space model – also known as the latent distance model – and the latent factor model. For the sake of exposition, we consider the case where relations are symmetric to describe the differences between these approaches. Both of these approaches can be incorporated into an undirected version of the framework that we have been constructing through the inclusion of an additional term to the model for y_{ij} , $\alpha(u_i, u_j)$, that captures latent third-order characteristics of a network, where u_i and u_j are node-specific latent variables. General definitions for how $\alpha(u_i, u_j)$ is defined for these latent variable models are shown in Equations 2. One other point of note about these approaches is that researchers have to specify a value for K.

Latent space model

$$\alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_j) = -|\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_j|$$

$$\mathbf{u}_i \in \mathbb{R}^K, \ i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$$

Latent factor model

$$\alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_j) = \mathbf{u}_i^{\top} \Lambda \mathbf{u}_j$$

$$\mathbf{u}_i \in \mathbb{R}^K, i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$$

$$\Lambda \text{ a } K \times K \text{ diagonal matrix}$$

The latent space model was developed by (13) to capture homophily. In this approach, each node i has some unknown latent position in K dimensional space, $\mathbf{u}_i \in \mathbb{R}^K$, and the probability of a tie between a pair ij is a function of the negative Euclidean distance between them: $-|\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_i|$. Hoff et al. show that because latent distances for a triple of actors obey the triangle inequality, this formulation models the tendencies toward homophily commonly found in social networks. This approach has been operationalized in the **latentnet** package developed by Krivitsky & Handcock (21). However, this approach also comes with an important shortcoming: it confounds stochastic equivalence and homophily. Consider two nodes i and j that are proximate to one another in K dimensional Euclidean space, this suggests not only that $|\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_i|$ is small but also that $|\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_l| \approx |\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_l|$, the result being that nodes i and j will by construction assumed to possess the same relational patterns with other actors such as l (i.e., that they are stochastically equivalent). Thus latent space models confound strong ties with stochastic equivalence. This approach cannot adequately model data with many ties between nodes that have different network roles.

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An alternative framework is the latent factor model. An early iteration of the latent factor approach was presented in (17). The revised approach is motivated by an eigenvalue decomposition of a network. An important difference in the earlier approaches compared to the model that we present here is that Λ was taken to be the identity matrix thus stochastic equivalence could not be characterized. The motivation for this alternative framework stems from the fact that many real networks exhibit varying degrees of stochastic equivalence and homophily. In these situations, using the latent space model would end up representing only a part of the network structure. In the latent factor model, each actor has an unobserved vector of characteristics, $\mathbf{u}_i = \{u_{i,1}, \dots, u_{i,K}\}$, which describe their behavior as an actor in the network. The probability of a tie from i to j depends on the extent to which \mathbf{u}_i and \mathbf{u}_i are "similar" (i.e., point in the same direction) and on whether the entries of Λ are greater or less than zero.

More specifically, the similarity in the latent factors, $\mathbf{u}_i \approx$ \mathbf{u}_i , corresponds to how stochastically equivalent a pair of actors are and the eigenvalue determines whether the network exhibits positive or negative homophily. For example, say that that we estimate a rank-one latent factor model (i.e., K=1), in this case \mathbf{u}_i is represented by a scalar $u_{i,1}$, similarly, $\mathbf{u}_j = u_{j,1}$, and Λ will have just one diagonal element λ . The average effect this will have on y_{ij} is simply $\lambda \times u_i \times u_j$, where a positive value of $\lambda > 0$ indicates homophily and $\lambda < 0$ antihomophily. This approach can represent both homophily and stochastic equivalence, and that the alternative latent variable approaches can be represented as a latent factor model but not vice versa (22). In the directed version of this approach, we use the singular value decomposition, here actors in the network have a vector of latent characteristics to describe their behavior as a sender, denoted by \mathbf{u} , and as a receiver, \mathbf{v} : $\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{v}_j \in \mathbb{R}^K$. These again can alter the probability, or in the continuous case value, of an interaction between ij additively: $\mathbf{u}_i^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{D} \mathbf{v}_i$, where **D** is an $K \times K$ diagonal matrix.

Both the latent space and factor models are "conditional independence models" in that they assume that ties are conditionally independent given all of the observed predictors and unknown node-specific parameters: p(Y|X,U) = $\prod_{i < j} p(y_{i,j}|x_{i,j},u_i,u_j)$. Typical parametric models of this 435 form relate $y_{i,j}$ to $(x_{i,j}, u_i, u_j)$ via some sort of link function: 436

$$p(y_{i,j}|x_{i,j}, u_i, u_j) = f(y_{i,j} : \eta_{i,j})$$

$$\eta_{i,j} = \beta^{\top} x_{i,j} + \alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_j).$$

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The structure of $\alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_j)$ can result in very different interpretations for any estimates of the regression coefficients β . For example, suppose the latent effects $\{u_1,\ldots,u_n\}$ are near zero on average (if not, their mean can be absorbed into an intercept parameter and row and column additive effects). Under the latent factor model, the average value of $\alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) = \mathbf{u}_i^{\top} \Lambda \mathbf{u}_i$ will be near zero and so we have

$$\eta_{i,j} = \beta^{\top} x_{i,j} + \mathbf{u}_i^{\top} \Lambda \mathbf{u}_j$$
$$\bar{\eta} \approx \beta^{\top} \bar{x},$$

and so the values of β can be interpreted as yielding the 454 "average" value of $\eta_{i,j}$. On the other hand, under the space model

$$\eta_{i,j} = \beta^{\top} x_{i,j} - |\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_j|$$
$$\bar{\eta} \approx \beta^{\top} \bar{x} - \overline{|\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_j|} < \beta^{\top} \bar{x}.$$

In this case, $\beta^{\top} \bar{x}$ does not represent an "average" value of the predictor $\eta_{i,j}$, it represents a maximal value as if all actors were zero distance from each other in the latent social space. For example, consider the simplest case of a normally distributed network outcome with an identity link. In this

$$y_{i,j} = \beta^{\top} x_{i,j} + \alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_j) + \epsilon_{i,j}$$
$$\bar{y} \approx \beta^{\top} \bar{x} + \overline{\alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{u}_j)}$$
$$= \approx \beta^{\top} \bar{x}.$$

Under the space model, $\bar{y} \approx \beta^{\top} \bar{x} + \overline{|\mathbf{u}_i - \mathbf{u}_i|} < \beta^{\top} \bar{x}$, and so we no longer can interpret β as representing the linear relationship between y and x. Instead, it may be thought of as describing some sort of average hypothetical "maximal" relationship between $y_{i,j}$ and $x_{i,j}$.

Thus the latent factor model provides two important benefits. First, we are able to capture a wider assortment of 481dependence patterns that arise in relational data, and, second, parameter interpretation is more straightforward. The AME approach considers the regression model shown in Equation 7:

$$y_{ij} = g(\theta_{ij}) \tag{3}$$

$$\theta_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{X}_{ij} + e_{ij} \tag{4}$$

$$e_{ij} = a_i + b_j + \epsilon_{ij} + \alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{v}_j)$$
, where [5] 489

$$\alpha(\mathbf{u}_i, \mathbf{v}_j) = \mathbf{u}_i^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{D} \mathbf{v}_j = \sum_{k \in K} d_k u_{ik} v_{jk}$$
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Using this framework, we are able to model the dyadic observations as conditionally independent given θ , where θ

4 | Minhas et al. 497 depends on the the unobserved random effects, e. e is then modeled to account for the potential first, second, and thirdorder dependencies that we have discussed. As described in 500 Equation 1, $a_i + b_j + \epsilon_{ij}$, are the additive random effects in this framework and account for sender, receiver, and within-dyad 502 dependence. The multiplicative effects, $\mathbf{u}_i^{\top} \mathbf{D} \mathbf{v}_i$, are used to 503 capture higher-order dependence patterns that are left over 504 in θ after accounting for any known covariate information. 505 A Bayesian procedure in which parameters are iteratively 506 updated using a Gibbs sampler is available in the amen package to estimate this type of generalized linear mixed effects model from continuous, binary, ordinal, and other relational data types.

Empirical Comparison

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513 To contrast AME with alternative approaches, we utilize a cross-sectional network measuring whether an actor indicated that they collaborated with each other during the policy design of the Swiss CO₂ act (23). The Swiss government proposed this act in 1995 with the goal of undertaking a 10% reduction in CO₂ emissions by 2012. The act was accepted in the Swiss Parliament in 2000 and implemented in 2008. Ingold (23), and subsequent work by Ingold & Fischer (24), sought to determine what drives collaboration among actors trying to affect climate change policy. The set of actors included in this network are those that were identified by experts as holding an important position in Swiss climate policy. In total, Ingold identifies 34 relevant actors: five state actors, eleven industry and business representatives, seven environmental NGOs and civil society organizations, five political parties, and six scientific institutions and consultants.

We follow Ingold & Fischer in developing a model specification. We do not review the specification in detail here, instead we just provide a summary of the variables to be included and the theoretical expectations of their effects in Table ??.

Parameter Estimates. Using the specification described in Table ?? we compare five different modeling approaches. First, as a baseline we use a logistic regression model. We also use two popular network based approaches: the multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP) and the exponential random graph model (ERGM). Next, we use a latent space model (LSM) with a two-dimensional Euclidean distance metric. Last, we use the AME, in which we account for nodal and dyadic heterogeneity using the SRM and third-order effects

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represented by a latent factor approach with K=2. SI Appendix, Table X shows that the parameter estimates presented here for the AME model remain very similar no matter the K

Most relevant for us are how parameter estimates from AME relate to other approaches. The first point to note is that, in general, the parameter estimates returned by the AME are similar to those of MRQAP and ERGM but quite different from the LSM. For example, while the LSM returns a result for the Opposition/alliance variable that diverges from MRQAP and ERGM, the AME returns a result that is

not only similar to those approaches but in line with the theoretical expectations of (author?) (24). Similar discrepancies between LSM and other approaches appear for parameters such as Influence attribution and Alter's influence degree. Each of these discrepancies are resolved when using AME. In part, this is a result of how the LSM approach complicates the interpretation of the effect of exogenous variables. SI Appendix, Table X shows that these differences persist even when incorporating sender and receiver random effects or when switching to a bilinear approach to handle third-order dependencies.

There are also notable differences between the parameter estimates that result from the MRQAP, ERGM, and the AME. Using the AME we find evidence that Preference dissimilarity is associated with a reduced probability of collaboration between a pair of actors, which is in line with the theoretical expectations stated earlier. Additionally, the AME and MRQAP results differ from ERGM for the nodal effects related to whether a receiver of a collaboration is a government actor, Alter=Government actor, and whether the sender is an environmental NGO, Ego=Environmental NGO.

Tie Formation Prediction. How do these approaches fit the data out-of-sample? We utilize a cross-validation procedure to assess the out-of-sample performance for each of the models presented in Table ?? as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. Please include your acknowledgments here, set in a single paragraph. Please do not include any acknowledgments in the Supporting Information, or anywhere else in the

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 $^{^{\}dagger\dagger}$ The set of parameters that are estimated in the model from the observed data, $\{Y,X\}$, are: latent Gaussian variables (θ); nodal and/or dyadic regression coefficients (β); additive nodal random effects $(\{(a_i,b_i)\}\in\{i=1,\ldots,n\})$; network covariance $(\Sigma_{ab},\Sigma_{\epsilon})$; multiplicative effects $(\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}, \text{ and } \mathbf{D}).$

 $^{^{\}ddagger\ddagger}$ This is a directed relational matrix as an actor i can indicate that they collaborated with j but jmay not have stated that they collaborated with i.

 $667 \\ 668$

 $671 \\ 672$

 $678 \\ 679$

 $680 \\ 681$

Table 3. Summary of variables to be included in model specification.

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 $688 \\ 689$

 $696 \\ 697$

 $702 \\ 703$

 $709 \\ 710$

 $728 \\ 729$

 $732 \\ 733$

 $739 \\ 740$

 $741 \\ 742$

Variable	Description	Expected Effect
Conflicting policy preferenc	es	
Business v. NGO	Binary, dyadic covariate that equals one when one actor is from the business sector and the other an NGO.	_
Opposition/alliance	Binary, dyadic covariate that equals one when i , sender, perceives j , receiver, as having similar policy objectives regarding climate change.	+
Preference dissimilarity	Transformation of four core beliefs into a Manhattan distance matrix, smaller the distance the closer the beliefs of i and j .	_
Transaction costs		
Joint forum participation	Binary, dyadic covariate that equals one when i and j belong to the same policy forum.	+
Influence		
Influence attribution	Binary, dyadic covariate that equals one when i considers j to be influential.	+
Alter's influence in-degree	Number of actors that mention i as being influential, this is a measure of reputational power.	+
Influence absolute diff.	Absolute difference in reputational power between i and j .	_
Alter = Government Actor	Binary, nodal covariate that equals one when j is a state actor.	+
Functional requirements		
Ego = Environment NGO	Binary, nodal covariate that equals one when i is an NGO.	+
Same actor type	Binary, dyadic covariate that equals when i and j are the same actor type.	+
Endogenous dependencies:	ERGM Specific Parameters	
Mutuality	Captures concept of reciprocity, if i indicates they collaborated with j then j likely collaborates with i .	+
Outdegree popularity	Captures idea that actors sending more ties will be more popular targets them- selves for collaboration.	+
Twopaths	Counts the number of two-paths in the network, two-path is an instance where i is connected to j , j to k , but i is not connected to k .	_
GWIdegree (2.0)	Takes into account how many ties a node sends in the network, used to capture network structures that result from some highly active nodes.	+
GWESP (1.0)	Counts the number of shared partners for each pair and sums across.	+
GWOdegree (0.5)	Takes into account how many ties a node receives in the network, used to capture networks structures that result from some highly popular nodes.	+

6 | Minhas et al.

Conflicting policy preferences Business vs. NGO -0.86 -0.87* -1.37* -1.11* -1.37* -1.11* -1.37* Opposition/alliance -1.21* -1.14* -0.00 -1.22* -1.08* -0.20) -1.66 -1.76* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.27) -0.60 -1.76* -0.44 -0.79* -0.27) -0.60 -1.55; -0.08] Transaction costs Joint forum participation -0.88* -0.75* -1.51* -0.90* -0.86; 2.17] -0.28) -0.40; 0.39) -0.28* -0.40; 0.39) -0.55* -0.41 -0.42 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.44 -0.79* -0.40; 0.39) -0.68; 2.17] -0.28) -0.40; 0.55] -0.21) -0.68; 2.17] -0.02) -0.02) -0.03; 0.04] -0.01 -0.21* -0.01; 0.02) -0.03; 0.04] -0.05* -0.07* -0.07; 0.15] -0.01; 0.09] -0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.05; 0.02; 0.02; 0.02; 0.03; 0.04] -0.05* -0.07* -0.06* -0.04 -0.05* -0.07* -0.06* -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.55 -0.77; 1.15] -0.38; 1.71] -0.38; 1.71] -0.38; 1.71] -0.38; 1.71] -0.38; 1.71] -0.39 -0.60 -0.79* -0.67 -0.26) -0.26) -1.32; 0.09] -0.17; -0.38; 1.71] -0.38; 1.71] -0.39; 0.25) -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.12; 0.96] -0.02; -0.04* -0.05* -0.04* -0.05* -0.07* -0.06* -0.04* -0.05* -0.07; 1.15] -0.08; 1.00* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.07; 1.15] -0.07; 1.15] -0.08; 1.00* -0.06*	•		•			
Conflicting policy preferences Business vs. NGO -0.86 -0.87* -1.37* -1.11* -1.37* -1.11* -1.37* Opposition/alliance -1.21* -1.14* -1.000 -1.22* -1.08* -0.20) -1.60* -1.76* -0.44 -0.79* -0.40; 0.39) -1.55; -0.08] Transaction costs Joint forum participation -0.27 Influence Influence attribution -1.20* -0.22) -1.21* -0.22) -1.55; -0.08 Alter's influence indegree -0.10* -0.02) -1.20* -0.03* -0.06* -0.04 -0.05* -0.07; 0.15] -0.11* -0.02) -1.09* -0.07; 0.15] -0.01* -0.02) -1.01* -0.02) -1.01* -0.03* -0.06* -0.04 -0.05* -0.07; 0.15] -0.11; 0.03] -0.05* -0.07; 1.15] Functional requirements		Logit	MRQAP	LSM	ERGM	AME
Conflicting policy preferences Business vs. NGO -0.86 -0.87* -1.37* -1.11* -1.37* Queen of the properties of	Intercept/Edges	-4.44*	-4.24*	0.94*	-12.17*	-3.39*
Business vs. NGO		(0.34)		[0.09; 1.82]	(1.40)	[-4.38; -2.50]
Opposition/alliance (0.46) (-2.42, -0.41] (0.51) (-2.44, -0.47]	Conflicting policy preferences					
Opposition/alliance 1.21* 1.14* 0.00 1.22* 1.08* (0.20) [-0.40; 0.39] (0.20) [0.72; 1.47] Preference dissimilarity -0.07 -0.60 -1.76* -0.44 -0.79* (0.37) [-2.62; -0.90] (0.39) [-1.55; -0.08] Transaction costs Joint forum participation 0.88* 0.75* 1.51* 0.90* 0.92* Influence (0.27) [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] Influence attribution 1.20* 1.29* 0.08 1.00* 1.09* Influence attribution 1.20* 1.29* 0.08 1.00* 1.09* Alter's influence indegree 0.10* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* (0.22) [-0.40; 0.55] (0.21) [0.69; 1.53] Influence absolute diff. -0.03* -0.06* 0.04 -0.05* -0.07* (0.22) [-0.03; 0.04] (0.04) [0.71; -0.03] -0.07* 0.05* Influence absol	Business vs. NGO	-0.86	-0.87*	-1.37*	-1.11*	-1.37*
Preference dissimilarity		(0.46)		[-2.42; -0.41]	(0.51)	[-2.44; -0.47]
Preference dissimilarity	Opposition/alliance	1.21*	1.14*	0.00	1.22*	1.08*
Transaction costs Joint forum participation 0.88* 0.75* 1.51* 0.90* 0.92* [0.40; 1.47] Influence Influence attribution 1.20* 1.29* 0.08 1.00* 1.09* (0.21) [0.69; 1.53] Alter's influence indegree 0.10* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* (0.02) [-0.03; 0.04] (0.04) [0.07; 0.15] Influence absolute diff. 0.02) [-0.01; 0.09] (0.01) [-0.11; -0.03] Alter = Government actor 0.63* 0.68 -0.46 1.04* 0.55 Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO 0.26) [-1.08; 0.14] (0.34) [-0.07; 1.15] Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO 0.88* 0.99 -0.60 0.79* 0.67 (0.26) [-1.32; 0.09] (0.17) [-0.38; 1.71] Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) [-0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity Twopaths GWESP (1.0) GWESP (1.0) GWOdegree (0.5)		(0.20)		[-0.40; 0.39]	(0.20)	[0.72; 1.47]
Transaction costs Joint forum participation 0.88* 0.75* 1.51* 0.90* 0.92* [0.40; 1.47] Influence Influence attribution 1.20* 1.29* 0.08 1.00* 1.09* [0.69; 1.53] Alter's influence indegree 0.10* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* (0.02) Influence absolute diff. 0.02) [-0.03; 0.04] (0.04) [0.07; 0.15] Influence absolute diff. 0.02) [-0.01; 0.09] (0.01) [-0.11; -0.03] Alter = Government actor 0.63* 0.68 -0.46 1.04* 0.55 Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO 0.88* 0.99 -0.60 0.79* 0.67 (0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.71] Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity 0.95* (0.09) Twopaths GWESP (1.0) GWESP (1.0) GWOdegree (0.5)	Preference dissimilarity	-0.07	-0.60	-1.76*	-0.44	-0.79*
Joint forum participation (0.27) [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] [0.86; 2.17] (0.28) [0.40; 1.47] [0.86; 2.17] [0.86; 2.17] [0.86; 2.17] [0.86; 2.17] [0.86; 2.18] [0.40; 1.53] [0.21] [0.69; 1.53] [0.22] [0.40; 0.55] (0.21) [0.69; 1.53] [0.21] [0.69; 1.53] [0.21] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.07; 0.15] [0.02] [0.03; 0.04] [0.04] [0.07; 0.15] [0.02] [0.03; 0.04] [0.04] [0.07; 0.15] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.07; 0.15] [0.02] [0.01] [0.0		(0.37)		[-2.62; -0.90]	(0.39)	[-1.55; -0.08]
Influence Influence attribution	Transaction costs					
Influence attribution	Joint forum participation	0.88*	0.75*	1.51*	0.90*	0.92*
Influence attribution 1.20* 1.29* 0.08 1.00* 1.09* (0.22)		(0.27)		[0.86; 2.17]	(0.28)	[0.40; 1.47]
Alter's influence indegree 0.10* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* 0.00*	Influence					
Alter's influence indegree 0.10* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.11* (0.02)	Influence attribution	1.20*	1.29*	0.08	1.00*	1.09*
(0.02)		(0.22)		[-0.40; 0.55]	(0.21)	[0.69; 1.53]
Influence absolute diff. -0.03* -0.06* 0.04 -0.05* -0.07* (0.02) [-0.01; 0.09] (0.01) [-0.11; -0.03] Alter = Government actor 0.63* 0.68 -0.46 1.04* 0.55 (0.25) [-1.08; 0.14] (0.34) [-0.07; 1.15] Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO 0.88* 0.99 -0.60 0.79* 0.67 (0.26) [-1.32; 0.09] (0.17) [-0.38; 1.71] Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5)	Alter's influence indegree	0.10*	0.11*	0.01	0.21*	0.11*
Influence absolute diff. -0.03* -0.06* 0.04 -0.05* -0.07* (0.02) [-0.01; 0.09] (0.01) [-0.11; -0.03] Alter = Government actor 0.63* 0.68 -0.46 1.04* 0.55 (0.25) [-1.08; 0.14] (0.34) [-0.07; 1.15] Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO 0.88* 0.99 -0.60 0.79* 0.67 (0.26) [-1.32; 0.09] (0.17) [-0.38; 1.71] Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity (0.99) Twopaths -0.04* GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*		(0.02)		[-0.03; 0.04]	(0.04)	[0.07; 0.15]
Alter = Government actor 0.63* 0.68 -0.46 1.04* 0.55 (0.25) [-1.08; 0.14] (0.34) [-0.07; 1.15] Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO 0.88* 0.99 -0.60 0.79* 0.67 (0.26) [-1.32; 0.09] (0.17) [-0.38; 1.71] Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* 0.81* 0.39 (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity 0.95* (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5)	Influence absolute diff.	-0.03*	-0.06*	0.04		-0.07*
Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO		(0.02)		[-0.01; 0.09]	(0.01)	[-0.11; -0.03]
Functional requirements Ego = Environmental NGO	Alter = Government actor	0.63*	0.68	-0.46	1.04*	0.55
Ego = Environmental NGO		(0.25)		[-1.08; 0.14]	(0.34)	[-0.07; 1.15]
(0.26) [-1.32; 0.09] (0.17) [-0.38; 1.71] Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) (-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5)	Functional requirements					
Same actor type 0.74* 1.12* 1.17* 0.99* 1.04* (0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5)	Ego = Environmental NGO	0.88*	0.99	-0.60	0.79*	0.67
(0.22) [0.63; 1.71] (0.23) [0.63; 1.50] Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5)		(0.26)		[-1.32; 0.09]	(0.17)	[-0.38; 1.71]
Endogenous dependencies Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* 0.81* 0.39 (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity 0.95* (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5)	Same actor type	0.74*	1.12*	1.17*	0.99*	1.04*
Mutuality 1.22* 1.00* 0.81* 0.39 (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity 0.95* (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*		(0.22)		[0.63; 1.71]	(0.23)	[0.63; 1.50]
(0.21) (0.25) [-0.12; 0.96] Outdegree popularity (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*	Endogenous dependencies					
Outdegree popularity 0.95* (0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*	Mutuality	1.22*	1.00*		0.81*	0.39
(0.09) Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*	,	(0.21)			(0.25)	[-0.12; 0.96]
Twopaths -0.04* (0.02) GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*	Outdegree popularity				0.95*	_
GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*					(0.09)	
GWIdegree (2.0) 3.42* (1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*	Twopaths				-0.04*	
(1.47) GWESP (1.0) 0.58* (0.16) GWOdegree (0.5) 8.42*	·				(0.02)	
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5 ()	GWOdegree (0.5)				. ,	
(2.11)	J (/				(2.11)	

 $839 \\ 840$

 $843 \\ 844$

 $778 \\ 779$

 $782 \\ 783$