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# The Decline of American Engagement:
# Patterns in U.S. Troop Deployments

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The number of U.S. troops deployed has been trending downward over the short and long terms, and is projected to reach zero before mid-century. This paper analyzes a unified dataset of U.S. troop deployments from 1950 to 2015, including annual estimates of "boots on the ground" in hundreds of countries. Linear and nonlinear forecast models of troop levels agree that total and deployed U.S. troop levels are declining rapidly. The trends are paradoxical as they contrast with an increasing number of countries where U.S. troops are based above three different threshold levels of troops in country per year. Econometric tests of causality indicate a link runs from total troop levels to deployments, but not vice versa, implying that a smaller U.S. military will indeed cause foreign policy to be less directly engaged.

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# 1    Introduction

This paper accompanies the publication of a comprehensive dataset that accounts for all annual U.S. troop deployments to 200 polities from 1950-2015. It extends previous datasets by a decade, focusing on counts of "boots on the ground" of uniformed service members from the four primary services – Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.[1]

In addition, this paper analyzes trends in the dataset. Just over 1.3 million men and women are in uniform in 2015, compared to 2 million in 1990 (the end of the Cold War) and 3 million in 1970 (the middle of the Vietnam War), as shown in figure 1. Two surprising facts about U.S. force posture in recent years stand out. First, the percentage of the U.S. population serving on active duty is lower today than at any time in the modern era, currently less than half of one percent, or 0.43% to be exact. Second, today there are fewer deployed U.S. troops based overseas relative to the world population than at any time since 1950. See figure 2.

**Figure 1.**



These two facts establish an unmistakable long-term trend – the strategic withdrawal of U.S. forces from the world. Regardless of public impressions of heavy U.S. engagement, the downward trend seems beyond doubt. A fundamental question is if this trend is colloquial or if it is also a mathematical provable trend in the statistical sense. This paper analyzes trends in troop levels and deployment levels using statistical techniques to forecast troop strength and forward force posture in coming decades. These forecasts have a wide margin of error, yet the analysis should be of interest given the importance of force posture to security, diplomatic, and budgetary policy. By limiting our analysis to variables presented here – active duty troops, deployed troops, and a measure of the breadth of deployments – we also explore which variables have primacy in a causal sense. In short, which comes first, troops, commitments, or deployments?

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[1] Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003," *The Heritage Foundation*, Center for Data Analysis Report No. 04-11 (October 2004).

**Figure 2.**

## U.S. Troops relative to Population, 1950-2015



Section 2 describes the dataset's creation and refinement. Section 3 describes regional patterns in troop deployments and introduces different synthetic measures of foreign engagement. Section 4 analyzes two raw data series – total troop strength and foreign troop deployments – as well as the synthetic variables. Section 5 concludes.

## 2    Data

Pentagon records of U.S. troop deployments on a country-by-country basis exist as far back as 1950 and have been published annually by different offices ever since. Kane (2004) integrated the annual reports for the first time in a single spreadsheet by de-conflicting the different historical formats, definitions, and geopolitical shifts.[2] This paper updates that effort, although the difficulty of accurate accounting has increased because of a new opaqueness in annual reports, namely the practice of non-reporting deployment figures for countries involved in wartime operations including Iraq, Afghanistan, neighbors in the region, and even South Korea.

Traditionally the annual deployment count was done as of September 1. An annual spreadsheet was published by the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR) from 1997 until 2011. Interestingly, documents for a few years in the early 1950s were either discarded or never made public, and annual counts for those years are interpolated from

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[2] Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003."

neighboring years. Annual records do not include the same list of countries for a variety of reasons, requiring some effort to digitize and integrate the reports into a unified spreadsheet.

Starting in 2012, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) began publishing the same cross-country "boots on the ground" data in a quarterly report.[3] This paper's integrated dataset includes the September quarterly count for each year, with the exception of 2015, which uses the most recent report of June of that year. Reported troop levels in Middle Eastern countries are complicated and often opaque due to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Over the past decade, many of the DMDC reports list zero/blank troop counts for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other OIF/OEF countries, as well as an inflated number of "undistributed" troop counts. I endeavored to supplement the raw files with more accurate counts from other official sources. Furthermore, the DMDC reporting format is revised frequently in the way countries are reported, the order of countries / regions, or the format of summary totals. For example, recent reports include data on military families (dependents) which were never included before, so a researcher needs to take care to distinguish total active duty forces for comparison across the years.

While total troop levels continue to decline in the Middle East and neighboring countries, exact boots on the ground measurements were difficult to collect. In response to Congressional interest, the Congressional Research Service published a number of insightful reports that detail country deployment counts with great accuracy. Notably, Belasco (2014) documents troop deployments by year and month for OIF/OEF countries.[4] She found that troops deployed in support of OEF were based primarily in Afghanistan, but sizeable numbers were based in the Philippines and Kyrgyzstan among a dozen other locations in the theater of operations. Likewise, Belasco identifies eight countries in addition to Iraq as bases for OIF troops, and a sizeable portion of troops that remain in the "Other" category including classified locations as well as afloat (Navy vessels). By working with congressional staffers, I was able to compile a detailed annual count of boots on the ground in all OIF/OEF countries, although this alone did not completely clarify the matter. In most but not all cases, the congressional count was equal to or higher than the raw data, but in a few cases the public DMDC count was higher. I report the higher of two figures on a case by case basis.

## 3    Global Patterns in U.S. Troop Deployments

In 1950, there were 1.46 million active duty U.S. forces, nearly the same as the 1.30 million in 2015, but the number varied tremendously during the intervening decades. In response to the 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea and later China, over a million U.S. troops

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[3] Defense Manpower Data Center, "Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by Region/Country," *Department of Defense*, (2008-2015).
[4] Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," *Congressional Research Service*, RL33110, (December 2014).

were added to the ranks in 1951 alone. By 1953, the U.S. had 3.5 million troops on active duty, a peak that was matched only once during the Vietnam conflict in the late 1960s.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the U.S. also maintained a relatively small force in Germany as well as countries allied with the U.S. during the war, including France, England, and others. However, the level of troops stationed permanently on European soil tripled during the 1950s as tensions between NATO and the Soviet Union intensified. In West Germany alone, there were roughly 250,000 U.S. forces stationed permanently until the Cold War ended in 1990.

## Table 1. Average Annual U.S. Troop Deployments by Region

| | 1950-1963 | 1964-1973 | 1974-1980 | 1981-1992 | 1993-2001 | 2002-2014 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Worldwide | 2,720,435 | 2,919,280 | 2,080,095 | 2,087,950 | 1,478,454 | 1,401,940 | 1,302,941 |
| Western Europe | 343,033 | 291,962 | 281,222 | 298,500 | 105,555 | 75,247 | 63,859 |
| Eastern Europe | 83 | 57 | 94 | 126 | 9,477 | 1,600 | 197 |
| Former Soviet Union | 45 | 34 | 38 | 54 | 119 | 3,890 | 96 |
| Asia | 287,293 | 450,686 | 110,633 | 103,445 | 79,091 | 69,034 | 77,261 |
| Middle East | 22,517 | 14,371 | 8,379 | 12,827 | 15,485 | 216,855 | 54,434 |
| Africa | 1,031 | 1,721 | 228 | 306 | 1,158 | 2,653 | 3,889 |
| Americas | 35,086 | 23,189 | 15,017 | 16,107 | 10,691 | 1,893 | 1,586 |
| Percent Abroad | 25% | 27% | 20% | 21% | 15% | 26% | 15% |

Source: DOD data compiled by author.

An overview of the force posture is visible in table 1 and figures 3 and 4. Table 1 shows the average annual number of troops based in each region of the world during six time periods. I divided the series at key points in recent military history, using 1964-73 to cover the years of the Vietnam conflict, 1974-1980 for the beginning of the all-volunteer force (AVF), 1981-1992 for the Reagan and Bush administrations and Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan, 1993-2001 to mark the Clinton presidency / peace dividend / Bosnia conflict, and 2002-present for the era after 9/11 attacks which precipitated OEF and OIF. The most interesting pattern may well be the decline in total forces worldwide (which includes the United States) after 2001, roughly 100,000 fewer in the era after than the "peace dividend" era before the 9/11 attacks.

Another surprise is how rapidly forces were withdrawn from the Middle East after 2010, shown in figure 4. At its peak, there were 321,570 American forces deployed to Middle Eastern countries, which was in 2007. There were 100,000 fewer in 2011, and another 100,000 withdrawn in 2012 leaving just 128,020. As of June 2015 (the most current report), there are 54,434 troops deployed to the Middle East. Contrast this with drawdown of U.S. forces from Europe during peacetime. The U.S. based over 100,000 service members in Western Europe for

a decade and a half *after* the cold war. Not until 2005, largely because of OIF, did the U.S. cut its deployments in Europe below 100,000.

**Figure 3.**

### U.S. Troop Deployments, 1950-2015



**Figure 4.**

### U.S. Troop Deployments, 1950-2015



Forward deployment of U.S. forces to NATO countries have been the norm since the 1950s. Only after the 1990 "peace dividend" and the end of the Cold War did a major reshaping occur. And the distribution of those troops among NATO allies was wide. Peak levels of

permanently based U.S. service members among the 23 countries in Western Europe were 274,000 in Germany, 63,000 in the United Kingdom, 18,000 in Italy, 15,000 in Greece, 14,000 in Austria, 13,000 in Spain, 8000 in Greenland, 6000 in Portugal, 5000 in Iceland, 4000 in the Holland, 3500 in Belgium, 3500 in Ireland, and 2000 apiece in Denmark and Finland. France hosted a more than 20,000 U.S. troops for nearly two decades, peaking at 72,000 in 1957, but abruptly terminated permanent basing in 1968. Today, deployments have remained sizable only in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. There are at present no major deployments of American forces in former Soviet and/or Eastern European countries. In total, 15.3 million U.S. troops have been deployed to Europe since 1950.

In Asia, a total of 12.2 million U.S. troops have been permanently deployed since 1950. Wars in Korea (287,000 on average) and Vietnam (450,000 on average) saw large spikes in deployments to the region. After 1974, U.S. troop levels in Asia were steady at just over 110,000 per year, mostly based in Japan, Korea, and until 1992, the Philippines. No other nation hosted more than a thousand. Starting in 1993, U.S. force posture pivoted away from Asia as major bases were shuttered and the number of forces hosted in the region permanently was cut by a third or more. In 2015, the total count is 77,261 U.S. service members, which is the highest level in a decade.

Two continents have seen almost no U.S. troops on permanent bases – South America and Africa. That situation still holds today with the exception of 1500-3000 troops in Djibouti.

The rise in "Undistributed" troops in the past decade is unprecedented in public data forthcoming from the Pentagon. In the past, this category was for miscellaneous and unknown assignments, and the numbers were low For example, it was common in the 1960s for official reports to account for 30,000 and sometimes more troops "undistributed" but most of those were categorized as "afloat". Troops counted as undistributed "ashore" were routinely fewer than 100, with the rare exception during 1990, until the post-9/11 era. During that time, the average count was 100,000 troops, which explains why so many OIF/OEF countries had zero counts.

To get a sense of how widely American forces are deployed, I created a few synthetic measures. Three are threshold counts. For example, there were four countries hosting over 10,000 U.S. troops in 1950, which jumped to nine countries in 1951 and stayed at that level or higher for the next two decades. This "10K+" measure has been steady for over half a century. Two additional threshold counts at 1000+ and 100+ levels are shown in figure 5. However, each of these threshold measures in isolation can miss the nuances of overall U.S. engagement. One way to capture the breadth of U.S. deployments is to sum the log (base 10) measures U.S. troop levels of all countries. For example, if troop levels based in country Z grew from 40 in year 1 to 400 in year 2 and 4000 in year 3, the engagement score would increase by exactly one point per year.

In 1960, the engagement score for Germany is 5.4, which was steady during the 1950s and 60s. The sum of all country engagement scores in 1960 is 197.1. That sum score reached a then-peak of 212.2 in 1966, fell to a low point in 1976, but rose above 200 in 1983. It has not fallen below that level since. Engagement peaked in 2012 at an all-time high score of 244.1, then

experienced its most dramatic drop on record to 211.7 in 2013. This measure paints a picture of widespread U.S. military engagement in the present day, despite the simultaneous drawdown in forces in individual nations.

**Figure 5.**



Synthetic Measures of U.S. Troop Deployments

# 4    Data Analysis of Key Time Series

Earlier in the paper, I noted the unmistakable downward trend in U.S. troop deployments since 1950. What is the projected stable level? Is it zero? This section will apply some statistical tests to project overall and deployed troop levels in the coming decades.

Based on the historical data, we can fit models of troop levels based on linear estimates using time and a constant as the only explanatory variables. These models project that there will be zero American forces deployed abroad in 2045 and zero active duty troops in 2060. While the projections may seem wildly unrealistic, note that this simple linear model explains 71 percent of the variation in total troop levels and 51 percent of the variation in deployed troop levels. Moreover, the historical data indicate that there will be a reduction of 28,841 in total active service members each year, and a reduction of 8556 deployed troops. I also fitted models attempting to discern if the downward trend was proportional (i.e., a percentage decrease each year) rather than linear, but the time series length is apparently too short to make a distinction between the two approaches. The adjusted R-squared was only slightly higher in the proportional model, but t-statistics were weaker.

**Figure 6.**

## Forecasts of Active Duty U.S. Military



A more advanced forecast uses an autoregressive (AR) model, in which the current value in the series is based on lagged values. Assuming the series are stationary, I assessed the number of lagged variables to include in each model. For total troops levels, three lagged variables were indicated as significant, and for deployed troop levels, two lagged variables were. Regressing the data series as AR(3) and AR(2) processes, I was able to determine statistically significant models with lagged coefficients to be used in forecasting as follows:

$$T_t = 2.14 * T_{t-1} - 1.59 * T_{t-2} + 0.44 * T_{t-3} \tag{1}$$

where T stands for all troops worldwide on active duty, including those based in the United States, and

$$D_t = 1.49 * D_{t-1} - 0.52 * D_{t-2} \tag{2}$$

where D stands for all deployed U.S. troops. By fitting the AR model without an intercept (year) and trend (constant), we are assuming that the long-run level of the dependent variable is zero. To check that, I fit AR models including a constant term and year as an independent variable. Interestingly, both terms were rejected at the 5% level for a model of deployed troops, D. However, both terms were statistically significant at the 1% level for total troops, T. In other words, the data cannot reject the null hypothesis that the long-term level of deployed troops is zero. The model for total troop levels is

$$T_t = 11{,}300{,}000 - 5503 * Year_t + 1.37 * T_{t-1} - 0.56 * T_{t-2} \tag{3}$$

Point forecasts made with these estimated models to the year 2050 are shown in figures 6 and 7.

**Figure 7.**

### Forecasts of U.S. Troops Deployed



We might like to think that these projections are wrong because troop levels are not decided on auto-pilot, which is how one naively objectifies mathematical trends, but are controlled by human decision makers. The latter observation is correct but also insufficient to debunk the trend. A counter argument is that the large presence of troops in other countries is an accident of history, and that democracies are unnatural occupiers. Thus, the trend reflects democratic choices, such as the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency on an explicit platform to end the war in Iraq and extricate ground forces from the Middle East generally.

An important first test applied to time series data helps determine if it is "stationary" which means that its core properties such as mean, variance, and autocorrelation are stable over time and can therefore be confidently forecast. Many data series reflect long-term growth rates such as home values or gross domestic product, and are considered non-stationary. In contrast, a stationary series looks more like random noise. Troop levels do not experience positive compound growth, yet neither are they a random walk. Note that I assumed stationarity in doing the AR forecasts, but that assumption may be wrong. It turns out that the Dickey-Fuller test statistic for the T (-1.2) and D (-1.6) are too low to reject the hypothesis that they are non-stationary, even within the 90% confidence interval.[5] In other words, the series show distinct disturbances based on presidential decisions that mean the forecasts are not reliable. Consequently, anyone alarmed by the apparent long-term decline of U.S. engagement apparent in the data may feel relieved that the United States is not destined to withdraw from the world.

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[5] With 65 observations in each series, critical values for the Dickey-Fuller test are -3.559 at the 1% level, -2.918 at the 5% level, and -2.594 at the 10% level. The more negative values for measured series' test statistics mean a stronger rejection of the unit root (non-stationarity) hypothesis.

Perhaps. The reality is that this data series is quite short and any conclusions must be taken with a grain of salt.

A final question can be addressed using the few series introduced in this paper, namely does any one cause the others? One theory of U.S. military engagement might be that the comparatively large number of troops would induce U.S. presidents to be more active, if not aggressive, in deploying troops. According to this theory, a smaller military would lead to fewer foreign wars. The alternative might be true instead, which is that foreign entanglements require a larger army. This dataset can shed some light on those theories, specifically by looking for signs of Granger causality among total troops (T), deployed troops (D), and the engagement score (E).[6]

Attempts to fit multivariate models of each of the three variables, dependent on two lagged values of itself and the others yielded conclusive results. Variation over time of engagement (E), the synthetic measure of how widespread troops are deployed in a given year, was not explained by the inclusion of T or D. Nor did the inclusion of a time variable add explanatory power. Likewise, neither engagements (E) nor deployments (D) add explanatory power to troop levels (T). However, lagged values of troop levels (T) were statistically significant explanatory variables with a p-value of 0.005 in the best regression model for deployments (D). Time and constant terms did not remain statistically significant in regressions, yielding the following model

$$D_t \quad = 1.11 * D_{t-1} - 0.37 * D_{t-2} + 0.06 * T_{t-1} \tag{4}$$

as best fit, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.987. This fit suggests that after accounting for the downward trend from the AR(2) of U.S. troops deployed, an additional amount of troops are deployed equal to 6 percent of the total number of active duty service members. Which came first, the soldiers or the foreign engagements? Causality econometrics say that the troops come first.

The alternative theory of foreign entanglements causing the United States to enlarge the size of its military is not supported by the past 66 years of data. The primary theory of a larger military potentially causing greater foreign engagement is partially true. The data cannot reject the theory that more troops lead to more troops deployed, but it does reject the theory of a wider array (more countries) of engagements. As important as this finding may be, the proper interpretation is not informative of conflict per se. The dataset is largely defined by peaceful allied host countries, not combat or coercive occupation.

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[6] Granger, Clive W. J., "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods," *Econometrica* 37, no. 3 (August 1969): 424-438.

# 5    Conclusion

With the publication of the global U.S. troop deployment dataset described in this paper, foreign policy scholars and policymakers have a new tool to understand the modern era. By integrating inconsistent and divergent public files, the dataset offers an unparalleled perspective on where and when and how many U.S. boots were on the ground. A visual overview of summary data shows an outright decline that runs counter to conventional wisdom, but is made stark when projected forward using linear and nonlinear techniques. Not only is America's global footprint growing smaller in raw and per capita terms, but the size of the worldwide force is trending lower as well.

The dataset poses more questions than it answers, offering a rich opportunity for further study. Why is there a downward trend in U.S. foreign engagement? The answer cannot be found by exploring this raw data series alone, and future studies should look to other explanatory variables such as federal and defense budgets, the increasing costs of human resources, and the impact of war. Scholars might also find clues by examining shifts during historical junctures such as presidential administrations and major institutional changes in the services (e.g., the all-volunteer force in 1973). The data is likely to have some kind of relationship with host country defense spending and force posture, either substituting for own-country armies or causing greater conflict and/or larger own-country armies. The truth is almost certainly a mix of both effects in interplay with additional variables, but this data allows that truth to be discovered.

Although U.S. deployments, like the U.S. military budget, are multiples larger than deployments of troops from all other countries, there is undoubtedly a rich interaction to be explored if deployment data for Soviet, English, French, and other nations were compiled and contrasted with this one.

# 6    Data Appendix

The full dataset is pending publication with a peer-reviewed journal. Contact the author with questions.

| Region | Country | Sum1950-2015 |
|--------|---------|--------------|
| 2AS | Asia | 12,231,253 |
| 3WE | Western Europe | 15,264,709 |
| 3EE | Eastern Europe | 110,193 |
| 3FSU | Former Soviet Union | 53,602 |
| 4ME | Middle East | 3,684,438 |
| 5SSA | Africa | 84,405 |
| 6AM | Americas | 1,143,905 |
| | Total | 139,729,204 |
| | Deployed | 32,572,505 |
| | | |
| 2AS | Australia | 25,814 |
| 2AS | Brunei | 23 |
| 2AS | Cambodia | 856 |
| 2AS | China | 1,492 |
| 2AS | Easter Island | 27 |
| 2AS | Fiji and Tonga | 111 |
| 2AS | Hong Kong | 13,626 |
| 2AS | Indonesia | 2,583 |
| 2AS | Japan | 4,526,509 |
| 2AS | Korea, North | 30 |
| 2AS | Korea, South | 3,786,510 |
| 2AS | Laos | 1,009 |
| 2AS | Line Islands | 3 |
| 2AS | Malaysia | 1,920 |
| 2AS | Mongolia | 49 |
| 2AS | Myanmar | 829 |
| 2AS | Nauru | 2 |
| 2AS | New Zealand | 6,789 |
| 2AS | Papua New Guinea | 6 |
| 2AS | Philippines | 685,949 |
| 2AS | Singapore | 4,974 |
| 2AS | Taiwan | 152,365 |
| 2AS | Thailand | 383,096 |
| 2AS | Tonga | 25 |
| 2AS | Vietnam | 2,636,655 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3EE | Albania | 204 |
| 3EE | Bosnia Herzegovina | 52,556 |
| 3EE | Bulgaria | 563 |
| 3EE | Croatia | 5,404 |
| 3EE | Czechoslovakia | 635 |
| 3EE | Germany, East | 557 |
| 3EE | Hungary | 13,665 |
| 3EE | Macedonia | 4,806 |
| 3EE | Poland | 1,302 |
| 3EE | Romania | 781 |
| 3EE | Serbia Montenegro | 28,414 |
| 3EE | Slovakia | 112 |
| 3EE | Yugoslavia | 1,194 |
| 3WE | Austria | 64,359 |
| 3WE | Belgium | 95,822 |
| 3WE | Cyprus | 4,422 |
| 3WE | Denmark | 5,319 |
| 3WE | Finland | 1,246 |
| 3WE | France | 686,060 |
| 3WE | Germany | 11,208,999 |
| 3WE | Gibraltar | 8,226 |
| 3WE | Greece | 148,541 |
| 3WE | Greenland | 95,370 |
| 3WE | Iceland | 160,411 |
| 3WE | Ireland | 4,274 |
| 3WE | Italy | 744,019 |
| 3WE | Luxembourg | 436 |
| 3WE | Malta | 5,660 |
| 3WE | Netherlands | 89,039 |
| 3WE | Norway | 20,139 |
| 3WE | Portugal | 101,268 |
| 3WE | Spain | 390,914 |
| 3WE | Sweden | 1,180 |
| 3WE | Switzerland | 1,595 |
| 3WE | United Kingdom | 1,427,354 |
| 3WE | Vatican City | 56 |
| 3FSU | Armenia | 90 |
| 3FSU | Azerbaijan | 129 |
| 3FSU | Belarus | 32 |
| 3FSU | Estonia | 117 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3FSU | Georgia | 307 |
| 3FSU | Kazakhstan | 5,411 |
| 3FSU | Kyrgyzstan | 38,614 |
| 3FSU | Latvia | 78 |
| 3FSU | Lithuania | 115 |
| 3FSU | Moldova | 51 |
| 3FSU | Russia | 3,247 |
| 3FSU | Slovenia | 126 |
| 3FSU | Tajikistan | 249 |
| 3FSU | Turkmenistan | 81 |
| 3FSU | Ukraine | 296 |
| 3FSU | Uzbekistan | 4,659 |
| 4ME | Aden | 9 |
| 4ME | Afghanistan | 738,071 |
| 4ME | Algeria | 7,380 |
| 4ME | Bahrein / Bahrain | 85,560 |
| 4ME | Bangladesh | 344 |
| 4ME | British IOT | 35,079 |
| 4ME | Egypt | 34,207 |
| 4ME | India | 2,827 |
| 4ME | Iran | 17,509 |
| 4ME | Iraq | 1,341,736 |
| 4ME | Israel | 3,661 |
| 4ME | Jordan | 10,529 |
| 4ME | Kashmir | 1 |
| 4ME | Kuwait | 463,671 |
| 4ME | Lebanon | 19,263 |
| 4ME | Libya | 77,497 |
| 4ME | Morocco | 148,416 |
| 4ME | Nepal | 393 |
| 4ME | Oman | 10,241 |
| 4ME | Pakistan | 19,073 |
| 4ME | Qatar | 193,848 |
| 4ME | Saudi Arabia | 118,143 |
| 4ME | Sri Lanka / Ceylon | 590 |
| 4ME | Sudan | 457 |
| 4ME | Syria | 518 |
| 4ME | Tunisia | 1,126 |
| 4ME | Turkey | 315,604 |
| 4ME | United Arab Emirates | 37,367 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4ME | Western Sahara | 11 |
| 4ME | Yemen | 1,307 |
| 5SSA | Angola | 66 |
| 5SSA | Botswana | 208 |
| 5SSA | Burkina Faso | 109 |
| 5SSA | Burundi | 170 |
| 5SSA | Cameroon | 356 |
| 5SSA | Central Afr. Republic | 53 |
| 5SSA | Chad | 368 |
| 5SSA | Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1,254 |
| 5SSA | Congo, Republic | 169 |
| 5SSA | Djibouti | 30,105 |
| 5SSA | Eritrea | 9,977 |
| 5SSA | Ethiopia | 20,899 |
| 5SSA | Gabon | 128 |
| 5SSA | Gambia, The | 0 |
| 5SSA | Ghana | 522 |
| 5SSA | Guinea | 201 |
| 5SSA | Guinea-Bissau | 0 |
| 5SSA | Ivory Coast | 743 |
| 5SSA | Kenya | 2,779 |
| 5SSA | Lesotho | 0 |
| 5SSA | Liberia | 1,376 |
| 5SSA | Madagascar | 278 |
| 5SSA | Malawi | 50 |
| 5SSA | Mali | 253 |
| 5SSA | Mauritania | 94 |
| 5SSA | Mauritius | 100 |
| 5SSA | Mozambique | 143 |
| 5SSA | Namibia | 9 |
| 5SSA | Niger | 270 |
| 5SSA | Nigeria | 794 |
| 5SSA | Rwanda | 50 |
| 5SSA | Senegal | 544 |
| 5SSA | Seychelles Island | 139 |
| 5SSA | Sierra Leone | 93 |
| 5SSA | Somali Republic | 8,474 |
| 5SSA | South Africa | 2,178 |
| 5SSA | St. Helena | 242 |
| 5SSA | Tanzania | 310 |

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|---|---|---|
| 5SSA | Togo | 158 |
| 5SSA | Uganda | 227 |
| 5SSA | Zambia | 247 |
| 5SSA | Zimbabwe | 269 |
| 6AM | Antigua | 3,790 |
| 6AM | Argentina | 2,373 |
| 6AM | Aruba | 141 |
| 6AM | Bahamas | 12,151 |
| 6AM | Barbados | 1,625 |
| 6AM | Belize | 118 |
| 6AM | Bermuda | 93,552 |
| 6AM | Bolivia | 2,020 |
| 6AM | Brazil | 7,203 |
| 6AM | British Virgin Islands | 2 |
| 6AM | British W Indies Fed. | 8,013 |
| 6AM | Canada | 257,327 |
| 6AM | Chile | 2,973 |
| 6AM | Colombia | 3,552 |
| 6AM | Costa Rica | 871 |
| 6AM | Cuba / Guantanamo | 183,500 |
| 6AM | Dominican Republic | 3,741 |
| 6AM | Ecuador | 2,836 |
| 6AM | El Salvador | 2,340 |
| 6AM | Grenada | 248 |
| 6AM | Guatemala | 2,492 |
| 6AM | Guyana | 285 |
| 6AM | Haiti | 24,732 |
| 6AM | Honduras | 21,883 |
| 6AM | Jamaica | 1,532 |
| 6AM | Mexico | 2,646 |
| 6AM | Nicaragua | 1,117 |
| 6AM | Panama | 485,752 |
| 6AM | Paraguay | 1,267 |
| 6AM | Peru | 3,741 |
| 6AM | St. Lucia | 7 |
| 6AM | Suriname | 453 |
| 6AM | Trinidad | 2,606 |
| 6AM | Turks Island | 324 |
| 6AM | Uruguay | 3,369 |
| 6AM | Venezuela | 3,323 |