

# **Seminar Approximation Algorithms**

# Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings

Based on a paper of the same title by J. Garg, P. Kulkarni, and R. Kulkarni

Zeno Adrian Weil Supervised by Dr Giovanna Varricchio

28th July 2023 · Algorithms and Complexity (Prof. Dr Martin Hoefer)

# What is the issue?





# What is the issue?



We need to distribute goods amongst recipients

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We need to distribute goods amongst recipients efficiently

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We need to distribute goods amongst recipients *efficiently* and *fairly*.

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We need to distribute goods amongst recipients *efficiently* and *fairly*.

Where is this encountered?

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We need to distribute goods amongst recipients efficiently and fairly.

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- satellites





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We need to distribute goods amongst recipients efficiently and fairly.

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- water withdrawal







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# **Allocations**



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**recipients**: set  $\mathcal{A}$  of n agents



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But how to measure its efficiency and fairness?

# **Valuation Functions**



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■ monotonically non-decreasing:  $v_i(S_1) \le v_i(S_2)$  if  $S_1 \subset S_2$ 



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# Valuation Functions




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
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  - diminishing returns







# Asymmetric Maximum Nash Social Welfare Problem





#### **Problem**

$$x^* \stackrel{!}{=} \arg \max \{ \text{NSW}(x) \}$$
  
 $x \in X_{\mathscr{A}}(\mathscr{C})$ 

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
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
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- ... independent from *m*?








### Naïve Approach




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




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
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
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
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  - **additive valuations**: sort items by valuation
    - $\Rightarrow$  2*n*-approximation (*SMatch*)





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- repeatedly use maximum weight matchings
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### **Key Ideas of the Algorithm**



We need change the past in three phases:


**Phase I** Assign enough high-value items temporarily.

**Phase II** Assign the remaining items definitely.

**Phase III** Re-assign the items of phase I definitely.

#### **Theorem**

RepReMatch guarantees a  $2n(\log_2 n + 3)$ -approximation under submodular valuations.



### **The Algorithm**



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Phase I:

■ repeat  $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil + 1$  times

## **The Algorithm**



- **1** repeat  $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil + 1$  times
  - **1** create bipartite graph  $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{G}, E)$  with edge weights  $\log v_i(j)^{\eta_i}$

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**2** repeat until  $\mathcal{G} = \emptyset$ 

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- 4 compute maximum weight matching
- **5** create bundles  $x_i^{III}$

# Analysing Phases I & III (1/2)



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Let  $\mathbf{x}_i^* = \{o_i^1, o_i^2, ...\}$  be an optimal bundle.

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### **Definition**

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⇒ Are enough outstanding items reserved?

# Analysing Phases I & III (2/2)



## Lemma

Each agent can be matched with an outstanding item in phase  ${\rm III.}$ 

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
- maximum number of unmatched agents halved with each round of phase I
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
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Base Case: In round 1 of phase I, either

■  $\geq n/2$  many agents matched with an outstanding item






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


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  - > n/2 many items  $o_i^1$  assigned to someone else






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


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


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


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


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## Analysing Phase II (1/2)



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
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
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


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


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


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


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



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



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


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



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



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
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
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⇒ What is the valuation of the remaining items?





## Analysing Phase II (2/2)



## Lemma


$$v_i\big(\overline{x}_{i,r}^*\mid a_i^1,\dots,a_i^{r-1}\big)$$

## Analysing Phase II (2/2)




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


$$v_i(\bar{x}_{i,r}^* \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) \ge -v_i(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) + v_i(\bar{x}_{i,1}^*)$$






$$v_i(\bar{x}_{i,r}^* \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) \ge -v_i(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) + v_i(\bar{x}_{i,1}^*) - v_i(\mathcal{L}_{i,2} \mid a_i^1)$$






$$v_i\big(\bar{x}_{i,r}^{\star} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}\big) \geq -v_i\big(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}\big) + v_i\big(\bar{x}_{i,1}^{\star}\big) - v_i\big(\mathcal{L}_{i,2} \mid a_i^1\big) - v_i\big(\mathcal{L}_{i,3} \mid a_i^1, a_i^2\big)$$






$$v_i\big(\overline{x}_{i,r}^{\star} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}\big) \geq -v_i\big(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}\big) + v_i\big(\overline{x}_{i,1}^{\star}\big) - v_i\big(\mathcal{L}_{i,2} \mid a_i^1\big) - v_i\big(\mathcal{L}_{i,3} \mid a_i^1, a_i^2\big) - \dots$$






$$v_i(\bar{x}_{i,r}^* \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) \ge -v_i(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) + v_i(\bar{x}_{i,1}^*) - \sum_{l=2}^r v_i(\mathcal{L}_{i,l} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{l-1})$$






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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


$$v_i(\overline{x}_{i,r}^* \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) \ge -v_i(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) + v_i(\overline{x}_{i,1}^*) - \sum_{l=2}^r \sum_{j \in \mathcal{L}_{i,l}} v_i(a_i^{l-1} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{l-2})$$






$$v_i(\bar{x}_{i,r}^* \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) \ge -v_i(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}) + v_i(\bar{x}_{i,1}^*) - \sum_{l=2}^r |\mathscr{L}_{i,l}| \cdot v_i(a_i^{l-1} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{l-2})$$





$$v_i\big(\overline{x}_{i,r}^{\star} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}\big) \geq -v_i\big(a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{r-1}\big) + v_i\big(\overline{x}_{i,1}^{\star}\big) - \sum_{l=2}^{r} (n-1) \cdot v_i\big(a_i^{l-1} \mid a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{l-2}\big)$$











# **Summary & Outlook**

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  Phase II assigning remaining items

  Phase III assigning outstanding items









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Phase II assigning remaining items

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### **Any Room for Improvement?**

Possibly! Lower bound of  $\frac{e}{e-1} \approx 1.58$ 











