Report

Title: Forensic Acquisition of Hard Drive in E01 Evidence Format

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Course	Digital Forensics
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Contents

Introduction

This project is about learning how to investigate digital evidence using forensics. The main goal is to find changes made to a computer system after some activity has happened. For this, we used a virtual machine (VM) with **Windows 11** installed on it through **VMware Workstation**.

First, we took a **clean disk image** (without any changes or activity) using **FTK Imager**. After that, we did some actions on the system that could be suspicious, like opening files, changing settings, or installing tools. Then we took another **disk image after those activities**.

To analyze both images, we used a tool called **Autopsy** on the host system. This helped us compare the clean and affected images and find out what was changed or added.

Objective

To learn how to take a disk image of a Windows 11 virtual machine using **FTK Imager**.

To do some basic or suspicious activities inside the VM to simulate a real-world scenario.

To take another disk image **after the activities**.

To compare both images and find differences using **Autopsy**.

To identify changes such as:

- New or deleted files,
- Modified system settings,
- User activity (like opened files),
- Any signs of malware or persistence methods.

Tools used

FTK imager for disk dump.

Autopsy for analysis



Figure 1 Showing not connect internet

Start 1 dump.

I open FTK imager.



Figure 2 Open FTK imager



Figure 3 Taking dump



Figure 4 Dump summary

After the dump complete I open autopsy for image analysis.



Figure 5 Open Autopsy



Figure 6 Set case name



Figure 7 Add random information



Figure 8 Select image file icon



Figure 9 Set image path



Figure 10 Setup configuration



Figure 11 Add data source



Figure 12 Start process



Module	Num	New?	Subject	Timestamp
Hash Lookup	1	•	**No notable hash set.**	2025/05/11 03:...
Hash Lookup	1	•	**No known hash set.**	2025/05/11 03:...
Recent Activity	1	•	**Started pro1.dd**	2025/05/11 03:...
Recent Activity	1	•	**Finished pro1.dd - No errors reported**	2025/05/11 03:...
Recent Activity	1	•	**pro1.dd - Browser Results**	2025/05/11 03:...
aLeapp	1	•	**aLeapp Processing Completed**	2025/05/11 03:...
DJI Drone Analyzer	1	•	**Started pro1.dd**	2025/05/11 03:...
iLeapp	1	•	**iLeapp Processing Completed**	2025/05/11 03:...
GPX Parser	1	•	**0 files found**	2025/05/11 03:...
File Type Identification	1	•	**File Type Id Results**	2025/05/11 03:...
Keyword Search	1	•	**Keyword Indexing Results**	2025/05/11 03:...
PhotoRec Carver	1	•	**PhotoRec Results**	2025/05/11 03:...
GPX Parser	1	•	**0 files found**	2025/05/11 03:...
Data Source Integrity	1	•	**Starting pro1.dd**	2025/05/11 03:...
Data Source Integrity	1	•	**pro1.dd hashes calculated**	2025/05/11 03:...

Sort by: Time Total: 15 Unique: 15

Figure 13 This modules ran

Hash Lookup (Yellow Rows)

- **No notable hash set:** The system did not have a list of bad files (like malware), so it couldn't check for them.
- **No known hash set:** The system also didn't have a list of safe files, so it couldn't check which files are safe.

Recent Activity

- **Started pro1.dd:** The tool started working on the disk image file named pro1.dd.
- **Finished pro1.dd - No errors reported:** The tool finished the work with no errors.

aLeapp & iLeapp (Mobile Tools)

- **aLeapp / iLeapp Processing Completed:** These tools looked at mobile data (Android and iPhone) and finished their work.

DJI Drone Analyzer

- **Started pro1.dd:** This tool started checking if there was any drone data in the file.

GPX Parser

- **0 files found:** No GPS location files were found.

File Type Identification

- **File Type Id Results:** It checked what types of files (like pictures, documents) are inside the disk.

Keyword Search

- **Keyword Indexing Results:** It prepared a list of words to make it easy to search in the files.

PhotoRec Carver

- **PhotoRec Results:** It tried to recover deleted files.

Data Source Integrity

- **Starting pro1.dd / pro1.dd hashes calculated:** It created a hash (a kind of digital fingerprint) to make sure the image is not changed or damaged.

Simple Summary

- 15 tools were used.
- Everything worked fine.

Start 2 dump of disk.



Figure 14 open FTK



Figure 15 Strating dump

After the dump complete and I used Autopsy for analysis dump.

I run Autopsy.





When I successful load dump file.



Figure 16 Show files



Figure 17 found pic



Analysis of Gzip Files in Autopsy

File Type and Context:

MIME Type: application/x-gzip

Total Files Identified: 132 .gz files

Location: /img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/

Status: Most files are marked as **Unallocated**, indicating they were likely **deleted** and later recovered during forensic carving.

Notable Files:

f0201438.html.gz

f0376340.html.gz
These may contain web content such as scripts or malicious payloads.

Extracted Artifact Highlights:

Table 1 important artifacts

Attribute	Value
URL Identified	http://vulnweb.com/testphp.vulnweb.com/userinfo.php
IP Address	142.228.249.39
User-Agent	Opera on Linux (chrome/startpage chrome/)
HTTP Response	HTTP/1.1 302 Found (Redirection detected)
Server	nginx/1.19.0
Powered By	PHP 5.6.40

Interpretation:

The URL and server headers indicate interaction with a known vulnerable web application possibly used for exploitation, testing, or red team activities.

IP 142.228.249.39 may represent a source or attacker system.

Presence of .html.gz and PHP reference (userinfo.php) points to potential web shell, data exfiltration, or injection script activity.



Figure 18

File Type and Context:

- MIME Type: application/x.windows-registry
- Total Files Identified: 9 registry export files (.reg)
- Location: /img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/
- Status: All files marked Unallocated, suggesting they were deleted and recovered from unallocated disk space.

Table 2

File Name	Size (Bytes)	Location	MD5 Hash
f0113372.reg	1,896,448	/img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/1/f0113372.reg	4842ab7c697f27fbad14da2e6e117e0e
f0375864.reg	338,772	/img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/1/f0375864.reg	acb12839dbeee8cf...
f0628124.reg	1,228,880	/img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/1/f0628124.reg	a7e8a25a188...

f0814102.reg	1,170,624	/img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/2/f0814102.reg	43e5a1646d6...
f0191030.reg	772,032	/img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/2/f0191030.reg	91c3d5ba466...



Figure 19

File Type and Context:

- **File Name:** f1216720_TestDiskDocumentation.pdf
- **File Type:** PDF Document
- **MIME Type:** application/pdf
- **Size:** 245,754 bytes (~240 KB)
- **Location:** /img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/4/f1216720_TestDiskDocumentation.pdf
- **Status: Unallocated** Indicates the file was deleted and recovered from unallocated disk space.,



Figure 20

Recovered Credential Leak

File Information:

- File Name: f0376340.html
- Parent Archive: f0376340.html.gz (Gzip-compressed file)
- Location: /img_prod.dd/SCARvedFiles/1/f0376340.html.gz/f0376340.html
- Size: 730 bytes

Extracted Text Content (Sensitive Data Found):

Username: kike

Password: 1234

Name: kike

Address: kio



Figure 21



Figure 22



Bridge Type: obfs4 – Obfuscated bridge that hides Tor traffic patterns

IP Address: 51.222.13.177

Port: 80

Fingerprint: Starts with 5EDAC3B810E12B01...

Listing

Previously Seen

Table | Thumbnail | Summary

Page: 1 of 1 Pages: Go to Page:

Source Name	Source Type	Correlation Type	Correlation Value	Other Cases
ID: jesssmith123@example.org	Accounts	Email Addresses	jesssmith123@example.org	__ap_testing4,__AP_dsTe
ID: jaredd@example.org	Accounts	Email Addresses	jaredd@example.org	__ap_testing4,__AP_dsTe
ID: janedoe@example.org	Accounts	Email Addresses	janedoe@example.org	__ap_testing4,__AP_dsTe

Figure 23 Get email address



Figure 24 Get email related



Figure 25 Basic properties



Figure 26 Showing book mark details



Figure 27 Russian text



Figure 28 Cost related



Figure 29 Get IP



Figure 30 Email communication graph



Figure 31 Get phone numbers and emails address



Figure 32 Sender and receiver emails



Figure 33 Emails subjects



Figure 34 Get email body



Figure 35 Get file path



Figure 36 Get domains



Figure 37 Text

Comparison of Clean and Activity Disk Images.

Clean Disk Image (Before Any Activity)

Artifact / Category	Observation
Internet Access	No internet connection detected.
.gz Files	No .gz (compressed) files found.
Web URLs	No URLs or web activity recorded.
IP Address	No IPs captured or logged.
Browser Activity / User-Agent	No browser history or user-agent found.
Registry Files (.reg)	No exported registry files found.
Documents	No PDF or office documents found.
Credential Information	No usernames, passwords, or sensitive text found.
Tor Bridge / Obfuscation	No signs of Tor usage or hidden communication.
Email Artifacts	No emails (senders, receivers, or bodies) detected.
Bookmarks / Browser Content	Not available or recorded.
Contact Data	No names, addresses, or phone numbers extracted.
Deleted Files	Very few deleted files, mostly system-generated.
File Types Detected	Normal system files only.
PhotoRec Recovery	Minimal recovery – no significant user files recovered.
Hash Lookup	No known bad or good file hashes in the database.

Activity Disk Image (After Suspicious Tasks)

Artifact / Category	Observation
Internet Access	Internet activity detected; multiple web artifacts recovered.
.gz Files	132 .gz files found, many in unallocated space.
Web URLs	Found URL: http://vulnweb.com/testphp.vulnweb.com/userinfo.php
IP Address	Detected IP: 142.228.249.39 (possible attacker or test system).
Browser Activity / User-Agent	Opera browser on Linux; activity confirmed.
Registry Files (.reg)	9 deleted registry export files recovered.
Documents	Recovered PDF: TestDiskDocumentation.pdf from deleted space.
Credential Information	Username: kike, Password: 1234, Address: kio (from HTML file).
Tor Bridge / Obfuscation	Detected: Obfs4 Tor bridge, IP 51.222.13.177, port 80.
Email Artifacts	Multiple emails with senders, receivers, subjects, and bodies recovered.
Bookmarks / Browser Content	Bookmarks and Russian text found in analysis.
Contact Data	Names, phone numbers, addresses extracted from unallocated files.
Deleted Files	Many deleted files carved including .html, .reg, and documents.
File Types Detected	Mixed: system files, deleted web files, PDF, registry files.
PhotoRec Recovery	Successful carving of deleted and hidden files.
Hash Lookup	Hashing done, but no known hash sets loaded. Manual analysis done.

Conclusion

In this project, we focused on understanding how digital forensics works by taking and analyzing two disk images. One image was taken from a clean Windows 11 virtual machine, and the second was taken after performing some user activities that could seem suspicious. We used **FTK Imager** to capture both images and **Autopsy** to examine them.

The clean image didn't show any major activity it had no internet usage, no strange files, and everything looked normal. It served as a reference point for us. But the second image clearly showed changes. We found over 130 .gz files, some deleted registry files, a PDF document, and even a leak of a username and password inside an HTML file. There was also a Tor bridge detected, which means the system might have been used to hide traffic, and several email artifacts and web activities were found.

By comparing both images, we were able to see how even simple activities can leave behind digital traces. This helped us understand how investigators use tools like Autopsy to recover deleted files and analyze system behavior. It also showed how important it is to take a clean snapshot before any activity, so changes can be tracked properly.

Overall, this project gave us hands-on experience in acquiring evidence, working with forensic tools, and understanding how digital traces are collected and examined. It made the concepts we learned in class feel more real and practical.