

Delhi District Court

Smt. Manjit Kaur vs Sh. Abdul Wahid on 21 August, 2018

- 1 -

IN THE COURT OF SH. AJAY NAGAR, COMMERCIAL CIVIL JUDGE-
CUM-ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER (WEST), TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI.

ARC No. 38/17

Smt. Manjit Kaur,
W/o S. Joginder Singh,
340, Pocket-9, Sector-21,
Rohini, Delhi-110085.

...Petitioner

VERSUS

Sh. Abdul Wahid,
S/o Sh. Abdul Majid,
R/o C-2, J.J. Colony,
Madipur,
New Delhi-110063.

...Respondent

Date of institution : 24.03.2017 Date of order : 21.08.2018 ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND

1. The present petition U/Sec. 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "DRC Act") has been filed by the petitioner against the respondent in respect of tenanted premises on the 1 st floor and toilet on the 2nd floor in property no.C-2, J.J. Colony, Madipur, New Delhi-110063 as shown in the site plan in red colour attached with the petition. (hereinafter referred to as "tenanted premises").

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2. The brief facts as stated by the petitioner in the petition are that petitioner is the landlady and owner of the tenanted premises. And the respondent is the tenant who was let out by way of rent agreement executed by the petitioner and respondent.

It is further averred by the petitioner that petitioner has one son, namely, Shri Prabhjot Singh who is going to get married recently and the petitioner seeks the tenanted premises for residential accommodation of her son and daughter in law as he wants to start his clinic nearby the area of Madipur. She also submits that tenanted premises is more suitable for the son of petitioner for residential accommodation and for settling down his clinic. The petitioner further submits that she does not have alternative reasonably suitable accommodation except the tenanted premises.

3. Notice of this eviction petition was sent to the respondent in the prescribed format which was duly served on the respondent. In response to which the respondent filed leave to defend application

accompanied by affidavit.

It is alleged by the respondent that petitioner can not claim herself as absolute owner of the property in question and the DDA is the owner of the property in question. It is further pleaded by the respondent that there is no evidence on record to substantiate that her son has been engaged for marriage as name, address, parentage etc. of her proposed daughter in law etc. has not been placed on record. Respondent has further contended that petitioner owns the three properties, i.e., no.340, Pocket-9, Sector-21, Rohini, Delhi, 2nd property at A-3/288, Sultanpuri, Delhi, 3rd property at C-2, J.J. Colony, Madipur, New Delhi.

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid The contention of the respondent is that the petitioner has not disclosed all the properties in her eviction petition as such the petitioner has not come to the court with clean hands. Next contention of the respondent is that the son of the petitioner is not at all dependent on her for his residential accommodation or for running the clinic. The respondent has taken a plea that the petitioner has not taken any action for eviction against other tenants.

Next contention of the respondent is that the petitioner wants to re- let the tenanted premises on higher rate of rent to another tenant after eviction or to sell it out at prevailing market rate. Lastly, he prays to the court to allow the leave to defend.

4. The petitioner has filed his reply to the leave to defend application of the respondent. In nutshell, the petitioner has specifically denied the assertions made by the respondent in his leave to defend application. In reply, the petitioner has reasserted her bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises. It is further stated that the respondent has failed to raise any triable issue.

It is further averred that respondent has no right to challenge the ownership of petitioner and the landlord is best judge of his requirement. It is replied by the petitioner that a son Dr. Prabhjot Singh has recently been got married on 15.10.2017 with Dr. Jaspreet Kaur and the marriage photographs and invitation card may be filed as and when directed by the court. It is further submitted that after the marriage, it will be very difficult for the newly wed couple to set up their clinic and residential house and they want to set it up in the tenanted premises.

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid Petitioner further submits that property at Sector-21, Rohini does not belong to her and it belongs to her husband. It is denied by the petitioner that alone son is running his own independent clinic as Sultanpuri, Delhi. The petitioner also submits that there is no requirement of giving details such as age, name of the son, daughter in law's name, marriage details etc. It is also denied by the petitioner that the petitioner wants to re-sell or re-let the tenanted premises after eviction.

5. Ld. Counsel for the respondent inter-alia submits that the petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises. He further submits that the petitioner has alternative reasonably suitable accommodation. Ld. Counsel for the respondent further submits that petitioner does not have any bonafide requirement and the petitioner wants to re-let or re-sell the tenanted premises after getting it vacated from the respondent.

On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for petitioner argues that the petitioner is the landlord as well as owner of the tenanted premises and the requirement of the petitioner as mentioned in the eviction petition is bonafide and she has no alternative reasonably suitable accommodation.

6. THE LAW:

It is well settled that burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by him discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) are good enough to grant leave to defend.

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid It is further well settled that at a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima-facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. Unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would non-suit the landlord leave to defend should not be granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25 B(5). A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter IIIA of the Act, leave to defend cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of landlord to recover possession of the premises from a tenant. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction.

It is also well settled at the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most unreasonable.

It is also well settled that when a possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and not his mere desire.

In short and substance wholly frivolous and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend but when a triable ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid issue is raised a duty is placed on the rent controller by the statute itself to grant leave. It would expedite disposal of eviction petition so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to competing claims.

There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought for, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action.

7. I have carefully and minutely gone through petition, leave to defend application accompanied by affidavit, reply, documents and material on record. I have also gone through the case law relied upon by the Ld. Counsels for the parties.

8. It is expedient to reproduce the Section 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act which is as under:

"Section-14. Protection of tenant against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by court or any controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid Provided that the controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-

"That the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation."

As such, followings are the ingredients of Section 14 (1)(e) of D.R.C.

Act:-

(i) There should be relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent.

(ii) Landlord should be the owner of the tenanted premises.

(iii) That the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for himself/herself or for any member of his/her family dependent upon him/her.

(iv) Landlord should not have other reasonable suitable accommodation.

9. Let us discuss the ingredients of Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act:-

(i) & (ii).
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LANDLORDSHIP AND OWNERSHIP:-

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10. Perusal of record reveals that petitioner has claimed herself as landlady as well as the owner of the tenanted premises. On the other hand, the respondent has admitted himself as tenant of the tenanted premises and has not disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant between petitioner and respondent.

But the respondent has disputed the ownership of the petitioner on the ground that she can not claim herself as absolute owner of the tenanted premises.

11. In case titled as Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors. 1995 RLR 162 a Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while dealing with the concept of ownership in a pending eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act had noted as follows:

"There is a tendency on the part of tenants to deny ownership in cases under Section 14(1)(e). To test the substance of such a plea on the part of the tenants the Courts have insisted that they should state who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner. In the present case it is not said as to who else is the owner. Further these cases under Section 14(1)(e) are not title cases involving disputes of title to the property. Ownership is not to be proved in absolute terms. The respondent does not claim the owner of the premises."

Further, in the case titled as Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs Smt Ved Prabha & ors 1987 AIR 2028, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: -

"That the meaning of term 'owner' is vis a vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant."

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid As such, the respondent can not challenge the ownership of the petitioner/landlady in view of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act.

Moreover, it is also well settled law that the landlord/landlady need not prove his/her ownership in absolute term. It is sufficient if he is able to prove that he/she is something more than the tenant.

As such, in my view, the petitioner has been able to prove that the petitioner herein is something more than the tenant.

Hence, ingredients 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in respect of the landlordship as well as ownership is proved.

(iii) & (iv). BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION:-

12. Record shows that the petitioner has sought the tenanted premises for bonafide residential requirement of her grand son Dr. Prabhjot Singh who is going to get married soon.

On the other hand, the plea of the respondent is that the details of marriage and daughter in law etc. have not been given by the petitioner.

Perusal of record shows that copy of the invitation card has been filed by the petitioner. In the reply to leave to defend, it is averred by the petitioner that marriage of Dr. Prabhjot Singh has already taken place on 15.10.2017 with Dr. Jaspreet Kaur.

As such, sufficient material is on record which shows that plea of the respondent is without any merit.

13. The another plea of the respondent is that petitioner has many ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid alternative accommodation at Rohini, Sultanpuri and Madipur, Delhi.

Perusal of record shows that the respondent has contended that petitioner owns the property no.340, Pocket-9, Sector-21, Rohini, Delhi but in her reply to leave to defend, the petitioner has claimed that she does not own this property as this property belongs to her husband.

As such, the petitioner is not owner of the property in Sector-21, Rohini, Delhi as mentioned above. Hence, it is not incumbent upon petitioner to disclose the property which does not belong to her. Moreover, no material has been produced by the respondent to show that petitioner is the owner of the aforementioned property.

Further more, the respondent has pleaded that petitioner is having property no.A-3/288, Sultanpuri comprising ground, 1st and 2nd floor. But the leave to defend itself shows that 1st floor and 2nd floor of the aforementioned property are in possession of other tenants as such these two floors are not vacant and it can not used by the son of the petitioner.

As per the submission of respondent, the son of the petitioner is running his own clinic at Sultanpuri but it has been refuted by the petitioner and denied that alone son of petitioner is running his own independent clinic at Sultanpuri.

Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument son of petitioner is running his clinic in the Sultanpuri area, it does not show the malafide on the part of petitioner as everyone has right to earn his livelihood and excel in his career and life.

Furthermore, in "Labhu Lal Vs. Sandhya Gupta" [2011(1) RCR, (Rent) 231 (Delhi)], it has been held by this Court that the children are very ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid much dependant on the landlord for the purpose of setting up their business and such a requirement is a bonafide one.

The moral duty of a father to help establish his son was also recognized by the Apex Court in "Joginder Pal Singh Vs. Naval Kishore Behal" [AIR 2002 SC 2256] in the following words:

"24.....Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall with circumspection inquire : (i) whether the requirement of such person can be

considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identify nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the overlaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent."

In the case titled as Sudesh Kumar Soni & Ors. Vs. Prabha Khanna & Ors. 153 (2008) DLT 652 it was observed that:-

"24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.

25. Suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement".

In the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs Firm Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, it was observed as under:-

"It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC

353. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."

In the case titled as Sarla Ahuja Vs United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 100 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:

"The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself

without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) through L.Rs.

Vs. Chagan Lal Sundarji & Co. (1999) 8 SCC 1 held that:-

"It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of "need or requirement" to be equivalent to "dire or absolute or compelling necessity". According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner in which the courts have gone into the meaning of "lockout" in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant".

In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR 1999 SC 2507, at pg-2512 in para 14 & 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:-

"14. The availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of Clause

(e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available than the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant fact Ors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come."

In the case titled as Metropolitan Book Company Ltd. vs. Ajay Rastogi & Ors. Passed in RC. Rev. No. 484/2013, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi observed as under:-

"Even assuming the other properties available, and which actually they are not as stated below, ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid these other properties situated far from the present residence of respondent no. 1 and his family members cannot be considered as alternative suitable accommodation."

14. In view of the above case-law, the Court is of the opinion that there is nothing malafide if the son of the petitioner wants to start his own clinic nearby the tenanted premises and wants to reside in the tenanted premises. Rather, the said requirement seems to be bonafide as the son of the petitioner wants to earn his livelihood and the tenant cannot stop the landlord/family member of landlord from starting any business or clinic for livelihood. The bonafide requirement of a landlord does not become malafide just because they want to run clinic for their livelihood and reside in the tenanted premises which is near to their clinic. The consequent hardship to tenant from eviction order could also not convert otherwise bonafide requirement into malafide requirement. Furthermore, in my view it is also in the interest of patients and public at large if the residence of a Doctor is near to his clinic as he can be available to his patients at any point of time and very easily.

Third property which has been claimed to be owned by the petitioner is ground floor, C-2, JJ Colony, Madipur, Delhi. The perusal of record shows that respondent himself has admitted that such ground floor in the Madipur property as mentioned above is being used as medical store by other tenant. As such, this ground floor in the Madipur property is also not available with the petitioner.

ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid As such, keeping in view the material and submissions made by the parties, it is clear that all the properties as claimed by the respondent are not available with the petitioner and in view of material on record the petitioner is not in possession of alternative

reasonably suitable accommodation in her possession.

15. It is further alleged that the petitioner has malafide intention to get tenanted premises vacated for selling the property in question or re-letting it out at the higher rate of rent.

"19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re- entry. -

(1) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 [or under sections 14A, 14B, 14C, 148 and 21], the landlord shall not, except with the permission of the Controller, obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the premises.

(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid within three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under sub- section (1) or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller may, on an application made on him in this behalf by such evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit."

16. In the case titled as Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. Smt. Neelam Dawar & Ors. Passed in RC (Rev.) 44/2014, C.M. Application 1313- 14/2014, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi inter-alia observed as under:-

"The tenant's apprehension that upon eviction the tenanted premises would be let out at a higher rent was found to be baseless and prematured since such contingency has been taken care of U/Sec. 19 of the Act."

17. As such, statute clearly lays down that the petitioner/ landlord has to occupy the vacated tenanted premises within two months and the landlord cannot re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant within three years from the date of obtaining possession and in case he does so, the evicted tenant may approach the Rent Controller seeking direction to the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises. As such, this contention of ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid the respondent does not have any force and cannot be treated as triable issue.

18. Respondent has claimed that other shops in the same suit property and other properties have been given to other tenants on rent but no action has been taken against them.

In my view, this contention of the respondent does not have any merit as the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and the respondent/ tenant has no right to dictate the petitioner/landlord to get a particular shop or premises vacated sparing himself.

19. One of the issues raised by the respondent is that site plan of the property in question as filed by the petitioner is wrong.

In the case titled as R.K. Bhatnagar vs. Sushila Bhargava AIR 1987 Delhi 363; the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi observed as under:-

"He has not filed any site plan wither to show that the site plan filed by the respondent- landlady is incorrect in any way. Hence, I see no reasons to doubt the veracity of the facts stated by the respondent in her affidavit. Likewise, I assume that the site plan filed by her showing the entire accommodation in her occupation is correct."

20. In my view, it is not a triable issue as the respondent had the ample opportunity to file his own site plan in case he found that the site plan filed by the petitioner was wrong.

21. In the light of the aforesaid legal propositions, the respondent has failed to raise any triable issues. The contents of the application for leave to defend have failed to rebut the presumption of bonafide qua the ARC No. 38/17 Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid requirement of the petitioner.

THE CONCLUSION:-

22. In view of the above discussions and well settled propositions of law, I am of the considered opinion that no purpose would be served, even if, the petitioner is compelled to appear in the witness box the position would be no different than it is today. For this reason also, I find no triable issue in the leave to defend application of the respondent. The application for leave to defend filed by the respondent is thus, dismissed.

23. Hence, an eviction order is passed U/s. 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act in favour of petitioner and against the respondent in respect of tenanted premises on the 1st floor and toilet on the 2nd floor in property no.C-2, J.J. Colony, Madipur, New Delhi-110063 as shown in the site plan in red colour attached with the petition marked as Mark P-1 (put by the court for the purpose of identification).

24. However, this order shall not be operative before the expiry of six months from today keeping in view Sec. 14(7) of D.R.C. Act.

25. File be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance.

Announced in the open Court AJAY Digitally signed by AJAY NAGAR on 21st August, 2018.

NAGAR

Date: 2018.08.21

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(This order contains 19 pages)

(Ajay Nagar)
Commercial Civil Judge-Cum
Additional Rent Controller,
West District, THC, Delhi.

ARC No. 38/17

Manjit Kaur Vs Abdul Wahid