


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# Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture

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Elisa Aaltola



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
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# Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture

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First published 2012 by  
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

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Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-32912-0 ISBN 978-1-137-27182-2 (eBook)  
DOI 10.1057/9781137271822

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12

*For my pack*

*In the memory of Hulda, in whose eyes hid a whole  
universe*

*It seems to me that animal suffering is invisible only when we avert  
our eyes.*

*Francoise Wemelsfelder*

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# Series Editors' Preface

This is a new book series for a new field of inquiry: Animal Ethics.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ethics of our treatment of animals. Philosophers have led the way, and now a range of other scholars have followed, from historians to social scientists. From being a marginal issue, animals have become an emerging issue in ethics and in multidisciplinary inquiry.

In addition, a rethink of the status of animals has been fuelled by a range of scientific investigations which have revealed the complexity of animal sentience, cognition and awareness. The ethical implications of this new knowledge have yet to be properly evaluated, but it is becoming clear that the old view that animals are mere things, tools, machines or commodities cannot be sustained ethically.

But it is not only philosophy and science that are putting animals on the agenda. Increasingly, in Europe and the United States, animals are becoming a political issue as political parties vie for the 'green' and 'animal' vote. In turn, political scientists are beginning to look again at the history of political thought in relation to animals, and historians are beginning to revisit the political history of animal protection.

As animals grow as an issue of importance, so there have been more collaborative academic ventures leading to conference volumes, special journal issues, indeed new academic animal journals as well. Moreover, we have witnessed the growth of academic courses, as well as university posts, in Animal Ethics, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, Animal Law, Animals and Philosophy, Human–Animal Studies, Critical Animal Studies, Animals and Society, Animals in Literature, Animals and Religion – tangible signs that a new academic discipline is emerging.

'Animal Ethics' is the new term for the academic exploration of the moral status of the non-human – an exploration that explicitly involves a focus on what we owe animals morally, and which also helps us to understand the influences – social, legal, cultural, religious and political – that legitimate animal abuse. This series explores the challenges that Animal Ethics poses, both conceptually and practically, to traditional understandings of human–animal relations.

The series is needed for three reasons: (i) to provide the texts that will service the new university courses on animals; (ii) to support the

increasing number of students studying and academics researching in animal-related fields; and (iii) because there is currently no book series that is a focus for multidisciplinary research in the field.

Specifically, the series will

- provide a range of key introductory and advanced texts that map out ethical positions on animals;
- publish pioneering work written by new, as well as accomplished, scholars; and
- produce texts from a variety of disciplines that are multidisciplinary in character or have multidisciplinary relevance.

The new Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics is the result of a unique partnership between Palgrave Macmillan and the Ferrater Mora Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. The series is an integral part of the mission of the Centre to put animals on the intellectual agenda by facilitating academic research and publication. The series is also a natural complement to one of the Centre's other major projects, the *Journal of Animal Ethics*. The Centre is an independent 'think tank' for the advancement of progressive thought about animals, and is the first Centre of its kind in the world. It aims to demonstrate rigorous intellectual enquiry and the highest standards of scholarship. It strives to be a world-class centre of academic excellence in its field.

We invite academics to visit the Centre's website [www.oxfordanimalethics.com](http://www.oxfordanimalethics.com) and to contact us with new book proposals for the series.

*Andrew Linzey and Priscilla N. Cohn*

# Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Andrew Linzey for all his kind help, and Katherine Perlo for carefully proofreading the manuscript.

I would also like to thank Paul for attentively maintaining our pack whilst I have been busy at work, and all the four-legged individuals within that pack for making each day an occasion. Vincent, the 15-year-old canine companion unsurpassed, who was made to spend the first eight years of his life in a minuscule backyard cage, in almost complete solitude and without ever getting to see the world outside, has taught me more than words ever could. Half Rottweiler, half Pit bull, is the most gentle being I have ever met, and it is in his continuously open presence, his ceaseless efforts to understand and pay heed to those around him, his overflowing care for others, that I have begun to know intersubjectivity. In Vincent's company, one can grasp what kindness and devotion beyond theories and language are, and how incredibly robust is their hold. With him, the world emerges anew. Hulda, our street puppy who did not survive, manifested to me what overcoming fear of others means, and how strong the ability to trust, to open oneself to others, truly is. She had to endure more than any dog ever should, but still hope and love lingered in her gaze. My biggest gratitude belongs to these two creatures.

Furthermore, my thanks go to all those who have diligently documented what happens to our non-human kin within the animal industries, and who have sought to render their suffering visible. The efforts of these individuals have often required great personal courage and sacrifice, and almost never lead to personal praise or reward. To give of oneself in order to ease the pain of another is the key to morality, and these advocates serve as an example of how this is poignantly true also in regard to the suffering of non-human animals. Finally, there are those who each day seek to make a practical difference against all odds whilst sacrificing many of their own comforts. The advocates in Romania working tirelessly for the hundreds of thousands of street dogs are one case in point, and I would like to thank particularly Cornelia Stanescu and Adelina Okros for never giving up.

# Introduction

Utilization of non-human animals is integral to contemporary consumerist societies. As is often argued, these societies have largely adopted an instrumentalist view towards other animals, according to which those animals are primarily things to be used rather than individuals with their own value. The use of other animals varies from breeding companion animals for profit, racing dogs and horses and keeping zoos or visiting animal circuses, to hunting, animal experimentation and animal farming. These practices are of astonishing proportions, many involving from hundreds of millions up to tens of billions of animals each year. They also involve clear financial incentives, as utilization is almost always linked to profit – thus, animal industries form one of the world's largest business sectors. As the financial driving forces behind them urge greater efficiency and turnover, the practices are becoming increasingly intensified. As a result, animals bred for meat, eggs, fur or dairy are kept in huge warehouses, where their production rates are optimized with a definite cost to their physical and mental well-being – pigs, cows and hens are pushed to grow faster and bigger and to produce more, which in many cases means that the animals themselves become utterly exhausted.

Animal rights and animal liberation philosophies have become more vocal in arguing that this type of instrumentalization of non-human animals is morally wrong, simply because other animals are also individuals of value. According to these critics, 'use' is 'abuse'. Those with a more moderate stance – often called 'welfarists' – have sought to highlight the pain and discomfort non-human animals are put through and have suggested that animal 'use' be made more 'animal-friendly'. For both camps, the *suffering* of non-human animals poses a significant moral issue: it is precisely suffering that perhaps most fully manifests

that there is something fundamentally wrong with instrumental approaches to other animals. The argument is that, particularly as animal production intensifies, animal suffering is the practically unavoidable flipside of consuming animal parts and using animal services.

However, most people prefer not to think about the animal cost of their lifestyles, and society makes forgetting very easy. Governments tell us that other animals are well looked after, while industry advertisements are eager to put forward a message that they are – if anything – very happy at the hands of farmers, vivisectors and zoo-keepers. This has led to a situation where only a few pay attention to the suffering of our non-human kin. In this sense, animal suffering is a marginalized and silenced topic, eagerly ignored in order to feel guilt-free in making one's consumer choices. Moreover, even if the critical arguments of animal advocates and ethicists have become steadily more frequent and popular, they are still marginal in comparison to the ubiquity of anthropocentric attitudes, which keenly downplay the moral relevance of non-human suffering. For far too many, the benefits of animal industries – even when frivolous or unnecessary – take priority over animal suffering.

Therefore, animal suffering acquires a dual position in contemporary consumerist societies: on the one hand it is ignored and sidelined, and on the other its causes are identified as a moral evil that everybody ought to be willing to eradicate. Animal suffering reserves an ambiguous position, which continues to spark moral concern, disregard, debate and conflict.

Taking its impetus from this ambiguity, the present book seeks to clarify both the nature and the normative relevance of the suffering of other animals. In particular, it will be asked how the suffering of other animals can be defined and understood, and what its moral implications are. It is hoped that, by paying closer attention to animal suffering, the book can help to eradicate some of the ambiguity that presently hinders moral evaluation concerning animal 'use' and 'abuse'. Although 'animal suffering' has been a frequent term in animal ethics, surprisingly few have performed any in-depth exploration of its precise nature and moral meaning. Therefore, it is hoped that the book will also help to fill a gap in the existing literature.

The task at hand is to explore the meaning of 'suffering of other animals' by investigating the philosophical basis of how Western societies in particular approach such suffering. The focus is on the normative dimension of animal suffering: how do we make sense of the moral relevance of non-human suffering? The book starts by looking at the

concrete nature of the suffering of other animals. Do other animals suffer, and how does the society tend to take their suffering into account? What happens in farms and experimentation laboratories? The second part of the book investigates the means by which we can make claims about animal suffering. The epistemological basis of knowing animal suffering is explored, and, in particular, the sceptical argument, according to which human beings cannot make definite knowledge claims concerning the suffering of other animals, is put under scrutiny. In the third part, the book concentrates on the cultural roots of both ignorance of and concern with animal suffering. The emphasis is on analysing when Western culture began to care about animal suffering, and what the philosophical ramifications of this history are. In the remainder of the book, what moral philosophy has to say about the suffering of other animals is put under scrutiny. In the fourth part, standard claims made within 'animal ethics' are examined, after which more general outlines regarding the relation between ethics and animal suffering are drawn from the standpoint of analytical animal philosophy. Questions such as 'Does concern for non-human suffering not lead to absurd consequences?' will be examined. In the fifth part, continental approaches to animal suffering are explored. Following this, in the sixth part, new directions based on emotion, empathy and intersubjectivity will be mapped out. The suggestion is that, although reason has its important role to play, it is through emotive, empathetic intersubjectivity that one can truly begin to 'understand' the moral relevance of non-human suffering. Finally, in the seventh part, persuasion and action are discussed, with the underlying question being: 'How can the moral relevance of animal suffering be communicated to others?'

Before continuing, a couple of clarifications are in order. First, various references will be made to 'animal industries'. The term is defined in the broadest possible sense, and thus covers any type of animal (ab) use which has gained an institutional status, and the motive for which is financial or culinary gain or entertainment value. That is, 'animal industries' include those types of animal (ab)use which have become common practice, and the direct, primary purpose of which is human gain.

The second clarification concerns the term 'animal'. As will become apparent, the term is overly general, and in fact ignores two significant factors: human beings, too, are animals, while the creatures that are commonly labelled 'animals' constitute an incredibly diverse and heterogeneous group of individuals, all different from each other. However, it is difficult to find a term that would do sufficient justice to these

two issues and accommodate adequate fluency of text. Because of these reasons, this book is tied down to speaking of not only 'non-human animals' or 'other animals', but also simply 'animals'. Readers are urged to keep in mind that what are being discussed are specific, individual creatures, all with their specific, individual characteristics and experiences. No animal, and indeed no animal suffering, is the same.<sup>1</sup>



# 1

## Animal Suffering: The Practice

In order to map philosophical, moral and cultural views of animal suffering, it is first important to have a look at the actuality of that suffering. Do non-human animals feel pain and suffering? How do Western societies take this pain and suffering into account?

### **Do other animals feel pain?**

‘Pain’ is usually described as a notably unpleasant physical sensation. It is often distinguished from the rudimentary capacity to map out noxious stimuli, that is, *nociception*. In nociception, pain receptors detect harmful chemical, physical, thermal and other changes in the body, and send out a signal to the brain, which again will lead to various ‘instinctual’ responses (such as pulling one’s hand away from fire).<sup>1</sup> Pain, on the other hand, refers to nociception that is subjectively felt or experienced: it is the *feeling of* and not mere *response to* something unpleasant and obnoxious that is relevant.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, pain is commonly viewed as including two elements: sensory and affective. The sensory element concerns the severity and location of bodily harm, whereas the affective element determines the level of the harm’s obnoxiousness, that is, how much it matters to the subject. The latter refers to the experienced ‘feel’ of pain and is the element that really gives pain its unique nature. We do not merely respond to harmful stimuli (as, for instance, plants do), but feel something towards those stimuli. This means that pain has an experiential, affective side – in other words, it has ‘negative valence’ (NRC 2009). It is linked to what in philosophy of mind is called ‘phenomenal consciousness’, which again is defined as the feeling of ‘what it is like’ to be a human being, a chicken, or a bat (see Nagel 1974), and which concerns ‘qualia’; the

subjective experience or feel of existence. It is this experience or feel that pain is intertwined with: pain is experience doubled together with nociception. That is, a pig in pain does not merely undergo harm, but also feels something towards that harm.

It would seem pretty obvious that (at least many) animals can experience pain. However, Western cultures have seen some very eager efforts to argue the exact opposite. Most of them utilize self-consciousness and propositional language as factors that exclude animals from the sphere of experience. That is, non-human animals' capacity to form the type of experiences necessary for pain has been placed under doubt, due to its presumed links to highly complex cognitive capacities. Self-consciousness means – quite literally – consciousness of oneself. More broadly, it refers to the ability to have a 'theory of mind', which enables one to conceptualize oneself and others as experiencing creatures. This ability, again, has traditionally been linked to the use of propositional, sentence-based language. The argument has been that I cannot experience pain unless I am capable of self-consciousness and its counterpart, propositional language. That is, unless I can comprehend the concepts 'myself' and 'pain', and form the sentence 'I am in pain', pain is not experienced.

This has had a significant impact on how animal pain is viewed. A famous critic of non-human experience, Peter Carruthers, has argued that other animals do not have self-consciousness (or the required theory of mind), and that this lack renders them incapable of experience. Carruthers advocates a higher-order thought approach to consciousness, and maintains that one must be able to form beliefs concerning one's experiences before those experiences become conscious. Language and concepts constitute a necessary component of such beliefs, and, thus, where there is neither language nor concepts, there is no conscious experience (Carruthers 1998; 2000 – for an earlier approach, see Carruthers 1992). Peter Harrison has been another vocal critic of the idea that non-human animals can experience pain. Amongst other things, he argues that the capacity to use reason in relation to pain is important, and here again concepts play a role. Partly based on this, Harrison boldly suggests that animals are not sentient creatures (Harrison 1991). Similarly, Donald Davidson has criticized the notion of 'animal minds' on the basis of propositional language: since animals cannot have the concept of a 'belief', they cannot have beliefs, which again places the existence of their minds in doubt (Davidson 1985). Thus, the sceptical view is that, in the absence of self-consciousness and concepts such as 'pain', animals cannot experience pain.

The sceptical argument has deep historical roots. For instance, René Descartes maintained that animals are capable of bodily sensation, but that this sensation is unconscious and thus mechanical, akin to a bodily reflex. Descartes divided 'movements' (in this context meaning actions or behaviours) into those caused by the incorporeal soul (and thus ultimately reason) and those caused by wholly corporeal mechanisms, and argued that, since animals do not have incorporeal souls,<sup>3</sup> their behaviour must be explained as purely mechanistic (Harrison 1992). To put it bluntly: even though it seems that animals can feel pain, they feel nothing. In the fifth part of his *On Method*, Descartes alludes to various correlations between machines, automata and animals. Elsewhere, he argues: 'Doubtless when the swallows come in spring, they operate like clocks. The actions of honeybees are of the same nature and the discipline of cranes in flight, and of apes in fighting' (Descartes 1991, p. 304). Descartes goes on to suggest: 'It is more probable that worms, flies, caterpillars and other animals move like machines than that they all have immortal souls,' and, a few lines down, calls an animal an 'automaton' (Descartes 1991, p. 366). For Descartes, the surest proof of lack of reason, and thus also of inability to experience pain, in animals is their lack of propositional language. In fact, it is language that forms the crucial divide between humans and other animals, and helps us to recognize only the former as creatures capable of conscious feeling: 'For it is highly deserving of remark, that there are no men so dull and stupid, not even idiots, as to be incapable of joining together different words, and thereby constructing a declaration by which to make their thoughts understood; and that on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect or happily circumstanced, which can do the like... And this proves not only that brutes have less reason than man, but that they have none at all' (Descartes 2008, p. 45).

Thus, Descartes put forward the influential suggestion that animals are something akin to mechanisms, and that the cries of animals apparently in pain could be correlated with the noises that malfunctioning mechanisms make (whether or not Descartes himself supported the latter conclusion remains a matter of controversy, although it should be pointed out that he was a keen vivisector in a time before analgesics or anaesthetics – see McCance 2008). Where there is no language there is no reason or soul, and where there is no reason or soul there is no pain. The legacy of this mechanistic view has been evident in philosophical arguments such as those presented by Carruthers, Harrison and Davidson. It has also lived on in psychology and even ethology. Rather notoriously, behaviourists argued in the early twentieth century

that animals are guided by mere automatic responses, the most typical manifestation of which is conditioned learning. Therefore, the animal's body begins to anticipate food when signs of food are present, or the animal will begin to whimper when a hostile creature is approaching her. However, in the absence of language, we have no proof that the animal is experiencing anything at all, and this renders talk of animal feeling unscientific.<sup>4</sup> Following suit, the father of behaviourism, J. B. Watson, stated that 'The behaviourist sweeps aside all medieval conceptions. He drops from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, and even thinking and emotion' (Watson 1928), and this approach was strongly advocated particularly in relation to non-human animals. Even today, terms relating to animal experiences such as emotions and even pain are often avoided in 'hard science' (on the legacy of behaviourism, see Rollin 1989).

The claim that it feels like nothing to be a non-human animal seems incredible if judged from the viewpoint of everyday accounts concerning animals and their behaviour. It strikes one as absurd to suggest that a dog who has been injured and is crying in pain is actually feeling nothing at all. What we are asked to do is to abandon intuition and experience concerning animals, and to accept a framework that tells us that our basic perceptions are flawed in a very fundamental way. This is too high a price to pay for a philosophical argument, and, if anything, suggests that there is something inherently wrong with scepticism of animal minds and pain. Indeed, there are good philosophical reasons to abandon the sceptical approach.<sup>5</sup> Self-consciousness and propositional language may lay the basis for particular forms of human pain: for instance, pain may be heightened or lessened by the ability to introspect on or analyse one's own feelings. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the rudimentary ability to feel pain does not require introspection or language, for neither is a necessary requirement for phenomenal consciousness. The so-called 'first-order theorists' of consciousness maintain that consciousness consists of beliefs concerning bodily perceptions and sensations, and that self-consciousness and propositional language play no necessary part in this process. That is, a pig does not need to have consciousness and concepts on the second-order level for her to have experiences and beliefs thereof on the first-order level. Alternatively, all that is required is for one's mind to become conscious of a given sensation or a perception – here, even beliefs are not needed. The difference between the first-order and the second-order theories is simple: for the latter, one needs to be able to step back from an experience and offer an analysis concerning it before one can claim

to have that experience; according to the former, no such analysis is needed. Importantly, advocates of the former also often argue that a large number of animals are conscious, experiencing beings capable of feeling pain (see Dretske 1995; Tye 1997). That is, the phenomenal, first-order approach to consciousness is much more inclusive when it comes to non-human pain.

The second-order theory not only goes against everyday intuition and experience, but also flies in the face of a growing stack of empirical research on animal minds (for a thorough volume on the latter, see Bekoff et al. 2002). Moreover, it seems to overcomplicate things: why would a 'meta-level' or a higher order of analysis be required for a being to have mental states? Can we really not think or feel without being able to analyse whether we think or feel? In view of these issues, it is reasonable to maintain that Matilda the pig can feel 'what it is like' without being able to comprehend her own self in a conceptual, higher-order sense, and without being able to form propositions around her experiences: having experiences must be separated from analysing or representing those experiences. More complex abilities than phenomenal consciousness may shape pain, but they are not the necessary requirement for its existence. (On the issue of phenomenal consciousness in animals, see DeGrazia 1996; Allen 1998; Searle 1998.<sup>6</sup>)

Fortunately, the history of Western thought has also seen more reflective takes on animal pain than afforded by Cartesian scepticism. In his rebuttal of the immortality of souls, the famous empiricist David Hume maintained that 'Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than men' (Hume 2004, p. 9).<sup>7</sup> Darwin has become famous for his assertion that non-human animals share a wide variety of capacities – including the capacity to feel pain – with human beings. Thus, he argued that 'There is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties' (Darwin 2009, p. 60). Importantly, others besides our closest kin were also included. 'With respect to animals very low in the scale,' Darwin asserted, 'their mental powers are much higher than might have been expected' (Darwin 2009, p. 61). Indeed, Darwin's thoughts proved to be revolutionary also in the context of how animal pain is perceived, and arguably have had a profound effect on the more sympathetic contemporary views.

Although scepticism is still rife in many 'hard sciences', the Darwinian stance on animal pain has found its advocates also amongst scientists, and particularly 'animal welfare sciences'. In present-day readings concerning animal welfare, the term 'sentience' is often used (see Duncan

2006). In brief, sentience is very similar to phenomenal consciousness, and is defined in the following terms: 'To be sentient is to have a feeling of something' (Kirkwood 2007, p. 13).<sup>8</sup> However, there is a slight difference in how these two terms are applied. Whereas 'phenomenal consciousness' refers to the capacity to experience in general, 'sentience' is frequently deployed specifically in the context of pain and other basic, often physical, experiences. Most commonly, sentience is understood to be a type of core consciousness, within which the brain produces an imaged, non-verbal account of how the organism is affected by its surroundings (see Parvizi and Damasio 2001). It helps the organism to choose an appropriate action, and thus a pig will, based on her imaged account, refrain from going near a fire. The influential animal welfare scientist John Webster summarizes this concept as follows: 'Sentient animals are those that have evolved mental processes for interpreting sensations and information so that they can choose what action, if any, is most appropriate to their needs' (Webster 2007, p. 151). A term closely related to sentience is 'an affective state', which refers to a state experienced as negative or positive. The pig has, based on the imaged account, affective relations to her surroundings, and therefore will maintain a negative affective stance towards, for instance, predators. One claim is that pain consists of sentience and negative affective states. Broadly outlined, the pig is in pain when she has formed a particular account of sensory input involving her body towards which she has negative affective states.

But do animals have phenomenal consciousness? Are they sentient beings? Can they feel pain? Above, it was stated that first-order theories can accommodate the idea of 'non-human pain', but are there good reasons to believe that, in practice, non-human creatures can indeed feel pain on the first-order level? These are the core questions of cognitive ethology, which seeks to map out the cognitive capacities of non-human animals (on cognitive ethology, see Allen and Bekoff 1997). There is wide scientific disagreement concerning when sentience came to be, and exactly which animals possess it. Some even argue that sentience may exist only in human beings (Kennedy 1992), while others place it as a capacity found widely in the animal kingdom (Bekoff 2002). As Colin Allen has suggested, understanding of animal pain is still very limited on both the empirical and philosophical levels (Allen 2004), and this in itself lays the basis for various conflicting views on the matter.

Analogies offer one standard way to approach the topic (for example, see Bateson 1991). Here, the central question is whether animals resemble human beings in sufficiently relevant ways for one to conclude that,

if given characteristics are tied to sentience in human beings, they will imply sentience also amongst other animals. However, it must be noted that analogies alone do not offer logically conclusive proof. For instance, both seagulls and penguins have wings, but only the former can fly high in the air, and, no matter how many analogies one found between the two, this fact would not change (on criticism of analogies, see Allen 1998). Moreover, analogies may be misleading, as similar functions can be fulfilled through different means, and may manifest in different ways. For example, sentience may have a different neurological basis in different species, and may emerge in different forms of behaviour (see Dawkins 1998). Thus evidence quite clearly suggests that birds, despite their lack of the neocortex, not only can experience pain but also have a rich variety of cognitive abilities (Rogers 1996; 1997). It is quite possible that even some creatures without a central nervous system may also experience pain (on this debate, see NRC 2009).

Importantly, animals often manifest pain in ways which human beings may struggle to recognize. Thus, for instance, laboratory technicians fail to identify post-surgery pain in rodents if not specifically taught how to look for the key signs (Fraser 2008). When interpreting animal welfare and pain it is paramount to keep this in mind. In the grip of pain, animals may do the exact opposite of what humans do: they may go quiet and stay still, or they may act as if nothing at all is wrong. These differences often have to do with survival, as evolution has taught animals to hide their enfeebled state from those who could take advantage of it. Take birds, for example: 'The ability to hide evidence of illness is a protective mechanism that chickens have developed over millions of years of evolution because any sign of weakness is quickly spotted by a predator' (Julian 2004, p. 51). Therefore, detecting animal pain requires a keen, open mind. Some animals vocalize their pain, but may do it in such a high frequency that human beings fail to hear it; many do not vocalize but rather go silent. Aggression, gait, apathy, lack of movement, rigid posture, scruffy or dull appearance, ear and tail flicking, licking, shivering, glassy eyes, dorsal lip curling, teeth grinding, neck extension, muscle contractions, agitated swimming (in fish), odd positions (such as 'bowing down' on elbows), and restlessness are among common pain behaviours in animals. The symptoms are very species-specific, and the only sign of pain in a lamb, for instance, may be lip curling or apathy. If wary of human beings, many animals will hide any signs of pain in human company, which makes observation even more difficult (NRC 2009). Therefore, it would be a crucial mistake to assume that only those animals feel pain who exhibit

pain behaviours typical of human beings. These differences may, in fact, have led to a situation where many remain blissfully blind to non-human pain.

Physiological, behavioural and evolutionary factors have often been used to indicate animal sentience. When it comes to physiology, it is commonly argued that, in order for a being to be able to feel pain, she must have nociceptors, a central nervous system and the capacity to secrete endogenous opioids, and must respond to analgesics (Varner 1998);<sup>9</sup> however, it remains uncertain which features are truly necessary (Allen 2004). The type of rudimentary neurological functioning and nerve structure required for sentience can be found at least in birds and mammals, and (in the light of new evidence) also in fish.<sup>10</sup> Quite possibly sentience resides also in other groups of species, such as reptiles, various invertebrates, and even insects (see Mather 2001; Rollin 2003; Griffin and Speck 2004; Kirkwood 2007; Mather and Anderson 2007; Braithwaite 2010).<sup>11</sup> The more research emerges, the farther out the line is drawn: 'The direction of discovery here seems uniformly towards identifying more similarities between diverse species, especially in the domains of anatomy and physiology' (Allen 2004, p. 623). Indeed, relying on the relevance of physiology, Voltaire replied to Descartes many centuries ago: 'Answer me, machinist, has nature arranged all the means of feeling in this animal, so that it may not feel?' (Voltaire 2010, p. 14).

In relation to behaviour, withdrawal from noxious stimuli is not, on its own, considered to be an adequate proof of sentience, but the ability to learn from interactions with such stimuli may well be, for it suggests that experiences are involved. Thus, Allen asserts that 'The conscious experience of pain is most likely not simply an "alarm bell" to be suppressed when it becomes essential to act, but instead has a complicated role in the capacity of organisms to learn how to behave when confronted with actual or possible tissue damage' (Allen 2004, p. 236). This means that those animals who learn from pain-related incidents most likely feel pain, and this ability appears to be widespread (for instance, goldfish can learn to avoid electric shocks; see Portavella et al. 2004). It is also, for instance, helpful to observe whether emotions are linked to interactions with harmful stimuli. Does the animal seem agitated, depressed, stressed or afraid, when she is injured or under attack? If so, we cannot speak of blind physical reaction (Fraser 2008). In the light of recent research, it has also been argued that emotional states have a clear impact on animal pain. Therefore, anxiety and fear, for example, affect the intensity of the pain felt by animals, and (vice versa) the threat of pain causes anxiety and fear (NRC 2009). This



further accentuates the claim that many non-human animals can, indeed, experience pain.

A further source of evidence of sentience is self-medication: in experiments, many animals will self-medicate with painkillers, when given the opportunity. For instance, lame chickens will choose to eat feed that contains painkillers, and the more severe their condition, the more painkiller feed they will consume (Danbury et al. 2000). Injured laboratory rats will do the same (Martin et al. 2006), and both mice and pigeons will learn to press a switch in order to avoid electric shocks (NRC 2009). Fish and frogs learn to actively avoid harmful, pain-inducing stimuli (Dunlop et al. 2003; NRC 2009). In humans particularly, self-medication is viewed as a scientifically valid means of evaluating the experience of pain, so there is little reason to doubt its validity also in the context of non-human animals. Moreover, if one experiences pain, redirecting attention to other experiences will help to lessen the impact of pain, whereas if pain is purely mechanistic no such redirection will have any effect. In many animals, redirection does work – hence, animals will show fewer signs of pain if they are presented with something interesting and fun (Rollin 2003; Fraser 2008; for a broader description of behavioural elements, see Broom and Johnson 1993).<sup>12</sup>

It is often argued that creative behaviour in particular stands out as a factor to look out for when determining whether non-human creatures truly are capable of forming experiences. An animal invested with phenomenal consciousness will not mechanically seek to avoid sources of harm or to overcome obstacles, but will, rather, become creative, innovative and flexible in her efforts. Hence, a rabbit will not keep monotonously jumping against a rock that she needs to pass, but will instead seek alternative routes to get to where she wants to go. Following set routines in a highly complex and even chaotic reality is awkward, time-consuming, and ultimately hopeless. Every part of the forest is different and exists in a constant state of change whereby creatures and weather conditions come and go. Were rabbits or elks to stick to one simple form of behaviour, they would quickly fall out of sync with their environment, rather like toy robots that get stuck at the edge of a rug. Experiences and sentience, on the other hand, enable quick and creative decisions. The animal has access to sensory information and, instead of repeating certain restricted responses, makes 'higher-order' choices on the basis of this information (Kirkwood 2007). Therefore, if non-human animals manifest creativity in their efforts to avoid harmful stimuli, it is likely that they are, indeed, capable of experiencing pain. (On the role of behaviour in assessing non-human pain, see Rutherford 2002.)

Finally, it needs to be determined whether sentience serves an evolutionary function. For some very simple animals, simple reactions suffice, and here sentience may not be required. For animals who live in complex environments and have to meet complex needs, simple reactions are not adequate for survival. This is most evident because of the aforementioned significance of learning and creativity: in order to survive in complex environments, animals need to learn to avoid harmful stimuli, often in creative ways.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the experience of pain is an extremely powerful motivation for avoiding and escaping harmful stimuli, and is thus clearly beneficial from the viewpoint of survival (McMillan 2003). Therefore, the capacity to experience pain does fulfil clear evolutionary functions for many animals. One hypothesis is that the ability to feel pain has, in fact, made possible the evolution of more complex cognitive capacities (such as intentionality and the formation of beliefs). Hence, the world might be a much simpler and duller place, filled with amoebas and bacteria rather than birds, fish and mammals, if sentience had never evolved (Fraser 2008).

Sentience, therefore, offers a huge survival advantage by promoting complex behaviour. If we recognize this in human beings, it is nonsensical to deny it in non-human animals. Bernard Rollin writes: 'Given that the mechanisms of pain in vertebrates are the same, it strains credibility to suggest that the experience of pain suddenly emerges at the level of humans... Human pain machinery is virtually the same as that in animals, and we know from experience with humans that the ability to *feel* pain is essential for survival... If pain had worked well as a purely mechanical system in animals without a subjective dimension, why would it suddenly appear in man with such a dimension?' (Rollin 2003, p. 87). If Darwin was right in his assertion that nature takes no leaps, it beggars belief to suggest that, of all the animal kingdom, only human beings can feel pain.

Therefore, there are a whole host of physiological, behavioural and evolutionary reasons to believe that many non-human animals can experience pain. Yet, for a long time it was thought that, if alternatives could be found, one should not refer to sentience as an explanation for an animal's behaviour. This approach is highly prejudiced against sentience: why should we avoid sentience as an explanation at all costs? A far more sensible and logical approach is to use the principle of parsimony, so fundamental to much of Western science, which stipulates that, when we have many competing explanations for the same phenomena, we ought to favour the simplest. When it comes to animal behaviour, sentience is often by far the simplest explanation. Instead

of having to refer to an extremely high number of 'pre-programmed' pathways for each small action that the animal takes, as though we were explaining the actions of a robot, we can simply talk of her sentience as the source of her behaviour. As Fraser points out, explaining an animal's behaviour as mechanistic is a very cumbersome and complicated task, since every single movement needs to be accounted for and explained on the basis of physiological reactions, whereas affective states offer an exceedingly simple and often far more credible alternative (Panksepp 1998; Fraser 2008).

Mammals and birds are often listed as the most obvious families of animals with the capacity for sentience and pain. Recent studies suggest that fish and certain molluscs (particularly squid and octopus), too, must be counted in. Many open the door to reptiles as well. Perhaps insects also have their own felt viewpoints on reality. (See again Rollin 2003; Chandroo et al. 2004; Griffin and Speck 2004; Somme 2005; Dawkins 1998; Kirkwood 2007; Braithwaite 2010; also look at Grandin and Deesing 2002 and Rose and Adams 1989.) Because there are good reasons to support the notion of animal sentience, and because research is still in its infancy, it has been further suggested that we ought to follow the precautionary principle and give animals the benefit of the doubt: until proven otherwise, we ought to approach them as sentient beings capable of feeling pain (Wise 2002; Bekoff 2008). In fact, perhaps there is no need to provide evidence for non-human sentience – rather, maybe it is the deniers of animal sentience who need to provide evidence for their own scepticism (Linzey 2009).

As cognitive ethology is beginning to manifest, non-human animals possess many of the capacities traditionally seen as the exclusive property of human beings. Many of them behave in an intentional way, form concepts and beliefs, and even show signs of self-consciousness.<sup>14</sup> It would be very strange, indeed, if these intelligent creatures did not have the simple capacity to experience pain.

### **Can other animals suffer?**

Whereas animal pain is becoming a more recognized fact, animal suffering still remains a contested issue. Thus, pigs may feel pain, but many people who carry on the Cartesian or behaviourist legacy still doubt whether they can suffer. Is this sceptical attitude warranted?

'Suffering', as a term, is notoriously difficult to define.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the first thing that springs to mind when thinking of suffering is substantial pain. According to this interpretation, headaches would not amount to

suffering, whereas the agonies of cancer do. Significantly, however, 'suffering' can also be a purely emotional or mental state, with no physical causes. For instance, distress, depression, fear or anxiety can count as suffering – again, as with pain, such conditions need to be substantial before they amount to suffering. Therefore, suffering has both physical and mental dimensions. It is also often stated that, whereas pain is specific (it concerns one specific area of our body), suffering is holistic (it grips our whole being). Suffering is something which concerns us as a whole – it affects our health, our mental state, all of our thoughts: it is a state which governs everything that we are. Hence, pain is a particular feeling, while suffering is an overall condition (Amato 1990; Mayerfeld 1999). Suffering also includes a sense of priority: it bypasses other considerations. When I grieve for a lost loved one, other considerations seem trivial; I cannot concentrate on them, and, no matter how much others try to comfort me, their words mean nothing. Suffering is, in this sense, hierarchical: it will take priority over most (and often all) other considerations.

A fruitful definition of suffering combines the different elements above. We can sketch it as follows: suffering is substantial physical discomfort and/or mental distress which affects our whole being and sidelines most (if not all) other considerations normally important to us.

What does this tell us about the animals' capacity to suffer? Let's have a look at two different types of suffering: physical and mental. Physical suffering depends, just like pain, on the capacity to experience. A pig can feel substantial pain, and hence suffer, if she is a sentient creature: this is all that is needed. Therefore, all sentient animals are capable of at least physical suffering, defined as substantial physical discomfort which overwhelms the animal, and in the grip of which the animal struggles to pay attention to anything else. A typical example would be a hen in a battery cage whose wing is broken, and who cannot direct her attention to anything other than her miserable condition. But what about mental suffering?

Again, sentience – or, more broadly, phenomenal consciousness – acts as a basic criterion. Those beings who can experience their existence as something will most likely also be able to have substantially negative experiences that constitute suffering. However, it needs to be noted that both the content and form of suffering can vary greatly, simply because suffering is linked to a variety of capacities and traits. We may talk of a multitude of capacities that can lay the basis for suffering, such as the capacities for attachment, self-awareness, intentionality, rationality and moral agency. There also exist a multitude of traits that may

enable suffering, such as curiosity or the desire to roam freely. Hence, one being can suffer social loss because she has the capacity for attachment, whilst another being can suffer due to moral remorse; a being can also suffer because she is kept in a barren environment that prevents curious exploration, or denies her species-specific need to roam. Alongside mental capacities and traits, the emotional level is another significant factor. A being capable of fear, sadness or anxiety will be capable of related suffering. Therefore, sentience acts as the basic criterion for mental suffering, and specific capacities, traits and emotions dictate which particular types of suffering an animal is capable of. As cognitive ethology has only begun to show us the breathtaking scope of abilities found in the animal kingdom, it is to be expected that many animals are not only able to suffer, but are also capable of types of suffering to which anthropocentric society has thus far remained blind.<sup>16</sup>

Some argue that the capacity to suffer is as old as the capacity to feel pain, and is widely distributed in the animal kingdom. Thus, Andrew Linzey asserts that 'There is ample evidence that all mammals experience not just pain, but also mental suffering, that is, stress, terror, shock, anxiety, fear, trauma and foreboding, and that only to a greater or lesser degree than we do ourselves' (Linzey 2007, p. 70). The well-known ethologist John Webster claims: 'The capacity for suffering is an inevitable consequence of the evolution of sentience, that is, all sentient animals have the capacity to suffer. This class certainly includes all the mammals and birds that we farm for food and probably the fish as well' (Webster 2007, p. 152). Therefore, if the capacity to experience is taken as a sufficient criterion, it becomes evident that many non-human animals are, indeed, capable of suffering.

Moreover, there is an increasing amount of data on specific forms of animal suffering. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that many animals have a capacity for the type of affective states that can lead to both suffering and joy (for a thorough review, see Nordenfelt 2006). Many animals respond to mood-enhancing drugs, such as benzodiazepine, used to relieve anxiety and related forms of mental distress in human beings, and (conversely) animals will also begin to act anxiously if administered anxiety-inducing drugs. Significantly, animals have been used as 'models' for various negative mental states and illnesses associated with suffering. For instance, depression and anxiety have been induced in animals (from rats to pigs) by subjecting them to constant inescapable electric shocks (NRC 2009). A common argument is that exercises such as these would be pointless if the animals did not truly experience depression, anxiety, stress, fear and other mental

states which the studies in question seek to research. When combined with the emerging evidence of animal traits, emotion and cognition, this suggests that many animals are capable of a wide variety of suffering, ranging from that related to anxiety and depression to that linked to core emotions and the frustration of key traits or cognitive ability. That is, when taking into account not only the sentience of non-human animals, but also the scope of emotions, traits and capacities innate to their species, it emerges as very likely that many of them are, indeed, capable of suffering. To use a simple example, if a pig is an experiencing being with traits, emotions and capacities linked to socialization, it becomes very difficult to deny that she would suffer if prevented from any form of social interaction with members of her species.

There are good reasons to support this view. When one observes the behaviour of animals, it strikes one as absurd to suggest that they are not capable of feeling the type of substantial pain or mental distress that can be called suffering. Our everyday interaction with non-human animals tells us quite clearly that Descartes was wrong: these are not machine-like beings, but creatures able to experience both the positive and the negative. However, it should be added that often observation needs to be very astute in order to recognize animal suffering. Just as animal pain can be manifested in ways that human beings struggle to read, animal suffering can generate behaviours that are not usually linked to suffering. For instance, prey animals will often hide their suffering, and therefore will simply stay still and stare when in the grip of unbearable fear, anxiety or frustration. Signs of suffering can, in fact, be very peculiar: for instance, cows manifest loss and emotional agony by repeatedly showing the whites of their eyes (Sandem and Braastad 2005). It is very easy for a farmer to walk past suffering animals each day, year after year, and never recognize any suffering; what is needed is willingness to stop and pay heed to the animal viewpoint in all its difference.

But can we compare the suffering of non-human animals to that of human beings? One common argument suggests that, due to the complex forms of intellect that many human beings manifest, they can experience greater levels and more severe types of pain and suffering than other, allegedly less intellectually complex, animals. Because of this, we cannot compare the pain or suffering of a human being to that of a pig or a hen.<sup>17</sup>

Before accepting this argument, we need to note that the possession of what could be called 'human-specific intelligence' may also work the other way. According to studies, the inability to understand the

reasons for pain and suffering, or to predict their duration, renders the pain and suffering in question more intolerable. Hence, for instance, small children who have fractured a bone will experience their condition as much more excruciating than it would seem to adults, who understand the cause of their pain and can anticipate its short duration. One claim is that pain and suffering reach their highest levels when a sense of helplessness is present, when the cause is unknown, when the implications of the pain or suffering are viewed as dire, and when the pain or suffering seems to be never-ending (Mayerfeld 1999).<sup>18</sup> Therefore, the manner in which pain or suffering is made meaningful has an impact on its severity, so that often lack of intellectual ability and knowledge will lead to greater, not lesser, levels of pain and suffering. This claim is fruitful. Not being able to understand the reasons behind one's own pain and suffering will render that pain and suffering into something uncontrollable and overpowering: behind a veil of ignorance, a minor physical injury may emerge as something utterly petrifying. This would mean that, in fact, non-human animals may have to go through much more than human animals. They will, particularly at the hands of human beings, often feel helpless and remain unable to know why their suffering is happening. They will also perhaps perceive the suffering through fear and apprehension, and feel that it will never cease. The pig in the farm and the rat in the testing laboratory will have no power over their own condition, and no understanding of what is happening to them. This will render their suffering something intolerable and enormous, like a great black hole from which there is no escape. Therefore, it has been argued that the suffering of animals may often be worse than that of human beings, for, in the absence of knowledge concerning its ramifications and without the ease brought by a sense of empowerment, it remains more 'raw' (see also Linzey 2009).

This suggests that, if anything, comparisons between the pain and suffering of human beings on the one hand, and those of non-human animals on the other, need to take into account that the latter may experience their own adversity much more strongly. Following this line of thought, Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued: 'Other things being equal it is worse to cause an animal pain than to cause an adult human being pain. An adult human being can, as it were, think his or her way around the pain to what lies beyond it in the future; an animal – like a human baby – cannot do this, so that there is nothing for the animal but the pain itself' (Thomson 1990, p. 292). For animals, there is no escape.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, it is quite possible that, based on their unique cognitive abilities and senses, animals are capable of types of suffering human beings cannot fathom. What is it like to be a fish dragged out from the sea, or a bird shot down from the skies? The variety of capacities in the animal world is astonishing. Many creatures experience the world in wholly different ways from human beings, by using entirely different sensory capacities. Even the animals most familiar to us, such as dogs, have ways of making sense of the world that are utterly unknown to human beings. The worrying prospect is that the make-up of animals may lead to types of pain and suffering that are alien to us, and that will therefore escape our attention. Perhaps the dog left alone in the yard harbours feelings that can never be understood by the human mind, and perhaps the chicken or the pig in the factory farm has a repertoire of extremely negative experiences that human beings cannot even begin to comprehend. There may be a silent world of suffering on the other side of the species border of which human beings – often the very perpetrators of that suffering – have no understanding. Instead of concentrating on whether non-human animals share all the types of suffering human beings are capable of, it may be more worthwhile to pay attention to the specific forms of non-human suffering that thus far have gone unnoted.

It should be added that cultural and social meanings can impact human suffering (Kleinman et al. 1997). For instance, notions concerning ‘good life’ and ‘dignity’ can affect what types of factors are considered as causes of suffering, and they can also have an effect on how suffering is experienced. However, it would be a sweeping mistake to assume that this excludes the possibility of non-human suffering. Combined with introspective self-awareness, cultural and social elements can facilitate the specificity of given variants of human suffering, just as the richness of non-human cognition and sense perception can give rise to the specificity and multitude of animal suffering. However, these factors are not the necessary conditions of suffering *per se*. Rather, it is the sentience behind them that acts as the key factor.

### **‘Animal welfare’ in science**

How can we know when non-human suffering, in actuality, takes place? One practical field of study that has explored this question is animal welfare science.

The sciences only began to take animal welfare seriously in the latter part of the twentieth century. Even this was due to external pressures.



In 1964, Ruth Harrison published her *Animal Machines* (later followed by books such as Hans Ruesch's *Slaughter of the Innocent*). The book depicted the harrowing way in which animals are treated within industrial animal production, as little more than machines. Just a couple of years earlier, Rachel Carson (who wrote the foreword to *Animal Machines*) had published her *Silent Spring*, which brought to the fore the alarming environmental destruction that had until then gone unnoted. Just as Carson's book had a tremendous impact on awareness of the looming environmental catastrophe, Harrison's book played a key part in the growing awareness of what happens to animals in factory farms. The British government responded to this awareness by appointing the Brambell Committee to look into how animals were being treated on British farms. Some members suggested that science should be used to detect the pain and suffering of animals, and, following this suggestion, the committee concluded that fields such as veterinary science should pay more attention to the experiences of farmed animals. This development proved the birthstone of a new science: the scientific study of animal welfare (its first manifestation was *Animal Suffering* by Marian Stamp Dawkins, published in 1980) (Duncan 2005; Fraser 2008).

Now, it should be noted that animal welfare science does include some problematic presumptions. Most notably, it highlights 'welfare' rather than 'suffering'. Moreover, it tends to assume that the use of animals *per se* is acceptable. Some choices of terminology also indicate a highly mechanistic understanding of animals and their treatment.<sup>20</sup> Animal welfare science can be split into two schools: ethology, which emphasizes behaviour as the indicator of welfare, and the physiological approach, which – through fields such as stress physiology and veterinary pathology – seeks to monitor the bodily implications of welfare. Within these schools, the study of animal welfare has become fragmented into many different specialized areas, all using different criteria, and this has led to substantial difficulties in the effort to form a comprehensive understanding of animal welfare (Duncan 2005; Sandøe et al. 2008). Most worryingly, qualitative research, which concentrates on the experiences of animals, has remained at the margins (Fraser 2008).<sup>21</sup> However, animal welfare science has also provided valuable insights into the actuality of non-human suffering.

'Welfare' as a term refers to an experiential state – it is something that we experience (Fraser 2008; for an analysis of different definitions, see Nordenfelt 2006). More precisely, it refers to the way the animal experiences her own quality of life: 'Welfare is the balance, now and through life, of the quality of the complex mix of subjective feelings associated

with brain states induced by various sensory inputs and by cognitive and emotion processes' (Kirkwood 2007, p. 12). It is commonly argued that welfare concerns the manner in which individual animals cope with the demands placed on them by their environments and their own bodies. Thus, one of the leading scientists in the field of animal welfare, Donald Broom, defines welfare in the following terms: 'The welfare of an individual animal is its state as regards its attempt to cope with its environment, with attempts to cope including the functioning of body repair systems, immunological defenses, the physiological stress response and a variety of behavioural responses' (Broom 1996). In essence, 'welfare' is often used to refer to the absence of suffering. Within such usage, it does not imply happiness as such, but rather a contented life, which is free from substantial physical pain or mental discomfort. Because of this underlying reference to absence of suffering, welfare studies have the potential to tell us what types of suffering non-human animals are both capable of and subjected to. (It should be added that, according to some, much more prominence should be placed on positive mental states that render life 'worth living': 'Indeed, what use is there in satisfying an animal's vital needs, if the life the animal then lives is devoid of any enjoyment?'; see Yeates and Main 2007, p. 298.<sup>22</sup>)

'Stress' is often treated as a key factor in welfare studies. A typical stress situation involves the body gearing up to face a challenge (such as a fight). In this process, the body releases energy, slows down the production of sex and growth hormones, and reduces the activity of the immune system. Usually, stress is only momentary, and the body therefore gets back to normality quite quickly. However, sometimes the stress situation does not cease, and instead keeps the body in its grip, leading to the production of cytokines, which urge the being in stress to rest by causing a feeling of ill-health. This is what 'stress' usually means in the context of animal welfare studies: it refers to the prolonged stress response that eventually causes the animal to manifest physical and psychological ill-health. Significantly, stress is intrinsically linked to negative experiences. It is the negative experiences of animals that pave the way for stress responses by activating the stress system (called the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal or HPA axis). Therefore, stress is caused by the way in which animals experience the challenges of their environment. Most commonly, the stress response exists because animals are faced by environmental challenges that will not go away, and thus, for instance, lack of space or the presence of hostile human beings can trigger it. Animal stress can be evaluated by measuring stress

hormone levels, and also by paying attention to matters such as bodily health: thus, emphasis is often on the physical rather than the mental (on animal stress, see Broom and Johnson 1993; Gregory 2004; Fraser 2008 – see also Broom 1986; 1987).<sup>23</sup>

However, it is important to note that, even though physiological factors (such as stress hormone levels) are an important indicator of welfare, they do not tell us the whole story. In particular, it is dangerous to reduce welfare to physical health. The well-known ethologist Marian Stamp Dawkins argues that welfare includes not only physical but also mental factors. Because of this, purely physical methods of understanding welfare, such as health and productivity, are highly limited. An animal in great distress can have a beautiful fur coat and a perfectly healthy body, just as long as her nutrition is kept to an optimal level. Ill-health can be an important indicator of welfare problems, but welfare comprises more than merely the physical (Dawkins 1980; Rollin 1995). Similarly, stress hormone levels can be normal even when the animal is clearly in deep distress (Duncan 2005).<sup>24</sup> This means that, alongside physiological factors, it is crucial to pay attention to 'what animals want' (Dawkins 2008; see also Duncan 2005). Both stress and other factors related to welfare and suffering also ought to be analysed from the viewpoint of animal experience.

But how can we interpret the experiences of non-human animals? In the 1940s, David Levy reported a repertoire of abnormal behaviours in disturbed children. These children would do odd things, such as rock their heads repeatedly from one side to the other. Later, a similar repertoire, often at a much more extreme level, was found in presumably disturbed animals. Macaque monkeys used for experimentation, and routinely kept in solitude in tiny cages, resort to repetitive behaviours and sometimes severe self-mutilation. Fur animals rock from side to side or bite off their own tails and limbs, zoo animals pace endlessly up and down their miserable pens and, again, may resort to self-mutilation, and farmed animals often chew the bars of their cages monotonously, roll their tongues around their lips time and again, or perform other repetitive tasks. Monotonous rocking, swaying, pacing, banging, biting, chewing and self-mutilation are among behaviours often called 'stereotypical'. Such behaviours tend to be recognized by the fact that they are repetitive and serve no obvious function (other than enabling the animal to vent her frustration). Studies have shown that animals who previously lived in rich environments, but were suddenly placed in barren or otherwise unsuitable conditions, will quickly develop a range of stereotypical behaviours. These behaviours represent a futile

effort to cope in an unbearable environment, and their presence signals that something is fundamentally wrong with the living conditions of the animal. In other words, they tell us that the animal experiences her situation in an extremely negative way, and therefore speak volumes about animal suffering (Fraser 2008; see also Broom and Fraser 2007).

Other types of behaviour, too, tell us of animal experience and offer strong reasons to believe that the welfare of animals is compromised. 'Vacuum activity' refers to a situation in which an animal cannot fulfil a tendency innate to herself, and where she will, as a result, resort to various inappropriate actions (calves suckling on iron bars is a typical example). Similarly, 'adjunctive behaviour' refers to a situation in which an animal resorts to one activity because of the inability to fulfil another (for instance, pregnant sows, who are routinely kept in constant hunger, drink vast amounts of water in order to fill their stomachs). 'Displacement activity' refers to an animal suddenly performing an action that she is not 'really' performing (such as pecking the ground as if feeding). These behaviours may seem innocent, but in fact they can reveal a great deal of suffering. Fraser states: 'From our own experience we understand how it feels to experience strong hunger or thirst at times when we are unable to eat or drink. Similar concerns arise if a calf is strongly motivated to suck, or a hen is strongly motivated to find a nest site, or a caged bird is strongly motivated to migrate, in situations where the corresponding behaviour is impossible' (Fraser 2008, p. 180). These behaviours have been linked to disturbances in brain pathology, and more precisely in basal ganglia, which in human beings entail various mental disorders (such as autism, schizophrenia and degenerative brain disease). This has an alarming implication: stress in animals may cause them to become mentally ill. Therefore, one argument is that animals, such as laboratory mice, kept in barren environments will begin to suffer problems in their brain development, and will, thus, ultimately become the victims of mental disorders (Fraser 2008). What society is doing to animals may have far more devastating consequences than previously thought. The frightening prospect is that it is not only inflicting suffering on animals, but also changing the very being of animals in a direction that prevents them from leading wholesome lives.

Additional ways of interpreting animal experience, common within animal welfare studies, include motivational testing and preference testing. In the former, animals must perform various chores before they reach their desired goal, and the more of these chores an animal will carry out, the more she is seen to value the given goal. For instance,

hens will perform a significant number of chores in order to follow species-specific behaviours, such as nesting or dust bathing (a less preferable version of this test measures how hard an animal will work in order to avoid something negative). In preference testing, animals are 'asked' which type of environment they would like to live in by observing which of many choices they opt for. Again, hens will typically choose environments where they can fulfil basic species-specific traits (Dawkins 1998). Therefore, animals communicate their experiences through the tasks they are willing to undergo, and through the choices they make.<sup>25</sup> These are just some examples of possible tests (for instance, the vocalizations of animals have also been regarded as reliable indicators of negative experiences; see Duncan 2005).

Unfortunately, animal welfare sciences often have limited practical impact. As already suggested, they are plagued by bias, as they tend to rest on the idea that the various practices involved in using animals for human consumption are acceptable, and should remain practically feasible. This means that welfare scientists are often attentive to the viewpoint of animal producers, and many will only offer suggestions which do not cause excessive financial loss. The implication is that human benefit – including economic gain – is ultimately seen as having more significance than animal welfare (see Sandøe et al. 2007). Moreover, regulators often ignore scientific studies and reports on animal welfare, so that the business of animal industries continues as normal even when we know that things need to change. In this sense, the danger is that animal welfare sciences remain overly moderate or have their suggestions altogether ignored.

### **'Animal welfare' in law**

In many countries, the term 'welfare' is noted in legislation. However, this has not meant that animal existence in human hands is free from suffering. One reason is that different understandings of welfare lead to highly conflicting views on how animals ought to be treated. David Fraser offers as an example the 1997 European Union report on the welfare of pigs. According to experts from the EU, the report showed that sows suffer from serious welfare problems even in the most advanced stall-systems. Experts from Australia, after reading the exact same report, came to the opposite conclusion. The key to this difference was found in the fact that European experts linked welfare to affective states, whereas the Australian experts linked it to health (Fraser 2008). Therefore, definitional differences concerning welfare can lead

to mutually contradictory views on what is best for the animal, and the same law may thus be interpreted to have altogether differing practical implications. Here, vested interests often play a part. Scientists funded by animal industries may be (even without thinking) motivated to use definitions of welfare that suit the interests of the industries. Also, scientists may simply hold an anthropocentric, utilitarian stance towards animals, emphasizing the significance of human benefit and downplaying the cost faced by animals (Fraser 2008). This creates a formidable obstacle to the advancement of animal welfare. Although the science of animal welfare is becoming more popular, and although it is used as one basis when drafting welfare legislations, both the science and the legislations are often affected by financial and political influences.

One of the strongest motives for ignoring non-human suffering and 'welfare problems' is self-interest. This does not include only the vested interests of animal industries, but also the vested interests of ordinary people who consume animal products. It is much easier to deny that suffering occurs than to face up to the moral challenge posed by suffering. Descartes admitted this quite frankly: '[This] is not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to human beings...since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill animals' (Descartes 1991, p. 366). Animal agriculture, the pharmaceutical industries, the hunt lobby, the animal entertainment industries, and ordinary consumers of animals all hold an interest in ignoring welfare considerations. Therefore, it is asserted that cows do not feel pain when their legs become lame due to overly intense milk production, that mice feel hardly anything when they are dying of cancer, that the foxes' welfare is not compromised when dogs rip them apart, and that calves in the rodeo are oblivious to pain and fear when their necks are jerked back in the middle of a run and their twisted bodies fall onto the floor. How we perceive 'animal welfare' is affected by what we have to gain from animal use, and the latter often means that attention to animal welfare remains superficial. This, again, helps to support the case for very moderate welfare legislations that do not have adequate regard for non-human suffering.

Thus, welfare legislations tend to be strongly influenced by financial and utilitarian considerations. One example is the manner in which they reflect current opinions as to which animals can feel pain and which cannot. In the Western world, perhaps the most troubling example comes from the USA. The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 is a federal law that concerns the treatment of animals. In 2002, the Act was amended with new wording that explicitly excludes rats, mice and birds – suddenly, significant groups of non-human animals were left outside

welfare regulations. This move can be largely explained by vested interests: the animal experimentation lobbyists are very powerful in the USA, and excluding the most common laboratory animals from the realm of the Welfare Act is tremendously convenient for the experimentation industry, even if doing so beggars common sense. Therefore, even though the Act's main emphasis was originally on animal research, the largest group of research animals are not subject to its regulations. The Act also excludes many other important non-human groups from its sphere, such as frogs and other cold-blooded vertebrates. Perhaps most significantly, it leaves out horses and other farmed animals, including 'livestock' and 'poultry'. Unfortunately, these animals often remain without any legal protection, as far too many states, as well as the federal government, omit them from the scope of animal cruelty laws. Like the welfare of rats and mice, the welfare of farmed animals is left to voluntary 'guidelines' or internal regulation of the animal industries, the efficiency and reliability of which remain very dubious; in fact, this type of regulation has been widely criticized as being biased, ineffective and ingenuous (the latter aspect referring to the way in which internal regulation functions as a form of advertisement).<sup>26</sup> Perhaps it is rather telling that animal industries have been happy to pursue 'self-auditing' while remaining very resistant to 'outside auditing', which would mean third-party involvement. (See Rogers and Kaplan 2004; for a slightly more positive view, see Mench 2008.) In short, the Animal Welfare Act of the most influential Western country has an extremely narrow focus and thus fails to offer animals any substantial shield against abuse and neglect. The power of financial interest has a definite impact not only on how animals are *de facto* treated, but also on how their treatment is regulated.

Similar trends can be observed in Europe. In 1997, the concept of 'animal sentience' was adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which meant that it gained a legal status within the European Union.<sup>27</sup> The 2009 Lisbon Treaty included 'animal sentience' in the main body of the treaty, which gave its status much added weight. The treaty argues that animals are sentient beings, and that their welfare should be paid 'full regard'. Significantly, however, it decreed that the 'legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage' must be taken into account.<sup>28</sup> This means that animal sentience and welfare play second fiddle to very broad human considerations: if a member state wishes to overlook animal sentience, it can always refer to cultural tradition. Moreover, the business interests of the animal industries

have been a powerful obstacle in the path of new welfare proposals.<sup>29</sup> Typically, countries with vested interests will vote against these proposals and prevent them from becoming law. Also, business interests affect how existing legislations are read: sentience is, in practice, often only given 'full regard' when doing so poses no economic costs. The financial considerations are very prominent indeed, as the total turnover output of animal agriculture in 2008 was 149 billion Euros. Unsurprisingly, a common criticism is that the EU welfare regulations are unsatisfactory, and that their implementation and supervision are poor. (For a report on the structure of and weaknesses in European regulation, see Sanco 2010.)

In general, both the regulations concerning animal welfare and their implementation often remain minimal. The treatment of animals is not adequately monitored (often it is not monitored at all), and, when problems are noted, the culprits face few if any consequences (Rogers and Kaplan 2004; Arluke 2006; Biscould 2008).<sup>30</sup> The treatment of non-human animals remains a 'no man's land', where almost anything goes.<sup>31</sup>

Therefore, it has been suggested that existing efforts to protect the welfare of animals are far too moderate. First, there is the argument that the current level of welfare infringement and suffering is unbearably high, and that animal welfare laws themselves enable such infringement and suffering by allowing animals to be kept in utterly unsuitable conditions. For instance, in many countries pigs that weigh 100 kg are only afforded 0.65 m<sup>2</sup> space, and European regulations state that 38 kg of 'broiler' chicken (which, depending on size, means tens of birds) can be crammed into one square metre. By allowing animals to be kept in such minuscule areas, the welfare regulations actually give their blessing to stress, frustration, physical illnesses, and – ultimately – animal suffering. Second, it can be claimed that different ways of using animals should, in themselves, be viewed critically, for it may be that, for any animal industry to be economically viable, it must cause animals pain and suffering. That is, for a farmer to reap profit from animals, she will have to keep them in conditions that require as little energy and as few resources as possible, which again means that the economic viability of animal agriculture renders talk of 'animal welfare' meaningless. Some also argue for animal rights or animal liberation, and criticize the use of sentient beings as mere instruments for human benefit. These criticisms in regard to animal welfare and suffering are slowly becoming more prevalent, and challenge the standard means by which Western countries have sought to come to terms with animal experience.



Such politicization is happening not only in Western countries, but also elsewhere in the world. Take China, for example. China has acquired a notorious reputation for its treatment of animals. Whereas the Confucian philosophy of the distant past demanded that animals be treated with care, the communist regime sought to eradicate care for animals as a Western perversion. This laid the basis for a belief that animals do not suffer or feel pain – at least in any way comparable to that of human beings. Following this belief, China practises many forms of extreme animal abuse, such as bile farms, in which moon bears are crammed into cages where they cannot move, and in which bile is extracted from an open wound on the side of the animal for many years; wild animal markets, where injured wild animals, bewildered and scared, are sold for food, often after days of travelling from the wilderness where they were caught; and fur farms, in which animals are routinely skinned alive (Li 2007). However, things are beginning to undergo some change. China's rapid economic and social changes have also brought the issue of animal welfare onto the agenda (Littlefair 2007).<sup>32</sup> 'Animal rights' as a concept was introduced to China in 1990, and the translation of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* sparked much debate after the mid-1990s. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have started to operate in the field of animal welfare. Whilst the old-school thinkers question animals' ability to feel pain, the new critics draw comparisons between humans and animals – not only in relation to pain and suffering, but also in relation to key moral concepts (Li 2007). Animal suffering is slowly appearing on the agenda, even if it still retains only a very marginal role.

Yet, despite growing criticism, progress is still painfully slow. In many countries where one would expect to see high concern for welfare, welfare standards are extremely poor. In fact, it would be entirely misleading to point the finger at China or other non-Western countries as the only sources of extreme animal abuse. In Western countries, such abuse is often hidden from the view of the public, both in a concrete way (we do not witness it) and in a metaphoric sense (when seen, abuse is sanitized into acceptable routine and clinical jargon of 'guidelines'). However, abuse still exists, and often on a frighteningly intense scale. Perhaps the best example, again, is the USA.

US animal agriculture is comparable in size to that of the EU. However, animal welfare laws are lagging behind, and there are only two minor federal laws to monitor the treatment of farmed animals. These laws date from as early as 1958, and stipulate two minimal requirements: after 28 hours of transport, animals should be afforded 5 hours of rest before the journey resumes, and animals should be stunned before

slaughter. Yet, transportation can take days, and horses, for instance, are routinely transported exceedingly long distances to be slaughtered in Canada or Mexico. The abusive treatment of 'downed' (disabled, diseased, dead or dying) animals, who are unable to walk upon entering the slaughterhouse, and who are routinely beaten, dragged or pushed by tractors whilst still fully conscious, has been a point of controversy, but these animals have not as yet gained legal protection (they most commonly include dairy cows, who have become lame from intensive milk production). Poultry are still not included in the slaughter regulation – this despite the fact that they are by far the most common farmed animal, with over 9 billion farmed birds being killed each year. Doubts, often based on accounts of slaughterhouse workers, have also been expressed as to whether other animals are always stunned before bleeding or indeed dead before being dipped into boiling water. State laws are no better. They often exempt common agricultural practices, which means that if cruelty is 'business as usual' it is allowed to carry on (Mench 2008; see also *Washington Post* 10/04/2001). So how is all this possible? One reason for the miserable state of affairs is that attempts to tighten welfare legislation have been hampered by animal agriculture: 'The agricultural industries have been extremely successful in preventing regulation of on-farm practices by lobbying against legislation' (Mench 2008, p. 301). Money, rather than welfare, is the deciding factor.

These are rather disturbing facts: one of the biggest animal producers in the world, and 'an icon' for Western culture, offers very little protection to the huge numbers of non-human animals it kills each year (including over ten billion farmed land animals and 80 billion sea animals). Since welfare and profit often exist in direct conflict, the rather inevitable consequence is that animal welfare is given the short straw. As intensive production has 'become the norm' and economic efficiency the 'main focus' (Mench 2008), animals are faced with some very disturbing practical consequences. (See also Rogers and Kaplan 2004.)

It is significant that in the producers' own voluntary welfare programs, increasingly popular in both the US and Europe, the main focus is on physical aspects such as productivity and bodily health. Thus, when producers say that the welfare of their animals is good, what they are in fact stating is that the animals are producing well, or that mortality figures are tolerable. The focus placed on physical aspects exists in stark contrast to the views of the public, who tend to correlate 'welfare' with animal experiences. The consequence of this disparity is a kind of

a deceitful symbiosis, within which animal producers advertise their high welfare standards (referring to high productivity rates) while the public interprets this to mean that the animals have happy lives (even when happiness has nothing to do with the producers' welfare claims) (Appleby 2007). Therefore, animal suffering all too easily remains hidden under layers of jargon and advertisement, and the consumers are often quite willing to sink into the ensuing state of self-deceit. This enables the public to believe that progress is being made in animal welfare, whilst in fact the conditions in which animals are reared may be getting worse.<sup>33</sup> Various multinational companies that flourish by using cheaply produced – and hence inevitably welfare-denying – animal foodstuffs have come up with their own welfare protocols in order to boost sales. For instance, McDonalds, notorious for obtaining their meat from the types of colossal intensive units that are very prone to violate the welfare of animals, have created their own welfare regulation programme. One must remain very cautious about these types of industry programmes, as their likely role is to serve as a form of advertisement, with the underlying motive, therefore, most likely to be increased revenue. Welfare sells, and, just as one can talk of 'green washing' (wherein environmental credentials are used to market products), one can talk of 'welfare washing'. The main problem is that industry programmes may, due to their ambiguous motives, not work in practice: that is, they may not ensure welfare in the way that is being advertised. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that various undercover investigations into farms which have signed up to these commercial welfare programmes have revealed that nothing much has changed, and that both routine neglect and extreme abuse are common.<sup>34</sup> (The same applies, unfortunately, to voluntary welfare programmes offered by animal welfare societies. In 2009, for instance, a selection of UK farms that had been given the RSPCA 'Freedom food' label were shown to take part in outright sadistic cruelty towards animals, and therefore cause extreme suffering.<sup>35</sup>)

Therefore, whilst animal welfare is slowly entering the political agenda, it is important to note that, in the meantime, economic factors often work as a counter-trend and add to the misery of non-human animals. Arguably, the root of the problem goes deep. As long as society at large will not recognize the moral relevance of animal suffering, the issue of animal welfare will remain on the margins; governments will not be willing to endorse something that people only vaguely care about, especially when it goes against financial interests. The unfortunate truth is that, ultimately, animal industries also largely impact on and control societal perceptions concerning the moral significance

of animal suffering. They captivate the public's imagination through the use of heavy advertisement machinery that tells us animals do not suffer, or that animal suffering does not matter. How the society understands 'animal welfare' or 'animal suffering' is not so much the product of welfare scientists, but rather of industry spokespeople and McDonalds' adverts. It should be evident that there is something wrong with this picture. Those who most benefit from ignoring animal welfare and suffering should not be the ones who get to choose how animals are treated.

The future does not look particularly bright. As in most Western countries, the US government has pushed for intensification and consolidation of animal production: farms must become ever bigger and more efficient in order for the industry to minimize costs. This tendency exists in conflict with welfare aspirations, as any welfare laws will almost certainly add to the costs of production. The motive behind these measures is market competition, as the government wants to ensure that the US retains a share of both the domestic and international trade in animal products. In practice, this means that it is willing to push aggressively for decisions that are harsh and even detrimental from the standpoint of welfare (Appleby 2007). In the meantime, the public remains blissfully unaware of the realities of production, particularly as it takes place in enormous, industrial units, far removed from their sphere of life.

Whereas some legislative changes have been made in response to agricultural waste and emission concerns, 'legislation is not the approach that is generally being taken to address public concerns about farm animal welfare' (Mench 2008). Therefore, aspects of animal agriculture that affect human health gain attention, whilst the experiences of the animals often continue to be overlooked. This is reflected also in the prevalence of animal welfare studies, which as a field of science is much smaller than fields which concentrate on food safety or the environmental aspects of animal agriculture. The relative marginality of concern for animal welfare is apparent more widely in the Western societies, and is reflected, for instance, in the lack of media interest. Food safety and the environment are pressing concerns, whilst animal welfare plays second fiddle. The same problems persist in many countries. For instance, although the European Union is leading the way in welfare considerations, things are far from perfect. The reason for this is obvious: just like the USA, European countries have prioritized economic gain at the expense of animal welfare. Often, welfare regulations are voluntary and, even more often, they come to nothing because of

industry lobbying; as seen, motions for new regulations are routinely hindered or rejected due to industry pressure. Countries with high financial stakes in animal agriculture will fight with all their might against raising existing welfare standards (see Wilkins 2007).<sup>36</sup>

Besides governments, international monetary funds have considerable influence on the treatment of animals. For instance, the World Bank Group has an agricultural department which invests in livestock. The obvious goal is to intensify and increase animal production, whilst welfare is placed second in relation to financial gain. A representative from the group ponders: 'While animal welfare is an important issue, it has to be seen within the context of other social and economic issues' (Ryan 2007, p. 243). Free trade is repeatedly offered as a viable option, although it is precisely endless competition that drives rewards and therefore pushes welfare conditions down. Unfortunately, this *laissez-faire* attitude has a near monopoly within animal industries, and welfare is often seen as an unnecessary restriction. Hence, regrettably, the World Trade Organization does not allow animal welfare to be used as a reason for trade restrictions (Bayvel 2007).

Here are a few examples that illustrate the type of treatment to which welfare laws give their blessing. In the USA, at least 95 per cent of laying hens are kept in tiny battery cages (the typical size of the cages is 432 cm<sup>2</sup>, which is almost a third smaller than an A4 sheet of paper; astonishingly, this is a recent 'improvement' from even smaller cages). Eighty-four per cent of US sows are bred in 'total confinement facilities'. Of these, 60 per cent are kept in gestation stalls and farrowing crates, where the animals cannot turn around, and where even getting up and lying down are difficult; this means that the animals spend the majority of their lives in cages which they struggle to physically fit into. Similarly, veal calves are routinely kept in tiny, barren cages, where turning is impossible (Mench 2008; see also Appleby 2007; Rollin 1995). The European Union has been hailed for banning battery cages for hens (starting from the year 2012); however, the law still allows 750 cm<sup>2</sup> 'enrichment cages' (of which only 600 cm<sup>2</sup> is 'usable area') to be employed, which in effect means that the birds still have very little space. In fact, the law has been criticized by animal welfare campaigners for remaining a superficial publicity stunt, as the cages still remain minuscule, and even the enrichment provided in them is minimal: 'Almost all normal behaviours require significantly more usable space per bird than is provided in "enriched" cages...The space and facilities provided in "enriched" cages are so inadequate that this system deprives hens of the ability to meaningfully fulfil natural behaviours,

leading to abnormal behaviours, frustration, suffering and body degeneration' (LyMBERY 2002b, p. 9). The EU has also banned gestation stalls (starting from the year 2013), but a loophole allows the stalls to be used during the first four weeks of pregnancy; moreover, farrowing crates will still remain legal, which means that pigs can be kept in cages that prevent free movement during the time that they are nursing piglets. As already suggested, the European Union with its 'advanced' laws also allows broiler birds and pigs raised for meat – amongst others – to be kept in highly cramped conditions.<sup>37</sup> These are just some brief examples of the types of shortcomings animal 'welfare' laws typically involve. The reality of animal existence within animal agriculture is, with the blessing of the law, often all but well-faring.

### **Animal welfare, pain and suffering in practice**

What is the practice of 'animal welfare'? In order to meet the requirements of industrial production and high-density housing, animals are routinely branded with hot irons, dehorned, debeaked, 'de-tailed' and castrated without any sedation or painkillers. This means, for instance, that piglets have their tails cut off and male piglets are castrated by crushing or pulling off their testicles without analgesics, even though these procedures cause 'considerable pain' (Broom and Fraser 1997). Most commonly, the squealing piglet is forced to stay still as the skin of the animal is sliced with a knife, and testicles are pulled out until they snap loose. The same happens to lambs, who may have both their tails and testicles cut off without any analgesic. The price of such mutilation is high for individual animals. Piglets will show signs of pain for up to a week afterwards (including trembling, lethargy, vomiting, and leg shaking). In lambs, the stress hormone levels take a huge leap as a result of mutilation, and the animals show signs of significant pain by standing still or otherwise behaving abnormally for four hours or more, seemingly unaware of their surroundings. Dairy calves who are dehorned show signs of pain for six or more hours afterwards (Turner 2006). Birds, too, are mutilated without the use of analgesics, as their beaks are trimmed, and at times inside toes are also cut, in order to prevent damage from the type of fighting that almost always occurs when abnormally large numbers of individuals are crammed into the same small confinement. After debeaking, the animals will experience acute pain for circa two days, and the chronic pain lasts for up to six weeks (Duncan 2001).

Mutilation is not the only cause for worry. Animals suffer from various forms of illnesses and injuries brought on by intensive production,

and a relatively large percentage of them die from these ailments, often without any veterinary care. The 'stock' numbers per farm are vast, which means that illnesses and injuries are likely to go undetected. American cattle farms have 8000 animals or more, broiler farms can have hundreds of thousands of individuals, 20 per cent of milk is produced in farms with over 2000 cows, and one-third of pig farmers raise over 10,000 animals for slaughter per year (Mench 2008). With these numbers, combined with increasing automation of practices such as milking, there is little chance that farmers will notice illness or injury. It may also make little financial sense to treat animals that are injured or sick, for the profit gained from an individual animal is often less than the costs of veterinary assistance.

Illnesses and injuries result from high density, lack of space, lack of mental stimulation, and physical exhaustion. As suggested above, welfare regulations enable farmers to keep animals in appallingly restricted and/or overcrowded conditions. Typically, the animals also have little or no mental stimulation, which means that the only activity available to them is eating and lying down. With no freedom of movement, with nothing to do, and with possibly too many other animals by one's side, physical injuries and mental health problems quickly raise their ugly heads (see Broom and Fraser 2007). It has been argued that both mental frustration and physical illnesses are common. For instance, sows are subject to various gastrointestinal illnesses (such as stress-induced ulcer), infections, lameness, heart problems, stress and depression. It is a dire indication of their mental ill-health that '50 % of their time can be spent in clearly or arguably stereotypic behaviour' (Turner 2006, p. 31). The sows have nothing to do other than chew the bars of their cages, or rock their heads from one side to the other, time and again. Another example of physical and mental ill-health is found in veal calves, often kept in tiny enclosures and tied down by their necks, who, in the absence of mental stimulation and ability to move freely, quickly succumb to 'abnormal behaviour and ill health' (Turner 2006, p. 30). These creatures have serious health problems (such as painful stomach ulcers), accentuated by substantial behavioural issues, as they aimlessly suckle on the bars of their cages or sway from side to side (European Commission 1995). The list of animals who suffer from very restricted confinement is long. For instance, many birds, from laying hens to broiler chickens, live in cramped, cacophonous environments, often surrounded by the sounds of tens of thousands of other birds, and commonly struggle with lameness that has been linked to lack of exercise, together with serious lung problems associated with dense housing

and the significant ammonia levels that it causes (Mench 2004; see also Julian 2004).

Fur farms are perhaps the most notorious example of what severe confinement can do to animals. In 2010 Finland, one of the biggest fur producers in the world, brought in new legislation concerning the treatment of fur animals. Even this new legislation, meant to be an improvement on welfare, only affords 0.25 m<sup>2</sup> of space per mink and her cubs. A fully grown fox is offered 0.8 m<sup>2</sup> of space. These cages are stacked next to each other in endless rows, and individual farms typically house thousands of animals. When considering that these animals are *de facto* wild creatures, who in the wild would maintain territories ranging up to tens of square kilometres, and whose days in the wild are (depending on species) filled with swimming, building nests, climbing trees, hunting, and maintaining social relations, the minuscule measurements become incomprehensible. It is not surprising that severe behavioural problems are common in fur farms. Animals exhibit stereotypical behaviours, jumping from side to side, swaying their heads and upper bodies time and again, pacing around in endless circles, chewing on their own bodies and those of others, and even mutilating themselves (by, for instance, chewing off their own tails or legs), or killing their own cubs. Foxes are particularly prone to feel great fear and anxiety, and will huddle in the corners of their cages in unusual positions, as if ready to bounce out. For minks, who are naturally solitary creatures, it may be unbearable to be surrounded by the smells and sounds of thousands of other individuals; for sociable foxes, it may be equally unbearable to be unable to create social networks (Broom and Nimon 1999; 2001; European Commission 2001).

Besides mutilation and lack of space, animals are faced with further problems. Intensification of agricultural production has meant that the physiologies of animals are put under a huge strain. As a result of policies on breeding, feeding and lack of space, animals are made to grow faster and bigger, and to produce more. Animals are heavier than ever before – in just 20 years, the carcass weight of cattle and pigs has risen by 23 and 17 per cent respectively, while broilers weigh 2.5 kg ('super-heavy' broilers favoured by large companies weigh 3.6 kg) as opposed to the 1.5 kg they weighed in the 1960s (Mench 2008; see also Appleby 2007). The sheer speed of physical development, the large body mass, and the constant production of milk and eggs can cause serious health problems: in particular, internal organs are put under a considerable strain, and the bones and joints of the animals may be too weak to carry their mammoth bodies, or to cope with the demand to produce



more. Thus, it has been argued that 'Breeding for maximum yield has resulted in increased pain and injury, often due to disease, because of the excessive demands put on the animals' bodies' (Turner 2006, p. 32). Hens, broiler birds and turkeys frequently become lame. According to Scandinavian studies, up to 75 per cent of chickens have difficulties walking, up to 30 per cent are 'very lame', and up to 50 per cent have bone deformities (Sanotra et al. 2003). Another study has indicated that up to 90 per cent of chickens have 'gait abnormalities' (odd stances that are caused by abnormally large chests, weak joints, and deformities). The worrying fact is that these symptoms clearly indicate pain (Mench 2004). Lameness has also further consequences for the animals, as lame birds will struggle to reach food and water, which again may mean that they slowly starve to death. They also lie down more, which causes additional problems: as the animals rest on dirty floors, the ammonia from the manure burns the skin on their legs and chests. This problem is very common, and in fact over 80 per cent of chicken carcasses sold in UK supermarkets have skin sores. Heart and lung failure (called 'ascites') is common amongst farmed birds, and signifies developmental problems often induced by intensive production (Turner 2006). At times, the birds just cannot cope with all the physiological and environmental strain that they are put under, and suddenly die for unknown reasons. This 'sudden death syndrome' is the most common cause of death amongst broiler chickens (Julian 2004). The birds' bodies simply give up.

Animals also produce more milk and eggs than ever before, with dire consequences. With hens, intensive egg production weakens bones and leads to lameness, osteoporosis and ultimately painful fractures, as all the calcium and minerals from the bird's body are used up for eggs. The situation is made worse by the restricted environment in which the animals are forced to live; almost complete lack of exercise leaves bones weak and fragile. The severity of the situation should not be overlooked. In fact, it has been argued that osteoporosis is 'inevitable' and 'severe' in intensive farming, and that the resulting fractures cause hens to experience 'both acute and chronic pain'; it can also lead to internal haemorrhages, starvation and ultimately death, which will be painful and 'lingering' (Webster 2004, p. 184). In short, the bodies of hens are so overused that their bones quite simply snap, often with disastrous consequences for the individual animal. In addition, other illnesses are looming. As a result of continuous straining, hens commonly suffer from uterine prolapse, which means that their uterus is pushed out of their body. Moreover, hens are susceptible to simple exhaustion, as their bodies give in under the huge pressure of constant egg-laying.

The exhaustion of these animals is so severe that it frequently leads to death, and so common that it has its own name: 'caged layer fatigue'. It is estimated that almost ten per cent of hens die during their time on the farm (Webster 2004).

Cows commonly suffer from a painful condition called mastitis (udder infection), which is linked to increased milk yield and industrial farming practices. Large udders can cause considerable unease for cows, and the animals often struggle to find comfortable positions, which again may force them to walk awkwardly, in turn advancing bone and joint problems. Lameness is the most typical problem for dairy cows and in the USA affects up to 35 per cent of the herd (Stokka et al. 1997). The affected animals struggle to walk, and tend to have chronic pain in their joints. Cows are often also tethered by their necks and forced to lie down on hard surfaces, which again increases the incidence of udder infection and lameness. Sheer physical exhaustion is perhaps the most palpable problem amongst dairy cows. The intense level of production takes its toll: animals are constantly kept pregnant through artificial insemination in order to keep milk yields high, and this leads to eventual fatigue. Cows use so many of their own nutrients in producing milk that their organs begin to deteriorate and the fat content of their bodies finally sinks below healthy limits. Outwardly, these fatigued cows appear bony and have 'dents' on their sides – the signs of exhaustion are obvious. This lowers their fertility, which again renders the animals 'valueless' in the eyes of farmers. Therefore, cows are used so extensively that they literally become physical wrecks: their bodies become exhausted and ill, and finally give in (Vernelli 2005; Turner 2006). One can only suspect what their minds are going through in their monotonous environments, in which their calves are continuously taken away from them, and in which their only role is that of production units. It is little wonder that the animal welfare expert John Webster has argued that 'The dairy cow is exposed to more abnormal physiological demands than any other farm animal. She is the supreme example of an overworked mother.'<sup>38</sup>

Both cows and hens become exhausted so quickly under the strain of production that they are slaughtered when they are still mere juveniles. In the wild, cows can live up to 20 years, whereas dairy cows are killed at around four years of age; hens could live up to 12 years, but are killed at around one to two years of age after their bodies can no longer cope with intensive egg production. As soon as the productivity of these animals decreases, they are viewed as useless and sent to slaughter. It is rather telling that at least 110 million 'spent' hens are killed each year

in the USA alone, only to have their corpses viewed as mere garbage or used for dog food. Because these animals are considered to be 'worth nothing', they are often killed on the farm rather than transported to slaughterhouses. Here, the killing methods can be horrific, and include being shredded to pieces and buried alive in landfills<sup>39</sup> (some buried hens manage to escape, only to die from exhaustion and hunger in the vicinity of the farm).<sup>40</sup> Those that are transported to slaughterhouses do not always fare better. As seen, hens frequently suffer from weak, fractured, and broken bones. The vibrations, rocking and swaying of the slaughter trucks can be severe, and this causes both further injury and acute pain from the already existing injuries, as broken bone ends rub against each other. Since transportation durations can exceed 24 hours, the situation that these hens face is miserable – in fact, the longer the duration, the more injuries the hens will sustain, and the more of those injured will die during transport. In general, being caught, transported and finally hung by the ankles from the slaughterhouse assembly lines plays havoc with the fragile bones of the 'spent' hens (Webster 2004). According to one study, 24 per cent of hens have broken bones after being caught from their cages, 31 per cent have them after entering the slaughterhouse, and 45 per cent of hens have broken bones after being hung from the shackles (Gregory and Wilkins 1989). Thus, it has been argued that 'spent' hens are faced with an 'unacceptably high injury level', partly due to the fact that farm hands see no financial value in them, and thus treat them callously (Duncan 2001, p. 210; see also Weeks and Nicol 2000). The animals, who have given their all and have finally succumbed to exhaustion, are too often treated as though they were sheer trash.

'Spent' dairy cows face similarly gruesome treatment. They are often 'downed animals' due to their lameness: having collapsed with complete physical fatigue, they cannot get up from the slaughter trucks, or walk towards the assembly line. As a result, they are frequently coerced to move in various ways: by pushing or (far worse) by kicking, punching, beating, breaking tails, using electric cattle prods, and so on. In 2008, the Humane Society of the United States made public the findings of its undercover investigation into the treatment of downed animals. In the video, employees kick, beat and prod cows that are too weak to walk, push animals around with tractors, and even jab them in the eye with batons; animals unable to move are also left overnight in places like parking lots to face their own lingering deaths (on the ensuing controversy, see Taylor 2009).<sup>41</sup> There is little gratitude for these broken beings crushed by intensive farming.

The offspring of the hens and cows fare no better. The male offspring of the laying hen breeds are killed as chicks, usually by tossing them into large grinders that crush and mutilate them to death, or by throwing them into trash bins, where they slowly suffocate to death<sup>42</sup> (these breeds are not used for meat, and therefore the male offspring are 'useless'). The male calves of dairy herds are considered equally worthless (the animals used for meat come from altogether different breeds), and are often killed at birth. None of these animals – 'spent' dairy cows and 'spent' laying hens, and their male offspring – have value in the eyes of the milk and egg producers, and as a result they are often treated in an exceedingly callous manner. To the list we could add breeding animals, such as sows, who are past their peak performance. That is, they are 'refuse', and thus much more likely to be pushed and shoved, beaten and kicked: 'The welfare of "low-value" animals is at great risk and safeguards need to be established for their protection. Probably, the animals most at risk are cull dairy cows, cull boars, cull sows, and any animals with reduced value due to some market quirk' (Duncan 2001, p. 211). It is the suffering of these animals that often remains the most unheard of all. Eggs and dairy have their very real price, too.

Breeding animals face their own particular problems. The mothers of the broiler breeds are kept in a condition of constant starvation: their appetites are as huge as their offspring's, but because they are not meant for meat they are fed only little. This chronic hunger, according to one expert, causes 'extreme distress' (Duncan 2001, p. 213). In fact, breeding birds show high levels of frustration, manifested in stereotypical behaviour, due to their restricted diets: since they cannot even spend time pecking and eating, there is very little for them to do in their barren environments, and this causes mental problems (Mench 2002). As already pointed out, sows suffer from the same problem, and are often so hungry that they will drink excessive amounts of water in order to feel fuller, and chew on various items, such as the bars of their cages, as though they were food. Yet hunger is only one of the issues. The death rates for sows are incredibly high: approximately nine to ten per cent of sows die in farms. The majority of the deaths take place during farrowing (giving birth). The risk has significantly increased as production has intensified, and the death rates rise with the size of the farms the bigger the farm, the higher the percentage of death (Kuratomi and Sukumarannair 2007; Koketsu and Sasaki 2008). In the commercial farms with large numbers of animals, the sad prospect is that sows face lingering deaths, induced by difficulties in labour, without any veterinary assistance.

Maternal relationships, in themselves, are one source of distress. Dairy cows have been shown to become stressed and frustrated when their calves are taken away (Sandem and Braastad 2005). When the mother and calf have been allowed to spend time together before separation, the distress shown by both is 'loud and prolonged' (Webster 2005, p. 146). Even when the calves are relatively mature, the mothers can call for them for days (Turner 2006). Pigs face similar difficulties. In contemporary farming, piglets are separated from their mothers much earlier than would happen in the wild, at a time when the piglets physically and emotionally still need the sow's presence. The young animals will do all in their power in order to get back to their mothers: they will squeal, run around and even jump against the bars of their pens; the sows, in turn, will seek to get to their offspring, and the louder the latter vocalize, the harder the former try. Lethargy is a common ailment, as some piglets seem simply to lose interest in life. As well as these mental symptoms, the piglets frequently suffer from physical diseases such as diarrhoea. Unsurprisingly, mortality rates are high during the first days of separation (Kottferovfl et al. 2005; Turner 2006).

Mental problems are significant in all fields of animal agriculture, as animals all too easily fall into the spiral of fear, anxiety, frustration, apathy or depression (see Wemelsfelder 2002). This can itself lead to physical manifestations (such as stress-induced stomach ulcers, which pigs and cows commonly suffer from). Medicine is often used to eradicate these manifestations. For instance, piglets separated from their mothers, who frequently fall ill and die due to stress, are pumped full of medicines in order to keep them alive (the most famous example of this overmedication is, of course, the routine use of antibiotics). This can have adverse long-term consequences, since the root cause of the animals' plight, not to mention their own experiences, is not taken into account (Thompson 2007). The farmers can build even more stressful living environments for the animals, because the animals' own negative experiences and suffering can be ignored through the use of drugs: it does not matter if the pig suffers, as long as the physical manifestations of the suffering can be controlled by a medicine bottle.

The time of slaughter is often the most difficult: 'Of all the things we do to our animals on the farm, the things we do to them in the 24 hr before they are slaughtered reduce their welfare the most' (Duncan 2001, p. 216). When sent for slaughter, birds (such as broiler chickens and turkeys) are pulled and dragged by their feet, and shoved into crates with great haste (up to thousands per hour). Dislocations and broken bones are a common consequence of this harsh treatment, as are internal

injuries and even death. Transport can be take a very long time, during which the birds have no access to food or water and remain exposed to overly hot and cold temperatures; this, again, increases mortality as birds die of physical ailments or simply stress. Animals are often injured during transport, which means that they can be in severe pain for long periods of time. In the EU, every year up to 35 million chickens are dead by the time they reach the slaughterhouse, often because of broken bones and exposure to the elements. As already pointed out, the leg bones of birds, rendered frail and brittle by intensive production, routinely snap when the animals are hung by their feet on a production chain that carries them to the throat cutter – thus, shackling is likely to be ‘very painful’ (Turner 2006, p. 33). Some birds are still conscious when their throats are cut, or even when they are dipped into tanks of boiling water. Welfare expert Ian Duncan has argued that, due to problems in stunning, birds ‘face a bigger risk of missing the automatic cutting machine’, and thus ‘run a higher risk of entering the scalding tank alive and conscious’ (Duncan 2001, p. 211; see also Mench 2008).

Other species as well face grim prospects. A UK study concluded that 75 per cent of cattle were bruised during livestock markets, due to being hit and poked with various instruments (Turner 2006). Pigs are well known to experience great fear and anxiety during transport and slaughter. Lamé pigs will face the severest welfare problems, as they are unable to move or cope amidst other animals (lameness affects particularly sows, but also overly muscular pigs bred for meat). Pigs do not have sweat glands, which renders them very vulnerable to heat; moreover, they are also very susceptible to frostbite. These highly intelligent animals become easily stressed when packed among strange individuals, and their stress is made worse by being handled by strange people. The stress reaches particularly high levels if the handling is rough; unfortunately, aggressive or callous handling is a common problem. Pigs are frequently packed in too tightly, and hence have no space to lie down. Vibrations of the trucks cause sickness in pigs, and many animals will vomit during transportation – these vibrations cause severe distress, and are a significant welfare problem. Therefore, already tired pigs will often be forced to stand for long periods of time, whilst feeling wary of other animals, feeling fear, feeling nauseous, and feeling excessively hot or cold. As a result, relatively large numbers of animals (circa 0.30 per cent of the pigs meant for meat) die prior to arriving at the slaughterhouse. Problems continue at the slaughterhouse. Movements, shadows and excess noise can frighten the animals. Piglets can be very afraid of their new environment, and therefore unwilling to move. Floor surfaces

can be slippery and difficult to move on. At times, new arrivals are showered with cold water, which is distressing in itself. Stunning can be ineffective, and approximately 9 per cent of stuns lead to welfare problems, as the tongues are not placed properly and the animal is thus caused painful electric shocks, or the animal is not rendered fully unconscious. Bleeding (that is, killing) techniques can be poor, which means that the pigs may regain consciousness whilst hanging upside down from the slaughter line shackles with a puncture wound in their chest. These animals will desperately try to right themselves, unable to comprehend what is happening to them (Grandin 2003).<sup>43</sup>

Similar problems are faced by all farmed animals, and are exacerbated by the speed and industrialism with which slaughterhouses operate: the goal is to kill as many animals as quickly as possible, and the experiences of individual animals (or a few mistakes here and there) matter very little. Already on farms, animals quickly learn to fear human beings who treat them roughly, which leads to high stress levels (and even the enlargement of the adrenal gland which secretes the stress hormone corticosteroid) (Turner 2006). During transport and slaughter, rough treatment goes hand in hand with speed and efficiency, and the animals' last hours are thus often filled with fear and stress. (It should be added that, for fish, dying is not any easier. If placed in ice, it takes up to 15 minutes for a fish to lose consciousness, as it slowly suffocates to death. This means that fish may be completely conscious when their gills are cut off. See Lymbery 2002a.)

These are just some examples of the tremendous difficulties faced by farmed animals. Further, more detailed, examples can be found in illustrative and influential books such as Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975), and Jonathan Safran Foer *Eating Animals* (2009) (see also Marcus 2005). However, farm animals are not the only creatures to suffer at human hands. Suffering takes place in zoos, on hunting fields, on race courses and in the homes of 'pet owners'. Some unlucky animals – that is, experimentation animals – even have illnesses and injuries deliberately inflicted on them.

In Europe alone, tens of millions of rats, rabbits, mice, dogs, monkeys and other animals are routinely mutilated on the surgery tables in order to break their bones, cause them brain damage, or scoop out their babies. They are injected with cancer cells and then observed for weeks, months or even years as the cancer slowly erodes their bodies. They are made to suffer from Parkinson's disease by having their brains artificially damaged, and their joints are chemically or mechanically injured so that they develop arthritis. They are force-fed household chemicals

and fertilizers in order to see what levels are toxic to them: that is, at what level, after being force-fed paint stripper, the rat or the dog finally dies of convulsions and internal bleeding. They are also force-fed alcohol and cocaine just in order to see how severe their addiction is. At times, they are simply killed and opened up so that curious students can scrutinize their anatomy. Often, analgesia is not used, because it is thought to affect the results, and even when it is administered its effectiveness is usually not adequately observed or controlled (NRC 2009). These animals are also industrially reared and housed in monotonous, cramped environments where they have little to do, where they cannot follow their species-specific behaviours, where they are constantly separated from their mates and their offspring, and where they may have to fear new painful procedures or violent staff.<sup>44</sup> When the animals do not die on the operating table or in their cages, they are killed by a broad range of methods, ranging from decapitation and neck breaking to inhalation of CO<sub>2</sub> gas. Although the latter sounds like an easy option, it has been proven to cause animals at times great aversion and distress (LaFollette and Shanks 1996; Greek and Greek 2000).

Genetic engineering causes new welfare problems. It enables scientists to breed physically or mentally ill animals (such as mice born with arthritis, rats born with addiction, or dogs born with cancer). Scientists become creators, who genetically modify animals so as to construct the perfect 'animal model' for their experiments (Rollin 1995b). The new technologies are opening the door for science fiction-like possibilities within animal agriculture also, as animals can be bred to grow even faster and produce even more. They offer the gateway to creating hybrids between different species, and knocking out or introducing genes in order to create continually bigger and more productive animals. The aim is to have animals with huge muscles and a phenomenal milking capacity – or to create meat that has an entirely new taste or includes both fish and cow genes. Very productive animals may be cloned, and species combined by implanting, say, broccoli genes into pigs. Ultimately, this opens a Pandora's Box containing grotesque images of a future in which cow-pigs roam. (See Sandøe et al. 2008; Warkentin 2009; Twine 2010.)

What happens to the animal herself attracts very marginal attention. Yet it should be a cause of profound concern. As seen, already within traditional breeding, rapid growth, massive production and huge muscles cause suffering. Moreover, already within traditional forms of animal testing, the cost to animals is often unbearable. As the bodies of animals are pushed to extremes with the use of genetic



modification, the consequences can be detrimental. The new physiologies produced may be utterly 'handicapped' and deformed, as the muscles or the udders of the animals become obscenely large, the animal is inherently ill with eroding sickness, or physiological features of two species are intertwined. This has obvious consequences: how can pain and suffering be avoided, when the physiological features of animals are tossed around and mixed anew like pieces of putty? Moreover, the risk is that the mental capacities of the animals no longer match their own bodies. For instance, what happens to a bird that suddenly cannot fly, or a mammal that cannot properly walk? Here, the bodies of the animals become sources of continuous pain and suffering. In this way, the body becomes the enemy of the animal – the source of her misery and plight.

### **Moral implications**

The foundational problem of animal industries (whether they be linked to agriculture, entertainment or experimentation) is that animals cannot behave as they are inclined to behave. To use the teleological approach of Aristotle (and applied in animal ethics by Bernard Rollin – see Rollin 1995; 1989), they cannot 'flourish' according to their natures – that is, they cannot follow their potential or 'telos'. Millions of years of adaptation and evolution are thrown away, as animals are forced to exist in conditions that are utterly unsuitable for their needs.<sup>45</sup> The monotony of the environments in which animals are made to live adds to the misery. Animals have been shown to experience less pain when they live in a diverse environment, in which there are other things to concentrate on or capture their attention (Gentle 2001). The sad implication is that animals kept in barren conditions feel pain and suffering even more acutely than their wild cousins. What it is like to be stuck in a bare, cramped cage with a broken bone, pushed around by others, with nothing else to concentrate on besides one's own pulsing pain, is beyond the comprehension of Westerners who consume the meat of animals unfortunate enough to meet such a fate.

Furthermore, the barren conditions of animal industries may warp the very being of animals. When all the basic needs related to food and shelter are taken care of, and when the activity of the animal is so restricted that she has no dynamic and proactive contact with her environment, the risk is that she begins to exist in a type of vacuum, where she cannot experience any links between her own actions, her needs and her environment. This may be a source of great frustration, and

may adversely impact the development of the animal: 'The inability to interact normally with the environment, both physical and social, can have detrimental results for the basic development of young animals' (Fraser 2008, p. 181). Therefore, even when all the physical needs of an animal are taken care of, she may experience great suffering. Marian Stamp Dawkins has a useful explanation for this disparity between satisfied bodily needs and welfare. She draws a crucial distinction between ultimate goals, such as health, nutrition and reproduction, and proximate needs, such as the need to socialize or build nests. It is the latter that most matter from the viewpoint of welfare, for they are the things that animals primarily experience. Human beings can ensure the healthy and balanced nutrition of an animal, but if the animal cannot satisfy the need to behave in a certain way, suffering will become a very real possibility (Dawkins 2006). In fact, when human beings ensure that the ultimate goals of animals are satisfied, they may be acting against the proximate needs and therefore the welfare of other animals. Farmers who raise piglets in clean, pathogen-free environments, separated from their mothers, will achieve excellent health for their animals, even though the animals remain utterly frustrated and bored in their inability to follow their niche tendencies. What we deem that the animals need on an objective level is very different from what the animals need on the subjective level.

This disparity has its consequences. Animals kept in barren conditions display two types of behaviour. First, there is a decrease in outward activity. Animals become lethargic and quiet, and manifest the clinical signs of depression. Second, there is an increase in the type of self-directed behaviour mentioned earlier. Animals will begin to gnaw at their own bodies, and may resort to extreme forms of self-mutilation (Wemelsfelder 1999). These behaviours can have a detrimental effect on the core being of the animal: just like a human being kept in total isolation, she will undergo psychological alteration. Fraser goes on to argue that 'Without question, keeping animals under artificial conditions can lead to major animal welfare concerns. Some concerns involve disease and injury. Others involve the affective states of animals, including what we might generally term "boredom", if animals cannot carry out the natural behaviour by which they would normally interact with their environment, and "frustration" if they are highly motivated to perform behaviour that is impossible under their actual circumstances. Yet other welfare concerns involve an inability to use normal cognitive processes. And if young animals cannot interact in normal ways with their environment – both physical and social – they may show

abnormal development of social behaviour, perceptual ability, or even of basic neural organization' (Fraser 2008, p. 189). Here, we come back to the harrowing but very real possibility that animal industries may, in their inability to take the animal perspective into consideration, render animals into mentally broken beings.

Therefore, intensive farming and experimentation take a mammoth toll on animals. In farming, animals are reduced to production units, mechanisms of financial gain and factories that feed human gluttony, while the animal herself – the experiencing, thinking being with her own wants – is sidelined. In experimentation, animals are reduced to body parts and genes, and ultimately objects of knowledge, whose experiences are rendered irrelevant. The key term in both types of animal use is 'efficiency'. Behind it, we find a highly 'mechanomorphic' (Crist 1999) understanding of not only animals, but also the human–animal relationship. In animal experimentation, mechanomorphia is disturbingly explicit. Animals are 'scientific models' for biological phenomena, and all attention is directed towards bodily mechanisms. Within agriculture, the term 'zootechnical' is becoming popular. It refers to efficient management of animals, and implies two things: that animals are machine-like creatures, and that what humans do to other animals is a matter of technique. In short, humans should operate the animal machine with an optimal technique in order to gain an optimal result.<sup>46</sup> The very thing that harms animals (productivity) is made the measure of their well-being.

The animal welfare expert Jacky Turner argues that 'Speed is all-important in modern farming. We aim to minimize the time that animals take to grow up to slaughter weight, to be slaughtered and processed, for breeding animals to become pregnant and reproduce, to wean their offspring and to become pregnant again. Together with the drive for maximum yield, the drive for maximum speed puts an enormous strain on the animals' bodies and arguably distorts their relationships with each other and our relationship with them' (Turner 2006, p. 27). The last sentence in particular makes an important point. When animals are viewed as production units, and when their treatment is a matter of technology, the human–animal relationship takes on a frighteningly detached and clinical form. We no longer *relate* to other animals from up close, but instead *manipulate* them from afar. Ontologically, animals become objects of manipulation, and epistemologically, human beings become blind to the animal viewpoint. The animal herself becomes lost, and with that loss the human–animal relationship breaks down. That is, when the animal is no longer viewed as a creature with experiences,

dual interaction between two beings is reduced into one-sided exploitation: one cannot have a relationship with a machine.

This may have significant consequences for our own identity. Juan Carlos Gomez has argued that personhood is built upon the capacity to recognize other beings (including other animals) as persons. That is, we are only persons when we see personhood in non-human animals, too: 'I am a person in so far as I and another perceive and treat each other as persons' (Gómez 1998). This suggests that how animals are treated and viewed bears crucial relevance to what types of creatures human beings are. We have a choice between morphing into empathetic fellow-beings or detached technologists. It is crucial to steer away from the jargon of mechanomorphia and detachment, because it affects how we relate to other beings and ultimately may turn us into ruthless aggressors, who see nothing morally troubling in treating sentient creatures as though they were mere biological matter, consisting of nothing but bodily tissue and blind instinct. Therefore, the type of efficiency around which animal agriculture revolves ought to be resisted if one wants to have a meaningful relationship with other animals, and if one wants to hold on to moral awareness in oneself.

All this suggests that animal suffering needs to be pushed onto the agenda more firmly. Society needs to take the issue of animal suffering seriously, and encourage reflection on how and on what basis animals are treated within animal industries, homes and hunting fields.

# 2

## Knowing Suffering

Thus far in the book, it has been presumed that animal suffering can be both defined and detected with relative ease. However, not everybody agrees. One argument is that animal suffering is, in fact, both extremely difficult (if not impossible) to define, and that we can never know for sure whether an animal suffers. This sceptical take on animal suffering gains its foothold from the inherently subjective nature of suffering: suffering is a subjectively experienced state which escapes objective definitions and verifications, particularly when the species barrier is crossed. Matilda will never know what it is like to be a bat or a chicken, and she should therefore, perhaps, cease talking of ‘animal suffering’ as a knowable entity. Are the critics correct?

### Impossible definitions

According to one view, all efforts to define suffering are deficient. Suffering cannot be defined, because it is something that will always remain alien to language and understanding. Simply stated, suffering is so horrifying that we cannot begin to put it into words.

The rationale behind this view is that suffering goes against us, and therefore defies language and reason; it is a force hostile to human beings, like the dark matter at the centre of the universe, wholly opposite to anything that we are or anything that makes sense to us. The list of those who support this view is long. For instance, Iain Wilkinson argues that suffering is ‘wholly “unspeakable” and radically opposed to reason’ (Wilkinson 2005, p. 10). In similar vein, A. W. Frank concludes that ‘Suffering is the unspeakable. ...Suffering resists definition because it is the reality of what is not’ (Frank 2001, p. 345), while Paul Ricoeur argues: ‘Perhaps we ask too much of our capacity for language when

we seek to represent a phenomenon which appears to be so dynamically adapted to the purpose of negating every aspect of our being?' (Wilkinson 2005, p. 17) Elaine Scarry summarizes this view nicely by maintaining that, because suffering is the very thing that destroys language and understanding, it can never be captured in language, or made the object of understanding. This means that whenever we think we have grasped suffering, it has already escaped (Scarry 1985). Because of this incomprehensibility, contemporary social research into suffering tends to approach it through paradoxes and dichotomies rather than logical analyses (Chouliaraki 2006).

Perhaps the most famous advocate of this view was Hannah Arendt. In her thoughts on the Holocaust and totalitarianism, and in her efforts to shed some light on how human beings come to cause extreme harm to one another, one of the underlying premises is the utter incomprehensibility of violence and suffering. Following this premise, Arendt sought not to solve or define suffering, but rather simply to point out our inability to make sense of it. In fact, Arendt argued that efforts to define and understand suffering often lead to undermining and trivializing it: words can easily render suffering into something mundane. Expert jargon and bureaucratic talk are typical examples of this. Within the vocabularies of scientists and civil servants, suffering becomes clinical and simple: it is reduced into numbers and procedures, and thus its horror is replaced with something altogether benign. 'Mass killing' becomes 'final solution'. Significantly, this leaves the door open for deliberate marginalization of given groups of sufferers and their suffering (Arendt 1955). When suffering becomes just another mundane term on a form, it is much easier to overlook and cast aside.

Therefore, the human inability to define suffering has disturbing implications. First, false definitions can be used to justify violence towards others. Second, lack of definitions may lead to what Ricoeur calls *aporia* in human thinking (Ricoeur 1995; see also Wilkinson 2005). Because suffering is such a powerful, negative force, it not only escapes human language but may also destroy it, as sufferers are no longer able to think sensically or communicate their own experiences to others (Scarry 1985). With the loss of communication, sufferers become lonely, abandoned creatures, who ultimately may not be able to identify with others. Arendt argues that, with extreme suffering, humanity itself can become superfluous, as we can no longer relate to each other as valuable creatures (Arendt 1968). Hence, suffering is a negative force that may dissolve the very ability for compassion.

These claims have much relevance in relation to non-human animals. If even human suffering is something entirely alien to us, how

could we begin to understand the suffering of members of other species? Moreover, if assessments of suffering only work to hide its horror, is there not a danger that, in discussing animal suffering, we render it into something mundane? Are non-human animals doomed to remain utterly alone in their plight?

The first question has remained the bedrock of scepticism towards animal suffering, as scientific discourse has repeatedly maintained that if we cannot define or verify animal suffering with scientific certainty there is no point in discussing it.<sup>1</sup> This criticism is linked to the issue of objectivity, and the claim has been made that, since we do not have direct access to the phenomenality of animal suffering (since we cannot get 'into' the animals' heads), talk of animal suffering is useless. However, here a lesson from Thomas Nagel is in order. Nagel famously pointed out that we need to separate two things: knowledge that another being has experiences, and knowledge of what those experiences are. Even if we do not have the latter, we can acquire the former (Nagel 1974). This means that even if I do not know what animal suffering is like, or even how it ought to be accurately defined, I can state that it is like something, and that it exists. That is, comprehending what non-human suffering is plagued with difficulties, but one can still assert with certainty that it does take place (we shall come back to this topic shortly).

Second, leaving suffering without scrutiny can also help to marginalize those who suffer. To state that the suffering of others cannot be known opens the door to a cynical attitude which leaves suffering untouched, and which in fact allows us to cause even more of it. That is, suffering becomes a formidable force that is allowed to take its course without resistance; an independent, all-empowering entity over which one can have no power and hence no responsibility. Just as defining suffering can render it mundane, leaving suffering without analysis can render it omnipotent, which again serves as an excuse for not caring. Wilkinson argues that the study of suffering must offer us tools with which to fight what suffering does to others: it should be understood as a form of combat (Wilkinson 2005). Following this, it can be claimed that a genuine effort to understand and discuss suffering serves as a way of beating down its force: it brings into light that which previously lay hidden and which was thus able to rampage freely through the world. Hence, declaring that suffering is fully known may be used to take control over the suffering of others, but letting go of all definition and knowledge may open the door to utter disregard. Perhaps the best we can do is to acknowledge that suffering always surpasses complete understanding, but that the act of striving to understand it is all a moral creature can do – and is ultimately the very essence of morality.

Following this line of thinking, non-human beings would no longer be left in the utter loneliness and abandonment of suffering in which they currently all too often exist; rather, their suffering would be made the object of constant efforts of understanding.

However, for some, the implications of becoming more aware of animal suffering are unbearable. If animals suffer, how can society go on using and killing them in their billions? In order to brush this uncomfortable question under the carpet, the type of clinical jargon emphasized by Arendt is utilized. Animal suffering is discussed in the language of finance and detached science, which renders it utterly unremarkable. Instead of animal experience, attention is directed towards the economic aspects of intensive farming methods, or the variables used in a given animal experiment. Even animal welfare scientists may put suffering in brackets for fear of otherwise seeming 'unscientific', or accentuate technical terminology in order to avoid raising uncomfortable moral issues (Fraser 2008).<sup>2</sup> Perhaps even the term 'welfare science' is guilty of distortion, as talk of 'welfare' rather than 'suffering' replaces the negative with the positive and thus implies that all is in order in our treatment of animals. As already seen, clinical jargon often serves vested interests. Unintentionally or intentionally, animal producers, scientists and laypeople alike dodge the issue of animal suffering by using sanitized terminology. In this way, animals become the unseen 'others', whose suffering is marginalized in contemporary society. It is precisely because of this that animal suffering needs to be better understood, and better explicated. It needs to be elevated from marginality into a recognized subject of serious concern, which cannot be buried under a mountain of expert talk.

Therefore, the difficulty of definition makes it even more – not less – urgent that animal suffering be explored. However, can such exploration ever be reliable? That is, since we cannot get inside a cow's head, are statements concerning animal suffering simply a matter of personal opinion and imagination? How can something inherently subjective be ever accurately understood from the objective viewpoint?

## **Scepticism and mechanomorphia**

There are two options for explaining animal behaviour: internal and external (Crist 1999; Bernard Rollin has made a similar differentiation between 'ordinary common sense' and 'common sense of science': see Rollin 2003b, p. 70). The internal descriptions emphasize subjective experiences, whereas the external descriptions refer to mechanical



explanations. Hence, the former explain animal behaviour through the experiences and cognitive states of the animal, and the latter through matters such as mechanical instinct and brain physiology. These descriptions lay down the conceptual frameworks that go on to govern whether or not animals are seen to have minds or to be capable of suffering. Thus, Rollin points out that 'Scientific common sense's agnosticism about such locutions [concerning animal minds] therefore in essence removes questions of animal welfare from the realm of legitimate empirical investigation' (Rollin 2003b, p. 70); if we follow external descriptions, animal suffering, as a relevant topic worthy of consideration, is sidelined. To put it simply, the descriptions determine how animals are perceived and what type of prominence their suffering is seen as having. Scepticism relies on the external approach, and is inherently suspicious of any references to internal states of non-human animals (including suffering).

As seen in the previous chapter, non-human animals are frequently approached as beings who have very limited cognitive abilities, and who therefore can be labelled biological mechanisms, to be utilized in whichever way suits human interests the most. As Eileen Crist argues, this mechanomorphic view is linked to anthropocentric (human-centred) scepticism, which will deny the existence of animal minds at all costs, due to the presumed primacy of human value and excellence. According to this approach, one must refrain from referring to animals as cognitive beings, as long as there are other possible explanations for their seemingly intelligent behaviour. Therefore, the basic premise from which we are to start is that animals are pure biology, not beings with their own minds (Crist 1999). For the advocates of scepticism, animal suffering is always a matter of doubt. This is, most importantly, because the type of objective, neutral proof that they request seems impossible to obtain: since suffering is a subjective state, we will never be able to prove beyond doubt that it exists in the minds of those who cannot offer us verbal testimonials concerning their own experiences.

Arguably, mechanomorphism often intertwines with practical considerations, and particularly the instrumental use of non-human animals: instead of informed knowledge concerning animals, it may be based on a practical desire to depict animals in a given way. As historians have pointed out (see Thomas 1983), Western society has tended to conceptualize animals in terms of use-value, and mechanomorphism accommodates this value. To put it simplistically, pigs cannot have minds or suffer, because people eat pigs. Yet, the philosophical challenge scepticism poses cannot be overlooked simply on the basis of this practical

dimension. Even if many sceptics choose to support the sceptical argument on the grounds of culinary preferences, that argument may still hold water. Therefore, the question becomes: can we know for certain that non-human animals suffer?

Descartes was the king of scepticism. He felt that philosophy – just like natural sciences – should be built upon finding certain truths that cannot be doubted. In his quest to find such certain truths, Descartes developed a sceptical method, the point of which was to question absolutely everything. Descartes even put forward the possibility that we cannot know for sure whether other human beings have minds (this is because our perception of others may be nothing but a ghostly hallucination created by an ill-meaning demon, who holds our brain in a vat). Ultimately, the only certain truth he felt he could find was that, because he himself thinks, he must also exist. (He then went on to state that other human beings must also have minds, because God would not let us exist under a demonic illusion.) However, as already noted, animals were left in the category of mindless creatures: according to Descartes, they lacked souls, and, since they were also incapable of producing language, there was no reason to believe that they were indeed anything other than automata. Descartes' effect on views of animal minds was profound, and his legacy can still be seen today amongst the sceptics, who feel that, even if animals manifest the physiological, behavioural and evolutionary characteristics of suffering, in the absence of incontrovertible evidence they must be treated as little more than blind mechanisms. Just as the suffering of other human beings could be a demonic illusion, the suffering of animals can be an anthropomorphic figment of one's imagination.

The sceptics continually demand more evidence of animal suffering, and for them no new piece of evidence will ever be conclusive. The presumption is that, as long as there is a possible counter-hypothesis for the behaviour of animals, we must use that hypothesis rather than admit that animals can suffer. As seen, even some welfare scientists fall into this category when they hesitate to refer to 'animal suffering' and other affective states until more (and more) proof can be found. Everyday experiences and anecdotes of animals do not count: the sceptics' society demands scientific verification. In fact, no amount of verification is adequate, for (as Descartes' examples show) there is always room for lingering doubt and further questions, no matter how far-fetched and theoretical.

Scepticism both makes and does not make sense. It makes sense in that it stipulates that one must have evidence for claims concerning

the empirical world: otherwise, we might as well claim that large pink hedgehogs are to blame for hurricanes. However, scepticism also does not make sense. It seems odd to doubt everything, and particularly odd to posit that we should not believe what seems to be obviously true, as long as some far-fetched and imaginative counter-hypothesis can be found. It does not make sense to question whether other human beings have minds, and in many cases it does not make sense to question whether animals can suffer. In fact, it can be argued that the demand for verification is absurd, for (if consistently applied) it leads to the frightening yet ridiculous claim that we cannot really know anything about anybody else's experiences (Mayerfeld 1999). That is, scepticism opens the door to the 'problem of other minds', which makes one doubt whether other beings (human or animal) actually have minds, or whether it just seems that they have minds. This is an important point: scepticism makes us doubt that which ought to be beyond doubt, and renders also the minds of other human beings a matter of debate. In fact, taken to the extreme, there is no way to absolutely refute the possibility that I alone on this planet have a mind, or that I only think that others, too, have minds because I exist under a Matrix-style illusion. That is, perhaps the minds of others are nothing other than my own imaginative hallucinations.

Hence, it is noteworthy that even attributing minds to other human beings 'involves projection that goes beyond evidence' (Nussbaum 2001, p. 124). Yet, we rarely succumb to total nihilism in regard to the suffering of other human beings, or start approaching them as pure mechanisms. Why, then, is this option chosen in regard to non-human animals? The reason is, as mentioned before, externalism and mechanomorphism. Sceptics ponder on the possibility of animal suffering, because they approach animals as beings without minds – that is, they have already adopted the mechanomorphic image of animals. This is an important point: scepticism is not a neutral stance, but is, rather, based on a particular view of animals. Scepticism can also be coloured by vested interests. It all too easily acts as a form of 'escapism', as it enables us to withdraw from what Cora Diamond calls the 'difficulty of reality' (Diamond 2008). It serves as a tool with which to escape suffering: instead of facing the disturbing acuteness of suffering, the being in pain in front of us, we can withdraw to the level of theory, and toy with abstract premises and arguments. The tangible and horrifying nature of suffering can, thus, be brushed under the carpet. This makes it very easy to avoid difficult moral issues. When faced with the animal screaming with pain, the sceptic can say: 'But does the animal *really*

suffer?’ instead of embarking on the difficult road of uncomfortable moral questions. Perhaps many resort to nihilism in regard to animal minds and suffering, because this is the easy – if dishonest – way out.

Scepticism is based on the rationalistic legacy of modern Western philosophy. New science and the Cartesian world view have emphasized one capacity at the expense of others. Calculating, detached rationality has stepped forward as the main faculty on which humanity ought to rely. What is expected of human beings has begun to resemble that which is expected of machines. Mechanical deductions, guarded by the rules of logic, are all that matter. You find evidence, apply logic to it, and then base your beliefs on what follows. This may seem innocent enough, but, as philosophers such as Edmund Husserl (1970) and Hannah Arendt (1968) have warned, this detached perspective will make possible regimented, hierarchical and ruthless societies, which diminish our capacity to view other beings as valuable entities, and which thus ultimately diminish our own humanity. In particular, the rationalistic society has overlooked the role of intuition, emotion, relations, the body and contexts as factors that do and ought to have an impact on our beliefs (see Midgley 1981; 2003). One no longer sees others through, for instance, empathy, or takes into account their pasts and their particular situations – all that others are is faceless creatures, part of the same, nameless mass, concerning which one can make logical deductions without moral scruples. The result of this prominent emphasis on rationality is paradoxical. Just as others are viewed through mechanomorphism, the person doing the viewing has herself become, in essence, a detached automaton.

This will eventually enable atrocities to take place. It is precisely the detached, calculating perspective that leads the Nazi to look at his victim and her suffering as insignificant, and which will similarly lead the butcher, the animal experimenter or the burger-lover to look at the pig and her suffering as something thoroughly trivial. The result is a society which each year subjugates and kills tens of billions of sentient, thinking creatures for inconsequential reasons, without so much as blinking an eye. Here, Arendt’s warnings of expert jargon become relevant again. Rationality in its calculating, detached form all too easily follows the pattern of expert talk. Suffering and the viewpoint of sentient creatures lose their relevance, as the world is explained with neutral terminology that relies on the rules of logic and scientific verification.

Therefore, because of its reliance on detached rationality, scepticism makes us question the very things that ought to be beyond questioning – the minds and experiences of others. From its detached viewpoint,

others appear as machine-like creatures who are presumed incapable of suffering unless certain evidence is offered to prove the contrary. As non-human animals are often approached through externalism, mechanomorphism and escapism, it is particularly their suffering that is placed in doubt. Moreover, as the sceptic insists on pure, calculating rationality and verification, she risks becoming a detached creature void of empathy, and ultimately a creature incapable of seeing moral relevance in non-human others. In other words, scepticism enables what takes place in farms, experimentation labs and slaughterhouses.

Fortunately, criticism of the sceptical stance has become louder, particularly in recent years. It has put forward the inevitable problem of scepticism, referred to above: no amount of evidence will ever render beliefs concerning the empirical world absolutely true. Therefore, as Dale Jamieson points out, there will never be enough proof to satisfy the sceptical mind, for there is always a counter-explanation for anything, no matter how unlikely. That is, no matter how much evidence the ethologist offers for the existence of animal minds, the sceptic can always ask one further question, or present one further alternative, far-fetched hypothesis (Jamieson 2002). Jamieson presents us with an important point. The problem is that scepticism starts from the odd presumption that animal suffering is not a reality as long as counter-hypotheses are possible. The sceptics of animal minds are asking us to do the impossible: they are asking us to prove the negative by manifesting beyond doubt that there are no other possible hypotheses, no other possible explanations for animal behaviour, no matter how slim, theoretical or imaginative. In other words, for the sceptic, animal minds or suffering will never become a reality. Raimond Gaita has described the situation as follows: 'Her [an animal's] howling provides evidence that she was in terrible pain. But it provides evidence only because there is no room for serious doubt whether she is a sensate creature. Should someone doubt that, then her howling and the howling of a million dogs could not convince him' (Gaita 2002, p. 61).

The central claim of the criticism is that evidence can be important, but that there are cases to which it holds little or no relevance. For example, Cora Diamond has argued that scepticism 'deflects' from the obvious, everyday level onto the realm of abstract, far-fetched thinking, and in doing so becomes incapable of offering credible accounts concerning our understanding of the reality. We start to debate theoretical points, while overlooking the obvious in front of us. In particular, because-arguments ('y is true because x') lead us astray: they seek ideals of objective, perfect knowledge that cannot be achieved (Diamond

2004; 2008). Thus, when discussing suffering, the sceptic will quickly start to build theoretical ivory towers that will – in the end – have precious little to do with the acuteness of the phenomenon itself. What Diamond is asking us to do is to go back to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, which revolves around meanings and ‘the obvious’. Here, abstract pondering holds little relevance, and instead philosophy seeks to reveal what seems so painstakingly evident all around us, as seen through pre-existing meanings. The best we can do is to become ‘exposed’ to other beings, which refers to a state where ‘The other can present me with no mark or feature on the basis of which I can settle my attitude’ (here Diamond quotes Stanley Cavell – Diamond 2008, p. 71). Exposure leaves us in a situation where we come face to face with the animal, and where there is no proof or verified certainty.

But what, precisely, is the non-sceptical method? Like Diamond, Gaita celebrates Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein famously stated: ‘My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul: I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul’ (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 178), by which he meant that we do not infer, on the basis of evidence, that other people have minds, or propose that our view could be entirely mistaken – rather, it is self-evident to us that others have minds, for we approach them as mindful beings. When I walk down the street and see another member of my species, I do not wait to see evidence that suggests to me that she is not a zombie: I feel that I know with full certainty that she is not a zombie, and approach her instead as a creature with a functioning mind. The whole notion of evidence is utterly misplaced in this context. Gaita concludes: ‘Perhaps, as Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested, we should cease to look for a further justification while at the same time refusing to concede that this is intellectual dereliction’ (Gaita 2002, p. 50).

This has clear relevance from the viewpoint of animal minds and suffering: ‘Almost all philosophical and scientific work about animals is based on the assumption that Wittgenstein threw into doubt – that we are justified in attributing various “states of consciousness” to animals only to the degree that we have evidence for them’ (Gaita 2002, p. 52). No such evidence is needed: ‘Our certainty is without evidence – *completely* without evidence – and is none the worse for that’ (ibid., p. 62). This means that the sceptical stance is foundationally weak. It asks for evidence, when no evidence should be asked for. In a sense, it is absurd: it makes demands that are nonsensical to the point of being ridiculous. No evidence needs to be offered for the minds and suffering of non-human animals, for, if we choose the appropriate attitude towards them, it is clear and blatant beyond doubt that they do have minds, and

that they can suffer. Gaita goes on to argue: 'That is the deepest reason why it is not anthropomorphic to say that Gypsy [a dog] intends this, or that she believes or hopes that' (*ibid.*, p. 60). Just as we approach other human beings as creatures with minds, we do the same with other animals. It emerges as 'obvious' that animals have minds and can suffer. In fact, it can be argued that something is amiss if one asks for further evidence. As seen, Gómez has maintained that personhood is dependent upon recognizing personhood in others (Gomez 1998). Perhaps the sceptic is lacking something in her own humanity when she denies animal minds and suffering. Something has gone awry when a human being sees around her mechanical bodies and biological automata rather than creatures with minds and individual viewpoints.

However, there are some obstacles in the path. What is the certainty or the 'obviousness', so inherent in this approach, based on? The Wittgensteinian approach links obviousness to the meanings inherent in our language games. For instance, the meaning of 'human being' includes the notion of a mind: to be a human being is to have a mind (Diamond 2004). To question this is to step outside meaning and language, and therefore to – quite literally – make no sense. What about other animals? The problem here is that, instead of defining animals as beings with minds, the dominant language games tend to define them as beings who do not have minds. That is, the same anthropocentric society that takes it for granted that other human beings can suffer can take it for granted that other animals cannot suffer.

Diamond offers, as a solution, the everyday experience of 'fellow feeling', within which we see other creatures, both human and non-human, as inherently akin to ourselves (Diamond 2004). For Diamond, fellow feeling is a way of looking at the world that competes with anthropocentrism and invites us to see animals anew, outside the sceptical framework. It resists subjugating, detached presumptions and instead relates to other animals as fellow creatures of flesh, joy and hurt. Following fellow feeling, we will quickly approach animals as beings who have minds and who are capable of suffering. No theory and no evidence are needed: when we relate to other animals, it simply becomes apparent that they, too, have experiences worthy of consideration. Therefore, the 'obvious' is found from an attitude rather than from a given concept in a language game: it is a perspective rather than a matter of terminology.

Gaita adopts a slightly different route and suggests that interaction with both human beings and other animals forms the concept of 'a mind': we develop this concept on the basis of acting in relation to other mindful beings. Gaita states that 'Out of...interactions...between

us and animals, there developed...our *very concepts* of thought, feeling, intention, belief, doubt, and so on' (Gaita 2002, p. 61). That is, the notion of a 'mind' is born out of witnessing it in other creatures with whom we are interacting. Therefore, animals lend us the concept of a mind and, because of this, questioning the minds of animals would mean that our whole concept of a 'mind' would lose its basis: 'If the word "consciousness" means anything then I have no doubt that Gypsy is a conscious being' (ibid., p. 62). Animal welfare scientist Francoise Wemelsfelder offers her support for this view: 'The concept of consciousness, as it functions in common-sense interaction with animals, denotes that animals are not mere objects but subjects; that is, it indicates that a level of behavioural organization is present which requires a non-mechanistic, subject-related, first person perspective level of explanation' (Wemelsfelder 1999, p. 42). Hence, we approach other animals as beings who have minds, because this is what 'mind' entails; this is how the term is applied. Anthropocentric meanings related to animals may deny that animals can think or experience, but, when we look at the concept of 'mind' itself, we quickly realize that it must also include non-human animals. Similarly, perhaps we have learned what 'suffering' is by witnessing it in others, and seeing it also in non-human animals. The wounded elk or the rat in pain has helped to develop the very notion of 'suffering', and to deny now that these animals can suffer is therefore nonsensical: we know that they can suffer, because they partly built our understanding of what it is to suffer.

It is worth noting that, besides Wittgenstein, some other notable early-to-mid-twentieth-century philosophers have been critical of scepticism. The father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, argued that the 'life-world' enables us to avoid scepticism. This life-world is something akin to the 'obvious' that Diamond speaks of: it is the lived and experienced everyday reality, rather than the level of abstract thinking and theory. Whereas, within the latter, scepticism is perhaps even unavoidable, within the former it makes absolutely no sense: in the lived reality, other beings have minds, and to doubt this is nothing but pure madness. We immediately recognize minds within bodies, and therefore instantaneously form the understanding that the human being in front of us is a cognitive being (rather than a body that may or may not include a mind). Husserl states: 'Now, as to the persons we encounter in society, their bodies are naturally given to us in intuition just like the other objects of our environment, and consequently so are they as persons, unified with the bodies. But we do not find there two things, entwined with one another in an external way; bodies and persons. We



find unitary human beings, who have dealings with us' (Husserl 1989, p. 246). Husserl also points out that, in the life-world, we constantly use various presuppositions and intuitions for which we have little or no evidence. They are what the life-world partly relies on and consists of: we cannot pause and seek evidence for absolutely everything, but must, rather, rely on something more immediate. Therefore, assuming that others have minds and that others can suffer can be a necessity that derives its basis from the very core of human life (Husserl 1989; 1970).

Another famous phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, has an equally clear response to the problem of other minds: according to him, it is not a problem to begin with. We do not meet other beings wondering whether there are minds behind their bodies. The whole problem of other minds is perverse and alienated from lived experience, for within such experience it makes absolutely no sense to doubt the minds of others. Our understanding of ourselves is born out of pre-lingual interaction with other beings whom we understand to have minds, and our recognition of their minds and experiences is immediate, beyond evidence and inference. Moreover, the body and the mind intertwine in a manner that makes it impossible to speak of one without the other: there can be no body without a mind, no machine without a ghost. In fact, mind and body form an inseparable whole, and, when one sees a body moving, one immediately recognizes how it involves a mind: 'A face, a signature, a form of behaviour cease to be mere "visual data" whose psychological meaning is to be sought in our inner experience, and the mental life of others becomes an immediate object, a whole charged with immanent meaning' (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 67). We also perceive the world with an underlying understanding that it is a world shared with other viewpoints; that we are not alone. In fact, Merleau-Ponty even maintains that we are as sure of the existence of the minds of others as we are of the existence of our own mind: 'My own "mental life" is given to me in precisely the same way' (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 67). Thus, Merleau-Ponty resigns entirely from scepticism: 'Like Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty rejects skepticism about other minds as utterly as he rejects skepticism about the external world...The fact that human being is essentially being-in-the-world inevitably drains sceptical doubt of all content...solipsism seems not just mistaken, but quite literally insane' (Carman 2008, p. 136). Just as 'to ask whether the world is real is not to know what one is saying' (Carman, p. 141), to ask whether the minds of other beings are real is a terribly misguided act. On the everyday level, we perceive others as bodies intertwined with minds, and intuitively relate to them as such: 'Others are always

already persons like myself' (Carman 2008, p. 141; see also Merleau-Ponty 2002).

For phenomenologists, direct knowledge in the form of 'intuition' performs an important function. The argument is that, in place of calculating rationality, human beings form knowledge first and foremost on the basis of immediate experience or perception. When Matilda sees a swan, she does not first pause to calculate whether the swan is really there or whether the swan is alive. Rather, she immediately recognizes the swan as a real, living creature. Intuition exists outside theoretical prejudices and pre-given concepts, and is, thus, direct: 'If we would touch on the thing itself, then it is required of us, assuming we wanted to grasp the essence of the thing and determine it conceptually, that we not be content with vague locutions and traditional philosophical preconceptions but instead draw from the very source of clear givenness' (Husserl 1989, p. 37). Visual perception, that is, looking at something, is the most basic form of intuition: the chair that I see in front of me appears to me directly and immediately, rather than as a result of calculating analysis or evidence-based inference (Husserl 1989). There is a range of similar 'self-evident forms of experience' (Smith 2007, p. 324), which all appear not to require any further evidence: in this sense, they offer justification for their own existence. Of course, intuition does not reveal the reality to us in its entirety, and may not be 'objective'. Nonetheless, it forms an important and fundamental form of understanding (on intuition, see also Hintikka 2003). It is only with intuition that we can relate to others and flourish in the life-world. This intuition helps one also to recognize the minds and suffering of others, and to step outside the puzzling and distorting questions of the sceptic.<sup>3</sup>

The phenomenologist approach, together with its emphasis on intuition, can also be applied to non-human animals. Just as we intuitively and self-evidently approach other human beings as creatures with minds, we also immediately recognize non-human animals as creatures who have minds and who can suffer. Scepticism is just as insane in relation to non-human animals and their suffering as it is in relation to human animals and their plight. Thus, philosopher John Searle has argued: 'I do not infer that my dog is conscious, any more than, when I came into this room, I inferred that the people present are conscious. I simply respond to them as is appropriate to conscious beings. I just treat them as conscious beings and that is that' (Searle 1998, p. 49).<sup>4</sup> The sceptical attitude is fundamentally mistaken and misplaced, for human beings endowed with intuition immediately and directly recognize that animals are experiencing, mindful creatures, who can suffer.

This type of criticism has been reiterated in recent years. For instance, Dale Jamieson has argued that we need to abandon the 'inferential stance', which follows the sceptical outlook and maintains that we can only accept that animals have minds after carefully inferring this from their behaviour and other evidence, and which presumes that 'all knowledge claims about animal minds are based on probabilistic inferences to hidden mental states from observations of behavior' (Jamieson 2002, p. 57). In fact, for Jamieson, the idea of a 'behaving body' is a 'philosophical monster' (Jamieson 2002, p. 57). He refers to 'perception' in this context, and argues that minds are directly perceived rather than empirically inferred. What matters is the perspective of our perception: minds may only surface when approached as minds. Bernard Rollin makes a similar point: 'common sense *perceives* mental states in others in exactly the way that it perceives physical states or objects' (Rollin 1989). Therefore, approaching animals affectively (or internally), through the framework of a mind, will enable one to perceive animal minds and recognize animal suffering.

However, perhaps something more than mere perception or intuition is required. A further notable philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, famously maintained that the 'face' of other human beings leaves no room for scepticism. This 'face' signals to us that the other being is an individual, and 'convinces even "the people who do not wish to listen"' (Levinas 1961, p. 201) of the fact that there is a mind behind the face. What is crucial here is that, for Levinas, it is specifically moral, evaluative recognition of the other being that enables us to see her as a mindful individual. That is, moral concern facilitates our recognition of the 'face' of another, and therefore seeing her as a person: 'Through morality alone are I and the others produced in the universe' (Levinas 1961, p. 245). Significantly, it is the *moral attitude* towards others that eradicates scepticism: recognition of suffering requires a moral approach. Although Levinas himself was critical of the subjectivity of non-human animals (according to him, animals cannot have a 'face'), it has been argued that this stance also applies to the rest of the animal world (Calarco 2008). Therefore, it can be claimed that, by approaching animals as morally significant creatures, we come to recognize them also as beings who have minds and who are capable of suffering. Again, scepticism has no foothold.

The importance of a moral approach has gained growing attention. For instance, Jamieson argues that, instead of inference, we should follow the 'affective stance', which approaches animal minds not from a detached position, but sympathetically, with a hint of moral recognition.

Like Diamond and Gaita, Jamieson stands by Wittgenstein's idea that when 'we see emotion', we do not 'see facial contortions and make inferences from them', but rather approach others as sentient, emotive beings, worthy of our consideration (Jamieson 2002, p. 59).<sup>5</sup> In other words, we adopt a normative perspective towards other beings – we see them as significant enough to warrant our attention – and this paves the way for recognizing them as mindful creatures. Therefore, one needs to have certain normative attentiveness towards others, or moral recognition of others, in order to form fruitful understanding of their minds and suffering.

But does this view not render recognition of animal suffering dependent on moral bias? That is, does it not mean that only those with a (possibly mistaken) soft touch for non-human animals will think that they can suffer? This is something Daniel Dennett has proposed. According to him, we see minds in other creatures when we view them through 'an intentional stance' (that is, approach them as intentional beings): however, that stance may be entirely mistaken, due to our biased and ill-informed views of those creatures (Dennett 1995; 1996). Here, the accusation of anthropomorphism, so common when animal minds and suffering are discussed, emerges. Fortunately, there is a way out of this dilemma. The crucial point is that all understandings concerning animal minds and suffering (including the inferential stance) are coloured by different types of moral presumptions, and can never achieve complete objectivity or neutral detachment. As was argued earlier, sceptics, too, are biased when they presume the mechanomorphic understanding of animals to be correct. This is a lesson learned from Wittgenstein: human knowledge is never neutral. So how ought we to proceed?

Sandra Harding has called the presumption according to which one ought to remain utterly detached and unbiased 'weak objectivism'. According to her, its main problem is belief in what human beings can never achieve: neutral, detached knowledge. Contrary to this belief, knowledge is always influenced by cultural, social and moral factors, for we form knowledge on the basis of our wider world view. Thus, Harding argues: 'What [weak] objectivism cannot conceptualize is... that nature as-the-object-of-human-knowledge never comes to us "naked"; it comes only as already constituted in social thought' (Harding 1991, p. 147). Strong objectivism, on the other hand, considers the conceptual frameworks that affect knowledge: 'We can think of strong objectivity as extending the notion of scientific research to include systematic examination of...background beliefs' (ibid., p. 149). In the present context, this means analysing the presumptions and frameworks that lead one

to make assertions concerning animal minds. Therefore, instead of pretending to be utterly objective, it is more fruitful to bring forth and analyse the prejudices and presumptions behind one's stance on animals. This suggests that the normative approach is not to be discarded due to bias. In fact, explicitly endorsing a given normative viewpoint towards animals and their suffering may be more intellectually honest than keeping one's own moral prejudices hidden, for here the framework within which one approaches animals is put on the table. What emerges as crucial is precisely our ability to recognize and account for the types of presumptions that lead to given views on non-human minds and suffering. If all understandings of animal suffering are necessarily affected by underlying presumptions, which type of presumptions should we choose to follow? To put it simply, should we favour an affective and normative stance, or should we rather emphasize external, mechanomorphic and anthropocentric takes on animality?

In order to explore this question, it is important first to recognize that externalism, too, requires evidence. That is, it is not only the internal account, but also the external account of animal suffering that needs to be further explicated. In fact, it is imperative to question: why do we have to prove the existence of animal minds and suffering, rather than their non-existence? There are several reasons which suggest that perhaps the burden of proof should lie not on internalism, but rather on externalism. Bernard Rollin maintains that 'as Hume points out, few things are more repugnant to ordinary common sense than skepticism about animals' mind' (Rollin 2003b, p. 68), and there is much truth in the claim. Quite simply, internal descriptions seem to have more explanatory power: 'we could not interpret animal behaviour in ordinary life without imputing such notions as pain, fear, anger, and affection to animals' (*ibid.*, p. 70). This suggests that the need to justify one's normative approach to animal suffering is secondary in relation to the need to justify one's 'detached' approach to that same suffering.

Second, it is vital to scrutinize which approach is best suited to accommodate the type of entities 'minds' are. Here, the external, sceptical approach draws the short straw. It can be argued that scepticism is a form of deflection because, in particular, it alienates us from a perceptive, empathetic reading of animal minds. Minds cannot be reduced to proof and evidence – rather, they require a phenomenological, normative perspective. As subjective, experienced entities, they shy away from objective measurement and criteria, and the only way to perceive them with any clarity is to use one's own experiences and normativity as a reference point. That is, minds and suffering are the type of things

that cannot be made sense of by using objective inferences alone, simply because they are so inherently subjective. For Matilda to grasp the suffering of Maggie the pig requires that she relates to Maggie through her own experiences, as a fellow being of internality. In fact, Diamond (2004) argues that the *meaning* of minds is such that they cannot be translated into the language of science. One could add that this meaning is particularly intrinsic to phenomenal beings, for whom it is like something to exist, and who value their own experiences. We own the concept of a mind, it *is* us, and this enables us to form understandings concerning the minds of others that do not rely on external evidence, and that take normativity into account. For me, as an experiencing, normative being, it makes little sense to relate to the animal in front of me through the demand for theory and evidence, rather than through empathetic, evaluative perception.<sup>6</sup>

Hence, even though an affective stance coloured with normativity may fail to be neutral, it may still stand out as the best choice. This is because scepticism and mechanomorphia – along with any other approach – will also fail to offer complete neutrality, and because affective normativity may be better suited to grasp internal experiences than detached scepticism. In other words, it may be necessary to use empathy and morality in order to fully recognize minds and suffering in others, simply because the internal states of others can be detected and communicated only through those very elements that most define our own internality.

Therefore, it is fruitful to approach the suffering of non-human animals from the viewpoint of everyday experience and the ‘obvious’, coloured with normative recognition. It is not only scientific observation, but the everyday evidentness<sup>7</sup> concerning animals, together with intuitive and normative encounters related to their mental ability, that has relevance.<sup>8</sup> Scepticism, in the meantime, is laid to rest as an approach that cannot do justice to suffering. It offers a very hollow understanding of not only non-human minds and suffering, but also human beings. Diamond asks, in reference to atrocities: ‘But what kind of beings are we for whom this is an “issue”?’ (Diamond 2008, p. 51) The same could be asked in reference to animal suffering: what kind of creatures doubt the suffering of others? What has happened to our empathetic, normative ability, if we perceive other animals from a detached viewpoint rather than as sentient, experiencing beings?

There is one more crucial factor to be noted. The affective stance must begin with the animal: she needs to be the focal point of inquiry. Understandings concerning other animals have to be anchored on the

animals themselves, whereby they (rather than anthropocentric presumptions) become the priority. The goal is to simply make the animal the *reference point* of efforts to explore animal suffering. This means that we are to come face to face with the animal and engage in interaction with her. As the renowned ethologist Marc Bekoff argues: 'There are no substitutes for listening to, and having direct experiences with, other animals' – for him, animals are 'a way of knowing' (Bekoff 2000, p. 869). Cognitive capacities and experiences such as suffering are hard to detect or grasp in their full potential without engaging in interaction with the other being. Hence, the study of animal minds and suffering requires *interaction*. As Martha Nussbaum states: 'All such scientific accounts must begin with experience of interaction between humans and animals' (Nussbaum 2001, p. 92).

Therefore, centralizing the animal is about putting forward not a conception of 'the real animal' (an objective portrayal of what animals are), but, quite literally, the animal in herself: we are to let the lived experiences of other animals affect the types of understandings we have concerning their suffering. Here, the animal needs to be related to as an active being that can affect (even if unintentionally) the understandings we construct of her. Gomez has suggested that ethology concerning primates needs to place emphasis on the animal as a 'you' – a being conceptualized in the second person singular (Gomez 2004). This approach should be extended to the study concerning animal minds and suffering in general, and the animal should move from being a passive object, a third person singular, to being a second person singular – a being that those seeking to understand animal minds need to face as a 'you'.

In the last part of the book, different methods of interaction and understanding the non-human 'you' will be explored. Before that, let's have a look at the historical grounds of moral concern for non-human suffering.

# 3

## History of Caring

Thus far, the book has concentrated on the descriptive aspect of non-human suffering. However, what are the prescriptive, normative ramifications of such suffering? More particularly, when and why did Western culture begin to care about animal suffering?

### **Animal suffering in the history of philosophy**

There are notable characters in Western history who have advocated great care for non-human animals, and for whom causing animals suffering (and at times, also, using animals for food) has been morally repugnant.<sup>1</sup> Although there is some ambiguity concerning the historical evidence, it is commonly stated that Pythagoras favoured a vegetarian diet, as did various less famous thinkers of antiquity, such as Empedocles. For them, the main reason for abstinence from meat was the possibility of cannibalism: they believed in reincarnation, and feared that in eating the lamb they were eating a long-lost human being. However, other considerations may also have played a part. Empedocles argued that one should follow the principle of love, and therefore refrain from violence and blood-shedding: hence, an archaic form of compassion can be seen in his thinking. Indeed, Sextus Empiricus suggested that both Pythagoras and Empedocles favoured vegetarianism because of recognizing their community of spirit with other animals. This would suggest that, besides reincarnation, a certain sense of kinship may have affected their thinking (see Sorabji 1993; Gilhus 2006).

Others offered explicitly moral arguments against meat-eating and other forms of violence towards animals. Here, particularly, animal suffering and the notion of 'necessity' were important considerations: it was wrong to eat or harm animals, because they could suffer, and because



one could do without. In his *Pyrrhonic Sketches*, Sextus Empiricus underlined the cognitive capacities of animals, and claimed also that animals could understand their own suffering. Aristotle's follower Theophrastus stipulated that killing animals for food was unjust as long as there were other sources of food. Therefore, although the reasons for vegetarianism may not always have sprung solely from concern for animal suffering, animal suffering did form one recurrent theme in many of the arguments for abstaining from consuming animal flesh: 'One reason for vegetarianism was that animals, like humans, had the capacity for suffering. Therefore, out of compassion toward their fellow beings, humans ought to treat animals well' (Gilhus 2006, p. 65). Moreover, the treatment of animals was seen to be a question of justice.

Perhaps the most famous advocates of vegetarianism were Porphyry and Plutarch. In his *On Abstinence*, Porphyry (a follower of Plotinus, another 'animal-friendly' philosopher) argues that animals are endowed with a soul and intelligence and that killing them should only take place when necessary for self-defence; moreover, he underlined the importance of care towards animals. Plutarch wrote with colourful and powerful words about the disturbing nature of consuming animal products. In *The Eating of Flesh*, he argued that animals share feeling, seeing, hearing, imagination and intellect with us, and should therefore not be considered as mere things to eat. In fact, he reminds his readers that the thing they consider 'meat' came from sentient animals, and describes with horror those who first correlated the two: 'For my part I much wonder in what humour, with what soul or reason, the first man with his mouth touched slaughter, and reached to his lips the flesh of a dead animal, and having set before people courses of ghastly corpses and ghosts, could give those parts the names of meat and victuals, that but a little before [be]lowed, cried, moved, and saw' (Plutarch 2004, p. 385). Plutarch offers two rather different views on killing animals: on the one hand, he argues that it always includes a moral cost ('And what meal is not expensive? That for which no animal is put to death' – Plutarch 2004, p. 392); and, on the other, he suggests that killing may be permissible, but only when it involves pity and when the animal is not caused suffering ('Let us kill an animal; but let us do it with sorrow and pity, and not abusing and tormenting it, as many nowadays are used to do' – Plutarch 2004, p. 391). Whichever interpretation one favours, it is clear that Plutarch gave great prominence to animal suffering. In fact, in many ways, Plutarch is an early spokesperson for animal welfare, as he vividly laments the horrors faced by animals at the hands of his contemporaries, and despises cruelty ('O horrible cruelty!').

Animal-friendly figures have dotted history since antiquity as well. In particular, St Francis of Assisi became famous for his great care for animals, and his claim that human beings can – if they are willing – communicate with their non-human others. However, these figures have tended to remain a small minority. Much of Western history has been influenced by an instrumental image of non-human animals, according to which they are beings to be utilized in whichever way one can. Thus, throughout much of Western history, the central question has been: ‘What can we gain from animals?’ (Thomas 1983).<sup>2</sup>

Domestication and agriculture laid down the stance according to which animals were first and foremost creatures meant for human consumption. This was strengthened by the hierarchical world view, offered by Aristotle and repeated later by important figures such as St Thomas Aquinas, according to which animals existed for the purpose of human use.<sup>3</sup> Within this world view, human beings (creatures invested with theoretical reason and/or a soul) were seen as more perfect than other animals, and, since the movement of the cosmos was towards perfection, the imperfect animals should be used for the benefit of the more perfect human beings. Although it was thought good that each being flourishes according to its *telos*, consideration for animal suffering had little relevance. For instance, Aquinas did recognize that there were some restrictions on animal use in the Old Testament, but in his *Summa Theologica* (II, I Q 102, Art 6) explained them as an indirect duty towards human beings: ‘The Lord wished to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through being used to be kind to beasts.’ Therefore, humans should treat other animals kindly only in order to learn to treat each other kindly. The same argument was later favoured by Immanuel Kant, and finds ancestry in Ovid’s claim, made in *Metamorphosis*, according to which violence towards animals has led to violence towards other human beings.<sup>4</sup> Here, we find the core argument of anthropocentrism: human ‘specialness’ justifies aggression towards other animals, and animal suffering has only indirect or secondary moral significance.

As seen, such thinking escalated in Descartes and the birth of New Science, as even the existence of animal suffering began to be doubted, while the instrumental status of animals gained increasingly extreme forms.<sup>5</sup> If anything, the birth of modern philosophy and science in the sixteenth century only served to harden attitudes towards animals. They became curious mechanisms, the parts of which scientists would dissect and explore on the vivisection table. Animals were cut open alive, without any analgesics, and their anatomy carefully observed

by curious gentlemen. Animals were thus reduced to little more than interesting objects of scientific endeavour. They were atomized or fragmented, and ultimately lost their individuality altogether: they were not beings with their own minds and experiences, but rather creatures akin to mechanical objects (on this legacy, see Birke 1994; Fudge 2000; McCance 2008). This brought the anthropocentric, instrumental view to its logical conclusion, as animals became entities to be utilized and manipulated as though they were nothing other than biological matter or collections of cells, and, as such, had their suffering wilfully ignored. It is here that we see the first glimmerings of intensive agriculture: not necessarily in the fields of pastoral narratives (although they, too, had their obvious part to play), but rather in the manipulative, detached environment of the vivisection laboratory, which seeks to make as efficient as possible a use of the animal's body without any regard for her pain.

Erica Fudge has argued that this early modern period was defined by egocentrism, which placed overt emphasis on the human mind and its ability to facilitate control. What mattered was one's capacity to use reason and to control biology. Since non-human animals were characterized as primarily biological creatures (the contemporary philosophical canon defined animals in terms of bodily senses and physicality), they were also creatures whom human reason was meant to govern. This led to a dualistic take on human and non-human animals that is still quite prevalent today: humans were beings who could control via reason, and animals were beings who could be controlled. That is, reason rendered human beings active agents (the controllers), and physicality rendered other animals their passive objects (the manipulated victims). Fudge maintains that this was a key division in the egocentric ontology, and argues that, through it, animals became the 'absolute others' of humanity (Fudge 2006, p. 101). As the manipulation of animals took more extreme forms, animals were even more relentlessly categorized as purely physical beings and the opposite of human beings. In the meantime, human beings' ability to manipulate raised them to the level of pure reason or even of gods. The contrast between the two became enormous.

The implications from the standpoint of animal suffering were evident. When animals are reduced to physiology, and when reason is seen as the most valuable trait, designed to control other, less esteemed traits (such as emotion or bodily sensation), the significance of suffering quickly dwindles. In fact, suffering becomes a weakness: if reason is to have control, it should also control suffering. To suffer is to lose

control, and hence one should suffer in silence, without showing it to the world; suffering becomes an embarrassment, a sign of one's failure and lack of strength. Perhaps, then, non-human suffering even emerges as a weakness that accentuates the otherness of animals, for, within the egocentric framework, it is their lack of control that renders animals vulnerable to the horrors of suffering. The more the animal suffers, the more clearly she lacks control and the further removed she is from human beings. The frightening prospect is that, from this viewpoint, the sight of animal suffering will help to highlight one's own sense of importance and human identity (perhaps this is something to which ritualistic forms of animal cruelty, such as bull-baiting or sport hunting, are partially linked). If we are to believe this hypothesis, the ethos of new philosophy and science may, in fact, feed contempt for animals precisely because they suffer at the hands of the scientist or the slaughterer – that which should spark compassion may only give wings to further condescension. Here, animal suffering becomes a sign of incapacity and weakness, so that (paradoxically) the more the animal suffers, the less moral significance she is granted.

The egocentric framework gives very marginal relevance to compassion. Reason is to control emotion, and this includes care for others. Caring becomes something foolish, naïve and 'sentimental', rather than a noble act; it, too, becomes a weakness. Thus, 'true' human beings will not flinch at the sight of non-human suffering, but rather will deliberately cause it: if control is the primary feature of humanity, the truest human beings will also control their emotions and set aside concern for suffering (it may be here that we find the type of masculine disregard for animals so often represented in contemporary Western culture, as well as contempt for the 'feeble women' or 'sentimental children' who let their compassion run wild – see Adams 1990; Birke 1994). Instead of care, one is to approach others with a detached calculation that enables one to estimate how they may be manipulated and utilized for one's own benefit. It is precisely this ethos that has portrayed compassion for animal suffering as something naïve and embarrassing, and made modern-day animal industries possible.

Yet, as noted at the beginning of the book, there is also growing (albeit far too minimal) concern for the plight of animals. The anthropocentric, egocentric tradition has been under attack, and the critical voices of antiquity were replicated even at the birth of new philosophy and science. For instance, Thomas More proclaimed in his *Utopia* that hunting was a vile pastime that did not exist in the perfect society, and, as seen, Voltaire ridiculed Descartes for his belief that animals do not

suffer. However, the most powerful attack on egocentrism came from Michel de Montaigne, who lived just before Descartes.

Montaigne's essay 'Of Cruelty' was a turning point in the egocentric tradition. As Fudge points out, Montaigne shifted attention away from the agent who causes suffering, onto the being who suffers: for Montaigne the presumed human excellence, and all the so-highly-esteemed human qualities, were of lesser significance; instead what emerged as relevant was the suffering of the maltreated animal. Thus, prominence was given not to the 'beast within' (our own human nature), but to the 'creature outside of us' (the non-human animal) (Fudge 2006, p. 204). The shift was made possible by Montaigne's belief that, rather than reason, it was in fact the emotive, living body in its capacity to feel (that is, the sentient body) that was of moral significance. Emphasis moved from reason to sentience. Significantly, sentience offered a common ground for humans and other animals. Since both humans and animals were able to suffer, humans could nurture a 'fellow-feeling' towards animals (*ibid.*). Arguably, this shattered, or at least tarnished, the dualistic stance. Not only did humans share suffering with other animals, but they could also feel sorrow for the suffering of their non-human kin. Therefore, within Montaigne's framework, animal suffering took priority over human egotism: one should pay heed to the animal's suffering, rather than gaze into the mirror, looking for signs of excellence. In this way, suffering emerged as a cause for shame in those who inflict it, rather than as a sign of weakness in those who undergo it. Moreover, whereas the egocentric tradition had approached compassion as foolishness, here compassion took pride of place as the quality that could bridge the dualism between humans and other animals.

What is more, whereas the egocentric tradition had assumed a detached stance towards animals, the Montaignean view assumed a *relational* stance. The detached stance had positioned animals as abstract beings (there is one faceless, generic 'animal', whom all animals mirror and to whom all animals can be reduced), and the same applied to the abstract human self. For Montaigne, however, human beings were real, situated creatures, who had relations with real, particular animals (Fudge 2006). That is, instead of 'the human being' and 'the animal', we should talk about specific human beings and specific animals. This further promoted fellow-feeling, for it is difficult to care for the suffering of abstract, faceless entities, and very easy to care for the suffering of particular individuals.

Therefore, Montaigne offers a compassionate, relational stance towards other animals that is antagonistic towards violence and suffering. In

fact, Montaigne despises cruelty. He says: 'Amongst other vices, I mortally hate cruelty, both by nature and judgment, as the very extreme of all vices: nay, with so much tenderness that I cannot see a chicken's neck pulled off without trouble, and cannot without impatience endure the cry of a hare in my dog's teeth, though the chase be a violent pleasure' (Montaigne 2009, p. 305). For him, compassion is a key virtue: 'I am tenderly compassionate of others' afflictions...Nothing tempts my tears but tears...' (Montaigne 2009, p. 306). Indeed, Montaigne greatly emphasizes suffering as the thing that most moves him, and positions it as something even more morally troubling than death (or rather, names the act of causing suffering more heinous than the act of killing – suffering is 'worse than death'). He readily describes how his regard for compassion and hatred of cruelty and suffering leads him to lament violence towards animals, too, and how he would rather set animals free than kill them. Montaigne recognizes that he may be 'laughed at for the sympathy' he has with animals, but does not swerve from his stance, and instead goes on to suggest that human and non-human animals are all part of the same 'family'. This claim for kinship has its roots in shared cognitive abilities and 'near resemblance betwixt us and animals' which Montaigne emphasizes, and it ultimately leads Montaigne to 'willingly resign that imaginary sovereignty that is attributed to us over other creatures' (Montaigne 2009, p. 310).

The Montaignean turn is very significant from a contemporary perspective. Even before Descartes was born, Montaigne presented a vocal and powerful criticism of the Cartesian understanding of animals, and in doing so laid down the roots of the alternative, sentience-based approach to animality that is slowly but surely gaining momentum in contemporary society. In his argument that animal suffering has moral significance, and that causing such suffering should be abhorred, he laid the foundation for animal welfarism. Whereas egocentrism suggested that 'true humanity' does not harbour compassion, here it is precisely concern for the suffering of others that emerges as crucial. However, Montaigne also laid down the basis for an animal rights or animal liberation perspective. In insisting that we ought to move the focus away from generic species towards specific, individual beings, he opened the door to new ways of looking at the moral status of non-human animals. Anthropocentrism thrives on the notion of generic species: there is 'the human being', glorious in his capacities, and 'the animal', utterly hopeless in his. When these generic categories are torn to shreds, it is impossible to place human beings at the centre of all that is important. Instead, we have different, particular individuals, who all

have a stake in moral worth. That is, without detached, broad categories, dualism becomes a conceptual impossibility, and what emerges is the prospect of basic equality among all sentient creatures.

Yet change was slow, and Montaigne's views on animals were, for a long time, not given due attention. It was not until the time of great societal upheaval (the French Revolution, the independence struggles of the USA, the debate over slavery, and the growing awareness of the plight of the working class in Great Britain) that the suffering and moral status of non-human animals also gained more (albeit still only limited) prominence. The year 1776, which saw the publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* and increasing political radicalism in various parts of the globe, also saw the publication of Henry Primatt's *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals*. This book was one of the first to suggest that the suffering of non-human animals had deep moral relevance, and that human beings had a duty to refrain from causing it. Like many in his day, Primatt emphasized the links between religion and kindness to animals. However, he also offered secular arguments to support the conclusion that animals ought to be treated kindly, for example maintaining that greater mental ability did not give humans the right to oppress other animals any more than skin colour gave 'white people' the right to oppress 'black people' – an argument that is often repeated even today. Although Primatt was not completely free of anthropocentric presumptions (he did believe in a value hierarchy between humans and other animals), his argument provided a radical challenge to the belief in complete human supremacy (Turner 1980; Kean 1998). This strengthened the trend started by Montaigne, and offered support for both animal welfare and animal rights and liberation tendencies.

Another, historically much more important, source of concern for animal suffering was to be found in utilitarianism, a school of moral thought that began to attract wider interest in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The philosophical ancestor of modern utilitarians, Epicurus, had argued that morality was not a matter of high-flying, complex theoretical postulations, but rather a very concrete project, the aim of which was to ease and avoid suffering. Jeremy Bentham and other 'grand utilitarians', such as John Stuart Mill, altered this 'negative utilitarianism' into a more positive version, maintaining that the promotion of pleasure and/or happiness ought to be the central object of moral life. The morality of an act was to be decided by scrutinizing whether it increased pleasure and happiness (or, more broadly, the welfare) of those beings on which it had an impact. Instead of abstract

moral principles, it was therefore the practical consequences of an act that determined whether that act was morally commendable.

Moreover, Mill in particular argued that all beings ought to be taken equally into account: one could not favour a rich person's happiness at the expense of that of a poor person. This belief in equality was linked to the radical claim according to which one's moral standing did not depend on rational ability or biological sex or 'race', any more than it depended on social status. Instead, what mattered was the capacity to experience happiness and suffering, and thus ultimately sentience: all sentient creatures ought to be given basic consideration when making moral choices. The logic behind this claim was simple. If eradication of suffering and promotion of happiness are the goals of moral life, then all those creatures who can suffer and feel happiness ought to be taken into account. Any other features and characteristics are surplus to requirements and cannot, therefore, be used as reasons to ignore the relevance of sentient creatures. Thus, Mill asserted that 'The reasons for legal intervention in favour of children, apply not less strongly to the case of those unfortunate slaves and victims of the most brutal part of mankind, the lower animals' (Mill 2004, p. 291). Species is not a reason to ignore animal suffering and happiness. Importantly, Mill also argued against the aforementioned indirect duty view, which suggests that the aim of concern for animal suffering consists of the educational benefits such concern has in the intra-human context: 'It is to be regretted that metaphysical scruples respecting the nature and source of government should induce many warm supporters of law against cruelty to animals, to seek for a justification of such laws in the incidental consequences of the indulgence of ferocious habits to the interests of human beings, rather than in the intrinsic merits of the case itself' (Mill 2004, p. 291). Therefore, utilitarianism challenged two important anthropocentric beliefs: that only the suffering of the representatives of the human species, or creatures endowed with human reason, can have moral significance, and that the ultimate object of concern for animal suffering is the human being and her suffering.

It was against this backdrop that Bentham – the predecessor of Mill – had made his famous claim: 'The Central question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they suffer?' (Bentham 1982). Although only in a footnote, he therefore quite explicitly argued that non-human animals ought to be taken into consideration when making moral choices, and that it was sentience – not reason – that gave a being its moral significance. The radicality of this claim cannot be overstated. Whereas the philosophical canon had for centuries emphasized



a 'perfectionist' stance, which made rationality and other perfectible capacities or qualities the criterion for the moral value of individual beings, the utilitarians put forward, in the concept of sentience, an 'experiential' stance that underlined the capacity to experience as the foundational source of one's moral significance (see Bernstein 1998). Whereas the anthropocentrics ignored animals in moral decision-making and gave them only instrumental value, the utilitarians posited that animal suffering and happiness had to be taken into account, and thus offered a direct challenge to the mechanomorphic tradition, which had subjugated other animals and ignored their suffering in the name of human reason. In this way, utilitarians concisely and powerfully both reflected and affected the emerging concern and care for the suffering of our non-human others.

Unease in the face of animal suffering became increasingly popular, and James Turner argues that, by the end of the eighteenth century, most people of the middle and upper classes already believed that cruelty towards animals was morally wrong (Turner 1980). Numerous famous figures came forward and offered their support for the view that animal suffering deserved moral recognition. Thomas Paine, a radical thinker involved in both the French Revolution and the founding of the United States, emphasized the importance of kindness towards animals, as did John Wesley, the father of the Methodist movement. Thus, the era of Enlightenment opened the door for new concern towards animal suffering, not only in philosophy, but also in religious and political thought.

This growing awareness of the plight of non-human animals was partly linked to the new status that emotion had acquired. Rather than pure rationality alone, emotion was becoming a noble and important characteristic. Sympathy was viewed as a capacity of elemental importance and as the chosen attitude towards others, while 'sentimentality' emerged as a positive term. The suggestion was that one ought to feel for the plight of others, rather than simply observe it from afar. This suggestion was accentuated by important philosophical works. For instance, in his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Adam Smith presented an argument for the importance of sympathy, and more precisely offered his support for 'fellow-feeling', which enables one to both recognize and lament the suffering of others.

A particularly weighty endorsement of both emotion and sympathy came from David Hume. In his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) Hume attacked, quite openly, the tradition that had centralized reason as the governor of emotion. He argued that, in fact, in the field

of morality it was emotion that ought to govern reason. Reason had an important role as the collector of facts, but it was only emotion that enabled one to recognize virtues and vices. Moreover, Hume claimed that the virtuousness of a person should not be correlated with her rationality but was, instead, to be found in emotions such as sympathy. This meant that neither our moral character, nor morality in general, were to be seen as entities ruled by reason. Hume greatly emphasized the role of sympathy, which he defined as the capacity to identify with the experiences of others. Within sympathy, the experiences of others are projected into our own minds, and we experience them as if they were our own: we feel with others, and, as a consequence, also for others. Hume admitted that people have a tendency to identify most with those who resemble them the most (thus, the rich will identify more strongly with other rich people), but his principle of neutrality required that such prejudice be critically scrutinized and set aside. Therefore, we should strive towards a shared viewpoint, which enables one to see the perspective of all those involved in a given situation, and which extends sympathy also towards those who are unlike oneself. These were all radical claims, which in many ways provided a fundamental challenge to the Cartesian priority of reason. Not only is sympathy to be given relevance – it is also made the governor of reason, and the basis of morality.

This challenge had clear significance from the viewpoint of non-human suffering. Hume pointed out that animals are much more cognitively able than was traditionally admitted – in fact, for Hume, it is a sign of ignorance to suggest that animals do not have mental lives that in many ways resemble those of human beings. Moreover, Hume asserted that animals are capable of love, affection and sympathy. In *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), he suggests: ‘It is evident, that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men. Fear, anger, courage, and other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another, without their knowledge of that cause, which produced the original passion. Grief likewise is received by sympathy; and produces almost all the same consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows’ (Hume 1896, p. 398). Although Hume does not discuss this issue in great detail, there does not seem to be any reason why animals, too, should not be included within the sphere of human sympathy, particularly when taking into account the prominence he places on the ‘common viewpoint’ that urges one to discern similarities between oneself and the object

of one's sympathy. That is, if animals are creatures capable of cognition, emotion and suffering, why should we not also identify with their mental states and misery, as we do with those of other human beings – surely species is just another insignificant factor that should not restrict our sympathy? (The same has also been argued with regard to Smith's theory – see Mancilla 2009.)

On a more general level, the different varieties of sympathy advocated by Smith and Hume provided a challenge to the calculating rationality of New Science. Whereas the Cartesian scientist sought to manipulate animals from afar, the sympathetic human being was much more likely to seek to understand the animal perspective, and to pay heed to animal suffering. Again, as with Montaigne, one was urged to move up close to animals instead of observing them from a detached viewpoint. Most importantly, in the late eighteenth century, animal suffering became a topic in its own right, worthy of moral recognition. That is, if sympathy was the chosen way to observe reality, suffering (including that of non-human animals) could no longer be bypassed.

The radicality of this new prominence given to emotion cannot be overstated: as James Turner points out, such an emergence of compassion would have been almost inconceivable earlier in Western history. One of the manifestations of this prominence was humanitarianism, which as a political and civil movement sought to extend moral concern towards those who had previously been marginalized, subjugated or discarded. Suffering became something that one should seek to eradicate or moderate, and this paved the way for the idea of 'prevention of cruelty', which again served as the birthstone for new political movements. Slaves, prisoners, the citizens of colonial countries, the poor, children and women were among the most important subjects of humanitarianism (Turner 1980). It was particularly suffering and happiness that gained attention, as humanitarians sought to advance the social status and treatment of these groups of human beings. Humanitarianism epitomized the new compassionate stance towards others, as it explicitly fought against forms of oppression that had previously been justified by reference to reason and detached hierarchies. It was precisely sympathy on which much of humanitarianism was grounded, the central claim being that people endowed with moral sentiment could see also the plight of those whose misery had no practical bearing on their own life. That is, with sympathy came concern for the most distant of others. Unsurprisingly, humanitarianism also raised awareness of the suffering of non-human animals, and in fact was one of the founding forces behind the birth of animal advocacy.

Therefore, Western philosophy, although dominated by anthropocentrism, has also seen tendencies that emphasize the relevance of animal suffering. The anthropocentrists and those more willing to pay heed to animal suffering have locked horns on both metaphysical and moral levels. On the one hand, anthropocentric philosophers have emphasized a dualistic, hierarchical stance on animality that opens the door to doubt over whether non-human animals are even creatures capable of suffering, while the critics have brought forward a relational stance that allows one to make correlations between human and non-human suffering. On the other hand, while the anthropocentric framework has facilitated an argument according to which animal suffering has no moral import, the critics have brought forward experientialism and compassion as elements which allow one to see value also in the suffering of non-human creatures.

Before entering contemporary moral debates concerning non-human suffering, let's have a look at how animal suffering was made sense of outside the ivory towers of philosophy. That is, how has moral concern for the suffering of other animals been manifested in practice?

### **Advocacy and animal suffering**

Within the humanitarian movement, compassion for the suffering of animals also emerged as important. The same people who fought to better the conditions of human beings often fought to eradicate cruelty and violence towards non-human animals as well. Hence, many of the first animal advocates were also humanitarians, and vice versa (examples include Harriet Beecher Stowe, Frances Power Cobbe and Henry Salt). The continuum between compassion for both human and non-human suffering was evident, and increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century: 'In the early nineteenth century analogies had been made between the plight of animals and slaves; now links of a more complicated kind were being made: "The same spirit of sympathy and fraternity that broke the black man's manacles and is to-day melting the white woman's chains, will tomorrow emancipate the working man and the ox"' (Kean 1998, p. 136). In particular, connections emerged between the suffragette movement and animal welfarism, as some feminist writers correlated the subjugation of women with the subjugation of animals. Humanitarianism was often defined as a movement that should take *all* animals (human or non-human) into account, for, if compassion was to be its central motivation, all those for whom

one can feel compassion – that is, all those capable of feeling suffering and happiness – ought to be included (Kean 1998).

In fact, it has been claimed that care for other animals was one of the reasons why suffering became a topic of such wide concern. James Turner asserts that ‘In 1800 sympathy was a tenuous, fitful, and often superficial response to the distress of others. By 1900 compassion for suffering was second nature. It is hard to overestimate the importance of that revolution of feeling... To attribute all of this to Victorian concern for animals would be ludicrous. But to ignore the critical role of love for animals in shaping and disseminating this modern sensibility would be blind’ (Turner 1980, p. 139). Therefore, one interesting argument has been that it was concern for the plight of animals that partly led to the new, esteemed status of compassion. This means that the causal relation may have run both ways: compassion raised the status of animals, and the raised status of animals further accentuated the importance of compassion. That is, compassion towards other animals may have opened the door to a more general popularity of compassion, and thus ultimately enabled extended concern for previously ignored groups of human beings also. Here, compassion emerges as a type of contagious attitude, which increases exponentially the more one puts it into use.

Whether or not this hypothesis is true, the humanitarians were not ashamed of endorsing compassion and emotion. Thus, Henry Salt asserted: ‘By humanitarianism I mean nothing more and nothing less than the study and practice of humane principles – of compassion, love, and gentleness, and universal benevolence. If the word, in the sense in which I use it, is associated in the minds of any of my readers with “sickly sentimentality” I ask them to divest themselves of all such prejudices’ (Kean 1998, p. 134).<sup>6</sup> John Oswald argued: ‘Alas, the very attempt could not fail to encounter the ridicule of the mob, the obloquy of the sensual, and the sneers of the unfeeling. The advocate of mercy would incur the reproach of misanthropy, and be traduced as a wild unsocial animal, who had formed a nefarious design to curtail the comforts of human life — Good God! Is it so heinous an offence against society, to respect in other animals that principle of life which they have received, no less than man himself, at the hand of Nature?’ (Oswald 2001). It is important to note that, for the humanitarians, emotion was nothing to be ashamed of, but instead was the very basis of morality and human decency: if anything, it was those without the capacity for emotion who should feel ashamed.

The practical consequences were manifold, and Great Britain served as an exemplary country in this respect. There, blood sports became a frequent target of criticism, and pets began to attain a new rank – not only as exotic status items, but also as loved companions. In 1800, the first efforts to ban bull-baiting in the UK took place, and they were followed by proposals to introduce anti-cruelty bills. Unfortunately, opposition was significant, and some even thought (very much in the vein of the more conservative parties in the twenty-first-century debate over fox-hunting) that the issue was not significant enough to spend parliamentary time on. It was not until 1822 that Great Britain saw the first animal protection law put into place, designed to prevent cruel treatment of cattle. During these years, also, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (which in 1840 gained the designation ‘Royal’) was formed, to become a major force behind contemporary attitudes and understandings of animal suffering. At first, it encompassed radical attitudes towards animals and their suffering, and one of its perhaps most progressive chairpersons, Lewis Gompertz, supported veganism. However, after much infighting the society took on a more conservative role, and concentrated on fund-raising and moderate education rather than waging a full-blown struggle against animal cruelty (Turner 1980).<sup>7</sup> Despite the evident moderation of the RSPCA and the new laws, they did establish a claim according to which animal suffering was significant. How significant it was in comparison to human benefit remained a matter of debate, but importantly it was to be recognized, not only in the field of morality, but also in the court of law.

Particular scrutiny was directed towards vivisection, which so obviously caused pain and suffering, and the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 proceeded to impose a moderate licensing scheme on this relatively new form of experimentation. For some this was a victory, but for others an actual setback. The latter felt that the law served to make legal a practice which thus far had remained hotly disputed, and also claimed that the law was far too moderate. The Act gave legal blessing to a practice that quite possibly lacked moral justification, while the criteria and wording of the Act (and its various alterations) were so lenient and ambiguous that they made any type of experiment *de facto* legal. Frances Power Cobbe, along with others, was not satisfied with this new piece of legislation, for it seemed to protect the vivisector from prosecution rather than the animals from suffering. She, together with the Victoria Street Society (later called the National Anti-Vivisection Society) which she had founded in 1875, moved on to demand total abolition (Kean 1998; see also Rupke 1987).<sup>8</sup> Therefore, as with organizations like the RSPCA,

the danger posed by the new animal welfare legislation was over-moderation. Concern for animal suffering threatened to become a means of justifying measures which in fact caused such suffering, or which turned a blind eye towards it. (Similar tension can be observed today, as one argument is that welfare legislation and organizations risk giving their seal of approval to the way in which the industries treat animals. In particular, 'welfare washing' poses a problem, as various laws and organizations can be utilized to endorse and advertise the use of animal products and services.)

For some, the moral significance of animal suffering outweighed superficial human benefit – not only when it came to different forms of 'entertainment', such as bull-baiting and fox-hunting, but also when it came to culinary preferences. Vegetarianism became more popular. Oswald, a political activist who died in the French Revolution, was strongly opposed to the killing of animals, and pamphleteered for the vegetarian cause. In 1791, he wrote *The Cry of Nature or An Appeal to Mercy and Justice on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals*, in which he argued that compassion is a natural part of humanity, and that, were we to feel what other animals feel, we would not position them as things to eat. Oswald also criticized rising modernity for the destruction of this natural tendency for compassion, and begged us to revert once again to our natural ability to feel for other creatures: 'But who, on the obduracy of the human heart, shall pour, O, nature, thy melting voice? The secret sources of the soul, what master hand shall unlock and bid the heart again to flow through long-forgotten channels of compassion!' (Oswald 2001). Oswald explicitly defended compassion against mechanical, detached reason, and offered perhaps one of the first modern critiques of anthropocentrism based on such dislike of the Cartesian legacy: 'Such are the unfeeling dogmas, which, early instilled into the mind, induce a callous insensibility, foreign to the native texture of the heart; such the cruel speculations which prepare us for the practice of that remorseless tyranny, and which palliate the foul oppression that, over inferior but fellow-creatures we delight to exercise' (Oswald 2001). Therefore, for Oswald, detached reason was a dogmatic, culturally constructed deviation from natural compassion, and vegetarianism a way to become compassionate once more. Oswald was not alone in his beliefs. For instance, *Abstinence from the Flesh of Animals* by William Metcalfe was published in 1827, and renewed the call for vegetarianism.

Therefore, to avoid causing suffering was becoming a significant moral imperative, and it was used not only to suggest kinder ways of killing, but, in addition, to maintain that animals should not be killed

to begin with. Therefore, concern for animal suffering paved the way for concern for animal lives.<sup>9</sup> Here, vegetarianism became a form of virtue: it was one of the bedrocks of one's moral character. Thus, Hilda Kean argues: 'Humane behaviour was not something merely urged on others but practiced oneself through adopting a vegetarian way of life' (Kean 1998, p. 123). Compassion towards both suffering and life became a way of being, a foundational element of identity.

Of course, it is important to note that the change was not categorical and that, if anything, concern for animal suffering still remained in the margins. One salient example of this was the rise in popularity of vivisection, within which ever more gruesome and tortuous procedures were carried out on often fully conscious animals (who usually were nailed or tied to a table by their limbs, whilst onlookers would stare with great curiosity as the vivisector peeled them open layer by layer). Therefore, while some felt that causing animals suffering was morally reprehensible, many scientists argued the opposite: for them animal suffering had little moral relevance, or none at all, and often even the animals' capacity to suffer was contested (see Langley 1989). Neither did violence towards animals stop outside the realm of science, for Western societies kept quite eagerly eating animal parts and products and using animals for various tasks ranging from entertainment to transport. If anything, the lot of animals in the rise of urbanization and industrialism was miserable, as workhorses were pushed to the extremes with the help of a whip, and as more and more cattle were raised and killed in order to feed the growing number of urbanites. However, the fact that these societies were discussing the possibility of outlawing certain forms of violence, together with the growing popularity of arguments for compassion and vegetarianism, were signs of momentous change in the human-animal relationship, and reflected the way in which non-human suffering was finally becoming a serious topic of moral thought and debate. Experientialism was finally gaining a foothold, and providing at least a small challenge to anthropocentric perfectionism.

It has often been argued that industrialism played a part in the growing concern for animal suffering. Therefore, the same era that has given us capitalism, totalitarianism and the rise of egoism has also – rather paradoxically – strengthened compassion.<sup>10</sup> Turner posits that there is a 'link between militant kindness to animals and the new England of factories and cities' (Turner 1980, p. 25), and continues: 'Clearly, animal protection is misunderstood if torn out of the general urge towards compassion flowering amid the urban-industrial transformation of England and America' (Turner 1980, p. 36). Concern for other animals



took place amidst broader societal change which impacted on how reality was perceived, and which sprang from the rapidly expanding factories and cities.

Turner argues that it is almost a self-evident truth that farming people are less amiable towards animals than city folk (Turner 1980). And why is this? The most cynical, and perhaps also the most common, argument is that detachment from traditional animal agriculture allowed unrealistic notions of animality to flourish. That is, as people lost touch with, say, dairy farming, they also lost touch with the type of creatures that cows are, and ultimately became vulnerable to the effects of anthropomorphism, which told them that animals are something akin to little people (Tester 1991; Franklin 1999). However, this claim has been disputed. For instance, Kean has pointed out that urbanization actually led people to see quite closely how animals were treated. Slaughterhouses and cattle markets were at first situated within cities, farmed animals roamed the back alleys and back yards of the working class, stray animals wandered the streets, often dying of abuse and hunger, and beaten-up horses were visible all around the city streets. Therefore, animal suffering and animal abuse were very much present in the early urban life of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In fact, Kean points out that the streets and backyards of London were so filled with cruelty that contemporaries wished to have their eyes covered and ears blocked in an effort to escape it (Kean 1998, p. 137).

Indeed, the prevalence and uncomfortable visibility of animal suffering were so great that slaughterhouses and animal laboratories began to seek ways of smothering the sights and sounds of animal suffering and death, and ultimately relocated to industrial premises with high walls and sound insulation. A key motive was to hide animal suffering 'from the hearing of the compassionate' (Kean 1998, p. 130) – a motive that accentuates the prominence of animal suffering within the newly developed urban life. That is, those responsible for vivisection and slaughterhouses were fully aware of how visibility of non-human suffering was feeding compassion, and therefore sought to conceal what happens to animals. Therefore, lack of familiarity could not have been the impetus behind the growing concern over animal suffering; if anything, one reason may have been the uncomfortable presence of violence towards animals within industrial society.<sup>11</sup>

In fact, visibility became a key factor in the early concern for animal suffering in an altogether opposite way. It was observation of animals and their suffering, rather than detachment, that acted as the main stimulus. Those who sought to better the position of non-human

animals would publish exposés from within the slaughterhouses and vivisection laboratories, and those who sought to advance these industries made an effort to hide them ever more deeply behind closed doors and high walls. The struggle (still very prominent today) revolved around the permissibility of seeing what happens to animals, as animal advocates fought to render animal suffering visible. Awareness of the importance of visibility was evident already in the eighteenth century. Thus, Oswald descried the fact that ‘On the carcase we feed, without remorse, because the dying struggles of the butchered creature are secluded from our sight; because his cries pierce not our ear; because his agonizing shrieks sink not into our soul: but were we forced, with our own hands, to assassinate the animals whom we devour, who is there amongst us that would not throw down, with detestation, the knife; and, rather than embrue his hands in the murder of the lamb, consent, for ever, to forego the favorite repast?’ (Oswald 2001). Just as in contemporary debates over animal suffering, what surfaced as the most crucial factor was the direct (and usually visual) evidence and experience of the plight of animals. From this context, it becomes ever more evident that, rather than detachment from other animals, it is the witnessing of their suffering that forms the core impetus for animal advocacy.

The importance of exposés was evident. Various accounts providing first-hand witness statements concerning the violent treatment of animals were published. In 1903, two women called Louise Lind af Hageby and Leisa Schartau entered vivisection laboratories in University College London and published their shocking discoveries of animal torture in a book called *Shambles of Science*; earlier, Frances Power Cobbe had already published horrific details from the laboratory. The book gave wings to the ‘brown dog affair’, as the women claimed that a brown dog (who reportedly had already been operated on, and who had been howling in the laboratory for the past two months to the point of being regarded as a nuisance by the scientists) had been cut open in front of a big audience while he was fully conscious and struggling. What was particularly shocking was the claim, not only that the dog was in agony, but also that the scientists and students involved continued to make jokes at his expense throughout the procedure. As a response, the Research Defence Society sought to ban the book, and the scientist William Bayliss brought the women to court for ‘libel’. The brown dog affair continued to spark angry responses, and became a public scandal that ignited protests for and against vivisection, and which culminated in the brown dog riots (Kean 1998). Ultimately, the affair led to the Second Royal Commission on Vivisection in 1906, which regrettably

did not bring any significant changes. Vivisection was not the only target of exposés. For instance, in 1877 Anna Sewell wrote the novel *Black Beauty*, which through fiction depicted the violent treatment of horses, and which became an instant best-seller. Soon similar accounts, designed to unmask the abuse of animals, became more frequent.

The popular appeal of these exposés manifests how important first-hand evidence was becoming: it was the currency with which animal advocates and animal industries continued to fight each other. Advocates sought to find first-hand accounts and make them public, whilst the industries sought to make it very difficult or even illegal to obtain any such accounts. It also shows how significant concrete knowledge of animal suffering was, and the role reserved for it in the growth of compassion and animal advocacy. In short, it was knowledge of non-human suffering rather than detachment from it that defined advocacy.

It has also been argued that industrialism enabled greater moral awareness of suffering, because, in particular, the middle classes experienced less personal hardship in their lives and had more spare time to think about the fate of others. People could also, via the rapidly growing news media, more readily gain information concerning the suffering of distant others (Turner 1980). This included the suffering of animals, as the treatment of our non-human kin was becoming a topic of pamphlets and books that were available to middle-class readers. Therefore, it may have been less the detachment from animal suffering, and more the detachment from one's own suffering, that allowed people to spend more time thinking about and recognizing the suffering of animals. This new concern was epitomized in the writings of the Romantics, who had much time for reflection and who gave imaginative, empathetic love a central position. Concern for the suffering of others became the basis of a new, emerging identity. Here, too, animal suffering was a central topic of concern, as many of the famous Romantics, such as Percy Shelley, mourned the plight faced by our non-human kin, and adopted vegetarianism as a way of manifesting their compassion (see Perkins 2003).

Another, seemingly contradictory, hypothesis is that industrialism in fact increased people's personal suffering, and that it was this increase which enabled them to care also for the suffering of others. That is, personal suffering facilitated sympathy with the experiences of others. Various famous commentators of the modern era, such as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, laid the grounds for this type of argument. For them, suffering was inherent in modern, industrial society, filled with

repetitive work and poverty. Significantly, this could produce deeper compassion for others. Thus, for instance, Durkheim maintained that one's own suffering both lays the grounds for and gives impetus towards compassion for other sufferers.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the paradox is that the very factor that creates suffering may also enable compassion for suffering. Herein lie also the seeds of possible change. As exemplified in the novels of Dostoyevsky, it is the wretched and the poor who help other wretched and poor people, and hence the motivation for eradicating the suffering of others comes from one's own suffering (see Wilkinson 2005). This, again, can be applied to the animal context: perhaps personal suffering encouraged many to feel also for the suffering of non-human creatures. Knowing what hunger and physical pain are could facilitate compassion for the hunger and pain of animals.

Therefore, two very different interpretations emerge concerning the links between industrialism and the rise of compassion. However, these two hypotheses need not be mutually contradictory. Instead, they explain two different ways in which compassion takes flight. Whereas detachment from personal suffering may have enabled the middle classes to lament the suffering of animals, personal and heartfelt suffering may have laid the grounds for similar compassion amongst the working classes and the poor. Perhaps compassion can flourish in many different contexts, and spring from both freedom from and extremes of suffering – a causal dynamic still very relevant today.

However, it is worth bearing in mind that industrialism simultaneously instigated a very different turn in the way animals were viewed. Productivity became a key issue, and soon animals were portrayed, not as sentient and cognitively able beings, but as dull objects of intensive production (Fraser 2008). Animals were increasingly treated as production units and their care mirrored assembly-line activity (indeed, slaughterhouses were amongst the first enterprises to adopt the assembly-line principle). What emerged as important was how much the animals could produce, whilst the animals' experiences were utterly sidelined. Therefore, the same industrialism that allowed growing compassion also strengthened the anthropocentric and mechanomorphic view, according to which animals are machine-like creatures to be used ruthlessly and without respite for human benefit. The result was a schizophrenic view of animals, still very recognizable today (on its contemporary ramifications, see again Francione 1996). On the one hand, people had more compassion for animal experiences, and many were horrified by scenes of animal suffering. On the other, often the very same people ate more animals than ever before, in wilful ignorance of

the fact that production of the flesh they were consuming caused just the type of suffering that they argued was abhorrent. Society claimed to feel compassion for creatures whom at the same time it treated as nothing more than mechanical tools to be used for human benefit, and whose experiences it routinely ignored as insignificant.

Therefore, industrialism had a dual impact on animal suffering: it fed both compassion and new, tortuous ways of utilizing animals. Perhaps a more consistent historical root of concern for animal suffering can be found in the ground-breaking Darwinian notion that humans and animals are related. Whereas human beings had previously been separated into their own exclusive category placed hierarchically above animals, Darwin offered a very different proposal. Human beings were one animal among many, and shared various important capacities with their non-human relatives. Animals were seen as the kin of humans in both the physical and the cognitive sense. Their organs were similar to those of human beings and the existence of their minds could no longer be denied. The Darwinian revolution had a significant effect on attitudes towards animals. First, it is easy to see how it emphasized the relational view, already put forward by Montaigne, that animals cannot be categorically distinguished from human beings, but instead exist in a continuum with us. Moreover, it underlined the experiential stance of Montaigne and the utilitarians, for it urged one to recognize the breathtaking variety of cognitive capacity and experience that exists in the animal world.

Darwin himself argued that many impressive cognitive capacities could be found in that world, possibly also including abstraction and self-consciousness. This provided support for Montaignean relationality, as dichotomies between humans and other animals began to appear dubious. Most significantly, animals share with us the capacity to suffer – thus, in his *The Descent of Man* (1871), Darwin argues that ‘The lower animals, like man, manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness and misery.’ Like Bentham before him, Darwin thus brought to the fore the importance of animal suffering, and manifested to the world that such suffering could no longer be denied. Furthermore, Darwin introduced Humean themes, as he maintained that ‘social instinct’ is the basis of morality: ‘The social instincts – the prime principle of man’s moral constitution – with the aid of active intellectual powers and the effects of habit, naturally lead to the golden rule, “As ye would that men should do to you, do ye to them likewise”; and this lies at the foundation of morality.’ Therefore, a natural tendency to recognize the perspective of others was positioned as one building block of morality, which of

course gave support to the already emerging emphasis on the role of compassion. Here, compassion gained an aura of scientific acceptability, and this again placed a seal of approval on humanitarian sentiment: there was nothing embarrassing about feeling concern for the suffering of animals, human or non-human. In addition, like Hume, also Darwin keenly argued that animals are capable of sympathy – thus, animals do not only share with us the capacity to suffer, but also the capacity to feel for the suffering of others, which further opened the door to the possibility that they might be not only the objects but also the participants in morality. These truly were radical claims that presented a drastic challenge to anthropocentric hierarchies and dualisms.

Philosopher Jacques Derrida has placed particular importance on the Darwinian revolution, viewing it as a radical and fundamental challenge to the anthropocentric order. Most importantly, animals were suddenly defined as specific beings, not as representatives of the enormous and faceless category ‘animals’, sharply distinguished from humanity (Derrida 2004). That is, animals began to emerge as individual creatures with their own specific experiences, who resembled human beings in many crucial aspects. Here again, we find echoes of Montaigne’s thinking: if there is no grand, generic category ‘animal’, how could there be a dualistic abyss between humans and other animals? Therefore, if industrialism laid the ground for compassion, Darwinism can be credited with bringing forward a relational stance on animals that constituted a direct attack on anthropocentric metaphysics with all its dualistic hierarchies. In terms of animal suffering this meant, most of all, that it could no longer be ignored in the name of the human–animal dichotomy. That is, if one were to be consistently Darwinian, one could not claim that only human beings could suffer, or that only human suffering had moral significance.

Quite possibly as a consequence of Darwinism, derogative terminology was gradually abandoned, and our relatives became ‘animals’ rather than ‘brutes’ and ‘beasts’. Non-human animals began to be described – at least in some circumstances – as cognitively able beings, which had an important effect. The cognitive abilities of animals meant that, besides compassion, animals ought also, perhaps, to be afforded just treatment. Thus, marginal voices started to claim that animals existed for their own sake, not for the benefit of human beings, and that they therefore had inherent value (value in themselves). Whereas, for philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, animals could only ever have instrumental value (be a ‘means to an end’), here it was claimed that they did have value as individuals (that is, that they were ‘ends in themselves’).

This was a revolutionary idea: suddenly, it was suggested that animal suffering could be a question not only of compassion, but also of justice (Turner 1980; see also Kean 1998). That is, it was not only sympathy for animal suffering that made one wish for that suffering to end, but also justice: the value of animals as individuals meant that they could not be tormented and harmed in the name of human benefit. It was here that glimmers of animal rights and animal liberation philosophies began to emerge more potently than before.

However, the Darwinian turn was also ambiguous. One sign of ambivalence was the fear of animality in oneself – if human beings were animals, the worry for some was that this rendered humans animalistic and thus uncivilized. As a result, the Victorians became increasingly concerned about the ‘beast within’, one example of which was found in novels that depicted beasts, such as werewolves, of dual nature. Some wanted to turn away from animal traits in order to preserve their human identity, and even slight displays of sexuality became highly regulated (Turner 1980).<sup>13</sup> Thus, not everybody was willing to embrace the newly found animality. One way to defend the special nature of humanity was to place emphasis on the moral capacity of humans. Animals have no qualms about killing the young and the weak alike, but human beings are normative creatures, and it has been claimed that this emphasis on morality helped to ‘neutralise the fear of the animal in man’ (Turner 1980, p. 24). Moral agency was identified as the pillar of human identity: in order to be human, you needed to show moral consideration and compassion. Therefore, although compassion enabled one to care for the suffering of animals, it also catered to the potential desire to be different from the rest of the animal world (if, of course, it was presumed that animals were not moral agents capable of compassion). Paradoxically, then, compassion may have served both a relational and a dualistic take on the human–animal relationship.

The notion that compassion and morality were the factors that separated humans from other animals had, quite possibly, a very interesting dual impact on how animal suffering was viewed. First, the stance seemed to justify a moral difference between human beings and other animals: if only human beings were capable of morality, surely only they and their suffering had moral relevance? This argument was echoed in the philosophy of Kant, who regarded moral ability as the criterion for inherent value, and is still prominent today in the claims of those who insist that one has to be a moral agent in order for one’s suffering to have any significant moral bearing. Here, compassion was no longer a contagious attitude, capable of exponential increase, but rather

something tied to reciprocity and contractual ethics. The more positive, and also logically more compelling, implication was that, if human beings were separated from animality via their moral ability, they indeed had to behave in a moral way in order to preserve their humanity. That is, true humanity required moral concern for other beings, including non-human animals. Compassion even for those incapable of reciprocity could in fact be seen as the truest test of humanity, for only by that means could one demonstrate unselfish and unbiased concern for the plight of others.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, human identity may have played a part in the growing relevance of compassion. Importantly, this need not be read in a cynical way, as nothing but an attempt to recreate the dichotomy between humans and other animals. Indeed, an altogether different explanation is that, via compassion, human beings could come closer to other animals. Here, compassion and morality do not distance humans from non-human animals, but instead they act as shared capacities, via which human beings can manifest their own animality. This reading is supported by the fact that, as seen, Darwin and many contemporaries did observe compassion also in animals, and therefore did not position it as an exclusively humanistic capacity. That is, compassion and even morality were not necessarily differentiating factors, but rather factors that were shared by both human and non-human animals, and via which human beings could claim back some of their own animality. In fact, the nineteenth century witnessed a deep desire to be closer to nature and animals – a desire that found scientific support in Darwin's theory, and which was exemplified in the beliefs of the Romantics.

Many Romantic authors, such as William Blake, were filled with a longing for animality, and offered much praise for the noble characteristics of animals (this went on to influence the very positive imagery of animals offered by the popular American authors Henry Thoreau and Ralph Emerson – see Lutts 1999). The Romantics' longing was linked to the idea of the 'noble savage', according to which the state of nature was an arena of virtue and innate compassion. This notion, in turn, was influenced by the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who – although he himself did not support the concept of the noble savage – had depicted human beings living in a state of nature as much more caring and harmonious than the human beings of contemporary societies. It was felt that, if anywhere, compassion was to be found in the state of nature, and that thus one should not strive to build a dualism between human beings and other animals, but rather to strengthen the more noble animal qualities of human beings, and to bring the latter



back to nature. Therefore, positioning compassion as the hallmark of human identity could also be understood as a method of getting closer to animality. Manifesting concern for the suffering of animals could act as a way of reverting to the state of nature. Indeed, vegetarianism was thought to enable one to eradicate the symptoms of civilization's corruption, and to facilitate efforts to become a decent yet 'natural' human being (see Perkins 2003).

The Romantics paved the way for a new attitude which sought to criticize the moral etiquette of the society, and which saw moral significance also in those creatures who had previously been marginalized and castigated (see again Perkins 2003). One could 'think wild' and question social norms, including those concerning animal suffering. Anthropocentric social norms became the suffocating culture from which 'wild thinkers' would seek to break free. In this way, it was the desire to be closer to, rather than distinct from, animality that opened the door to compassion for non-human suffering. (This wildness is still evident today, particularly in the thoughts of those who urge us to 'go feral' – see Luke 1995.) Here, the pivotal Romantic figure – Frankenstein – becomes relevant. As already pointed out, many romantics practised vegetarianism, and the theme of vegetarianism, combined with a pessimistic image of humanity and human civilization, was nowhere more obvious than in Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's *Frankenstein: or, The Modern Prometheus* (1818). Frankenstein's creature was one rejected by society and its 'norm citizens', who nonetheless proved to be much more caring and morally aware than those who sought to marginalize and destroy him. What is significant is that Frankenstein (the new person having come to be popularly known by the name of his creator) was not the carnivorous monster that the society presumed him to be, but rather a vegetarian, and it was this vegetarianism that epitomized his moral superiority (see Adams 1990). In *Frankenstein* we find the epitome of the nineteenth-century argument according to which, rather than human beings, it may be non-human animals who are the truly moral creatures. This, of course, opened the door to the idea that concern for the suffering of animals was an important natural virtue.

However, change was in the air. Soon the above tendencies were faced with Cartesian arguments that sought to diminish the relevance of compassion: the utter dominance of detached, calculating reason was making a comeback. Animal advocates were labelled 'animal lovers', and sentimentality (in the eighteenth century still a proud word) became a highly stigmatizing term, something about which a person ought to be embarrassed. Perhaps following this stigmatization, early

twentieth-century animal advocacy appeared more tame and conservative (Kean 1998).

This counter-development coincided with a new glorification of science. Scientists instigated their own propaganda war against animal advocates and humanitarians, and began to portray animal advocates as scientifically ignorant, or as 'hysterical women'. The scientist himself emerged as an all-knowing saint who could cure illnesses that had previously been detrimental to humanity. Spokesmen for vivisection were soon shaking hands with politicians, as the belief in progress began its charge towards popularity. Ultimately those who sought total abolition were more readily classified as extreme and eccentric (Turner 1980; Rupke 1987; Kean 1998). This legacy lives on today, and, if anything, has assumed a more stringent form. Animal advocacy is repeatedly blamed for 'sentimentalism', excessive 'femininity' and naïvety: these three presumed antidotes to reason (emotion, the female gender and children) are used to depict concern for animals (see Adams 1990; Birke 1994). The contemporary era, with its robust belief in scientific progress, has marginalized compassion and turned it into something amusing or embarrassing, whilst detached reason has emerged as the defining characteristic of the human species.

The trend towards greater concern for the suffering and moral status of non-human animals was cut short by the two world wars (Kean 1998). It was not until the 1960s that animals came back onto the agenda, as advocated in Carson's *Silent Spring* and Harrison's *Animal Machines*. In 1975 Peter Singer published his *Animal Liberation*, which was a phenomenal piece of philosophy for one particular reason: it not only argued that animal experiences should be afforded a higher moral standing, but also elucidated in great detail the types of pain and suffering that animals are subjected to within animal industries. *Animal Liberation* has often been linked to the birth of the animal rights movement, although it is important to note that the movement was already advancing, and emphasized a very different argument from Singer's. Whereas Singer maintained that we ought to avoid causing animals suffering, the animal rights movement argues that animals should not be used as mere instruments for human benefit, regardless of whether or not this use causes suffering.<sup>15</sup> For them, veganism based on universal moral principles and justice, rather than merely on compassion, is the moral way forward. Animal rights activism emerged in full force in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, when activists began to sabotage fox hunts, vocally criticize animal experimentation, and call attention to the problems of meat, egg and dairy production.

The animal rights movement (or, more recently, the 'animal liberation movement') is significant from the standpoint of suffering for two reasons. First, regardless of its commitment to moral principles that do not revolve around compassion and suffering, the movement has been very active in bringing to the fore the suffering that animals are caused within the animal industries. Perhaps the most powerful tool of an animal rights advocate is the camera, which records the abuse and suffering that take place in meat and dairy farms, experimentation laboratories, fur farms, hunting fields, circuses, zoos, rodeos, puppy farms, and similar places. Thus, modern-day animal rights activists frequently show shocking footage in which suffering takes the centre stage. It is via the animal rights activist that many hear about animal suffering. Second, the animal rights movement has introduced new distinctions into our understanding of animal suffering. In particular, it has begun to refer to 'animal welfarism' as opposed to 'animal liberation', and linked the former to emphasis on animal suffering. Within animal rights theory, suffering is often secondary in comparison to the value of the individual animal, and therefore the argument is that welfarists make a mistake in identifying suffering as the main topic of concern. Hence, animal rights advocacy has sparked a new form of discussion about the relevance of animal suffering. This time, the question is not whether animal suffering should matter at all, but whether it is the primary consideration when talking about the treatment and status of other animals.

Perhaps the most important facet of contemporary advocacy is the impetus to render animal suffering public – to take undercover footage and show it to the world. That is, the aforementioned visibility, which dominated much of Victorian debate, is still at the heart of advocacy.

If the Victorian slaughterhouses and vivisection laboratories went into hiding, their contemporary versions are even more carefully concealed. Ordinary folk do not know where and in what way animals are reared and killed, and the animal industries are extremely wary of the possibility that advocates might gain footage from within their premises. Thus, robust security measures are used in order to prevent strangers from entering laboratories, and increasingly these same measures are utilized to protect farms. At the same time, many animal welfare and animal rights campaigns and organizations are devoted to publicizing undercover footage from farms, experimentation laboratories, the hunting fields, the 'pet' trade, animal circuses and zoos, as exposés have become the most efficient form of attack on animal industries, which would otherwise thrive on idyllic advertising imagery assuring the public that animals are always treated well and never have to undergo suffering.

The role of exposés is so crucial that animal industries have even sought to prevent them via legal means – for instance, in 2011 Florida, Iowa and Minnesota suggested making it illegal to take undercover footage from premises that make financial profit from animals. In fact, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act from 2006 opens the door to defining such acts as ‘terrorism’.<sup>16</sup> In Europe, advocates have also been prosecuted for taking undercover footage, on the premise that doing so tarnishes the reputation of farmers. For instance, in 2011, Finnish advocates were prosecuted for libel after exposing the abuse that takes place in pig farming. Quite astonishingly, gaining visual evidence of non-human suffering is being criminalized. The worrying implication behind these trends is that evidence of animal suffering is becoming a legal impossibility: if bills such as these pass, and if advocates are successfully prosecuted, one is faced with an absurd situation, where proving that animals suffer is made a crime. Thus, quite intriguingly, animal advocates are denied access to the ‘truth’ – they cannot enter the arena of gathering and presenting evidence. Such a consequence clearly serves the interests of the industries, as their accounts of what happens to animals can no longer be contested by anything other than hearsay: in practice, the industries become the only source of knowledge concerning animal suffering. The philosopher Michel Foucault has famously pointed out that knowledge is one form of power, by means of which other people (those with less knowledge) are subjugated. In the context of animals, this aspect of power is becoming very prominent.

Next to renewed advocacy and its increasing politicization, contemporary times have seen the birth of ‘animal ethics’, ‘animal philosophy’, and ‘animal studies’, all of which seek to make sense of the relation between human and non-human animals. What do they tell us of the moral relevance of the suffering of other animals? That is, whilst advocates seek to render animal suffering visible, what do academics say about the moral ramifications of such suffering?

# 4

## Morality and Non-Human Suffering: Analytical Animal Ethics

What can be said about the moral aspects of causing other animals suffering? In order to explore this question, the obvious first port of call is 'animal ethics'. This field of philosophy, which has gained momentum since the 1970s, concerns itself with the moral status of non-human animals and, more broadly, with the normative elements of the human-animal relationship. Quite simply, it asks: what is the moral value of animals, and how ought animals to be treated?

### **The relevance of sentience**

The most common positions held in animal ethics are perhaps best exemplified by the type of attitude towards non-human suffering that many working in animal ethics have sought to criticize. This attitude is what Tom Regan has called the 'cruelty-kindness view' (Regan 1983). According to this, we ought to refrain from deliberately causing unnecessary suffering to animals, and be kind to animals when 'using' them.

This view has been the target of considerable criticism.<sup>1</sup> First, suffering is rarely the result of deliberate cruelty, and therefore this view would exclude the great preponderance of suffering caused to animals. Most obviously, animal agriculture and animal experimentation would be placed outside the area of concern, except in cases where individual workers display sadistic behaviour. It is the routine practices of animal industries that need to be brought under critical scrutiny; however, the cruelty-kindness view does not allow for such general criticism.

Second, it has been argued that 'kindness' is a patronizing term, which implies that the treatment of other animals is not a serious moral issue but rather something akin to voluntary, contingent charity (Rollin

1995). A similar point has been made regarding 'cruelty', which as a term suggests that causing suffering to animals is morally dubious, but not morally as weighty as 'violence', 'abuse' or 'torture'. Perhaps because of this, 'cruelty' and 'kindness' remain ambiguous in regard to duties. It is suggested that it is good to be kind, but not necessarily that one has a stringent duty to be kind: rather, kindness seems to remain a supererogatory act, that is, something that is good and virtuous, but not a duty in itself. One argument is that, if non-human animals are to be given serious moral consideration, weightier normative terms than mere 'cruelty' and 'kindness' are required.

Third, 'unnecessary suffering' is a problematic term due to its ambiguity. Unnecessary in relation to what? This ambiguity becomes evident when we note that, in practice, 'necessary' suffering often includes suffering that could be prevented but is not, for the sake of one's own convenience or financial profit. Thus, animal agriculture may (and indeed often does) deem 'necessary' any type of suffering that makes farming quicker and easier, or promotes financial gain: hence, the farmer will tell you that he has to keep hens in tiny cages in order to reap a worthwhile profit, and he will just as quickly protest against the use of other rearing methods by stating that they would add too much to his costs or his workload. Similarly, experimenters may deem 'necessary' given types of painful research methods that render the experiments significantly easier or cheaper to carry out. This ambiguity is far-reaching, as meat-eaters may even tell you that it is necessary for their culinary satisfaction to keep on eating meat, and hunters may argue that hunting is necessary for their recreational well-being or cultural identity.

A more stringent way of defining 'unnecessary' relies on matters of life and death: inflicting suffering on animals would only be justified if it were necessary for the basic welfare and survival of given others. This utilitarian approach has been favoured by some in animal ethics, most notably Peter Singer. Although Singer is very critical of animal agriculture and experimentation, he does allow use of animals that either does not cause suffering or is necessary for the basic needs and survival of a relatively significant number of other beings (Singer 1993; see also VanDeVeer 1979). In short, if an experiment on ten cats will rescue 10,000 human beings (or 10,000 cats) from dying, it becomes justified. In case this might be seen as a sign of speciesism, it should be added that utilitarians may, in theory, also accept experiments on human beings in similarly exceptional circumstances – particularly if the human beings in question are mentally on the same level as or a lower level than the non-human candidates (on this topic, see Frey

1996). What Singer is arguing, then, is that we can justifiably and without species bias cause suffering to non-human animals, when doing so is necessary for the survival of the great majority.

However, this definition of 'unnecessary', too, faces the problem of ambiguity. It is easy to understand what 'necessary' means if we are stuck in the wilderness, with absolutely no other means of survival than hunting down an elk. However, animal use very rarely concerns such simple equations, for we have very different understandings of what constitutes a 'necessity' for basic welfare and survival. 'Necessity' is always linked to additional factors, such as – say – probability and alternatives. For vivisectors, a given experiment may be necessary even if it has no relevance for contemporary science, because there is a minuscule chance that someday, in decades to come, the data produced by it will prove to be very useful; for others, such lack of concrete usefulness in the here and now renders the experiment anything but necessary. That is, some will see the remote likelihood of benefiting human survival as an adequate justification for animal research, while others will find it utterly irrelevant. More importantly, there are differing understandings of how far one has to go in seeking for alternatives. The vivisector will maintain that, as long as there are no alternatives, he will experiment on animals, whereas those critical of vivisection will argue that scientists should put all their effort into seeking out and actively developing those alternatives instead of persisting with animal experiments and hoping that alternatives will materialize of their own accord.<sup>2</sup> 'Necessity' requires that there be no alternatives, yet in everyday life the existence of alternatives is usually not a categorical 'yes' or 'no' matter, but, rather, lies on a continuum of possibility, defined by our willingness to make the corresponding effort. Thus, what we understand to be 'necessary' depends on the amount of effort we see as reasonable. For some, being lost in a winter wilderness will indeed mean that killing an elk is necessary, whereas others will search far and wide for other sources of nourishment, or keep on walking with an empty stomach.

Therefore, 'necessity' remains ambiguous even when we add in the criteria of basic welfare and survival; and the problems do not end here. We also have differing understandings of exactly what is justified in the name of necessity. For instance, in the context of experimentation, is absolutely *anything* to *any number* of animals justified in the name of human interests? What if the experiment includes 10,000 dogs or rats, who will be subjected to extreme pain for a considerable length of time, and the experiment is expected to benefit 12,000 human beings – is it

still justified? And what if the pain from which the experiment saves human beings is only mild or moderate? What if the experiment is unlikely to be successful? In intra-human ethics, necessity does not justify all types of actions. For instance, it may be a necessity for a sick person to get a new kidney, but she is not justified in stealing a kidney from a healthy person, or even in paying bribes in order to be pushed up the donation lists. Similarly, necessity does not justify all types of animal use – rather, it is just one moral consideration amongst many (one that has, perhaps, been unduly emphasized). What need to be taken into account are the contextual and moral factors that affect in which situations ‘necessity’ is a justified reason for given actions. Hence, the cruelty-kindness view and the welfare laws that tend to follow it fall foul of the nuances of different types of animal use: they offer legal justification for just about all animal industries and practices under the broad heading of ‘necessity’, while overlooking the consideration that ‘necessity’ is just a starting point for moral scrutiny, not its conclusion.

Not surprisingly, many animal ethicists have criticized the cruelty-kindness view. Animal suffering matters, and it matters more than is suggested by welfare laws and charitable declarations of kindness. But what type of view do these ethicists themselves advocate? One of the most central arguments within animal ethics is that specifically human-induced animal suffering holds normative relevance: it is something that ought to morally concern us. In fact, the suffering of non-human animals ought to be given the same moral weight as descriptively comparative human suffering. That is, causing suffering to other animals should be no less relevant than causing suffering to human beings, if the types of suffering are similar. Following this line of thinking, even Singer, who otherwise advocates a rather welfarist approach to animal ethics, argues that: ‘Animals can feel pain... there can be no moral justification for regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans’ (Singer 1989).

This approach goes well with the common notion that suffering is a morally loaded term, or a ‘thick’ moral concept: ‘suffering’ is something that ought not to take place. That is, one cannot meaningfully talk of ‘suffering’ without the presence of a normative component; ‘suffering’ is not a light, neutral concept but rather one that comes with deep moral relevance. This moral thickness or weightiness is based on the inherent aversiveness of suffering. Suffering includes aversion, which is most obvious on the individual level. When Matilda suffers, she feels that her suffering should not exist, and that her suffering has negative



value. As argued earlier, this is what suffering is: it is defined by our aversion towards it and our desire to rid ourselves of it. When we move on to the level of morality, it becomes obvious that most beings with moral ability will also feel aversion towards the suffering of at least some others, for they understand that others besides themselves also wish for their own suffering to end. That is, based on my own aversion towards suffering, I can see aversion in others as well, and conclude that, just as I wish for my own suffering to end, they wish for theirs to; and this awareness sparks moral concern over the plight of others. Through this process, 'suffering' emerges as something inherently negative, an entity that attracts moral worry. Consequently, it is often argued that the suffering of others is immediately recognized as a moral evil: 'Suffering calls out to the world, seeking compassion, forgiveness, and mercy' (Amato 1990, p. 17). For those with moral ability, to fully recognize and understand suffering means to have moral concern for the sufferers. And, if it is suffering in itself that invites such concern, it seems that all creatures capable of suffering – whether they be humans or other animals, moral agents or beings incapable of moral thought – ought to be taken into account.

In this way, the radical claim according to which all animal suffering (human or non-human) ought to be given equal regard gains its basis in the more moderate view, which emphasizes the aversiveness of suffering. Just like human beings, other animals too react negatively to their own suffering (this is what it means to suffer). If we experience moral worry at the sight of human suffering, on what grounds should we not experience similar worry at the sight of non-human suffering? Thus, Mayerfeld argues: 'The suffering of non-human animals is no less evil from a moral point of view than the suffering of human beings when equivalent in intensity and duration...consequently our duty to prevent animal suffering is just as strong as our duty to prevent human suffering' (Mayerfeld 1999, pp. 9–10).

Of course, plenty of reasons for excluding non-human animals have been offered. As philosophers have viewed reality through the anthropocentric, dualistic perspective, they have also tended to look for differences between the species that would justify one in caring about the suffering of human beings while overlooking and causing non-human suffering. Language, rationality and moral agency have all been put forward as capacities which render all and only human suffering morally relevant, or which at least give human suffering categorical moral primacy (Scruton 1996; Cohen 1997). However, these capacities fail to offer the type of justification that the philosophers are looking for. First,

as cognitive ethology has manifested, these capacities may not belong only to human beings, but may in fact be found – in varied forms – surprisingly far and wide in the animal kingdom (see again Bekoff 2002; Wise 2002). Second, the appeal to these capacities falls foul of the ‘argument from marginal cases’ (Dombrowski 1997; this ill-chosen term would be better replaced by ‘the argument from distinct cases’<sup>3</sup>). Not all human beings master propositional language, rationality and moral agency, but we do not let this affect how the suffering of these individuals (small children, the cognitively impaired, the demented elderly) is viewed. Why, then, should lack of ability bear such relevance in relation to non-human animals? Third, the moral relevance of the suggested capacities remains unclear. If it is accepted that the capacity to suffer does not in itself require the existence of these perfectionist qualities, where is their relevance when it comes to the moral weightiness of suffering?

In order to bypass these difficulties, some have resorted to species bias and argued that there is, in fact, nothing wrong with favouring the human species. For instance, Carl Cohen and Roger Scruton argue that ultimately it is the human species *per se* that matters (see again Scruton 1996; Cohen 1997). However, species in itself is a very problematic criterion. As Singer eloquently observed, why would a biological factor, such as species, be the criterion for moral relevance any more than sex or skin colour? That is, why should we not call emphasis on species ‘speciesism’, just as we call emphasis on skin colour ‘racism’ (Singer 1975)?<sup>4</sup> Biological factors can, of course, have some bearing on morality, but to simply identify a biological factor as the necessary criterion for moral inclusion without offering further justification for doing so is intellectually lazy and quite possibly the result of *ad hoc* thinking, within which one merely *assumes* that the suffering of human beings must have superior moral relevance. Just as we cannot simply state, or simply assume, that white men are the crowns of existence, we cannot simply state, or simply assume, that only the suffering of human beings has true moral significance.

Some, such as Cora Diamond and Raymond Gaita, have been intellectually more vigorous in their efforts to show why humanity has differential relevance. They argue that the special value of humanity, and thus presumably also human suffering, is written into our meanings or ‘language games’. This Wittgensteinian approach maintains that morality intertwines with how meanings inherent to it are used, and that the specialness of humanity is inherent to those meanings (Diamond 2004; Gaita 2002). Thereby, the term ‘humanity’ comes with connotations of

greater value than the term, say, 'pig', and this establishes the grounds for accepting that human suffering is of greater relevance than non-human suffering. If morality is based on lingual meanings, and if these lingual meanings place more value on humanity than other animals, there is little room for criticism; rather, one has to accept certain anthropocentric presumptions as 'given'.

However, it remains thoroughly unclear whether this argument is valid. Meanings come in many conflicting forms, and one could also maintain that the relevance of suffering in itself, regardless of the species of the sufferer, is a very basic meaning to many of us, easily ignited when we are shown images of non-human suffering. That is, there are many for whom non-human suffering does have equal relevance, at least in some circumstances. Why, precisely, ought the anthropocentric meanings related to animal suffering be favoured? That is, if we have conflicting and multiple presumptions and meanings concerning non-human suffering, why should we overlook those pointing towards equality and instead prioritize those that reflect anthropocentrism? Moreover, putting all emphasis on meaning may lead to a dangerous conservatism within which, on the basis of the various deeply built-in prejudices that our language games include, we favour not only human beings, but also those of the 'right' sex or skin colour (Aaltola 2010b). That is, if contemporary meanings are to be accepted as such and requests for further justification discarded, would one not have to simply accept the strong racist or sexist meanings and undertones unfortunately prevalent in many contemporary societies? And if, in order to avoid the ensuing cultural conservatism, we accept that justification and analysis are to be used in these intra-human contexts, why should we not apply the same model to the non-human context and demand that there, too, something more than cultural prejudice is to impact on how individual beings are treated? Lastly, perhaps there is more to morality than deeply built-in meanings – that is, perhaps, rather than language, it is the capacities for intersubjectivity and for empathy that shape our moral horizons (we shall come back to this theme towards the end of the book).

A claim frequently presented in animal ethics states that neither perfectionist capacities nor species provide a sound reason to ignore non-human suffering. Instead, non-human suffering is morally loaded: it is indeed a thick concept, which should receive attention and care. This sentiment has been dressed up with many different explanatory ramifications. For utilitarians, such as Singer, suffering and happiness are, alongside the satisfaction of interests or preferences, the very elements

that morality ought to concentrate on. To suffer is morally undesirable, and we should therefore avoid causing suffering, regardless of the species of the sufferer. For many virtue ethicists, and those who put forward the role of emotion, the issue has to do with our own capacity to feel compassion and empathy for others. Paying heed to animal suffering is not primarily a matter of rational postulation, but rather something that depends on our basic moral ability to relate to others with care and consideration. Again, there is no reason why we should only extend this care to co-specifics (for an example, see Midgley 1983).

The above alternatives give prominence to the capacity to suffer in itself: it is the animal *suffering* that warrants our attention, not necessarily the *being* undergoing the suffering. According to some, however, it is precisely the individual who should be the focus of attention, and who ultimately lends suffering itself its significance. For those, such as Mark Rowland, who have applied contractualism to the non-human context, animal suffering matters because impartiality and justice require that other animals also have 'rights'. More specifically, if we are to accept that biological characteristics, differences and handicaps should not be used as reasons for moral exclusion, and if we recognize that not only the strongest and the most fortunate should reap moral benefits, it is logical to conclude that non-human animals too should be afforded moral concern and rights, and that thus their suffering matters also (Rowland 1998). That is, the task at hand is to step behind the 'veil of ignorance' made famous by John Rawls, to adopt the viewpoint of those less fortunate than, or simply different from, oneself, and to acknowledge that they, too, are subjects deserving of justice. Crucially, it is not only suffering but the whole animal and all her interests and rights that warrant attention, and, in fact, it is the latter that render the former so significant.

Deontologists offer the notion of 'animal rights' perhaps its soundest formulation. According to Tom Regan, it is 'inherent', or what will here be called 'individual', value<sup>5</sup> that lies at the root of moral concern for other animals. Following the aforementioned Kantian division into beings who are 'ends in themselves' and beings who are 'a means to an end', 'individual value' refers to a state of affairs in which a being has moral value in her own right, rather than as an instrument for the benefit of others. Therefore, the claim is that non-human animals have value in themselves: an individual cow is a valuable being in herself, not because she can provide milk or leather for human beings. But what is this value based on? Regan argues that all 'subjects of a life' have inherent or individual value, and maintains that such subjecthood is

grounded on a long list of capacities, such as the capacity for intentionality, memory and anticipation of the future. However, he also states that, in the end, it is the capacity to experience – that is, consciousness in the phenomenal sense, or sentience in its broader meaning – that constitutes being a subject of a life: ‘Those, who satisfy this condition [those, who have inherent value], in short, are individuals *who have an experiential welfare* – whose experiential life fares well or ill, depending on what happens to, or is done to or for, them’ (Regan 1983, p. 262). Therefore, it is the capacity to have negative and positive experiences that establishes the grounds for the value of individual beings.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it also entails that a creature has moral rights, and this, of course, opens the door to animal rights. Since many non-human animals are experiencing beings, they too have moral rights. Thus, Regan argues that ‘Sentience has an important role to play when it comes to understanding [animal] rights’ (Regan 2007, p. 79). Now, the suffering of those who have individual value and moral rights cannot be a matter of mere cruelty or kindness. Rather, suffering of this type is an object of duties and rights: we have a *prima facie* duty to refrain from causing suffering to non-human animals, and animals have the right not to be made to suffer. Again, as with contractualism, it is the broader moral status of the animal that renders her suffering so significant.

Therefore, animal ethics has offered a variety of theories to support the argument that the suffering of non-human beings has moral relevance. Although there is much friction to be found among supporters of these theories (famously, for instance, utilitarians and deontologists will bang heads together), there is one common denominator that ties many of them together. This is the emphasis placed on the role of the capacity to experience. The link between sentience and individual value is often posited in animal ethics: consciousness in the phenomenal sense, not ‘perfectionist capacities’ (rationality, self-consciousness, moral agency, propositional language) or species, is the basis of our moral worth as individuals. What is significant is that, ultimately, inherent or individual value is entwined with the significance of suffering: it is our value as individuals that also renders our suffering foundationally important – and, on the other hand, suffering as a manifestation of our capacity to experience that builds our value as individuals.

The assumption that the capacity to experience is, indeed, the basis of our value has been shared by many. Mary Midgley argues that: ‘To recognize the spark of conscious life out there is to see it as having a certain importance’ (Midgley 1983, p. 93) and Martha Nussbaum concludes that sentience is the ‘threshold condition for membership

in the community of beings who have entitlements based on justice' (Nussbaum 2004, p. 309). It has even been claimed that the 'failure to value them [sentient beings] involves failures of objectivity or impartiality in our reasoning or sentiments' (Jamieson 1998). It is easy to postulate a link between our moral relevance as individuals, on the one hand, and sentience on the other. Sentience makes things matter to us. It enables us to care about what happens in our lives; it forms the basis for seeing the world from the viewpoint of good or bad, positive or negative. More importantly, like suffering, sentience is a morally loaded capacity that invites normative consideration: to truly recognize another creature as sentient implies that we recognize her as a valuable being, as a 'someone'. In fact, it is precisely sentience that lays the groundwork for our individuality, or even our personhood: humans and pigs differ from stones and apple trees in that they can experience their own existence as something; they have a viewpoint concerning reality, and this forms the pillar of their individuality. Therefore, sentience not only has clear value implications, but also renders us distinct individuals.

However, not everybody in animal ethics places great emphasis on sentience. According to some, such emphasis is indeed anthropocentric, for here a human quality and thus a similarity with human beings is made the basis of value. That is, the criterion of sentience translates into a demand that the animal be like humans – it implies that it is only similarity with human creatures that renders non-humans valuable. Instead of sentience, attention ought to be placed on the *difference* of non-human animals: it is their utter difference from – not similarity to – human beings that ought to spark awe and wonder, and related moral consideration. Only regard for the utter difference of animals can provide grounds for true respect for their being (Plumwood 1991; see also Deleuze and Guattari 1988). A related criticism is that emphasis on sentience is overly individualistic (see Calarco 2008). When we speak of sentience and suffering, we are assuming that beings ought to be primarily made sense of on the basis of their individuality, which again may lead us to uncomfortable political and metaphysical positions that overlook the importance of duties towards, and networks with, others. We are left with single, atomistic individuals, ripped apart from their wider contexts. Here, isolated and lonely individuals of the neo-liberalistic tradition, eager to demand rights for themselves, replace communal understandings of morality, which emphasize how individual beings are but parts of various contextual underpinnings and wider networks of interrelations with each other, and which assert that we ought to pay

more heed to duties to, and care for, others. Therefore, perhaps animal ethics ought to concentrate less on individuals and the criteria of their value.

There is much truth to both criticisms. One must steer away from anthropomorphism and its anthropocentric ramifications, for other animals do not need to resemble human beings in order to have moral significance. Moreover, it is important to note that placing emphasis on the individual runs the risk of repeating worrying politico-moral notions, such as atomistic seclusion from, and ignorance of, others. However, both criticisms also have their weaknesses. It is crucial to note that sentience is not the exclusive property of human beings, but rather a shared capacity. That is, it is not 'human-only' any more than 'cow-only' or 'pig-only', and this makes it difficult to comprehend why discussion of sentience is seen as a demand for similarity with human beings (why could it not equally be seen as a demand for similarity with pigs?). Ironically, the criticism may fall into the trap of assuming that important shared capacities are, indeed, exclusive to human beings, and of thereby adopting the anthropocentric perspective that considers all shared attributes as primarily human rather than animal. If we take a more general, zoocentric perspective, it becomes evident that sentience and the capacity to suffer are shared far and wide in the animal kingdom, and that no species can claim a privileged stake in them, or declare them its own. If we define sentience as species-neutral, questions of similarity and human-bias simply do not arise.

Moreover, seeing importance in the individual does not necessarily imply that one is a neo-liberalist supporter of 'individualism', eager to cut oneself loose from contexts or duties towards and networks with others. To see importance in the individual can, quite easily, go together with communitarian perspectives which celebrate the relations among different individual beings. This is because 'individuals' do not need to be perceived through an atomistic and egoistic ethos, as 'Individuals' with a capital letter, but may just as well be understood as nothing more sinister than specific agents of mutuality and relationality. In other words, 'individuality' can refer to specificity rather than political 'individualism', and this specificity may again be linked to communal, contextual ramifications. Animal rights philosophy epitomizes this possibility perfectly, as it prioritizes human duties towards other animals and reminds us that sentience is, indeed, a capacity shared by innumerable interlinked creatures. That is, individuality within animal ethics tends to emphasize duties and care towards others and bring

forward interrelations between beings, thus avoiding the trap of neo-liberalist connotations.<sup>7</sup>

## **Practical implications**

What does concern for non-human suffering mean in practice? This is a huge question, which here will be explored from three different angles: advocacy, interest conflicts, and 'naturalness'.

### **Advocacy: welfare vs. liberation**

Let's first look at advocacy, and its practical manifestations. It is important to notice the difference between placing emphasis solely on suffering, and placing emphasis on the individual behind the suffering. This difference becomes most obvious when we compare the philosophies of Singer and Regan. Singer will approve of animal use and the killing of animals who have no concept of the future (and thus, Singer claims, no interest in going on living), if this is done without the infliction of suffering. Thus, Singer argues that 'Sentience suffices to place a being within the sphere of equal consideration of interests, but it does not mean that the being has a personal interest in continuing to live' (Singer 1993, p. 131). Regan, on the other hand, claims that we cannot use and kill beings of individual value (except in utterly exceptional instances, such as those involving immediate self-protection, or protection of 'innocents'). Beings of such value ought not to be treated as instruments for the benefit of others, but should, rather, be respected as morally significant creatures with their own experiences, desires and interests – in other words, they have a right to respectful treatment (and others have a corresponding duty to treat them with respect). Whereas the Singer approach allows one to ignore matters such as life, autonomy and integrity, and to simply concentrate on suffering, the Regan approach requires that life, autonomy and integrity can, at times, even trump suffering, as the value of the individual acquires more significance than a specific pain or point of anguish.

This difference has enormous practical consequences. On the one side, there are animal welfarists who argue for more stringent animal welfare regulations, and on the other there are animal rights or animal liberation advocates, who argue that non-human animals ought not to be made into objects of consumption even when no suffering is caused. As the popular metaphor puts it, the first option asks for bigger cages and longer chains, while the latter demands that cages and chains be abolished altogether. The tension between these two camps is one of



the defining elements of the contemporary debate concerning non-human suffering.

This ambivalence is exemplified in advocacy. Whereas welfarist advocates are preoccupied with how the animal feels, animal rights and animal liberation advocates are also concerned with concepts such as 'autonomy', 'rights' and 'justice'. The latter often maintain that giving all prominence to suffering deflects discussion onto the wrong track and creates the illusion that the only moral problem surrounding animal industries is the suffering caused. For the former, the argument is that only small steps at a time (such as those involving welfare legislation) are practically attainable and will lead to concrete benefits for other animals.<sup>8</sup> That is, animal rights and liberation advocates wish to give prominence to the value of other animals, whilst welfarists concentrate on avoidance of suffering. However, at the same time both parties often use seemingly contradictory methods. Welfarists emphasize the type of 'fellow-feeling' towards other animals that, consistently read, inevitably means that those animals should not be used as mere instruments, no matter how kindly they are treated. Animal rights and liberation advocates use constant imagery of and references to animal suffering to strengthen their case. Here, evidence of animal suffering is used as a means of persuasion, the aim of which is to lead the general public to reflect on the wider ramifications of the human-animal relation. That is, it is hoped that reference to suffering can spark more in-depth criticism of how and why animals are instrumentalized.

What can we make of this tension? Some sound reasoning can be found behind both arguments. Emphasis on suffering and welfare can create the impression that, were it not for these factors, animal industries would be morally unproblematic. Of course, many welfarists are quite happy with this implication, but more problems loom ahead: such emphasis can act as a catalyst for further animal use, since welfare considerations can be utilized as a marketing ploy. Instead of refraining from the use of animal products, those concerned about non-human animals may feel justified in consuming even more of them, just as long as they are made to think that suffering no longer takes place. Hence, instead of becoming vegetarians or vegans, these well-meaning people flock to buy 'organic' or 'free range' meat, dairy and eggs. The difficulty here is that 'small steps' towards moral awareness concerning non-human animals and their suffering may in fact turn into big leaps towards even more intensive and economically viable animal production. Even if welfarists do not see a problem in people not adopting a vegan lifestyle, they should note that, within this development, animal

'welfare' risks becoming an empty marketing slogan, behind which increasing levels of non-human suffering can be observed.

Yet, lack of attention to suffering would render talk of animal value or rights abstract and, in the context of contemporary understandings of non-human animals, even meaningless. If people are told that they should boycott meat because pigs and chicken have moral rights or individual value, many will find such talk absurd or even hilarious. This is because such a claim does not 'interrupt' those with anthropocentric perspectives in any way, and will thus leave them utterly indifferent: one needs to cause a stir, to create a reaction, in order to delve underneath existing belief systems (see Schnurer 2004). Reference to suffering can provide such a stir simply because suffering is so deeply aversive and morally troubling. As seen, suffering is very interruptive: it is a rude awakening to the reality of others. As such, it can play a definite part in persuading people to take note of animal rights or animal liberation agendas.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, it needs to be kept in mind that 'suffering' is often intrinsically linked to value and rights violations. Because of this connection, it is odd to reject the notion of suffering as somehow irrelevant or misleading.

Therefore, although there are sound and fruitful reasons for accepting that suffering is indeed not the only concern when it comes to how humans relate to other animals, placing all attention on theoretical concepts such as 'rights' or 'justice' runs the risk of rendering animal ethics abstract. What is needed, alongside them, is reference to the lived experiences of our non-human kin. In this way, animal rights and liberation discourse needs to remain open to the relevance of animal vulnerability and suffering, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of welfarism (most notably its conservatism, moderation and frequent blindness towards the value of individuals).

### **Interest conflicts**

Now, if we accept that the suffering of other animals has the same moral bearing as human suffering, what does this mean in practice?

First of all, it is clear that non-human suffering should not be caused for secondary reasons: one cannot violate primary interests in order to benefit secondary interests (VanDeVeer 1979). That is, we cannot cause harm to others for purely trivial or secondary reasons. Consumption of animal products is, in the great majority of cases, based on secondary motivations, such as taste or custom (our health does not require it). If the making of these products causes suffering to non-human animals, it cannot be justified on the grounds that some fancy the taste of meat

or worship weekly portions of dairy ice-cream. Although many proud meat-eaters like to declare that animals 'taste great', it is a sign of very sloppy moral thinking to suggest that pain and suffering can be brushed aside on the basis of culinary pleasure. Can we not do better than this? Is it really true that the 30 or so days of misery that broiler birds have to face, the inability to walk properly, the breathing problems, the joint pains and the broken bones, can be justified by the fact that one day some human being will be able to enjoy a five-minute meal of chicken wings? The claim commonly made in animal ethics is clear: as long as consuming other animals both causes suffering and is not necessary for survival, humans should refrain from doing so.

The consequences are radical. Most animal production, as it exists today, ought to be eradicated. Since it appears highly unlikely that commercially viable, large-scale animal production can ever meet even the most basic welfare requirements, one has to look at animal industries with a very cynical eye. If profit is the main motivation, animal welfare is almost certainly seriously compromised, and the larger the ramifications of farming, the more obvious the suffering caused will become. Even if drastic welfare changes were made, it seems unlikely that suffering could be avoided, for even the best small-scale, free-range farms would have to overlook some crucial animal interests in order to make ends meet. Veganism emerges as the inevitable solution, if one wants to make sure one's diet does not support mechanisms that cause other animals suffering (of course, if we take into account also the individual value of other animals, the case for veganism becomes even stronger, for standard forms of animal use would lack justification even in the event that they caused no suffering).

But what about the types of usages of animals that aim to help vital human interests? The most obvious port of call here is animal experimentation. Is it justified to cause suffering to other animals in order to prevent human suffering? That is, can primary non-human interests be violated in order to satisfy primary human interests? Now, firstly it needs to be pointed out that many animal experiments serve secondary interests, such as academic ambition and financial gain, and many are not necessary even when they are aimed at serving primary interests (for instance, it may be that similar medications already exist on the market; see LaFollette and Shanks 1996; Dagg 2008; Greek and Greek 2000). However, a small minority are aimed at developing entirely new and much needed cures for debilitating conditions, and it is the moral permissibility of these types of experiments that presents the most difficult case.

Are life-saving experiments justified? One way to approach the issue takes the numbers involved into account. As seen, utilitarians like Singer are eager to let numbers decide: if the suffering of a few non-human animals helps to cure the suffering of many human beings (or many other animals), experimentation may be justified. However, this utilitarian approach has received much criticism, not least because it opens the dreaded door to human experiments as well. If species does not matter, surely we can experiment on a few unwilling human beings in order to save a million (for a rather alarming analysis, see Frey 1996)? This thought experiment reveals just how disturbing is the idea of tormenting others against their will in order to benefit the majority: there is something deeply unsettling about causing harm to 'innocents' in the name of the greater good. The main reason for this is to be found from the aforementioned notion of 'individual value', as the claim simply is that sentient individuals should never be instrumentalized in order to serve the interests of others – that is, they should never be reduced to tools through which to seek benefit for oneself. This question of individual value goes beyond ethics that centres only on suffering, and brings us again towards animal rights and liberation philosophy. It is precisely for this reason that animal rights and liberation advocates reject experimentation: a world in which other sentient creatures are treated as nothing more than means to an end appears morally horrifying.

Moreover, there is something morally quite repulsive and frightening about sacrificing a few in order to save the many, and one reason for this is that experiences cannot be added together: the suffering of one individual is just as significant as the suffering of five individuals, because for each it is just that unique suffering that matters. That is, for each being, it is just their own viewpoint and their own suffering that are experienced.

In this sense, the utilitarian framework appears clinical and detached, for it so easily becomes blind to the actual experiences of individual beings, and instead concentrates on abstract moral equations. Perhaps individual experiences cannot and never should be rendered into numbers, for doing so immediately causes one to lose touch with what it is to experience. In fact, Jamie Mayerfeld argues that the number of potential sufferers is entirely irrelevant: we should save just one from severe suffering rather than a million from mild suffering. The basis for this claim is simple: suffering is intrinsically qualitative; one cannot quantify it, and therefore the suffering of two people is not suffering times two. Mayerfeld uses a quote from C. S. Lewis (1940): 'There is

no such thing as the sum of suffering, for no one suffers it. When we have reached the maximum that a single person can suffer, we have, no doubt, reached something very horrible, but we have reached all the suffering there ever can be in the universe. The addition of a million fellow-sufferers adds no more pain' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 173).<sup>10</sup> But how, then, can interest conflicts be resolved?

According to some critics, instead of numbers, emphasis should be on the quality of the suffering. For instance, Mayerfeld is eager to emphasize the 'priority view', according to which we have to prioritize individuals who have already endured a lot, and who therefore would be worse off should they go through more suffering; it is the combined quality of the suffering rather than the number of the sufferers that matters. Moreover, we should prioritize saving a few from extreme suffering rather than many from moderate suffering (Mayerfeld 1999). This qualitative approach means that tormenting other animals in medical experiments lacks justification, if the suffering caused to individual animals exceeds the suffering that human beings would face in the grip of the same disease. Numbers have no relevance; instead, we need to concentrate on the type of suffering involved. Here, Mayerfeld comes close to Tom Regan's 'worse-off principle', which states that we must favour the minority, if its suffering is greater than that of the majority (Regan 1983). Since most animal experimentation involves much more extreme suffering than what human beings would have to undergo when ill (most obviously, animals are not afforded the same care as human beings, and often pain medication is omitted on the grounds that it would distort the results), much of it would lack justification even when aimed at serving primary human interests.

Whether the qualitative approach would offer support for experimentation in cases where human suffering was comparative to or more severe than the non-human suffering remains unclear. This is because the type of setting that the approach uses presumes that we have to choose between two groups who are already under the threat of harm: that is, they are both involved in the situation. An often-heard argument is that this setting does not apply in the context of animal experimentation, for the animals are 'artificially' introduced to harm. In other words, it is only the humans, not the other animals, who are faced with a threat, and the humans then try and push this threat onto other animals. It is as if, instead of there being two groups just about to be hit by a hurricane, and between whom one had to make a decision, there was just one group, who tried to invite a hapless new group from outside the realms of harm to come and take their place. Moreover, we

are again faced with the issue of instrumentalization: just like the quantitative approach, the qualitative approach can lend support for causing harm to others in the name of greater good. If we accept that it is not only the suffering but also the individual value of non-human animals that matters, experimentation would not necessarily be justified even when human experiences were qualitatively more significant.

The main problem that often plagues efforts to find justification for animal experimentation is that it is assumed that one should decide between 'humans' and 'animals'. If it is accepted that suffering of equal nature has equal relevance regardless of species, it emerges as problematic to discuss this issue solely on the basis of species. That is, if the moral relevance of suffering is not grounded on the human-animal dichotomy, why should the justification of experimentation be decided on this basis (particularly if such justification seeks to rest on the notion of 'suffering')? A truly zoocentric view would approach the subject as that concerning different individuals, whether these be humans or other animals – no definite answers as to when the use of other animals would be permissible would be offered, for the question would never be raised. This suggests that one should stop looking for a way of solving 'human' and 'animal' interest conflicts, because conflicts between beings are not best explained on the basis of species. The best one can do is to try and take into account all those creatures that can suffer and otherwise experience, and to make decisions based on the context, not the species. To ask 'can humans use other animals, when the interests of both are primary' is therefore misled, for the terms 'human' and 'animal' should not be the main grounds on which to approach the topic. (On further interest conflicts, see Aaltola 2005.)

### **Existence and naturalness**

However, we are not out of the woods yet, for there are plenty more practical dilemmas to be solved. An increasingly common claim is that modest suffering does not have relevance, for it is better to have lived and suffered a little bit than not to have lived at all. This applies to farming, experimentation, and any other form of animal use. Extreme suffering renders life not worth living, but, if given the choice, surely a little bit of suffering can be tolerated, if the life otherwise includes joy and happiness as well. Thus, many ardent meat-eaters wishfully believe that, if given the choice, the cow would rather have lived and suffered moderately than never have been born. Is there any merit to this argument?

One obvious problem is that a being who does not exist is not losing out on anything by not being born. There is nobody who is missing out on the chance to be alive, because there is no existence prior to life, no potential pig or cow eager to experience the joys of living. This is a simple metaphysical point: those that do not exist are not harmed by not existing, for there is nobody to be harmed. Thus, the vegan is not robbing an animal of a chance to experience life. If we were to believe otherwise, we would open the door to a whole collection of absurd requirements. Most obviously, we would have to start making as many human beings as possible so that they, too, would have the chance to live, even if that life included poverty, lack of resources, and ultimately suffering.

But is it not good that there are many animals who are alive and can experience joy? That is, regardless of whether non-existent animals can be robbed of life, is it not a good thing that many animals do, in fact, exist and experience? This may, indeed, be so. As Singer argues, it is better that there is joy in this world than to have a barren world, devoid of experience. However, again a detour to animal rights or liberation theory provides a potent source of criticism. According to these theories, what is crucial is that animals do not consist of mere joy or suffering, but are also individuals. To cut a long story short, an individual can never be brought to life and then killed just so that her experiences will pass through a brief existence, because once the individual does exist, her future existence, too, has to be respected. You cannot have one without the other. It is because of this that we do not start mass-producing human babies in order to give them the chance to experience life, and then kill these babies when they grow up so that more babies can be brought into existence. Once the baby does exist, she is an individual with her own value, and this means that she cannot be killed. Similarly, non-human animals cannot be brought into existence only to be killed after a short period of time, for, once the pig does exist, regard also has to be given to her future experiences (and their continuation). It is a choice between no animals to begin with or animals that are respected throughout their natural lives.

One further common form of criticism aimed at pro-animal arguments concerns the 'naturalness' of animal suffering. 'Nature' is filled with suffering, and what is deemed a 'natural' life for an animal may consist of much hardship and pain. Now, if we accept that humans are animals, and if we also accept that the human species has been utilizing non-human animals for a considerable proportion of its natural history,

should we not just accept violence towards other animals as something just as 'natural' as the violence that takes place between non-human animals? Why is it wrong for a human being to harm an elk, but not for a wolf? Why should a human being, as an animal, not be allowed to follow her species tendency to kill and harm other animals? This Argument from Naturalness is an exceedingly common way of rebutting concern for animal suffering. It suggests, first, that suffering is to be found everywhere in the wild and is therefore a natural, not a moral, property. That is, suffering is part of what it means to be a sentient, biological creature, and is therefore an unavoidable, 'natural' element in both human and non-human animal existence. Second, the claim is that, if indeed humans are animals, no differentiation should be made between the moral responsibility of humans and other animals. Third, it is implied that the long history of human violence towards other animals renders that violence 'natural'.

However, the argument is plagued with problems. Let's start with the last claim. What we understand to be 'nature' and 'natural' is littered with ambiguities (Siipi 2008). In particular, claims of 'naturalness' are often politically loaded, in that depictions of 'natural' support one's own political viewpoints or other motivations. Therefore, the neo-liberalist competitors may emphasize the selfish gene hypothesis in order to offer a 'natural' framework for their chosen political agenda (Midgley 2002). Similarly, male chauvinists may assert that the female gender is 'naturally' more submissive and fragile, again without noting that their assertion is based on their culturally constructed understanding of male dominance. This problem is evident in the non-human context, as the 'naturalness' of animal suffering or violence towards other animals is often emphasized on the basis of an anthropocentric world view, eager to find justification for the instrumentalization of other animals. That is, the risk is that the Argument from Naturalness is used in an *ad hoc* manner, simply to affirm and offer justification for anthropocentric notions. Now of course, animal suffering does take place everywhere in nature; however, placing primary emphasis on its perceived 'naturalness' may simply reveal the anthropocentric wish to concentrate on what non-human species do to each other rather than on the morality of what human beings do to other species. It is also worth pointing out that a long history of behaving in a certain way does not render that behavior 'natural'. One viewpoint is that only those behaviours without which we cannot cope or flourish as beings are 'natural' to us – therefore, it is natural that human beings engage in social interaction or use their intellect. However, humans in general can cope and flourish



perfectly well without harming other animals, and it would therefore simply be erroneous to suggest that violence towards those animals is 'natural'.

This leads us to the second problem. It is crucial to note one difference between 'nature' and human beings: the latter have a capacity for moral reflection. Once this ability takes flight, it also bestows great responsibilities. Wolves and foxes are not committing immoral acts, because they are not the type of moral agents that could view predation as normatively problematic; however, human beings possessing this type of moral agency have a responsibility to explore whether it is indeed right to cause suffering to others. Whereas the predatory nature of wolves remains outside moral blame, the predatory nature of human beings does not. Ignoring morality simply will not do, for declaring that one lives by the rules of 'nature' rather than morality is not an option – we are, fundamentally, moral creatures who cannot revert to normative oblivion (any more than we can declare cognitive oblivion). Moral agency is an innate part of human nature, and cannot be discarded on a whim when morally difficult or uncomfortable issues come our way. This is what it is to be a human being: a morally capable creature, who, because of her capability, cannot escape responsibility for her own actions. It should also be noted that observing morality is 'natural' in itself. If evolution has instilled in us the capacity for moral agency, following this capacity means following one's human *nature*. In fact, it is very odd to assume that morality is somehow artificial, or that it goes against nature. From this perspective, paying heed to non-human suffering can be one of the most 'natural' things we can do. Matilda is not being artificial or somehow 'estranged from nature' (as the common argument goes), but, rather, deeply embedded in her natural tendencies, when she takes non-human suffering into account.

It is because of this moral ability that we do not condone acts of intra-human violence, which after all have longer roots than violence towards other animals, as 'natural'. Human beings have been killing, tormenting and raping each other since the dawn of time, but nobody holds this as a justification for continuing these practices today. This is most of all because one can see that violence is immoral, regardless of its long history. It appears unclear why a similar realization is not possible in relation to violence towards other animals.

Here we come to the final point. As Hume famously emphasized, 'is' does not equal 'ought'. Facts of nature cannot be correlated with moral norms and values without providing justification for the move. In other words, the fact that suffering takes place all around us does not mean

that suffering *should* take place all around us, and in particular it does not mean that one should start causing suffering to others. Descriptions of life ('life is filled with suffering') do not necessarily tell us about prescriptions or norms to follow in life. It can be acknowledged that the life of sentient beings is coloured by pains and fears, but it is altogether different to suggest that, because of this, it is morally permissible to cause pain and fear to others. Existentially, it is crucial to understand that life can never be completely free of suffering, and that suffering may even be needed for a full appreciation of life, but this does not mean that, morally, we should go about causing suffering to others. In the same breath, it should be noted that suffering in the wild does not justify causing suffering in a domestic setting. *Tu quoque* reasoning, which maintains that one type of harm justifies another, needs to be resisted as logically flawed, for, even if the whole world were filled with nothing but suffering, it would still be dubious for Matilda to choose to treat others badly.

Hence, the fact that violence has always existed does not mean that violence should continue to take place. Even if 'nature' is red in tooth and claw, even if it were filled with the worst type of animal suffering imaginable, and even if human beings had been ruthlessly causing suffering for millennia, we would still, in the here and now, be accountable for our own actions, and still blameworthy for causing suffering to our non-human kin.

### **The argument from absurd consequences**

One formidable challenge to the claims made in animal ethics is 'The Argument from Absurd Consequences'. It is often claimed that placing emphasis on non-human suffering or individuality has ridiculous or simply bizarre implications. The suggested absurdities take many forms, some of which will be explored next.

First of all, if humans have the duty to refrain from actions that cause other animals suffering, are they not faced with a practically impossible task? How can we take into account each and every being that may suffer as a consequence of our actions, without having to resort to the methods of Jainism, which would urge us to gently brush insects away from our path in order not to crush them? That is, would life not become impossible, if one had to respect the lives and sentience of mice, pigs, and possibly spiders and flies, too? Another possible source of absurdity might be found in wild animals, whose suffering and value seem to imply – or so the critics claim – that society ought to eradicate

vital prey–predator relationships. Should we proceed to protect wild animals and therefore save the hare from the fox? Should predators be kept incarcerated and fed soya chunks in order to prevent them from ripping other animals to bits? And what about suffering caused by forces of nature: ought humans to domesticate all wild animals within massive sanctuaries, so that they will be shielded from the realities of nature and the suffering these realities bring?

While it is important to note that The Argument from Absurd Consequences is often used as a form of ridicule rather than a source of serious debate (Adams 1990), these questions are nonetheless valid and important. Even though those presenting it are often acting out of a self-indulgent desire to mock their opponents, the argument does form one of the most relevant practical challenges to concern for non-human suffering. Because of this, it deserves closer inspection. Let's look at wild animals first.

### **Wild animals**

Theorists in the field of animal ethics often assume that there is a clear difference between the suffering caused by non-human sources and the suffering caused by human beings. Only the latter merits attention, because morality only concerns acts committed by moral agents. Thus, in seeking to answer the problem of the fox and the rabbit (should we save the rabbit from the fox?), Regan has suggested that only acts that are committed by moral agents count; where there are no moral agents, no harm has been done (Regan 1983). The suffering of the rabbit mauled by a fox is, quite simply, outside moral concern. However, this view has also been criticized. Dale Jamieson has pointed out that, applied to human beings, it would mean that we should only help Matilda if she is attacked by a murderer, but not if she is about to be hit by a tree (Jamieson 1990). The ridiculousness of this conclusion would suggest that suffering must bear some relevance regardless of whether or not its source is human.

Indeed, according to Mayerfeld, there is no moral difference between the suffering caused by moral agents and the suffering caused by natural forces. The act of intentionally or knowingly causing suffering is reprehensible; however, this does not mean that suffering itself is morally less evil in the absence of moral agency (Mayerfeld 1999). This is again easy to see in relation to human beings: human suffering due to malnutrition is morally significant, even when the famine has not been caused by moral agents. Similarly, we abhor the suffering of the severely ill, even when their plight is not down to agency, and even

when nothing in the world can be done to ease their condition. A similar argument can be made in relation to non-human animals. Thus, Stephen Clark maintains that the suffering of non-human animals is morally pertinent even when the cause of the suffering is not a moral agent; it is because of this that we react when we see children or dogs harming other animals (Clark 1997). There is much truth to this claim. If 'suffering' is a thick moral concept that inherently includes a sense of aversion, how could one remain neutral in the face of suffering simply because of the nature of its source? Paying attention to the source of suffering is, of course, relevant, but it would be a mistake to place that source as the only noteworthy consideration.

One common response to this issue is that prey animals do not have a right to be helped by human beings, because, if we claim that prey animals and predators alike have rights, we should, in the first instance, refrain from actively violating the rights of predators by preventing them from hunting. That is, we should not cause the fox or the wolf suffering by actively preventing her from doing something integral to her well-being. It is commonly accepted that negative duties (for instance, the duty to refrain from killing someone) are more considerable than positive duties (for instance, the duty to help someone who is dying): we must first be accountable for our own actions, and only then help those that we can. Therefore, Matilda has to prioritize her negative duty not to harm the interests of the predator, even if this means that the prey animal will suffer. In other words, if one is to prioritize negative duties, the first port of call is to refrain from harming the predator's welfare by preventing her from hunting. (See LaFollette and Shanks 1996; Aaltola 2010.) To put it simply, suffering that takes place in the wild does have moral relevance, but so too does the predator who causes it. Hard as it may be to look the other way and not help a creature in agony, it would be a bigger crime to stop a predator following her species-specific traits and protecting her own welfare; in the end, not helping the prey animal will ensure that the predator does not have to suffer.

However, there is another possible obstacle in the path. If we favour the predator, we are making a choice not between two animals, but between one animal and, say, 200 animals, since the predator will require not just one meal, but many, in order to survive. Should we not favour prey animals in the name of the numbers game? Surely one should prevent 200 animals from suffering instead of only helping one?

Here, the broader context needs to be kept in mind. Suffering is not the only relevant consideration when making decisions about how to

treat other beings; on the contrary, various other considerations can at times trump concern for suffering. One such consideration is basic ecology. If we were to prevent prey–predator relations, or bring all wild animals under domestication, we would destroy the very basis of ecology, open the door to the extinction of predatory animals, and thus ultimately jeopardize life on earth (see Everett 2001). Non-human animals kill each other, life comes from death, and without this chain of events there will be no animals, and no life as we know it. As moral agents, human beings can change the way they themselves affect other animals, and can therefore minimize the suffering they cause, but we shall enter very dangerous waters if we begin to curtail the actions of other animals. For human beings to refrain from causing suffering will, if anything, have positive ecological implications (due to, for instance, the notorious environmental problems linked to animal farming), but if wild predators were to cease killing the outcomes would be dire. The aim is to minimize suffering, while paying heed to the consequences of doing so.

It is also essential to remember that respect for the integrity and autonomy of non-human animals demands that they be valued as the types of beings they are: there should be no demand for drastic changes. That is, we should not seek to alter the animals' very being; they should be cherished and accepted as they come. To force a predator to follow human morality simply does not fit this principle of respect. The predator deserves moral consideration as the type of being she is, with or without blood on her teeth.

Therefore, other considerations besides suffering decide the case in favour of predators. But should we help wild animals who are suffering from causes other than predation? Is it morally justified, when hiking on a Sunday afternoon, to leave an injured bird, clearly in a state of acute suffering, to its own devices and merrily continue on one's way? And, if we should help, does this not mean that we should actively venture into the forests and seek to find and help all the wild animals suffering from cold or, say, malnutrition? The idea may sound absurd. However, it is good to keep in mind that this type of action is not unheard of in contemporary society. In fact, welfare laws in some European countries stipulate that, when one comes across an injured wild animal, one has a duty to alleviate the animal's suffering. Following suit, mainstream welfare organizations often give medical attention to injured or sick wild animals, and the majority of people find nothing odd about this; quite the contrary, individuals are frequently found feeding wild animals during particularly cold weather or bringing injured wild animals

into wildlife hospitals. Of course, these actions cover only the very tip of the iceberg when it comes to suffering in the wild. They also tend to involve situations in which one happens to stumble across suffering individuals, and therefore do not tell us whether it would be feasible to deliberately locate and assist animals in need. However, these actions do suggest that alleviating the suffering of wild animals as well as others is not as absurd as it may initially sound.

It also has to be remembered that human beings are responsible for many of the events that cause suffering to wild animals. Global warming, deforestation, destruction of local ecologies and similar instances all have their significant part to play. Droughts, floods, malnutrition, loss of habitable areas, all wreak havoc among non-human animals, and are often caused by lazy ignorance and all-consuming greed. This means that most of us carry direct or indirect responsibility for the suffering of wild animals. The fact that the lion or the deer struggles with hunger may be the fault of ordinary consumers and the ruthless industries that they inadvertently yet continuously support. Why, then, would it be absurd to ask us to lend these animals a helping hand?

Yet, this issue requires careful consideration. There is only so much that can be feasibly done to assist wild animals, and at times intervening may, in fact, be a form of interference, whereby damage is caused to local ecologies or the animal's ability to cope with or relate to her surroundings. It is incredibly naïve and shortsighted to argue that suffering in the wild should never be interfered with, or that helping wild animals is always 'unnatural', but equally one must reject a future in which human beings seek to control everything that happens in the wild. A careful balance between concern for the suffering of wild animals and letting be is required.

But should wild animals be domesticated in order to shield and protect them from suffering? This suggestion has been used as a serious justification for animal industries. A common defence of contemporary animal agriculture is that farmed animals are not subjected to the type of suffering animals face in the wild and that, thus, domestication serves animal welfare. Setting aside the obvious problems that this defence encounters – the suffering and frustration caused to domesticated animals, not to mention the ecological devastation implied by 'dewilding' animals – what can we make of the claim, according to which losing one's freedom may be a good thing, if one gets in return a life free from suffering? Like Epicurus and Schopenhauer before him, Mayerfeld asserts that avoidance of suffering is more important than the pursuit of happiness, and maintains that suffering is something to be

prevented: it calls for its own abolition. Therefore, Mayerfeld supports 'negative utilitarianism', which emphasizes the abolition of suffering rather than the significance of happiness (Mayerfeld 1999). Following this stance and placing all emphasis on suffering opens the door to the possibility that we should, indeed, go ahead and domesticate as many animals as possible in order to shield them from suffering.

Fortunately, this conclusion is too hasty. First, suffering would not stop with domestication. As seen, suffering concerns not only the physical but also the mental, and it is the latter type of suffering that wild animals would be subjected to were they brought into human care in order to prevent them from causing each other pain. When incarcerated, wild animals cannot follow their species-specific traits, and therefore various forms of captivity (including contemporary zoos) are always a very probable source of profound mental suffering for them (Aaltola 2010). This means that domesticating the hare might relieve her from the fox's teeth, but land her in even more misery. Since the animal has evolved her repertoire of capacities in the wild, it is only in the wild that she will be able to live fully according to those capacities. The same argument applies to domesticated animals, who tend to struggle in the settings offered to them within animal industries: the lucky ones may receive health care and good nutrition, but they also have to undergo constant frustration of their most basic mental and emotional needs. In other words, being born into captivity may not be quite the blessing industry spokespeople are eager to suggest, for one type of suffering is replaced with another, often more severe and debilitating, type.

Second, although suffering is an important consideration, it may be a mistake to consider its eradication as the primary object of morality. More precisely, it may be fruitful to view suffering as just one experience among many. The list of the types of experiences enabled by wild living, and nearly or completely absent under domestication, is long. A pig placed in the domestic setting may – if very lucky indeed – not suffer, but neither will she be able to have all those rich experiences related to socialization, use of intellect, or simply free movement that go together with wildness. The gains of wild living may simply far outweigh the losses. The animal may suffer, but she will also live a life of exploration, curiosity, free movement and roaming, socializing, mating, taking care of young, and so forth. Therefore, if we could ask the pig whether she would like a shielded yet monotonous existence, or an existence in which she can smell the air and earth, feel the pinch of fear and pain, affection and curiosity, and run in a direction of her own choosing, the pig would most likely choose the latter.

This means that wild animals should not be domesticated in order to protect them from suffering, for doing so would quite possibly negate any chance of joyful existence that the animals have. The claim being advanced also means that domesticated animals are not better off than their wild cousins, and that meat-eaters cannot soothe their consciences with the thought that at least the bird or pig they ate received health-care and food.

### **Impossible ideals?**

What about the claim that eradicating non-human suffering imposes absurd and impossible demands on human beings?

On the most obvious level, this issue involves negative duties. Matilda has a negative duty to refrain from causing other animals suffering, and in many ways these duties are easy to fulfil: in average circumstances, all that Matilda has to do is not consume animal body parts or services. However, when we dig deeper, the issue is much more complex, for refraining from causing suffering is an intricate task to say the least. Even if Matilda does not eat Penny the cow, she will unwittingly step on insects on her way to work, the petrol that she uses for her car will be damaging to the local wildlife, and the vegetables she eats will have been farmed in a way that causes death to small creatures: examples arise aplenty. To make matters more difficult, the eradication of suffering also involves positive duties, that is, helping others. If we accept negative and positive duties to non-human animals and their suffering, does this not place impossible demands on human existence?

The first thing to note here is that one does not need to abandon a moral idea just because it is very difficult or even impossible to accomplish fully. Take human rights as an example. Their perfect fulfilment or execution is impossible because of cultural, political and religious differences regarding human value and equality, and because of the intolerable size of the human population, combined with intolerable economic priorities, which renders resources even scarcer. Still, this does not mean that we ought to throw the whole notion into the rubbish bin. Moral ideas are often *ideals*, which means that they concern goals that will always remain elusive, but without which ethics dwindles into something blank, directionless and cynical. They act as moral compasses, without which we would be utterly lost: they are the aims towards which to strive, even when they cannot be fully achieved. Therefore, we may not be able to make the world a thoroughly moral place, but we must strive to make it as moral as possible; it is finding the right direction, rather than getting there, that matters. This means that,



even if the suffering of all animals cannot be cured, it still does make sense to seek to cure suffering wherever this is feasible and prudent, and to put serious effort into directing ourselves and those around us towards a more compassionate way of living. In fact, it is quite absurd to state that, since all animal suffering cannot be cured, none of it matters – on the contrary, the more suffering there is, the more vigilant we should be in our efforts to ease it.<sup>11</sup> Importantly, there is nothing absurd in saying that animal suffering has huge moral relevance, while acknowledging that human life of necessity causes some such suffering. The question is not whether suffering can be altogether avoided, but rather what can be done to limit the amount of suffering caused to others.

So when is it prudent to stop trying? How far should we go in our efforts to curtail suffering? ‘Prudent’ here refers to practical sensibility. As J. M. Hare has prominently argued, human beings are not archangels. We cannot perfectly take everything and everybody into account. It is often stated that to try to be an archangel may, in fact, be dangerous, for it would involve sacrificing one’s own interests to a point where life became overly difficult to live. Now, those happy with the rather luxurious life of the West too easily use this as an excuse for not doing anything; for many, even the smallest sacrifice is apparently too much. Prudence does not entail such egoism, but, rather, reminds us that there are limits to what can be done for others, if one is also to guard one’s own welfare. Figuring out and establishing this line between self-interest and the interests of others is perhaps the most intricate task in morality.

Following this mode of thinking, Mayerfeld argues that the duty to alleviate or prevent suffering does not apply if it leads to unreasonable personal sacrifice. Because of this, Matilda can eat vegetables or cycle to work, even when she knows that doing so may cause some harm. Yet, Mayerfeld also talks of a maximal duty to prevent suffering, which requires that we give up a significant amount of our non-vital comforts in order to help others. Mayerfeld states: ‘Of course, the maximal duty to relieve suffering often makes demands I don’t want to fulfill, but that is beside the point...Suffering must not be allowed to occur, and if we find ourselves in a position to honour this “must”, then we must honour it’ (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 210). Therefore, the bar is raised high. Matilda has to be willing to sacrifice at times a hefty chunk of her own comfort in order to alleviate suffering. We are not asked to become archangels, but we cannot remain egoists, either. Striking a balance between regard for others and regard for oneself is a demanding task, and arguably the

Western world has become quite ignorant of its significance. This is one of the most noteworthy tasks of animal ethics: to challenge both societies and individuals to rethink their own needs in relation to the needs of other animals, and to ask each of us to map out the very delicate balance between prudent self-regard and willingness to make sacrifices in order to ease the suffering of our non-human kin.

If anything, we have a tendency to underestimate our powers to prevent suffering, which again is used as an excuse for doing nothing. One rationale for this tendency is found in the deliberate confusion between hedonistic self-regard and objective limits: 'I do not want to do anything more' is translated as 'I cannot do anything more' (Mayerfeld 1999). The suffering of others becomes a nuisance, which many seek to forget about by concentrating on their own immediate desires. This applies also to non-human animals, whose suffering is readily ignored even by those who otherwise claim to care. 'Don't tell me; I don't want to know' is the often-heard response to images and information concerning animal suffering. Knowledge would require changes in one's own life, and many, since they are unwilling to make the changes, simply refuse to know. It is precisely this attitude that animal ethics needs to overcome.

Mayerfeld argues that duties towards others can be observed from two contrary positions, depending on our conception of the 'baseline' of moral life. According to one conception, the baseline of moral life is passivity. Moral life consists of relatively few duties, which shade a life devoted to pursuing one's own interests (Mayerfeld 1999). These duties tend to be negative, and therefore a person can be deemed thoroughly virtuous as long as she lives without harming others – even if she never helps a creature in need, and even if her life is marred by egoism. This conception is libertarian at heart. It is centred upon John Stuart Mill's famous and in many ways appealing 'Harm Principle', according to which we are free to live as we please, as long as we refrain from harming those around us. What emerge as central are our own rights to do as we will, rather than duties towards others. The other conception, favoured by Mayerfeld, stipulates that the baseline of moral life consists of continuous duties: to live morally is to apply oneself in everyday life so as also to better the lives of others. Here, emphasis is on positive duties, and therefore a person lives a morally good life if she seeks to actively help others; mere omissions are not enough. Hence, instead of the freedom to pursue and concentrate solely on one's own interests, prominence is given to regard for other beings: it is not just our own freedom and interests that have relevance, but also those of others. This

view comes close to Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of the virtuous life, which emphasizes obligations towards the most vulnerable, and which underlines the dependent aspect of human nature. We are not independent beings, selfishly seeking only our own good, but dependent creatures, who both need and cherish others, and who should actively exist for others (MacIntyre 1999).

This difference in baseline is significant. How we perceive duties towards others who suffer depends on our wider understanding of reality and of ourselves. Following a hedonistic and egoistic viewpoint, we shall quickly come to the conclusion that duties to help others – particularly non-human others – are very limited. If, on the other hand, we follow the viewpoint that emphasizes commonality and vulnerability, we shall see the duty to help as one of the bedrocks of morality, and be much more willing to recognize it also in relation to non-human creatures. In this way, thinking about suffering requires that we take a second look at our whole world view, and re-examine our conception of what it means to be a moral creature.

Moreover, finding a balance between self-regard and regard for others is not only a moral but also a metaphysical question, in that it rests on and implies differing conceptions concerning the nature of sentient existence. In the context of animal suffering, this means that the task is to re-examine our 'animal metaphysics': what does it mean to be a moral agent and a human individual in a world which is filled also with non-human pain and joy? Can we really recoil in atomistic seclusion and go deeper inward to our own desires and rights, until they are all that we see, or should we open up to the world of other experiencing creatures and see also their misery and happiness? Therefore, making the choice between the two baselines boils down to which type of morality and metaphysics we are willing to follow: exclusion or commonality.

Mayerfeld argues that egoism is often aided by misrepresentations, 'pale beliefs', which are vague and uninteresting references to the suffering of others. We can believe that a child is starving in a faraway country, but this belief is pale if it does not cause compassion or motivate action, and instead is instantly forgotten. Here, Mayerfeld repeats the old idea that 'to know and not to act is not to know': if Matilda does not want to help the suffering creatures around her, she does not really know what suffering is (Mayerfeld 1999). Therefore, the egoistic baseline is founded on misconceptions of suffering, as one lacks a grasp of what suffering is. Many claim to know, but actually just hold on to pale beliefs that are easy to ignore, and which fail to provoke action.<sup>12</sup> Thus, when Matilda is declaring that there is no point in helping other

animals, she may be expressing her own lack of comprehension: what the argument from absurdity states to be 'impossible' may simply be a delusion created on a murky foundation of ill-understanding.

Often this ill-understanding rests on the anthropocentric paradigm, and in particular its tendency to centralize species hierarchies and competition. However, competition is not the only way to define human-animal relations, and the most obvious alternative is to link together the welfare of both human and non-human animals. One does not need to choose one camp, but, rather, can embrace both. Therefore, as Mary Midgley has emphasized, instead of the 'either-or' option, we can choose to take into account both humans and other animals; competition is the wrong approach to animal suffering (Midgley 1983). From this viewpoint, it is odd to prioritize oneself categorically at the expense of other animals: egoism only makes sense within the framework of competition, and if this framework is abandoned it becomes evident that, next to one's own welfare, there is a need to also pay heed to the welfare of others (both human and non-human).

This view has been supported with some practical considerations. It has been argued that different forms of institutionalized violence and repression tend to be interlinked: we subjugate one type of beings because we have learned the 'logic of domination' (Warren 1987) from subjugating other types of beings. Therefore, to give full regard to the well-being of, say, women or human beings in general, the society needs to re-examine its broader perspective on other sentient individuals. How one treats non-human animals may well go together with how one treats human animals. This connection is most commonly made in relation to deliberate violence. Violence towards animals is linked to violence towards human beings, historically (Patterson 2002),<sup>13</sup> psychologically (Linzey 2009b) and practically (Shiva 2007).<sup>14</sup> Conversely, this is taken to mean that concern for the suffering of animals will also heighten concern for the suffering of human beings. The competitive model is, quite simply, turned on its head. There are solid grounds for this new arrangement. In particular, from the viewpoint of moral psychology, it seems rather evident that compassion feeds further compassion, and that denial of compassion feeds further denial. Thus, the welfare of one is inherently linked to the welfare of others, and the well-being of human beings intertwined with the well-being of other animals.

Thus, the egoistic baseline risks embracing the competitive model offered by anthropocentrism. We are asked to choose between our own comfort and that of another, but the question is misplaced. Rather, the real issue is how to combine efforts so that as many as possible can lead

lives relatively free from suffering. Each individual should try to answer this question, and to be accountable. Such a demand is not absurd – instead, sticking blindly with egoistical anthropocentrism appears as the misled choice. That is, to take seriously the idea that the suffering of non-human others may place demands on oneself is not ridiculous; rather, to remain in a state of ignorant hedonism emerges as the foolish decision.

Before continuing, let's have a look at one more worrying prospect. The life of one individual will inevitably lead to the suffering of countless others, both human and non-human. Even if unintentionally, we cause hurt and harm to countless particularly small animals without even knowing it. If the eradication of suffering is all that matters, should we not simply end all life? The most obvious answer is that it would be wrong to destroy sentient life, for such life is morally valuable in itself. That is, supporting the life of those sentient individuals wanting to live takes priority over duties to prevent suffering. Therefore, Matilda does not have to kill herself in order to avoid causing suffering to others, for her own life, too, has fundamental moral importance.

Yet, there is some adventitious truth to this version of the Argument from Absurd Consequences. Mayerfeld claims that, in relation to future generations, suffering may become so frequent that human beings need to reflect on the morality of creating more life on earth. It is crucial to draw a distinction between destroying life and abstaining from creating life, and Mayerfeld argues that we only have the right to resort to the latter (Mayerfeld 1999). This issue is highly relevant in the current context, in which we are plagued by a population explosion, and it also has a huge impact on non-human animals. As more people enter this planet, the consumption of animal products also rises dramatically. In fact, it is estimated that animal production will more than double by 2050, which again will contribute to global warming and thus cause further problems for animal life (human and non-human alike).<sup>15</sup> In short, the more human beings there are, the more non-human animals will be reared and killed (most likely in increasingly unbearable conditions), and thus the more suffering there will be. Therefore, although concern for animal suffering does not dictate that life itself ought to be eradicated, it does mean that we need to curtail the numbers of future generations.

### **Active or passive suffering?**

However, we are not off the hook yet. One important question concerns the nature of suffering: is it an active or a passive ability? This question

deserves closer scrutiny, because its moral implications are far-reaching. In what follows, a list of different, mutually contradictory takes on the topic will be explored.

One argument is that the anthropocentric tradition tends to define human beings as active creatures, and other animals as passive. This, in itself, helps to exclude the latter from the categories of 'individuality' and 'personhood', for these terms imply agency and thus activity. Now, because suffering is a passive capacity (it refers to being a victim of something), emphasizing it in the context of animals can reinforce the anthropocentric view. That is, because suffering underlines passivity, it may feed the anthropocentric image of non-human animals as incapable beings, and thus help to omit non-humans from the category of valuable individuals.

In animal ethics, much attention has been paid to the agent–patient division (according to which non-human animals are 'moral patients', not 'moral agents') and vulnerability. A common welfarist assumption states that animals are the objects (patients) of consideration by human subjects (agents), and that, therefore, the reason why consideration is due to them lies in their passive vulnerability rather than active abilities: animals matter primarily because they suffer, not because they are beings with their own intentions and desires. Human beings are active doers, animals the passive recipients of this doing. This again can, quite against the intentions of those who support this view, hinder efforts to perceive animals as 'persons' with individual value. Giving suffering the top priority can reinforce an image of animals as passive and rather helpless beings, who are fine as long as they are shielded from suffering, as a result of which portrayal of animals' individuality is lost. The worrying, if ironic, prospect is that highlighting animal suffering will lead to a diminished view of animal value. If we are to change this passifying dynamic, more prominence must be given to the animal mind in the broader sense, by underlining active capacities as well. Animals are not only passive and sentient, but also active and intentional. This means that sentience and suffering are only one basis for the moral considerability of non-human animals. Besides these factors, the beliefs, intentions, interests, wants and desires of animals need to be taken into account. That is, if we are to recognize the individual value of non-human animals, alongside passive sentience and suffering, other more active mental capacities need to be brought to the fore.

Now, it is worth noting that suffering and sentience can also be perceived as active traits. As Derrida has pointed out, Jeremy Bentham's take

on suffering – so influential in animal ethics – is based on the premise that suffering is a capacity, and thus something akin to an activity (as seen earlier, Bentham famously argued that what is morally relevant is not the rationality or linguistic capacity of animals, but rather the capacity to feel pain) (Derrida 2004). Derrida's observation has merit. Bentham does, indeed, use the verb 'can' in reference to suffering ('Can they suffer?'), which seems to imply that suffering is an active capacity. The same implication can be found in contemporary animal ethics, too, as we speak of the 'capacity' to experience as something that the animal actively practises and takes part in. This would suggest that the standard view of sentience and suffering offered in animal ethics does not imply passivity, but instead embraces activity. However, the issue is far from clear. The use of terms such as 'can' in the context of sentience and suffering may be purely semantic. In fact, sentience is quite commonly portrayed as something passive, akin to 'vulnerability', by which the animal is laid open to the actions of others and helplessly bears the mark of their impact. Within this reading, to be a sentient creature means to exist in a state of vulnerability, wherein the external world can cause both joy and pain; the animal does not actively experience, but rather experiences take place in her, and she remains forever vulnerable to the effects of the forces around her.

However, according to Derrida, there is, in fact, no reason to underline activity. If anything, it is precisely passivity that should be deemed important: passivity is normatively much weightier than active ability. Thus, Matthew Calarco argues: 'Derrida is suggesting that one is perhaps less moved, ethically and even emotively speaking, by the recognition of an animal's "ability" or "capacity" for suffering as by an encounter with an animal's *inability* or *incapacity* to avoid pain, its fleshy vulnerability and exposure to wounding' (Calarco 2008, p. 118). Derrida himself states that 'Being able to suffer is no longer a power, it is a possibility without power... Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share with animals...' (Derrida 2004). Therefore, it is the utter openness towards the acts of others, the animals' utter vulnerability and passivity, which issue the most poignant call for normativity. Here, it is precisely the passivity of other animals – their complete helpless openness – that causes one to notice their presence. This vulnerability immediately and directly calls for a moral response and, as Derrida suggests, gives birth to ethics: it is at the moment when we recognize the vulnerability shared with others that we become moral creatures. This perspective suggests that we should, in fact, encourage recognition of passivity rather than activity;

it is suffering as vulnerability rather than active agency that ought to be given priority in animal ethics.

Echoing the philosophy of Levinas, Derrida argues that vulnerability forms the basis for an 'interruptive encounter' with animals, as it interrupts our self-endowed existence, forces us to respond, and makes us pay heed to the animal (Derrida 2004). In short, passivity disrupts the active, perfectionist and egoistical existence nurtured by anthropocentrism, and makes one notice the plight of other beings. Perhaps the suggestion is that, were animals perfectionist, active beings, there would be nothing to notice: they would be just another faceless and bland addition to the contemporary society of capable and self-centred individuals. It is only their passive vulnerability that forces the self-endowed human agent, so eager to pursue her own perfectionist goals with blinkers on, to take notice. Derrida is not alone in his suggestion, for many have argued that it is vulnerability rather than active ability that gives one value. Hence, Andrew Linzey claims that with non-human animals, as with children, their lack of perfectionist agency combined with utter vulnerability renders duties towards them more, not less, stringent (Linzey 2009). Alasdair MacIntyre has maintained that it is precisely shared vulnerability – our *inability* to live in perfectionist solitude, unaided by others – that both gives ethics its significance and helps us see value in the non-human world (MacIntyre 1999). Similarly, Mary Midgley argues that 'duties of justice become more pressing, not less so, when we are dealing with the weak and inarticulate who cannot argue back' (Midgley 2002, p. 183).

There is much truth in this claim. It is vulnerability that renders ethics important: perfectly active, self-reliant and capable creatures do not need ethics, for nothing can touch them. It is in passive fragility and openness towards the world that ethics resides. It is perhaps because of this that the wounded and the hurt, most particularly, gain our moral attention even when we remain blind to moral arguments: it is their explicit vulnerability that forces us to stop and pay heed to others. Suffering invites an immediate normative response partly because the passive vulnerability in front of our eyes makes us think ethically once more.

This being said, however, it needs to be kept in mind that a counter-argument can also be offered, according to which passivity leads to contempt rather than respect. When human beings, culturally inclined to think that they are perfect agents, encounter passive, vulnerable creatures, they may feel a sense of smug superiority rather than moral concern. To those who have fully incorporated anthropocentric doctrines,



the suffering animal may be a pitiful sight in a negative sense: she does not evoke the desire to help, but rather contempt for her miserable condition. Here, the animal is perceived as a being who cannot do what humans do, and who therefore is marked with the distinct lack of human capability and 'excellence'. The animal becomes a creature who cannot even look after her own welfare or fight back against those who abuse her; her vulnerability signals inability. 'Passivity' becomes 'weakness' or 'failure'. Just as the rich often fail to see the vulnerability of beggars on the street from a moral perspective but, rather, view it with contempt as a sign of inability, the anthropocentric human may fail to see the moral connotations of animal vulnerability and instead merely concentrate on the animals' assumed lack of agency. There is much merit to the claim that passive vulnerability can make us pause and take notice, but this alternative interpretation suggests that passivity may not be the final answer.

Yet, one argument is that human beings, too, are passive, vulnerable creatures, and that it is exactly this aspect of human nature which makes us notice the broken-down animal in front of us. In short, the passive vulnerability of other animals forces humans to pay heed, for they, too, are ultimately passive and vulnerable. The ideal of perfectionist agency remains just that – an ideal. Here, the interruption caused by non-human animals is based not on their complete difference from, but rather on their basic similarity with, human beings; it is not utter difference but fundamental similarity that causes the interruption. This interpretation has merit also, for it is elemental that the anthropocentric mind, so keen to emphasize potency and capability, must come to terms with finitude and vulnerability. In other words: if human beings recognize their own vulnerability, they will not feel quite so contemptuous towards non-human suffering.

However, also a rather different interpretation can be offered. Although shared vulnerability is often emphasized as the reference point of similarity linking human beings to other animals, another suggestion is that witnessing the complete opposite of the anthropocentric image – namely, an active animal – would yield a comparable result. The human being, smug in her self-perfection, would have to notice that other beings, too, are active agents in their own right. In this way, the similarity between humans and other animals would concern not only passivity, but also agency: with regard to non-human animals, there is nothing to feel smug about. The interruption caused by other animals would, thus, be based on the sudden realization that they, too, are subjects with their own intentions and aims. In fact, this could

make possible a more thorough understanding of suffering and vulnerability. The *inability* inherent in suffering and vulnerability exists because there is an ability or a capacity that is being frustrated. The pig suffers because she cannot move, build nests, search for food, socialize or doze off in the sunshine: the cause of her pain is her incapacitation. That is, animals often suffer under human rule not because of their passive inability, but because their active agency is utterly denied. Therefore, suffering does not consist only of passive vulnerability, but also of agency constantly frustrated.

Perhaps truly understanding the finitude of non-human animals requires that we first see them as active creatures; and perhaps recognizing animal activity is a necessary requirement for debunking the anthropocentric wish to believe that only human beings are individuals in their own right. As Derrida points out, the potent gaze of a cat (an example of which more later) provides one powerful example of an interruptive encounter: the active animal forces us to rethink the human–animal relation, and in fact holds the promise of dismantling anthropocentric metaphysics. Following this line of thinking, it is the active animal who is the ultimate source of interruption; even the broken-down animal causes a stir in us because we know that behind her injury she is an active individual, struggling to fight her own miserable condition, and (to follow Derrida's example) capable of looking at us just as we look at her. Therefore, interruption is not necessarily caused by difference but, rather, by similarity, and not only passive vulnerability, but also active agency, forms a potential point of reference for such similarity. However, just as animal vulnerability can have unwanted connotations, so can animal agency. The capable, high-flying anthropocentric may feel contempt for a passive animal, but is it fruitful to characterize the animal herself as another capable, high-flying individual? One argument is that the agency-based framework models non-human animals as precisely the type of liberalistic, capable individuals that should be dethroned if we are to find a fruitful basis for ethics.

This leaves us with a hopelessly confusing mixture of arguments. It is not easy to pinpoint whether suffering is an active or a passive capacity, let alone to determine whether activity and passivity are positive or negative states. With all these different, head-spinning possibilities, how should we make sense of non-human suffering?

One solution is to accept that sentience lurks on the border between activity and passivity: it enables the animal to actively direct her own actions – to be an individual who follows her own experiences – but it also means that the animal is utterly vulnerable to the actions of others.

That is, the capacity to experience is both debilitating and enabling: it leaves us vulnerable, but also enables us to be creatures with an outlook on reality, who direct their behaviour on the basis of what they feel and experience.

Let's briefly go back to Regan, who emphasizes the continuity of mental life: humans and many other animals have a sense of continuity in regard to experiences. It is this 'strong conception' of sentience that serves as the criterion for inherent or individual value (Regan 1983). Just as John Locke famously argued that the 'self' is based on the continuity of consciousness, Regan is therefore asserting that the continuity of experience forms the basis of our value as individuals. Here, sentience goes hand in hand with other cognitive capacities. It concerns the whole being: it is a continuum of experience in all its different manifestations, and gains support from capacities such as intentionality, belief-formation, or species-specific behaviour traits. That is, sentience emerges as a feel of things, the nature of which is derived from the specific capacities that a given being has: how an animal experiences her existence depends on her cognitive ability. In this sense, sentience combines the active and the passive: it renders us vulnerable, but also makes us potent. We are passive in that experience takes place in us and affects us; as the vessels of constantly ongoing experience, we are left vulnerable to the effects of the external world. However, we are also active in that different cognitive abilities impact on and guide our experience, and experiences again help us to direct our actions; experiences are partly based on and also directed by active ability, and furthermore render us into potent creatures, capable of intentionality. Human and non-human animals alike are, therefore, both the vessels and the captains of experience, not just one or the other. In this way, sentience is both passive and active, and leads to both vulnerability and agency; either/or categorization does not apply in this context.

Perhaps suffering, too, ought to be viewed in the same light. It is not merely a feeble, utterly passive state, in which we are completely at the mercy of the external world, but also an active state, which makes us scream and shout, flee and fight. This would mean that suffering cannot be pinpointed as either passivity or activity, but, rather, concerns our whole spectrum of experience in all its openness and potency. This duality of sentience and suffering means that other animals are neither entirely passive, incapable creatures nor perfect agents. They, like human beings, lurk somewhere between these two extremes, and it may be just this balancing act that lends sentience and suffering their moral significance.

## Universal suffering and universal duties?

A further difficult question concerns the universality embedded in many advocacy claims. A critic may point out that there are places and cultures in which animal suffering is not taken into account due to contextual factors. For some, practices that cause animal suffering may be part of a cultural tradition and thus entwined with self-identity. Can the Western, middle-class animal advocate really tell these people that what they are doing is wrong, without turning into a moral imperialist? If not, does this not mean that animal suffering lacks universal reprehensibility? This issue is linked to a more general criticism, according to which universality and objectivity are dubious concepts: there are no universal and objective moral truths, for morality is always contextual.

It can with good reason be argued that cultural traditions are not beyond moral scrutiny, nor are they sacred entities that should be preserved at all costs. Traditions are constantly undergoing change; they are never fixed phenomena that stay the same throughout eternity, but are tied to their own historical contexts and can both change form and gain new meanings as times and situations change. Thus, it simply is misguided to seek to keep a tradition from ever changing. In this process of change, morality should play a part: change should not be made to depend merely on random historical contingencies, but should also be reflected upon and guided from the perspective of morality. It is because of these two factors – change and moral reflection – that we now look down upon many racist and sexist traditions, and it is for the same two reasons that traditions which cause other animals suffering ought to undergo change. Whether it is fox-hunting, rodeos, bullfights, bear-hunting, cockfighting or whaling, causing animals suffering cannot be justified on the simple grounds that a tradition needs to be kept alive (see Aaltola and Oksanen 2002).

But is universalism warranted? Moral scrutiny may be needed, but should it come from within given cultures, or can others from the outside demand change, thus assuming a universal position? Mayerfeld vehemently defends the view that causing suffering to others is morally reprehensible in all places and at all times. To illuminate this claim, he suggests that, even if Roman slave-owners did not understand that they were doing the wrong thing in subjecting their slaves to suffering, they were still committing an immoral act. In other words, the historical or cultural contexts do not affect the moral implications of causing suffering: 'Morality is too important to leave to the jurisdiction of community values' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 5). What Mayerfeld bases his claim on

is the idea that suffering is necessarily something negative, regardless of what particular moral agents make of it. On the grounds of the aversive nature of suffering, unsurpassed by cultural considerations, we can also make the claim that causing suffering is always morally problematic, even if all the individuals in a given community believe otherwise. This is a strong stance to adopt, and reflects a neatly universalistic and objectivistic take on ethics.

For Mayerfeld, such strong universalism poses no discomfort. In fact, he links suffering to the birth of universal ethics, and argues that we can comprehend the latter precisely because it is intuitively so evident that causing suffering is a universal moral wrong: aversion towards suffering is our most basic universal value, and helps us to perceive other universal values, too. Thus, Mayerfeld bases his claims on the aversive nature of suffering. According to him, suffering is an 'intrinsic bad' for the person who suffers, and – in fact – is 'an evil in itself' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 85). No sufferer will, in his opinion, culturally contextualize or relativize the moral nature of her own suffering. Rather, from the individual perspective, suffering is always viewed in negative terms; it is always something the sufferer would wish to end. The same applies from an impersonal, universal perspective: 'Suffering isn't bad only for the sufferer. It is bad, period. The prevention of suffering is an improvement, not just from the perspective of the individual whose suffering it is, but an improvement in the state of the world' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 87). Therefore, Mayerfeld makes a leap from the individual to the universal: suffering is always negative from the individual viewpoint, and this negativity can be extended to inform the impersonal, universal perspective also. (He admits that he has no argument to offer in justification of this leap, and instead hopes that most will intuitively accept it.)

Now, there is truth to this view, for, as argued earlier, 'suffering' necessarily includes the element of aversion; it is a thick concept, fraught with moral apprehension. Past and present societies and individuals may have found ways of overriding the negative aspect of suffering in given circumstances (by claiming, for instance, that the suffering of given types of beings does not matter). However, if they are to suggest that suffering *per se* holds no moral relevance, their concept of suffering is unrecognizable – that is, we are no longer talking of the same thing.<sup>16</sup> Arguably, almost all human beings view 'suffering' as something morally charged and problematic, simply because of its deeply aversive and unsettling nature. This approach avoids the standard potholes encountered by universalism and moral objectivism (which are, of course,

age-old philosophical topics, debated to the brink of exhaustion). Often, universalists struggle to point out exactly where their moral truths originate from, and how they can be comprehended. But, if we understand suffering to be something that experiencing, moral beings will make sense of in morally negative terms, nothing too mystical needs to be implied. For moral beings of flesh and blood, viewing suffering as a moral evil makes sense and may even be both innate and necessary. Therefore, for us, suffering is a universal moral evil, not because this has been written on the cards of the cosmos, but because we are experiencing beings, from whose point of view suffering can never be neutral or positive. The intrinsically aversive nature of suffering lays the basis for its presumed universal moral 'thickness'.

As Mayerfeld points out, non-human suffering, too, merits universal concern (Mayerfeld 1999). If we feel that suffering is in itself something that should not take place, non-human suffering has to be included. Species differences bear no relevance, even if the anthropocentric culture seeks to inflate their significance. Moral agency is not relevant, either. Non-human animals may not be able to understand normative analyses of 'suffering', but their aversion to their own suffering is just as potent as ours, and this aversion holds equally strong normative meaning. The argument can be sketched as follows: 1) I feel strong aversion towards my own suffering; 2) because of this aversion, 'suffering' is a moral evil to me; 3) I can see that other animals feel similar aversion; 4) as a moral agent, I view their suffering in moral terms, too, even when the animals in question are incapable of doing so. The assumption underlying the argument is that aversion has moral weight or thickness, which cannot be ignored on the basis of species or moral agency.

In fact, it can even be claimed that we can only understand the concept of 'animal suffering' if we view it in morally aversive terms. If the term 'suffering' has substantial normative significance, ignoring that significance may render one blind to the whole concept. The interesting consequence is that those who abuse other animals do not understand what 'animal suffering' is. To put it simply, were they to understand it, they would not take part in abuse. This is the paradox of causing suffering: it is only really possible to cause suffering intentionally if one does not understand what 'suffering' means. This group does not only include sadistic school kids or psychopaths unable to empathize with others, but also individuals raised in cultures or societies which do not see animals as the types of creatures that one approaches from a standpoint of normativity. Quite simply, these individuals lack

understanding of 'animal suffering', because they are ignorant of its normative component.

But what does this mean from the viewpoint of telling other cultures 'what to do'? The obvious argument is that, if ignorance of non-human suffering is based on anthropocentric narratives that seek to hide the aversive and normative aspects of such suffering, it would seem only fruitful to call for further scrutiny on these narratives. What those opposed to 'cultural imperialism' attack is dictating how others ought to live and believe – however, requests for further scrutiny and exploration are hardly such acts of tyranny. If anything, the type of openness and dialogue that are often emphasized in inter-cultural affairs would seem to facilitate these requests easily. Moreover, it should be noted that strong cultural pluralism and relativism are troubling, most of all because they place a presumed cultural independence as the most sacred value, to be respected before any other considerations. However, one could claim that there are, in fact, many other considerations far more important than cultural independence, and that one such consideration is the suffering of others (be they human or non-human). To remain quiet in the face of suffering, simply in order to respect the autonomy of a different culture, appears as morally crooked. Therefore, just as one should seek to tackle non-human suffering in one's own culture, one can justifiably seek to bring forward criticism of suffering-inducing practices in other cultures.

Still, not everybody is willing to agree that suffering warrants universal concern. Joseph Amato argues that, in fact, with the birth of universality, we have lost the tool with which to make sense of suffering, for it is only locality – concentrating on a given, restricted group of people in a given, specific context – that enables one to adequately understand and cope with suffering. With universality, we no longer know whom to help (since there are impossibly many who should be helped, what action should we take?) and ultimately lose the moral compass that helps us to understand what is relevant in each circumstance. Amato asserts that there is a definite need for hierarchies: some sufferers count for more than others. The suggestion is that one should look back to the past, when communities constructed hierarchies with which to make sense of suffering. Here, it was not the suffering of all that mattered, but rather – on the basis of specific cultural traditions – only the suffering of some (Amato 1990). Hence, universal concern is replaced by hierarchy-centred cultural relativism.

Not only universal concern, but also the very emphasis on suffering, is criticized. Amato claims that preoccupation with suffering has led

to a situation in which suffering trumps other considerations, such as justice or fairness. Suffering has become an obsession, an overly emphasized facet of morality. As a result of this emphasis, 'an ethos of guilt' has emerged, which requires those with power to feel responsible for the suffering of the world. Different groups of victims (African Americans, women, and so on) have started to argue their case, and here non-human suffering, too, has raised its head: 'blacks, Native Americans, women, Latinos, the unemployed, the disadvantaged, the animal rights advocates, representatives of wildlife, and others' speak with the 'language of victims', which demands society's attention (Amato 1990, p. 156). Amato asserts that the ethos of guilt is misplaced, for it asks too much of the privileged, and places too much guilt on their shoulders. He even argues that universality is an 'enemy' that would have us 'suffer all suffering... he invites us to live the sham of imagining ourselves to be none other than all-feeling and merciful God' (Amato 1990, p. 210). The privileged are placed in an impossible position, where they are meant to be Hare's archangels, capable of caring for everybody, and blamed if they fail in this mammoth task.

Thus, prominence of suffering has sidelined other moral considerations and placed unreasonable demands on those with power. Quite startlingly, Amato goes on to state that what he sees to be a language of victims and guilt has become 'the means for seeking moral dominance and contending for power' (Amato 1990, p. 156). Therefore, advocates use suffering as a means to gain power over the privileged. The different groups mentioned above utilize guilt, for it 'allow[s] its users a dramatic and superior moral posture, serving their desire for power' (Amato 1990, p. 157). Hence, concern for suffering, and the corresponding attack on the privileged, are ultimately based on the desire for power.

In order to defeat this scenario, Amato suggests that we diminish concern for suffering, and even diminish morality. He maintains that society has become overly sensitive to suffering, which again has led to an overly elevated status of morality and ethics: 'This increasing and paradoxical sensitivity to suffering... accounts for among other things the softening of civilization. Nietzsche was right. Concern for others (particularly the weak and the downtrodden) and the guilt associated with it turns warriors into courtiers. It makes power taboo; it surrenders culture to moralisers' (Amato 1990, p. 179). The rather disturbing implication is that concern for suffering and morality are a sign of weakness, a perversion of human character. With the Nietzschean image of the egoistic superhuman in one hand and disregard for pity and suffering in the other, Amato asserts that the past shows how indifference to



suffering can be necessary for survival: 'There is always a standing need to repress some suffering, to leave it without meaning, to live beyond, around, and despite it' (Amato 1990, p. 185). In other words, suffering does not always matter, and in particular the suffering of distant others can lack all moral significance. The strong are justified in concentrating on themselves and those closest to them, while the unprivileged remain in a state of torment.

These are very harsh words, and what emerges is a thoroughly conservative, cynical and hierarchical view of the world: in order to serve our own interests, we must concentrate only on the suffering of those who personally matter to us. It is 'us' against 'them', the strong against the weak, and to pay heed to the weak is to become weak. This type of criticism does not, perhaps, deserve further exploration, simply because its basic claims are so warped by a dubious metaphysic of eternal competition and egoistical individualism. However, in this context, there are reasons to have a closer look. This is because arguments similar to Amato's have been used to attack animal advocacy. As seen, it is often claimed that it is absurd to ask for universal consideration for all suffering regardless of species, that human beings have the right to put themselves first and therefore ignore the suffering of other animals, and that animal advocates are annoying, whining moralists, who ultimately just want power over other people.

Amato offers a caricature of a highly conservative sentiment, which attacks efforts for change on the grounds that the status quo will thereby be weakened and the privileged will have to make some sacrifices. He chooses to observe a complex phenomenon from only one perspective: that of egoistical power. Everything is reduced to egoism and power, and thus the most fundamental aspects of concern for suffering are quite simply lost – understanding what 'compassion' means requires that one step outside the framework of competition and self-obsession, and without the willingness to do this one remains blind to the nature and possibility of paying regard to distant others. Most importantly, this is because egoism is self-directed, and compassion other-directed. Thus, with breathtaking disregard, Amato concentrates solely on the viewpoint of those who cause suffering, and altogether ignores the viewpoint of those who suffer. The presumed 'us' (those with power) constitute the epistemological and moral centre of reality; nobody else's experiences and views are given prominence.

It is this one-sided take on suffering that leads him to dwell on the issue of power: what is usually deemed compassion for others, Amato deems an attack on oneself. That is, since everything is viewed from the

perspective of the perpetrator and her own desire for power, any efforts to limit or curtail her actions are perceived as stemming from a desire to get into her shoes, to become the perpetrator. When egoism and power are the sole explanatory concepts, even compassion translates into a competitive act. Because the egoist is herself fixated on self-regard and power, she interprets any demands for morality as further manifestations of power; seeing the world through the lens of power struggles, she fails to comprehend or recognize claims of compassion for what they are. Advocacy becomes egoism. What Amato is sorely missing is an understanding that there is more to life than this narrow Nietzschean metaphysic.

The same logic has been repeatedly witnessed in criticism of animal advocacy. In particular, the charge of misanthropy has been common, reflecting a presumption that concern for animals must equal an attack on humanity: if you care for animals, you must hate human beings. The 'us' – 'them' and the 'privileged' – 'weak' dichotomies, so evident in Amato's stance, are vividly present in this claim. Give regard to non-human creatures, and you are eroding the power of human beings by redirecting attention away from the human self. In this criticism, the suffering of other animals does not play a part; it is not even recognized. All that matters is the priority of the human point of view. It is this that enables critics to warp 'compassion' oddly into 'misanthropy', for they do not comprehend any epistemology other than that centred on the human self. Moreover, advocates are easily depicted as high-and-mighty moralists who consider themselves ethically superior: that is, those who speak for animals are often thought to regard themselves as better than other people. Again, this presumption stems from an odd world view, in which egos fight against egos, and everybody seeks to claim a higher place in the hierarchy. If this world view – modelled on the values of neo-liberalistic, capitalist societies – were torn to pieces, it would become easier to see that concern for animals can be just that, concern, not an effort to seek more power over others.

Amato's approach is a very handy tool for denial and rejection of both guilt and responsibility. The egoist wants to be shielded from the cries of the victims so that she can follow her own desire to serve her own interests ruthlessly. To hear about suffering places uncomfortable demands on oneself, even arousing the awkward stirrings of conscience, and therefore the egoist simply demands that suffering not be discussed. It is because of this that morality is attacked as 'moralizing': what is a genuine, well-founded claim is turned into something invalid by giving it a disparaging new name, enabling one to ignore the uncomfortable

request to pay heed to the suffering of others as well as of oneself. We should not be made to feel guilty, the egoist thinks, because this hinders the wholehearted pursuit of one's own happiness, and, if anybody dares to arouse guilt, she can be ignored with the help of demeaning labels.

Of course, moral claims regarding suffering need not have anything to do with power; instead, they often achieve the opposite by serving as a reminder that the search for power is, in itself, harmful. This is precisely the point of the countless grass-roots organizations that seek to help suffering human and non-human animals: they explicitly criticize power hierarchies and point out how overemphasis on power often initiates the type of framework that fuels suffering. This is the crucial difference between the self-directed and the other-directed world view: the former centres on power, while the latter seeks to question its centrality. It is precisely here that we find the meaning of 'compassion', so alien to Amato's argument. Compassion requires that one ignore power hierarchies and cross lines between 'us' and 'them', 'me' and 'you'. It blurs boundaries and helps one to become open to the experiences and moral worth of others; it offers us a world in which our own perspective is just one amongst many, and in which equality rather than hierarchy is the ultimate aim of morality.

But how do we navigate amidst the totality of suffering, if everybody's suffering has equal moral relevance? How are decisions to be made, if we are bound by universal concern? These are very important questions from the standpoint of animal advocacy, as there are millions upon millions of non-human animals suffering at human hands every moment, and it may seem mind-boggling even to begin to know how and whom to help. Now, as already seen, the impossibility of helping everybody does not mean that the ideal of equal moral concern should be abandoned. Rather, we just have to do our best, even if this best is never good enough. It is this simple observation that Amato fails to recognize: even if the suffering of all sentient beings is counted as morally relevant, one does not need to succeed in helping everybody, and neither does one have to meet impossible demands. All that is required is that we do what we can, within the limits given to us. Nobody has to become the archangel, even if most have to put much more effort into respecting the sentience of non-human others.

Therefore the claim, according to which hierarchies are needed simply in order to prevent moral agents from becoming overburdened, is groundless. But do we need culturally produced hierarchies in order to make moral decisions regarding the practice of helping? The answer is

no – all that is needed are normative tools with which to make prioritizations. When deciding whom to help, it is worth paying attention to questions such as: Whom can I help? Whom am I good at helping? Who would benefit most from my help? These types of contextual considerations go a long way towards determining which sufferings to direct one's attention to in a world where suffering seems to exist everywhere. Ironically, perhaps the most efficient way of helping is to start by attacking the egoism that allows animal subjugation and fuels the incessant suffering that takes place within the animal industries. Whereas Amato argues that universalists are lost as to how to relieve suffering, it may well be that the quickest way to help is to demolish the type of egoism advocated by Amato. Hence, before we embark on helping those that we *can* help, the first thing to do is to rid ourselves of egoistical fantasies that so easily produce nothing but violence and passivity.

There is one more criticism of universal concern that ought to be taken into account. Cynical egoism can, at times, be linked to contemporary post-structural theory, with very unfortunate results. Those post-structuralist intellectuals who cast doubt on whether we can speak of 'universal concern' may unwittingly offer alibis for aggressors. This is because, along with universal concern, truth value and objectivity are relativized as well: there are as many truths as there are viewpoints. Although there is much merit to the criticism of traditional understandings of universality, truth and objectivity, the danger is that this criticism leads to moral nihilism. It is silly to fight atrocities, because, on the level of theory, there is no such thing as 'truth': the dictator's word is just as valid as the victim's, and there is no way of deciding whether to favour the egoist anthropocentric or the compassionate advocate. Commenting on this, Stanley Cohen has argued that what we are faced with is 'mindless relativism', within which atrocities become 'allegations' (Cohen 2002, p. 243; see also Bauman 1993). Cohen maintains that suffering without compensation and violation without accountability are typical of postmodernity: you can get away with causing tremendous suffering, since even those who are looking at it do not care. In other words, contemporary morality lacks the substance that is needed to establish duties and responsibility, partly because even well-intentioned people are eager to relativize morality.<sup>17</sup>

Again, this analysis applies also to the case of non-human animals, since any claim concerning their suffering can be viewed as just another allegation among many. In particular, it is very common to relativize what animal suffering is: how does anyone know what goes on in the mind of a cow or a pig, and how can anyone ever assert without doubt

that an animal suffers? As seen in the first part of the book, these questions are in themselves problematic, as they rely on a sceptical world view plagued with difficulties. However, with the growth of moral nihilism, they may become ever more popular, as even people eager to alleviate animal suffering may colour it with a relativistic brush. Moreover, relativism asserts that there really is no way of knowing whose moral beliefs about non-human suffering are the most valid. A hunter, a sadistic schoolboy, a farmer, a vegan, will all have differing beliefs, and in the end these beliefs are nothing more than 'opinions' that cannot be placed in a clear order. Suddenly, not only cultures, but also individual people, can decide for themselves what to do with animals, for there are no universal guidelines, no way of establishing 'truth'. In the end, anything goes.

It is worth keeping in mind that this nihilism stems from a particular cultural context, eager to underline fragmentation, egoism and loss of value (see again Bauman 1993). Contemporary consumer societies, constantly seeking entertainment and things to buy, and obsessed with the desire to instantly forget and ignore whatever no longer serves one's interests, are fertile ground for nihilistic attitudes towards both human and non-human suffering. However, the most obvious response to this form of moral nihilism is the inherent aversiveness of suffering, emphasized earlier. A sentient being cannot approach her own suffering with an 'anything goes' attitude and decide either to like or to hate it – it is always something deeply negative, leaving no room for interpretation. Perhaps for a sentient creature the aversiveness of suffering is the most fundamental truth of all, something that cannot be hidden from or denied. Whether the morality of causing suffering to others can be deemed equally obvious depends on our capacity or willingness to identify with and care for others. It is this topic that we shall turn to in the last part of the book, where the emphasis will be on our capacity to empathize with and feel compassion for non-human others. First, however, let's take a look at those post-structural theories concerning animals which offer an alternative to the cynicism presented here.

# 5

## Morality and Animal Suffering: Continental Investigations

Besides analytical animal ethics, there are other routes to understanding non-human suffering. One of these can be found in continental philosophy. Here metaphysics, or the manner in which the sufferer is positioned in relation to oneself, acquires prominence.

One famous source is Emmanuel Levinas. According to Levinas, ethics is not reducible to theory, but rather has to do with the metaphysics of meeting the 'other' (i.e. another being). We are to come face to face with other creatures outside predetermined intellectual configurations or categories (which Levinas calls 'totalizations'), for these force our own preconceptions onto others and hence fail to do them justice. To put it simply: categorizing, prior assumptions concerning others need to be abandoned, and other beings are to be met completely afresh and anew (Levinas 1969).

Levinas argues that it is, in fact, only outside such assumptions that we can truly understand others, for this ensures that our understanding is not tied to misleading predefinitions. Therefore, other beings must be 'refractory to every typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification' (Levinas 1969, p. 73).<sup>1</sup> The other being and her 'face' must be naked in front of us, and an ideal situation is one in which 'The face has turned to me – and this is its very nudity. It is by itself and not by reference to a system' (Levinas 1969, p. 75). That is, others must be 'naked' in front of us; they must exist without reference to any fixed presumptions. It is this nakedness that leads to an interruption or astonishment, which again lays the groundwork for ethics. When we suddenly see the other being without biased assumptions, naked, fragile and vulnerable, we become interrupted from our prejudiced dreams and egoistical existence, and can see her as a being of value, and become aware of our need to attend to her. What is crucial

is that the vulnerability of the other shines through her nakedness: her very being calls for attention, because we suddenly realize that she is a vulnerable creature, worthy of care.

Ethics is therefore built on the sudden realization that our own hedonistic pursuits are utterly secondary: 'The presence of the Other is equivalent to this calling into question of my joyous possession of the world' (Levinas 1969, p. 76). As a result, self-directedness is replaced with a desire to be there for the other being, to care for her: 'To recognise the Other is to recognise hunger. To recognise the Other is to give' (Levinas 1969, p. 75). After seeing the vulnerable other in front of us, we realize how narrow egoistical considerations are, and how they must be eradicated in order to make room for care for this other being and her suffering. These moments constitute an epiphany, a sudden realization that has a huge impact, as if we had only now opened our eyes: 'My encounter... Has the character of a visitation, an epiphany, a revelation' (Zahavi 2001, p. 159). Ethics emerges as obvious – concern for the other being is not a matter of logical argumentation or theory, but instead comes to be at the moment we recognize that being in her vulnerability. Thus, it is coming face to face with others that gives birth to moral awareness. Significantly, killing the other being is the ultimate act of power, but in these sudden moments of ethical epiphany we come to see how utterly wrong the act of killing would be: 'This infinity, stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial expression, is the first word: "You shall not commit murder"' (Levinas 1969, p. 199). Therefore, the sudden epiphany that the other has value, too, makes it clear that killing her would always be wrong. Suffering, too, plays an important role. Levinas underlines the enormity of suffering and maintains that physical suffering, from which one feels there is no escape, epitomizes moral evil.<sup>2</sup> It is precisely the suffering of others that Levinas is asking us to recognize and come face to face with; it is suffering that most clearly establishes the grounds for moral awakening.

Hence, as soon as one stops force-fitting other beings into pre-existing categories, and thereby imposing culturally created stereotypes on them, one begins to see their naked vulnerability, and start to care. In other words, it is prejudice which invites and maintains self-directedness, whereas truly seeing the other being in her immediacy opens the path for other-directedness. This is very relevant in the context of animal suffering. As soon as the animal ceases to be an 'experimental animal' or 'vermin', and as soon as we meet her outside specific anthropocentric narratives that tell us how other animals ought to be treated, we can

gain a glimpse of her and her vulnerability, which may stop us in our egoistic desire to keep on doing whatever promotes our immediate benefit, so that we actually feel concern for the fate of the animal in front of us. Suddenly, one begins to care for the suffering of beings whom one had hardly even noticed before; an epiphany arises and other animals are seen anew, as beings with subjectivity and value. The promise is that not only non-human suffering, but also the killing of non-human animals, will be seen through the prism of normativity.

However, for Levinas, an animal cannot be an 'Other'. He discusses a dog (Bobby) who repeatedly came to visit him in the perimeters of a Nazi prison camp built for French officers, and treated him more humanely than the human guards around him. Yet Levinas maintains that the dog did not have a 'face', for he could not speak. Therefore, although the dog displayed vulnerability and even ethics, he did not count as a significant other, for he had not mastered propositional language. This stance has been the object of some heavy criticism. In demanding that the dog should possess language, Levinas is precisely placing him in the type of prefixed category that he otherwise detests; he is demanding that the dog conform to established anthropocentric assumptions about moral relevance (Calarco 2008). Why should the dog not be accepted in his naked 'otherness'? That is, why is the dog seen in terms of a requirement for propositional language, rather than as the type of a creature he is, just as capable of vulnerability and suffering as a human being? Levinas wants us to forget about moral presumptions and demands, but himself hangs on to them in his take on non-human animals. The animal's vulnerability is not allowed to reach us because of prefixed assumptions concerning the importance of language.

This is all the more troubling when we consider that, for Levinas, the alterity and difference of others form the grounds for ethics: it is in recognizing the difference in others, without a desire to confine them within familiar categories, that we find the grounds for moral awareness. As Levinas argues, the other should be left in her otherness; she should be allowed to exist in her difference. It would appear that Levinas ignores this possibility in relation to non-human animals. He argues that 'If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other' (quoted in Zahavi 2001, p. 159), yet insists that non-human animals must communicate their state to us by means of propositional language. Why should they not remain a mystery, unreachable by language, and still retain moral relevance? Now, for Levinas, language is supremely important because he assumes that it is necessary for communication and contact with others; without it, others could not reveal



their experiences for us to see. However, keeping in mind what cognitive ethology has told us about non-human communication and the astonishing methods of non-verbal expression found in not only non-human but also human animals, this criterion seems hopelessly old-fashioned and ill-founded. That is, there are plenty of channels through which other animals can communicate their being, even if they are incapable of using propositional language. Therefore, there seems little reason to exclude non-humans from the sphere of moral concern, particularly if the principle of respecting the alterity of others is taken seriously.

Consequently, it has been argued that a consistent reading of Levinas would also include other animals. According to Matthew Calarco, Bobby is a victim among victims, no less significant in his vulnerability than human beings, and a consistent application of Levinas' approach requires that he, too, be seen as 'an other'. Calarco emphasizes that there is a definite need to get rid of the anthropocentric ramifications that have haunted the Western world, and that this applies also to continental philosophy. Although the latter has offered radical criticism of various forms of hierarchical metaphysics commonly found in Western world views, many (including Levinas) have still failed to challenge anthropocentrism (Calarco 2008). That is, although other hierarchies and categorizations have been resisted with passion, the anthropocentric hierarchies and categories have been, if anything, reaffirmed and restated time and again. As Cary Wolfe has pointed out, this post-humanistic philosophy has been deeply humanistic when it comes to other animals (Wolfe 2003). Therefore, Levinas' framework should also include non-human animals, who in their vulnerability and suffering call out to be noticed, and call out to be cared for. Witnessing a non-human animal in pain should lead to an epiphany of immediate understanding that she is a valuable creature, worthy of concern, and infinitely more important than those mundane, self-directed daily pursuits that many occupy their lives with.

Compared with Levinas, there are other representatives of the continental tradition who have been more favourable towards non-human animals. One example is Giorgio Agamben. Agamben is critical of the notion that only beings who master propositional language have minds. He is interested in the transition between non-human animal communication and human language, arguing that thought exists before language and that other cognitive capacities may pre-date and give birth to propositionality. This pre-linguistic understanding of cognition enables Agamben to maintain that non-human creatures can have minds despite the absence of language (Agamben 2003; see also Calarco 2008).

Thus, the very basis of human exclusivity that Levinas emphasizes is placed in doubt.

More importantly, Agamben argues that the human–animal dualism is one of the main obstacles in the path of a radically new take on reality. For him, if we are to broaden our horizons, nothing less than a complete eradication of this dualism will do. Agamben speaks of the ‘anthropological machine’ as a tool by means of which the human–animal distinction is maintained. Its basic function is to separate beings into different categories on a basis of exclusion and inclusion: that is, it establishes divisive boundaries between humans and other animals.<sup>3</sup> Contemporary biopolitics is one manifestation of this ‘machine’, and within it the biological animal aspects of humanity are more and more closely manipulated and controlled. This control of ‘bare life’, again, provides the basis for new concentration camps and totalitarianism: a consequence that should make us demand nothing less than the eradication of artificial divisions and ultimately the whole human–animal dichotomy. That is, divisions lead to overt control and violence, and therefore also the human–animal dualism, so central in the violence-inducing structures of contemporary Western societies, is to be abandoned. In keeping with this idea, Agamben argues that the question of human–animal dualism is more significant than that of human rights. We should not dwell on human values and rights while humanism itself remains an open question. Rather, we should notice how, through the use of exclusive humanistic categories, totalitarian regimes of control have begun to manipulate life itself (Agamben 2003; Calarco 2008).

Thus, Agamben shows us the error in Levinas’ rejection of the animal and abandons the type of dualism on which this rejection is based. In doing so, he opens the door to accepting non-human animals as ‘others’, whose vulnerability and suffering ought to interrupt us. We are, of course, already witnessing the concentration camps born of rigid anthropocentrism, as animals are manipulated, controlled and then killed with ruthless efficiency in laboratories, industrial farms, puppy mills, and even zoos and hunting fields. The human–animal relationship has been reduced to nothing but control of the other, and it is precisely this that Agamben urges us to attack and rectify.

Jacques Derrida is perhaps the most often quoted continental thinker who has forcibly argued that an animal can be an ‘other’. Derrida’s aim is to alter how we view reality and to demolish contemporary Western metaphysics, and, as Calarco (2008) points out, here the role of non-human animals is crucial.

Like Levinas, Derrida criticizes the types of classifications and categorizations that have been so fundamental to Western philosophy. The desire to name and label everything has blinded us to the specificity of reality. This applies to other animals, too, for there is no generic 'animal', but countless varieties of individual creatures. Here, Derrida urges us to pay heed to the Darwinian revolution (in Derrida's terms, the 'second trauma' to humanism), which laid the path towards realizing that reality does not consist of 'humans' and 'animals', but of a multitude of beings, a breathtaking variety of different types of creatures. For Derrida, this multitude cannot be placed into clear categories or hierarchies, for its inherent specificity refuses to be given faceless, generic identities (Derrida 2004). Therefore, we are yet again to see other animals naked, outside predetermined categorizations that do violence to their specificity.

In order to explore this topic more deeply, Derrida uses as an example a moment when a cat looks at him. Suddenly, as the cat's piercing eyes are pointed towards him, Derrida is interrupted by the look. Under the cat's scrutiny, Derrida realizes that he is naked, and that the cat is a 'somebody' whose object Derrida has become. The Western roles or categories assigned to 'humans' and 'animals' are turned upside down: the animal is the looker, and the human an object to be looked at. This role reversal opens the door to an understanding that human beings are not the great subjects or masterminds Descartes would have liked them to be, nor are other animals dumb, faceless objects, as Western culture treats them. The cat cannot be rendered as a mere passive object: moreover, the omnipotent identity of the human being is also placed in doubt, since at the moment of the gaze both exist outside hierarchies and prefixed categories. In short, with one look, anthropocentric hierarchies and dualisms are demolished. In addition, the cat in question is not a generic 'cat', but 'that cat' – a specific creature, who can never be fully explained by reference to generalizing categories. As Calarco argues, Derrida offers us an animal who is 'an absolutely unique and irreplaceable entity' (Calarco 2008, p. 124). Derrida himself states that the cat's animality can never be fitted into the types or classes that language tends to demand: 'Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualised' (Derrida 2004). That is, not only the human–animal dualism, and not only the broad concept 'animal', but language itself may fail to do justice to the specificity of non-human creatures, who are cognitive, able creatures just like their human kin.

The moment of the look involves the demolition of two things in particular: prefixed categories and the types of definitions and hierarchies assigned to those categories. This means that the very basis of Western metaphysics – naming reality within generic boxes, and arranging them in hierarchies – is abolished (or, as Derrida famously would say, ‘deconstructed’). Because of this, reason and language suddenly make no sense. They cannot capture that which does not follow their own classifications, and which in fact is utterly alien to them: they cannot make sense of a specific animal actively gazing at the naked human being. Derrida even argues that the moment of the look can be defined as ‘madness’, for, as soon as one uses reason and language to make sense of it, the moment itself has vanished. Meeting the animal outside anthropocentric categories and hierarchies cannot be made sense of with the traditional language and reasoning of Western metaphysics, and therefore the moment is lost when words and reason come into play (hence, even descriptions like this will utterly fail to do it justice). As Calarco points out, encountering the animal is an ‘event’ which ‘jumbles experience of time, self and being’ and exposes ‘the limitations and shortcomings of our existing philosophical language about animals’ (Calarco 2008, p. 126). The other animal is to startle us, and we are to meet her outside the restrictions of language, on the level of immediacy.

In this way, the cat (or ‘that cat’) holds the key to revolutionizing Western metaphysics, as with such ease she invites us to look beyond categories and words, and to reach out towards existence beyond hierarchies and dualisms. That is, she invites us to enter into a world of immediacy and specificity, which may appear as ‘madness’ to those used to the rigid logic of language and reason, but which may also be much more real than anything constructed by such a logic. Here, the animal appears as an equal, specific creature, capable of both vulnerability and subjectivity.

Therefore, just as Levinas asks us to see others outside ready-made conceptualizations, Derrida urges a new approach to non-human animals that exists on the level of immediacy. This immediacy goes on to provide the basis of Derrida’s take on ethics. As pointed out earlier, Derrida speaks of the ‘interruptive encounter’, through which we come face to face with the vulnerability of others. According to Calarco, this is where ethics resides: ‘The Other leaves a trace of the shock of encounter within me, and how I respond to that trace – whether I affirm or negate, avow or disavow – constitutes ethics, properly speaking’ (Calarco 2008, p. 126). Importantly, Derrida confirms that non-human animals can

be others, who interrupt us in their vulnerability. They exist outside anthropocentric assumptions, and we shall only understand them if we are willing to forsake those assumptions; moreover, it is here, in these moments of direct understanding, that ethics comes to be. To see the cat outside anthropocentric categories and to let her see you gives birth to morality.

This has clear implications from the standpoint of animal suffering. For Derrida, encounters with animals are forceful and as such defy mechanomorphic preconceptions that deny the relevance of animal suffering. They also preclude scepticism as to whether or not the animal really suffers, and whether or not that suffering is morally relevant: what unravels in front of one appears obvious and real. Calarco applauds Derrida's claim. Modern philosophy is interested in scepticism rather than in the undeniable, and thus – as already witnessed – will ask for more and more proof that the animal actually suffers. The result has been a “war” over compassion toward animals’ (Calarco 2008, p. 119). For Derrida, however, the disruption caused by animal suffering leaves no doubt.<sup>4</sup> Non-human suffering and its moral relevance emerge as blatant. Therefore, through forsaking prefixed categories and entering into ‘moments of madness’ (Calarco 2008) with other animals, we shall discover, not only specificity and absence of hierarchies, but also the significance of animal suffering.

Derrida does not shy away from describing the violence suffered by animals, but makes explicit his opposition to the treatment endured by billions of non-human others. He discusses in detail the technological methods used to oppress other animals, which prompts Calarco to state that Derrida is ‘one of the very few prominent philosophers in the Continental tradition not just to allude to this violence but to name and examine it with care’ (Calarco 2008, p. 109). In particular, whereas Levinas states that animals cannot be ‘others’ or correlated with the victims of Nazi concentration camps, Derrida argues that animals are, in fact, constant victims of a Holocaust. He advances the radical claim that animals suffer continuous atrocities of the worst kind: ‘The annihilation of certain species is indeed in process, but it is occurring through the organisation and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, outside of every supposed norm of a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or even their overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organise the overproduction and

overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by the means of artificial insemination so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of imposition of genetic experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire. In the same abattoirs' (Derrida 2004, p. 120).

Therefore, the fate suffered by animals is actually worse than the fate suffered by human victims, because, whereas the latter are destined to meet conclusive annihilation, the former are intentionally and continuously brought into existence and kept in horrid conditions, only to be killed. There is no conclusion, but, rather, a steady flow of suffering and death that has no end. What we have is a never-ending Holocaust-machinery, which will spew out more and more animals into the world with only one purpose: to kill and eat them. There is no end, no resolution, only constant suffering and death. Derrida also makes a distinct correlation between the Holocaust of humans and that of other animals, as he points out that both take place in the same abattoirs, that in both cases living, sentient, specific creatures are killed as if they were nothing but flesh and bones to begin with. That is, in neither case do the experiences and specificity of the individual beings count for anything: the creature in question is but a physical body or an abstract category, devoid of value and relevance.

Derrida continues by offering practical ways of combating violence towards non-human animals. Although he is critical of the type of standard political configurations on which 'rights movements' rest, Derrida goes on to offer his support for the animal rights movement. In an interview, he also states his opposition to factory farming, animal experimentation, bullfighting, and so forth, and criticizes standard arguments against vegetarianism (such as nutrient deficiency, culinary pleasure, and violence in nature) (Calarco 2008; Derrida 1991; see also *overspill* from the 2002 film *Derrida*). Resigning from the very institutions that oppress other animals and cause them to suffer is the way forward: the cat's look is not just a stimulus to theoretical pondering, but also carries obvious practical implications.

Derrida's account shows us that recognizing animal suffering is not only a matter of analytical theory, but also of reconfiguring the human-animal relationship by positioning ourselves in a thoroughly new way in relation to our non-human kin. It is not just what we think of other animals, or even how we feel about them, that matters, but also how we position ourselves towards them, that is, how we align ourselves in relation to the animal presence. We should be willing to see the animal outside presumptive categories, meeting her as a creature capable of also

seeing us. If anything, we should be surprised by the animal, startled by her presence as a specific being who has her own perspective on the world. Here, our whole metaphysics, that is, our understanding of reality, becomes open to change. What Derrida suggests is very radical, for accepting it would make it difficult even to speak of 'humans' or 'animals', but rather would require one to give up the types of categories that Western thinking is used to. How to talk about other animals without referring to the 'animal' category remains an open question, as does the way in which philosophy can depict the moments of 'madness' that lie outside words. Yet, as difficult as these questions may seem, perhaps it is in exploring them that new and important ways of comprehending non-human suffering can be found. Paying heed to animal suffering demands that one's wider perspective on the world be put under scrutiny.

It can be argued that non-human suffering is, in fact, best seen in 'moments of madness'. Outside presumptive categories and language, a sense of immediacy gains power, and it is this immediacy that can best manifest and communicate the suffering of others. If suffering is deeply subjective and deeply aversive, it will (as already argued) always escape words. Theories and categories will fail to do it justice, and it is perhaps due to this that non-human suffering is so easily buried under layers of clinical description and detached, theoretical jargon. Moments of immediacy, on the other hand, can reveal and present that which escapes words. When we are suddenly startled awake to the presence, subjectivity and specificity of other animals, we can also begin to see their suffering in an entirely new way. This means that there may be understanding outside or beyond words, and that this understanding can be more vivid and poignant than that afforded by language. What this immediacy consists of will be the topic of the next and final part of the book.

# 6

## Emotion, Empathy and Intersubjectivity

Cora Diamond has argued that analytic animal ethics – animal ethics based on reasoned, theoretical analyses – risks becoming a form of ‘deflection’ if it concentrates merely on argumentation and logic instead of what ought to be immediate and obvious (Diamond 2004). That is, reasoned analyses can distract us from what is right in front of us: what is easy and immediately known becomes something complicated and obscure. This argument has become increasingly common, as the Cartesian emphasis on reason has been accused of leading to an abstract view of the world, detached from the practical level. Philosophers argue about the logical relations between moral concepts and the abstract ramifications of specific theories, while remaining blind to the everyday level of reality, at which other beings are concretely and immediately grasped, and at which we are guided, not only by reason, but also by contextuality and emotion. Perhaps, therefore, ethics concerning non-human suffering should pay less attention to analytical theories and more attention to the ‘immediate’. However, what this immediate consists of remains an open question. In this section of the book, three potential channels of immediacy in particular – emotion, empathy and intersubjectivity – will be explored.

### Emotions

Like Diamond, Alice Crary criticizes what she calls the ‘philosophers’ fixation on moral judgment’ (Crary 2009, p. 10), which requires abstraction and detachment, and which may therefore create blindness to everyday experiences. Arguably suffering, too, can become just another factor in a moral argument, and thereby be sanitized: it is no longer disturbing or touching, but instead one element in a neutral discussion characterized



by intellectual gymnastics. Perhaps, then, ethics of animal suffering should not be approached from the standpoint of theory, but through the lens of emotion, subjective experience and the 'obvious'.

Crary maintains that developing emotive sensibilities can be necessary for the ability to create sound judgements. She claims that, although emotions, or more generally the subjective perspective, may lead one astray, they can also be essential to a fuller understanding of reality. In fact, without them, a question mark can be placed on the accuracy of one's beliefs, and one's very ability to comprehend reality: 'While in some cases we may discover that the ascription of a given subjective property is grounded in a mere projection of particular subjective propensities, in others we may discover that such an ascription figures in the best, objectively most accurate account of how things are and, further, that the person who lacks the subjective endowments that would allow her to recognise them is simply missing something' (Crary 2009, p. 28). In fact, lack of emotion can render us blind to the world, and make even thinking impossible: with reason alone, we see what is in front of us, but we do not understand it without some emotional input.

Emotions and subjectivity have a clear role to play in ethics. Matilda does not need to remain neutral and detached, but, rather, should allow personal experiences and emotions to affect her conceptions of right and wrong. If anything, such experiences and emotions can be necessary if we are to grasp the world and see the 'obvious'. Whereas purely analytical thinkers will be deflected into the ivory towers of abstract ideas, those who make reference to experiences and emotions offer the promise of a more nuanced take on the world. The logic behind this claim rests on the now popular 'particularist' view, according to which detached reason all too easily 'codifies' or classifies reality into neat categories, and in so doing overlooks the fact that it is far too complex and heterogeneous ever to fit such rigid measurements. Instead, the best one can do is to try and grasp the particular, specific things, beings and events that one encounters; and here, rather than abstract theory, it is personal involvement with the world that guides our steps. That is, it is through emotion that one can comprehend the nature and relevance of the particular: rationality helps in the development of generalizations, but, to fully understand specificity, emotion also is required. And if, indeed, morality concerns the particular, it becomes obvious that, without emotion, moral beliefs remain hollow.

Therefore, emotion enables a more genuine look at the reality, simply because it does not have to cut corners. Reason seeks to fit the reality

into neat boxes, all accounted for by simple logic. As a consequence, much of the heterogeneity and complexity of life is left without due consideration. Emotion, on the other hand, allows one to view the world from 'within', and to take into account every little detail: it is like light, which caresses its objects from all corners (Nussbaum 1990). When we feel for another being, we will begin to understand her predicaments much more fully than if we were to follow nothing but cold deduction. This means that, rather than being whimsical and unreliable, emotion is just as legitimate a form of knowledge-production as reason. Hence, Johanna Tito has claimed that a 'feel for the animal' is a valid way of comprehending animality. Whereas critics would argue that subjective sentiments such as compassion are 'not about the reality', Tito maintains the opposite: 'The emotion or feel, no less than the concept of thought, is intentional, is a means or vehicle whereby reality is grasped' (Tito 2008, p. 294).

The relevance of emotion cannot be overstated. Crary claims that it is elemental to what we are as beings, and even gives our lives purpose: 'Particular emotional attachments may be essential to who we are in the most fundamental sense...they may be what give our lives meaning and make them worth living at all' (Crary 2009, p. 197). Again, it is easy to see where Crary is coming from. Without emotion things do not matter; with mere reason to guide us, we would be like robotic creatures without motivation or substance. As Mary Midgley has observed, emotions are the impetus and driving force behind our thoughts and actions, for only they make us care about what happens: reason alone will not suffice. Importantly, emotions are also the source of moral concern, to which reason only contributes fine-tuning: we care because of emotion, and arguments only sculpt what we already know (Midgley 1983; 1981). Martha Nussbaum has argued that emotions are a necessary element in moral understanding. She makes a distinction between 'knowing' and 'understanding', and claims that, whereas the former concerns factual information, the latter includes normative, felt comprehension. We may have factual 'knowledge' concerning, for instance, the structure of molecules, but 'understanding' requires that we see things with emotion and affect (Nussbaum 1990; 2001).<sup>1</sup> In particular, without emotions such as compassion, we may be entirely blind to the moral relevance of suffering.<sup>2</sup> Thus, if I see a child being hurt but have no emotional response to what I see, I do not fully understand what is unravelling in front of me; I see the facial expressions or hear the screams, but do not comprehend their meaning. Therefore, emotions

play an integral part both in our sense of meaning and in our sense of morality and suffering.

Nussbaum has offered an illuminating example of why emotion is important in our understanding of suffering. She refers to Martin Seligman's notorious studies of learned helplessness, in which Seligman would train dogs to do certain tricks to avoid electric shocks, and then would begin to bombard the animals with shocks regardless of what they did. First the animals had learned to control their environment, and suddenly all control was taken away and replaced with all-empowering pain. After repeated failed attempts to escape the continuous shocks, the animals would eventually become broken beings, who would 'piss and shit themselves, howl and struggle' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 167) to no avail. For Seligman, and presumably for many animal experimenters, this posed no issue, for animal suffering was to be approached from the viewpoint of detached rationalism. Science could not fully prove that other animals suffer, so – the detached scientist reckoned – there was no reason to view them as anything other than experimental models. For Nussbaum, this refusal to use emotion meant that Seligman was blinded: he had lost grasp of what was right in front of him (Nussbaum 2001).

The horror of this blindness is skilfully illuminated by Michael Fox and Lesley McLean, who have applied Nussbaum's emphasis on emotion to animal ethics. They speak of 'moral perception', which allows one to adopt a position from which one 'does not just see the events before her, she sees them *with her feelings*' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 163). For Fox and McLean, moral perception is about 'compassion, love, sympathy, tenderness and empathy' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 164) – which are also the core elements of understanding suffering. Seligman's notorious experiments exemplify unperceptive thinking. Intellect, they maintain, tells us to ignore the experiences of the animals and instead to turn to theories such as utilitarianism in order to justify the extreme cruelty that takes place. Intellect blocks away emotion, and the person can no longer understand the moral relevance of animal suffering: in fact, the person no longer understands what 'animal suffering' means. That is, because emotions are needed in order to understand suffering, the consequence is that, without them, 'we no longer see... the animal's pain and suffering' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 165). Fox and McLean comment that here 'perceptions have become shallow and faint; they [scientists] don't see what is there to be seen because they ignore their emotional and imaginative responses and what these responses should

reveal to them' – they are taking part in a 'de-sensitised reading process' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 168).

Like Midgley, Fox and McLean argue that ignoring emotion goes against human nature. Because of this, human beings following only calculating intellect can even be termed psychopathic: 'We are asked to neutralise our moral sensibility, to become, in some sense, like moral psychopaths' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 165). Yet, not all hope is lost. While the experimenters in this case risk turning into moral monsters – into psychopathic beings without a sense of compassion or emotion – those invested with such compassion can use it to seek a change in how other animals are treated. Thus, Fox and McLean suggest that: 'Our horror, our disgust, our grief and our empathy show us the suffering and cruelty inflicted on these dogs, and it is empathy and compassion toward them which for many demand that such forms of cruelty be stopped' (Fox and McLean 2008, p. 168). In this way, emotion may be needed for both moral awakening and action. Whereas lack of emotion lays the groundwork for moral monsters, emphasis on emotion may turn thus-far deflected and detached people into morally perceptive individuals.

These claims are hugely important in relation to animal ethics, and have been beautifully emphasized also by many eco-feminists (see, for instance, Plumwood 1991). The danger is that, when all prominence is placed on detached theory, people begin to lose sight of animal suffering, and as a consequence will become incapable of understanding that suffering and its moral implications. With nothing but theory in mind, the very obviousness and tangibility of suffering, together with its moral horror, disappear from sight. Theory can leave people cold, and, when no emotion is allowed space, claims presented in animal ethics may appear absurd, tedious, odd and even misanthropic; they simply make no sense ('What do you mean, a pig should have rights?'). More importantly, even when logical scrutiny shows that the animal ethicist is winning the argument and that her take on things is valid, her opponent can remain entirely unpersuaded, simply shrugging her shoulders and carrying on as usual. This is because, when emotions are not evoked, the opponent fails to grasp or truly understand what the ethicist is saying: it all looks good on paper, but fails to matter. Theory alone will not do; rather, it needs to be accompanied by emotion that helps us to see the very obviousness of what is wrong with causing other animals suffering.

To make matters worse, detached, diversionary language can serve as clinical jargon of the type that Arendt speaks of. This would mean

that deflective theories may erode the moral significance of animal suffering. Suffering becomes one premise in an argument, and thereby risks losing the experiential element that renders its moral meaning so obvious. Diamond explicates this very well in her take on the aforementioned 'difficulty of reality'. She refers to Elizabeth Costello, a character in J. M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals*, who has been exposed to the horror of animal suffering and as a result experiences a 'profound disturbance of the soul' (Diamond 2008, p. 54). She feels terror when noting that the supposedly decent people around her take part in a massacre beyond comprehension, and it is this that renders her reality so intricate. Diamond argues that animal ethicists like Singer and Regan ignore this difficulty, for they do not reflect on the very experiences that make us both care about animal suffering and also feel utterly helpless in the face of its magnitude. Here Costello's approach acts as an alternative to deflection. For her, it is just as problematic to treat the fate of animals as a point of normative debate as it would be to treat the Holocaust in the same way. Costello has been exposed to the suffering of other animals; she has been touched by its horror, and can no longer treat it as one premise in a neatly planned argument. It is no longer a matter of logic or theory, but is something far more obvious and concrete. The suffering of other animals *is*, it exists, and we should be touched and wounded by it without the need for argumentative support. Diamond argues: 'Is there any difficulty in seeing why we should not prefer to return to moral debate, in which the livingness and death of animals enter as facts that we treat as relevant in this or that way, not as presences that may unseat our reason?' (Diamond 2008, p. 74).

Similar views have been presented in phenomenology, wherein the suggestion has been that calculating rationality may be entirely misleading. For instance, Husserl felt that there is a disparity between everyday experience (the aforementioned 'life-world') and mathematized science, which remains blind to experience. The life-world is utterly complex and specific, whereas science demands abstract, generalizing categories. When the life-world is made sense of with the use of science, it effectively becomes unrecognizable and ultimately lost, for its complexity does not fit the rigid categories demanded by science. This leads to a domino effect of unfortunate events. First comes a sense of alienation, as we lose touch with the specificity of our surroundings and even of our own experiences. This leads to us viewing humanity in a disconnected, mathematized fashion: as it is made to fit rationalizing explanations, one no longer quite grasps what humanity means. Ultimately, one's sense of self is lost, which leads to a total collapse of

understanding: when the subjective element of experience is forgotten, so too is the experiencing subject – the focal point of all understanding – and thus a ‘crisis’ is born. With the loss of sense of self, also loss of empathy will take place, which further deepens the crisis. I do not know what I am, and therefore I will be unable to identify with or even acknowledge others (Husserl 1970). The consequences are petrifying. Since they have lost touch with experience, people begin not to care about the world and other beings, and may even become indifferent towards their own good. They may simply accept the irrationality of what is happening all around them, and turn a blind eye towards injustice and violence (Husserl himself felt that the inevitable consequence is the emergence of destructive political systems such as fascism – see Husserl 1970).

Arguably, the mechanomorphic understanding of animals is precisely a product of the mathematized world view, which ignores emotion and explains animals in the type of technical jargon Arendt speaks of. Many see other animals as more or less cognitively incapable creatures, simply because they have lost touch with their own experiences. As a result, we have a detached, anthropocentric world, which treats non-human animals as instruments for given gains, and which either does not recognize their suffering or sees no relevance in it. It is not just scientists who treat animals as mere things, but the society in general. If emotion is the route to knowing the suffering of others, in a world devoid of compassion suffering becomes insignificant.

Hence, there are risks involved in placing all the emphasis on theory. Our capacity to see animal suffering in a new light – or, rather, to see animal suffering at all – depends on our willingness to include emotion, and if theory rejects this inclusion it may act as a blindfold rather than as a motive for advocacy. This means that the negative image attached to ‘sentimentality’ needs to be expunged. Emotions are not something to be ashamed of, but something elementally important for human understanding and morality. Without them, we are lost. Most importantly, emotions may provide one basis for that all-important moment of epiphany, wherein things appear anew and yet crystal clear, and wherein both non-human suffering and its moral relevance emerge as tangible and obvious. They draw on one’s own sense of vulnerability and help one to see the victim of suffering in a wholly new light.<sup>3</sup> In other words, through emotion, the suffering of others becomes a recognized reality.

What does this mean in practice? What emotions are we to follow? Perhaps the most often discussed emotion in the non-human context

is compassion. Here, the logic of the argument is simple. Suffering is aversive to each individual subject, and through compassion we can relate to the way it is aversive also to others. Therefore, compassion in particular arises as a morally significant emotion, capable of reminding us of other individuals' viewpoints and experiences. Other emotions, too, can be significant; in fact, there are a whole host of emotions that help one to understand suffering and morality, ranging from anger and sadness to joy. However, in order to remain morally relevant, they need to be anchored by compassion, for the focus must be on the perspective and experiences of the animal. In other words, we must remain 'other-directed', rather than 'self-directed'; our intentions need to reach out towards other beings and seek to grasp their plight.

Psychological research has strengthened the case for compassion. One famous study comes from Carol Gilligan and suggests that culturally absorbed patterns of behaviour mean that boys will be a lot more likely to follow abstract rules, whereas girls will be guided by care for others. Boys are told to become detached, independent agents, ready to evolve into the high-achieving, competitive individuals of the capitalist workplace, whereas girls are taught to develop into caring creatures, who are willing to admit dependency and vulnerability, pay heed to emotion, and look after other family members. (Gilligan 1993). Of course, this gender division is very simplistic, and many individuals escape its influence. However, the important point of the study is that people tend to be committed either to the justice approach or to the care approach, not to both: that is, people pick and choose whether to remain detached and follow theory, or whether to feel compassion. Gilligan argues that those who follow the justice approach remain detached from others and depict ethics as a form of neutral, reasoned calculus. When things go wrong, they will feel anger and guilt, and finally give up. Those who favour the care approach, on the other hand, view others through emotion and involvement. They will respond to things that have gone wrong with grief and sorrow, and seek to mend the sorry state of affairs (Gilligan and Wiggins 1988). Moreover, whereas those who follow the justice approach will accept hierarchies and exclusions, those advocating the care approach emphasize inclusion. They will argue that the suffering of all, not just that of those closest to oneself, needs to be attended to.

In all, the care approach offers a much more fruitful ground for ethics. It enables a deeper understanding of other beings and a deeper commitment to their needs. Arguably, it is exactly what is required for society to take animal suffering more seriously. Yet, society tends

to favour the justice approach. Non-human animals are viewed from afar and allocated, in a wholly detached, unemotional way, positions in different groups and classes ('companion animals', 'prey', 'vermin', 'farmed animals', and so forth), which also occupy different levels of value. Utilitarianism is rife, as the suffering caused to non-human animals is justified on the basis of a hedonistic calculus that emphasizes human gain. Care has little relevance, and this renders us blind to animal suffering, which in turn means that very few people seek to effect a change. The importance of reinstating the value of emotion cannot be emphasized enough: society needs not only justice but also compassion. What is required is a greater number of human individuals able to feel care for other animals and sorrow at the sight of their suffering, and willing to take action in order to affect a change. Research shows that emotions such as compassion are, indeed, key elements in social change (Wilkinson 2005), contributing to moral change and inviting moral awareness. It is precisely because of this that emotions need to be emphasized also in relation to non-human suffering.

Therefore, understanding animal suffering and particularly its moral implications requires emotion. Here emotion need not be of the overwhelming and tearful kind, but can simply constitute ability to take into account and share the viewpoint of other beings. There is nothing embarrassing about emotion, nor is it necessarily misleading or blind: rather, it is one of the core elements of the process of making sense of the world. It is a way of perceiving what is real, obvious and important, and as such is something to cherish rather than to hide. Yet, it is important to note that, as well as emotion, reason and theory have their place. Just as morality needs emotion, it also needs reason, for, without the latter, emotions may push us in multiple conflicting directions, and ultimately become self-serving and muddled. Just as mere reason alone will lead to deflection, mere emotion may lead to distracted confusion. Hence, bringing emotion forward does not mean denial of reason – on the contrary, the two need to walk hand in hand, if the suffering of other animals is to be given full moral regard.

We will have another look at the role of reason later on – however, before that, let's explore other routes of finding immediacy.

## **Empathy**

Besides emotions, empathy has also been identified as one ground for morality. Emotions allow one to feel for the other being, but empathy enables one also to seek to comprehend what that other being is feeling



herself. That is, empathy is not so much an emotion towards others as an approach through which the experiences of other creatures can be grasped – it is not my own experience but the experience of another that emerges as central.

‘Empathy’, ‘sympathy’ and ‘compassion’ are at times treated as synonymous, but there are important differences.<sup>4</sup> The most standard definition states that empathy refers to understanding the viewpoint of another, whereas sympathy refers to feeling care for that being. In other words, sympathy is feeling *for* someone, and empathy is feeling *with* someone.<sup>5</sup> This interpretation of empathy was endorsed, for instance, by Edith Stein, according to whom ‘Empathy is a kind of act of perceiving sui generis... Empathy... is the experience of foreign consciousness in general’ (Stein 1989, p. 11). For her, sympathy is fellow-feeling or ‘joy-with-him’ (14), whereas empathy need not include emotion. Therefore, in empathy we simply understand what the other being is feeling, and in sympathy we care about her feelings, are concerned about them. However, some disagree with this standard differentiation. For example, Simon Baron-Cohen maintains that empathy means the ability to identify with the experiences of others, and to respond to those experiences with an appropriate emotion. This definition collapses the standard borders between empathy and sympathy (Baron-Cohen 2011).

To make matters more complicated, many have wanted to separate ‘emotional contagion’ from ‘empathy’. According to this view, we do not need to share another person’s emotional state in order to have empathy with her. Consequently, it is commonly argued that empathic emotions are ‘off-line’ (see Nilsson 2003). Imagination takes centre stage, as we try to imagine what the experiences of others are like, without necessarily sharing those experiences. From this perspective, empathy is like sketching, with the help of imagination, an emotionless painting of the experiences of another creature. To use Peter Goldie’s words, ‘Empathy is a process or procedure by which a person centrally imagines the narrative (the thoughts, feelings and emotions) of another person’ (Goldie 2000, p. 195); however, this process need not involve emotive commitment to the imagined narrative. One of the most famous advocates of this view, Stein, argued that empathy is representational, like memory or fantasy, not ‘primordial’: it represents the experiences of others to us, without causing us actually to feel those experiences (Stein 1989). Interestingly, this reading of empathy offers the added benefit in the non-human context, in that one does not need to know what animal suffering *is* like, but only to try to imagine what it *could be* like. That is, human beings do not need to share the emotions of other animals

and thereby claim to know them fully, for all that suffices is that they seek – with whatever limited means are available – to envision what those emotions might be like. From this standpoint, empathy towards animal suffering is less open to criticism, since it presents no strong claims to knowledge of animal experience.

One fruitful way to look at empathy combines the abovementioned elements. Here, empathy means an ability to imagine the viewpoints of others, and to feel care towards those viewpoints, without necessarily experiencing the very same sensations. Therefore, we can feel empathy towards non-human suffering if we use imagination to perceive what that suffering might be like, and if we feel care towards that suffering; yet, we need not actually share the animals' experiences. To summarize once more: in empathy, one seeks to comprehend the perspectives and experiences of others through using not only imagination but also knowledge as a method (knowledge may concern, for instance, the types of physiology and personal histories the other beings have). Moreover, as a consequence of this project of identification, one also cares and feels concern for the inner lives of the other creatures.

And what about compassion? Arthur Schopenhauer famously discussed compassion, or 'Mitleid', in his *On the Basis of Morality*. For Schopenhauer, compassion is close to emotional contagion, since within it 'I suffer directly with him, I feel his woe just as I ordinarily feel only my own' (Schopenhauer 1998, p. 143). As for Hume, compassion is for Schopenhauer the only true motivator of moral actions. In particular, compassion is closely linked to morality in regard to suffering, since compassion is aimed at the prevention of suffering: it is the sentiment that prepares the ground for the moral notion that suffering should be eradicated. In fact, prevention of suffering emerges as the most important moral norm of all, and this renders compassion the key capacity of moral existence. For Schopenhauer, only those actions are morally valuable which aim at producing happiness in others, and, since happiness, in his opinion, is absence of suffering, 'the only actions that can have moral worth are those that aim toward the relief or the prevention of other people's pains' (Nilsson 2003, p. 57). Therefore, prevention of suffering is the foundation stone of morality, and, since compassion helps us to feel for the suffering of others, compassion is what renders us moral. Schopenhauer summarizes: 'Only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have moral value, and every action resulting from any other motives has none' (Schopenhauer 1998, p. 144). Therefore, when it comes to morality and suffering, compassion acquires a foundational role.

But how does compassion differ from empathy? The distinguishing element in compassion is the way in which the self blurs into the other, so that the feelings of the other being are felt as though they were one's own,<sup>6</sup> and finally the line between oneself and the other being vanishes. Whereas in empathy we remember self–other distinctions, in compassion the suffering of others becomes our own, and identity-lines become blurred.<sup>7</sup> For the same reason, compassion is also more than sympathy. It collapses the 'I–other' distinction:<sup>8</sup> we not only feel *for* the suffering of others, but feel suffering as a result of theirs. That is, one does not look at suffering from an outside perspective; rather, one becomes embedded in it. What is significant about compassion is its ability to consume one's experiences: we become so involved in the suffering of another that we lose our own state of welfare. Their pain becomes our pain, and as a result our own happiness may be momentarily lost. In this sense, compassion can be very selfless, as one no longer concentrates solely on one's own state of being. Hence, the person who feels compassion cares so deeply for the plight of the other creature that she becomes consumed by it, even if it hurts her own interests, and even if it momentarily erodes her sense of self.

Therefore, compassion refers to feeling both suffering and care in response to the suffering of others: 'To feel compassion for another person is...to be in a state of sadness or suffering for this person's sake' (Nilsson 2003, p. 126). Yet, compassion can be frivolous, in that we may feel compassion mostly towards those for whom we already have the strongest feelings, while remaining utterly cold towards distant others. It is because of this that compassion should never lose sight of empathy. Empathy also reminds one of the viewpoints of those who do not immediately invite care and concern. For instance, there are many who feel nothing but aversion at the thought of rats or pigs, cannot really muster any compassion for these creatures, and would be hard pressed to change their approach, were it not for empathy and its ability to manifest that also those who are not immediately appealing or familiar do have their own legitimate and worthy perspectives and experiences. Because empathy is based more on imagination and intellect than on purely emotive tendencies, it can steer one towards relatively neutral waters and act as a reminder of the viewpoints of those who do not invite strong emotive commitment: regardless of our personal likes and dislikes, with empathy we can comprehend that rats, snakes or wolves have their own takes on reality. Empathy acts as a torch that illuminates the experiences of others, and in doing so it offers release from prejudiced restrictions, broadening one's horizons so that one can begin to

see subjectivity even in beings whose appearance fails to inspire care and concern.

There is an additional reason to underline empathy. Compassion is to be celebrated and nourished wherever it may grow. It offers a moral map with such immediacy and vividness that hardly anything can surpass its efficiency in making us behave morally towards (at least some) non-human animals. Yet, compassion can – precisely because of its raw, felt vividness – lead to exhaustion. Feeling suffering at the thought of animal suffering can render everyday life too difficult to bear, particularly if one constantly seeks to remain aware of what is happening to animals all around us. How can one endure the knowledge that every single second millions upon millions of animals are in a state of acute, hopeless suffering, stuffed in tiny cages, prodded and poked with syringes and knives? Very few can tolerate such awareness, and it is because of this that *compassion fatigue* – a prominent term in the human context also – so easily kicks in. In short, those who feel the most compassion may grow so desperate and tired of their overwhelming emotion that they ultimately give up and refuse to think or know about non-human suffering. Denial and rejection replace care and concern. In order to avoid this, it is useful to use empathy as a backdrop on which to rest when compassion becomes overly consuming. Compassion is to be celebrated and cherished, and it is worthwhile to remember that most people have far too little rather than too much compassion towards non-human suffering. Yet, in order to avoid being crushed under its weight, it is at times prudent to channel some of compassion's manifestations into empathy. Empathy's effects are less potent than those of compassion, and as such it allows one to care for others without completely losing oneself in their suffering.

Many have made the connection between morality and empathy. Perhaps the most famous of these is David Hume, mentioned earlier in the book, who emphasized 'sympathy', but who used the term in a way that combined elements from the contemporary definitions of both 'empathy' and 'compassion'.<sup>9</sup> Although he did not strictly endorse the type of understanding of 'empathy' brought forward here, many of his claims include facets integral to it. Most importantly, Hume manifested why the capacity to take the perspective of other beings into account is elemental to morality. Because of this, his philosophy deserves closer scrutiny.

For Hume, sympathy is a breathtaking feature of the human (and animal) mind: 'No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequence, than that propensity we have to

sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own' (Hume 1975, p. 316). That is, sympathy is an extraordinary capacity, which has changed the way the human mind works: it is the doorway to the reality of others, and, in its ability to release one from egoistic fantasies, truly outstanding. Most importantly, it is noteworthy because it provides the grounds for morality. To cut a long story short, sympathy together with emotion provides an impetus or motive for normativity. More precisely, sympathy enables us to take into account the perspectives of others, and emotion enables us to care about the plight of those others: thereby, we become concerned about what happens to those around us.

This needs to be understood in the broader light of Hume's theory. The prominence Hume gave to emotion was based on his metaethic, which strongly resisted any grand metaphysical configurations and instead sought to be – following Hume's own empiricism – as practical as possible. In keeping with this approach, morality found its source in basic psychology. For Hume, it is emotion that inspires biological, vulnerable creatures to think in moral terms. More specifically, we have a tendency to feel positively towards certain things (particularly those that promote happiness) and negatively towards others (particularly those that lead to suffering), and this tendency goes on to build our sense of 'value' and with it the foundations of moral life. Therefore, emotions are both the source of ethics and our moral compass. With them, we create values and navigate through a world filled with vulnerability and experience.

According to Hume, it is not only self-directed emotions that have relevance, but also emotions that have been examined from a neutral viewpoint, by taking others into account as well. Because of this, Hume argues that cruelty to others is the greatest vice of all, as it so wilfully ignores the experiences of other creatures. Moreover, because of the need for neutrality, and because reason cannot be made the judge of emotion, Hume claims that selfless sacrifice for the benefit of others cannot be deemed irrational. Therefore, we should not willingly cause others suffering, and – on the contrary – it may be quite moral to sacrifice one's own needs in order to help others. Here, sympathy emerges as a crucial capacity.

For Hume, in sympathy one uses imagination to try to conceive of the experiences of others. That is, 'in sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression' with the use of imagination (Hume 1975). To understand this, it needs to be noted that, in Hume's philosophy,

perception can be divided into *impressions* and *ideas*. Impressions, for instance bodily sensations, are immediately experienced, while ideas refer to impressions (an example being an idea of the sensation of pain). Therefore, in sympathy we become aware of the actual experiences of others that lie behind the 'idea' of those experiences: I not only know that, in theory, Matilda has physical sensations, but I actually comprehend what those sensations are like. Now, the types of impressions sympathy is mainly concerned with are emotions. External signs in others convey an idea of an emotion in us, which is again 'converted into an impression', which can 'become the very passion itself and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection' (Hume 1975, p. 317). Hence, in sympathy, we feel the emotions of others and, in fact, the emotions of others are felt so vividly that they seem like our own: 'The sentiments of others can never affect us, but by becoming, in some measure, our own: in which case they operate upon us.... In the very same manner, as if they had been originally deriv'd from our own temper and disposition' (Hume 1975, p. 593). In this way, sympathy enables one to experience what others experience. The only difference is that the emotion reached through sympathy will be slightly weaker than the original emotion.

But can human beings sympathize with non-human animals? As noted earlier, Hume admits that similarity renders sympathy stronger, and that we tend to sympathize most with those who are most like us. Contiguity also has an impact, as beings closer to oneself in space and time are easier to sympathize with. However, Hume was adamant that these forms of bias must be overcome. Therefore, we are to strive towards greater impartiality, and to take into account the experiences of all significant beings, including those very different and distant from ourselves. This opens the door for feeling sympathy also towards non-human creatures and their suffering. Although Hume is not very clear on this issue, a consistent reading of his argument implies that humans can use their imagination to experience the pains of other animals too, and that, if bias is to be avoided, feeling sympathy towards non-human creatures is, in fact, important. Such a conclusion, if correct, would mean that, if indeed sympathy is at the core of morality, paying heed to non-human suffering is one requirement of a moral life.<sup>10</sup>

This approach to morality is radical indeed when compared with the philosophical tradition that has so vehemently centralized reason; in addition, it opens the door to deeper moral commitment towards non-human animals. If the aim is to remain neutral and not to restrict sympathy to those who are like oneself, it becomes evident that species may

be an irrelevant factor when extending moral concern to other beings. If Matilda should not favour other women, why should she favour other human beings? To be consistent, if cruelty itself is a vice, why would cruelty to animals not be frowned upon also? If anything, Hume's views establish a perfect basis for an empathy-based animal ethic. If we push Hume's theory to its logical conclusion, caring identification with the animal perspective, irrespective of species, surfaces as the aim of normativity.

Empathy was also important in phenomenology. For instance, Husserl argued that by forsaking scepticism one can find empathetic routes to understanding others.

That is, after we recognize others as beings with minds, it becomes steadily easier to comprehend what they are feeling: 'When I see the sadness in another's face, I do not see her sadness in the way I see her furrowed eyebrows... When I see – immediately, evidently, intuitively – that she is sad, my experience is empathetic' (Smith 2007, p. 334). Here empathy is a self-evident route to understanding others. In fact, for Husserl, it forms 'our primary form of experience of others, as others' (Smith 2007, p. 228). Husserl explains: 'We experience the same things and events, we experience the animals and people there facing us, and we see in them the same inner life... In a certain way, I also experience (and there is a self-givenness here) the others' lived experiences' (Husserl 1989, p. 208). Thus, empathy enables one to create immediate representations of the experiences of others: 'I can experience others, but only through empathy' (Husserl 1989, p. 210). Again, there are no reasons to think that empathy could not be extended to concern other animals also. If they are approached as experiencing creatures, one can gain an instant comprehension of what their experiences may be. From this viewpoint, suffering of non-human animals would be understood immediately – it would emerge as an obvious factor, not something for which one has to find scientific evidence. In fact, it would be only through empathy that the suffering could be properly grasped.

Edith Stein, Husserl's student who was later to die in a Nazi concentration camp, was keen to demonstrate the links between empathy and morality. According to Stein, values are based on emotion. More specifically, she maintains that we have 'value feelings' (Stein 1989, p. 101) and that 'the ability to love, evident in our loving, is rooted in another depth from the ability to value morally' (Stein 1989, p. 102). Therefore, morality and love are intertwined, and should be approached as a unit. In this unit, an important role is reserved for empathy, for it helps one to become aware of morality: 'Every comprehension of different persons

can become the basis of an understanding of value' (Stein 1989, p. 116). That is, through understanding others, we also come to understand values: morality stems from grasping the experiences of other creatures.

For Stein, empathy is 'inner intuition' (Stein 1989, p. 34), a source of immediate knowledge that gives certain, beyond-doubt understanding of the experiences of other beings. That is, empathy is a form of knowledge the accuracy of which cannot be questioned. In fact, empathy is the ultimate source of knowledge concerning other beings.<sup>11</sup> It forms the route to discovering who other creatures are: 'through empathizing do we experience others' (Stein 1989, p. 18). Not only does empathy reveal to us the minds of other creatures; it is also necessary if one is to form knowledge concerning the external world: 'Empathy as the basis of intersubjective experience becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world' (Stein 1989, p. 64). This is because, by knowing that others have their own perspectives on reality, we can rest assured that our own experiences are not mere hallucinations or a lonely, never-ending dream: the world must exist, because I am not alone in perceiving it. Moreover, we can understand our own individuality only if we perceive it in relation to the individuality of others: 'Our own individual...occurs on the basis of the perception of foreign physical bodies in which we come upon a conscious life by the mediation of empathy. We first actually consider ourselves as an individual, as "one 'I' amongst many", when we have learned to consider ourselves by "analogy" with another' (Stein 1989, p. 64). Therefore, empathy is a source of knowledge on many different levels. It enables knowledge not only of others and the world, but also of ourselves.<sup>12</sup>

Hence, empathy gives birth to morality by making us see what is valuable in the world. Moreover, it helps one to understand the self, the world and others. As such, empathy emerges as a crucial factor in both epistemology and normativity: it makes possible knowledge and moral awareness. But can empathy be extended to non-human beings? Here, the basic similarities of experience that non-human animals share with human beings render empathy relatively easy. Stein suggests that humans can feel empathy for non-human creatures, too, for their bodies – albeit different in many respects – are not so alien as to render all identification impossible, and in fact give grounds for understanding that, like humans, other animals also have inner lives. Stein argues: 'Should I perhaps consider a dog's paw in comparison with my hand, I do not have a mere physical body, either, but a sensitive limb of a living body. And here a degree of projection is possible, too. For example, I may sense-in pain when the animal is injured' (Stein 1989, p. 59).



Therefore, empathy is based on awareness of how, in both humans and other animals, the physical aspects of the body serve a living phenomenology: that is, body parts which are very different from each other can perform similar, experienced functions for the subjects who possess them. The dog's paw is utterly different from the human hand, yet perhaps the dog has similar feelings when moving her paw to those of the human being when moving her hand.

Stein also points out that we can understand foreign expressions, and uses this example to illustrate how comprehension of animal language may also be within our grasp: 'thus, too, I can understand the tail wagging of a dog as an expression of joy if its appearance and its behavior otherwise disclose such feelings and its situation warrants them' (Stein 1989, p. 86). In fact, we can imagine experiences that are utterly alien to our own awareness: 'He who has never looked a danger in the face himself can still experience himself as brave or cowardly in the empathic representation of another's situation' (Stein 1989, p. 115). The same can be applied to non-human experiences which one has never undergone but which one can imagine.

Therefore, Stein leaves the door open for empathy towards non-human animals. Differences do not render empathy impossible, for shared phenomenality, together with imagination, help one to understand those creatures that seem different or even alien. If, then, empathy is a constituent of moral life, and if non-human animals can be the objects of empathy, it would seem obvious that non-human experiences are to be taken into account also in the sphere of morality. This, again, would mean that animal suffering is to be approached through empathy and the type of normativity that it feeds. Empathy towards the suffering of other animals would not only lead to moral recognition, but could also extend and deepen one's understanding of the human self and reality, as we would become more fully aware of how our own actions and experiences relate to and impact on other creatures, and how the world is experienced by countless creatures, different from oneself.

Also, philosophers with an interest in neurophysiology have argued that the capacity to value is ultimately grounded on the basic tendency to feel attachment towards others, and to empathize with them. Therefore, rather than abstract theoretical principles, it is caring responses towards others that form the background to morality.<sup>13</sup>

For instance, Patricia Churchland argues that morality 'originates in the neurobiology of attachment and bonding' (Churchland 2011, p. 7) – in short, 'attachment. ... is the neural platform for morality' (Churchland 2011, p. 16).<sup>14</sup> She maintains that, in social species, neurobiology has

evolved to enable individuals to care, not only for their own interests, but also for the interests of certain others, and it is here, according to Churchland, that we find the source of Hume's 'moral sentiment'.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, caring and attachment as biological tendencies give morality wings.<sup>16</sup> Here empathy, too, becomes important, because through it one can interpret the experiences of others. That is, we care for others because we can empathize with their experiences.<sup>17</sup>

Interestingly, this neurophysiological perspective suggests that suffering may be the very root of morality. Echoing Hume, Churchland argues that 'Brains are organized to seek well-being, and to seek relief from ill-being. Thus, in a perfectly straightforward way, the circuitry for self-maintenance and the avoidance of pain is the source of the most basic values – the values of being alive and of well-being' (Churchland 2011, p. 30). In short, because we can experience pain and suffering, we have also learned to value that which helps us to avoid them, and in our extension to others, through empathy, of a similar valuing process, morality is born. That is, Matilda constructs her morality around the very basic value of happiness and corresponding aversion to suffering, and through empathy can see that the happiness and suffering of other creatures also have moral relevance. Churchland's model appears to accommodate concern for non-human suffering. In fact, from the standpoint of the model, it can even be claimed that *not* recognizing the relevance of animal suffering calls into question our very moral capacity. That is, not being able to note that the suffering of other animals, like our own, bears relevance implies that our moral ability is overly restricted; that there is something wrong with our capacity for attachment, empathy and value-processing.

Therefore, there are good reasons to favour empathy as the chosen perspective on non-human animality. First, empathy is one founding element of morality. Normativity and values spring from the tendency to feel something towards one's well-being and suffering, and empathy helps one to develop similar feelings towards the well-being and suffering of others as well. Thus, empathy opens up a horizon in regard to others: it strips away the blindfolds that only let us see our own experiences and our own suffering. On these grounds, the suffering of others emerges as a moral evil, worthy of attention and consideration. Second, empathy helps us to develop understanding, not only of other beings, but also of ourselves and the world in general. With empathy, we are no longer alone, but develop in relation to others and the external world. That is, empathy is like a light that helps us to finally *see* ourselves, the world and others. Human beings no longer exist in a vacuum, but in

relation to countless other animals, all invested with their own viewpoints and experiences. Within the framework of empathy, the moral relevance of animal suffering emerges as self-evident – moreover, one begins to view one's own identity and the world in relation to the necessity to take into account not only the suffering of human beings, but also that of non-human others.

And what happens when empathy is missing? Simon Baron-Cohen has explored the way in which lack of empathy leads to lack of moral awareness. He argues that morality is ultimately based on the capacity to empathize with others: at the moment when the viewpoint of others is recognized, morality, too, becomes possible. Equally, immorality can be explained as lack of empathy. In consequence, Baron-Cohen wants to replace the term 'evil' with 'empathy erosion', and defines the latter as a state which, unlike empathy, approaches other beings as objects.<sup>18</sup> Here he refers to Martin Buber's take on contemporary morality, which asserts that 'I-you' thinking, within which we treat the other as an experiencing subject, has been replaced with an 'I-it' form of thinking, wherein the other is manipulated to serve one's own interests, and her subjectivity and experiences are ignored. It is precisely lack of empathy that enables the 'I-it' mode to kick in (Baron-Cohen 2011). What is so worrying in this scenario is that this lack of empathy strips others of their value as individuals: 'Treating other people as if they were just objects is one of the worst things you can do to another human being, to ignore their subjectivity, their thoughts and feelings' (Baron-Cohen 2011, p. 5). That is, lack of empathy enables one to approach others as instruments for one's own enjoyment, or as mere meaningless extras in one's own pursuit of a happy existence, and it is here that 'evil' is born.

Baron-Cohen speaks of an 'empathy-spectrum' containing different levels of ability to feel empathy for others. On the lowest level are various psychological syndromes, such as narcissistic and psychopathic personality disorders; subjects with these will often feel complete disregard for others, instead using others for their own personal gain. Moreover, they may even feel 'Schadenfreude', which means that they take pleasure in observing the suffering of others (Baron-Cohen 2011). Lack of empathy is, therefore, something akin to a mental illness that may even pave the way for not only ignoring, but also positively enjoying, the suffering of others.

The relevance of Cohen's analysis in the context of non-human suffering is evident. All too often other animals are approached in the 'I-it' mode, and thus both their subjectivity and the value of their

experiences remain ignored. They are depicted as objects of human manipulation, with empathy towards them viewed as childish 'anthropomorphism' or 'sentimentality'. Since empathy is required for moral awareness, the likely outcome of this approach is that the value of non-human individuality and the moral relevance of non-human suffering will remain hidden from sight. In fact, the treatment of other animals often exemplifies empathy erosion, as creatures capable of experience and suffering are treated as if they were mere biological matter and products for consumption.

Furthermore, the analysis reveals the worrying possibility that contemporary society is not only (as argued earlier) *schizophrenic* in its attitudes towards animals, but also *narcissistic* and *psychopathic*: narcissistic in the sense that the anthropocentric culture only grants significance to the human viewpoint; and psychopathic in the sense that society can so wilfully cause devastating suffering to non-human animals for what is often no more than purely secondary benefit or enjoyment. The core problem in both these pathologies is that all emphasis is placed on the self, while the subjectivity of others is ignored. According to Stein, such lack of empathy produces utter egoism, which again means that we become even more incapable of understanding the experiences of others: 'If we take the self as the standard, we lock ourselves into the prison of our individuality. Others become riddles for us, or still worse, we remodel them into our image and so falsify historical truth' (Stein 1989, p. 116). This is a clear danger in the case of non-human animals, who are often sidelined on grounds of presumed human excellence and supremacy; contemporary cultures tend to have eyes only humanity, with human capacities and human nature time and again celebrated as the pinnacle of evolution. Like Narcissus, humanity only has eyes for itself, and in this egoistic dream the breathtaking variety of animal experience is overlooked. It is this tendency that enables contemporary societies to remain silent about the systematic violence constantly inflicted on our non-human others and the immense suffering that this violence causes.

Therefore, it seems that contemporary societies are missing out on their opportunities to create entirely new ways of relating to and interacting with non-human animals. We are stuck in a rut, so to speak, for the lack of empathy means that we understand other animals far less than might be expected of an inquisitive culture that so eagerly explores the possibilities of artificial and even extraterrestrial intelligence. As a result, human understanding of non-human animals, the world and the self remains limited and obscured. That is, with lack of empathy, our

vision has – just as Stein warns – become clouded, and all the horizons that could open up if we were to embrace empathy towards non-human creatures stay hidden. This may have devastating consequences, not only for other animals, but also for the development of human understanding. The ethologist Barbara Smuts argues: ‘Experience suggests that by opening more fully to the presence of “self” in others, including animals, we further develop that presence in ourselves and thus become more fully alive and awake participants in life’ (Smuts 2001, p. 308). Simply put, paying heed to the perspectives of others helps one to become more aware of one’s own identity and way of existing in the world. By recognizing that they are not alone and by becoming familiar with the viewpoints and experiences of non-human animals, humans could learn more about their own limitations and strengths – about what it means to be human. Choosing to remain blind to the animal viewpoint has, thus, also a human cost, as our take on the world lacks the breathtaking variety of non-human experience.

So what should be done? It has been argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on developing empathy, as it is ‘the most valuable resource in our world’ (Baron-Cohen 2011, p. 103). What is required is education on empathy. Yet society, from schools to politics to courtrooms, seems to be blind to empathy’s significance (ibid.). Contemporary societies need to embrace the lesson of virtue ethics, according to which morality is about building one’s own character, about ‘becoming good’. Constant self-cultivation is required if we truly want to be moral, and here it is especially important to develop the capacity to feel empathy for others – including non-human animals. With empathy, moral understanding becomes a *skill* (see also Churchland 2011) that needs to be actively rehearsed and practised. Bringing forward the role of empathy and the need to ‘become good’ are new and paramount tasks for animal philosophy also. The challenge is to develop an animal ethic that expands on the significance of empathy as a skill, actively rehearsed in relation to non-human creatures.

But how can empathy be cultivated? Evan Thompson emphasizes emotional self-development – a feature which has been integral to many world religions<sup>19</sup> for thousands of years, but which has been largely ignored by modern societies. In fact, the potential for development in compassion and empathy may be far greater than the potential for cognitive development, simply because the former have been so underrated (Thompson 2001). The argument is that we are to practise ‘mindfulness’ in relation to others, and to seek a ‘multi-perspectival view of oneself, others and the intersubjective relations between oneself

and all other sentient beings'<sup>20</sup> (Wallace 2001, p. 216). This effort to cultivate 'mindfulness' also takes many secular forms and has gained much recent attention in psychiatry, where it is thought to help one to become more aware of one's prejudiced thoughts and emotions, and to give rise to a heightened sense of empathy and compassion (Siegel 2010). By means of different methods, new pathways towards relating to and understanding others can be developed, together with a deeper sense of care and empathy. For some, these methods may be spiritual or psychological (including, for instance, meditation), and for many others they may simply consist of conscious efforts to try to grasp more thoroughly the types of presumptions one has concerning others, along with the attitudes and frameworks that determine how one treats others. Therefore, cultivation of empathy can be the result of immersion in contemplation and awareness, or simply a cognitive task established for the purpose of changing – through the use of self-reflection, analysis and regrouping – one's ways of approaching others.

Yet it is not just the individual that needs cultivation. The important point to take note of is that individuals will often only change if their cultural surroundings offer them the tools with which to do so. Therefore, cultivation of empathy on the level of individuals is – in practical terms – often tied to the extent to which the culture is willing to endorse empathy. Thus, although individual change is sorely needed, what emerges as perhaps even more crucial is cultural transformation. As Churchland shows, moral learning takes place partly through social imitation. Here, being accepted by others is the ultimate goal, and hence many will adopt the moral beliefs of their society as 'universal truths'. As a result, 'prevailing practices may have substantial inertia, and can be changed only quite slowly, bit by bit' (Churchland 2011, p. 132). If we accept that lack of empathy is based on culturally constructed prejudice and anthropocentrism, it becomes evident that the cultivation of empathy needs to go hand in hand with recognition of the power of social inclusion and imitation. There is a need to expose the types of anthropocentric assumptions often accepted as universal truths, and to instigate critical reflection on the shaky grounds they stand on. This process of cultural change is a lengthy one, requiring both radicalism and patience: radicalism in the sense of having the courage to vocally question prevailing societal attitudes, and patience in the sense of recognizing that change will not happen overnight.

Empathy takes many forms, and it is worth bringing forward one less frequently discussed variant, 'reflexive sympathy' or 're-iterated

empathy'. Here, we recognize how others might empathize with us: more specifically, we see ourselves from the viewpoint of other beings.

Stein argues that 'reflexive sympathy' takes place 'when I empathically comprehend the acts in which my individual is constituted for him [the other person]' (Stein 1989, p. 88). That is, it means taking into account, not how we perceive others, but how others perceive us. Stein continues: 'To consider ourselves in inner perception, i.e. to consider our psychic "I" and its attributes, means to see ourselves as we see another and as he sees us' (Stein 1989, p. 88).<sup>21</sup> Here, a mode of interaction begins to emerge within which it is understood that the other creature has an experience of how we relate to her. Wallace, another who adopts this approach, emphasizes what he calls 're-iterated empathy', with which he refers to perceiving ourselves from the viewpoint of others: 'I begin to sense my own presence not only "from within" but "from without"' (Wallace 2001, p. 213). Reflexive sympathy is particularly important for self-understandings, because it helps clear away the type of deception that easily occurs when people fail to see how they might appear to others. In this way, reflexive sympathy acts as a wake-up call that can evoke very much needed moral cultivation.

It is perhaps this type of empathy more than anything else that is sorely missing in contemporary relations to non-human animals. Human beings all too often overlook the question of how they themselves might seem from the non-human perspective. Indeed, if they were to pay attention, the picture that emerged would not be pleasing. From the viewpoint of other animals, human beings may appear as deaf creatures who cannot be reached, who cannot be communicated with, whose acts are random and inconsistent, and far too many of whom remain forever more violent and abusive. Seeing what other animals see, witnessing humanity from the non-human standpoint, might be utterly unbearable. Besides empathy with non-human animals, what is needed, then, is seeing how other animals see human beings. Instead of eternally staring into the narcissistic mirror, it is time to look at how cows, pigs and rats perceive humanity.

## **Intersubjectivity**

Buber, who spoke of the worrying tendency of contemporary society to emphasize 'I-it' relationships, argued that we can go beyond the distinction between 'I' and 'others', and instead exist in a state of inbetweenness (Wallace 2001). The 'I' and the 'other' stop being two separate and

independent individuals, rather forming a new, joint way of being.<sup>22</sup> This brings us to the theme of *intersubjectivity*.

Empathy is often depicted on the basis of two different approaches to understanding other minds. According to the 'theory-theory', 'our attribution of mental states to each other involves causal explanatory generalizations' (Thompson 2001, p. 11). Therefore, we have a theory about the minds of others, and then apply this theory to each individual that we meet: this is the route of the aforementioned scepticism. According to the 'simulation-theory', on the other hand, 'mind-reading depends not on the possession of a tacit psychological theory, but on the ability to mentally "simulate" another person' (ibid). Therefore, we instantaneously simulate the experiences of the other individual, and thereby understand as a self-evident fact that she, too, has a mind. However, Thompson argues that neither of these models does justice to empathy, within which the self must be 'inter-subjectively open', and which includes 'pre-reflective experience of the other as an embodied being like oneself' (Thompson 2001, p. 12).

What Thompson is driving at is that, within empathy, other individuals are from the start approached as individuals with minds; our approach does not rely on theories or simulation, but, rather, includes the assumption that other beings have their own viewpoints on reality and are capable of interacting with us. Very like the critics of scepticism explored earlier, Thompson argues that, instead of 'an epistemic gulf that can be crossed only by inference', we need to underline 'affective engagement' (Thompson 2001, p. 13), of which the starting premise is that other beings are their own subjects. In other words, we must already be 'intersubjectively open' towards others for empathy to take place. Similarly, Shaun Gallagher argues that both the theory-theory and the simulation theory fail, for empathy requires the assumption that the other creature is an experiencing individual: 'I must already have an understanding of the other and their experience – including the other as the subject of intentional action' (Gallagher 2001, p. 86). In short, the other creature must already be a subject to me. If we accept that empathy makes us 'resonate' (Cole 2001) with others, enabling us to sense the world as others sense it, we must already presume that those others do, indeed, have their own viewpoints on this shared reality, that there is something to resonate with. It is here that intersubjectivity begins to emerge.

In phenomenology, intersubjectivity forms an important stepping stone. For Husserl, intersubjectivity is something that we immediately experience, as we perceive the world. When we look at an object, we



realize that it is also there for others to see: one comprehends that other beings have their own perspectives, and that one is not alone in the world. Therefore, other beings are approached as beings with minds, who are not mechanical creatures but fellow subjects: 'And each subject can at the same time recognize, in virtue of mutual understanding, that what is given to him and what is given to his companions is one and the same thing' (Husserl 1989, p. 208). The same applies to seeing other animals. Thus, Husserl scholar David Woodruff Smith states: 'I see this dog, immediately and "intuitively", as a being that is a body animated with experiences of seeing and willing' (Smith 2007, p. 228). In this way, intersubjectivity concerns our ability to relate to other creatures as the type of 'yous' Gómez speaks of. Recognizing their viewpoints enables one to approach each of them as a somebody, rather than as a thing.

Therefore, in empathy towards other animals, one enters into a state of intersubjectivity, through which pigs, cows and rats are depicted as experiencing creatures, capable of the same agency that exists in human beings. Other animals appear as active creatures with their own intentions and desires. Their suffering, too, is seen in the broader perspective of agency: suffering takes place in a subject, a 'somebody', who can relate to us and interact with us. It was earlier noted that one must not lose sight of the cognitive abilities of other animals, even when their suffering is emphasized. Intersubjectivity facilitates this combination of suffering and cognition, for the suffering other is also an active creature, an agent in her own right.

But what does this mean in practice; how does intersubjectivity manifest itself? Thompson has stated that the cognition of social creatures develops through a 'dynamic co-determination of self and other' (Thompson 2001, p. 3). That is, the mind develops in relation to the minds of others. This co-determination rests on intersubjectivity, already present in infants, who can relate to others as creatures with minds, and whose cognition is 'intrinsically "intersubjectively open"' (Thompson 2001, p. 14). In other words, we are born with the tendency to view other beings as their own subjects, and to be open to forming relationships with them. This claim is supported by recent research in neurology and psychiatry, where it is argued that 'interpersonal neurobiology' renders us into fundamentally intersubjective creatures. From our very first experiences, far before the development of propositional language, we want to relate to others as a 'you' and to be treated as a 'you' by others – in fact, our psychological health depends on the fulfilment of this tendency. Moreover, there is an innate need to enter into a

'we-mode' with others, within which out of two individuals emerges a dynamic whole (see Siegel 2010).

Therefore, the fact that intersubjectivity exists in infants points towards its also being non-lingual; in fact, it may be the very first thing that the mind is capable of. Thus, Gallagher argues that 'An embodied practice of mind begins much earlier than the onset of theory or mind capabilities', and this constitutes 'a strong claim for primary intersubjectivity' (Gallagher 2001, p. 103), within which we understand others through an 'immediate, less theoretical (non-mentalistic) mode of interaction' (Gallagher 2001, p. 87). Here, we comprehend and approach the minds of others just as we do our own minds. In many of our everyday actions and intentions, we do not follow propositional schemes ('I will walk now') but simply act on the basis of more immediate and pragmatic modes, and this instantaneous interpretation is also applied to the behaviour of others. Just as it is obvious to me that I have a viewpoint, it is obvious that others have viewpoints, too. No theory is needed. This basic sense of intersubjectivity continues to guide us throughout our lives. Gallagher argues that, although second-order thinking can be important in adulthood, it takes place relatively rarely (for instance, when one writes philosophy); otherwise, a much more direct and non-propositional form of understanding guides actions. Often it is only when pragmatic modes fail that we seek to understand what is happening by means of third-person analysis and theory (Gallagher 2001). In fact, a theoretical, propositional approach to the minds of others is itself based on previous experiences of intersubjectivity: 'This kind of knowledge... derives from embodied practices in second-person interactions with others' (Gallagher 2001, p. 90). That is, building a theory concerning other minds requires the prior awareness, gained through intersubjective openness, that others do, indeed, have minds.

Hence, intersubjectivity may be a very foundational mode of being, which enables us to see minds in others, and which goes on to build our own minds, too. These claims have interesting implications in regard to non-human animals. First, even when they lack propositional language, other animals can become intersubjective creatures. Interaction with others does not depend on language, and thus non-human animals can enter into meaningful interactive relations with human beings. Second, the human mind may be partially constituted in the context of this interaction. As has been argued by, for instance, Donna Haraway, human beings have evolved in relation to other animals. To give an example, just as human beings affected wolves by transforming them into dogs, those wolves and eventually dogs affected human

evolution and the human way of approaching reality (Haraway 2004). Most significantly, wolves may have helped humans to become more empathetic and aware of the animal way of being: by sharing human communities, they challenged human beings to become alert to how other animals may perceive the world. Therefore, human cognition was not shaped in isolation, but, rather, in relation to non-human animals. The utter loneliness of humanity, emphasized by the anthropocentric world view that presumes 'an abyss' (to use Martin Heidegger's terminology) between humans and other animals, is thus a mistaken concept. Non-human minds are not inaccessible, because they intertwine with our own minds. This, again, offers the entirely new hope that we might also understand non-human suffering: in fact, perhaps such understanding is ingrained in human nature.

Intersubjectivity is often viewed as a novel entity formed from two creatures coming together. That is, interaction is not two individuals combined, but two individuals merging to form something new. Thus, Stein describes intersubjectivity as follows: 'From the "I" and "you" arises the "we" as a subject of a higher level' (Stein 1989, p. 17), and Thompson similarly speaks of 'interbeing' (Thompson 2001, p. 29) as the new space formed by mutuality and interaction.<sup>23</sup> For many, this new space or mode of being escapes precise definitions; that is, even though it is so integral to life, it also cannot be conceptualized. In fact, it is often described as something rather mysterious. Intersubjectivity has been characterized as primordial awareness beyond language, a 'mysterious space' between beings, an awareness that is present in everyone, but which cannot be conceptualized and which therefore escapes closer scrutiny (Wallace 2001). What is formed from intersubjectivity is, although incredibly familiar, also painfully difficult to describe in propositional language. On the level of immediacy it is obvious and clear, but, on the level of concept and language, descriptions always seem to do it an injustice.

This mysterious space is beautifully alluded to by Barbara Smuts in her accounts of studying baboons in the wild. After spending a significant amount of time with the animals, Smuts found that she was 'learning a whole new way of being in the world – the way of the baboon' (Smuts 2001, p. 295). Expanding the idea, Smuts writes: 'The baboon's thorough acceptance of me, combined with my immersion in their daily lives, deeply affected my identity. The shift I experienced is well described by millennia of mystics but rarely acknowledged by scientists. Increasingly, my subjective consciousness seemed to merge with the group-mind of the baboons' (Smuts 2001, p. 299). In this process,

she 'had gone from thinking about the world analytically to experiencing the world directly and intuitively' (Smuts 2001, p. 299). Therefore, the moments of mutuality cannot be deciphered with or interrupted by language; instead, one is guided towards a different mode of being which exists outside language, and which is potent in its ability to reconfigure the way we relate to the world. Suddenly, these moments 'just exist', and with breathtaking ease guide our actions towards new directions. A human being finds herself immersed in a pack of baboons or dogs, or witnesses in herself an ability to relate to a cat, a cow or a rat. The mysteriousness of these moments is accentuated by the way in which human-animal interaction can defy the readily given categories of 'human' and 'animal', and perhaps even question the validity of language itself.

Therefore, in her interaction with the baboons, Smuts achieves a 'moment of madness' of the sort described by Derrida, in which language no longer makes sense. By simply entering into a wordless world, where other animals are subjects just as surely as she is, Smuts is able to take part in the same experience Derrida had with his, by now famous, feline friend. She has epiphanies of non-human animals which escape language, and which seem much more real and substantial than the narrow interpretations afforded by language. In the process, Smuts gains a new understanding of animality, far beyond the reach of propositional theories, an understanding that seems more authentic and tangible than those supported by analytical thinking.

Gilles Deleuze has talked about the importance of breaking down rigid identities and taking a 'line of flight' between human and animal categories, that is, jumping out of the category of 'humanity' and questioning its boundaries by entering the unknown diversity of the animal world. Interestingly, Deleuze emphasizes that it is precisely 'a pack mode' that can challenge the anthropocentric identity by enabling the human individual to merge into a plurality of animals, and to take part in something utterly new (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). Arguably, Smuts took precisely this type of line of flight when she entered the baboon world and abandoned her own human identity built on reason and language. When she became part of the baboon pack, she let go of the rigid separation of 'humans' and 'animals', and instead participated in something new for which there are no verbal definitions. By this means, novel types of interaction and intersubjectivity are born, not only through 'moments of madness', but also through the 'line of flight' that erodes and questions the standard division between humans and other animals.

These 'moments of madness' or 'lines of flight' may ultimately help us to understand non-human suffering much more acutely than information afforded by standard forms of scientific evidence. One can read a report on animal suffering, which describes its physiological and cognitive nature at length, and still remain completely unscathed. However, when we enter into moments of mutuality and interaction with other animals, we may gain an immediate and deeply touching understanding of their plight. Therefore, through escaping language and ready descriptions and truly relating to the animal, an understanding of animal suffering that is both wounding and beyond sceptical doubt can emerge. This is because, outside language, hidden yet obvious forms of understanding can surface and make one forget about the rigid human identity and the narrow perspective it imposes. Interaction can help us find new ways of understanding which resist the rigid, time-consuming and sceptical ponderings encouraged by propositional theory. That is, interaction can pave the way for intuitive knowledge characterized by immediacy. It is this intuition, again, which contains the great promise of enabling us to understand other animals and their experiences, including their suffering, in a completely new light. By coming to know an animal, one begins to see what types of things might cause her pain and fear, how she manifests her own suffering, and how she tries to cope with that suffering. Forming relations with other animals allows one to become sufficiently familiar with them to see things anew, from their perspective, and it is this type of shift that is desperately needed if the moral ramifications of non-human suffering are to be recognized.

In fact, suffering may play a crucial part in intersubjectivity. As Elaine Scarry suggests, suffering promotes intersubjective ethics: we become alert to others most acutely precisely when we recognize not only our own suffering, but also theirs (Scarry 1985). Suffering in ourselves is so forceful that it cannot be denied, and this same undeniability is present when we truly 'see' the suffering of others; suffering forms an instantaneous bridge between two creatures simply because its hold is so vivid and so powerful. That is, since suffering cannot be denied, it creates a connection of immediate mutuality and understanding between two beings. Interestingly, if suffering is the most cogent basis of intersubjective awareness, it becomes obvious that it may have been animal suffering in particular that has helped human beings to become aware of the animal viewpoint. Moreover, if indeed the human mind has been partially shaped in relation to understandings concerning the minds of other animals, in a roundabout way, notions of non-human suffering, too, have impacted its constitution. Try though the anthropocentric

societies may to ignore it, animal suffering has made its permanent mark on the human mind; animal suffering has enabled us to enter into intersubjective awareness of animality, and this awareness has gone on to affect how human minds have developed. It is perhaps because of this that, no matter how much contemporary culture has dismissed the significance of animal suffering, a sense of its horror still persists. No matter how assiduously animal suffering is marginalized, and however powerful the grip of anthropocentrism, something still trickles through the barriers built to exclude animality and awakens the uncomfortable and often horrifying feeling that something is wrong.

Hence, intersubjectivity offers a fruitful ground for efforts to grasp non-human suffering. As other animals are approached as experiencing creatures, their suffering can be witnessed immediately, without reference to scepticism or theory. Furthermore, intersubjectivity enables one to position suffering in the broader context of animal agency, as other animals are viewed as individuals rather than empty vessels of experience. Here, it is no longer just suffering, but also the very being of the animal, that emerges as morally relevant: one cannot care for only the suffering of hens and mice, but must also take into account their value as individuals. In this way, intersubjectivity helps one to move away from mere welfarism and edge closer towards animal rights and liberation philosophies. Ultimately, intersubjectivity allows us to see ourselves as intertwined with other animals. They no longer remain distant others, but instead emerge as beings who can have a deep effect on our own constitution, and with whom we can form interactive relationships that defy anthropocentric dualisms. These relationships constitute morality, as it is within them that not only the agency, but also the moral value, of other animals becomes crystal clear, a matter beyond doubt. Moreover, they constitute a fresh perspective on reality: existing in relation to a non-human other is in itself like discovering a new world.

Perhaps the most crucial lesson learned through intersubjectivity is the fact that the other being remains her own independent creature, of whom one knows very little. That is, respect for difference forms one cornerstone of intersubjectivity. As Smuts argues, "These moments reminded me how little we really know about the "more-than-human world"" (Smuts 2001, p. 301). Therefore, the new space afforded by intersubjectivity helps one to see the world and other beings anew, and here, instead of assuming that the other being is fully known, one may in fact become aware of the way in which she cannot ever be fully conceptualized or defined. Her individuality both remains obvious and yet escapes

the types of propositional definitions that would erase her autonomy and difference. Hence, intersubjectivity does not imply loss of difference: it is not a crucible in which other animals lose their particularity or are seen only in terms of their similarity to humans. Rather, it helps one to become ever more acutely aware of the spectacular differences within the animal world. This is a lesson worth remembering also in the context of non-human suffering. Suffering can take many forms and be expressed in many ways; human suffering is not the prototype of suffering *per se*. In seeking to truly comprehend animal suffering, differences must be kept in mind, and here intersubjectivity may play a crucial role.

Importantly, non-human animals may be much more eager to achieve interaction with human beings than the other way around. Smuts points out that, no matter how much she has sought to empathize with a dog called Safi, it has always appeared that Safi tries to empathize with and understand her even more. It may well be that the door to intersubjectivity is constantly kept open by non-human animals, but that human beings all too often refuse to enter. In their suffering, too, animals may communicate their pains to us, but we remain deaf. In domesticated contexts in particular, it would seem that other animals try their hardest to let humans know they are suffering, and are left bewildered in the hands of human individuals who not only are unwilling to take notice, but also go on inflicting further suffering on them. If only there were more openness towards the animal viewpoint, and more effort on the human side to enter into spaces of interaction, discussions of animal suffering might be altogether different.<sup>24</sup>

But how does one engage in intersubjectivity? The bedrock of intersubjectivity is interaction: concrete mutuality with other animals. Living in a pack of baboons and living with a dog are perfect examples of this type of interaction. Additionally, intersubjectivity requires that one stay open to the animal, that the animal is allowed to behave according to her own tendencies, and to have an impact on one's own psyche and tendencies. That is, openness demands that the animal be permitted to affect the human being, and thus to be truly an active 'subject'. Openness also requires that the animal is listened to, that her needs and viewpoints are afforded space and taken into account. Often, actions towards other animals lack this mode of openness, as farmers or hunters act in relation to their animal others, but refuse to become open towards animality, let alone listen to the animal point of view. That is, other animals remain passive objects, not active subjects, and their experiences remain silenced and ignored. The task at hand, then,

is to develop the ability for both interaction and openness. In practice, this does not mean that one needs to develop intersubjectivity with all animals, but, rather, that one aims at taking part in enough intersubjectivity to comprehend the richness and splendour of the non-human perspective, to become exposed to it, and to learn to pay heed to animality (including non-human suffering).

Smuts argues that this intersubjective mode of being offers the prospect of building entirely new ways of understanding the world: 'My awareness of the individuality of all beings, and of the capacity of at least some beings to respond to the individuality in me, transforms the world into a universe replete with opportunities to develop personal relationships of all kinds' (Smuts 2001, p. 301). Perhaps one task of animal philosophy is to explore the normative ramifications and possibilities raised by moments of intersubjectivity. That is, maybe the types of new directions that animal philosophy needs can be found by further developing an understanding of what human-animal interaction and mutuality entail. Here, also understandings of non-human suffering may become more nuanced, gain more depth.

To further explore what all this means, Smuts explains how she and Safi have found themselves in an intersubjective space, in which they both spontaneously interact in relation to each other. Here, 'Trust deepens, mutual attunement grows, and that elusive quality we call consciousness seems to extend beyond the boundaries of a single mind' (Smuts 2001, p. 305). Smuts and Safi have formed a new way of being, a new space of intersubjectivity, with its own rules and perspective. Smuts describes one particular moment when she found a very profound connection with Safi: 'Looking into her eyes, my body relaxed. Her face became the world, and I seemed to fall into her being' (Smuts 2001, p. 305). In this way, the human identity can lose its meaning or transgress its boundaries so that one begins to make sense of oneself through reference to other animals. Smuts talks of 'mutuality', within which we form new cultures with another being, and finally merge with her. Here, 'individuals experience such a profound degree of intimacy that their subjective identities seem to merge into a single being of a single awareness' (Smuts 2001, p. 307). From two beings, something thoroughly new materializes. Mystical as these moments may seem, and therefore scoffed at by conventional analytical thinkers, they are arguably common. As Smuts points out, such experiences remain hidden in contemporary cultures, but they are nonetheless very real and frequent.<sup>25</sup>



Perhaps it is not only animal philosophy, but also each human individual, who ought to awaken to the possibility of these new modes of being that intersubjectivity with other animals can stir. Whether it be the elk or the fox in the wild, the crow in the garden, or the dog in one's home, it may be worthwhile to ignore language and its expectation for a while, and simply meet these creatures through immediacy and interaction. Just as Smuts can fall into the being of Safi, we can enter into states of intersubjectivity with a multitude of other animals. Here, we may begin to better recognize and understand non-human suffering – particularly if we allow ourselves to relate to and interact with those animals whom the society approaches through violence.

## **Criticism**

Therefore, emotions, empathy and intersubjectivity offer a fruitful way of approaching animal suffering. Emotion enables one to care for the suffering of other animals, empathy allows one to understand that suffering, and intersubjectivity facilitates positioning it within the broader context of non-human agency. Yet, these three methods are not exempt from criticism.

One criticism is that emotions may serve dubious political ends, as they can be used to persuade us not only to believe in the good, but also to follow undeserving agendas (Tester 2001; Chouliaraki 2006).<sup>26</sup> In addition, many people have a tendency to feel emotion only for victims whose suffering they themselves are not causing, whilst emotion disappears when they are accomplices to suffering (Sontag 2004). Therefore, emotion can invite bias and distort the sense of personal responsibility.

The first criticism is clearly relevant in relation to non-human suffering. Hate, disdain and anger are common when it comes to other animals, and their suffering is easily overlooked when these emotions surface. For instance, wolves, rats and sharks have been targets of long-standing hate campaigns, and as a consequence their fate may be entirely overlooked as irrelevant. Yet, focusing on empathy and intersubjectivity can erase this problem. As already suggested, even if a person has negative feelings towards a given animal, she can still appreciate the relevance of that animal's suffering, if not only compassion, but also identification and interaction, are evoked. That is, somebody with a deep-seated dislike of rats can recognize that causing rats suffering is morally problematic, if she takes their viewpoint into account – she may

never like rats, but may still be able to give them moral regard. Hence, in order to keep our focus clear, emotion needs to be accompanied by empathy and intersubjectivity.

Also, the issue of responsibility is prominent in the non-human context. When the suffering of other animals is directly or indirectly caused by one's own actions, seeing it in a moral light becomes difficult. The stakes are too high, for, in order to seek to heal the suffering caused, one would first need to acknowledge blame and vice in oneself. It is because of this that very few people wish to come face to face with the suffering that they have inflicted. Many are keen to take notice of animal suffering that occurs in faraway places or that is committed by others than themselves. Westerners may thus get angry about how the Chinese treat other animals, whilst they themselves continue to eat meat and dairy products tainted with animal suffering. Acknowledging blame in oneself, and recognizing that one has taken part in appalling practices that cause much suffering, is extremely challenging, because we do not want to think of ourselves as 'bad people'. As has been suggested, many people resist moral change because they 'resent the imputation of guilt' (Cohen 2002, p. 215).

Still, there is a way out. MacIntyre, drawing upon virtue ethics, offers courage as an answer to many contemporary moral dilemmas, and courage provides a good solution to the present problem as well. If it is our understanding of ourselves as 'good people' that makes it unbearable to acknowledge blame, it becomes important to have a more thorough look at what 'being good' entails. As many philosophers from antiquity have emphasized, seeking to be good is a lifelong journey, a process that never ends, and thus demands continual self-education. We must constantly stop and reflect on how we are behaving and, if learning is to take place, we must be able to take stock and recognize problematic deeds. Morality is about self-growth, and no growth can take place without coming to terms with the wrongs that have been committed. It is here that courage plays such a crucial role. As MacIntyre argues, courage is one of the most important virtues because it facilitates doing what many find so difficult: seeing culpability in oneself. Looking into the mirror is a brave act indeed, particularly when accompanied by awareness that the image will not be pleasing. In relation to animal suffering, too, courage is a key word. If we truly want to be good in relation to our non-human others, we need to have enough courage to see where we have gone wrong.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, if emotion is to be adopted as a moral guide, it needs to come with a hefty serving of courage – without

the latter, many will indeed become blind to suffering caused by their own actions.

When it comes to empathy, one problem is that the type of representation of the experiences of others which empathy produces may not correspond with what those experiences were originally like. That is, my empathetic representation of a pig's suffering may remain completely biased and be nothing like what the pig went through. Richard Holton and Rae Langton have proceeded along these lines to criticize at length the role that empathy has assumed within animal ethics. For them, the danger is that empathy is completely misguided in its representations: we simply cannot be sure whether it works. Thus, Holton and Langton argue: 'Sentience transcends imaginability' (19). Because empathy is potentially unreliable, moral theories, purely and simply, should not be built on it (Holton and Langton 1998).

Holton and Langton maintain that the accuracy of empathy is strongly linked to similarity with others, and that, therefore, the further from humanity we move, the less reliable empathy becomes. This, of course, is bad news for non-human animals: 'If the method of simulation barely gets us beyond the average guy, there seems little hope of its getting us as far as we need to get with the non-human animals' (Holton and Langton 1998). In particular, Holton and Langton direct their criticism at R. M. Hare, for whom empathy offers promising grounds for paying moral heed to non-human animals: 'Hare's confidence that we can, in general, think our way into their [animals'] positions is surely misplaced' (15). They criticize Hare for being 'remarkably sanguine' in his insistence that, were a bear-baiter able to empathize with bears, he would treat them differently. For Holton and Langton, empathy with bears is simply a step too far; it cannot be reliable, and would therefore not teach us anything.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, due to its unreliability, empathy with other animals cannot be used as a basis for knowledge or morality. Holton and Langton maintain that, in fact, empathy can be a dangerous tool when it comes to animal ethics. This is because we all too easily imagine mistaken types of experiences, or feel biased towards individuals who are most like human beings. Rather than on empathy, the emphasis should be on evidence and recognition that even those creatures with whom human beings cannot empathize at all can have moral significance.

Thus, Holton and Langton underline the difference of non-human creatures: many other animals are simply too different for human beings ever to be able to imagine their experiences. As examples, they

use bats and platypuses, who, with their unusual sense mechanisms, perceive their surroundings in a manner very dissimilar to that of human beings. To imagine their experiences is simply not possible: 'We have no idea what it is like to see the world this way – and no amount of sharpening our sensitivities could ever help us find out' (15). As a result, 'the method of imaginative identification has achieved nothing' (15). Yet, Holton and Langton want to emphasize that they are not 'sceptics' as such: they do not doubt the existence of non-human minds or non-human suffering, only the human ability to know what it is like to be another animal: 'We won't discover, by imaginative identification... innate desires peculiar to non-human animals' (16). Even where pain and suffering are concerned, non-human animals are worlds apart from humans, and thus the use of empathy is futile. This is because non-human suffering cannot be 'abstracted' from the other experiences of that particular creature: even if the basic physiology of pain or suffering were the same, pain and suffering take different forms depending on the specific cognitive and sensory capacities of the animal.

Now, Holton and Langton are right to point out that the suffering of those animals in relation to whom empathy is difficult should also be given moral regard. This is a very important point to bear in mind: empathy is not the criterion for moral relevance, and those creatures with whom it is difficult to empathize also deserve care and attention. However, there are also problems with this criticism. First, Holton and Langton concentrate on animals with exceptionally rare forms of sense-structure. The fact that they must reach for such extreme examples is, perhaps, in itself revealing: if it is so obvious that empathy with non-human animals is not reliable, why must one resort to extraordinary cases to prove the point? Would reference to dogs or pigs be as persuasive, and, if not, how well do the examples chosen by Holton and Langton represent empathy with animals in general, or domesticated animals in particular? Are all animals as far removed from human beings in their sensory worlds as platypuses and bats, and, if not, does this not imply that differences may not be quite as extensive and unbridgeable as Holton and Langton suggest?

More importantly, Holton and Langton overlook the fact that there are not only differences, but also fundamental similarities, between species. I cannot imagine what it is like to use echolocation as a bat, but I can imagine what it is to be frustrated or frightened as a bat, or what it is to feel pain or suffering as a bat. The grounds for this understanding exist in shared physiological and behavioural factors, which serve as reference points when trying to grasp non-human experiences.

The differences between species are enormous, but the number of shared factors should not be underestimated, and range from physiological features related to nerve structure all the way to intentionality and basic emotive states. That is, underneath layers of spectacular variety of difference, there are always some core features that human beings can relate to, and which can feed empathy. Hence, the suffering of bats or giraffes is not an alien phenomenon, derived from alien abilities and traits, but instead something that human beings, as biological, experiencing creatures, can relate to. Moreover, the broader cognitive capacities that accompany pain and suffering do not necessarily render empathy futile, but may, rather, give further grounds for establishing points of reference with other animals. When I know that the pig suffers because she is an intentional, social and curious creature, I can relate to her much more efficiently than I could if the only source of information were her physiology. That is, cognitive abilities may ease empathy instead of acting as a barrier against it.

It should be added that, although the structures that experiences are built upon may differ (at times dramatically), the contents supported by those structures may be relatively similar. That is, sensory physiologies may be altogether dissimilar, but the experiences made possible by those physiologies can yet remain surprisingly parallel: *structure* and *content* need to be distinguished. Because of this, it is quite possible that certain basic feelings, such as fear, anxiety, joy, attachment or suffering, are all found in broadly analogous forms across species, even when each animal has clear physiological areas of uniqueness. Besides separating structure and content, we need to separate content and manifestation. All animals manifest their experiences differently, but the content of these experiences may remain comparable. That is, all animals have their behavioural specificities; cows, wolves and rats will all show their suffering in very different ways, but these specificities do not by any means prove that their experiences are so alien that no empathy is possible. Physiologies and behaviour can vary tremendously, while the basic experiences remain comparable in such a way as to facilitate empathy.

Now, of course, the type of imaginative projection that empathy relies on may not be completely accurate, and may often just amount to hazy sketches – yet, there may be much more truth in them than critics acknowledge, simply because of the vast, fundamental shared points of reference common across the animal world. The precise content of a non-human animal's suffering may always be beyond grasp, but it is an exaggeration to state that empathy fails to shed any light on the experiences of other animals. It offers us sketches and interpretations, the

precise accuracy of which will always remain a mystery, but which nonetheless are supported by basic, foundational points of comparison.

To underline differences alone is, therefore, rather misleading, and may pave the way for unfounded pessimism. That is, although empathy does not offer bulletproof representations or precise simulations of the suffering of non-human creatures, to claim that it is completely false is equally misguided. It should be added that, if one assumes the critical position, one also has to discount empathy towards human beings. No magical line between the species exists<sup>29</sup> that would enable one to assert that all and only human beings resemble each other enough to validate empathy. Therefore, Holton and Langton must be committed to debunking empathy in relation to other human beings as well if they are to sustain their view. This, again, raises a very uncomfortable question: are we truly to completely forsake empathy as a normative tool? Would this not render us utterly blind towards the perspectives of others?

Most significantly, to ask for certain knowledge in this context is, to some extent, misguided. Experiences are subjective, and therefore understanding the experiences of others can never be shown to be objectively correct: the demand for verification and objectivity is misplaced. To put it simply, the realm of the subjective cannot be made to fit completely error-free, objective measurements or tools of verification. Importantly, this does not render empathy groundless unless we believe that the subjective realm in its entirety is to be abandoned because we cannot gain objective knowledge concerning it. That is, either we have to decide to drop all concern for the subjective realm, or we have to accept that this realm is to be approached also with other than objective methods. The first option is senseless, since the subjective realm in a fundamental way shapes us into what we are, forming our minds and our experiences of the world – it cannot be sidelined or dropped, and any efforts to do so would be foolish indeed. Instead, it is fruitful to adopt the second option, and to accept that subjectivity is to be examined through methods that do not always exemplify objective science. Here, empathy emerges as an important tool of understanding. In fact, empathy may be the best option if subjectivity is to be taken into account: it may not be perfect, but it is the best we have. Thus, the task is to navigate in the field of subjective experience, knowing that there is always room for error.

Furthermore, it is important to note that, without empathy, morality gains a very clinical and biased form. Whereas Holton and Langton argue that morality should not be built upon something as uncertain

as empathy, it would seem that, despite its uncertainty, empathy is a necessary building block of morality. This is, first and foremost, because it enables one to pay heed also to those who cannot propositionally present their own viewpoints. It is precisely through empathy that we can venture into the experiences of those human and non-human animals who are unable to lay out their subjectivity to us clearly and poignantly through the use of propositional language. Empathy speaks for and protects the most vulnerable, and, without it, morality would categorically favour those rational and moral agents who can represent and communicate their own experiences to others, and shout out the loudest for attention.

It is also good to keep in mind that empathy can be further cultivated. As pointed out, empathy is a scarce resource in this world, often overlooked and discarded as irrelevant. There is much scope for exploring and advancing it further, and perhaps through such an undertaking empathy might gain more precision and depth. Thus, R. M. Hare has argued that 'The difficulty of fully representing to ourselves absent states of experience (our own or other people's) is one of the main obstacles to good moral thinking – that is obvious.... The remedy, for humans, lies in sharpening our sensitivity, and above all in cultivating considerate habits of thought for use at the intuitive level' (Hare 1988, p. 217). In relation to non-human animals, too, empathy may yet prove, given further cultivation, a tool of great clarity and reliability; to dismiss it on the basis of the current lack of interest in empathy and its possibilities would be a grave mistake.

A related criticism involves the role of evidence. It would seem that, in the absence of a shred of evidence, empathy can be completely whimsical, and attach not only to dogs and rats, but also to bikes and stones. Bearing this in mind, does empathy necessarily reveal experiences and suffering in others, or is it just a sign of developed imagination which sees suffering where none is to be found?

One solution is to acknowledge that evidence also has its place. It has a role to play in preventing us from falling into anthropomorphic dreams, in which the experiences and intentions of non-human animals are reduced to the types of experiences and intentions human beings might have in similar situations. Perhaps more than anything else, empathy requires that one remain respectful of the difference of other beings, steering away from egoistic projections which reduce others into 'mini-me's'. The suffering of other animals has countless variations and degrees, and arises from countless different causes and triggers; no animal is the same in her suffering. In order to pay full regard to this

difference, there is a need to learn more about non-human animals also on the objective, third-person level, and therefore become more aware of their biology, history and behaviour. Of course, evidence is not airtight, but it is one guiding element that may help to achieve a fuller understanding of animal suffering. Like Holton and Langton, Stein also warns that the further removed from human beings other animals are, the more difficult empathy with them becomes: 'The further I deviate from the type "human being" the smaller does the number of possibilities of fulfillment become' (Stein 1989, p. 59). In foreign waters, signs may be needed to guide one's way, and here evidence serves its purpose. That is, evidence can be used as a supportive factor when expanding imagination and empathy, particularly concerning those non-human creatures who are very different from human beings.

Yet, it is important to keep in mind that third-person evidence has definite limitations when it comes to subjective experiences, simply because it may not – as argued above – grasp the nature of those experiences. Gallagher points out that research, which takes as its starting point the third-person perspective, struggles to comprehend or do justice to second-person (person to person) interactions, and it may be because of this that animal experiences have been so easily ignored (Gallagher 2001). Empathy without evidence may, in some instances, become overly biased, but evidence without empathy faces the greater risk of remaining blind to the experiences of others. Moreover, it is important to note that, even when empathy seems to give only a few clues, other beings are never completely unfathomable. Thus, Dan Zahavi argues that, no matter how different others are from oneself, there is always some room for empathy: 'The reason why I can experience others is because I am never so close to myself that the other is completely and radically foreign and inaccessible' (Zahavi 2001, p. 163). Therefore, although difference may point towards the need for evidence, it is never so great as to render empathy a categorical impossibility.

One further problem concerns intersubjectivity. Does intersubjectivity not require empathy also on the animal's part – that is, do other animals not need to empathize with human beings in order for interspecies intersubjectivity to be viable? One obvious answer is that intersubjectivity does not require empathy, and all that is required is that other animals respond in relation to the human self, not that animals seek to understand that self.<sup>30</sup> That is, it suffices that other animals relate to human beings as intentional creatures, as the type of 'yous' Gomez speaks of, without necessarily having a 'theory of mind' or capacity to empathize with the intentionality of those human beings.



Intersubjectivity rests on two individuals treating each other as a 'somebody' – however, whether they are able to empathize with the experiences of each other is another question. For the human mind, intersubjectivity is often accompanied by empathy, but this need not be the case when it comes to other animals. Yet, animal empathy is an interesting question, because it potentially implies deeper and more complex types of interactions between humans and other animals. The question that emerges, then, is: can non-human creatures take part in empathy?

In his popular book *Good Natured*, Frans de Waal depicts how primates exhibit many other-directed behaviours, manifested in, for instance, food sharing and protecting or helping others. Similar findings have been made within many other species, such as rats (who are willing to refrain from eating in order to spare another rat from being given electric shocks). These cases suggest that the animals in question are indeed capable of empathy. In fact, according to de Waal, there are different degrees and types of empathy found in nature – in other words, if one keeps in mind the variety of forms empathy can take, it becomes evident that it is manifested also in many other animals. A related view has been put forward by Jaak Panksepp in his *Affective Neuroscience*. According to Panksepp, all mammals share similar core emotions that are linked to their relations with other animals. In many animals, these emotions have a great impact on how they perceive others and themselves; that is, they relate to others through shared emotion. This, again, would establish a promising basis for animal empathy. Neurophilosophy has reached similar conclusions. According to Churchland, many animals (such as monkeys and scrub jays) have demonstrated the ability to attribute mental states to others (Churchland 2011), which again indicates a capability for empathy.<sup>31</sup>

Following this line of thought, Smuts argues that non-human animals can be quite capable of forming intersubjective relations and also participating in empathy (Smuts 2001). Animal empathy, whatever forms it may take and to whatever degree it may exist, strengthens the case for intersubjectivity and reflective sympathy: when we understand that the non-human animal is, indeed, looking at us and trying to figure us out, it becomes infinitely more difficult to deny her any empathy, and to remain blind to how she perceives and experiences what society is doing to her. Moreover, it becomes impossible to deny that interactive, intersubjective relationships of depth and colour can be formed with non-human creatures, which further help one to understand the suffering of other animals.

# 7

## Action against Suffering

Finally, how can all this be put into practice? How can others be invited to adopt an empathetic approach to non-human suffering? Animal ethics has devoted attention to the question of why animal suffering matters, while explorations of the type of action that should be taken to eradicate that suffering have remained less frequent. Here we come back to the theme of advocacy.

An important constituent in advocacy is *persuasion*. How can others be persuaded to reflect on their own attitudes towards other animals and their suffering? Often, it is not heavy-handed arguments but, rather, soft persuasiveness that holds the promise of achieving moral change.

One obvious element in persuasion is language, as it is partly through language that humans construct morality and communicate that morality to others. Crary argues that, in fact, morality is part and parcel of learning a language: when we adopt a language, we also adopt beliefs concerning what is good, what is valuable, how others should be treated, and so forth. Therefore, with language, one also learns a particular way of perceiving and valuing reality. In Crary's opinion, this has an important consequence. She follows a Wittgensteinian approach, according to which language forms our world views and constitutes what we understand to be reality: language makes the world appear in a given way. Now, if human morality is part of language, it also affects whole world views; like language, it is everywhere. Whereas Western philosophy has been keen to reduce morality to moral premises and arguments, this approach suggests that such a reduction is far too narrow to do justice to what morality is. For Crary, morality can be expressed in a great variety of ways, not only through concise moral arguments; moreover, since language and morality go hand in hand, morality is present in all that

we do and all that we say. Therefore – following Iris Murdoch – Crary calls morality ‘a total vision of life’ (Crary 2009, p. 165).

Therefore, moral differences can extend to and involve differences between broader world views. According to Crary, this means that, when faced with moral conflicts, we need to take into account the wider web of beliefs of both ourselves and our opponents (Crary 2009) – that is, it is not only specific moral claims that require attention, but also claims which concern more broadly how we view the world. In this way, one’s beliefs concerning other animals need to be seen in relation to, say, beliefs concerning care, kinship, humanity and nature. What is important here is that exploring these wider ramifications may help in addressing moral conflicts and ultimately in persuasion. By understanding why a given person holds given beliefs, one becomes more able to try and persuade her to listen to alternative views. This is because paying attention to the wider ramifications not only shows us the reasons behind or the context of our opponent’s morality, but also helps us to establish a common, respectful ground for dialogue with the other person – moreover, others become more open towards our own arguments if they are presented in a manner that makes sense from the perspective of their take on the world. In other words, it is by approaching moral conflicts from *within* the opponent’s take on things that change can be ignited. In this sense, persuasion benefits from a *holistic* approach to morality: abstract arguments that are detached from broader world views may fail to be appealing.

As Crary points out, the wrongness of sexual violence will only be apparent if one has a particular outlook on life, and perhaps the same can be said of speciesism: many will only view given ways of treating other animals as morally problematic if the belief that species alone is not a valid reason to ignore the suffering of others fits well with their foundational beliefs about the world. Quite simply, within world views that classify other animals as nothing but instruments to be used for human consumption, talk of the moral relevance of animal suffering may not make any sense at all; it might seem as odd as speaking of the moral relevance of table legs. In order to make others listen to her, the animal advocate needs to take into account these ramifications that feed anthropocentrism.<sup>1</sup>

But what can be done, if the broader framework is speciesist and hostile towards concern for non-human suffering? Both Diamond and Crary further argue that, in persuasion, identification with and compassion for others are elemental. As seen, Diamond speaks of igniting

'fellow-feeling' in those whom one seeks to persuade (Diamond 2004), and Crary, similarly, emphasizes luring one's opponents to see other creatures through empathy (Crary 2009). In this way, it is emotion and empathy that hold promise of affecting even those whose world views are strongly anthropocentric. Through emotion and empathy, one can begin to question speciesist background beliefs, or decide to adopt a new morality towards other animals, even if it does go against given facets of one's wider take on the world. Particularly, Diamond implies that fellow-feelings can be brought to the surface even in those seemingly hostile towards concern for other animals. These feelings do exist in many, and can be encouraged to surface once more. So, what form does such encouragement take?

Both Diamond and Crary maintain that fellow-feeling and empathy may be evoked by means other than theory, one perfect example being literature. According to Crary, the strong emotional responses literature can spark hold the promise of opening up new ways of understanding ethics. As it invites readers to identify with different characters and to pay heed to different contexts, literature offers them glimpses of how others see the world, thereby preparing the ground for remembering that our own perspective is not the only relevant one; moreover, it helps us to become aware of the complexities of both the reality and our own morality. In fact, the power of literature is often greater than that of moral theory, for the latter can leave its audiences entirely cold and indifferent (Crary 2009) or lead to the aforementioned 'deflection' (Diamond 2004). Therefore, like Nussbaum, who has maintained that literature can help to spark moral sentiments and understanding by offering a reminder of the variety of different viewpoints on reality (Nussbaum 2001), Crary suggests that literature enables one to become aware of the complexities of moral issues, in particular because it invites identification and care.

There are solid grounds for this line of thinking. Moral arguments rest on logic and reason, whereas literature and similar tools of persuasion (including many other arts and documentary footage) tap into existing fellow-feeling, inviting identification with the life-stories and experiences of other beings. From the standpoint of logic, I may condemn the thief, but when I hear her side of the story in literature I may grow to see her in a new light. This, again, ensures a deeper grasp of the morality involved in different situations, allowing us to better understand others and their plight. This approach has famous advocates in history, including Aristotle, who underlined the power of tragedy and poetry in bringing forth moral insights. Later, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,

for instance, has emphasized the role of art and maintained that it can teach us to 'see' (Merleau-Ponty 2002). What emerges as relevant is representation and communication of the experiences of other creatures, and seeing things from their phenomenality, their perspective.

Perhaps it is time that 'stories' in the broader sense of the term were more readily used in relation to non-human suffering. They can shed light not only on what it means to suffer, but also on what it means to be compassionate in an anthropocentric world, and what it means to exist as a non-human creature in a human world. These stories can include fiction, but also factual accounts of personal experiences with animals, and 'zoological' investigations into what the lives of cows or wolves or crows may be like. The possibilities are plentiful, and may also involve visual arts (a perfect example being artist Sue Coe's drawings from slaughterhouses) or make use of images and film footage that bring the pig in the crate or the hen in the cage closer to us. It is worth noting that persuasion does not always need to be soft, but may also be 'interruptive'. Here, people are interrupted with stark depictions of animal vulnerability and suffering that shatter, for a moment, their hedonistic everyday lives, and force them to come face to face with animal suffering (see Schnurer 2004). These interruptive stories would tell us what other animals in the grip of animal industries have to go through: in short, they would bring us, uncensored, the suffering animal.

As seen earlier, the novelist J. M. Coetzee presents a literary character who is torn by animal suffering, and who struggles to live in a society that so blatantly both causes and ignores that suffering. Diamond has suggested that this character, Elizabeth Costello, has become exposed to animals. She has been touched by what happens to animals – she suffers with her non-human others. For Diamond, it is precisely this type of exposure, letting oneself become 'an open wound' in front of the suffering of others, that is important for fellow-feeling (Diamond 2008). In other words, compassion can grow from exposure: those unwilling to pay heed to animal suffering need to be confronted with it. Perhaps the society needs to become more aware of the stark realities of animal industries, and to be faced with what happens to animals all around us. When one looks suffering square in the face, it is a lot harder to resort to mathematizing, detached explanations, or to the superficial puzzles of scepticism. Here, stories of non-human suffering can both exemplify and evoke fellow-feeling towards other animals, and ultimately invite criticism of the society's anthropocentric ramifications.

To draw the above arguments together, it is crucial to take a closer look at the way total outlooks on life can shape concern (or lack thereof)

for animal suffering, and how a change can be evoked by inviting identification and fellow-feeling with other animals. Those blinded by anthropocentrism need to be persuaded to look at the viewpoint of the animal and to recognize shared vulnerability. We are to imagine finally what the cat (Derrida's or otherwise) experiences, and here stories act as a perfect catalyst.

Of course, animal philosophy and animal ethics are important, too. To prove the point, it should be remembered that Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* has been a highly influential book, which has had a tremendous impact on how people relate to non-human animals and their suffering. That is, theory can act as an important form of persuasion. Reasoned moral arguments should never be completely sidelined; rather, they serve a hugely valuable role in both helping one to clarify given beliefs concerning non-human suffering and enabling one to seek to persuade those who will not be affected by other forms of persuasion. Therefore, arguments (including those that are highly abstract and rely solely on logic) are still required.

Reason offers structure and analysis that help one to explore the moral relevance of non-human suffering, while emotion, empathy and intersubjectivity – and all the stories that persuade one to recognize these factors – inspire moral understanding and concern on a more felt, experienced level.

And what about other forms of action – what shape should advocacy take? Luc Boltanski has argued that there are three historical types of activism against suffering: pamphleteering, philanthropy and sublimation. *Pamphleteering* seeks to evoke anger towards the wrongdoer, and asks people to man the barricades, fight the perpetrator, and finally bring her to justice. The downside of pamphleteering is that, although it swings people into action, its effect also tends to be short-lived. After you have been to the demonstration or signed the petition, what do you do then? *Philanthropy*, on the other hand, concentrates on the sufferer. Charity is a typical example of philanthropy, as it encourages people to pick up the pieces after the perpetrator has committed his evil acts. Rather than building barricades, people are persuaded to focus their energies on kindly deeds, particularly in the form of monetary donations (Boltanski 1999). However, philanthropy has also been the target of criticism. Its downside is that, while it invites empathy, this empathy can be quite momentary, and philanthropy itself superficial because it often lacks a proper understanding of the causes of suffering. In fact, philanthropy easily suffocates fruitful action by using overly moderate

methods, and by turning to sensationalism, aimed at producing fleeting moments of emotion, and entertainment (such as charity galas), which presents an overly simplistic view of sufferers and their plight (Boltanski 1999; Cohen 2002).

Whereas pamphleteering centres on the perpetrator and philanthropy on the victim, *sublimation* concentrates on the audience itself by inspiring contemplation of the reasons for suffering, its moral implications, one's own responsibility, and even one's own identity. For Boltanski, this is the most productive option, because only sublimation will make possible a proper grasp of the complex chains of events behind violence and atrocities – a grasp needed for fruitful alleviation and prevention of suffering (Boltanski 1999). There are good reasons for this claim. In the course of sublimation, people will pause and reflect on the causes of suffering, including the way in which their own world views and actions have implications for how others are treated. The result can be a permanent change in one's lifestyle, as one begins to avoid those beliefs and actions that provide grounds for violence. Thus, sublimation goes hand in hand with the type of critical scrutiny of one's take on reality that was called for above.

However, pamphleteering and philanthropy should not be entirely sidelined. Pamphleteering can be a way of pointing out problems: without it, sublimation may never take place, as we may never become aware of the violence suffered by others. Most importantly, pamphleteering embodies the role of action and positive duties. It is not enough to ponder on the nature of suffering; one must also go out there and help. What type of action should be taken remains, of course, a source of controversy, but these divisions should not blind us to the need to act on behalf of suffering others. One obvious form of pamphleteering consists of the type of stories advocated earlier. We need to tell stories that invite scrutiny of how human beings treat other animals, and why. From this standpoint, perhaps the best tools of the activist are a pen and a video recorder, accompanied by eagerness to explore and bring to light the misery of which contemporary society has so willingly remained ignorant.

Philanthropy also has its place, since at its best it can serve as a financial platform for pamphleteering, create educational infrastructures relevant to non-human suffering, or help to build shelters and provide relief for those animals discarded and abused by society. Although philanthropy may, at times, remain superficial, there is no reason why this should always be so, and why it could not also incorporate deeper

awareness of the causes and ramifications of non-human suffering. In the context of animal suffering, all three methods are used, but arguably there is much room for improvement.

Yet, there are obstacles in the path. Moral reflection, awareness and sublimation are often avoided as something overly serious and crude: they are seen as a 'geeky' way of doing things, and thus even something of an embarrassment. As Stanley Cohen has pointed out, the contemporary era is witnessing an antagonism to cries of suffering, as people respond to the suffering of others with the cynical statement: 'I don't give a shit' (Cohen 2002). One suggestion is that the reason for this new hostility may be found in contemporary culture. Compassion and morality quite simply go against the rushed, consumeristic and entertainment-based lifestyle that today's society endorses (Bauman 1993; Tester 2001). Morality requires stability, commitment and self-sacrifice, which are all very alien qualities in the contemporary atmosphere that celebrates constant change, replaceability and hedonism. If anything, current morality has become a pick-and-choose affair: one can pick those feelings and beliefs that best serve one's particular purposes, as though they were commodities or products on sale, with no consistency, justification or commitment being required (MacIntyre 1984).

This means that moral sentiments are reduced to personal tastes, and those discussing ethics are held to be boring do-gooders, who inevitably become marginalized and dismissed as naïve or annoying. There is no room for compassion or sublimation: the inn is full. As a result, many avoid serious arguments, emotions or empathy which might appear to demand moral action, and instead seek to make light of even the most harrowing of suffering. Quite catastrophically, morality emerges as something that one needs to escape from. The courage to question current practices and to express moral criticism is all too often missing. Lilie Chouliaraki even argues that Western society is plagued by a narcissism that cancels out any serious effort to help the suffering (Chouliaraki 2006); far too many people simply do not care, preferring to concentrate on their own pleasure-seeking, entertainment-filled, consumeristic realities.

This has a definite bearing on how other animals are viewed. All too often concern for non-human beings and their suffering is labelled as something only the very uncouth, the overly serious or the very sentimental will engage with. Animal advocates are readily stereotyped as irritating spoilers of fun, or as joyless and interfering preachers, who want to make your life difficult. The term 'moralizing', favoured by Amato, is repeatedly brought to the fore, as those who remind us of



animal suffering are accused of thinking that they are better than the rest, or of being tedious 'naggers'.<sup>2</sup> It's not 'cool' to be compassionate or moral, and this further hinders willingness to be concerned about or take action on behalf of other animals. In a pick-and-mix consumerist culture, there is no room for the degree of concern for animal suffering that leads to effort and commitment, and those who would rather be submerged in the everyday realities of hedonism are, if anything, irritated when somebody dares to request that they pay heed to animals. This situation feeds apathy, as only a few people are willing to take the type of action required for even minimal awareness of animal suffering to grow. That is, sublimation remains rare, simply because cultural influences support egoism and amorality rather than moral reflection.

Moreover, denial feeds apathy.<sup>3</sup> Many are eager to pretend that nothing all that serious is happening, that other animals are doing well. As Cohen has noted, denial is often the biggest obstacle to the eradication of suffering (Cohen 2002), and this clearly applies also in the animal context.

In order for advocacy to succeed in the task of persuasion and of inspiring sublimation, it therefore needs to break through both egoism and denial. One obvious route to achieving this goal is to do more: tell more stories, show more footage, present more reasoned arguments, do more tapping into people's empathy and fellow-feeling. We need to become more vocal and more active, and never become the silent majority that simply stands by watching as billions upon billions of non-human animals undergo immense suffering in the name of nothing more than human profit, hedonism and custom.

# Concluding Words

What is happening to other animals in human hands is not 'normality', nor even 'cruelty', but rather 'violence'. Non-human suffering does not 'just exist', nor can it be reduced to rare acts of sadism; it is not inevitable or exceptional, but, rather, the consequence of anthropocentric hierarchies and the types of egoism that they feed. That is, the suffering of other animals is all too often the consequence of human actions carried out in the name of human gain and power.

Levinas argues that violence is based on eradicating the individuality of another creature and subjecting her to the service of one's own interests: 'Violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognise themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy every possibility of action' (Levinas 1969, p. 21). Therefore, violence is an act that destroys our individuality – our very being – and renders us nothing more than instruments for others to use. This is precisely what is happening to non-human animals. They are made to exist in conditions which are utterly alien to their species-specific needs, and which therefore utterly clash with their cognitive capacities and physiologies: to use Levinas' terminology, if presented with the possibility, they would not recognize themselves, as their surroundings prohibit them from acting according to their very substance, force them into acts and ways of being that are thoroughly foreign to them, and ultimately annihilate their very agency.

In these conditions, animals cannot function or behave in the way that millions of years of evolution have formed them to do. The animals cannot thrive, because they cannot fulfil their nature: their potential or their *telos* cannot be achieved in the artificial, restricting environments.

They are torn away from their own potential, their own 'true being', and reduced to production machines with no value other than utility for human beings. As they are treated as mere objects instead of a 'you' or a 'someone' – that is, as their own innate tendency towards intersubjectivity is denied – the animals may also be put under unbearable psychological strain. This strain is rendered even more painful when taking into account that social animals, who have the inbuilt need to both experience and be experienced by other members of their own species, are made to live in conditions where they cannot relate to each other in any meaningful way. What it is to be a sow, forever kept incarcerated from not only other sows but her own offspring, in a cage where she cannot even turn around, must be nothing short of pure horror. The real product of animal industries is a crippled, destroyed, and ultimately annihilated animal. This, if anything, is violence.

As seen, for Arendt, there is no satisfactory way of describing atrocities: they are senseless, beyond comprehension, defeating our very capacity for understanding (Arendt 1968). This evaluation applies also to animal industries. Their enormity, and the immense suffering that they cause, is something incomprehensible. According to moderate estimates, 55 billion animals are killed for food each year – and this includes only the more typical farmed animals, thus excluding fish, wild animals, and so forth. Nine hundred million farmed animals are killed each year in the UK alone.<sup>1</sup> Most of them live in barren conditions, in which even natural light or room to move may be rare luxuries. Here, there is hardly any mental or physical stimulation; instead, injuries and illnesses dominate the lives of many animals. For one to even begin to understand what suffering on this scale means is very difficult. How can we make sense of the idea that billions of individuals are subjected to violence, suffering and annihilation for nothing more than taste or financial greed? Or, more poignantly, how can we make sense of the idea that societies and most people around us give their blessing to what is happening? How to fathom that suffering is accepted and then ignored, and let flourish all around us, amidst the very societies that many deem good and decent?

Evil is not written on the faces of farmers and vivisectioners, yet evil is here. It exists in the processes whereby sentient, thinking beings are reduced to biological matter and treated as mere instruments for human benefit. The ultimate prize of its constant presence is the suffering faced by billions of non-human animals. Despite this, contemporary societies do very little to change the course of events. If anything, they wish to silence and marginalize the voices that want to tell the

world what is happening. Yet, as Derrida has claimed, horror exceeds utilitarian calculations; that is, it cannot be explained away by utility or instrumentality. Indeed, this is perhaps the most important lesson in morality: suffering can never be ignored on the grounds of its usefulness for others. Guided by this idea, many, including writers such as Dostoyevsky, have sought to demonstrate how monstrous is a world in which suffering is caused to silent minorities in the name of the greater good. As Levinas points out in his 'Useless suffering', we can never justify suffering on the basis of its claimed utility – suffering can never be named 'useful'. The same lesson must finally be recognized also in the context of animal industries. Fortunately, its echoes are already heard, even if often only faintly. Although the anthropocentric society seeks to reduce animal suffering into something trivial and hide it behind the appealing façade of human benefit and 'welfare legislation', something always escapes. Now and then we experience the cold, petrifying sensation that all is not well, that something horrendous is taking place everywhere around us.

It is here that we can confront the all-important question: 'What is it like to be a non-human animal in a human society?' In this book, it has been argued that billions of animals undergo suffering – some for the whole duration of their lives – within animal industries. Hamburgers and dairy ice-cream come with a heavy cost, paid by the animals they are made from. It has also been argued that many (if not most) non-human animals can suffer, and that doubt over their capacity to do so is often based on mechanomorphic blindness and hollow scepticism. Moreover, the suggestion has been that, whilst concern for non-human suffering has a long history, in Western culture anthropocentric disregard has played a dominating role. The book has also explored the moral status of animal suffering, and sought to manifest that there is room for many different approaches, ranging from analytical reason to continental metaphysics, and from emotion and empathy to intersubjectivity. Lastly, the book briefly examined perhaps the most important theme of all: the challenge of persuading others to finally take note of the suffering of other animals.

If one had to choose the most important capacity instilled in the personality of most human beings, it would be empathy. It is specifically empathy that acts as the reminder of the animal perspective, of the non-human mode of being, and of the suffering that anthropocentrism causes. In short, empathy can help one to resonate with other animals, to exist in relation to them and their subjectivity. When combined with emotion and intersubjectivity, empathy can help one to achieve

an entirely new way of relating to non-human animals and their suffering. Here, such suffering is real and morally relevant, and the animal subjectivity behind it something that impacts our own sense of self and the world. That is, through emotion, empathy and intersubjectivity, the world appears anew: non-human animals emerge as individuals, whose perspectives on this shared reality have much to teach those previously tied down to the narrow viewpoint of anthropocentrism. Instead of being restricted to the narcissistic fantasies of human excellence, one finally becomes aware of the multitude of experience and ways of being manifested all around us. In this juncture, other animals do not need to be moral agents or otherwise similar to human beings: what suffices is that it is like something to be them, that they can approach the world through experience.

However, emotion, empathy and intersubjectivity need to be channelled into action. What this means is that concern and care must materialize: they must manifest themselves in how one behaves towards non-human creatures, what types of industries one supports, what one tells others about animal suffering. Edith Stein argued that 'He who feels a value and can realize it, does so. In normative terms: If you feel a value and can realize it, then do it' (Stein 1989, p. 114). This is a poignant reminder in the context of animal suffering: it is time for action.

# Notes

## Introduction

1. A related clarification concerns another term, 'we', often used to exclude and draw boundaries. The book will employ this term quite frequently – however, it is not used to refer to human beings as such, but rather to those individuals able and willing to read this text.

## 1 Animal Suffering: The Practice

1. Nociception has been detected in a variety of species, from flies and leeches to reptiles and fish (Pastor et al. 1996; Braithwaite 2010).
2. It has to be noted that nociception and the affective, experienced aspect of pain may be difficult to distinguish from each other in any categorical way. Moreover, as Colin Allen (2004) has argued, the sensory aspect of pain and the experience of pain are possibly intertwined to such a degree that it makes little sense to draw a clear distinction between the two.
3. In his 'Correspondence', Descartes justifies the assertion that animals have no souls by arguing that quite clearly oysters have no souls (Descartes 1991).
4. It should be noted that the positivistic school of thought in philosophy supported the behaviourist conclusion in its insistence on material verification.
5. For an ethological rebuttal of Descartes, see Wemelsfelder 1999.
6. Colin Allen offers a direct rebuttal of Carruthers' emphasis on a theory of mind. According to Allen, it is overly generic at best, for there are various senses (such as touch and smell) to which a theory of mind can have no relevance. Moreover, he argues that given types of learning linked to phenomenality do not – as Carruthers suggests – depend on a theory of mind (Allen 2004).
7. Already Aristotle – a keen zoologist – saw that animals were not only able to feel pain, but also capable of practical reasoning: they could learn and remember, and perceive connections between different phenomena (Sorabji 1993).
8. Kirkwood argues that sentience is a combination of a whole spectrum of feelings and is thus 'symphonic' (Kirkwood 2007, p. 13).
9. Analgesics have been viewed as a highly reliable indication of the ability to feel pain, as are various stress hormone levels (such as cortisol). For instance, fish will display far fewer pain-related behaviours if they are administered morphine (Sneddon 2003).
10. Fish have nociceptors similar to those of mammals and manifest various behaviours linked to pain and distress (Sneddon 2003; NRC 2009).

11. On insects, it has been argued that 'In general, insects are equipped with numerous sense organs. The brain is particularly well developed in social insects, and the size of certain neural centers can be correlated with learning capacity. Learning is also known from many solitary species of insects. Insects do not react to damage of their bodies, but may show strong reflexes to constraint... Among invertebrates, social insects represent a high level of cognition, and their welfare should be considered during handling' (Somme 2005, p. 37).
12. Fraser argues that animal communication is one way of approaching their affective states. The most obvious form of communication consists of sounds, which seem to indicate states such as fear or joy. However, signalling exists only in cases in which it offers an evolutionary advantage. Thus, prey animals, who do not receive assistance from conspecifics, will suffer pain quietly, which again may mislead one into thinking that they do not feel pain. Amongst prey animals, attention needs to be paid to different forms of behaviour. For instance, vigilant 'freezing still' is a simple, non-vocal sign of fear and hesitation (Fraser 2008).
13. Rollin argues that sentience is, in fact, a very primary requirement for survival, for research shows that animals who have had their nerves damaged soon mutilate themselves because they can no longer feel pain (Rollin 2003).
14. Rats are keen learners and pigs portray highly complex intellectual and social capacities. Octopuses manifest the capacity for learning as well as emotions such as annoyance, dogs can master over a thousand words, primates can be taught to use sign language, and chickens have been alleged to surpass even primates in their level of conceptual ability. (For these and further examples, see, for instance, Bekoff 2002; Wise 2002; Fraser 2008.)
15. Because of this, the definitions are often somewhat vague. For instance, Gregory suggests that 'Suffering is an unpleasant state of mind that disrupts the quality of life. It is the mental state associated with unpleasant experiences such as pain, malaise, distress, injury and emotional numbness (e.g. extreme boredom)' (Gregory 2004, p. 1).
16. Anthropocentric society may be equally blind to animal joy (see Balcombe 2007).
17. One underlying thought here is that, since human beings can comprehend their own inability to control and understand suffering, they will suffer in a more acute way. For instance, Schopenhauer argued that the capacity to imagine life without suffering renders suffering unbearable (Schopenhauer 1970).
18. Mayerfeld is referring to Eric J. Cassell (1991) *The nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine*, New York: Oxford University Press.
19. Similarly, Marc Bekoff points out that non-human animals may experience emotion, for instance, more strongly than human beings: 'It just might be that other animals experience more vivid emotion than we do' (Bekoff 2007, p. 35).
20. As an example of the latter two tendencies, one research project discusses the animal's path from 'farm to fork' and uses the term 'zootechnical performance' to refer to the speed at which animals produce meat (see Bock and van Huik 2007).

21. There are many viewpoints as to what constitutes animal welfare. Some emphasize sentience and argue that animals should have lives with positive affective states. Others emphasize naturalness and argue that animals should be able to live according to their innate capacities (for instance, Bernard Rollin states: 'Not only will welfare mean control of pain and suffering, it will also entail nurturing and fulfillment of the animals' natures...'; Rollin 1993). There are also those (usually affiliated to animal industries) who emphasize external matters, such as good nutrition and lack of predators, as the criteria of welfare (Fraser 2008).
22. Also, negative mental states such as boredom have not been studied properly, although they can be very relevant in the lives of production animals (one exception here is the work of Francoise Wemelsfelder – see Duncan 2005; 2006). Therefore, avoidance of suffering should not be the only key issue in welfare studies.
23. Studies show that animals go through considerable stress within various forms of animal use. For instance, deer hunted for hours by dogs have significantly high levels of stress-related chemicals (such as cortisol). They go to the limit in trying to escape, rupturing their muscles and causing damage to their internal organs, until they simply cannot go on any more. Leopards in zoos, under the constant gaze of the viewing public, have notably high stress hormone levels, as do pigs in their small pens (Fraser 2008).
24. As Fraser points out, we also need to remain cautious about the connections between high stress hormone levels and suffering. This is because many presumably happy events in life, such as mating, exploration and playing, increase the level of alertness, and therefore also increase stress hormone levels (Fraser 2008).
25. However, these methods also present difficulties, as, for instance, the fear of the new may distort results (Duncan 2005).
26. For an example, see 'USA – Animal welfare and poultry' in *Meat Trade News Daily*, 15 March 2011 ([http://www.meattradenewsdaily.co.uk/news/150311/usa\\_\\_\\_animal\\_welfare\\_and\\_poultry.aspx](http://www.meattradenewsdaily.co.uk/news/150311/usa___animal_welfare_and_poultry.aspx), accessed March 2011).
27. The Amsterdam Protocol on Animal Welfare (1997) states that 'The high contracting parties, desiring to endure improved protection and respect for the welfare of animals as sentient beings... shall pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals'.
28. For more information, see the Treaty on European Union, *Official Journal of the European Union* C 115, 9 May 2008.
29. For instance, pig farmers who use standard farming methods tend to be hostile towards more stringent welfare regulations (see Bock and Huik 2000).
30. It has been repeatedly argued that, when animal cruelty cases are brought to court, 'Complaints are often refused, and those that ultimately lead to trial are usually dismissed or given no hearing' (Arluke 2006, p. 43).
31. At times, things appear good on paper. Various welfare measures have been written into legislation, the most famous of which perhaps are the 'five freedoms', meant to offer at least some protection for the welfare of farmed animals. These are freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition; from fear and distress; from physical and thermal discomfort; from pain, injury and disease; and freedom to express typical patterns of behaviour (Webster



- 2007). However, the extent to which such measures are realized in practice remains highly dubious.
32. The flipside, of course, is that economic growth will feed environmental destruction, which again will affect wild animal species, often in a detrimental manner. Also, economic growth usually goes hand in hand with the intensification of animal production, which again is not good news for animals.
  33. In the first decades of industrialism and hard labour, industry spokespeople argued that it was in their own interests to treat their workforce well. The same argument is used today in relation to production animals, as animal industries claim that animals would not be productive if they were not happy (Fraser 2008). Of course, there are good grounds for refuting this argument. Already the Brambell Report (1965) has stated: 'The argument is that in the absence of any scientific method of evaluating whether an animal is suffering, its continued productivity should be taken as decisive evidence that it is not. This is an oversimplified and incomplete view and we reject it' (Brambell Report, quoted in Fraser 2008, p. 101). It is true that, according to various studies, offering more room to animals and treating them in a non-aggressive manner will increase production rates. Often, however, this will not increase the actual profits, and is thus against the financial interests of the producer. As Fraser points out: 'Productivity should not be confused with profit. Profit requires a certain level of productivity, but profit can also be increased by limiting input costs.... Even if these cut-backs reduce productivity to some extent, the net result may still be greater profit overall' (Fraser 2008, p. 102). Therefore, some loss of animals and their productivity due to neglectful production may result in less financial loss than altering the rules of production. Fraser gives us an example: 'Especially if egg prices are high and feed costs are low, then profit can often be increased by adding extra birds to a facility so that crowding is more severe, even though the death rate is increased and the birds' individual rate of lay declines' (ibid.). When numbers of animals are huge, the industries can sustain the blow that comes from decreased production or a higher death rate, for the overall production level remains high.
  34. See TV news footage from a Swedish fur farm which belongs to an industry-run welfare assurance programme, and in which animals can be seen in dire straits (some are already dead from illness and injury). The journalist asks the farmer whether this was what he wanted the world to see and the farmer replies: 'No, it was not'. [http://www.nyhetskanalen.se/1.1741869/2010/08/11/fordomde\\_vanvard\\_misskotte\\_minkar](http://www.nyhetskanalen.se/1.1741869/2010/08/11/fordomde_vanvard_misskotte_minkar) (accessed 12 December 2010).
  35. <http://www.five.tv/programmes/news/five-news/95729> and [http://www.animalaid.org.uk/h/n/NEWS/news\\_factory/ALL/2078/](http://www.animalaid.org.uk/h/n/NEWS/news_factory/ALL/2078/) (viewed 12 December 2010).
  36. For instance, Finland, a big fur producer, has remained defiant against any criticism of fur farming, and has even challenged other countries willing to ban fur farming by taking them to court. When the EU commission on animal welfare compiled a meta-analysis of over 100 studies on fur farming and concluded that fur farming seriously compromises the welfare of animals, a handful of Finnish scientists – many with presumed ties to the fur farming industry – publicly rejected the findings. Therefore, the financial

- and political powers that go against animal welfare often have quite tangible manifestations.
37. It is noteworthy that farmed fish are often unprotected by any law, and may be similarly afforded only scant space: for instance, young salmon may have the equivalent of a bathtub per 83 fish (Turner 2006).
  38. See Viva! at <http://www.milkmyths.org.uk/intro.php> (accessed 11 August 2010).
  39. On the treatment of poultry, see also United Poultry Concern at <http://www.upc-online.org/chickens/chickensbro.html> (accessed 12 March 2011).
  40. See Pressdemocrat.com 22/11/2006, at <http://www1.pressdemocrat.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061122/NEWS/611220399/1033/NEWS01> (accessed 12 March 2011).
  41. See HSUS at <http://video.humanesociety.org/video/629262638001/Channels/729780768001/Factory-Farming/775461364001/Downer-Cow-Investigation/> (accessed 13 February 2011).
  42. See again United Poultry Concern at <http://www.upc-online.org/chickens/chickensbro.html> (accessed 12 March 2011).
  43. CO<sub>2</sub> stunning may lead to breathing difficulties and distress, and is not recommended for use on any animal (Turner 2006).
  44. Sarah Kite of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, who infiltrated the notorious testing laboratory Huntingdon Life Sciences in the UK, gives an example of the everyday reality of research animals: 'In one test, 48 Beagles had their backs shaved then an anti-psoriatic cream applied every day for 30 days. This resulted in open sores and blisters on the dogs' backs. The dogs had their bodies bound in tight sticky plaster and they had to wear large head collars to stop them pulling at the plasters as they were in pain... This was no new cure but simply another drug company looking to cash in on a lucrative market... More pointless animal research for profit'. 'Whilst cleaning out the cages, I regularly found blood, vomit and diarrhoea on the floor. Many dogs were very ill. They were extremely thin with their fur standing on end. They were visibly shaking and often so scared they were unable to leave their cages.' See BUAV at <http://www.buav.org/undercover-investigations/secret-suffering> (accessed 12 December 2010).
  45. Examples are endless. In nature, chickens spend the majority of their time foraging and pecking, whereas in the farm cages they have little chance of doing either. Other important tendencies such as sand bathing and nest building are usually made impossible to express. In preference and motivational tests, hens work very hard in order to be able to engage in natural behaviours, and, when given the chance to, for instance, sand bathe, will do so repeatedly, over and over again, thus signalling huge enjoyment (Turner 2006). In the wild, pigs spend a lot of their time chewing and rooting for food. In intensive agriculture, they have no opportunity to follow these behaviour traits and will resort to rooting on the barren floor or chewing the bars of their cages (or the tails of their mates). For these highly social animals, social hierarchies are also important. Because in intensive production they are often impossible to maintain, fear, stress and aggression are the rather inevitable consequences (this applies particularly when piglets are separated from their mothers and placed in meat production units, and when animals are herded together for transport to slaughter) (Turner 2006).

In studies, domesticated pigs that are released into suitable natural habitats will very quickly begin to live almost exactly like their wild ancestors (Fraser 2008), which proves that their capacities are still intact, and still affect them.

46. In one research article that uses the term 'zootechnical', a pig farmer is quoted as saying: 'You can recognise good animal welfare by low mortality rates; the animals grow optimally and perform well. You look at it from a technical viewpoint' (Bock and Huik 2007, p. 937).

## 2 Knowing Suffering

1. This view follows the tradition of logical positivism, epitomized in the famous claim: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent' (Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, prop. 7).
2. Even ethologists favourable towards animal minds can remain extremely sceptical. For instance, Marian Stamp Dawkins argues that her description of animal emotions is a personal opinion of hers, not 'a view that can be grounded in empirical fact'. Moreover, she claims (in much the same vein as behaviourists before her) that 'I carefully put scare quotes around words such as "pleasure" and "suffering" in describing positive and negative emotional states' (Dawkins 2003, pp. 98–9). Scientists like Francoise Wemelsfelder have used terms that refer to sentience (such as 'timid' or 'inquisitive') – however, this qualitative approach has not yet become dominant.
3. In a similar vein, Gaita uses Peter Winch's term 'primitive reactions', which are 'a condition rather than a consequence of ascribing states of consciousness to others' (Gaita 2002, p. 59).
4. Not all are as favourable towards this approach. For instance, the sceptic Peter Carruthers maintains that 'It really is something of a scandal that people's intuitions, in this domain, are given any weight at all' (Carruthers 2000, p. 199).
5. Gordon Brittan makes a similar point: 'The text is not a "report" on the author's mind whose accuracy, in the nature of the case, can never be verified. In the same way, when we properly interpret some animal's behaviour, locating it in a present environment and past history, there is little room for asking, yes, but does this *really* signify a mind? The behaviour itself, contextually understood, answers the question' (Brittan 1999, pp. 68–9).
6. Jamie Mayerfeld argues that it is rather obvious when and if other animals suffer. This is based on our own 'intrinsic aversion to suffering' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 56) and the consequent understanding of how creatures behave when they suffer.
7. Francoise Wemelsfelder has sought to put this intuitive sense of the obvious into scientific practice by constructing a free choice test, within which a large group of humans are asked to interpret the affective states of animals. Usually people offer very similar interpretations (Fraser 2008).
8. For many distinguished ethologists, it is this direct type of knowledge that forms the basis for understanding the suffering of animals. Thus, Marc Bekoff states: 'Dare to look into the sunken eyes of animals, who are afraid or feeling other sorts of pain, and then try to deny to yourself and to others that these

individuals aren't feeling *anything*' (Bekoff 2007, p. 31). Jane Goodall observes, along similar lines, 'And that's the message that I've seen in the eyes of so many abused, neglected animals whether they be chimpanzee orphans for sale in the African markets or chimpanzees looking out from their bleak sterile lab cages or under the frills of the circus. I've seen it in the eyes of chained elephants and dogs cast out on the streets, and in the eyes of animals imprisoned without hope in factory farms. If we see that look with our eyes and we feel it in our hearts, we have to jump and try to help' (Goodall 2007, p. 11).

### 3 History of Caring

1. Many of the kindest attitudes towards animal suffering can, of course, be found in Asia, and include world views such as Jainism and Buddhism, which celebrate compassion and underline the wrongness of causing animals suffering.
2. This aspiration to put animals into use as efficiently as possible has long historical roots. As Ingvid Gilhus argues, already in antiquity 'humans exploited animals on their farms, hunted them on the wilderness and at sea, trained and tamed them, used them to transport people and goods, utilized them in magic and medicine, kept them as pets, cheered them on the racetrack, killed them in the arenas, and sacrificed them to the gods' (Gilhus 2006, p. 12).
3. Aquinas argues: 'According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use"' (*Summa Theologica* II, Q 64, Art 1).
4. Montaigne also maintains that cruelty towards animals leads to cruelty towards human beings: 'Those natures that are sanguinary towards beasts discover a natural proneness to cruelty. After they had accustomed themselves at Rome to spectacles of the slaughter of animals, they proceeded to those of the slaughter of men, of gladiators' (Montaigne 2009).
5. History has seen extreme forms of violence towards animals being presented as sources of frivolous entertainment. Perhaps the most notorious example is bull-baiting, in which tied-up bulls would be tormented by dogs, often for hours, whilst onlookers would cheer, drink and place bets (Turner 1980). Even today, bullfighting gathers wide audiences who watch merrily as animals are first tormented and finally killed. Arguably, pastimes such as these have served as a justification for the everyday practices of animal agriculture. Because they are so extreme, they make lack of concern for animal experiences and suffering obvious and blatant, and in doing so illustrate that there is no reason to be concerned; that one can, without blame, do anything to an animal. And, if something that extreme is justifiable, surely everyday agriculture passes the test of moral scrutiny with perfect ease?
6. Not only activists, but also artists and writers, began to offer their support for compassion that ought to extend also to non-human animals, and this trend continued into the twentieth century. For instance, Bernard Shaw was a vociferous proponent of animals, and Thomas Hardy wrote beautiful endorsements of compassion towards animals and their suffering in his novels (Kean 1998).

7. As in other early animal protection societies, disagreements ran high. In particular, people felt unsure of how to relate to animal suffering. Was using animals *per se* morally dubious? Could one use animals if they were treated well? What counted as good treatment? One of the founders of the SPCA, Lewis Gompertz, was an early animal rights vegan. He felt that animals ought not to be used for purposes that were not motivated by their own benefit, and therefore refused meat, dairy, eggs and horse carriages. This was deemed by some to be irrational and even mad (his critics blamed him for following the old doctrines of Pythagoras, and – worryingly enough – for being Jewish). Whereas Gompertz had been eager to embark on an all-out mission to change how animals are treated, and wished to see the SPCA prosecute offenders, the critics moved on to reshape the SPCA as a conservative, moderate organization that avoided stepping on society's toes, and, rather, concentrated on mild education and quiet fund-raising amongst the middle and upper classes. Avoidance of controversy became dominant, for fear that it might alienate well-off benefactors. Once Gompertz was ousted, this was to set the RSPCA's future trend, still very recognizable today (Turner 1980).
8. Turner presents an oddly negative and unfair image of this campaign, and in doing so perhaps reveals an underlying prejudice against the animal welfare movement: 'Much of their propaganda was pitched on an offensively low level: vicious anonymous letters to physiologists from hysterical women, lurid posters of bloody experiments flaunted on busy streets' (Turner 1980, p. 95).
9. It has to be noted that vegetarianism was supported also from viewpoints other than those related to animal suffering, being linked, for instance, to the fight against poverty and alcoholism, and (as will be seen) even to the desire to protect 'humanity' during the upheavals caused by Darwin's radical suggestions. Hence, Hilda Kean has argued: 'Vegetarianism in the late nineteenth century offered many things: a respite from the prevalent contamination of meat and animal produce; a practical alternative to the continuing maltreatment of animals by butchers and slaughterers; and a solution to poverty' (Kean 1998, pp. 121–2). For some, eating meat was linked to lack of humanity on many different levels. Thus, Oswald maintained that 'Animal food overpowers the faculties of the stomach, clogs the functions of the soul, and renders the mind material and gross' (Oswald 2001). However, the moral element remained pertinent (Kean 1998).
10. Wilkinson asserts that 'It may be as an unintended consequence of the intensifying force of market relations, rationalisation and state control upon our lives that we are also prone to develop humanitarian sensibilities that have the potential to become an active force in the public domain' (Wilkinson 2005, p. 109).
11. From the standpoint of moral psychology, it is important to bear in mind that a certain distance from given practices is often required in order to make fruitful moral evaluations concerning those practices. Therefore, the possible link between personal detachment from agriculture and growing compassion can be viewed as a positive rather than a negative development.
12. Thus, Wilkinson suggests that 'Durkheim leaves us with the perhaps troubling proposition that it is only in so far as we ourselves are made socially vulnerable to a mental state of suffering that we are likely to become

- sentimentally orientated to the suffering of others' (Wilkinson 2005, pp. 77–8).
13. Victorians also created a new type of animal, which you did not need to fear. This animal was transformed from a blind, savage force (the stereotype of a wild animal) into an intelligent, sentient and emotive being, worthy of moral regard. Thus, one argument is that the creation of the modern 'pet' was the ultimate act of taming the beast within (Turner 1980).
  14. This meant that the mobs gazing with enjoyment at bulls being torn apart by dogs, or the scientists readily cutting animals to pieces, were not participating in the ethos of humanity. Such distrust was evident particularly in the way in which scientists were criticized and even abhorred. The scientist was deemed a worrying specimen of humanity, utterly stripped of kindness and compassion (Turner 1980; Langley 1989; Kean 1998). Opposition to vivisection did, thus, include a more general concern for the fate of humanity, as compassion and goodness struggled against the emerging emphasis on rational, materialistic calculation.
  15. Early echoes of this stance can be found in Henry Salt, who spoke of 'animal rights' and argued that 'If people looked these stark truths in the face, they would have to cast aside their ragged illusions of uniqueness, admit that they were in the same boat with their animal cousins, and reorganise their relations with other animals on a basis of reciprocity, mutual help, and fraternity' (quoted in Turner 1980, pp. 136–7).
  16. My thanks to Katherine Perlo for pointing this out to me.

#### **4 Morality and Non-Human Suffering: Analytical Animal Ethics**

1. Critics include Tom Regan and Bernard Rollin, both of whom have put forward the type of criticism presented here.
2. Indeed, it has been claimed that very little money and few resources have been dedicated to the development of innovative non-animal research models. (See Greek and Greek 2000.)
3. This was kindly pointed out to me by Oscar Horta.
4. It should be noted that the term 'speciesism' was first coined by Richard Ryder.
5. 'Individual value' refers to value based on the intrinsic qualities of a being, and which leads to duties towards that being, the fulfilment or lack thereof the being herself can experience.
6. Regan argues that 'We are all aware of the world...we are aware of what happens to us, and what happens to us...matters to us because it makes a difference to the quality and duration of our life, as experienced by us...' (Regan 1983, p. 81).
7. Lastly, it needs to be acknowledged that giving prominence to sentience and the capacity to suffer does not necessarily mean that nothing other than sentience or suffering can have value. The holistic notions often underlined in environmental philosophy can coincide with individual notions presented in animal ethics. Besides sentient squirrels, forests and ecologies can have value, too.

8. Of course, one can question why promotion of vegetarianism and veganism would not be equally attainable.
9. Moreover, even though it needs to be taken with a truckload of salt, 'welfare' can act as a concept that slowly but surely lures people towards more compassionate approaches to animals, and thus prepares the ground for the type of awareness required for one to accept animals as individuals with their own value and/or rights. A society which readily talks about 'animal welfare' is much more likely to adopt, say, 'animal rights' than a society which places no importance on the experiences of non-human animals.
10. However, Mayerfeld also states: 'While learning to view the world as victim Y sees it, we can remember how it was seen by victim X... We can know that the addition of the suffering of each one makes the world much worse than it would have been otherwise, because if someone's suffering were not added to the total picture, than *that* person would not have suffered' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 173). Therefore, Mayerfeld is offering two very different approaches to the relevance of numbers.
11. But why bother, when tens of billions will suffer no matter what one does? The simple answer is that saving even one animal is an important achievement. Matilda may not be able to cure all the suffering of the world, but, if she helps just one creature, this in itself is invaluable.
12. Mayerfeld argues: 'We can save large numbers of people from torture, starvation, and other forms of extreme suffering, provided we are willing to give up our more expensive pleasures, a portion of our leisure time, and a percentage of our bank accounts. Failure to do this is unjustifiable... [and] results from ignorance or confusion about the meaning and moral significance of suffering' (Mayerfeld 1999, p. 224).
13. Patterson's (2002) argument is that the type of deception required in domestication (which leads the farmer to kill the very animal he has carefully nurtured from young age) has had an impact on how humans treat each other: in order to justify deception, the individual value of those being deceived needs to be denied, and, once the individual value of obviously sentient, thinking animals has been denied, it is only a small step to deny also the individual value of other human beings (particularly if they look different, or behave differently). That is, once we learn to ignore the suffering and joy of other animals, it becomes easier also to ignore the suffering and joy of other human beings.
14. Shiva's claim is that industrial animal production will ultimately also lead to poverty, segregation and violations of human rights. This is because, partly aided by the build-up of huge industrial units of intensive animal production, traditional communities and ways of life are ruthlessly destroyed and replaced with mass ghettos of both poverty and consumerism. Of course, global warming as well is closely linked to animal industries, which again worsens the problem. Thus, Shiva argues that 'India can only export compassion toward all living creatures of the world' (Shiva 2007, p. 199).
15. United Nations News Centre, 29 November 2006, at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsID=20772&CR1=warning> (accessed 12 December 2010).

16. Of course, there are various types of pains which people do not view in negative terms, and which – on the contrary – are the source of contentedness or even pleasure. ‘Suffering’ is something altogether different, depending on whether you are a Stoic philosopher, a Dominican monk, a masochist or a utilitarian. The types of pains that are not viewed aversively do not constitute ‘suffering’ proper, for suffering does not exist where there is no aversion. In these cases, ‘suffering’ is instrumentalized: it is a tool through which to gain some end (repentance, pleasure, strength of character). Yet, suffering is all-devouring, not something that can be manipulated, controlled and directed as one wishes: it consumes us, and cannot be reduced to a tool of one’s desires. That is, suffering does not include instrumentalization.
17. Particular blame attaches to academics who have the arena and the resources to effect a change but who choose to turn a blind eye: ‘Intellectuals who keep silent about what they know, who ignore the crimes that matter by moral standards, are even more morally culpable when their society is free and open. They can speak freely, but choose not to’ (Cohen 2002, p. 286).

## 5 Morality and Animal Suffering: Continental Investigations

1. Sartre had similar ideas. Instead of being *with* others, Sartre talks of being *for* others. Here, the alterity or the ‘radical otherness’ of others is important, for, if we concentrate on similarity, we too easily begin to endorse a monism that swallows the other into our own ego.
2. Levinas argues that ‘The privileged situation where the ever future evil becomes present...is reached in the suffering called physical...The whole acuity of suffering lies in the impossibility of fleeing it...it lies in being cut off from every living spring. And it is the impossibility of retreat’ (Levinas 1969, p. 238). Interestingly, he maintains that causing another creature suffering reaffirms her subjectivity, for only subjects can suffer: ‘To inflict suffering is not to reduce the Other to the rank of object, but on the contrary is to maintain him superbly in his subjectivity.’ Therefore, deliberately inflicting suffering on others assumes that they are experiencing beings, a ‘somebody’ rather than a ‘thing’ (Levinas 1969).
3. The pre-modern version of this machine goes back to Aristotle and Linnaeus, and it establishes categories by rendering humans into animals: borders are kept clear by humanizing animals and thereby showing the monstrosity of inclusivity (thus, we have werewolves, barbarians, and so forth). The modern version works by animalizing humanity and by searching for the animal within us in order to then separate it into a controllable, distinct category (Agamben 2003).
4. Interestingly, Derrida argues that contemporary culture places particular emphasis on meat-eating: only meat-eaters are depicted as ‘real subjects’. In this way, subjectivity is not a purely theoretical matter, but an event littered with symbolic and cultural meanings. Thus, David Wood has suggested that deconstruction is vegetarianism. (On this topic, see Calarco 2008.)



## 6 Emotion, Empathy and Intersubjectivity

1. This view is often repeated. For instance, Evan Thompson claims that emotions constitute values, for we experience emotion in relation to things that matter; in this way, emotions 'mark importance' (Thompson 2001, p. 23).
2. Crary quotes from George Eliot: 'There is no escaping the fact that want of sympathy condemns us to a corresponding stupidity' (Crary 2009).
3. Thus, Chouliaraki argues that 'It is the awareness of our own vulnerability as human beings that informs...our commitment to the pain of the other' (Chouliaraki 2006, p. 202).
4. References to 'sympathy' are very old, and can already be found in Aristotle's philosophy. 'Empathy', on the other hand, came as a translation from German '*Einfühlung*' in the early twentieth century (Cole 2001). *Einfühlung* was a common term in German philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century, and meant 'feeling oneself into'. Theodor Lipps was perhaps the most popular advocate of *Einfühlung*, and used this term in relation to aesthetics (Nilsson 2003).
5. Hence, Nilsson argues that sympathy is 'a state of awareness of and concern for the condition of another', whereas empathy refers to 'a state of awareness of, but not necessarily concern for, another person's condition' (Nilsson 2003, p. 1).
6. It is important to note that, although compassion is often close to emotional contagion, it does not always or necessarily imitate the precise emotions of its object; rather, the emotions it evokes can be triggered by the suffering of the other being. In these cases, what we have is suffering born out of suffering, not suffering imitating suffering. Because of this, we can feel strong compassion for creatures whose viewpoints seem very alien to us: we do not need to know precisely what it is like for a fish or a rat to suffer in order to feel suffering at the idea of their suffering. Hence, Nilssen argues: 'It is possible to feel compassion for a person, or for that matter an animal, also in cases where you cannot share or even imagine his, or its, experience' (Nilssen 2003, p. 127).
7. Scheler talked of 'pity' (a term he used synonymously with compassion) as fellow-feeling, wherein one shares the suffering of other creatures: 'I no longer view it [suffering] as the other's suffering, but as my own'. Thus, Nilsson argues that Scheler's pity is 'essentially based in love' (Nilsson, p. 84).
8. There are additional differentiations. Adam Smith argued that pity and compassion are related to experiences of hardship, whereas empathy (or 'sympathy', as he referred to it) can concern also neutral experiences: 'Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever' (*Theory of Moral Sentiments* 1.1.1.5). Spinoza also spoke of compassion or 'pity'. According to him, when empathy is combined with sadness, we get 'pity': 'Imitation of the affects, when it is related to sadness is called pity' (*Ethics* 3p27). As a consequence of this sadness, one seeks to help the suffering others: 'And so

we strive to free the thing we pity from its suffering' (see also Nilsson 2003). Arendt, too, speaks of the 'animal pity by which all normal men are affected in the presence of physical suffering' (Cole 2001).

9. Hume also speaks of 'pity', which is concern for the state of others. Sympathy can lead to pity, but should not be mixed with it. In Hume's later philosophy, it is benevolence rather than sympathy that takes centre stage: see Cole 2001.
10. Another passionate advocate of sympathy, Adam Smith, argued in his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* that we are more likely to feel empathy if we know why others are feeling as they are feeling: 'Sympathy does not in general arise from an idea of another person's passion, but rather from an idea of the situation in which the other finds himself' (Nilsson, p. 47; see also Cole). Therefore, contextual considerations are important, and include both objective and subjective dimensions: 'I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters' (TMS 7.3.1.4). Although Smith did not discuss non-human animals, it would seem clear that this type of contextuality is crucial if empathy with animals is going to be fruitful. We cannot feel empathy with an abstract animal ('the animal'), but, rather, need to envision the situations out of which the experiences of animals have been born.
11. For Stein, empathy has three stages: learning about the other person, seeing the world as she sees it, and, finally, going back to one's own perspective. Out of these, the second is the most important. Stein criticized some of the other Germans who had made use of the term *Einfühlung* – particularly Lipps – for confusing empathy with emotional contagion (Stein 1989).
12. Also, Evan Thompson argues that knowledge of the self is founded on empathy: 'One's awareness of oneself as an embodied individual embedded in the world depends on empathy' (Thompson 2001, p. 14). Similarly, Patricia Churchland argues that understanding of the self (self-attribution) and understanding of others (other-attribution) develop side by side, in relation to one another (Churchland 2011).
13. Other contemporary thinkers also make the connection between empathy and ethics. For instance, Michael Slote has asserted: 'One can claim that actions are morally wrong and contrary to moral obligation if, and only if, they reflect or exhibit or express an absence (or lack) of fully developed empathic concern for (or caring about) others on the part of the agent' (Slote 2007, p. 31).
14. Churchland argues: 'Kant's conviction that detachment from emotions is essential in characterizing moral obligation is strikingly at odds with what we know about our biological nature' (Churchland 2011, p. 175). A similar view is expressed by the primatologist Frans de Waal: 'Aid to others in need would never be internalized as a duty without the fellow-feeling that drives people to take an interest in one another. Moral sentiments came first; moral principles second' (de Waal 1996, p. 87).
15. One of the main physical derivatives of this ability to care is oxytocin, a chemical that strengthens feelings of trust, openness towards others and attachment. It is at least 700 million years old, and found in all vertebrates (Churchland 2011).

16. Similarly, according to Alvin Goldman, the 'off-line' mode of empathy is required for understanding of other minds and forms a possibly important component of morality (Goldman 1995).
17. A popular explanation for the physical manifestations and routes of empathy comes from the 'mirror neuron theory'. Vittorio Gallese has suggested that mirror neurons provoke automatic simulation, which again allows empathy to take place (unfortunately, Gallese has carried out intrusive experiments on primates for over 20 years, which perhaps manifests his own difficulty with comprehending empathy towards beings other than humans). However, many have criticized the mirror neuron theory. For instance, Churchland argues that automated imitation does not suffice to enable one to make mental attributions to others, for, within empathy, when we see pain or fear in others, we do not actually feel these emotions ourselves, but, rather, feel grief, remorse and similar emotions (Churchland 2011). In addition, Cohen suggests that the mirror neuron theory may prove to be only one aspect of how empathy is constituted, because empathy is more than automated imitation (Cohen 2011).
18. Baron-Cohen argues that 'When you treat someone as an object, your empathy has been turned off' (Baron-Cohen 2011, p. 7).
19. In Buddhism, cultivation of compassion is a primary aim of moral life. It is noteworthy that, in world religions, animal suffering, too, may be of great significance. Buddhism argues that 'for all sentient beings the most fundamental drive is to experience pleasure and joy and to avoid pain and suffering' (Wallace 2011, p. 215). For a Christian interpretation that similarly pays heed to animal suffering, see Linzey (2008).
20. Here, we are first to recognize mental states in ourselves, then perceive them in others, and finally fluctuate between these two viewpoints. This approach is linked not only to Buddhism, but also, for instance, to the Neo-Confucians (and Mencius), who argue that benevolence is intrinsic to 'heart-mind', which again may be crucial for mental well-being: 'The single most powerful practice for achieving such emotional health is the cultivation of a sense of connectedness with others' (Wallace 2001, p. 212). Self-cultivation is important for our own humanity as well. Thus, Mencius argued that 'a man without the feeling of commiseration is not a man.... The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity' (quoted in Thompson 2001, p. 28).
21. Additionally, Husserl speaks of moments 'where I experience the other as experiencing myself... The absolute difference between self and other disappears. The other conceives of me as an other, just as I conceive of him as a self' (Zahavi 2001, p. 160). To continue the list, for Sartre, too, it was important to notice that others have their own distinct viewpoint, the object of which can be the self: 'I am encountering somebody who is able to perceive and objectify me' (Ibid).
22. According to Zahavi, intersubjectivity in fact goes beyond empathy, for, rather than approaching two creatures as separate, it views them as a continuum, a whole (Zahavi 2001).
23. Barbara Smuts also argues that, within intersubjectivity, 'the relationship creates for each individual a new subjective reality.... That transcends (without negating) the individuality of the participants' (Smuts 2001, p. 308).

24. This has relevance also from the perspective of animal capacities. Smuts argues that Safi seems much more intelligent than many other dogs, and this may be because 'she has shared her life with another being, who sees who she is' (Smuts 2001, p. 306). Animals who exist under human rule may struggle to flourish and develop, because they are not heard or seen: they cannot become what they could be, because one important constituent in their environment (human beings) refuses to act in ways that would show them it is all worthwhile. After trying and trying, a pig or a cow will stop seeking to communicate, and will fall silent. Therefore, by remaining blind to the efforts of animals, human beings can have a detrimental impact on the very being of their non-human kin, which will further add to the suffering of the latter.
25. These moments of intersubjectivity were, perhaps, more fully recognized in the past. According to Smuts, 'Until recent times, all humans possessed profound familiarity with other creatures<sup>224</sup>... Each of us inherited this capacity to feel our way into the being of another, but our fast-paced, urban lifestyle rarely encourages us to do so' (Smuts 2001, pp. 294–5). As a result, 'An ancient interspecies tradition was broken, replaced by mutual fear and mistrust' (Smuts 2001, p. 302).
26. Crary (2009) points out that readers of literature, for instance, may be manipulated to take on board hostile emotions that hinder moral understanding. (Examples include the racist worlds of Mark Twain and Ernest Hemingway.)
27. As Crary points out, in *Culture and Value* Wittgenstein also argued: 'You could attach prices to thoughts. Some cost a lot, some a little. And how does one pay for thought? The answer, I think, is: with courage.'
28. The ultimate absurdity, according to the authors, lies in Hare's suggestion that he can empathize even with trout: Hare argues that, when he puts himself in the position of a trout growing up in a trout farm, he would quite possibly prefer not to exist at all.
29. As Peter Singer points out: 'We can never directly experience the pain of another being, whether that being is human or not' (Singer 1993).
30. Natalie Depraz manifests how Husserl was open to animal intersubjectivity: 'Subjectivity is from the very start intersubjectivity... [Animals] are subjects in the full sense, precisely because they are from the very beginning always already intersubjective subjects' (Depraz 2001, p. 169). Husserl frequently mentions animals, infants, foreigners and others different from the 'normal' subject. However, they are not impaired individuals, but, rather, 'generative subjects, enabling and compelling us to learn and to become familiar with unknown dimensions of ourself and with new horizons or our world' (Depraz 2001, p. 174). These different types of individuals enrich our understanding of reality by offering an alternative to anthropocentric egoism. Thus, Husserl states that 'Animals, beasts are subjects of a conscious life like us... We meet animals in our life-world through an empathy which is a resembling modification of an inter-human empathy... we understand animals through our understanding of human beings' (quoted in Depraz 2001, p. 175).
31. In keeping with this, Churchland maintains that it is wrong to assume that human morality differs categorically from animal morality, and

equally wrong to suggest that only human morality is 'true morality'. This is because the root of both human and animal morality is the same: 'In mammals, elaboration on the rudimentary capacity to detect and respond to distinct types of distress in offspring gave rise to fancier capacities to attribute goals, intentions and emotions to others' (Churchland 2011, p. 76). For Churchland, it is 'obvious' that non-human mammals at the very least have social values, which render them moral beings. Therefore, not only can non-human animals empathize, but this ability may also enable them to form rudimentary moralities.

## 7 Action against Suffering

1. The need for persuasion is supported by sociological research, which suggests that rational argument has relatively little power to change opinions and that, when confronted, people tend to hold on to their inconsistent views even more strongly (Cohen 2002).
2. For example, see Rudy 2011, in which animal rights advocates and vegans are mercilessly mocked.
3. As Andrew Linzey (2009) and Brian Luke (1995) have demonstrated, such denial can take various forms, ranging from 'misperception' to placing the blame elsewhere. Andrew Linzey argues that we typically use four ways to ignore animal sentience. *Misdescription* refers to giving animals names that are marginalizing (a typical example being the term 'brute'). *Misrepresentation* includes definitions of animals that are misleading, and here Cartesian mechanomorphia is a prime example. *Misdirection* refers to, for instance, scepticism. We are directed to concentrate on what we do not know rather than what we know, and thus begin to deny experiences of non-human animals. *Misperception* concerns the inability to 'see' animals. Linzey talks of a 'Eureka!' experience as a moment when one suddenly grasps animals as the types of beings they truly are: sentient, thinking creatures. Many avoid this experience by sticking to mechanomorphic biologisms, whereby animals are nothing but biological mechanisms or production units; they remain blind to the viewpoint of the animal (Linzey 2009).

## Concluding Words

1. See <http://www.evolvecampaigns.org.uk/animals.asp> (accessed 08/10/2010).

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