# The Effects of Demographic Instructions on LLM Personas

Angel Felipe Magnossão de Paula<sup>1,2</sup> J. Shane Culpepper<sup>2</sup> Alistair Moffat<sup>3</sup> Sachin Pathiyan Cherumanal<sup>4</sup> Falk Scholer<sup>4</sup> Johanne Trippas<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Universitat Politècnica de València <sup>2</sup>University of Queensland <sup>3</sup>The University of Melbourne <sup>4</sup>RMIT University









## Motivation

- Content moderation must reflect subjective views of sexism.
- ► LLMs are promising but susceptible to demographic bias.
- ► We adopt a **perspectivist** stance: preserve disagreements and model diversity.

#### Research Questions

- 1. Do LLMs exhibit demographic bias when detecting sexism?
- 2. Can persona-style prompts mitigate that bias?

#### Dataset

- **EXIST 2023**: 7,958 tweets, six annotations each.
- ► Labels: Sexist / Not Sexist
- ➤ Sexist Sample Tweet: "Mujer al volante, tenga cuidado!"
- ► Annotator strata:  $\{F, M\} \times \{18-22, 23-45, 46+\}$ .

### LLMs Evaluated

- ► GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o (Enterprise)
- ► Mistral-Small-Instruct, Qwen2.5-14B (Open Source)

#### Methodology

- 1. Base prompt: task guidelines  $\rightarrow$  YES/NO sexism label.
- 2. Persona prompt: inject gender or age into system instruction.
- 3. Agreement metric: Krippendorff's  $\alpha$  v. each annotator cohort.
- 4. 10k-sample bootstrap  $\rightarrow 95\%$  Cls.

# Key Results

- ► All five LLMs align more with **female** annotators.
- ► Preferred age group differs per model—no universal pattern.
- Persona prompting gave inconsistent improvements; sometimes worse.

# Gender Agreement Results (Krippendorff's $\alpha$ )

| Model                | F (Female) | M (Male) |
|----------------------|------------|----------|
| Human Annotators (F) | 1.000      | 0.477    |
| Human Annotators (M) | 0.477      | 1.000    |
| GPT-3.5              | 0.415      | 0.371    |
| $GPT\text{-}3.5_F$   | 0.398      | 0.358    |
| $GPT	ext{-}3.5_M$    | 0.404      | 0.360    |
| GPT-4                | 0.365      | 0.325    |
| $GPT	ext{-}4_F$      | 0.401      | 0.360    |
| $GPT	ext{-}4_M$      | 0.372      | 0.336    |
| GPT-4o               | 0.228      | 0.191    |
| $GPT	ext{-}4o_F$     | 0.234      | 0.198    |
| $GPT	ext{-}4o_M$     | 0.213      | 0.172    |
| Mistral              | 0.353      | 0.310    |
| $Mistral_F$          | 0.363      | 0.326    |
| $Mistral_M$          | 0.330      | 0.293    |
| Qwen                 | 0.378      | 0.345    |
| $Qwen_F$             | 0.372      | 0.337    |
| $Qwen_M$             | 0.382      | 0.347    |

## Age Agreement Results (Krippendorff's $\alpha$ )

| Model                    | 18-22 | 23–45 | 46+   |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Human Annotators (18–22) | 1.000 | 0.445 | 0.436 |
| Human Annotators (23–45) | 0.445 | 1.000 | 0.463 |
| Human Annotators (46+)   | 0.436 | 0.463 | 1.000 |
| GPT-3.5                  | 0.382 | 0.408 | 0.413 |
| $GPT-3.5_{18-22}$        | 0.372 | 0.399 | 0.409 |
| $GPT3.5_{23-45}$         | 0.365 | 0.398 | 0.402 |
| $GPT3.5_{46+}$           | 0.383 | 0.407 | 0.419 |
| GPT-4                    | 0.421 | 0.421 | 0.404 |
| $GPT-4_{18-22}$          | 0.455 | 0.462 | 0.452 |
| $GPT-4_{23-45}$          | 0.446 | 0.484 | 0.430 |
| GPT-4 <sub>46+</sub>     | 0.463 | 0.474 | 0.457 |
| GPT-4o                   | 0.316 | 0.290 | 0.278 |
| $GPT\text{-}4o_{18-22}$  | 0.286 | 0.261 | 0.247 |
| $GPT-4o_{23-45}$         | 0.302 | 0.272 | 0.265 |
| $GPT	ext{-}4o_{46+}$     | 0.302 | 0.271 | 0.262 |
| Mistral                  | 0.368 | 0.384 | 0.392 |
| $Mistral_{18-22}$        | 0.372 | 0.389 | 0.392 |
| $Mistral_{23-45}$        | 0.378 | 0.392 | 0.398 |
| $Mistral_{46+}$          | 0.360 | 0.377 | 0.383 |
| Qwen                     | 0.406 | 0.418 | 0.404 |
| $Qwen_{18-22}$           | 0.421 | 0.432 | 0.424 |
| $Qwen_{23-45}$           | 0.423 | 0.437 | 0.427 |
| $Qwen_{46+}$             | 0.412 | 0.419 | 0.411 |
|                          |       |       |       |

## Discussion

- ► Gender bias persists across closed and open models.
- Simple persona prompts are not a reliable mitigation.
- Prompt sensitivity & randomness hinder stable alignment.

## Implications

- Perspectivist evaluation better captures fairness risks.
- Bias-mitigation claims need rigorous validation.
- ► Future LLMs should expose controllable persona hooks.

## Take-Away Messages

- ► LLMs inherit underlying demographic preferences from training.
- Prompt personas offer no guarantee of alignment.
- User-centric evaluation is essential.

## Get the Paper

Full paper, data, and scripts: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.11795











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