

Trusted Build

Why Trusted Build?




Why Trusted Build?

- Ensure fidelity between models and system image
 - Proofs are over architectural models
 - Information flow between processes and threads
 - Well-formedness of architecture: scheduling, memory limits and safety, etc.
 - Trusted build *generates* system image from architectural model
 - Prevents stupid errors
 - Mismatches on unit types between modules [Mars Polar Lander]
 - Mismatches on alignment of data, data representation, and data location

Trusted Build Features

- OS Support: eChronos, CAmkES/seL4, vxWorks, linux
- Process/thread support
 - Periodic, sporadic, hybrid dispatch models
 - User provides entrypoints which are invoked by middleware
- Comm Support: Shared Memory, event-, event data-, data-port communications, RPC.
 - Cross thread / process
 - For data-port, cross-VM
 - Interrupts
- Support for interaction with external code
 - External types
 - External threads



CAmkES/seL4 Build process



Why *Trusted* Build?

- OSATE plug-in for Eclipse
- Written in Java using String Template library
- No high-assurance pedigree, except:
 - Implementations of some connectors (Mailboxes for Dataports (seL4/Linux), Connector components for data/event ports (seL4) have associated proofs
 - Code has been inspected by multiple groups, including Red Team, looking for security flaws
- Eventual goal is to tie into CAmkES/seL4 connector proofs
 - Isabelle/HOL

Generating Code:



eneration Run D Case Translation AGREE
Generate AADL Middleware

```

> tb
  > prodcon
    > components
    > include
    > interfaces
    > make_template
    > > make_vm_template
      prodcon_assembly.camkes
  
```

```

...
assembly {
  composition {
    component dispatch_periodic dispatch_periodic_inst;

    component TimeServerKZM time_server;
    // Component instances for all AADL-defined threads
    component sender sender_inst;
    component receiver receiver_inst;

    // Port declarations for active threads
    connection sel4TimeServer tb_sender_periodic_dispatcher_timer(from
sender_inst.tb_timer, to time_server.the_timer);
    connection sel4Notification tb_sender_periodic_dispatcher_echo_int(from
dispatch_periodic_inst.sender_periodic_dispatcher, to sender_inst.tb_timer_complete);
  }
}
  
```

AADL Modeling Issues

- Proper way of modeling interrupts / drivers
 - Interrupts have 1st and 2nd level-handlers
 - Strictly speaking, 1st level handler does not run on associated AADL thread.
- “External” threads and types that do not match the AADL dispatch paradigm
 - external types / threads
- VMs / Containers
 - Maintaining VM memory / device mappings
 - Schedulability?

ISR ports and Drivers

thread sender

features

Input1: in event port {

Source_Text => ("user_code/f1.c", "user_code/f2.c", "user_code/f3.h");

TB_SYS::Is_ISR => **true**;

TB_SYS::First_Level_Interrupt_Handler => "timer_flih";

Compute_Entrypoint_Source_Text => "timer_slih";

TB_SYS::Signal_Name => "irq";

TB_SYS::Signal_Number => 27;

TB_SYS::Memory_Pages => ("mem", "0x53F98000:0x1000");

TB_SYS::Sends_Events_To => "{{2 Output1}}";

};

...

properties

Dispatch_Protocol => Sporadic;

Initialize_Entrypoint_Source_Text => "initialize_timer";

TB_SYS::Thread_Type => Active ;

...

end sender ;

ISRs have a first-level and second-level handler

Each ISR must have a unique signal name and number

Each ISR port is associated with a list of named, sized memory regions:
"mem" is the name
0x53F98000 is the location
0x1000 is the size

AADL Engineering Issues

- Aligning with Code Generation Annex
 - We started developing our tools in 2012 – concurrent with CGA development.
- Factoring tool to allow multiple implementations of comm primitives
 - OS-specific
 - Team(!) specific (mailboxes, queue-servers)
 - Specializations for cross-VM communications
- Running OSATE “headless”
 - For code generation: want single command build
 - For AGREE / Resolute analysis
 - I think that this will be a standard mechanism for use.

AADL Code Gen Annex Questions

Is there a complete description of the desired interactions between entrypoints and communication functions or complete examples?

Ports:

- Are send/receive interfaces typesafe? What happens if the wrong type is injected into a call?
- What happens if you call `send_output()` and `receive_input()` multiple times in a dispatch?
- What happens if you use a dataport that does not support tracking number of updates?
 - E.g. shared memory

Threads:

- How do you manage interrupts?
- How are periodic dispatches managed?

Wrap Up

- Trusted Build is a tool for generating system implementation skeletons from AADL models
- Goal is to make AADL analysis meaningful against generated code
- It supports a subset of AADL
 - This is intentional: goal is to have small enough code base to have confidence in result
- Can target multiple Oses: seL4, VxWorks, eChronos, linux
 - Focus for this talk was on CAmkES/seL4

Backup

DEMO: Producer / Consumer

- Producer / Consumer
 - Deployed to CAmkES/seL4
 - Producer periodically emits `int32_t`
 - Consumer is event-dispatched and consumes it.
- To compile the code:
 - Copy “template” makefile to top-level tb directory
 - Copy all code to `camkes/apps` directory
 - Add application directory to `Kconfig`.
- To run the image:
 - Type:
`qemu-system-arm -M kzm -nographic -kernel images/capdl-loader-experimental-image-arm-imx31`

Structure of Generated Code

- CAMkes OS Configuration
 - .camkes component files
 - CAMkes assembly file for top-level system
 - IDL files describing RPCs
- Generated C Middleware Code
 - tb_<component>.c
 - Implementation of middleware services
 - tb_<component>.h
 - Description of API between user-level AADL code and TB code.
- Template Makefile for system build
 - Works for simple build procedures
 - However, for more complex system generations, likely you will want to replace it with a more “full-featured” make

Simple Model Initial Structure

test1 [smacm develop]

user_code

user_receiver1.c

user_receiver2.c

user_sender.c

test1.aadl



C files describe the component behavior; in this case, there is one C file per component.



AADL files describe the system structure

Structure of Generated Code

- components
 - dispatch_periodic
 - receiver
 - receiver2
 - sender
- include
- instances
- interfaces
- make_template
- user_code
 - Kbuild
 - Kconfig
 - Makefile
 - > test1_impl_assembly.camkes
 - test1.aadl

Each AADL thread becomes a CAMkES component

















- sender
 - include
 - smaccm_sender.h
 - src
 - smaccm_sender.c
 - user_sender.c
 - sender.camkes

Autogenerated files for the middleware implementation

User-provided code for component.

CAMkES interface file

Structure of Generated Code

- ▲  > components
 - ▷  > dispatch_periodic
 - ▷  > receiver
 - ▷  > receiver2
 - ▷  > sender
- ▲  > include
 -  smaccm_test1_impl_types.h
- ▷  instances
- ▷  > interfaces
- ▷  > make_template
- ▷  user_code
 -  Kbuild
 -  Kconfig
 -  Makefile
 -  > test1_impl_assembly.camkes
 -  test1.aadl



Common include files for all components. In this case, only the AADL type definitions.

Structure of Generated Code

- └ components
 - └ dispatch_periodic
 - └ receiver
 - └ receiver2
 - └ sender

- └ include

- └ instances

test1_test1_impl_Instance.aaxl2

} OSATE/AADL-generated XML file for the system instance. This file can be ignored.

- └ interfaces

- └ make_template

- └ user_code

Kbuild

Kconfig

Makefile

test1_impl_assembly.camkes

test1.aadl

Structure of Generated Code

- ▲ 📁 > components
 - ▷ 📁 > dispatch_periodic
 - ▷ 📁 > receiver
 - ▷ 📁 > receiver2
 - ▷ 📁 > sender
- ▷ 📁 > include
- ▷ 📁 instances
- ▲ 📁 > interfaces
 - 📄 receiver_interface.idl4
 - 📄 receiver2_interface.idl4
 - 📄 sender_interface.idl4
 - 📄 uint32_t_writer.idl4
 - 📄 uint64_t_writer.idl4
 - 📄 void_writer.idl4
- ▷ 📁 > make_template
- ▷ 📁 user_code
 - 📄 Kbuild
 - 📄 Kconfig
 - 📄 Makefile
 - 📄 test1_impl_assembly.camkes
 - 📄 test1.aadl

Interface definitions for components.

Structure of Generated Code

- └─ components
 - └─ dispatch_periodic
 - └─ receiver
 - └─ receiver2
 - └─ sender

└─ include

└─ instances

└─ interfaces

└─ make_template

└─ Kbuild

└─ Kconfig

└─ Makefile

Autogenerated templates for makefiles and related build files required by CAMkes. To use them, copy them to the parent directory.

└─ user_code

└─ Kbuild

└─ Kconfig
















└─ Makefile

└─ test1_impl_assembly.camkes

└─ test1.aadl



Structure of Generated Code

- ▲  > components
 - ▷  > dispatch_periodic
 - ▷  > receiver
 - ▷  > receiver2
 - ▷  > sender
- ▷  > include
- ▷  instances
- ▷  > interfaces
- ▷  > make_template
- ▷  user_code
 -  Kbuild
 -  Kconfig
 -  Makefile
 -  > test1_impl_assembly.camkes ← Top level assembly file for CAMkES ADL.
 -  test1.aadl

Supported AADL Constructs: Types

- Types from Base_Types.aadl

- Integer_{8, 16, 32, 64}
- Unsigned_{8, 16, 32, 64}
- Float_32, Float_64

- N-Dimensional Arrays

- Structures

- Externally-defined types:

```
data can_message
  properties
    TB_SYS::Is_External => true;
    TB_SYS::CommPrim_Source_Header => "canDriverTypes.h";
end can_message;
```

Supported AADL Constructs: Ports

- **Example models found in smacm github repository: `smacm/models/Trusted_Build_Test`**
- **Data ports**
 - Reader gets copy of last write
 - Can be “lossy”
 - Examples: test8, test9, test10
- **Event Data ports**
 - Queued communications
 - Lossless (unless queue fills up)
 - If queue fills, write call returns **false**
 - Examples: test4, test5, test6, test10, test11, test12
- **Event ports**
 - Signal only
 - Examples: test13


Supported AADL Constructs: Shared Memory

- Provides “raw” interface to shared memory between tasks – pass-through to CAmkES shared memory support (CAmkES dataport)
- Useful for passing large amounts of data between tasks
- Example: test16

Supported AADL Constructs: RPCs

- Provides direct support for RPCs between threads
 - Pass-through to native RPC support in CAmkES
 - In CAmkES, RPCs are organized into “procedures”
 - Analogous concept in AADL is “subprogram group”
- Synchronization
 - CAmkES synchronizes all entry points in same “procedure”
 - However, thread may have several “procedures”
 - Possibility for race conditions
- Example: `test_rpc_native`

Structure of Threads



- Walk through tb_sender.c
- Thread main function:
 - Waits on a semaphore to dispatch
 - When semaphore “wakes up”, calls user dispatchers for events that have occurred
 - User code can call communications primitives provided by TB

DEMO: Periodic Producer / Consumer

- Modify producer/consumer so that consumer is periodically dispatched
 - Switch to the producer_consumer_periodic project
 - Remove the dispatcher from the receiver input port
 - Add a period of 1 second and a periodic dispatcher to the receiver
 - Modify the periodic dispatcher in user_receiver.c file to drain the queue of messages.
- To compile the code:
 - Copy “template” makefile to top-level tb directory
 - Copy all code to camkes/apps directory
 - Add application directory to Kconfig.
- To run the image:
 - Type:
qemu-system-arm -M kzm -nographic -kernel images/capdl-loader-experimental-image-arm-imx31

Interfacing with External Code

- Drivers and other low-level systems code may not fit the AADL dispatch paradigm
- You can designate a thread as “external”
 - TB generates a template .camkes file matching the communications ports defined in AADL
 - It *does not* generate the C code; you can choose to implement this in any fashion that you like.
 - You can use existing mechanisms in CAMkES to map external thread to *composite* components

Using ISR Ports

- Example in `smaccm/models/Trusted_Build_Test/test_irq1`
- ISR ports allow you to build “native” drivers
- Interrupt triggers AADL thread
- Memory-mapped IO for interacting with the hardware.

Using ISR ports

thread sender

features

```
Input1: in event port {  
  Source_Text => ("user_code/f1.c", "user_code/f2.c", "user_code/f3.h");  
  TB_SYS::Is_ISR => true;  
  TB_SYS::First_Level_Interrupt_Handler => "timer_flih";  
  Compute_Entrypoint_Source_Text => "timer_slih";  
  TB_SYS::Signal_Name => "irq";  
  TB_SYS::Signal_Number => 27;  
  TB_SYS::Memory_Pages => ("mem", "0x53F98000:0x1000");  
  TB_SYS::Sends_Events_To => "{{2 Output1}}";  
};
```

...

properties

```
Dispatch_Protocol => Sporadic;  
Initialize_Entrypoint_Source_Text => "initialize_timer";  
TB_SYS::Thread_Type => Active ;
```

...

end sender ;

ISRs have a first-level and second-level handler

Each ISR must have a unique signal name and number

Each ISR port is associated with a list of named, sized memory regions:
“mem” is the name
0x53F98000 is the location
0x1000 is the size

Interacting with Shared Memory

```
#include <autoconf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <clock_driver.h>
#include <sender.h>
```

CAmkES-generated file
that contains the shared
buffers

Name is right here.

```
#define KZM_EPIT_BASE_ADDR (unsigned int)mem
#define KZM_EPIT_CTRL_ADDR (KZM_EPIT_BASE_ADDR + 0x00)
#define KZM_EPIT_STAT_ADDR (KZM_EPIT_BASE_ADDR + 0x04)
#define KZM_EPIT_LOAD_ADDR (KZM_EPIT_BASE_ADDR + 0x08)
#define KZM_EPIT_COMP_ADDR (KZM_EPIT_BASE_ADDR + 0x0C)
#define KZM_EPIT_CNT_ADDR (KZM_EPIT_BASE_ADDR + 0x10)
```

...

User ISR Port Code

```
void timer_flih() {  
    epit_irq_callback();  
}
```

First level handler for
fast response

```
void timer_slih() {  
    smaccm_thread_calendar();  
}
```

Second level handler for
longer processing

CAmkES Code

Sender.camkes:

```
import "../interfaces/sender_interface.idl4";
import "../interfaces/uint32_t_writer.idl4";
import "../interfaces/receiver_interface.idl4";

component sender {
  control;
  has semaphore smacm_dispatch_sem;

  uses receiver_interface receiver_inst;

  // interfaces for IRQ port dispatchers (if any).
  consumes DataAvailable irq;
  dataport Buf mem;
}
```

Test_irq1_impl_assembly.camkes:

```
component irq_hw {
  hardware;
  dataport Buf mem;
  emits DataAvailable irq;
}

...

assembly {
  composition {
    component irq_hw irq_obj;
    ...
    // IRQ connections (if any)
    connection seL4HardwareMMIO irq_mem(
      from sender_inst.mem, to irq_obj.mem);
    connection seL4HardwareInterrupt irq_irq(
      from irq_obj.irq, to sender_inst.irq);
  }
  configuration {
    irq_obj.mem_attributes = "0x53F98000:0x1000";
    irq_obj.irq_attributes = 27 ;
  }
}
```

Wrapping Existing Drivers / External Code

- NICTA has existing drivers and external code.
- How do we use them?
- Declare a thread in AADL as “external”
 - It is usually an active thread
 - This leaves a placeholder in the model
 - It will be “wired up” to other threads as usual in the assembly
 - You can fill it in.
 - In most cases, best way is to wrap the driver and HW components in a CAMkES **composite component**.
 - You need to write the C and CAMkES Code
 - Trusted build provides .template files to get you started.

Example: UART

- Available at github at:
smacmm/models/Trusted_Build_Test/test_uart_active
- CAmkES Interacts with rest of the system using two methods:

```
// reader
```

```
void pilot_recv(int32_t uart_num, int32_t c);
```

```
// writer
```

```
int32_t uart_write(int32_t uart_num, int32_t wsize);
```

- Uses shared buffer for write.

On the AADL Side

Packet with 1 byte

thread uart
features

```
send : in event data port uart_packet.impl {  
  Compute_Entrypoint_Source_Text => "send_handler";  
  SMACCM_SYS::Sends_Events_To => "{}{}";  
};
```

```
recv: out event data port uart_packet.impl {  
  SMACCM_SYS::CommPrim_Source_Text => "recv_data";  
};
```

properties

```
SMACCM_SYS::Is_External => true;  
Dispatch_Protocol => Sporadic;  
-- Source_Text => ("user_code/user_sender.c");  
Priority => 10;  
Stack_Size => 256 bytes;  
SMACCM_SYS::Thread_Type => Active ;  
Compute_Execution_Time => 10 us .. 50 us;
```

This says "external"

end uart ;

CAmkES Composite Components

- Allows you to wrap other components, their connections, and their configurations, in one component.
- Looks like a CAmkES Assembly file except that it has top-level interface for communication with the rest of the system.
- We'll have to write this by hand; an example is on the next slide

CAmkES Composite Components

```
....  
component uart {  
  uses test_uart__uart_packet_impl_writer uart_rcv;  
  provides test_uart__uart_packet_impl_writer send;  
  
  composition {  
    component uartbase uartbase;  
    component uart_driver uart;  
    connection seL4HardwareMMIO uart_mem  
      (from uart.uart0base, to uartbase.mem);  
    connection seL4HardwareInterrupt uart_irq  
      (from uartbase.irq, to uart.interrupt);  
  
    connection ExportRPC conn1(from send, to uart.send);  
    connection ExportRPC conn2(from uart.rcv, to uart_rcv);  
  }  
  
  configuration {  
    uartbase.mem_attributes = "0x12C10000:0x1000"; //UART1  
    uartbase.irq_attributes = 84;                //UART1 interrupt  
    uart.ID = 3;  
  }  
}
```

component uartbase {
 hardware;
 dataport Buf mem;
 emits DataAvailable irq;
}


Original driver code goes in here.

Connections to the hardware.

Connections in/out to AADL

This comes from original CAmkES VM Assembly.

How it splits into files



uart_driver CAmkES Code

```
import "../interfaces/uart_interface.idl4";
import "../interfaces/test_uart__uart_packet_impl_writer.idl4";

component uart_driver {
  control;

  // provided interfaces for input event / event data ports
  provides test_uart__uart_packet_impl_writer send;
  uses test_uart__uart_packet_impl_writer recv;

  // information from native UART driver
  consumes DataAvailable interrupt;
  has semaphore      read_sem;
  has semaphore      write_sem;
  attribute int      ID;

  // buffer is for shared memory.
  dataport Buf      uart0base;
}
```

This name must match the AADL CAMkES interface

```
bool send_write_test_uart__uart_packet_impl(const test_uart__uart_packet_impl *arg) {  
    int32_t result = -1;
```

```
    // Other options rather than fail: re-send up to a bounded # of times?
```

```
    // int32_t retries = 0;
```

```
    result = uart_write(arg->uart_num, arg->datum);
```

```
    if (result == -1) {
```

```
        printf("send failed!.\n");
```

```
        return false;
```

```
    }
```

```
    return true;
```

```
}
```

Note: this is hand-written code!

```
void pilot_rcv(int32_t uart_num, int32_t c) {
```

```
    test_uart__uart_packet_impl packet;
```

```
    packet.uart_num = uart_num;
```

```
    packet.datum = c;
```

This name must match the AADL CAMkES interface

```
    // MWW: might want to do error checking here
```

```
    rcv_write_test_uart__uart_packet_impl(&packet);
```

```
}
```

Makefile modification

You have to add the build instructions for the component that is not visible to AADL

```
...
uart_driver_CFILES := \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/src/*.c)) \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/src/plat/${PLAT}/*.c)) \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/src/arch/${ARCH}/*.c))

uart_driver_HFILES := \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/include/*.h)) \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/include/*.h))

uart_driver_ASMFILES := \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/crt/arch-${ARCH}/crt0.S)) \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/src/*.S)) \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/src/arch/${ARCH}/*.S)) \
    $(patsubst ${SOURCE_DIR}/%,%, $(wildcard ${SOURCE_DIR}/components/uart_driver/src/plat/${PLAT}/*.S))
...
```

Issues

- Can wrap as big or small a “chunk” as we want
 - ...Thanks to NICTA’s composite components
 - We just need to normalize the interface
 - I hope to wrap the entire Linux VM as one external component
- Autogenerated makefile must be extended.
 - AADL tool is not designed to manage complex makes.
 - It is designed to automate simple models and assist the designer.

VM Support

- seL4/CAMkES can be used to host Linux VMs as “components”
- Trusted Build can support VMs in two ways:
 - As external “threads” (Air Team)
 - Allows custom interfaces between seL4/CAMkES OS and VM
 - In Air Team vehicle: *vchan* was used as mechanism for communication
 - VM code is treated as “black box”
 - As *virtual processors* (Ground Team)
 - This is more principled approach
 - AADL model can describe comms between threads/processes within the VM

Cross-VM Communications


- HRL has implemented an extension of TB to support data port communications across the VM boundary
 - Automatically builds driver support and interfaces to support communications across boundary
 - It is not part of the publically released TB

Wrap Up


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- Goal is to make AADL analysis meaningful against generated code
- It supports a subset of AADL
 - This is intentional: goal is to have small enough code base to have confidence in result
- Can target multiple Oses: seL4, VxWorks, eChronos, linux
 - Focus for this talk was on CAmkES/seL4

PUTTING CODEGEN IN CONTEXT


SMACCMcopter Phase 2 Architecture




Evaluation: Attack Surface



Demo Setup




Secure Software Architecture





Key Compromise

- Unverified kernel has a security vulnerability affecting memory protection
- Attacker uses vulnerability to break out of the Linux virtual machine (VM) and access the encryption process memory
- Attacker is able to overwrite the key and take control of the vehicle





Key Compromise Blocked

- With the seL4 kernel, the key exfiltration attack is unsuccessful
- Any attempt to read memory outside of what is allocated to the Linux VM fails



Fork Bomb Contained


- A “fork bomb” is an attack that exhausts system resources
- seL4 confines the impact to the Linux VM
- Payload (camera) stops working but the rest of the system is unaffected



HACMS Phase 2 Demo – 11 August 2015




Boeing: ULB and STANAG 4586



- STANAG 4586 is an interoperability architecture designed to allow mix and match control of UAVs by ground stations
- Compatible ground station
 - STANAG 4586 defines the requirements for a compliant Ground Control Station (GCS) capable of potentially controlling multiple dissimilar UAVs.
- Compatible UAV
 - STANAG 4586 defines the requirements for a Vehicle Specific Module (VSM) that is the interoperable interface to the air vehicle
 - The standard is consistent with either an airborne or ground based VSM
- The ULB VSM is on the aircraft


Baseline ULB Architecture



Phase 1 Architecture

SMACCM Authentication


VSM Hosted on seL4 in a single Linux VM



Phase 2 Architecture

VSM split into “navigation” and camera VSMs
 Authentication and LOI Ivory components
 Other VSM components in Ivory


VSMs natively on sel4
 Simplified VSM to FCC Communication



Phase 3 Architecture



FCC AADL model, running on VxWorks

Some FCC components implemented in Ivory/Tower



Phase 3 – SMACCMcopter

- Final version of SMACCMpilot on eChronos on Pixhawk with updated Ivory/Tower build
- SMACCMcopter mission computer hardware refresh
- Update AADL model for SMACCMcopter mission computer
- Focus on verification of system-level properties
 - E.g., Geofence
- CAN gateway and protocol verification
 - Untrusted network segment
- seL4 real-time features




ODROID-XU



NVIDIA Tegra K1 SoC

- Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A15
- IOMMU



Conclusion

- Cyber-secure: not vulnerable to a broad range of attacks
 - Secure communications with ground
 - Enforced software task separation onboard
 - Correct data flows and behaviors in system architecture
- Software components have no structural flaws
 - Analysis and construction based on *formal methods*
- Untrusted code can be safely used on the platform within trusted boundaries
 - Legacy code or COTS

Secure systems can be built without sacrificing performance



More information, code, and papers available at:

Loonwerks.com