


DNS-based SOC infrastructure for WLCG

Sep 2021





Threat intelligence strategy

- Empowering WLCG sites with SOC technologies (SOC WG)
 - Harvesting local system and network logs
 - Local data enrichment (when mature enough)
 - Threat intelligence sourcing (local sources, private feeds, and, WLCG MISP instance)
 - Correlation
 - Alerts on past events and new logs
- Making quality threat intelligence available to WLCG sites (CERN, SAFER)
 - Collected from trusted partner (governments, private sectors, trust circles)
 - Produced by WLCG security teams based on incident response



Challenges

- Building a SOC is hard
 - Leveraging threat intelligence proves extremely difficult for most sites
 - Only a very small fraction of WLCG sites have a production SOC
- Current plan: 2 levels of operations
 - Support large/mature sites directly to improve their capability
 - Provide other/smaller/less mature sites with a minimalist SOC design (still non-trivial)



DNS-based SOC

- An alternative or complementary approach could be to:
 - Central SOC at a selected number of mature sites (1 per region?)
 - Use a subset of threat intelligence available and focus on DNS data
 - pDNS sent by sites to a central SOC for analysis
 - Rely on a network of regional DNS servers for analysis + blocking of malicious domains
- CERN has a successful model with the Swiss health sector during the pandemic
 - 1 DNS server at CERN, 1 at GovCERT: 50 health organisations covered




DNS to the Rescue!

- 17th March 2020: **Team decides** setting up a Secure DNS Resolver
- 18th March 2020 : Asking **CERN** if they would participate – They do!
- 20th March 2020 : First system is **up and ready** for testing
- 6th April 2020 : First health care organisation is **protected**
- 17th Sept 2021: **50 organisations** are protected. There are about 3M queries / day and 5K – 10K Domains being blocked.



DNS to the Rescue!



```
forwarders  
{ 94.x.x.x;  
  188.x.x.x;  
};
```




DNS-based SOC for WLCG

- WLCG could leverage the experience learned with the health sector
 - Start a small pilot service with a handful of sites
 - Two DNS-based offerings:
 - **pDNS**: passive DNS data sent by sites to a SOC for analysis (replaying pDNS files daily)
 - **RPZ+DNS**: Rely on a network (for reliability) of regional DNS servers:
 - For blocking well-known malicious domains based on available RPZ feeds
 - For alerting based on correlation of DNS data with threat intelligence (MISP)
- Two services components (can be at different locations):
 - **Infrastructure service**: operates the containers/VMs running the DNS services (pDNS or RPZ+DNS)
 - **SOC service**: local (site itself), regional (NGI) or central (EGI/WLCG) analysis and managements of alerts



DNS-based SOC for WLCG

- Multiple deployment models and integration levels (one organisation per colour)





Next steps

- Containerising infrastructure services
 - Produce a container to automatically deploy
 - **pDNS service:**
 - Collect domain/IP threat intelligence data from the WLCG MISP instance
 - Receive (SCP) pDNS data daily
 - Replay the pDNS data and correlate it with indicators
 - Send resulting alerts to a SOC (local or remote)
 - **RPZ+DNS**
 - Receive and reply to DNS requests
 - Block well-known malicious domains based on available RPZ feeds
 - Collect domain/IP threat intelligence data from the WLCG MISP instance
 - Correlate incoming DNS queries it with indicators
 - Send resulting alerts to a SOC (local or remote)
 - Identify teams/sites to operate the SOC (receive, analyse alerts, contact victim(s))
 - Identify sites for a pilot service