


A Trusted Business Card



WHY?

- To celebrate TCG's 25th
- To demonstrate full supply chain protection on an inexpensive IoT device
 - Supply chain of embedded electronics is now critical
 - Tired of the excuses that trusted computing is too complex and too expensive
- It's an Arduino development board
 - Learn how to write arduino sketches
- It's an esp32 development board
 - Learn esp-idf command line build and flash tools
- It's a TPM development board
 - Prototype new and interesting TPM applications



What

- Hardware

- ESP32-S3-Wroom
 - 32bit dual core
 - 16mb flash
 - 8mb PSRAM
 - efuse based secure boot*
- Infineon SLB9672 TPM

- Software

Application

WolfTPM/WolfSSL

WolfTPM HAL

tinyusb

FreeRTOS

esp-idf bsp

100% Open Hardware and Open Source

*not activated on demo cards, so you can play

Application Functionality


- USB-MSC: VFAT thumb drive to serve resume, certs and log
- USB-ACM: Firmware loading and debug over serial
- Full Supply chain attestation
 - Endorsement Key Cert
 - Platform Cert
 - Attestation Key Cert
- WolfTPM provides full TPM stack on the card,
- Measured boot and runtime
- CEL-IMA-TLV attestation with signatures in RIM

David Safford

<https://sites.google.com/view/davidsafford>

david.safford@gmail.com

TCG 25



BOM Cost (qty 1)

- PCB (jclpcb.com) \$3
 - Esp32 \$4
 - TPM \$5
 - Everything else \$3
- Total \$15

Detailed BOM (Digikey)

Schematic ID	Manufacturer ID	Digikey ID	Description
U1	ESP32-S3-WROOM-1-N16R8	1965-ESP32-S3-WROOM-1-N16R8CT-ND	ESP32S3
U2	SLB9672AU20FW1613XTMA1	448-SLB9672AU20FW1613XTMA1CT-ND	TPM
D1	TPD2EUSB30ADRTR	296-28153-1-ND	ESD Diode Pair
U4	TLV1117LV33DCYR	296-28778-1-ND	3.3V regulator
Led1, Led2	QTLP601CRTR	1080-1407-1-ND	Led, red
Boot, Reset	RS-282G05A3-SMRT	CKN10384CT-ND	Switch, tactile
R1, R4	RMCF0603JT10K0	RMCF0603JT10K0CT-ND	RES 10K
R2, R3	ERJ-3EKF2001V	P2.00KHCT-ND	RES 2K
C1	CL05A105KP5NNNC	1276-1076-1-ND	CAP CER 1UF 10V
C2, C4, C5	CL05B104KA5NNNC	1276-6720-1-ND	CAP CER 0.1UF 25V
C3	CL10A226MQ8NRNC	1276-1193-1-ND	CAP CER 22UF 6.3V


The High Cost of Assembly

- Precision Placement Device (\$2)



- Reflow Station (\$49)

Learn Arduino Programming



Espressif tools

```
idf.py set-target esp32s3
```

```
idf.py menuconfig
```

```
idf.py build
```

```
idf.py -p /dev/ttyACM0 flash monitor
```


Keys and Certificates

- Infineon OPTIGA(TM) RSA Root CA 2 (Root for EK.CRT)
- Infineon OPTIGA(TM) TPM 2.0 RSA CA 065 (intermediate for EK.CRT)
- safford_ca.com.pem (Self-signed root for AK.CRT and PLATFORM.CRT)
- EK.DER, EK.CRT (signed by Infineon)
- AK.DER, AK.CRT – issued based on verification of EK, signed by Dave
- PLATFORM.CRT binds EK to Platform description, signed by Dave
- Verifying a Quote with AK proves:
 - Talking to Infineon certified TPM
 - Platform characteristics, including EK and AK certified by Dave

Trust Chain Management

Not securehttps://localhost:8443/HIRS_AttestationCAPortal/portal/certificate-request/trust-chain

HOST INTEGRITY
AT RUNTIME
& STARTUP



Attestation Certificate Authority

✓

New certificate successfully uploaded (safford_ca.com.pem):

Trust Chain Management

HIRS Attestation CA Certificate

Trust Chain CA Certificates

Show 10 entries

Search:

Issuer	Subject	Valid (begin)	Valid (end)	Options
C=DE,O=Infineon Technologies AG,OU=OPTIGA(TM) Devices,CN=Infineon OPTIGA(TM) RSA Root CA 2	C=DE,O=Infineon Technologies AG,OU=OPTIGA(TM),CN=Infineon OPTIGA(TM) TPM 2.0 RSA CA 065	Mon, 03 Jul 2023 12:29:21 GMT	Fri, 03 Jul 2043 12:29:21 GMT	<div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div>
C=DE,O=Infineon Technologies AG,OU=OPTIGA(TM) Devices,CN=Infineon OPTIGA(TM) RSA Root CA 2	C=DE,O=Infineon Technologies AG,OU=OPTIGA(TM) Devices,CN=Infineon OPTIGA(TM) RSA Root CA 2	Fri, 22 Nov 2019 00:00:00 GMT	Sun, 22 Nov 2054 23:59:59 GMT	<div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div>
O=safford_ca.com	O=safford_ca.com	Mon, 21 Oct 2024 22:08:48 GMT	Sat, 21 Oct 2034 22:08:48 GMT	<div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div>

Showing 1 to 3 of 3 entries

Previous

1


Next

Certificate Details

Not secure https://localhost:8443/HIRS_AttestationCAPortal/portal/certificate-details?id=83b9e0a9-731e-4f28-be79-35d1bef887a5&type=...

Gmail Maps dave News Google GE CUPS Log In to Fide... Imported Fro... CATO Home... All Bookmarks

HOST INTEGRITY
AT RUNTIME
& STARTUP



Attestation Certificate Authority

Platform Certificate

Issuer

Distinguished Name: [O=safford_ca.com](#)
Authority Key Identifier: 8E:86:31:E3:90:43:8B:1F:2D:D8:7D:9E:D1:36:D8:23:41:F9:40:D3
Authority Serial Number: 4F:5A:7E:B1:C7:30:F8:C8:A7:1B:FD:C0:FC:F5:FE:BC:26:BF:06:2B
✓

Certificate
Serial
Number

01

Validity

Not Before: Mon, 01 Jan 2018 05:00:00 GMT
Not After: Sat, 01 Jan 2028 05:00:00 GMT

Signature

Signature

Algorithm

X509
Credential
Version

1 (v2)

Credential
Type

TCG Trusted Platform Endorsement


Platform
Type

Base

Platform

0

Verifying the TPM_Quote



Normally we could do this entire check with `tpm2_checkquote` utility, but it cannot handle the raw data blobs from WolfTPM, so we have to do these checks manually with `openssl`.

Example Quote Verification

Decrypting QUOTE.SIG with AK

Decrypted data:

00000000	30	31	30	0d	06	09	60	86	48	01	65	03	04	02	01	05
00000010	00	04	20	ea	ca	a1	c3	4b	d9	9c	b3	63	af	60	5f	db
00000020	2b	0b	99	65	e0	93	2e	55	92	28	70	4f	fd	16	e8	57
00000030	f1	a0	66													

	010...	`	.	H.e...			
	K...	c...	`	.	
	+	..	e...	U.	(p0...	w	
	..	f					

sha256 of QUOTE.DAT

00000000	ea	ca	a1	c3	4b	d9	9c	b3	63	af	60	5f	db	2b	0b	99
00000010	65	e0	93	2e	55	92	28	70	4f	fd	16	e8	57	f1	a0	66

	...	K...	c...	`	.	+	..	
	e...	U.	(p0...	w...	f			

QUOTE.DAT

00000000	ff	54	43	47	80	18	00	22	00	0b	e1	27	0c	17	cb	b3
00000010	2f	04	60	27	27	5e	1c	07	be	9b	44	6e	80	76	e4	7d
00000020	27	32	64	f7	02	a3	59	d9	28	0b	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000030	17	67	73	9e	27	9f	e7	c0	94	6e	df	a3	01	ad	bb	dd
00000040	1c	87	f7	a5	06	00	00	00	01	00	0b	03	00	04	00	00
00000050	20	32	d4	a6	27	37	ff	00	e2	90	01	06	26	8f	90	40
00000060	df	dc	45	6e	5e	01	85	d3	87	2f	3f	0b	4b	4b	e6	bf
00000070	89															

	.TCG...	"	...	'	...		
	/.	`	i	^	...	Dn.v.}	
	'2d...	Y.	(...			
	.gs.'	...	n	...			
	
	2...	'7	&...	@	
	..En^	...	/?	..KK	...		
	..						

hashed PCR.BIN

00000000	32	d4	a6	27	37	ff	00	e2	90	01	06	26	8f	90	40	df
00000010	dc	45	6e	5e	01	85	d3	87	2f	3f	0b	4b	4b	e6	bf	89

	2...	'7	&...	@	
	..En^	...	/?	..KK	...		


PCR.BIN

00000000	a4	84	07	20	57	9f	a9	c1	71	ac	b2	26	f8	39	82	db
00000010	9d	9f	c1	0f	67	32	ad	08	f6	86	08	4b	33	81	c2	01

	...	w	...	q	...	&	..9	..	
	...	g2	K3	...			

CEL_IMA_TLV

- An example of how to do measurement safely
 - Entire content field, including types and lengths are measured



Example Attestation Verification

Verifying Measurement log from Quote

PCR 10 SHA256: A4840720579FA9C171ACB226F83982DB9D9FC10F6732AD08F686084B3381C201
MATCHES

SEQ 0 PCR 10 CEL_CONTENT_IMA_TLV

Filename /data/esp/safford.pdf

Filehash: D0471A5C5E9F00A0A2E761924C6AFF6EB966E8A468822E9016D0DED8751E18F2

Entire Content TLV Verified by digest

File Hash Verified by signed RIM

SEQ 1 PCR 10 CEL_CONTENT_IMA_TLV

Filename /data/esp/card.jpg

Filehash: 8D5C6DB2635740A84188CDE92D8A8CD56E5F16175F8992C59033B6FBB998AF66

Entire Content TLV Verified by digest

File Hash Verified by signed RIM

SEQ 2 PCR 10 CEL_CONTENT_IMA_TLV

Filename /data/esp/chall.bin

Filehash: 063F1995CA9EF8471D7F40992E27BD075A04E04F4F6EBA270E1CDBE2FC7CAAF6

Entire Content TLV Verified by digest

Warning

- I used leaded solder paste for assembly.
- Try not to lick the front of the card.