

 Member-only story

# Postgres Security 101: User Access and Authorization (4/8)



Oz · Following

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Managing user access and authorization is one of the foundational elements of database security in PostgreSQL. A well-defined user management strategy helps prevent unauthorized access, data breaches, and ensures that only the right users have the necessary permissions. In this article, we'll explore PostgreSQL's user roles, how to create users with different privilege levels, and the importance of adhering to the principle of least privilege. We'll also cover schema and object-level permissions, which allow for fine-grained access control in your PostgreSQL environment.



```

useradd -m -G dba kemał

echo '%dba ALL=(postgres) PASSWD: ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/postgres

chmod 600 /etc/sudoers.d/postgres

su - kemał

sudo -iu postgres

```

### 4.3 Ensure Excessive Administrative Privileges Are Revoked

- With respect to PostgreSQL administrative SQL commands, only superusers should have elevated privileges. PostgreSQL regular, or application, users should not possess the ability to create roles, create new databases, manage replication, or perform any other action deemed privileged. Typically, regular users should only be granted the minimal set of privileges commensurate with managing the application

```

psql -c "\du+ kemał*"

List of roles
Role name | Attributes | Member of | Description
-----+-----+-----+-----
kemał.oz  | Superuser  | {"DBA"}   |

psql -c "ALTER ROLE kemał.oz NOSUPERUSER;"

ALTER ROLE "kemał.oz" NOSUPERUSER;

psql -c "\du+ kemał*"

List of roles
Role name | Attributes | Member of | Description
-----+-----+-----+-----
kemał.oz  |            | {"DBA"}   |

# Lock Out Accounts if Not Currently in Use (Manual)
ALTER ROLE "kemał.oz" NOLOGIN;

```

### 4.4 Ensure Excessive Function Privileges Are Revoked (Manual)

- Manually review and revoke excessive function privileges. Functions in PostgreSQL can be created with the SECURITY DEFINER option. When SECURITY DEFINER functions are executed by a user, said function is run with the privileges of the user who created it, not the user who is running it.

```
SELECT nspname, proname, proargtypes, prosecdef, rolname, proconfig FROM pg_proc
```

nspname	proname	proargtypes
public	dblink_connect_u	25 25
public	dblink_connect_u	25
profile	get_diffreport	19 3910 1043 25 16
profile	get_diffreport	19 1043 3910 25 16
profile	get_diffreport	19 3910 3910 25 16

/\*In the query results, a prosecdef value of 't' on a row indicates that that function uses privilege elevation. If elevation privileges are utilized which are not required or are expressly forbidden by organizational guidance, this is a fail.

\*/

```
psql -c "ALTER FUNCTION dblink_connect_u SECURITY INVOKER;"
```

```
SELECT proname, proacl FROM pg_proc WHERE proname = 'dblink_connect_u';
REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION dblink_connect_ (integer,boolean) FROM appreader;
```

## 4.5 Ensure Excessive DML Privileges Are Revoked

- Manually review and revoke excessive Data Manipulation Language (DML) privileges.

```
select t.schemaname, t.tablename, u.username,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'select') as select,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'insert') as insert,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'update') as update,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'delete') as delete
from pg_tables t, pg_user u
where t.schemaname not in ('information_schema','pg_catalog');
```

schemaname	tablename	username	select	insert	update	delete
public	a	repuser	f	f	f	f
public	b	repuser	f	f	f	f
public	a	admin	f	f	f	f
public	b	admin	f	f	f	f
public	a	replication	f	f	f	f
public	b	replication	f	f	f	f
public	a	postgres	t	t	t	t
public	b	postgres	t	t	t	t
public	a	kemal.oz	f	t	t	f
public	b	kemal.oz	f	f	f	f

```
select t.tablename, u.username,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'select') as select,
```

```

has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'insert') as insert,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'update') as update,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'delete') as delete
from pg_tables t, pg_user u
where t.tablename = 'a'
and u.username in ('kema1.oz');

```

tablename	username	select	insert	update	delete
a	kema1.oz	f	t	t	f

```
REVOKE update, insert ON TABLE a FROM "kema1.oz";
```

```

select t.tablename, u.username,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'select') as select,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'insert') as insert,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'update') as update,
has_table_privilege(u.username, t.tablename, 'delete') as delete
from pg_tables t, pg_user u
where t.tablename = 'a'
and u.username in ('kema1.oz');

```

tablename	username	select	insert	update	delete
a	kema1.oz	f	f	f	f

```
/*
```

**Note:** For versions of PostgreSQL prior to version 15, CVE-2018-1058 is applicable. It is recommended that all privileges be revoked from the public schema for all all databases. If you have upgraded from one of these earlier releases, this CVE is fixed for you during an upgrade. You can correct this CVE by issuing:

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1058>

```
*/
```

```
REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC;
```

## 4.6 Ensure Row Level Security (RLS) Is Configured Correctly (Manual)

- Configure Row Level Security to restrict data access based on user roles.

```

SELECT oid, relname, relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE relrowsecurity IS TRUE;
oid | relname | relrowsecurity
-----+-----+-----

```

```

CREATE TABLE passwd1 (
  user_name text UNIQUE NOT NULL,
  pwhash text,
  uid int PRIMARY KEY,
  gid int NOT NULL,
  real_name text NOT NULL,
  home_phone text,

```

```

extra_info text,
home_dir text NOT NULL,
shell text NOT NULL
);

SELECT oid, relname, relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE relname = 'passwd';
oid | relname | relrowsecurity
-----+-----+-----
26300 | passwd | f

CREATE USER admin;
CREATE USER bob;
CREATE USER alice;
INSERT INTO passwd VALUES
('admin','xxx',0,0,'Admin1','111-222-3333',null,'/root','/bin/dash');
INSERT INTO passwd VALUES
('bob','xxx',1,1,'Bob','123-456-7890',null,'/home/bob','/bin/zsh');
INSERT INTO passwd VALUES
('alice','xxx',2,1,'Alice','098-765-4321',null,'/home/alice','/bin/zsh');
ALTER TABLE passwd ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
SELECT oid, relname, relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE relname = 'passwd';
oid | relname | relrowsecurity
-----+-----+-----
26300 | passwd | t

CREATE POLICY admin_all ON passwd TO admin USING (true) WITH CHECK (true);
CREATE POLICY user_mod ON passwd FOR UPDATE
USING (current_user = user_name)
WITH CHECK (
current_user = user_name AND
shell IN ('/bin/bash','/bin/sh','/bin/dash','/bin/zsh','/bin/tcsh')
);

GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON passwd TO admin;
GRANT SELECT
(user_name, uid, gid, real_name, home_phone, extra_info, home_dir, shell)
ON passwd TO public;
GRANT UPDATE
(pwhash, real_name, home_phone, extra_info, shell)
ON passwd TO public;
set role admin;
table passwd;
user_name | pwhash | uid | gid | real_name | home_phone | extra_info | home
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----
admin | xxx | 0 | 0 | Admin1 | 111-222-3333 | | /root
bob | xxx | 1 | 1 | Bob | 123-456-7890 | | /home
alice | xxx | 2 | 1 | Alice | 098-765-4321 | | /home

set role alice;
table passwd;
ERROR: permission denied for table passwd
select user_name,real_name,home_phone,extra_info,home_dir,shell from passwd;
user_name | real_name | home_phone | extra_info | home_dir | shell
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----

```

admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

```
update passwd set user_name = 'joe';
```

```
ERROR: permission denied for table passwd
```

```
update passwd set real_name = 'Alice Doe';
```

```
UPDATE 1
```

```
update passwd set real_name = 'John Doe' where user_name = 'admin';
```

```
UPDATE 0
```

```
select user_name,real_name,home_phone,extra_info,home_dir,shell from passwd;
```

user_name	real_name	home_phone	extra_info	home_dir	shell
admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

```
update passwd set real_name = 'John Doe' where user_name = 'admin1';
```

```
UPDATE 0
```

```
select user_name,real_name,home_phone,extra_info,home_dir,shell from passwd;
```

user_name	real_name	home_phone	extra_info	home_dir	shell
admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

```
update passwd set shell = '/bin/xx';
```

```
ERROR: new row violates row-level security policy for table "passwd"
```

```
delete from passwd;
```

```
ERROR: permission denied for table passwd
```

```
insert into passwd (user_name) values ('xxx');
```

```
ERROR: permission denied for table passwd
```

```
update passwd set pwhash = 'abc';
```

```
UPDATE 1
```

```
select user_name,real_name,home_phone,extra_info,home_dir,shell from passwd;
```

user_name	real_name	home_phone	extra_info	home_dir	shell
admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

```
update passwd set pwhash = 'abc';
```

```
select user_name,real_name,home_phone,extra_info,home_dir,shell from passwd;
```

user_name	real_name	home_phone	extra_info	home_dir	shell
admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

admin	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root	/bin/dash
bob	Bob	123-456-7890		/home/bob	/bin/zsh
alice	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home/alice	/bin/zsh

```
# Authorized user
```

```
table passwd;
```

user_name	pwhash	uid	gid	real_name	home_phone	extra_info	home
admin	xxx	0	0	Admin1	111-222-3333		/root
bob	xxx	1	1	Bob	123-456-7890		/home
alice	abc	2	1	Alice Doe	098-765-4321		/home

## 4.7 Ensure the set\_user Extension Is Installed (Manual)

- Install the `set_user` extension to safely change user identities. PostgreSQL access to the superuser database role must be controlled and audited to prevent unauthorized access. Prior to performing this audit you must create a roletree view. Here are the procedures to create this view:

```
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW roletree AS
WITH RECURSIVE
roltree AS (
    SELECT u.rolname AS rolname,
           u.oid AS roloid,
           u.rolcanlogin,
           u.rolsuper,
           '{}'::name[] AS rolparents,
           NULL::oid AS parent_roloid,
           NULL::name AS parent_rolname
    FROM pg_catalog.pg_authid u
    LEFT JOIN pg_catalog.pg_auth_members m ON u.oid = m.member
    LEFT JOIN pg_catalog.pg_authid g ON m.roleid = g.oid
    WHERE g.oid IS NULL
    UNION ALL
    SELECT u.rolname AS rolname,
           u.oid AS roloid,
           u.rolcanlogin,
           u.rolsuper,
           t.rolparents || g.rolname AS rolparents,
           g.oid AS parent_roloid,
           g.rolname AS parent_rolname
    FROM pg_catalog.pg_authid u
    JOIN pg_catalog.pg_auth_members m ON u.oid = m.member
    JOIN pg_catalog.pg_authid g ON m.roleid = g.oid
    JOIN roltree t ON t.roloid = g.oid
)
SELECT rolname,
       roloid,
       rolcanlogin,
       rolsuper,
       rolparents,
       parent_roloid,
       parent_rolname
FROM roltree;

SELECT
    r.rolname,
    r.roloid,
```



```

    r.rolcanlogin,
    r.rolsuper,
    r.rolparents
FROM roletree r
ORDER BY 1;

```

rolname	roloid	rolcanlogin	rolsuper	rolparents
admin	16385	t	f	{}
admin1	26309	t	f	{}
alice	26311	t	f	{}
bob	26310	t	f	{}
kemal.oz	26299	t	f	{}
pg_database_owner	6171	f	f	{}
pg_execute_server_program	4571	f	f	{}
pg_monitor	3373	f	f	{pg_stat_scan_ta
pg_monitor	3373	f	f	{pg_read_all_set
pg_monitor	3373	f	f	{pg_read_all_sta
pg_read_all_data	6181	f	f	{}
pg_read_all_settings	3374	f	f	{}
pg_read_all_stats	3375	f	f	{}
pg_read_server_files	4569	f	f	{}
pg_signal_backend	4200	f	f	{}
pg_stat_scan_tables	3377	f	f	{}
pg_write_all_data	6182	f	f	{}
pg_write_server_files	4570	f	f	{}
postgres	10	t	t	{}
replication	16386	t	f	{}
repuser	16384	t	f	{}

(21 rows)

```

SELECT
    ro.rolname,
    ro.roloid,
    ro.rolcanlogin,
    ro.rolsuper,
    ro.rolparents
FROM roletree ro
WHERE (ro.rolcanlogin AND ro.rolsuper)
OR
(
    ro.rolcanlogin AND EXISTS
    (
        SELECT TRUE FROM roletree ri
        WHERE ri.rolname = ANY (ro.rolparents)
        AND ri.rolsuper
    )
);

```

```

rolname | roloid | rolcanlogin | rolsuper | rolparents
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----

```

```

postgres | 10 | t | t | {}
rpm -ivh /a/set_user_14-4.0.1-2.rhel9.x86_64.rpm
patronictl -c /etc/patroni/patroni.yml edit-config
shared_preload_libraries = 'set_user,pgaudit,somethingelse' --Required restart
select * from pg_available_extensions where name = 'set_user';

```

name	default_version	installed_version	comment
set_user	4.0.1		similar to SET ROLE but with

```
create extension set_user;
```

```
select * from pg_available_extensions where name = 'set_user';
```

name	default_version	installed_version	comment
set_user	4.0.1	4.0.1	similar to SET ROLE but with

Now, we use GRANT to configure each DBA role to allow it to use the set\_user fu  
In the example below, we will configure my db user kemal.oz. (You would do this  
DBA's normal user role.)

```
*/
grant execute on function set_user(text) to "kemal.oz","ali.oz";
-- "kemal.oz" is an unprivileged user that can run as "ali.oz" through calls to
-- "ali.oz" is an unprivileged user that can run as "kemal.oz" through calls to
grant execute on function set_user_u(text) to "kemal.oz";
-- kemal.oz is the privileged (non-superuser) role, which is able to escalate p
set role "kemal.oz";
```

```
select set_user('postgres');
```

```
ERROR: switching to superuser not allowed
```

```
select set_user_u('postgres');
```

```
set_user_u
```

```
OK
```

```
select current_user, session_user;
```

```
current_user | session_user
```

```
postgres | postgres
```

```
select reset_user();
```

```
reset_user
```

```
OK
```

```
select current_user, session_user;
```

```
current_user | session_user
```

```
kemal.oz | kemal.oz
```

```
ALTER USER postgres NOLOGIN;
```

```
ERROR: must be superuser to alter superuser roles or change superuser attribut
```

```
alter user "kemal.oz" SUPERUSER;
```

```
ALTER USER postgres NOLOGIN;
```

```
REVOKE name_of_granting_role FROM kemal.oz; -- an example only REVOKE ROLE
```

## 4.8 Make Use of Predefined Roles (Manual)

- Utilize predefined roles to simplify and secure role management.

```
select rolname from pg_roles where rolsuper is true;
```

```
rolname
```

```
-----
```

```
kemal.oz
```

```
db_monitor
```

```
postgres
```

```
GRANT pg_monitor TO "kemal.oz";
```

### Default Value:

The following predefined roles exist in PostgreSQL 13.x:

- pg\_read\_all\_data

Read **all** data (tables, views, sequences), **as if having SELECT** rights **on** those objects, **and USAGE** rights **on all** schemas, even **without having** it explicitly. The role does **not** have the role attribute **BYPASSRLS** set. If **RLS** **is** being used, an administrator may wish **to set BYPASSRLS on** roles which this role **is** GRANTED to.

- pg\_write\_all\_data

Write **all** data (tables, views, sequences), **as if having INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE** rights **on** those objects, **and USAGE** rights **on all** schemas, even **without having** it explicitly. This role does **not** have the role attribute **BYPASSRLS** set. If **RLS** **is** used, an administrator may wish **to set BYPASSRLS on** roles which this role **is** GRANTED to.

- pg\_read\_all\_settings

Read **all** configuration variables, even those normally visible **only to** superuser

- pg\_read\_all\_stats

Read **all** pg\_stat\_\* views **and** use various statistics related extensions, even those normally visible **only to** superusers.

- pg\_stat\_scan\_tables

**Execute** monitoring functions that may take **ACCESS SHARE** locks **on** tables, potentially **for** a long time.

- pg\_monitor

Read/**execute** various monitoring views **and** functions. This role **is** a **member of** pg\_read\_all\_settings, pg\_read\_all\_stats **and** pg\_stat\_scan\_tables.

- pg\_database\_owner

None. Membership consists, implicitly, **of** the **current** database owner.

- pg\_signal\_backend

Signal another backend **to** cancel a query **or** terminate its session.

- pg\_read\_server\_files

Allow reading files **from any** location the database can access **on** the server **with COPY and** other file-access functions.

- pg\_write\_server\_files

Allow writing **to** files **in any** location the database can access **on** the server **with COPY and** other file-access functions.

- pg\_execute\_server\_program

Allow executing programs **on** the database server **as** the **user** the database runs **as with COPY and** other functions which allow executing a server-side program.

- pg\_checkpoint

Allow executing the **CHECKPOINT** command.

- pg\_use\_reserved\_connections

Allow use of connection slots reserved via reserved\_connections.

- pg\_create\_subscription

Allow users with CREATE permission on the database to issue CREATE SUBSCRIPTION

## 4.9 Ensure the Public Schema Is Protected

- Restrict access to the public schema to prevent unauthorized changes. you need to manage the permissions on the public schema carefully.

```
/*
Note: For versions of PostgreSQL prior to version 15, CVE-2018-1058 is applicable.
it is recommended that all privileges be revoked from the public schema for all
all databases. If you have upgraded from one of these earlier releases, this CVE
fixed for you during an upgrade. You can correct this CVE by issuing:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1058
*/

REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC;
GRANT CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO "kema.oz"; -- Grant necessary privileges to s
/*
Periodically, you should review the current permissions on the public schema
to ensure that there are no unauthorized changes.
*/
SELECT grantee, privilege_type
FROM information_schema.role_table_grants
WHERE table_schema = 'public';
SELECT nsname, username, has_schema_privilege(username, nsname, 'CREATE') AS cr
FROM pg_namespace, pg_user
WHERE nsname = 'public';
```

By effectively managing user access and authorization, you can significantly strengthen the security of your PostgreSQL database. Following best practices, such as using role-based access control, assigning the minimum required privileges, and regularly reviewing user permissions, will help keep your data safe and secure. Properly defined access levels minimize the risk of internal and external threats, contributing to a more robust database environment. If you're looking to continue learning about PostgreSQL security, be sure to check out my next article: "[Postgres Security 101: Connection and Login \(5/8\)](#)". It dives deep into password management strategies and best practices to ensure your database is protected from unauthorized access. For more detailed and technical articles like this, keep following our blog on

Medium. If you have any questions or need further assistance, feel free to reach out in the comments below and directly.

Database Security

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## Written by Oz

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Database Administrator 

## No responses yet



Gvadakte

What are your thoughts?

## More from Oz



Oz


# Installing Percona Monitoring & Management (PMM) with Postgres

Introduction:

Sep 26, 2024

54

1




Oz

## Pluggable Database Command

----- - create pluggable database pdb1 admin user root identified by test123; alter pluggable database...

✦ May 12, 2023



Oz

## RMAN Backup Basic Commands

`rman target / rman target sys/password@YDKTST; backup database; backup database format '/backup/path/%d_%t_%s.rman'; backup tablespace...`

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Oz


## delete jobs



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# podman

## with PostgreSQL

@mehmetozanguven



mehmetozanguven

## Running PostgreSQL with Podman

Instead of running PostgreSQL locally, we can easily run with Podman. Here are the basic steps you should follow.

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```
3. nodeAPP 4. nodeTWO
b/postgresql/16/main/*

t patroni

/etc/patroni.yml list
21665717) -----+-----+-----+
Role      | State      | TL | Lag in MB |
-----+-----+-----+
Leader    | running    | 1  |           |
Replica   | streaming  | 1  | 0         |
Replica   | streaming  | 1  | 0         |
-----+-----+-----+

```



Dickson Gathima

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