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Personal Information:
Date of Birth: February 11th, 1988
Citizenship: United States and Chile

Previous Studies:

B.A., Mathematics and Economics (double major), Cornell University, 2010
Ph.D., Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University, 2016
- Advisor: Patrick Cheridito
- Thesis Title: "Existence Results in General Equilibrium Theory"

Current Studies:

University of Pennsylvania, 2017 to present
Thesis Title: "Essays on Information"
Expected Completion Date: May 2023

Thesis Committee and References:

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Research and Teaching Fields:

Applied Theory, Mathematical Economics, Financial Engineering, Political Economy, Econometrics.

Teaching Experience:
2010-2016:   Optimal Learning, Introduction to Financial Mathematics, Fundamentals of Statistics
2017-2023:   Game Theory, Introductory Econometrics, Introductory Time Series, Introductory
              Economics, International Trade.

Research Experience and Other Employment:
2016 - 2017   ETH Zurich, Postdoctoral Researcher for Professor Patrick Cheridito.

Professional Activities:
Referee   Journal of Economic Theory, International Economic Review, Journal on Financial
           Mathematics.
Seminar
Presentations   2020 Stanford GSB Rising Scholars Conference, 2022 International Industrial
           Organization Conference

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2010 – 2016   Princeton University Presidential Fellowship
2017 – 2023   University of Pennsylvania Fellowship

Research Papers:
"*The Visible Hand*" (Job Market Paper)

Technological innovations have allowed some sellers to collect detailed information about buyers. We study these changes in a standard search-theoretic model of imperfect competition, featuring buyers with heterogeneous private valuations for quality, and introduce sellers who observe valuation signals of heterogeneous precision. Signals induce third-degree price discrimination, and their precision largely dictates whether they are used to increase trade versus increase markups - impacting aggregate surplus and its distribution. When valuations are more heterogeneous, imprecisely informed sellers prioritize high-markups despite limiting trade, and precision relaxes this tension, allowing them to pursue high-markups when it is least obstructive, and encouraging them to extend low-markup offers that increase trade upon signals indicative of low valuation - increasing aggregate surplus and benefiting (hurting) buyers with a low (high) valuation. However, when valuations are more homogeneous, imprecisely informed sellers prioritize trade, and precision can encourage them to extend high-markup offers that limit trade upon signals indicative of high valuation, hurting all buyers and even decreasing aggregate surplus. In either case, additional precision makes sellers more profitable, but its effect on competitors can be positive or negative. The more competitive a market and the lower the precision of sellers who acquire it, the worse its profit externalities; nevertheless, these can be positive and allow all sellers to benefit.

"*The Political Economy of Pandemics*"
With H. Herrera and G. L. Ordoñez.

The COVID-19 pandemic presented an unprecedented challenge. Policymakers had to manage a crisis with little information but under high public scrutiny, particularly via cross-regional comparisons. We show how comparisons induce herding of policymakers with popularity concerns and discuss its extent under different scenarios. Policy contagion is stronger when shocks are sequential, more correlated, and popularity concerns are larger. Ex ante, it improves welfare, by disciplining biased policy agendas, but ex post, it can decrease welfare, by incentivizing acquiescing to a biased public consensus.

Research Paper(s) in Progress:

"*Expertise Appropriability*"

"*The Cost of Discipline*," With H. Herrera and G. L. Ordoñez.

<u>Languages:</u>
Spanish (native), English (native)

<u>Computational Skills:</u>
Proficient in Python, C++, R, MATLAB, and SQL; knowledgeable in Julia and Excel.