



# Shivaji


## His Life and Times

- *Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale*



# **Shivaji**

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**Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale**

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1st Edition ISBN No.: 978-0-9891538-0-5

# **Shivaji His Life and Times**

“Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes,  
our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion,  
they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”

—**John Adams**

*(Argument in Defense of the Soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials,  
December 1770)*

# **Dedication**

## **Dedicated**

to

two great researchers of the life of Shivaji

**B. G. Paranjpe**

*Barrister-at-Law*

who, with indefatigable industry, made available to all in his  
*English Records on Shivaji*, one thousand English documents

and

**Dr. Surendra Nath Sen**

who, with meticulous care and judiciousness, translated  
Marathi, French and Portuguese resources into English

## About the Author

**Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale** earned his Masters in Defence Studies from the University of Pune. During the 1971 Bangladesh War, he worked as a war correspondent. Thereafter, he engaged himself in studying history with an emphasis on the life of Shivaji. His Marathi volumes of Shivaji's biography have been widely acclaimed. Living in Pune, he is an active member of the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal. The present volume is an outcome of his 30 years of research, based on primary sources, and will provide the readers new insights about the King's Life and Times.

# Preface

The reverence Shivaji commands in Maharashtra is no less than that accorded to divinity. He is an object of fascination, even adulation, to every Maharashtrian Hindu from his childhood. I was no exception. This fascination turned into curiosity after I began reading military history. As I delved deeper into his life, I realized that not only would he easily rank among the Great Captains of the world, but that he was an equally able and humane administrator and astute statesman. What he accomplished has influenced the course of Indian history for more than three centuries since his passing.

A large part of this biography was written three decades ago when I was a young man. My sole object in writing it was to satisfy my personal curiosity and to cogently arrange what I had learnt of his life. I had not given a thought to publishing it and the manuscript lay untouched with a friend. Meanwhile I shifted to writing a biography of the great king in Marathi, the first two volumes of which have already been published. When an associate from previous work, Santosh Shintre, suggested the publication of the English version, and Bhalchandrarao C. Patwardhan (scion of the princely family of Kurundwad Senior) promised his whole-hearted support, I shook off the dust from the manuscript which had been lying in repose for several years, revised it in the light of new information from sources I have been collecting, and penned the portion which was absent in the original draft.

The book could not have been completed without the drive and perseverance of my editor, Santosh Shintre, who also took charge as a tactful and patient coordinator. Bhalchandrarao Patwardhan corrected linguistic and other slips and ensured that I dotted my i's and crossed my t's. I owe a special debt of gratitude to both of them. Without them this book would have been inconceivable.

Thanks are also due to Vinayak (alias Vinay) Dixit for allowing me to study Shah Jahan's spurious *farman* which he owns and to print its photographs. I am grateful to Dr. Vijay Bedekar and Dr. Madhukar Ambekar (London) who let me use a photocopy of the Persian letter book, called *Khutut-i Shivaji*, which they procured from Royal Asiatic Society, London.

Among many friends who helped me in a variety of ways, I would like to especially mention Pradeep Rawat, who read the entire manuscript, and Dilip Amdekar and Mukund Gadgil, who read parts of it, and rendered me the benefit of their suggestions. Warm thanks also go to the staff as well as to the Chairman, Professor Shobhana Gokhale, and Secretary, Professor S. M. Bhave, of the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Pune. I would also like to thank A. B. (alias Raman) Chitale who prepared the maps, P. K. Ghanekar who, with his intimate knowledge of the forts of Maharashtra, helped in identifying many of them, Rajendra Joshi for emendations in my translations of Persian letters and P. N. Balkawde who traced and copied certain documents for me from the Pune Archives. I am also grateful to Dr. Gijs Kruijzer who took time to explain to me the meaning of Dutch inscriptions on certain portraits. Last but not least, I thank Professor Irfan Habib for permitting me to quote a passage from his book *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* as well as a note he gave me expressing his opinion about the two *farman* I showed him several years ago.

I would also like to thank Kapil Kelkar and Sharvari Navale of Santosh Shintre's team for their assistance in translation, Loukika Raste for assistance in preparing index and Asavaree Mahajan who took care of computer-processing and page layout. Thanks are also due to Sharmila Bhagawat for assistance in proof-reading.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to Swati and Madhav Joshi of Param Mitra Publications for their forbearance and patience.

I am grateful to all those who made this book possible. None of them, however, bear any responsibility for any errors of commission and omission. That privilege is exclusively mine.

**Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale**

# India in Shivaji's Times

## PROMINENT MUSLIM STATES IN INDIA

Muhammad, the founder of Islam, died in 632 and was succeeded by a line of Caliphs,<sup>1</sup> who were both religious and political heads of the Muslim world. Under their rule, the Arabs, fired by the spirit of the Jihad, began to advance in all directions. In the west, their wave of conquest rolled along the northern coast of Africa, reached the Atlantic in 710 and crossed into Spain in the following year. After establishing their hold in the Iberian Peninsula, they crossed the Pyrenees and entered France. There, in 732, Charles Martel, the commander-in-chief and the *de facto* king of the Franks, routed them at Tours, some 320 km south of Paris. About the importance of this battle, Gibbon observes in his inimitable style:

"A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet."

Within the next few years, the Arabs were thrown out of France; the border of their empire settled on the Pyrenees.

Another wave of Arab conquests swept northward, through the territories which we now call Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Asia Minor (part of Turkey), and reached the Strait of Dardanelles. In 717 they laid siege by land and sea to Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, but Emperor Leo III, aided by the Bulgars, forced them to raise the siege and retire with great losses. This event, though less dramatic perhaps than the Battle of Tours, was no less decisive in turning back the tide of Muslim incursions. For a long time thereafter Constantinople remained the eastern bulwark against Islamic expansion into Europe.

The third wave of Arab conquests went eastward and reached the borders of India and China about the middle of the eighth century. The Kingdom of Sindh lay on the western border of India with two smaller kingdoms – Kabul and Zabul<sup>2</sup> – to its north. Despite repeated Arab attacks since 637, these kingdoms held the invaders off for a while. Finally, an Arab army under Muhammad Bin Qasim defeated Dahir, the Hindu King of Sindh in 712 and annexed Sindh to the Caliphate of Damascus. Soon thereafter, two great dynasties emerged in north India, the Palas in the east and the Pratiharas in the west. The Pratihara kings were to India what Leo III and Charles Martel were to Europe. They, especially Nagabhata I, held the Arabs at bay and, for the next 300 years, the Muslim tide of conquest was stopped at the eastern borders of Sindh.

The Pratihara and Pala kingdoms declined and fragmented into smaller states in the latter half of the 10th Century. The Caliphate, whose capital had been shifted to Baghdad in 762, had also broken up, giving rise to many smaller Muslim states. The Safavid dynasty of Iran annexed the kingdoms of Kabul and Zabul in 870. The local population was originally Hindu, but in time was converted to Islam and became alienated from India in culture as well. A Turkish dynasty had established its rule in Ghazni by the latter half of the 10th Century. At the beginning of the 11th Century, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni defeated an

alliance of Hindu kings in the border areas and annexed Punjab which served as the base for several devastating raids that he led into India. After his death, the sultanate was torn by internecine feuds and later on appropriated by the Ghori dynasty.

The Ghoris did not intend to remain mere raiders; they cherished a desire to expand their kingdom into India. Prithviraj Chauhan of Ajmer was the most prominent king in North India at the time. He defeated Muhammad Ghori in the battle of Tarain (150 km west of Delhi) in 1191. Next year, however, Muhammad returned with a stronger army and defeated and slew Prithviraj in the same field. Then he appointed his slave, Qutb ud-din Aibak, as his viceroy in India and himself returned to his capital. In the next few years, the tidal wave of Muslim conquest roared across and submerged a large portion of North India. Muhammad Ghori was murdered in 1206 and, as he had no son, his sultanate was divided among his slaves. Qutb ud-din Aibak thus became independent as the first Muslim sultan of Delhi. Centuries passed, dynasties changed, but North India remained in bondage.

Towards the end of the 13th Century, during the rule of the Khilji dynasty, Muslim armies crossed the Vindhya Range and set foot in the South which was then ruled by four Hindu dynasties: the Yadavas of Devagiri, Kakatiyas of Warangal, Pandyas of Madurai, and Hoysalas of Dwarasamudra.<sup>3</sup> Anybody could have foreseen that the fate of northern India was going to befall the South, too. Yet, these dynasties were unable to bury old feuds and forge an alliance against their common enemy. Soon, a large portion of southern India was also overrun by Muslims armies.

The Khiljis were replaced by the Tughlaqs. The Delhi Sultanate began to break up during the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq and an independent sultanate emerged at Madurai in 1334-35. Two brothers, Harihar and Bukka, overthrew Muslim

rule in the Tungabhadra basin in 1336 and founded an independent Hindu state, later to be known as the Vijayanagar Empire, which became a bulwark against Islam in the South for almost 300 years.<sup>4</sup> About 1370, in the reign of Bukka Rai, Vijayanagar armies defeated and killed the Sultan of Madurai and annexed that region. The Bahamani Sultanate, a rival of Vijayanagar, emerged at Gulbarga in 1347.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, three independent Muslim sultanates had risen in Bengal, Khandesh, and Gujarat, to be followed by two more in Jaunpur and Malwa.<sup>6</sup> Mewar kings took back their lost territories, and a solitary Hindu kingdom which had survived in Orissa gained a new lease of life. Thus, by the end of the 14th Century, India had been divided into several Muslim and Hindu kingdoms.

Babar (or Babur), the Sultan of Kabul, who was descended from Timur on his mother's side and from Genghis Khan on his father's, invaded India in 1525, defeated Ibrahim Lodhi, the Afghan Sultan of Delhi, in the Battle of Panipat in the following year and founded the Mughal dynasty with its capital at Delhi.<sup>7</sup> He followed this up with a victory over the Rajput alliance led by Rana Sanga at the Battle of Kanua and consolidated his rule.<sup>8</sup> After his death in 1530 his son, Humayun, succeeded to the throne of Delhi. Sher Shah Suri, the Afghan ruler of Bihar, defeated Humayun in 1540 and forced him to flee to Iran. With a small territory near Kabul under his control, Humayun bided his time. Sher Shah was succeeded by his son Islam Shah who died in 1554. Taking advantage of the civil war that ensued amongst the Afghans, Humayun recaptured Delhi in 1555 and re-established Mughal rule.

The Bahmani Sultanate began to break up in the latter half of the 15th Century. It produced five splinter sultanates, each known after the title of its founder: the Imadshahi of Elichpur,<sup>9</sup> Nizhamshahi of Ahmednagar, Adilshahi of Bijapur, Qutbshahi

of Golconda (near Hyderabad) and Baridshahi of Bidar. The ancestors of the founders of the Imadshahi and Nizhamshahi were native Hindu converts. Yusuf Adilshah and Muhammad Quli Qutb-ul Mulk, the founders of the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi respectively, were Turks; Qasim Barid, who founded the Baridshahi, was a Georgian.

The Vijayanagar Empire not only survived the emergence of these powers, but often actively intervened in their squabbles. But eventually these sultans, except the Imadshah, came together and their combined armies routed and slew Ram Raja, the virtual ruler of the Vijayanagar Empire, in the Battle of Talikota<sup>10</sup> in 1565. Soon thereafter, however, the victors resumed their squabbling. This gave the Hindu Empire a chance to recover and it survived the debacle for almost a century. By the end of the 16th Century it had lost the territory between the Krishna and Tungabhadra Rivers to the Adilshah. The Qutbshah annexed a small region south of the Krishna, but had to give it up not too much later. However, Muslim armies had destroyed the capital city of Vijayanagar after the battle of Talikota, so the capital was now shifted to Penukonda.<sup>11</sup>

The Nizhamshah devoured the Imadshahi in 1574. The Adilshahi annexed the Baridshahi in 1619.

The territorial loss which Vijayanagar suffered after the debacle at Talikota was not significant. But it delivered a severe psychological blow to the Hindu Empire. The Emperor's prestige waned, central authority weakened, factionalism grew. Nayaks, who were regional governors, began to assert their independence. This process culminated in the break-up of the Empire into smaller, squabbling states. The Emperor's writ ran only in the region around Vellore.

Akbar came to the throne in 1556 after Humayun's death. Within the next forty years he brought most of northern India under Mughal domination. He then turned his attention to the

south. In 1599, he annexed the Sultanate of Khandesh. The following year Ahmednagar, the capital of the Nizhamshah, was overrun and Bahadur Nizhamshah was taken prisoner. But the Nizhamshah's generals rallied under the leadership of Malik Ambar, installed a scion of the royal family on the throne, shifted the capital to Daulatabad, and continued the resistance.

Akbar died in 1605 and his son Jahangir ascended the throne. Only the Rana of Mewar among the Rajputs had preserved his sovereignty till then. But circumstances forced Rana Amar Singh to acknowledge the nominal suzerainty of the Mughal Emperor. In the South, Malik Ambar, the Abyssinian nobleman and virtual ruler of the Nizhamshahi Sultanate, held the Mughals at bay.

Jahangir died in 1627 and his son, Shah Jahan, came to the throne. He undertook expansion of the Empire with a new zeal. Mughal armies took the fort of Daulatabad and imprisoned Husain Nizhamshah in 1633. But Shahji Bhosale, a Maratha nobleman, installed a young boy from the Nizhamshah's family on the throne and took the reins of administration in his own hands. The Adilshah and the Qutbshah supported him in the hope of checking the Mughal advance. The mere threat of a Mughal attack induced the Qutbshah to acknowledge their suzerainty. But the Adilshah could not be forced into submission so easily. So the Mughal forces invaded the Adilshahi Sultanate and began to lay waste its territory. This, together with a revolution in the court, led to a change in policy of the Adilshahi. So it sued for peace and concluded a treaty with the Mughals in 1636. The two powers agreed to divide Nizhamshahi territories among themselves. Shahji now found himself without friend or ally. Soon, Mughal and Adilshahi forces were on his heels. He took refuge in the fort of Mahuli, which was soon besieged. Finally, in 1636, he capitulated and handed over the Nizhamshah to an Adilshahi general, who turned him over to the Mughals. Shahji himself entered

Adilshahi service. Nizhamshahi provinces were divided among the victors.

Shah Jahan ruled for twenty years thereafter. He was often busy suppressing revolts of minor chieftains and annexing smaller states that bordered on Imperial territory.

Kandahar in Afghanistan became a great source of worry to him after 1648. The city was situated on the route linking Iran and India. The fort of Kandahar was the bone of contention between Iran and the Mughal Empire. It often changed hands through war or treachery. A Persian commandant delivered it to the Mughals in 1638. Then Shah Abbas II of Iran took it in 1648–49 after a siege. The Mughals thereafter launched three expeditions between 1649 and 1653 to wrest it from the Iranians, but in vain.

Shah Jahan thus remained busy in the North after the Sultanate. That gave time to the Adilshah and Qutbshah to invade the squabbling Hindu states which were once part of the Vijayanagar Empire. The Qutbshah began conquering the region beyond the Penner River between the Eastern Coast and the Eastern Ghats. The Adilshah expanded his territory southwards up to the borders of Mysore, which was the most powerful among the splinter states that had succeeded the Vijayanagar Empire. Their progress barred by Mysore, Adilshahi forces turned eastward and captured the territory between the Kolerun and Palar Rivers. By now the Vijayanagar Empire was reduced to Vellore and the surrounding areas; this two pronged invasion further ate into it.

#### OTHER INDIAN STATES

By the middle of the 17th Century, most of India was under control of the Mughals, the Adilshah or the Qutbshah. Yet

there were a few other states which had retained their independence.

*Tripura*: The north-eastern boundary of the Mughal Empire touched the Bay of Bengal a little to the north of Chatgaon in the kingdom of Arakan.<sup>12</sup> The kingdom of Tripura lay north of here with its capital at Udaypur.<sup>13</sup> The Mughals took the capital town Udaypur in 1618, imprisoned King Jaso Manikya (or Yashodhara Manikya) and annexed his territory. But they could only hold onto Tripura for two years. The people declared Kalyan Manikya the new King who took Udaypur back and ruled over it till 1660.<sup>14</sup> It is said that his son Govindmanikya struck gold coins.<sup>15</sup> This was then considered the prerogative of kings and, therefore, a declaration of sovereignty.

*Kachar*: In the hilly region to the north of Tripura lay the kingdom of the Kachari tribe with Maibong<sup>16</sup> as its capital.<sup>17</sup>

*Manipur*: To the east of Tripura and Kachari lay the kingdom of Manipur. It was an independent state, but very little is known about its history in this period.<sup>18</sup>

*Jaintiya*: This kingdom was situated in the hilly area between Assam and Bengal. Jaintiapur<sup>19</sup> was the capital.<sup>20</sup>

*Assam*: Located to the north of Kachari and Jaintiya, its capital was at Gargaon.<sup>21</sup> Independent aborigines like the Nagas, Mishmis, Miris and Daflas lived in the hilly forested areas to the north, east and southeast.<sup>22</sup>

*Coochbihar*: This kingdom was situated on the western border of Assam. In 1581, the king of Coochbihar gave some

territory east of the Sankosh River <sup>23</sup> to his nephew, on the condition that he acknowledged suzerainty of the king and struck coins in the king's name. The new principality was known as Koch Hajo. <sup>24</sup> War broke out when the chief of Koch Hajo reneged from this undertaking. <sup>25</sup> To obtain Mughal support, the king of Coochbihar acknowledged Mughal suzerainty in 1596. <sup>26</sup> But the alliance did not help as the Mughals annexed for themselves the kingdom of Koch Hajo in 1612-13. <sup>27</sup>

*Bhutan:* Bhutan was an independent state, under the rule of a Buddhist dynasty. <sup>28</sup>

*Sikkim:* The founder of the kingdom brought various tribes together and crowned himself in 1642. His kingdom also included a part of present day Nepal. <sup>29</sup>

*Nepalese states:* To the west of Sikkim, i.e. in today's Central Nepal, were situated three small but independent kingdoms, with Kathmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon<sup>30</sup> as their respective capitals. <sup>31</sup> To the east was a group of 24 tiny principalities called collectively as the 'Chaubisi'. Further east, a group of 22 principalities was known as 'Ba-isee'. These petty principalities continually warred with each other. <sup>32</sup>

*Garhwal, Kumaon and Sirmour:* To the west of Nepal, in the Himalayan foothills were the kingdoms of Garhwal, Kumaon and Sirmour. The king of Kumaon had presented himself in the Mughal Court during the reigns of Akbar and Jahangir. <sup>33</sup> Barring such occasions, which were rare, the king of Kumaon was by and large independent.

Garhwal lay to the west of Kumaon, with Srinagar as the capital (not to be confused with Srinagar in Kashmir). During Shah Jahan's reign, the commander of Kangra (then a part of Punjab), Najabat Khan, told the Emperor that if he was given two thousand horsemen, he would invade Garhwal and obtain tribute. Shah Jahan dispatched that force, whereupon Najabat Khan, supported by the King of Sirmour, invaded Garhwal in 1634-35. He captured four forts, two of which he gave to the King of Sirmour. When the Mughal forces were within 30 *kos* of Srinagar, an emissary from Garhwal met the Khan. Lured by an offer of Rs.1 million to the Emperor and Rs.100,000 to him, the Khan halted his advance. But only Rs.100,000 were received in the next month and a half. The Khan waited. In the meantime, Garhwal troops cut off his line of communications and surrounded his camp. Most of the army perished in its attempts to break out. Najabat Khan himself barely managed to escape with his life. Shah Jahan held him responsible for the debacle and dismissed him from service.<sup>34</sup>

In 1654 Shah Jahan dispatched Khalilullah Khan with 10,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry to invade Garhwal. The king of Kumaon joined him. The invading army captured Dun.<sup>35</sup> The Khan set up a garrison there and returned to the Mughal capital in 1655. The following year the Emperor learnt that the King of Garhwal was reconstructing a fort and his army was raiding the villages around Dun. So he sent Qasim Khan with 4,000 troopers and 5,000 infantry. He destroyed the fort and returned. Soon afterwards, through the mediation of Dara Shukoh, the King of Garhwal sent his elder son to the Mughal court. He met Shah Jahan on 31st July 1656, presented a tribute of one thousand ashrafis (or about Rs 14,000) and was granted permission on 12th August to return.<sup>36</sup>

But Garhwal largely remained an independent state.

*Ladakh*: Mughal sources refer to Ladakh as Greater Tibet (Tibat-i Buzurg or Tibat-i Kalan) .<sup>37</sup> It was situated in Eastern Kashmir, beyond the Deosai and Zaskar ranges. Its capital was at Leh.

Aurangzeb issued a farman in 1665 to the King of Ladakh, Daldan Namgyal, that he should convert to Islam, propagate that religion and acknowledge Aurangzeb's suzerainty or else the Imperial army would devastate his territories and root out 'infidelity'.<sup>38</sup> The king yielded to the fiat. He ordered a mosque to be built in his kingdom, acknowledged Aurangzeb's suzerainty and minted coins in Aurangzeb's name. He also sent some tribute to the Emperor.<sup>39</sup> But this was a nominal surrender. His son who succeeded to the throne remained a Buddhist.<sup>40</sup>

Baltistan, north-west of Ladakh, was a part of the Mughal Empire. Mughal historians call it Little Tibet (Tibbat Khurd).<sup>41</sup> It passed under Mughal rule in 1637 after the king was imprisoned and his younger brother was given the province in *jagir*.<sup>42</sup>

*Mewar*: The Rana of Mewar acknowledged Mughal suzerainty in 1614 by a treaty which enjoined him to send one thousand horsemen to serve in the Mughal army and to desist from repairing the fort of Chittor.<sup>43</sup> But for these constraints, Mewar retained its independence.

*Ramnagar*: The family name of the chief was Rane.<sup>44</sup> The Portuguese collected a tax, called the chauth, from the villages of Daman District which was under their control, and remitted it to the chief. The rate varied between 12½ and 17 % of the revenue.<sup>45</sup> This was not in the nature of a tribute, but rather

protection money to forestall nuisance of tribal gangs living within the territory of Ramnagar.<sup>46</sup> In Portuguese documents of the period, the King is called Chauthia, a name derived from the nomenclature of the tax.<sup>47</sup> Bocarro states in his book written in 1634 that the Chauthia could bring 500 to 600 horsemen in the field.<sup>48</sup> Godinho, too, states in his travelogue written in 1663 that the Chauthia maintained 600 horsemen.<sup>49</sup>

*Jawhar:* The Mukane dynasty ruled this area. They were kolis by caste, and European documents refer to them as Koli kings.<sup>50</sup> Like the Chief of Ramnagar, the Chief of Jawhar also received a tax (called Gaokhandi) from the Portuguese, probably for the same reason.<sup>51</sup>

Till 1655, Jawhar did not pay tribute to Mughals. But when, in that year, a Mughal force under Rao Karna invaded his territory, the King of Jawhar sued for peace and agreed to pay tribute regularly.<sup>52</sup> But he remained autonomous in his internal affairs.

*Garh-Katanga:* Garh and Katanga<sup>53</sup> were two villages near Jabalpur which gave the state its name. Earlier, Chauragarh<sup>54</sup> was its capital. When the king, Dalpatshah, died his queen, Durgavati, took the reins of the state in her hands as her son, Veer Narayan, was a minor. She successfully repulsed an invasion by the Baz Bahadur, the Sultan of Mandu. In 1564, on orders of Emperor Akbar, Asaf Khan invaded Garh-Katanga with 10,000 horsemen and a sizeable infantry. Durgavati was wounded in the battle and committed suicide by stabbing herself. Asaf Khan took the fort of Chauragarh; Veer Narayan was killed in the battle.<sup>55</sup> Although a large part of the state was annexed by the Mughals, it survived with Chauragarh as its capital.<sup>56</sup>

Veer Narayan was succeeded by his son Chandrasahi followed by Madhukarsahi and, after him, by Prem Narayan alias Premsahi. This Premsahi met Jahangir along with other vassals when the Emperor came to Mandu in 1617. According to the Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, he offered fourteen elephants by way of tribute and was made a mansabdar (an officer of the Mughal Empire) in lieu of which the Emperor ordered assignment to him of a jagir in his own dominion.<sup>57</sup>

Jujhar Singh Bundela, the Raja of Orchha, <sup>58</sup> was a Mughal mansabdar, too. But he had been defying Shah Jahan ever since the latter ascended the throne. He invaded Garh-Katanga, invited Prem Narayan for negotiations under due assurance of safety and murdered him. At that time Mughal general Khan Dauran had arrived at the Court with a tribute from Prem Narayan and had also brought Prem Narayan's son Hridayeshwar alias Hridaysahi along with him. Shah Jahan learnt of Juzhar Singh's invasion of Garh-Katanga from Hridayeshwar. Whereupon he ordered Juzhar Singh to hand over to imperial authorities the territory of Garh-Katanga or an equal territory from his own dominion, and one million rupees from the wealth he had seized from Prem Narayan.

Jujhar Singh Bundela was in no mood to comply. So the Mughal army, led by Prince Aurangzeb, invaded the territory of Orchha in 1635. Jujhar Singh fled to Chauragarh and from there to Gondvan where the Gonds killed him. Orchha was annexed to the Mughal Empire. Chauragarh too was taken over by the Mughals.<sup>59</sup> Hridayeshwar shifted his capital to Ramnagar<sup>60</sup> and built a fort there.<sup>61</sup>

*Deogarh:* The rulers of Deogarh belonged to the Gond tribe. Khan Dauran, the Mughal general, invaded the principality towards the end of 1636 and laid siege to the fort of Nagpur. Mughals took the fort after blasting off a part of the rampart. Kokshah, the king of Deogarh, surrendered, acknowledged

Mughal suzerainty and agreed to pay tribute. So the Mughals returned the Nagpur fort to him.<sup>62</sup>

But later, the king of Deogarh defaulted on payment of tribute. So Shah Jahan ordered Prince Aurangzeb to invade the state again in 1655. Aurangzeb was the governor (subadar) of the Deccan at the time. He wrote to Shah Jahan that the proposed action was not advisable because, while capturing Deogarh was easy, holding on to it was not; expenses on keeping the area under Mughal rule would be more than the revenue generated by it.<sup>63</sup>

Shah Jahan must have agreed with this assessment; the Mughals invaded Deogad at a later time, only to withdraw after they were promised tribute. Aurangzeb sent two armies against Deogad in October 1655. Mirza Khan, Governor of Varhad led one army and Hadidat Khan, the Governor of Telangana, led the other. The King of Deogad immediately surrendered, and came to meet Mirza Khan. He accompanied the Khan to Aurangabad in January 1656 and handed over all the twenty elephants which he owned. He also promised to pay Rs.500,000 as arrears of tribute and gave an assurance of timely payment in future.<sup>64</sup>

When Aurangzeb invaded the Qutbshahi Sultanate soon afterwards, the Raja of Deogad had joined the Mughal forces.<sup>65</sup>

*Chanda:* Mughal generals Abdulla Khan Firoz Jang Bahadur and Khan Dauran were giving chase to Jujhar Singh Bundela in 1635 when they demanded tribute from Kaiba, the King of Chanda, to which the king agreed. His successor joined Mughal expeditions against Deogad in 1636-37 and 1655, and against Golconda in 1656.<sup>66</sup>

*Vijayanagar*: Emperor Venkatpati II died on 30th September 1642 and his nephew, Shriranga Rayalu, succeeded to the throne.<sup>67</sup> His capital was at Vellore.<sup>68</sup>

The Vijayanagar Empire, at this time, comprised the present-day districts of Nellore, Cuddupah, Anantpur and Chittoor in Andhra Pradesh, and Chingleput, North Arcot and Dharmapuri in Tamil Nadu.<sup>69</sup> The rulers (known as Nayaks) of Gingee, Tanjore, Madurai, and Mysore nominally acknowledged the Emperor's suzerainty but they were practically independent. They never joined in any of Shriranga's campaigns.

The Nayak of Madurai had in fact become defiant from the very commencement of Shriranga's rule. After gaining the throne, Shriranga decided to bring Madurai to heel. The Nayak of Madurai obtained the support of the Nayaks of Gingee and Tanjore. Shriranga dispatched a force under Krishnappa against them.<sup>70</sup>

Shriranga was fighting a war on two fronts at the time. Towards the end of the reign of Venkatpati II, Qutbshahi armies had launched an attack from the north and had advanced up to Pulicat by 1644. So Shrirang recalled Krishnappa's force and, launching a surprise attack on the Qutbshahi forces sometime in August-September 1644, put them to flight. The Qutbshahi general, Qazi Ali, was killed and the Sultanate's force retreated to Armgaon.<sup>71</sup>

But this success was short lived. Soon, the Adilshah and Qutbshah launched an attack on Vijayanagar. Vellore fell to Adilshahi forces in 1654. Shriranga was allowed to retain the fort of Chandragiri<sup>72</sup> and a small territory around it.<sup>73</sup>

*Gingee*: Muthu Venkat was the Nayak of Gingee in 1639.<sup>74</sup> Adilshahi forces took the fort of Gingee in 1649 and annexed the prinipality.<sup>75</sup>

*Tanjore*: Raghunath Nayak ruled at Tanjore from 1614 to 1633 to be succeeded by his son Vijay Raghav who died in 1673.

*Madurai*: Tirumal Nayak was the ruler of Madurai from around 1627 or 1628 till his death in February 1659. He shifted the capital from Tiruchirapalli to Madurai between 1640 and 1644. His son Muttu Veerappa died shortly thereafter and was succeeded by his son Chokkanatha. He shifted the capital back to Tiruchirapalli sometime before 1661. He died in 1682. Madurai would often be at war with Mysore and Travancore.

*Mysore*: This was the most powerful among the splinter states of the Vijayanagar Empire. Its capital was at Shrirangapatna. Kanthirava Narasaraja Wodeyar was the ruler of Mysore from 1638 to 1659. He had lost his son and had adopted his cousin Devraj. Devraj ruled till 1673. He too died childless and was succeeded by his nephew, Chikka Devraj.

Mysore was often at war with Ikkeri and Madura.

*Ikkeri*: The kingdom was known by various names. The dynasty hailed from Keladi; <sup>76</sup> so that was the official name of the kingdom.<sup>77</sup> The capital was at Ikkeri,<sup>78</sup> so the kingdom was also known by that name.<sup>79</sup> The Adilshahi army captured Ikkeri in 1637.<sup>80</sup> The capital was then shifted to Bednur.<sup>81</sup> Thereafter, the kingdom was also known as Bednur.<sup>82</sup> Yet the old name, Ikkeri, remained in vogue as well.<sup>83</sup> The territories of the kingdom comprised the regions of Canara and Malnad, by which names too it was sometimes known.<sup>84</sup> Bhatkal was the

main sea port of this state, whence large quantities of pepper was exported to Europe.<sup>85</sup> So the English referred to it as the kingdom of Bhatkal.<sup>86</sup>

Veerbhadrappa Nayak was the nominal ruler of Ikkeri from 1629 to 1645 with real power in the hands of a distant uncle, Shivappa. Veerbhadrappa had no issue. He abdicated the throne in 1645 and made Shivappa the king. Shivappa ruled till 1660. A special achievement of his rule was expulsion of the Portuguese from their settlements at Basrur (1652), Gangolli (1652-53), Mangalore (1653) and Honavar (1654).<sup>87</sup>

After Shivappa's death, his younger brother Venkatappa came to the throne. He was succeeded by Shivappa's son Bhadrappa who died in 1664 when Shivappa's second son, Somshekhar, became king.

Ikkeri often warred with Mysore and occasionally with Kolattiri.

*Other Minor Principalities in Karnataka:* There were several tiny states north of Mysore and east of Ikkeri, which included Shire, Bangalore (Bengaluru), Basavapatna, Chiknayakanhalli, Belur and Tumkur. The Adilshahi annexed all of these between 1636 and 1644.<sup>88</sup>

*Kolattiri:* The principality of Kolathiri dynasty occupied the north tip of the Malabar Coast bordering on the southern territory of Ikkeri. Baliapattam which was also known as Valapattanam, was its capital.<sup>89</sup>

*Aliraja's Principality:* A Muslim nobleman in the service of the Raja of Kolattiri broke away in the 16th Century and became independent. He and his descendants began to be known by the

tile 'Aliraja'. The capital was at Kannur (Cannanore). He also ruled over the islands of Lakshadweep.

Kannur was divided into two parts. Aliraja controlled eastern or Upper Kannur, while the Portuguese controlled western or Lower Kannur, where they had built a fort. It was captured by the Dutch in 1663.

Aliraja's strength lay in his prowess on the sea. But it was no match for the Europeans. However, Muslims from his principality engaged in extensive piracy on the west coast of India.<sup>90</sup>

*Calicut (Kozhikode)*: Calicut was the biggest state in Malabar, ruled by the Samoothiri (Zamorin).<sup>91</sup> Malabar pirates thrived in the coastal areas of the state, evidently with the Zamorin's blessings.<sup>92</sup>

*Cochin (Kochi)*: Cochin was initially a feudatory state under the Zamorin's control. The king shook off the Zamorin's suzerainty with the help of the Portuguese but, as a consequence, had to suffer them as the new overlords of Cochin.

Upper (eastern) Cochin was under the control of the King of Cochin and Lower (western) Cochin was a part of the Portuguese settlement.

The Portuguese deposed the ruling dynasty of Cochin in 1646, replacing it with another branch of the family. The Dutch expelled the Portuguese from Ceylon in 1658 whereupon Veer Kerala Varma, scion of the deposed royal family, went to Ceylon to seek their assistance. The Dutch captured Kodungallur in 1662 and lower Cochin in 1663 and made Veer Kerala Varma the king with the Dutch admiral, Van Goens, personally placing the golden crown, with the Dutch East India Company's emblem, upon his head. The new king accepted the Dutch as

overlords and granted them exclusive rights to purchase pepper and cinnamon from his state.<sup>93</sup> However, the Dutch did not interfere in his internal affairs.

*Petty Principalities in Malabar:* There were many petty principalities, such as Purakkad and Kayamkulam between Cochin in the north and Kollam in the south.<sup>94</sup>

*Kollam:* The state of Kollam (Quilon) lay to the north of Travancore. The eastern part of Kollam city was under the rule of the local king and western part was Portuguese territory with a fort to guard it. The Dutch took the fort in 1661.

*Travancore:* The state of Travancore occupied the southernmost part of Malabar. Kalkulam<sup>95</sup> was the capital.<sup>96</sup> Occasional conflicts arose with Madura located to its east.

With this brief look at the political situation in India just before the advent of Shivaji, we will take a slightly more detailed overview in the next chapter of the various Muslim states that were the real hurdles with which he had to contend in prosecuting his ambition of establishing an indigenous, independent political entity.

While such was the overall political situation that prevailed in India at the time of the advent of Shivaji, it was primarily against the enormous military machines of the Mughal Empire and the two residual Deccan Sultanates (Bijapur and Golconda) that he had to match his wits and means. These three States constituted the real hurdles to his ambition of establishing an indigenous, independent political entity. What is indeed astonishing is that he contemplated issuing the challenge at a time when even the most powerful land in the land had meekly submitted to alien rule, and the polity was blissfully ignorant, even complacent, about its own individuality and a right to independent existence. The peerless task he accomplished may be better appreciated when the

expanse, strength, organization and intention of his contenders are studied in slightly greater detail, which the next chapter intends to do.

# INDIA

1650





# The Mughals and other Muslim Rulers in Shivaji's Times

## THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

### THE MANSABDARS

Officers in the Mughal Empire were known as mansabdars. Mansab is an Arabic word for 'rank' in the official hierarchy. The mansabdari system had not been intentionally designed; the rules governing this system had evolved over time and were beset with so many complexities that the result was often chaotic.

Essentially, the Mughals were military rulers and their army consisted primarily of horsemen. Most of the *mansabdars* were, therefore, cavalry officers. *Mansabdars* were expected to recruit and maintain their own troopers along with other staff like blacksmiths, farriers and water carriers, and animals like elephants and camels depending on the size of their contingents.<sup>97</sup> Every *mansabdar* was directly subordinate to the Emperor. There were no permanent units and formations like sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, or divisions.

Mansabdars were either paid in cash or given territory as a jagir from which they were entitled to collect taxes as their remuneration. This latter was the most common form in practice. More than 80 per cent of Imperial territory was assigned in *jagirs*.<sup>98</sup> The territory which was not so assigned was called *khalisa* or *khalisa-i sharifa*. There were no fixed *khalisa* or *jagir* territories; a territory assigned in *jagir* could

become a *khalisa* territory, or vice versa, at the Emperor's pleasure.<sup>99</sup>

Ranks of *mansbdars* were indicated by two figures the dhat number and the sawar number; for instance, 5000 dhat / 4000 sawar, 1000 dhat / 1000 sawar, 500 dhat / 250 sawar. *Dhat* is an Arabic word that means person, self. *Sawar* is a Persian word meaning rider, horseman or trooper. The *dhat* figure indicated an officer's position in the hierarchy<sup>100</sup>. The greater the *dhat* figure, the higher was the rank. There were 28 dhat ranks ranging from 10 to 7000. <sup>101</sup> *Masabdars* holding dhat ranks of 1000 and above were known as *Amirs*. Generally speaking, none except princes of the blood was given a rank higher than 7000 *dhat*. <sup>102</sup> Princes began their service from 7000 *dhat* or an even higher rank. For instance, in 1607, Jahangir conferred upon his fifteen year old son Khurram the rank of 8000 dhat / 5000 *sawar*. <sup>103</sup> After several promotions, he obtained in 1617 the rank of 30,000 dhat / 20,000 *sawar* along with the title 'Shah Jahan'. <sup>104</sup>

The second figure in an officer's rank, or the sawar figure indicated the number of troopers he was supposed to maintain in his contingent. But this did not mean that the number of troopers he was to maintain was equal to the sawar figure in his rank. The rules regarding this were as follows: <sup>105</sup> (a) A *mansabdar* posted in the same suba or province in which he was assigned a jagir was to maintain troopers equivalent to one third of the sawar figure in his rank. For instance, if he held the rank 1000 dhat / 1000 sawar he was to maintain 334 troopers. (b) A *mansabdar* posted out of the province in which his jagir lay was to maintain troopers equivalent to one fourth of the sawar figure in his rank; for instance, 125 troopers if he held the rank of 1000 dhat / 500 sawar. (c) A mansabdar posted in Balkh or Badkhshan (in Afghanistan) was to maintain troopers

equivalent to one fifth of the *sawar* figure in his rank; for instance, 100 troopers if he held the rank of 800 dhat / 500 *sawar*.

*Mansabdars* who were paid in cash instead of a jagir were to maintain troopers equivalent to one fifth of the *sawar* figure in their ranks. [106](#)

As mentioned earlier, seniority of mansabdars was decided by the dhat figures in their ranks. Where the dhat figure in the ranks of two mansabdars was the same, the one with the higher *sawar* figure ranked as senior. [107](#) The *sawar* figure in a mansabdar's rank could not be higher than the dhat figure. [108](#)

Each *dhat* rank from 10 *dhat* to 5,000 *dhat* was divided into three classes. A *sawar* figure of less than half the *dhat* figure in a *mansabdar*'s rank placed him in the third class of that *dhat* rank; a *sawar* figure half or more than half of the *dhat* figure in a *mansabdar*'s rank placed him in the second class of that *dhat* rank; a *sawar* figure equal to the *dhat* figure in a *mansabdar*'s rank placed him in the first class of that *dhat* rank.

Ranks of 5000 *dhat* and above were not divided into classes. [109](#)

Since the Mughals were military rulers, there was no distinction between civil and military officials. Even those *mansabdars* given civilian duties such as a *hakim* (doctor), for instance, were treated as *mansabdars* of a status comparable with military officers of the same *dhat* rank. The only difference was that in the rank of such *mansabdars* the *sawar* figure was much lower than the *dhat* figure. [110](#) The troopers maintained by them were no more than their personal attendants and peons.

Payment to *mansabdars* was treated separately for the *dhat* and *sawar* components. The *dhat* figure determined the

personal salary of the *mansabdar* and the *sawar* figure, the remuneration to be paid for the maintenance of troopers in his contingent. Some dhat rank salaries, according to a document dated 1st March 1641, were as follows:<sup>111</sup>

<i>Dhat Rank</i>	Annual salary in Rupees		
	First Class	Second Class	Third Class
20	1000	875	750
100	5000	4750	4500
500	20000	18750	17500
1000	50000	47500	45000
5000	250000	242500	235000

Those who received a jagir as payment were granted Rs.200/- per *sawar* per annum.<sup>112</sup> The *sawar* figure appearing in the *mansabdar's* rank, and not the number of troopers he actually had in his contingent, was considered for the remittance.

The actual revenue of any area assigned as *jagir* seldom matched what was regarded as its revenue potential (*jamadami*).<sup>113</sup> What was usually being realized from it was called *hasil*.<sup>114</sup> A comparison of the *jamadami* and *hasil* was done and the area was quantified for convenience in terms of 'months'.<sup>115</sup> For instance, if the *hasil* was half the *jamadami*, the

grant was called ‘six monthly (*shah maha*); if it was one third, ‘four monthly’ (*chahar maha*) and so on. Thus there were twelve categories of land, ranging from ‘one monthly’ (*yak maha*) to ‘twelve monthly (*duwajdah maha*), depending on revenue realization.

Just as there were twelve categories of lands there were twelve scales of remuneration paid to the *mansabdars*. How they were related may best be explained by an example. If a *mansabdar* with the rank of 100 *hat* / 100 *sawar* was granted the ‘twelve monthly’ pay scale, he would receive, according to the table given above, Rs.5000 as his personal salary and 100 x 200 = Rs.20,000 as remuneration for his contingent of horsemen, i.e. a total of 25,000 rupees. So he would be assigned a ‘twelve monthly’ territory, i.e. one in which the *hasil* was equal to the *jamadami*, as his *jagir*. Another *mansabdar* with the same rank but with a ‘six monthly’ scale of remuneration would have a total annual claim of Rs.12,500 and would be assigned a ‘six monthly’ territory, i.e. one in which the *hasil* was half of the *jamadami*, as his *jagir*. If both these *mansabdars* were posted in the same province in which their *jagirs* lay, they would have to maintain 34 troopers in their contingents. So, one of them received Rs.25,000 for maintaining 34 troopers and the other, only Rs.12,500 for the same number of troopers. This was so because the one with a higher pay scale was expected to keep a greater number of horses. In the Mughal army, some troopers had to keep only one horse each, while others had to keep two or even three.<sup>116</sup> The proportion of two horsed or three horsed troopers in a *mansabdar*’s contingent was dependent on his pay scale. <sup>117</sup>*Mansabdars* who held the rank of 100 *sawar* and who were posted in the same province in which their *jagirs* lay had to maintain, according to their pay scales, one horsed and two horsed troopers according to the following table:<sup>118</sup>

Salary scale	Two horsed	One horsed	Total number of	Total number
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	<b>troopers</b>	<b>troopers</b>	<b>troopers</b>	<b>of horses</b>
12 month	22	12	34	56
11 month	17	17	34	51
10 month	12	22	34	46
9 month	8	26	34	42
8 month	3	31	34	37
7 month	1	33	34	35
6 month	—	34	34	34
5 month	—	24	24	24
4 month	—	18	18	18
3 month	—	14	14	14
2 month	—	11	11	11
1 month	—	9	9	9

It will be noticed that the number of troopers in the contingents of those having one month to five month pay scales has also been reduced.

Mansabdars receiving cash salaries too had twelve pay scales ranging from one month to twelve months. In their case, those who held the rank of 100 sawar had to maintain, according to their pay scales, one horsed, two horsed and three horsed troopers as per the following table: [119](#)

<b>Salary scale</b>	<b>Three horsed troopers</b>	<b>Two horsed troopers</b>	<b>One horsed troopers</b>	<b>Total number of troopers</b>	<b>Total number of horses</b>

12 month	6	12	2	20	44
11 month	5	10	5	20	40
10 month	–	16	4	20	36
9 month	–	12	8	20	32
8 month	–	9	11	20	29
7 month	–	5	15	20	25
6 month	–	2	18	20	22
5 month	–	–	20	20	20
4 month	–	–	16	16	16
3 month	–	–	12	12	12
2 month	–	–	8	8	8
1 month	–	–	4	4	4

Though pay scales ranged from ‘one monthly’ to ‘twelve monthly’, the normal practice followed in Shah Jahan’s reign was to assign ‘four monthly’ to ‘eight monthly’ scales. Shah Jahan’s *farman* dated 12th July 1653 says, ‘Cash pay should not be more than eight month scale nor do I recommend less than four month scale’. [120](#) A similar pattern appears to have been adopted during Aurangzeb’s reign. [121](#) Most of the jagirs assigned in the Deccan during Shivaji’s time fell in the ‘two monthly’ to ‘six monthly’ categories. [122](#)

Although *mansabdars* received remuneration at a fixed rate for every trooper they employed, there was no rule regarding the actual salary they paid to their employees. [123](#) This was left entirely to the discretion of the *mansabdar* and even the agreed remuneration was often irregular. According to *Manucci*, the *mansabdar* and the local money lender ran a racket which

forced the trooper into a lifelong debt, with a share of the interest being paid back to the *mansabdar*.<sup>124</sup>

Some *mansabdars* had a third figure added in their rank. It was called the *du aspa sih aspa*. For instance, 6000 *dhat* / 5000 *sawar* / 1000 *du aspa sih aspa*. For all practical purposes, this *du aspa sih aspa* figure was nothing but an addition to the *sawar* figure in the *mansabdar's* rank. For calculating the number of troopers such a *mansabdar* was required to keep, the *du aspa sih aspa* figure was to be added to the *sawar* figure before applying the rules stated above.<sup>125</sup> For instance if a *mansabdar* with the rank cited was posted in the same province in which his *jagir* lay, he would be required to keep 2000 troopers in his contingent. If he was posted out of the province in which his *jagir* lay, he would be required to keep 1500 troopers in his contingent. The *mansabdar* was paid for this addition in his contingent at the same rate as he was paid for his *sawar* rank. The device of adding *du aspa sih aspa* figure in a *mansabdar's* rank was resorted to when his contingent was to be increased without promoting him either to a higher rank or a higher class of the same rank. The *du aspa sih aspa* figure in a *mansabdar's* rank could never be higher than the *sawar* figure in his rank.<sup>126</sup>

#### THE ADMINISTRATION OF JAGIRS

Rulers in Seventeenth Century India had only two tasks – maintaining an army and collecting taxes. The intention of maintaining an army was to assert the ruler's right to collect taxes, suppress internal revolts, protect boundaries from external aggression, and, if possible, extend them; and taxes had to be collected to defray the cost of maintaining the army.

<sup>127</sup> The practice of assigning *jagirs* freed the government to a large extent from the tedious task of collecting taxes. The *mansabdars*, too, preferred this method of payment because it afforded them the opportunity to wield power and influence, albeit over a small territory. In theory, the *jagirs* were under the

jurisdiction of the *subadars* (provincial governors); in practice their functioning was nearly autonomous.

The *mansabdars* were not owners of the area granted to them as their jagir. The Emperor was the sole owner of all lands in the Empire. That the *jagir* was given to somebody only meant that he was authorized to collect taxes in conformity with prevailing rules.

*Mansabdars* usually appointed a small staff to oversee the actual collection of taxes and levies. Some even rented out portions of their *jagir* for a guaranteed return. <sup>128</sup> Such a contract was called the *ijara* and such agents, *ijaradars*. <sup>129</sup> The *ijaradars* gave a one time payment to the mansabdar and then collected taxes. The *mansabdar* benefited from this as he was saved the bother of collection and was also insured against shortfalls in collection. The *ijaradar* benefited as he negotiated a lesser price than the expected revenue (*hasil*) and often resorted to extortion to gain a handsome profit. <sup>130</sup>

*Jagirs* awarded to *mansabdars* were regularly changed from one territory to another, perhaps to prevent development of individual or personal interests and loyalties leading to undue augmentation in the incumbent's influence and power. <sup>131</sup> Often, it was necessary to change *jagirs* for administrative reasons, too. <sup>132</sup> A drawback of this measure was that the *mansabdar* felt no motivation to implement any medium or long term measures for public welfare or augmentation of agricultural yield. The sole short term objective was to collect tax and ensure maximum surplus for himself. <sup>133</sup>

Rajput Rajas, though *mansabdars* of the Mughals, were an exception to this rule. They held hereditary *jagirs* called *watans*. These, of course, were their dominions before their subjection to the Mughals. Nevertheless, they had to serve in the Mughal

army like any other *mansabdar*. When the holder of such a *watan-jagir* died, his heir, even if he was a minor, was granted a *mansab* commensurate with the *watan-jagir*.<sup>134</sup> Only when the revenue from the *watan-jagir* of such a Rajput *mansabdar* was less than the remuneration due to his rank would he be assigned an additional *jagir*.<sup>135</sup> Such supplementary *jagirs* were subject to transfer.<sup>136</sup>

#### SOME REGULATIONS

*Mansabdars* were bound by a set of rules. They were required to maintain horses and troopers as required by their rank. But they often cheated on the required numbers. To avoid being caught by inspecting authorities, they temporarily hired horses and men to pass the muster.<sup>137</sup> Horses began to be branded from the time of Akbar to prevent such malpractices.<sup>138</sup> Each horse in the *mansabdar's* contingent was branded with emblems of both the *mansabdar* and the Emperor.<sup>139</sup>

The *Ain-i Akbari* lists seven types of horse: Arabian, Persian, *Mujannas*, *Turki*, *Yabu*, *Tazi* and *Jangla*.<sup>140</sup> *Mansabdars* were to generally maintain only *Turki* horses in their contingents.<sup>141</sup> Shah Jahan had issued a farman ordering that *Tazi* horses should not be branded (i.e. retained in service) anywhere except in the subas of the Deccan, Ahmedabad, Bengal, Orrisa and Thatta.<sup>142</sup> Of course, *mansabdars* in territories other than these could also keep *Yabu* or *Tazi* breeds in their contingents but had to incur a deduction from their remuneration for doing so.<sup>143</sup>

Descriptions were maintained of *mansabdars* and their personal mounts, along with those of the troopers in their

contingents and their horses.<sup>144</sup> Here is an example of one such record of a trooper and his horse serving in the contingent of a *mansabdar* called *Ilhamullah*:<sup>145</sup>

“Shaikh Parveez son of Shaikh Farid – complexion wheatish. Broad forehead, eyebrows set apart. Eyes like a sheep [dark gray]. Pronounced nose. Black mustache and beard. Marks on the face. Full height. About 35 years old.

Horse: Blue, <sup>146</sup> spotted. Branded on the mounting side. Moles on both sides of the neck. [Breed –] Turki.

“19th January 1649. Re-branded.

22nd October 1649. One man and one horse inspected. [Two seals”]

Several such descriptions of men and horses during Shah Jahan’s and Aurangzeb’s reigns are extant.<sup>147</sup>

An independent Dagh and Tashiha (Branding and Inspection) department had been instituted to brand new horses and periodically inspect all contingents.<sup>148</sup>

Each mansabdar, apart from the horses of the troopers in his contingent, had to maintain two or more Turki horses as his personal mounts.<sup>149</sup> He was also expected to possess armour and helmet for himself.<sup>150</sup> His horses and armour, too, had to be inspected at regular intervals. Any delay or defect would result in a fine.<sup>151</sup>

Muster rolls of the attendance of mansabdars were regularly maintained.<sup>152</sup> The mansabdar, before his appointment, had to submit a written undertaking by another mansabdar as surety that he would punctually attend to the duties assigned to him.<sup>153</sup>

## CANDIDATES FOR A MANSABDARI

A *mansab* in the Mughal Court could be acquired in three ways.

(1) Hundreds of recorded instances may be found showing that a *mansabdar*'s sons and relations were given mansabs. When a high ranking *mansabdar* died, his son, even if he were a minor, was given a *mansab*.<sup>154</sup> For instance, when Sadullah Khan, the diwan of the Mughal Empire, died in 1656, his eleven year old son was granted a *mansab* of 700 dhat / 100 sawar.<sup>155</sup>

(2) *Mansabs* would also be awarded as allurements to defectors from other states. Several examples of such awards to defectors from the Ottoman Empire, Balkh, Iran and the Adilshahi and Qubtshahi Sultanates are extant.<sup>156</sup>

(3) Sometimes a *mansab* was also given to a capable man in a *mansabdar*'s contingent, a horseman from the Emperor's special cavalry force or a *hakim* (doctor) or, perhaps, a Muslim scholar.

<sup>157</sup>

Whatever the modality of acquiring a *mansab*, it normally had to be recommended by a senior *mansabdar* and sanctioned by the Emperor.<sup>158</sup>

It was not necessary for a *mansabdar* to work his way up the hierarchy from the lowest rung. He could be awarded any rank according to the Emperor's whim, but it is possible that factors like his social background and merit might also have been considered. The sons of high ranking *mansabdars* usually began at a higher rank than others. Status in the earlier employment was considered in the case of defectors. There was no fixed policy nor was there any kind of training program.

#### PROMOTIONS, HONOURS AND AWARDS

Generally, a mansabdar of a lower rank had to be recommended by a senior *mansabdar* for obtaining promotion. Such recommendations were accepted or rejected depending on the Emperor's wish. [159](#) There were no fixed rules.

Various means were employed to bestow honours upon officers. A ceremonial dress of honour (called the *khilat*) was given whenever newly appointed *mansabdars* took leave of the Imperial Court. *Khilats* were also given to *mansabdars* of armies setting out on campaigns or returning after successful expeditions. *Mansabdars* received *khilats* at special events like the Emperor's birthday, New Year's Day or some other celebration. On such occasions the Emperor also bestowed upon the *mansabdars* various costly gifts such as horses and elephants, sometimes with gold and silver furniture, enameled and jeweled swords and daggers, and ornaments like pearl necklaces and aigrettes. *Mansabdars*, on their part, were expected to give presents to the Emperor whenever an audience was granted. Cash, ornaments, horses and elephants would be presented to the Emperor for obtaining royal favours. The Emperor usually always received more than he gave.

A *khitab* or title was another way of honoring a person and was the Emperor's prerogative exclusively. Jahangir formulated the rules and regulations for *mansabdars* in the 6th year of his reign, and one of these was that *mansabdars* were forbidden to bestow honorific titles on their employees. [160](#) Muslim *mansabdars* were usually given the title of Khan to be used as a suffix to their given name or a name of the Emperor's choice. For instance, in 1653, Shah Jahan gave the title of Safi Khan to Muhammad Safi, the then Diwan and Bakhshi of the Deccan Province. [161](#) In 1659 Aurangzeb gave the title *Mustafa Khan* to

*Mir Ahamad Khafi* [162](#) Some titles, bestowed on Muslims, such as *Khan-i Khanan* and *Amir ul-Umara* were exclusive; they were not granted to anyone while a holder of the title was alive. Hindu mansabdars were given titles like *Raja*, *Rao*, or *Rai*. Among the titles given to the Hindus *Rai-i Rayan*, *Maharaja* or *Mirza Raja* were exclusive.

Another honour that would be bestowed was a standard with the right to fly it. While several instances of courtiers being honoured thus are extant, no description in any form of the actual standard is available. A further augmentation in status was the *naqara* (or *kettledrum*).

#### **LEAVE, DISMISSAL, RETIREMENT**

Leave of absence from duty would be granted to a *mansabdar* on occasions like weddings in the family, illness or need to visit his *jagir*. [163](#) However, it seems there were no hard and fast rules governing the matter.

A *mansabdar*, having neglected his duties or having incurred the Emperor's displeasure in some way, could have his mansab reduced or even his title revoked. For instance, the Safi Khan mentioned earlier failed to come up to the Emperor's expectations, for which reason his *mansab* was reduced by 500 dhat / 100 sawar and the title 'Khan' was revoked; needless to state, he became Muhammad Safi once again. [164](#)

There was no retirement age as such for a *mansabdar*; he remained one till his death unless he was dismissed from service, applied for retirement due to age or illness, or was compulsorily retired by the Emperor's orders. In 1644, Abdulla Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang died in office at the age of 70. [165](#) Shyista Khan, a *mansabdar* since Jahangir's reign, was still a *mansabdar* when he died in 1694 at the age of 89. [166](#)

Examples of mansabdars being given pensions after retirement can also be found, but there were no rules regarding this matter. In some instances, dependents of a deceased *mansabdar* were also given a pension, but this does not seem to have been a regular practice.

When a mansabdar died, his entire property would be impounded by Imperial officials. After calculating and deducting dues to the Empire, the Emperor would decide how much was to be credited to the state treasury before releasing the balance to the heirs.<sup>167</sup> There were no rules for this deduction; everything was determined at the Emperor's whim.

#### PRINCIPAL OFFICERS IN THE MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION

##### *Diwan or Wazir (Chancellor or Finance Minister)*

The *Diwan* was the Chief Financial Officer of the Mughal Court. His chief responsibilities included receiving taxes from *khalisa* (Emperor's) territory, assignment of jagirs and disbursing cash payments to those who received their salaries directly from the Imperial treasury.<sup>168</sup> Though he was obviously a very senior officer, he was not necessarily the most senior officer, even if the princes of the blood are not counted, in the Mughal service.<sup>169</sup> He was assisted by the *Diwan-i Tan* and the *Diwan-i Khalisa*. The *Diwan-i Khalisa* looked after *khalisa* territory while the *Diwan-i Tan* looked after the assignment of *jagirs* and related revenue matters.<sup>170</sup> Both of them were, of course, *mansabdars*.

##### *Khan-i Saman or Mir-i Saman*

He was responsible for government (i.e. the Emperor's) gardens, buildings and *karkhanas* (factories).<sup>171</sup> Fabrics, dresses, gold and silver ornaments and artistic curios were produced in these factories, which were spread throughout the Empire.<sup>172</sup> He was assisted by the *Diwan-i Buyutat*. Together, they were responsible for production and supply of munitions and gunpowder, cannonballs, rockets (bans) and leaden bullets.<sup>173</sup>

### ***Mir Bakhshi***

He was in charge of appointment of new mansabdars, promotions, transfers, branding of horses and inspection of *mansabdars'* contingents.<sup>174</sup> Current military parlance would equate this post with Adjutant General and the Emperor's Chief of Staff rolled into one. He was obviously a very senior ranking army officer, but not the commander in chief nor the most senior officer in the army.<sup>175</sup> He was assisted by the *Bakshi Duwum* (2nd *Bakhshi*) and the *Bakshi Siwum* (3rd *Bakhshi*).

### ***Mir Atish or the Darogha-i Topkhana***

He was the chief of the artillery. Musketeers in the Imperial army came under his jurisdiction.

*Darogha-i Dakchauki*: Chief of the department of posts that dealt only with the correspondence of government officials.

*Qazi-al Quzat*: Chief Justice.

*Sadr-us Sudur or sadr-i kul*: In charge of recommending grants of rent-free lands and annuities to masjids, Muslim priests and clerics.

*Muhatasib*: The Alamgirnama tells us that on 5th June 1659, the day of his second coronation, Aurangzeb decided to

appoint a Muslim cleric called Mulla Iwaz Wajih to enforce strict Islamic laws, and gave him a mansab of 1000 *dhat* / 100 *sawar*.

[176](#) The title of the post was *Muhatasib*.[177](#) His job was to ensure that activities forbidden by Islam, such as prostitution or consumption of alcohol and other intoxicating substances, were prohibited and punished. Some *mansabdars* and *ahadis* (single troopers) were appointed to assist him.

None of these offices could be inherited. The Emperor enjoyed the privilege of appointing or changing incumbents.

#### THE MUGHAL COURT AND THE EMPEROR'S DAILY ROUTINE

Agra was the capital of the Empire when Shah Jahan ascended the throne.[178](#) By his orders, work on the construction of the fort and other Imperial buildings at Delhi commenced on 19th April 1639. He entered the fort on 8th April 1648 after the work was complete.[179](#) The capital was shifted to Delhi, which was re-named '*Shahjahanabad*'.

Persian was the official language of the Court.[180](#) Shah Jahan ordinarily conversed in that tongue but used Hindustani while speaking with those of Indian origin and did not know Persian.[181](#) As the dynasty was Turkish by ethnicity, children of the Imperial household were also taught that language.[182](#) Aurangzeb evidently knew the language fluently. The *Alamgirnama* tells us that Aurangzeb usually spoke Persian, but knew the Turki language very well and used it for conversing with the Turks, and that he used Hindi with those who did not know Persian or could not speak it well.[183](#) During his second tenure as *subadar* of the Deccan, Aurangzeb was particular that his son, Muhammad Sultan, should learn Turkish and had appointed a tutor for that purpose.[184](#)

Important *farmans* addressed to his children and amirs would be written personally by Shah Jahan, while some others written by scribes would have a few lines in his own hand. [185](#)

Aurangzeb had exceptionally good handwriting. [186](#) The *Alamgirnama* says his *farmans* to princes and senior *mansabdars* would very often be personally written by him; others written by scribes would rarely not have a few lines in his own hand. [187](#)

Mughal Emperors led lives of extreme luxury. However, since administration of the Empire had to run smoothly for their title to the throne to continue unhindered, they had to devote some time every day to oversee the affairs of the state. Shah Jahan's daily routine is described in detail in the *Badshahnama*. Briefly, it was as follows: [188](#)

Shah Jahan generally arose two hours before sunrise each morning (or around 4 a.m.) and at about 7, after finishing his ablutions and namaz, would sit at a specially assigned window to facilitate his subjects to sight him. [189](#) Elephants in heat and horses from some *mansabdars'* contingents would then be arrayed in the courtyard below this window for his inspection. According to his pleasure, four or five fights would be arranged between elephants; they would be made to chase horses in order to make them accustomed to attacking enemy horses in actual combat.

After an hour or so at the window, he would proceed to the *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Am*, [190](#) i.e. the hall where he held court. An area about 50 x 15 meters outside the main hall would be covered by a large awning which had wooden railings on three sides with a gate in each. The floor would be covered with carpets. Princes would remain standing on either side of the throne till permitted to sit. Some noblemen would also stand on either side according to their ranks. The *bakhshi* would submit *mansabdars'* applications and the Emperor would issue orders

for promotions and transfers. *Mansabdars* from the *subas* reporting at the Court would be present here. Those posted outside the Capital would be granted permission to set out to their new charge. The *mir atish*, the *mushrif* [superintendent] of the artillery and the *bakhshi* of the *ahadis* would parade contingents of musketeers and *ahadis* before the Emperor. The *mir saman* and *diwan-i buyutat* would present applications of officials in the khalisa territories and obtain the Emperor's orders. Applications as well as sums of money or valuables in token of allegiance [*peshkash*] submitted by *subadars*, *faujdars* and other officials would be presented to the Emperor by officials of the Court. The *sadr-i kul* would submit applications for financial assistance on behalf of learned scholars or needy and deserving persons, and secure the Emperor's orders for grants. Matters relating to *mansabs*, jagirs and the like would be submitted by the *darogha-i arz mukarrar* for confirmation.<sup>[191](#)</sup> Elephants and horses from the Imperial stables would be arrayed before the Emperor by the respective officers-in-charge. If any steeds were found weak, money on their expenses would be recovered from the concerned official. Horses from *mansabdars'* contingents, recently inspected and branded, would be presented before the Emperor by the officials of the *dagh* and *tashiha* [branding and inspection] department. Any *mansabdar* with sub-standard men or horses would be punished. The business of this *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Am* would take about two hours.

Descriptions of this Court are also to be found in several European records.<sup>[192](#)</sup>

A silver railing, positioned some distance from the Imperial throne, created an enclosure within which senior *mansabdars* stood. A little further behind this was a coloured wooden railing. *Mansabdars* of rank below 200 *dhat*, *ahadis* and some soldiers from contingents of amirs would stand between the wooden and silver railings. *Sentries* and *gurzbardars* (mace-bearers) stood at the entrances to each enclosure to prevent

ingress of any unqualified person.<sup>193</sup> Very seldom, if ever, was any person other than a Mughal Prince permitted to sit in the Emperor's presence. Of these rare occasions, a few may be cited. Deviating from established custom as a special bestowal of Imperial grace, Jahangir ordered Prince Khurram [i.e. Shah Jahan] in 1617 to sit in a chair near the throne.<sup>194</sup> Shah Jahan, on 5th February 1655, on the occasion of the completion of his sixty-fifth year by the lunar calendar, ordered his eldest son, Dara Shukoh, to sit in a golden chair placed below the throne.

<sup>195</sup> Abdurrahim Khaja, envoy of the Sultan Imam Quli of Turan [i.e. Bukharal], was permitted by Shah Jahan to sit in a chair placed behind the princes when he visited the Mughal court in 1628. <sup>196</sup> Aurangzeb permitted his prime minister, Asad Khan, in 1686 to sit before the throne. <sup>197</sup> Thus, with a few and very rare exceptions, no one except the Emperor was allowed to sit in the Imperial Court. All stood with their eyes lowered to the ground before them and hands clasped in front of the body (a token of abject servility).<sup>198</sup> The Emperor would enter through a doorway behind the throne and sit.<sup>199</sup> As soon as he did so, everyone present would accord to him the *tasleem* [obeisance, salute] by bending at the waist, touching the ground with the back of the right hand and raising the palm to the forehead.<sup>200</sup>

After the court session at the *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Am*<sup>201</sup> was over, the Emperor would leave for the *ghuslkhana*.<sup>202</sup> or the *Daulatkhana-i Khas* (audience hall of the 'select'). Here, he would personally write his remarks on some applications or issue oral orders. Scribes would then reduce these to *farmans* and present them for the Emperor's approval at the next session. Instructions to correct any errors or discrepancies in such draft *farmans* would be issued. The *sadr-i kul* would submit applications that especially merited urgent attention, and obtain orders for allotting land or cash to the needy as the

case may be. Some time would be spent in inspecting *objets d'art* crafted by artisans. Architects and the daroghas of civil work would submit plans and designs of proposed buildings for the Emperor's perusal. Occasionally, animals and birds of prey would be exhibited before the Emperor here. Sometimes, equestrian exercises would be displayed for the Emperor's pleasure.

After spending about two hours at the *ghuslkhana*, the Emperor retired to the *Shah Burz* [Royal Tower] where only the princes and some very select amirs were permitted to remain present. Matters of state that were too vital to be discussed publicly were dealt with here.

Around noon, the Emperor would leave the *Shah Burz* and go to the *harem* for namaz and lunch. After a nap of an hour or so, the Emperor would hear from *mahad ulia* [the chief begum, Mumtaz Mahal] matters which destitute suppliants had previously submitted to her through her special lady-in-waiting, *Sati-un Nissa*. The Emperor would consider these applications and order such relief as he deemed fit. Girls of marriageable age, unable to get married due to helpless indigence, would be sanctioned apparel, jewellery and cash.

After the afternoon namaz, the Emperor would again sit in the *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Am* and as many matters of state would be discharged as was possible within the available time.

Sentries would offer salutations to the qur. [203](#)

The Emperor would then go to the *Daulatkhana-i Khas* where the evening namaz would be offered. The hall used to be illuminated with lamps richly inlaid with jewels. Work here would go on for about two hours and, occasionally, the Emperor would be entertained with music.

Then he would go to the *Shah Burz* where unfinished work from the *Daulatkhana-i Khas* would be completed. Hereafter he proceeded to the harem.

When the Emperor retired for the night, specially appointed readers would read out to him travelogues and biographies of Prophets, saintly persons and the Emperor's predecessors – especially those of *Sahib-i Kiran* [204](#) (i.e. *Timur*) and *Babar* – till he fell asleep. He normally slept for about six hours.

Only on Wednesdays, however, after the public viewing in the window, the Emperor would proceed not to the *Daulatkhana*, but to the hall of justice where none but officials of the judiciary, clerics skilled in Islamic law and a few amirs were allowed to be present. Persons seeking justice would be brought into the Emperor's presence and their matters explained. The Emperor would pass necessary decrees and mete out punishments according to Islamic law.

Aurangzeb's lifestyle and routine was not too different from that of his father, described above. However, it appears that he spent more time in official work and prayer than did Shah Jahan. His daily routine is described in the *Alamgirnama* thus: [205](#)

Waking up before sunrise and completing his ablutions, Aurangzeb would go for namaz at the mosque in the *ghuslkhana* and remain there reading the Quran till it was time for breakfast (about 9 a.m). Then he would go to the *harem* to meet ladies among near relations and proceed to the hall of justice to decide litigations according to Islamic law. From there, he would sit at the window in his bed chambers for his subjects to look at him. [206](#)

He would leave the window after about an hour and go to the *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Am*, where he would dispatch official business for an hour and a half or two hours, before going to the

*ghuslkhana*. [207](#) Around noon, he would go to the *harem* for lunch and rest. He would set out again for the mosque, just before it was time for the early afternoon namaz. He would offer namaz in the company of mullahs, maulvis and persons close to him, and then retire to the recreation room between the *ghuslkhana* and the *harem* where he would read the Quran and its commentaries till it was time to go for the late afternoon namaz. Some urgent official work was also discharged here. Occasionally, he would utilize this time to return to the *harem* where elderly ladies in the family would present before him cases of destitute women, widows and children to whom he would award relief according to the merit of each.

After the late afternoon namaz in the *ghuslkhana* mosque, he would go to the *khalwatgah* [hall exclusively used for discussing confidential matters] and, after spending about an hour there, go to the *ghuslkhana* again. Those *mansabdars* assigned to guard duty would come before Aurangzeb and offer salutations. At the *muezzin's* call for the evening namaz, he would rise from the throne and go to the mosque where he would spend about an hour.

He would then again return to the *ghuslkhana*, which would by then be illuminated by lamps of gold, to consider and decide on petitions received. After another namaz at night, he would retire to the *aramgah* (bed chambers) where he would spend a considerable part of the night in prayer. [208](#)

Shah Jahan's routine in the evening included occasional music recitations. However, Aurangzeb, perhaps because he considered activities like listening to music frivolous or because he found no leisure on account of his remarkable dedication to statecraft, had ordered that musicians like *Khush-hal Khan*, *Bisram Khan* and *Rasbeen* may attend the Imperial Court but may not render musical recitals. In time, he completely prohibited all music at the Court.

The *Khas* and *Am* sessions were not held on Wednesdays, and Aurangzeb would attend to judicial matters. Aurangzeb would sit in the *ghuslkhana* along with officials of the judiciary and do the work of deciding litigations.

The evening sessions of the Court were not convened on Thursdays. Aurangzeb would spend that time in prayer.

When a campaign, hunt or excursion occasioned the Emperor's absence from the Capital, arrangements for his stay would be made in tents. [209](#) All official work otherwise conducted in the Capital would also be discharged at places of his sojourn. A large tent would be set up to house the *Khas-Am* courts and a smaller one, for the *ghuslkhana*. [210](#) Two sets of tents for the Emperor and his noblemen would be transported, one of which would be sent ahead to be set up at the place fixed for the overnight stay of the entourage so that the camp would be ready for occupation. The other would be sent ahead to the next halt. The set sent ahead thus was called the *peshkhana*.

Some *mansabdars*, whether with the Emperor in the Capital or away with him on excursion or campaign, would need to take turns to perform guard duty around the Emperor's residential quarters. [211](#) Since the turn of each usually came once a week, this arrangement was known as the *haftchauki*.

Special occasions like *nauroz*, [212](#) and anniversary of the Emperor's coronation or his birthday, both according to the solar and lunar calendars, would be celebrated in the Imperial Court. Some *mansabdars* would be given valuable gifts and robes of honour, while others would receive promotions. The Emperor would receive tributes from the *mansabdars*. He would be weighed against gold, silver and other valuables and the proceeds would be distributed among the poor as *largesse*. [213](#)

Because *nauroz* was an *un-Islamic* observance, Aurangzeb stopped the celebration of the day from his second year as Emperor. [214](#) He continued undergoing the *tula* ceremony up to the tenth year of his reign. [215](#) In the eleventh, the *tula* was done on the occasion of his lunar birthday on 25th April 1668. [216](#) But the practice was abandoned from his solar birthday that year, i.e. from 21st October 1668. [217](#)

#### THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROVINCES

The Mughal Empire was divided into many provinces called subas. At the end of the 20th year of Shah Jahan's reign there were the following 22 subas in the Mughal Empire: [218](#) (1) Shahjahanabad (Delhi) (2) Akbarabad (Agra) (3) Lahore (Punjab) (4) Ajmer (Rajasthan) (5) Daulatabad (6) Varhad (Vidarbha, formerly Berar, capital at Achalpur, formerly Elichpur) (7) Ahmedabad (Gujarat) (8) Bengal (capital at Dhaka or Muhammadnagar) (9) Allahabad (10) Bihar (capital at Patna) (11) Malwa (capital at Ujjain) (12) Khandesh (capital at Burhanpur) (13) Awadh (Ayodhya) (14) Telangana (capital at Nanded) (15) Multan (Sindh) (16) Udissa (Odisha, Orrissa, capital at Cuttack) (17) Kabul (Afghanistan) (18) Kashmir (19) Thatta (Sindh) (20) Balkh (Northern Afghanistan) (21) Kandahar (Afghanistan) and (22) Badakhshan (Northeastern Afghanistan).

Balkh and Badakhshan are in northern Afghanistan, located between the Hindu Kush Mountains on the south and the Amu Darya River on the north. Badakhshan, in the east, was mountainous territory while Balkh, in the west, was in the plains. Both these were a part of the Bukhara Sultanate and were occupied by the Mughals, ostensibly to quell internecine feuds, in 1646. However, they were compelled to evacuate those

provinces in 1647 due to intervention by the Sultan Abdul Azeez of Bukhara. They never succeeded in recapturing them.

The Shah of Iran invested Kandahar in December 1648 and the fort commandant surrendered in February 1649. This marked the end of the Mughal possession of the Kandahar province. From 1649 to 1653 the Mughals made three unsuccessful attempts to recapture the fort.

Thus, since February 1649, there were nineteen subas in the Mughal Empire, a position that remained true till Shivaji's death.

The chief of the *Suba* was the *Subadar* or the *Sahib-i Suba*. He was generally a *mansabdar* of senior cadre and was in charge of both the civil and military administration. The incumbent was transferred every two or three years.

Sometimes one mansabdar was appointed as the subadar of more than one *suba*. For instance, Alimardan Khan was appointed subadar of Kashmir in 1638. In the following year the subadari of Punjab was also assigned to him in addition to that of Kashmir.<sup>219</sup> The four *subas* of Daulatabad, Varhad (capital at Elichpur), Khandesh (capital at Burhanpur) and Telangana (capital at Nanded), were collectively known as the Dakhkhan (Deccan). Since 1636, a very high ranking mansabdar, often a prince of the blood, came to be appointed as the overriding subadar, in addition to the four subadars, to govern the entire region of the Dakhkhan with his headquarters at Aurangabad or Daulatabad.<sup>220</sup>

The *Subadar* had his own staff, including a diwan, *bakhshi*, *diwan-i buyutat*, *darogha-i topkhana* and *sadr*. The suba was divided into areas called sarkars. Each sarkar was further divided into parganas (districts). Each pargana had a number of villages. The chief of a sarkar was called the *faujdar* and the

chief of a pargana, the thanadar. Each town had an officer called the *kotwal* (Chief of Police).

The *Subadars* and *Faujdars* sat in their halls of audience four or five hours every morning and conducted official business, such as passing orders on various matters in their jurisdiction and meeting subordinate officers.<sup>221</sup> No work was done on Fridays.<sup>222</sup> The officers reporting to them were also *mansabdars*, but of a lower cadre who would be appointed directly by the Emperor. The typical office was served by various servants such as the *muharrir* or *nawisanda* (clerk), *khazanchi* or *futadar* (treasurer), *chubdar* (mace bearer, peon), *mimar* (a builder, mason), *najjar* (carpenter), *ahangar* (blacksmith), *daftarband* (for filing away documents), *saqqa* (water carrier), *farrash* (a servant for spreading carpets etc.) and *khakrob* (sweeper). An attendance register was maintained; each member of the staff, even a menial, was required to furnish a guarantor.<sup>223</sup> Each department had *mushrifs* (inspectors). There is no record extant to tell us how many people were employed on such jobs in the Mughal Empire.

Reporters called the *waqai-nawis* were appointed in every field army, *suba*, *sarkar*, *pargana*, fort and town in order that the Emperor received intelligence from every corner of the Empire.<sup>224</sup>

They were special officers appointed to write weekly reports and send them directly to the Emperor. An officer at the court placed them, presumably a selection, before the Emperor.

<sup>225</sup> The reporters were also *mansabdars*. Sometimes both the offices of *bakhshi* and *waqai-nawis*, or all the three offices of *diwan*, *bakhshi* and *waqai-nawis* of a suba, were held by the same person.<sup>226</sup>

Their tasks were to report the movements of troops, financial transactions, market rates, ingress and egress of

important personages, the weather, crime and extraordinary or strange events.

A Portuguese missionary called *Godinho* visited Surat in January 1663 and wrote in his memoirs that a Muslim, who had been appointed there by the Emperor to keep an eye on the *Nawab* (Governor, subadar) and other officials, reported everything in such minute detail that both 'Muslims and Christians might consider them worthless'. <sup>227</sup> A sampling of what used to be reported will make interesting reading. <sup>228</sup>

Aurangabad, 31st May 1661: "The wife of Shankar, the copper seller, died of opium consumption. Khuskhu had her husband arrested and then released upon surety."

Ramgir Sarkar, 29th March 1661: "Collection in the treasury of the Ramgir Sarkar today was 177 Hons and 4.5 Annas. The officer in charge of Ramgir fort was indisposed with fever today."

Ramgir Sarkar, 3rd May 1661: "Being Friday, the office was closed today."

Dharur fort, 28th July 1661: "Today's Market prices are as listed below." (Then follow exchange rates of various currencies and the selling and purchase prices of 108 commodities.)

Dharur Fort, 9th September 1661: "Baran-i Rahmat (rain of divine mercy) poured for three hours today."

Supe Thana, 24th May 1662: "Kishan Singh, with his contingent, passed by this way to Pune."

Junnar, 19th April 1662: "Malik Ghori mansabdar died this morning."

Examples are found in Mughal records of disciplinary action taken against offenders on the basis of such reports. For instance: Jan Sipar Khan, 1000 dhat / 600 sawar, had the charge of the Jafarabad Fort. It was conveyed in the news report of *suba* Jafarabad [Telangana] that he was becoming lax in getting rockets made and that he would frequently go out of the fort for hunting deer.<sup>229</sup> Whereupon, the Emperor ordered a reduction in his *mansab* by 200 sawar, his removal from command of the fort and transfer to Khan Jahan's army. The entire incident is narrated in an official memorandum dated 31st January 1662.  
[230](#)

Besides these reporters, the Emperor also appointed secret reporters, called *khufya-nawis* (secret writer), to keep an eye on provincial administrations. They stayed in the provinces secretly and sent their reports directly to the Emperor.<sup>231</sup> An English letter dated 28th January 1664 from Surat to the Company mentions "the King's public and private intelligencers" in Surat.<sup>232</sup>

#### THE ADILSHAHI ADMINISTRATION

Mughal documents like official memos, daily diaries of office (*Siyaha-i Huzur*), newsletters and revenue accounts of *jagirs* or memoirs and travelogues of Europeans are available in comparative profusion to determine the nature of the Mughal administration. Unfortunately, however, documents which give some idea of the Adilshahi administration are scanty. Official histories of Mughal Emperors throw a floodlight of information on Mughal government. Histories of the Adilshahs are useless for any information about the Adilshahi government. Persian manuscripts like the *Ain-i Akbari*, *Khulasat-us Siyak* and various *dastur ul-amals* were written specifically to provide information about Mughal administration. No such work pertaining to the Adilshahi has come to light so far. Yet a few salient features

which could be gleaned from some Persian and Marathi documents are noticed below. [233](#) The Nizamshahi and the Qutbshahi Sultanates, too, functioned in a manner more or less similar to the Adilshahi Sultanate.

#### **ADILSHAHİ NOBLEMEN**

Like the Mughals, the Adilshahi Sultanate was also a military state. The Adilshahi army consisted of many small and large contingents. Each of these was headed by a nobleman called the wazir. [234](#) Every wazir recruited and maintained his own contingent. In return, he was given territory from which he was entitled to collect taxes as his remuneration. This type of allotment was akin to the jagir system and was called either a jagir or mukasa. [235](#)

The Mughals had an elaborate system of appointment, recruitment, promotion, transfer and remuneration. The seniority of a mansabdar in Mughal service could be discerned from his rank. One could even calculate the number of troopers in his contingent if his rank were known. No such gradation is known to have existed in Adilshahi service. But it is obvious that the maximum number of troops that any wazir could maintain was limited by the revenue yield of the territory assigned to him.

There were three ways in which one could become a wazir in the Adilshahi:

1. Sons of wazirs were usually confirmed as such. For example, the son of Afzal Khan — Fazil Afzal Khan — was also a wazir. So was Shahji's son Ekoji (Shivaji's half brother).

2. Defection from other states. Shahji, who was originally an officer in Nizamshahi service, defected to the Adilshahi Sultanate in 1625 and was made a wazir.

3. On merit. Afzal Khan was Randaula Khan's employee before he rose in the ranks and became a wazir on his own merit.

Some officers were paid directly from the treasury in the Mughal Empire. This does not seem to have been the case in the Adilshahi Sultanate, for no instance is known. Elaborate rules and regulations were observed in the Mughal Empire about various matters such as salaries, branding, periodical inspection, and the like. Nothing is known about the existence of such rules in the Adilshahi Sultanate. There were various devices — conferring khilats, titles, flags and kettledrums — for honouring mansabdars in the Mughal Empire. Examples of wazirs being honoured with flags or kettledrums are not found in the records of the Adilshahi Sultanate. The Adilshah honoured his wazirs by giving them khilats and titles. For instance, Muhammad Adilshah conferred the title Mustafa Khan on Mirza Muhammad Amin Lari and Rustum-i Zaman on Randaula Khan.<sup>236</sup>

#### **ADMINISTRATION OF PARGANAS (DISTRICTS)**

Adilshahi territory was divided into districts called parganas or muamalas.<sup>237</sup> Sometimes the fort associated with a certain area lent it its name. These parganas were further divided into subdivisions called the tarfs, qaryats, samts or tapas.<sup>238</sup> In the Mughal Empire, a number of parganas were organized into a higher administrative unit called sarkar. There was no such system in the Adilshahi Sultanate. There, the pargana or muamala was the highest administrative unit.

No source tells us the extent of the area given to wazirs as mukasas compared to the total cultivable area of the kingdom but, as in the Mughal Empire, most of it seems to have been

given out in jagirs. A powerful wazir could have two or more parganas as his mukasa. Each wazir would appoint his havaldar or sarhavaldar to oversee the administration of a pargana. A majmuadar would be appointed to assist the havaldar in book keeping. Additional staff would also be appointed if deemed necessary. However, these were not treated as employees of the Adilshah; they were but servants of the wazir. Sometimes a wazir would parcel out portions of his mukasa to officers in his contingent.

The revenue from some districts was reserved for the central administration. Cash salaries of employees who were paid directly from the treasury and the personal expenses of the Adilshah would be defrayed from the income of these districts. Such parganas were called amanat parganas. The wazir appointed by the Adilshah for the administration of an amanat pargana was also called havaldar. But there is a great difference in the status of a havaldar appointed by a wazir to administer his jagir and that of a havaldar appointed by the Adilshah to administer an amanat territory. The former was a mere servant of a wazir, the latter, a wazir in his own right.

Sometimes, border areas threatened by invasion or internal revolt were placed under one senior wazir nominated as subadar or sar subadar. In 1656-57 Muhammad Ikhlas Khan was appointed as the Subadar of Karnatak while a military campaign was in progress there.<sup>239</sup> Towards the end of 1657, Shahji wrote to the Adilshah that the territory of Karnatak had been laid waste (by insurgents) and, unless a subadar was appointed there, would be lost forever. In response, the Adilshah appointed Afzal Khan as the Subadar of Karnataka in January 1658. <sup>240</sup> In 1665, Muhammad Ikhlas Khan was appointed as the Subadar of South Konkan to prosecute a campaign against Shivaji.<sup>241</sup>

At times, a wazir would appoint one of his senior servants, as subadar or sar subadar, to oversee the administration of one or more parganas assigned to him. Again, the difference in status between the two types of subadar was wide. While one was a senior wazir appointed by the sultan himself, the other was a mere servant of a wazir.

Like the Mughal jagirs, mukasas were liable to be transferred. But, by mid-seventeenth century the frequency of transfer was quite low. Randaula Khan held the Wai Pargana as mukasa at least from 1629 to 1639. Again, Afzal Khan held it as mukasa from 1649 till his death in 1659. By the latter half of the 17th Century, mukasas began to be assigned by inheritance as well. After the death of Randaula Khan in 1644, the Wai Pargana was assigned to his son Rustum-i Zaman (the younger). Sharza Khan (Saiyid Ilyas) held the Wai Pargana as mukasa. It passed on, after his death in 1666, to his son Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan.

A few references, in fact only two, have been found in Adilshahi records of the appointment of reporters, perhaps similar to the waqai-nawis in the Mughal Empire, to report happenings in the sultanate.<sup>242</sup> There is no way of knowing how widespread and effective they were. No reference has been found of the existence of secret reporters (like the Mughal khufya-nawis) in Adilshahi records.

#### THE ADILSHAHI COURT

No details are available about the working of the royal court and the daily routine of the Adilshah. The Badshahanama and Alamgirnama include detailed descriptions of the Mughal Court and the daily routine of the Emperors. But Adilshahi court histories like the Tarikh-i Ali and the Muhammadnama do not give any such descriptions. European visitors were few and they have left little or no account.

#### **GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS**

Adilshahi records mention various departments in the administration such as Mahal-i Umur-i Mulki, (territorial administration), Mahal-i Khizana (Treasury), Mahal-i Muhasaba (Accounts), Mahal-i Teep (betel leaves), Mahal-i Tambaku (tobacco), Mahal-i imarat-i Huzur (Royal buildings) Mahal-i Ratib-i Khasa Sharifa (Royal Kitchen supplies), Mahal-i Jamadar-khana (Royal wardrobe), Mahal-i Ambarkhana (Granary) and Mahal-i Thati (cattle). But no more details are available about them.

It seems from Adilshahi records and court histories that the Adilshahi administration was entrusted in the hands of a grand wazir called the Wazir-i Hukumat. Other offices of importance were the Amir-i Jumla (chief of Revenue collection), Majlisi (councillor), Sar-i Sarnaubat (commander-in-chief), or Sarkhail-i Mamalik (chief of household cavalry). It is not clear whether these appellations indicated specific duties or were mere honorifics.

#### **OFFICIAL LANGUAGE**

The official language of the Court was Persian. All Adilshahi farmans were written in Persian; a few were bilingual, the Persian text being followed by its Marathi or Kannada translation. Correspondence between the wazir and his servants like havaldar was either in the local language (Marathi or Kannada) or, if the wazir were a Muslim, bilingual, the Persian text followed by vernacular. Correspondence on a still lower rung of administration, such as that between the havaldar and hereditary officials of villages and parganas, was entirely in the vernacular. Thus, although Persian enjoyed primacy, Marathi and to some extent Kannada, were also used in the Adilshahi administration.

Habitations in Seventeenth Century Maharashtra were generally of three categories: *mauza* (a village), *kasaba* (a large village or a town) and *shahr* (a city). A *pargana* consisted of many villages. A hamlet, a little distant from the village but regarded as part of it was called a *mazra*. The headquarters of the *pargana* was usually a *kasaba*. For instance, Pune *Pargana* had Pune as its *kasaba*, while Indapur *Pargana* had Indapur (near Pune) as its *kasaba*. Some *parganas* had more than one *kasaba*: the Wai *Pargana* had the Wai, Bavdhan and Rahimatpur *kasabas*. A *kasaba* was nothing but a bigger village with a larger number of resident craftsmen like carpenters, a blacksmiths, and others, and a main market place. The principal activity still remained farming. For example, in 1675-76, of the total land in Rahimatpur *Kasaba* about 4 per cent was utilized for residential purposes, slightly less than 1 per cent was reserved for the annual horse market, 17.25 per cent was rocky and left as pasture and the rest (more than 77 per cent) was utilized for cultivation.<sup>243</sup> In 1671, of the land in Pune *Kasaba*, about 0.64 per cent was utilized for residential purposes, less than 2 per cent was left for grazing and the rest (over 97 per cent) was under cultivation.<sup>244</sup> In 1689 in the Indapur *Kasaba*, craftsmen like goldsmiths and tailors numbered 113.<sup>245</sup>

Villages had their own system of administration. Irrespective of whether a village was under dominion of the Mughal Emperor, the Adilshah or the Nizamshah, it functioned in the traditional manner to which it had been accustomed for generations, which was more or less uniform throughout Maharashtra.<sup>246</sup>

### ***The Kuls and Balute***

Villages were mostly populated by farmers. They were called *kul*, *kulwadi*, *kunbi*, *praj* or *mujeri*.<sup>247</sup> Craftsmen like carpenters, blacksmiths, cobblers, potters, barbers and others were called the *balute*. They rendered service to the farmers for the entire year and were paid in farm produce. The rate of this remuneration varied from trade to trade and village to village. Tradition dictated the amount of grain to be paid every year. The payment made to a *balute* was also called *balute*. In a village named *Khor* in Pune *Pargana*, one *maund* of grain was paid as *balute* for every *khandi* of yield, i.e. 5 per cent.<sup>248</sup> This was, of course, for all the craftsmen in the village put together.

Craftsmen of all trades were not always available in a single village; that depended on its size. Each *balute* was a caste, and people from one caste were not permitted to ply the trade of another. One desiring to become a barber, therefore, could only become one if he was born in the barber caste; nor was one born in a certain community allowed to ply any trade other than his hereditary occupation.

It was not necessary that there could only be one craftsman of a type in a village; increasing progeny could also set up shop, in which case the annual payment would get divided among the clan. Outsiders were not allowed to settle and practice their trade in the village. Such a hereditary rights structure was called the *miras* and holders of that right, the *mirasdars*. If more than one practitioner of a trade lived in the village, the eldest of the senior branch of the clan was regarded as its chief and was known as the *mehtar*. Such *mehtar* had his privileges, mostly honourific in nature.

### *Patil, Chaugula, Kulkarni and Mahar*

The hereditary chief of the village was called the *patil* or the *mokadam*. He was in charge of tax collection. The chief source of revenue was levy on agricultural produce. About 33 to

50 per cent of the yield was payable as tax in cash or kind. The farmer's actual earnings were the residue of farm produce that remained after this tax, other minor impositions and the *balute* were discharged. The *patil*'s job was to ensure that maximum land was brought under cultivation and, when the produce matured, charge tax on it. In the event that famine, drought, floods or war caused the clans to flee the village, the *patil* was responsible for ensuring their return. Where no *kuls* or families to till the land were available, he could bring people from outside and assign them land for cultivation. If the expected revenues did not materialize, the *patil* had to borrow or make good the deficit from his pocket or even face imprisonment. The *patil* was assisted by the *kulkarni* in maintaining accounts, by the *chaugula* in actual collection and by the *mahar* as the village guard. As remuneration for their services, the *patil*, the *chaugula* and the *mahar* were assigned tax-free lands.<sup>249</sup> Besides, they received various articles from village craftsmen: footwear from the cobbler, earthen pots from the potter or services from others like the carpenter and the barber. The *kulkarni* usually received grain from the farmers and, in some villages, was assigned tax-free land as well. The *mahar* was also included among the *balute*. So he too received grain from the farmers. The *patil* also enjoyed some ceremonial rights, such as primacy in public events.

### ***Deshmukh and Deshkulkarni***

The same work which the *patil* and *kulkarni* discharged in the village was performed by the *deshmukh* and the *deshkulkarni* at the level of the *pargana*.<sup>250</sup> The *deshmukh*'s tasks included bringing more and more land under cultivation and collecting taxes. He was assisted in this work by the *deshkulkarni* who maintained accounts. A letter sent by Afzal Khan on 18th October 1656 to Malharji Deshmukh and Mahadji Deshkulkarni of the Shirval *Pargana*, giving them instructions

on their duties and reprimanding them, is extant. It identifies these duties very clearly. A rough translation is as follows: [251](#)

“Ever since this area (*pargana*) was given to me, I have ensured that no injustice was done or trouble given to you. Why has the area not prospered despite this? It is your duty as deshmukh to ensure that no land is left uncultivated and barren lands are also brought under cultivation by granting concession of *istiwa*. To ensure growth in revenue every year is your responsibility. This being so, why are you sitting idle? Why do you take your share? You should ensure that you give your lord and master his dues before taking your share. Now satisfy the farmers in every way and bring the land under the plough. Ensure that not a digit of land is left barren.”

As an incentive to bring more land under cultivation, a concession in tax, called the *istiwa*, was granted for land newly brought under the plough. [252](#) The tax assessment on such land would gradually be increased each year till it reached the normal figure in five or six years.

Though the primary task of the *deshmukh* was tax collection, he also employed armed men and was expected to serve in military campaigns along with them. As remuneration for his services, he was assigned the grant of one or more villages in the *pargana*. This meant that he had the right to receive the taxes leviable on them. In addition, he enjoyed the grant of some land in every village in the *pargana* and received some cash and grain from each. The craftsmen in every village contributed some service or item of their craft to him. Similar remuneration was also given to the *deshkulkarni*. Though this practice was uniform in essence, there were no fixed norms or quantification of standards applicable throughout Maharashtra for payment to the deshmukh or *deshkulkarni*. These varied from place to place; tradition dictated and superseded norms.

## ***Watandars***

*Watan* is Arabic for homeland, one's own land or motherland. In Marathi, the word was used in the sense of hereditary office. The *watandar* was holder of such a *watan* or hereditary office. The *patil*, *chaugula*, *kulkarni* and *mahar* were *watandars* of the village and the *deshmukhs* and *deshklakarnis* were *watandars* of the *pargana*. Like any other property, a *watan* passed to the eldest son or was divided among sons of the *watandar*. The *watan* could also be mortgaged against loan of money, or sold fully or partially. It was not necessary for the *watandar* himself to perform the duties associated with the *watan*. A representative (called *mutalik*, *gumashta* or *yardi*) could be appointed to act for and on behalf of the *watandar* in his absence. This made it possible for a *watandar* to obtain more than one *watan* and yet conduct all necessary transactions through proxies. Vitthal Kaydeo was the *deshkulkarni* of the Shirval *Pargana* and simultaneously also the *kulkarni* of all the 40 villages in that *pargana*. [253](#)Vinayakbhat Thakar was the *kulkarni* and astrologer of 10 villages in the Pune *Pargana*. [254](#) Kanhoji Jedhe was the *deshmukh* of the tarf of Bhor in Rohidkhore and also the *patil* of Velang village in the Wai *Pargana*.[255](#)

The *mahar* of the village always belonged to the *mahar* caste. The *chaugulas* were usually *Marathas* but it was not a necessary condition. The *chaugula* of Walhe in the Pune *Pargana* was a Thakur by caste while the *chaugula* of Koregaon Tadvale in Wai *Pargana* was a *Wani* (grain seller) by caste.[256](#) The *kulkarni* was usually a Brahmin or Prabhu by caste. The *patil* or *mokadam* was usually a Maratha. But any person, irrespective of caste or creed, could become a *patil*. In the Supe *Pargana* the *mokadami* of a village was equally divided between a Maratha, a Brahmin and a Dhangar (shepherd). [257](#) The

*mokadam* of Nagewadi village in the *Wai Pargana* was a mahar.

[258](#)The *mokdam* of Katraj village in the *Pune Pargana* was a Muslim. [259](#) The *deshkulakarnis* were usually Brahmins or Prabhus. The *deshmukhs* were usually Maratha by caste but any one regardless of caste or creed could become a *deshmukh*.

The *watandar* was the link between the government and the people for collection of taxes. The *deshmukh* would collect taxes and pay them to the *havaldar* – whether appointed by the sultan or the *mukasdar* (holder of a *mukasa*). Since the *deshmukhs* and other junior *watandars* were permanent, the *wazir* who held the *pargana* as his *mukasa* was not required to create his own organization for the collection of revenue. He merely needed to send a representative as *havaldar* with a small staff to the headquarters of that *pargana*. The *havaldar* would get the work of revenue collection done through the *deshmukh*. Even if the governing power changed owing to military campaigns or treaties involving transfer of territories from one kingdom to another, the *watandars* remained the same. The new rulers continued the work of revenue collection through them. Thus, *watandars* were scarcely bothered about who the ruler was. Whatever happened, they remained at their posts and collected their dues. Their daily routine did not change.

Since the *watans* were hereditary, they were also subject to sub-division among heirs. Family feuds were also very much a part of routine and even bloodshed and murder were not uncommon. Even noblemen realized the stability of *watandars* and would exert to hold on to some *watan* or the other. Using their influence with the central power, they would also try and gain more *watans* for themselves. *Jagirs* (or *mukasas*) were transferable, *watans* were not.

### ***Naikwadi***

In addition to the watandars cited above, there was one more category of watandar called the naikwadi, employed for police duty, at the headquarters of the pargana. The small band of armed men which they maintained was called a jatha.<sup>260</sup> As remuneration for their services, naikwadis were paid either in cash or by assignment of land. The naikwadi too was a watandar and the position remained with the family from generation to generation. In the Pune Pargana, the Jachaks, Kanades and Babars were the three naikwadis and maintained a total of 116 men in their jathas.<sup>128</sup>

### *Qazi*

The *qazi* was a magistrate who dispensed justice according to Muslim law. He was also a *watandar* of the *pargana*, with the proviso that only Muslims were eligible to become *qazis*. The *qazis* were authorized to notarize copies of original documents. Some land or annuity was given to the *qazi* as remuneration for his services.

### *The Got, the Mahzar and the Judicial System*

Any dispute about *watans* or boundaries of villages would be decided in a congregation of the *got*.<sup>261</sup> Normally, the *havaldar* and his subordinate officials in the *pargana* like the *deshmukh*, the *deshkulkarni* and some other *watandars* attended these got congregations. Sometimes, the mokadams of some villages in the *pargana* and *deshmukhs* of neighbouring *parganas* were also present at such congregations. At times, the *balute* too attended.

There was no restriction on the religion of members of the congregation. In some cases, which were rare, a woman, who would be actively looking after the affairs of a *watan*, could also attend. There was no requirement of a quorum. Sometimes less

than 20 and at others more than 100 are known to have attended. The decisions given were based on local customs and Hindu scriptures. Both contending parties were given an opportunity to present their statements in writing. Letters of Assurance that the decision of the got would be accepted, and written guarantees to ensure compliance, were taken in advance from the parties to the dispute. Testimonies were recorded, documents presented in evidence were examined, arguments heard and, if need be, written corroboration of evidence was also sought. Sometimes, if there was no evidence or if one of the parties insisted, ordeals were also resorted to. Though the proceedings were conducted before the gathering, the decision was taken by only a few of the seniors. The rest had no say in the matter. It is possible that the presence of a large gathering brought some pressure on the decision makers to be just and fair in their decree. If one party so demanded, the suit was transferred to some other got acceptable to both parties. After the decision was given, the proceedings including the date, place, names of contestants, names of persons present in the congregation, issues of dispute, statements of both parties, evidence presented, the result of ordeal if performed, and the given ruling, were all written down. This recording was called the *mahzar*. Quite often, the *qazi's* name would appear at the top of the *mahzar*, along with that of the *havaldar*. But no special powers were given to him. Also, his attendance does not seem to have been compulsory.

Cases referred to the got could often be those involving assault or even murder. However, it appears that the crime, per se, remained outside the purview of the got. The only matters deliberated were the title of a watan, its lawful division among heirs or claimants, the rightful boundaries between two villages, and the like. No punishments, except sometimes a small fine, were meted out. Arriving at a compromise solution, more than doing justice seems to have been the object of most gots. Moreover, since there was no machinery for implementing and enforcing the decision of a got, either party to a dispute

could ignore the verdict. There are some instances of disputes being protracted for years together and repeatedly brought before successive gots, sometimes for generations. This was the system that was functioning in the regions of Maharashtra that were ruled by the Adilshah. In those under Mughal rule, it seems that a parallel judicial system was functioning in addition to the got.<sup>262</sup>

Redress of a grievance was not the only purpose of the congregation of the got; these congregations were also utilized as witnesses for important events, or agreements and transactions. The record of the minutes, in the form of a *mahzar* could later be used as proof if required. A sale of property or loan against a watan could also be brought before the got. The fact of the loss of original papers of a watan or their destruction by fire would be stated before a got and recorded to obviate prospective difficulty in establishing one's right and title.

### ***Inams (Grants)***

Details of the total land appertaining to a village and its revenue assessment are found recorded in old land records. Land was classified as *bagait* (irrigated) or *zirait* (non-irrigated, dependant on rainfall). Both types were further classified as *inam* land (revenue on which was not taxed) and *khalisa* land (on which tax was leviable). Details are also to be found of how much of the inam land was awarded to which *inamdar* (holders of inams). There was no rule or uniformity about how much of the total land would be awarded as *inam*. Commonly, some of the inam land was given to *watandars* like the *mokadam* or *patil* or the *mahar* and others as remuneration for services they rendered to the government, while some was awarded to other persons as a hereditary entitlement for various reasons. The *inam* granted to a *watandar* was remuneration for the services he rendered to the government. Other *inamdars*, such as hereditary servants of mosques or temples, Hindu or Muslim holy men and physicians, were not required to perform any

service to the government in exchange. Also to be found are a few instances of inams granted for heroism in war.

It was not necessary for the inamdar to till the land himself and it was quite often leased out to someone else for a share in the produce.

*Inams* were not necessarily in the form of land; they could also be given as hereditary entitlement to cash or kind. Principal monks of monasteries, priests and other employees of temples or mosques, or Brahmins engaged in the study of the *Vedas* and other scriptures could be given an annuity in cash, grains or oil for lighting purposes from the revenue of the *pargana*.

*Inams* were usually given by an order of the *mukasdar* who could be changed or transferred by the administration. In the event of such change, officials employed by the previous incumbent would also be replaced by those of the new one. When this happened, all holders of such *inams*, other than *watandars*, needed to approach the new *mukasdar* for renewal of their respective grants. Such letter of renewal was called a *khurdkhhat*. If, for any reason like war or a pilgrimage undertaken by the inamdar, a discontinuity occurred in his enjoyment of the *inam*, or even if for no apparent reason the officials of the *mukasdars* so demanded, such letters had to be solicited again.

Sometimes a new *mukasdar* would issue a blanket order confiscating all inams.<sup>263</sup> Then all *inamdars* under his jurisdiction were required to bring *khurdkhats* from the *mukasdar*. Shahji had issued such an order in 1650 for all inams in the Pune *Pargana*.<sup>264</sup> Afzal Khan, too, had confiscated all inams in the Wai *Pargana* once during 1653 and again in 1657-58.<sup>265</sup> Sometimes, an original inam was reduced at the time of granting restoration after such confiscation. Nevertheless, it is

generally seen that the new *mukasdar* normally continued established arrangements and allocations made by previous incumbents.

#### ASSESSMENT AND REALIZATION OF TAXES IN THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE ADILSHAHİ SULTANATE

Tax on agriculture was the only major source of revenue for the State in 17th Century India. The two prevalent systems of tax assessment were the *batai* and *bighawani* (the latter, also sometimes called the *katuban*).

In the *batai* system, a certain portion of the produce, determined after assessing the quality of land and inspecting the standing crop per *bigha* (a unit of area), had to be paid in taxes.<sup>266</sup> The taxes were realized in cash or kind. The share of the government was known in Marathi as the *rajbhag* while that of the farmer, the *prajbhag*.

The *bighawani*, on the other hand, levied a tax in cash or kind at flat rates determined by the quality of land.<sup>267</sup> Both the *batai* and *bighawani* systems were applied to seasonal yield crops, but perennial yields only attracted the *bighawani*.

No uniform system existed in the Mughal Empire for assessment of taxation. The rates, too, were not uniform. But in most cases, tax was collected in cash. It can be said that, for prime quality non-irrigational land, about 50% of the produce was payable as tax.<sup>268</sup>

The *Adilshahi* had no fixed system of tax collection. In some places it was in cash, in others partly in cash and partly in kind.<sup>269</sup> There are no sources to tell us what proportion was collected as tax, but it appears that, like that in Mughal territories, it worked out to around 50 per cent.

Tax on agriculture was not calculated individually but was levied on the entire village, the *mokadam* being responsible for collection and remittance. Every year the *mokadam* met the *havaldar* through the mediation of the *deshmukh* and *deshkulkarni*, and lamenting about the plight of the farmers due to famine, pestilence or devastation caused by the passage of armies, tried to obtain some concession in tax. After negotiations, an amount was decided for which he gave a written assurance called the *qabul-katba*. [270](#)

If conditions became too unbearable due to famine, drought, floods, war, or exploitation by officials, the farmers of an entire village would resort to migration. Land was plentiful and the population scanty. Large tracts of uncultivated land were to be found everywhere; it was not difficult to obtain a piece of land for cultivation. The *mukasdar* would therefore try to conciliate the disaffected farmers by giving them assurance of fair treatment or some concession in taxes and bring them back to till the land. [271](#) But it was never easy to bring uncultivated land under the plough; therefore, unless driven to extremities, farmers did not resort to migration.

The *Badshahnama* says at the end of its account of the first twenty years of Shah Jahan's reign (i.e. in 1647-48) that the *jama* (revenue potential) of the Mughal Empire was 8800 million dams (i.e. Rs.220 million) per year. [272](#) Even after deducting the revenue of Rs.4.5 million from the provinces of Balkh and Badakshan which had to be evacuated, and Kandahar which was captured by the Shah of Iran, the *jama* would still have been about Rs.215.5 million. According to *Mirat-i Alam* the *jama* of the Empire was 9,241,716,082 dams (i.e. about Rs. 231 million) in the tenth year of Aurangzeb's reign. [273](#) Since these figures are fairly comparable with one another, the annual *jama* of the Mughal Empire between 1650 and 1680 can be said to have been around Rs.220 million. The actual collection or hasil

is not known but it can be assumed at around Rs.120 million.

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Statistics for the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates for this period are not available or accurately deducible.

#### MISERY OF THE POPULATION UNDER MUGHAL RULE

Some European accounts provide information in profuse detail about the pitiable condition of the Indian population under Mughal rule. These narratives, notes and musings are here fairly extensively reproduced since they are eye witness accounts describing the unthinkable suffering of the people.

Francisco Pelsaert, who was employed with the Agra factory of the Dutch East India Company between 1621 and 1627, writes:

“The land would give a plentiful, or even an extraordinary yield, if the peasants were not so cruelly and pitilessly oppressed; for villages which, owing to some small shortage of produce, are unable to pay the full amount of the revenue-farm, are made prize, so to speak, by their masters or governors, and wives and children sold, on the pretext of a charge of rebellion... Some peasants abscond to escape their tyranny, and take refuge with rajas who are in rebellion, and consequently the fields lie empty and unsown, and grow into wilderness. Such oppression is exceedingly prevalent in this country.” 275

“... The provinces are so impoverished that a jagir [assignment of revenue] which is reckoned to be worth 50,000 rupees, may sometimes not yield even 25,[000], although so much is wrung from the peasants, that even dry bread is scarcely left to fill their stomachs. . . .but they [the lords] spend great

sums on an extravagant display of elephants, horses, and servants, so that they ride out more like kings than subjects..."<sup>276</sup>

"I have often ventured to ask great lords what is their true object in being so eager to amass their treasures . . . Their answers have been based on the emptiest worldly vanity, for they say that it is a very great and imperishable reputation if it is generally known, or the official records show, that such a man has left an estate worth so much. In reply I have urged that it would be possible to win a greater reputation for time and eternity, if . . . they would share it with the poor, who in this country are in hundreds of thousands, or indeed innumerable, and would banish outside their doors all oppression, injustice, excessive pomp, chicanery, and similar practices, whereby they have nothing to hope for in the future, but very much to fear. [When I have urged such arguments], they have closed the discussion by saying that it is just the custom of the country."<sup>277</sup>

"As regards the laws, they are scarcely observed at all, for the administration is absolutely autocratic, but there are books of law, which are in charge of their lawyers, the *Kazis*. Their laws contain such provisions as hand for hand, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; but who will excommunicate the Pope? And who would dare to ask a Governor 'Why do you rule us this way or that way? Our law orders thus.' The facts are very different, although in every city there is a *kachhahri*, or royal court of justice, where the *Governor*, the *Diwan*, the *Bakhshi*, the *Kotwal*, the *Kazi*, and other officers sit together daily, or four days in the week. Here all disputes are disposed of, but not until avarice had had its share. All capital cases, such as thefts,

murders, or crimes are finally disposed of by the Governor, if the criminals are poor and unable to pay, and the sweepers drag them out to execution with very little ceremony. In the case of other offences the criminals are seldom or never executed; their property is merely confiscated for the Governor and the *Kotwal*. Ordinary questions of divorce, quarrels, fights, threats, and the like, are in the hands of the *Kotwal* and the *Kazi*. One must indeed be sorry for the man who has come to judgment before these godless ‘un-judges’; their eyes are bleared with greed, their mouths gape like wolves for covetousness, and their bellies hunger for the bread of the poor ; everyone stands with hands open to receive, for no mercy or compassion can be had except on payment of cash. This fault should not be attributed to judges or officers alone, for the evil is a universal plague; from the least to the greatest, right up to the King himself, everyone is infected with insatiable greed, so that if one has any business to transact with Governors or in palaces. . . without presents he need expect very little answer to his petitions.”<sup>278</sup>

The French physician, François Bernier, spent the years between 1658 and 1667 in India during which time he travelled extensively all over the Mughal Empire. This is what he says about the sorry plight of the people:

“Of the vast tracts of country constituting the empire of Hindoustan, many are little more than sand, or barren mountains, badly cultivated, and thinly populated; and even a considerable portion of the good land remains untilled for want of labourers; many of whom perish in consequence of the bad treatment they experience from the Governors. The poor people, when incapable of discharging the demands of their rapacious lords, are not only often

deprived of the means of subsistence, but are bereft of their children, who are carried away as slaves. Thus it happens that many of the peasantry, driven to despair by so execrable a tyranny, abandon the country, and seek a more tolerable mode of existence, either in the towns, or camps; as bearers of burdens, carriers of water, or servants to horsemen. Sometimes they fly to the territories of a Raja, because there they find less oppression, and are allowed a greater degree of comfort.”<sup>279</sup>

“We have seen how in the Indies the gold and silver disappear in consequence of the tyranny of Timariots,<sup>280</sup> Governors, and Revenue contractors – a tyranny which even the monarch, if so disposed, has no means of controlling in provinces not contiguous to his capital – a tyranny often so excessive as to deprive the peasant and the artisan of the necessities of life, and leave them to die of misery and exhaustion – a tyranny owing to which those wretched people either have no children at all, or have them only to endure the agonies of starvation, and to die at a tender age – a tyranny, in fine, that drives the cultivator of the soil from his wretched home to some neighbouring state, in hopes of finding milder treatment, or to the army, where he becomes the servant of some trooper. As the ground is seldom tilled otherwise than by compulsion, and as no person is found willing and able to repair the ditches and canals for the conveyance of water, it happens that the whole country is badly cultivated, and a great part rendered unproductive from the want of irrigation. The houses, too, are left in a dilapidated condition, there being few people who will either build new ones, or repair those which are tumbling down. The peasant cannot avoid asking himself this question :

'Why should I toil for a tyrant who may come tomorrow and lay his rapacious hands upon all I possess and value, without leaving me , if such should be his humour, the means to drag on my miserable existence ?'— The *Timariots*, *Governors*, and Revenue contractors, on their part reason in this manner: 'Why should the neglected state of this land create uneasiness in our minds? and why should we expend our own money and time to render it fruitful? We may be deprived of it in a single moment, and our exertions would benefit neither ourselves nor our children. Let us draw from the soil all the money we can, though the peasant should starve or abscond, and we should leave it, when commanded to quit, a dreary wilderness.'<sup>281</sup>

Then he adds:

"The country is ruined by the necessity of defraying the enormous charges required to maintain the splendour of a numerous court, and to pay a large army maintained for the purpose of keeping the people in subjection. No adequate idea can be conveyed of the sufferings of that people. The cudgel and the whip compel them to incessant labour for the benefit of others; and driven to despair by every kind of cruel treatment, their revolt or their flight is only prevented by the presence of a military force."<sup>282</sup>

It seems that the condition of the population subject to Adilshahi rule was less terrible, but only slightly so, compared with that under the Mughals. However, things were bad all the same. Writing from Vengurle on 25th July 1664 to the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, Pieter van Santvliet says:<sup>283</sup>

“The King [i.e. the Adilshah], lords and the governors. The latter represent and replace the lords in towns, villages and hamlets. The office of governor is often let on lease by the lords for want of money, because they have no capital. This system does not work well, as it gives rise to abuses, extortion and grinding down of the population. The King favours a lord by means of *farmans* with large territories of which the revenue is reserved for him in exchange for some services. His office is not a hereditary one, but a mere favour on the part of the King. Some lords practically conduct themselves as if they were independent. . . . Each takes the appearance of being a king, and after having committed diverse crimes by robbing, murdering, burning and devastating the land to their hearts' content they appear at court, where they are praised for being brave soldiers, if they know how to oil His Majesty's palm.”

The Qutbshahi was no different. William Methwold, chief of the English factory on the Coromandel Coast from 1618 to 1622, writes about his experiences: [284](#)

“His [i.e. the Qutbshah's] ...huge treasure arises from the large extent of his dominions, his subjects being all his tenants, and at a rack-rent: for this King [i.e. the Qutbshah], as all others in India, is the only free-holder of the whole country, which being divided into great governments, as our shires, those again into lesser ones as our hundreds, and those into villages, the government is farmed immediately from the King by some eminent man, who to other inferiors farms out the lesser ones, and they again to the country people, at such excessive rates, that it is most lamentable to consider what toil and misery the wretched souls endure. For if they fall short of any part of their rent, what their estates [means] cannot

satisfy, their bodies must; so it sometimes happens, they are beaten to death, or, absenting themselves, their wives, children, fathers, brothers and all their kindred are engaged in the debt, and must satisfy or suffer. And sometimes it happens that the principal [governor], failing with the King, receives from him the like punishment, as it befell to one Bhujbalrao (governor at Machilipatnam since the English traded thither), who for defect of full payment was beaten with canes upon the back, feet, and belly until he died. Yet hold they not these their governments by lease, for yearly in July all are exposed in sale unto him that bids most: from whence it happens that very governor (during his time) exacts by tolls taken in the way, and other oppressions, whatsoever they can possibly extort from the poorer inhabitants, using what violence within their governments they shall think fit; for in them (during their time) they reign as petty kings, not much unlike the pashas under the Turkish monarchy."

#### PEOPLE'S UPRISINGS

When unable to bear it in silence, people rose up in revolt against such extreme oppression, although it was impossible for them to successfully attack Mughal military forces or forts and overthrow their regime in order to establish political independence. Indeed, it would even seem that the very thought of doing so had hardly, if ever, occurred to the wretched population. The only measure within the grasp of 'rebellious' groups among the persecuted population was to exact levies from caravans of goods passing through their territory. As a result, bands of men (to whom Peter Mundy refers as 'thieves' and 'dacoits') roving the countryside had become commonplace. When some of these fell into the hands of the Mughal army, they would be tortured to death, their wives and children sold into slavery and their habitations

burned to the ground. However, despite these harsh measures the incidence persisted and large armies had to be assembled to curb the menace. In one such expedition, a force comprising as much as 12,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry had to be mobilized, which makes it plain that the insurgents could hardly be called common highwaymen. It is true that they were disunited and undisciplined, they lacked good leaders, their efforts were without unity of direction and their uprisings appeared like banditry. But it is also true that they resorted to these measures only when oppression became unbearable and their backs were against the wall.

No mention of these disturbances is ordinarily found in contemporaneous Persian sources and even when it is, it is only fleeting.<sup>285</sup> This is perhaps because these insurrections were so common that they were viewed by chroniclers as unworthy of special notice. Nevertheless, some contemporaneous European accounts do take serious note. For example, Pelsaert writes:<sup>286</sup>

“If all these countries [in the Mughal Empire] were justly or rationally governed, they would not only yield an incalculable income, but would enable him [Jahangir] to conquer all the neighbouring kingdoms. But it is important to recognize also that he is to be regarded as King of the plains or the open roads only; for in many places you can travel only with a strong body of men, or on payment of heavy tolls to rebels. The whole country is enclosed and broken up by many mountains, and the people who live in, on, or beyond, the mountains know nothing of any king, or of Jahangir; they recognize only their Rajas, who are very numerous, and to whom the country is apportioned in many small fragments by old tradition. Jahangir, whose name implies that he grasps the whole world, must therefore be regarded as ruling no more than half the dominions which he

claims, since there are nearly as many rebels as subjects. Taking the chief cities for example, at Surat the forces of Raja Piepel<sup>287</sup> come pillaging up to, or inside, the city, murdering the people, and burning the villages; and in the same way, near Ahmedabad, Burhanpur, Agra, Delhi, Lahore, and many other cities, thieves and robbers come in force by night or day like open enemies. The Governors are usually bribed by the thieves to remain inactive, for avarice dominates manly honour, and, instead of maintaining troops, they fill and adorn their mahals [palaces] with beautiful women, and seem to have the pleasure-house of the whole world within their walls."

Peter Mundy, an employee of the East India Company who stayed in a place called Koil between 20th and 24th December 1631 during his journey from Agra to Karnabas <sup>288</sup> on the Ganga River, records in his diary: <sup>289</sup>

"One day (my business permitting me) I went to take the air about the town [named Koil], and at one side thereof were many minars [towers] or little turrets with many men's heads round about it, made into mortar. It is built of purpose, in form like a pigeon house, not exceeding 3 or 4 yards in height and so many more in compass. <sup>290</sup> These heads were of certain thieves lately taken by the faujdar of this government, Taj Khan. Their bodies were hung up by the heels in a grove of Mango trees, and by which we also passed through. Of these thieves so lately taken, some were roasted alive, and the rest their heads cut off; also about the town were many of their bodies on stakes. Minars are commonly near the great cities.

“ A *faujdar* is a captain of 2 or 3000 horse with 5 or 6000 foot, more or less according to the place where he is sent, appointed of purpose to keep that part of the country quiet, there being a governor besides ordinarily; but this man held both places, having his maintenance from the labourers who are generally Hindus, whom they call *ganwars* [villagers], using them as the Turks do the poor Christians that live under his tyranny (in some parts), taking from them all they can get by their labour, leaving them nothing but their bad mud walled ill thatched covered houses, and a few cattle to till the ground besides other miseries. [291](#) For thieves that forage over this part of the country do many time belong to some strong place afar off, taking their lodgings in these poor villages (which they [the villagers] durst not contradict nor cannot prevent), from whence they make their sallies on passengers. News hereof cometh to the *faujdar*, who makes to the place with his *lashkar* [army], and without resistance kills most of the men. The rest, with women and children, are carried away and sold for slaves. Otherwhile the people of a whole town are removed to another afar off, and the people of that town to this again. This happens sometimes to those that are innocent; but for the most part the towns themselves are not without store of *thievish Gacoares*. [292](#) Here now are in this castle about 200 of them prisoners, because they cannot pay the tax imposed on them, which heretofore was paid when their corn was sold; but now they must pay for it in the ground. This is the life of the Hindus or naturals of Hindostan etc. [and other] parts of India under the subjection of the Mogol hereaways.”

Mundy traveled from Agra to Patna in 1632. In his narrative of that journey he writes:[293](#)

“The 17th August 1632. From Bhogani ki Sarai we came to this place (Shankar ki Sarai, 6 kos [from the previous place of halt]),...

“From Bakewar hither were about 200 minars, with heads mortared and plastered in, leaving out nothing but their very face, some 30, some 40, some more some less. This was Abdullah Khan’s exploit (who is now governor of Patna), by the king’s order. For this way was so pestered with rebels and thieves, that there was no passing, so that the King sent Abdullah Khan with 12,000 horse and 20,000 foot to suppress them, who destroyed all their towns, took all their goods, their wives and children for slaves, and the chiefest of their men, causing their heads to be cut off and to be immortered as before [depicted].”[294](#)

“The 28th August 1632. We came to this place (Bara Mahal ki Sarai, 8 kos [from the previous place of halt]) and lay at the end of the town. In the morning we passed by Saif Khan’s lashkar [army] which he hath provided and is still making more force, and for this occasion. About one month since, Mirza Yahya, Saif Khan’s son, was coming from Patna, and passing through Ahu Mahal ki Sarai, some of his followers seized on some of the town’s people, carrying them away prisoners, there having a robbery been committed thereabouts and the goods found in that town. These prisoners they carried through Bhadohi, a great place which hath this under it and many others, who seeing their fellows led prisoners, fell together by the ears with Mirza’s people, so that there were many of them slain. To revenge that injury is

Saif Khan making preparation. It is said the rebels are very strong and will fight it out, and about 10 days hence the lashkar may set forward. Yesterday in the castle we saw his commissioners entertaining more soldiers, both horse and foot.” [295](#)

“The 1st September 1632. About 10 o'clock we came to this place (Baboo ki Sarai). In this sarai was a theft committed on Mirza Yahya's people. The stolen goods was [sic] carried to Ahu Mahal ki Sarai, and sold there. A certain karori [a tax collector] of Mirza's, passing through it, saw the goods and apprehended 7 Hindus, carrying them away with him to Bhadohi, where Saif Khan has a castle, into which they were put. Upon this they fell by the ears, wherein there were 200 of Saif Khan's people slain and 2 Mughalanis or Moor women taken, whom they restored, desiring also to have back their Banias [Hindu merchants], which being denied them, they have besieged the castle, wherein they say are 2000 horsemen of Saif Khan's people, and he himself (as before mentioned) is making forces, as well to raise the siege as to revenge the wrong and affront done him and his son.

“This part is under a Raja, who holds it of the King, the people Rajputs and Brahmans, their town consisting of poor low houses, which on a small occasion they fire and, running to the woods and deserts, where they are hard to be found out. Their arms: swords and bucklers, with extraordinary long bows of above 6 foot, and broad headed cutting arrows, a people tall and strong to see to, appareled, as is before mentioned. [296](#) They neither regard the king nor his laws very much.” [297](#)

“The 11th September 1632. About 3 hours before day we parted from Khurramabad, and near midnight following were came to this place (Sasaram, 6 kos). All by reason of some miry passages . . . This place lay almost at the corner of the high land before spoken of, which is a mere wilderness overgrown with bushes.

The inhabitants rebel against the Raja thereof. [298](#)  
They say that Abdullah Khan is preparing to bring [them] to obedience perforce.” [299](#)

Mundy commenced his return journey to Agra in November 1632. Some entries in his diary are as follows:

“The 27th and 28th November 1632. Some 2 kos from Khwaja ki Sarai (6 kos), we met great droves of kine and buffaloes, in number about 700, taken from the ganwars [villagers] hereabouts by the son of Mirza Manuchihr, who yesterday being in fight with them, had 7 horsemen slain and 20 other hurt, meeting some of them in our way ([to] Khajura ki Sarai, 10 kos). Of this kind of broils, there is perpetually in one part or other of India, but most commonly the ganwars go to the worst, though they may be able to stand out a while.

“The 29th November 1632. On the way hither (Mogol ki Sarai, 7 kos) we met with Naubat Khan, who was going against the ganwars in Darbhanga about Patna.” [300](#)

“The 5th December 1632. In our way we passed through Anhoomahal ki Sarai, and hard by the place where we lay at our coming (Jagadish ki Sarai, 8 kos), Saif Khan had made a little fort of earth, wherein were set certain soldiers to secure that passage. Many

towns hereabouts destroyed; the inhabitants fled at his approach.”<sup>301</sup>

“The 7th December 1632. Near this place (Jhusi, 9 kos), on the mango trees, Saif Khan had caused 50 or 60 men’s heads to be hung up by a string run through their noses, having compounded with the Raja of Bhadohi for 200000 rupees. Other Rajas there be that have not submitted as yet, with whom having concluded, he will return to Allahabad.”<sup>302</sup>

“The 19th December 1632. (Bakewar, 19 kos). To the minars of dead men’s heads made by Abdullah Khan are added since our coming this way by Farzand Khan about 60 more with 35 or 40 heads a piece, lately killed.

“The 20th December 1632. (Ahirbans ki Sarai). Near Etawa there was a new minar amaking with a great heap of heads lying by them, ready to be immortared.”<sup>303</sup>

Mundy travelled from Agra to Surat in 1633 along with a large caravan. The notes in his diary about this journey say:

“The 28th February 1633. We came to this town (Bayana, 6 kos), between which and Fatehpurn<sup>304</sup> were about 250 or 300 men set on stakes by Mirza Lashkar, Governor here, being of rebels and thieves by him taken, this way heretofore being much pestered with them and very dangerous for passengers.”<sup>305</sup>

“The 26th April 1633. (Pansar,<sup>306</sup> 7 kos) ... [We saw] men staked by the highway by Baqir Khan.”<sup>307</sup>

## **PERSECUTION OF HINDUS UNDER MUSLIM RULE**

Muslims have always been a minority in India despite increase in their numbers by natural procreation, conversion and immigration. As such, they were forced to rely upon co-operation of their Hindu subjects in order to continue ruling the land. Moreover, ethnic and factional differences also existed among them. Just as Muslims warred against Hindu states, they were also almost always in conflict with other Muslim states, which entailed maintenance of large armies. It was owing to this need that Hindus gained employment in the civil and military administrations of Muslim states. These conditions have been described by Bernier, who says: [308](#)

“The Great mogul is a Mahometan of the sect of the Sunnis . . . The majority of his courtiers, however, being Persians, are of the party known by the appellation of Shias . . .

“Moreover, the Great Mogul is a foreigner in Hindoustan . . . Consequently he finds himself in an hostile country, or nearly so; a country containing hundreds of Gentiles [309](#)to one Mogol, or even to one Mahometan. To maintain himself in such a country, in the midst of domestic and powerful enemies, and to be always prepared against any hostile movement on the side of Persia or Uzbek, he is under the necessity of keeping up numerous armies, even in the time of peace. These armies are composed either of the natives, such as Rajputs and Pathans, or of genuine Mogols and people who, though less esteemed, are called Mogols because white men, foreigners, and Mahometans. The court itself does not now consist, as originally, of real Mogols; but is a medley of Uzbeks, Persians, Arabs, and Turks, or

descendants from all these people; known, as I said before, by the general appellation of Mogols. It should be added, however, that children of the third or fourth generation, who have the brown complexion, and the languid manner of this country of their nativity, are held in much less respect than new comers, and are seldom invested with official situations: they consider themselves happy, if permitted to serve as private soldiers in the infantry or cavalry....

“... The Mogol never finds the Rajas more useful than when he is engaged in hostility with the Persians. His *Omrahs*,<sup>310</sup> as I have just remarked, are of generally of that nation, and shudder at the idea of fighting against their natural king; especially because they acknowledge him as their *Imam*, their *Calif* or sovereign pontiff, and the descendent of Ali,<sup>311</sup> to bear arms against whom they therefore consider a great crime.

“The Mogol is also compelled to engage *Pathans* in his service by reasons very similar to those I have assigned for employing Rajputs.”

Although Islamic persecution of Hindus lost some of its zeal with their influx into the Muslim armies, injustice towards them had by no means abated. Muslims would become charged with doctrinal bigotry when they conquered some new territory – Hindus would be slaughtered, sold into slavery or forcibly converted, their womenfolk would be driven into harems and their temples, either demolished or turned into mosques. Hindus were subjected to untold indignity and religious persecution even in places where hostilities had ceased and Muslim rule had become well established. While enough material by way of historical evidence exists to easily

fill an entire book, it would serve our purpose to merely list, as an overview, what Hindus had to face in those times.

1. Hindus were accorded an inferior status in government employment. Senior offices were predominantly filled by Muslims; Hindus had to remain content with second and third rate jobs.

For example, out of the 252 *mansabdars* of ranks between 500 and 5000 dhat appointed during Akbar's reign, just 32 (or about 13 per cent) were Hindu. <sup>312</sup> This proportion had increased to about 20.7 per cent (109 out of 526) by the thirtieth year (1657) of Shah Jahan's reign. <sup>313</sup> Of the 17 *mansabdars*, excluding Princes, who attained the rank higher than 5000 dhat in these thirty years, just one was Hindu. <sup>314</sup>

2. All non-Muslims living in territory ruled by Muslims were forced to pay the *jizya* or similar poll tax.

It is evident from a bilingual Persian-Hindi *farman* issued in 1597 to officials and clerks by Bahadur Shah, the last sultan in the Faruqi Dynasty of Khandesh, that an entire administrative department had been set up in the sultanate for collection of *jizya*. <sup>315</sup>

A bilingual Persian-Marathi Nizamshahi *farman* dated 31st January 1607, addressed to officials of the Murtazabad (i.e. Chaul) Muamala, mentions a tax called the *Zakat-i Hinduwani*. <sup>316</sup> That it was being collected exclusively from Hindus is clear from the very name of the levy.

A tax called the *Bhutfarosi* (a corrupted form of the Persian *but-parvarish*, or idol-worship) used to be collected (only from Hindus, who were idol-worshippers) in at least some regions of the Nizamshahi Sultanate. <sup>317</sup>

Muhammad Adilshah's *farman* dated 26th May 1647, issued to the havaldar of the Sandalpur (i.e. Solapur) Muamala, decrees that a tax called the Khanakhushi was to be levied (to replace an earlier tax called the ganachari), at rates specified in the farman, upon '*lingadar Hindus*' (i.e. the Lingayats, a sub-caste of Hindus) of the muamala and the proceeds deposited into the jamdarkhana (i.e. Department of the Royal Wardrobe) account as it had been specifically allocated for defraying expenses for clothes and dresses of the royal family.<sup>318</sup> Mention of the ganachari tax also appears among several documents of the Deshpande family of Atpadi in the Man Pargana, which was under Adilshahi rule.<sup>319</sup>

The *jizya* tax had been abolished by Akbar in 1564.<sup>320</sup> However, Aurangzeb re-imposed it in 1679.<sup>321</sup>

3. Demolition of Hindu temples was a frequent occurrence under Muslim rule.

The Badshahnama has the following entry under the date 13th January 1633:<sup>322</sup>

"It had been brought to the notice of His Majesty that during the reign of Jahangir construction of many idol temples had been begun, but remained unfinished, at Banaras – the source of infidelity, waywardness and sin – and that several rich infidels had been desirous of completing them. Whereupon His Majesty, the Defender of the Faith, had ordered that the temples that were being built at Banaras and at every place in the royal dominions should be demolished. It was now learnt from the report of the news-reporter of Allahabad that seventy-six temples had been destroyed in the territory of Banaras."

While the Badshahnama does not state how many Hindu temples were demolished at places other than Banaras, it may be assumed that if what occurred there was repeated elsewhere, the number would easily have exceeded five hundred.

Peter Mundy leaves us an eye witness account of an incident connected with one such demolition. He was on his way from Patna to Agra when, on 3rd December 1632, he wrote in his diary: [323](#)

“The 3rd December 1632. (Mohan ki Sarai, 4 kos) At our coming forth of Banaras we saw a man hanging by the heels on a tree. His offence was this. This king [Shah Jahan] had commanded that all Hindu churches made in his time should be demolished, and for that purpose sent his farman to this governor, who sent his cousin, with other principal men in commission, to see it executed on one lately built. A rajput hearing of it, hid himself, [324](#) and with a kamtha or long bow provided for that purpose, seeing his time, shot amongst them, killed the governor’s cousin, and 3 or 4 more of the chiefest, which was done on the sudden. But being quickly found and set upon, with his jemdar [a kind of dagger] killed one or 2 more, and then was slain himself and his body hanged on the tree as aforesaid.”

When Aurangzeb was subadar of the Deccan during Shah Jahan’s reign, an entry dated 12th February 1644 in the official diary states that a *mansabdar* called *Sakhi Beg*, who had been sent to demolish a butkhana (i.e. idol temple) in the Lonar Pargana, returned and made his report to the Prince. [325](#)

Shah Jahan was as hostile to Christians as he was to Hindus. Sebastien Manrique, a Portuguese Dominican preacher, writes how Shah Jahan had ordered demolition of churches in Sindh and how he (i.e. Manrique), through the good offices of Asaf Khan (the Emperor’s father-in-law) whom he knew well

through several personal meetings in Lahore, obtained Shah Jahan's *farman* permitting their reconstruction.<sup>326</sup>

The business of wanton temple destruction was being prosecuted in the Adilshahi, too. In a stone inscription dated 24th October 1652, commissioned by Adilshahi nobleman Afzal Khan at the village of Takya (also known as Afzalpur) a few kilometers west of Bijapur, the Khan adds to his name qualifications like *Qatil-i Mutamarridan o Kafran* (Slayer of Rebels and infidels) and *Shiknanda-i Butan* (Idol Breaker).

<sup>327</sup>Fernão da Miranda Henriques, the Portuguese captain of Chaul, writes in a letter dated 27th December 1654 that Afzal Khan had issued orders for the demolition of all Hindu temples in Upper Chaul.<sup>328</sup>

Another Adilshahi nobleman, Masud Khan, waxes eloquent in a rock inscription (1085 A.H. or 1674-75) embedded in the masonry of one of the gates (which the inscription says he built) in the ramparts of the fort at Sirguppa in Bellary District, that he had destroyed temples and idols and constructed mosques.<sup>329</sup>

The Qutbshahi was no different. The French jeweller, Tavernier, who paid a visit to the camp of Qutbshahi Prime Minister Mir Jumla a short time after the latter had captured the Gandikota fort in 1651, writes that idols collected from temples had been melted down in order to use the metal for casting guns.<sup>330</sup>

A Persian-Telugu bilingual inscription in a mosque at Poonamallee in the Chingleput District of Tamil Nadu says that its construction was completed on 3rd September 1653 by Rustum Astarabadi when Mir Muhammad Saeed was governor and Abdullah Qutbshah was the reigning sultan.<sup>331</sup> Two couplets in Persian are also inscribed in the margin stating that a pre-existing temple was demolished and the mosque was

constructed in its place.<sup>332</sup> Ghulam Yazdani, the editor of the published text of the inscription, says that the upper portion of the mosque is constructed in brick and mortar but the plinth, built in stone, could have originally belonged to a Hindu temple.<sup>333</sup> The Mir Muhammad Saeed mentioned in the inscription was none other than Mir Jumla whom Tavernier met at Gandikot. 'Mir Jumla' was his title.

There are two mosques atop a hill called Udayagiri in the Nellore District of Andhra Pradesh. A Persian inscription dated Hijri 1071 (1660-61 A.D.) on one of them says that during the reign of Abdullah Qutbshah, Husain Khan demolished a temple and constructed that mosque (on the site).<sup>334</sup>

Dr. G.H.Khare observes that a number of mosques are in fact converted temples and that parts of old temples, like pillars and carved stones, have been used in the construction of many.<sup>335</sup>

4. Muslim rulers used coercion to convert Hindu prisoners of war to Islam. In regions where hostilities had ended and they had attained stability, conversions were done through threats and bribes.

Shah Jahan had appointed two officials – Shah Mir Lahori and Muhibb Ali Sindhi – specifically to conduct the work of conversion.<sup>336</sup> Those converting to Islam were rewarded. Hindu relatives of one intending to convert to Islam were prohibited from dissuading him from doing so.<sup>337</sup>

Cosme de Guarda writes:<sup>338</sup>

"In these lands of the Moors there is an inviolable law or custom that if any offence is committed against one who is not a Moor [i.e. Muslim], be he a Christian, Gentio [gentile, Hindu] or Jew, etc., if he wants to be avenged he has to become a Moor. When

he declares himself as such, justice at once grants satisfaction to the aggrieved according to the nature of the offence. The same is the case if he has debts and does not want to pay, for when he becomes Moor he owes nothing (to anybody), nor can the creditor say anything about it."

What Guarda writes might not have been true at all times or for all places in Muslim ruled territories. Yet, ample evidence exists to establish the primary theme of his observation that Hindus were discriminated against in the delivery of justice and that the judiciary was in fact utilized as a tool for securing conversions. Here are two examples.

An official newsletter of 3rd July 1644 states that a person of the *Dhed* caste absconded from Aurangabad with the wife of another of the same caste. The husband apprehended both of them and presented them in the kotwali (police station). The offender, who was sentenced according to Muslim Law to 79 lashes, lost his nerve and offered to convert to Islam. He was promptly converted and acquitted. The woman was given 10 lashes and restored to her husband. [339](#)

A Hindu *mokadam* of Kurkumbh in Adilshahi territory was arrested for failing to remit the requisite sum of money into the government treasury. As it was not possible for him to raise the sum needed, he converted to Islam. He was then released from prison and the sum due was also waived. This incident is reported in a written statement submitted in 1695-96 by his son, Shaikh Bawa. [340](#)

5. Records of numerous incidents exist to show how Muslim rulers violated the modesty of women captured in battle.

Jujhar Singh of Orchha was a *mansabdar* of the Mughal Empire.

[341](#) Shah Jahan sent a large force against him because he had rebelled, upon which he fled into the territory of Chanda. When

he realized that his pursuers were closing in upon him, he attempted to kill the womenfolk in traditional Rajput manner. However, just when some of the women had been dispatched, the Mughals fell upon him and captured the survivors. Parvati, elder consort of Jujhar's father Bir Singh Dev, died from her wounds. Jujhar's son, Durgbhan, and Durjansal, grandson from his elder son Bikramjit, were taken captive. Another son, Udaybhan, along with a younger brother and a trusted follower called Shyam Duda fled into Qutbshahi territory. Jujhar Singh himself and Bikramjit took cover in the forest where they were killed by the Gonds. The surviving womenfolk along with son Durgbhan and grandson Durjansal were brought before Shah Jahan who ordered their conversion to Islam. They were duly converted and given the names Islam Quli and Ali Quli respectively, while the womenfolk, also converted to Islam, "attained the fortune of serving in the heavenly harem" (or, in plain language, Shah Jahan turned them into his concubines). The Qutbshah arrested Udaybhan, his younger brother and Shyam Duda, and sent them to Shah Jahan. The younger brother was ordered to be converted. Udaybhan and Shyam Duda, being older in age, were given the choice between conversion and death. They chose the latter and were duly executed.

Pratap, the chief of Ujjaniya near Buxar, [342](#) rebelled against Shah Jahan. Towards the end of November 1636, the Emperor ordered the subadar of Bihar, Abdullah Khan Bahadur Firoz Jang, to march against him. Pratap was ensconced in the Bhojpur fort, which the subadar invested. Soon, Pratap sued for peace, saying he was at the subadar's mercy, and surrendered on 25th April 1637. Abdullah Khan imprisoned Pratap and his wife and put their followers to death. On learning of these developments, Shah Jahan sent an order for Pratap's execution and for taking his wife into custody, whereupon Abdullah Khan converted the lady to Islam and married her off to his grandson.

However, it cannot be said that persecution of Hindus in the form of temple destruction, forcible conversion or forcing their womenfolk into seraglios was a regular, everyday occurrence. After all, taxes needed to be collected in order to run the affairs of state, to enable which, agriculture and trade had to go on, for which at least the semblance of the rule of law had to be in place. So, regularly engaging in doctrinal fanaticism was not convenient even for Muslim rulers and they often felt obliged to curb their bigotry, as the following instances illustrate.

1. A rich merchant called Shantidas Zaveri used to live in Ahmedabad in Gujarat. In an English letter dated 28th December 1627 from Ahmedabad to Surat, he is referred to as “Santidas, the deceased King’s [i.e. Jahangir’s] jeweller” <sup>344</sup> A contemporaneous work in Sanskrit verse called the *Chintamani-Prashasti* says he was presented elephants and horses by Shah Jahan after ascending to the throne. <sup>345</sup> Another English letter from Ahmedabad to Surat, dated 15th May 1636, says Shantidas wielded great influence in the Imperial Court. <sup>346</sup> While traders do not usually find mention in Mughal Court Histories, Shantidas’ name appears as a rich jeweller in Waris’ Padshahnama under the date 31st May 1655. <sup>347</sup>

Be that as it may, Shantidas began construction of a Jain temple in the Bibipur (now known as Saraspur) part of the town in 1621-22 along with his elder brother, Vardhaman, and completed it in 1625-26 when the idol of Teerthankar Chintamani Parshwanath was installed therein. <sup>348</sup> Mandelslo, the German traveler, had seen this beautiful temple in 1638 and has left us a description. <sup>349</sup> Aurangzeb, when he was *subadar* of Gujarat (1645-46), had a cow slaughtered in the temple, the idol desecrated and the structure converted into a mosque. <sup>350</sup> He named the mosque as the *Quwat-ul Islam* Mosque (or, ‘Might of

Islam').<sup>351</sup> However, Shantidas was apparently not a person of insignificance. It seems from the contents of a *farman* dated 3rd July 1648 issued by Shah Jahan to Ghairat Khan (deputizing for Dara Shukoh who had been appointed subadar <sup>352</sup>) and other officials of the suba that Shantidas had complained to the Emperor against this gross inequity and injustice. The *farman* says: <sup>353</sup>

"Be it known to the governors, subadars and mutsaddis [officials], present and future, of the province of Gujarat, especially the one who has been worthy of various favours [here follow various honorific prefixes], viz., Ghairat Khan , who has been reliant on and gladdened by royal favours, that formerly, in respect of the temple of the leading person of the time (zubdat-al-akran), Satidas Jawahari, <sup>354</sup> an exalted and blessed order had been issued to *Umdat-ul-Mulk* [pillar of the state] Shayista Khan to this effect: Shahzada [prince] Sultan Aurangzeb Bahadur had constructed in that place some mihrabs [prayer-arches] and had given it the name of a mosque; and after that Mulla Abdul Hakim had represented to His Majesty that this building, by reason of its being the property of another person, could not be considered a mosque according to the inviolable Islamic law; a world-obeyed order, therefore, obtained the honour of being issued that this building is the property of Satidas, and that because of the mihrab which the famous Prince had made in that place the above- mentioned person should not be harassed and that the arch should be removed and the aforesaid building should be handed over to him.

“Now at this time, the world-obeyed and illustrious order has been issued that the *mihrab* [355](#) which the victorious and illustrious Prince has constructed may be retained and a wall be built near the same as a screen between the temple and the *mihrab*. Hence it is ordained that, since his exalted Majesty has, as an act of favour, granted the aforesaid temple to Satidas, he should be in possession of it as before and he may worship there according to his creed in any way he likes, and no one should obstruct or trouble him; also that some of the *Faqirs* (beggars) who have made their abode in that place should be turned out, and Satidas should be relieved from the troubles and quarrels on this account.

“And since it has been represented to His Majesty that some of the *Bohras* [356](#) have removed and carried away the materials of that temple, in the event of this being so, those materials should be got back from them and should be restored to the person referred to above (Satidas), and if the aforesaid materials have been used up, their price should be recovered from them and should be paid to Satidas.

“In this matter this order should be considered extremely urgent and there should be no deviation from or disobedience to it. Written on the twenty-first of the month of *Jumad-as-Sani* in the year 1058 H. [3rd July 1648.]”

Although Shayista Khan was ordered to remove the structures added by Aurangzeb, it appears from this *farman* that the orders had not been carried out. Now, the present *farman* orders retention of the structures built by Aurangzeb, the addition of a wall to segregate them from the rest of the original temple and

restoration of possession of that part to Shantidas. The temple was never put into use again; perhaps the Jain community considered it permanently desecrated because a cow had been slaughtered within its precincts. Writing in 1666, Thevenot says the place was used only as a mosque.<sup>357</sup> M.S.Commissariat, the historian of Gujarat, wrote in 1932 that even the remains of the temple had almost become untraceable.<sup>358</sup>

2. Indraman, the Rajput Chief of Dhandhera,<sup>359</sup> was a Mughal mansabdar but had, for some reason, fallen in disfavour with Shah Jahan for, in 1636, the Emperor conferred the Dhandhera region as a jagir on another Rajput mansabdar called Shivram Gaud.<sup>360</sup> Shivram went to Dhandhera and took forcible possession of the territory. However, soon thereafter, Indraman gathered a force and recovered the loss. Thereupon, in November 1636, Shah Jahan sent a strong force under a Rajput mansabdar named Raja Vitthal das against Indraman. Vitthal das invested Dhandhera and Indraman was forced to sue for peace. He surrendered after securing an assurance of safety and was taken to the Imperial Court where Shah Jahan, on 26th December 1636, ordered his incarceration in the Junnar (i.e. Shivneri) Fort.

Indraman languished in prison for the next twenty years but in 1655, when Aurangzeb was subadar of the Deccan, he sent an envoy to the Prince to convey that if he was released he was willing to pay a sum of Rs.50,000 into the Imperial treasury, serve in the Deccan for one year along with 50 troopers and 100 foot soldiers without seeking reimbursement either through a *jagir* or mansab (i.e. at his own cost) and, after that period, serve with whatever *mansab* that may be granted. He added that he would never even contemplate returning to Dhandhera.<sup>361</sup> The fort commander of Shivneri, Narsinghdas, was willing to stand surety to Indraman in this matter.<sup>362</sup> Aurangzeb informed Shah

Jahan of this entreaty and also recommended the pardon since Indraman had been in prison for many years and had been reduced to a pitiable state. [363](#) However, the Emperor directed the Wazir, Sadullah Khan, to write to Aurangzeb that Indraman would only be released if he became Muslim. It is evident that Aurangzeb was against the imposition of this condition, for he wrote in reply that Indraman was in prison for twenty years and was prepared to remit a sum of Rs.50,000 for which Brahmins and Mahajans had stood guarantee; that if he was converted to Islam, there would be no way he could raise this sum and would spend the rest of his time in prison. [364](#)

It is not known if the condition of conversion was waived, but it seems it was not. Indraman finds no mention in chronicles or documents of the time until the war of succession broke out among the four princes, and Aurangzeb dispatched his son, Muhammad Sultan, with the vanguard from Aurangabad towards Burhanpur on 25th January 1658. The Alamgirnama says that “Raja Indraman Dhandhera” was present in that force, having received a promotion of 500 *dhat* / 500 *swar* to become a *mansabdar* of 3000 *dhat* / 2000 *swar*. [365](#) It follows that Indraman had been released from captivity some time before 25th January 1658; perhaps Aurangzeb had freed him when it became clear that the war of succession was imminent.

It would appear from this account that Muslim rulers occasionally needed to rein in their doctrinal fanaticism in the interest of realpolitik. Aurangzeb had desecrated Shantidas' temple and, by adding new structures, had converted it into a mosque. Shah Jahan, who had himself committed several acts of religious intolerance before that incident, as he also did thereafter, had issued a decree ordering the demolition of those additions and the restoration of the temple to Shantidas. Why had he issued such an order? No source of history has an answer to this question, but it is not difficult to venture a guess. Shantidas was not only wealthy; he also apparently wielded

great influence in the Imperial Court. Possibly, several Mughal courtiers were under his obligation. It is thus quite possible that some such person, perhaps even several, had put in a word to the Emperor on behalf of the merchant which Shah Jahan found inconvenient to turn down. Of course, there might well be some other reason. Yet, since Shah Jahan is known to have evinced religious intolerance many times before and after he ordered the restoration, his motive could not have been the principle of ‘tolerance’ as much as some consideration of expediency. As for the justification he proffers, on the basis of the inviolable Islamic Law, the less said the better.

It is unnecessary to reiterate that Aurangzeb is notorious for his bigotry. He demonstrated it time and again both before and after the case of Shantidas’ temple. On this background, how is it that he makes an entreaty to his father against the condition for Indraman’s conversion? No source of history provides an answer to this question, either. Again, we must surmise. Shah Jahan was old at the time and it was obvious that his sons were going to vie with one another for succession after his death. Every prince, therefore, must have been busy garnering support of as many *mansabdars* as he could. Indraman was a Rajput *mansabdar* and must have had close ties with others of his ilk. The fact that he was prepared to pay a sum of Rs.50,000 for his release, even when reduced to a state of penury, leaves no doubt that he enjoyed the support of some very strong allies to back his offer. It was also remarkable that the commander of the very fort in which he was held prisoner was prepared to stand surety for him. It is also quite possible that some of his supporters had mediated on his behalf with Aurangzeb. The imminent conflict for succession and the fact that he could ill afford to displease the Rajput faction at such crucial juncture had perhaps forced Aurangzeb to curb his religious zeal and make a recommendation favourable to Indraman. Again, like Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb, too, was probably impelled by realpolitik at a compromise of his religious identity and what he considered his duty as a good Muslim.

It may be concluded from the foregoing discussion that events seeming *prima facie* to be lofty and celebrated instances of ‘toleration’ are equally, if not more, likely to have occurred for considerations of simple, down to earth expediency.

Religious obligations and political need were the two primary impulses that shaped the policy of Muslim rulers in India. Doctrinal compulsions, on the one hand, urged them to desecrate and destroy un-Islamic icons like temples and idols or forcibly convert non-Muslims. But, on the other, since a vast majority of their subjects was Hindu, some of whom were also part of the administrative hierarchy, they had to reluctantly control their true desire. The basic nature and disposition of the incumbent Muslim ruler as well as his perception of prevailing circumstances affected the intensity of those two primary impulses and determined his policies.

The very same Aurangzeb who desecrated Shantidas’ temple when he was but a prince, is known to have evinced uncharacteristic religious tolerance in at least two more instances. He declares in a letter he wrote in March 1658 (before the war of succession) to Rana Raj Singh of Mewar, “A king who practices intolerance towards the religion of another is a rebel against God”; then, early in the following year, he decreed in a farman issued on 28th February 1659, a few months after his enthronement (21st July 1658) as Emperor, that while construction of new temples should not be permitted, existing temples should also not be demolished. [366](#) It needs to be appreciated that at the time of the first instance cited, Aurangzeb was proceeding towards Agra for the inevitable war over succession and was going to need all the support he could muster from the Hindu Rajputs, which was considerable. Obviously therefore, this statement was only a shrewd ploy aimed at dispelling any misgivings the Rana might be entertaining on the basis of Aurangzeb’s previous record of intolerance. It is quite possible that he had also sent letters with

a similar import to other Rajas in Rajasthan in an attempt to secure support of Rajput Hindus who formed an important element of his fighting force. In the second case, although Aurangzeb had defeated Dara Shukoh at Samugarh on 29th May 1658, the war of succession was far from over as the latter had again taken up arms and was yet to be completely neutralized. Dara was finally vanquished and forced to flee after the Battle of Devrai (12/13th March 1659, near Ajmer). The contents of this farman show that he could ill afford at that stage to incur the displeasure (by ordering demolition of their temples) of the Hindu majority. Both instances illustrate the conflict between the doctrinaire Aurangzeb and the pragmatic Aurangzeb. les should not be permitted, existing temples should also not be demolished. [367](#) It needs to be appreciated that at the time of the first instance cited, Aurangzeb was proceeding towards Agra for the inevitable war over succession and was going to need all the support he could muster from the Hindu Rajputs, which was considerable. Obviously therefore, this statement was only a shrewd ploy aimed at dispelling any misgivings the Rana might be entertaining on the basis of Aurangzeb's previous record of intolerance. It is quite possible that he had also sent letters with a similar import to other Rajas in Rajasthan in an attempt to secure support of Rajput Hindus who formed an important element of his fighting force. In the second case, although Aurangzeb had defeated Dara Shukoh at Samugarh on 29th May 1658, the war of succession was far from over as the latter had again taken up arms and was yet to be completely neutralized. Dara was finally vanquished and forced to flee after the Battle of Devrai (12/13th March 1659, near Ajmer). The contents of this farman show that he could ill afford at that stage to incur the displeasure (by ordering demolition of their temples) of the Hindu majority. Both instances illustrate the conflict between the doctrinaire Aurangzeb and the pragmatic Aurangzeb.

But later, in 1669, when his rule had become stable, he felt secure enough to give vent to his true nature – doctrinal fidelity. So this same Aurangzeb felt obliged to order temples at

Mathura,<sup>368</sup> Banaras and many other places to be demolished or turned into mosques, and the *jizya* to be re-imposed. <sup>369</sup>

Some instances of Muslim rulers and noblemen continuing existing grants to Hindu temples, mutts or religious scholars are found in historical documents. There is one of even Afzal Khan, who took pride in calling *himself 'slayer of infidels (kafrs)'* and 'breaker of idols', sanctioning the continuation of an existing grant to a mutt in the village of Nimb which lay within the *Wai Pargana* that was assigned as a *mukasa* to him. <sup>370</sup>

Just as genuine tolerance for the faith of another could be a reason for this seeming anomaly, it is also true that the practical need occasioned by the recommendations or mediation of their Hindu officials, could also equally – if not more – have been a considerable factor. However, when one takes an overall view of the religious persecution suffered by Hindus under Islamic regimes, one is led to conclude that such uncharacteristic policy was less a result of tolerance and far more one of expediency.

This is not to say, of course, that all Muslim rulers were fanatical without exception. We know of at least one who might qualify as 'tolerant'. Ibrahim Adilshah II evinced reverence for Saraswati (the Hindu Goddess of Learning) and had composed devotional hymns in Deccani Urdu to this Goddess as also other deities like Ganesh. <sup>371</sup> The *Basatin-us Salatin* says Ibrahim had a passion for music and had accorded patronage to several Hindu musicians in his Court. These musicians believed that the art could only be mastered if Saraswati was invoked, which led Ibrahim to also become a devotee under influence of this belief.

<sup>372</sup> Numerous *farmans* issued by Ibrahim begin with the words "Az Pooja Sari Sarasati" ("With Obeisance to Shri Saraswati"). <sup>373</sup> This phrase also occurs in letters written by some officials in his administration. <sup>374</sup> Needless to state, this must have been in

emulation of their master. Unfortunately, the seals appearing on these officials' letters are too obscure to determine the identities of their authors, otherwise it would have been possible to say whether they were Muslim or Hindu.

Suffice it to say, however, that tolerant Muslim rulers like Ibrahim Adilshah II were few and far between, if not almost altogether absent. He was indeed the astonishing rare exception.

One cannot but make a most intriguing observation in this connection. The 'tolerant' among Muslim rulers in India are, almost without exception, seen to have been attracted by indigenous Hindu thought. However, is it not strange that one does not find a single Muslim ruler who, being a firm follower of the uncompromising Islamic doctrine and not evincing a fascination for Hindu thought as such, was also tolerant?

#### **THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF MUSLIM RULERS**

##### **THE CAVALRY**

The *mansabdari* system has already been briefly stated. It was the *mansabdar's* responsibility to maintain troopers and horses as required by the rank he held. Normally, except for princes, no *mansabdar* received a rank higher than 7000 *dhat*/7000 *swar*/7000 *du aspa sih aspa*.<sup>375</sup> A *mansabdar* of that rank, who was subject to the 1/3rd rule and twelve month pay scale, was required to maintain a total of 4,667 horsemen.<sup>376</sup> Some very junior *mansabdars* had no sawar rank at all, which implied that the *mansabdar* himself was the lone trooper in his contingent. Hence, other than the princes' contingents, the Mughal army was made up of a large number of disparate contingents ranging from 1 sawar to 4,667 sawars. The *Badshahnama* says the Mughal army had 8,000 *mansabdars* and their contingents

totaled 185,000 horsemen in the twentieth year (1646-47) of Shah Jahan's reign.<sup>377</sup>

The number of horsemen a *mansabdar* was expected to employ and the rules governing their administration are detailed in the Khulasat-us Siyak, which was compiled towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign.<sup>378</sup> For instance, an Afghan mansabdar was supposed to maintain a contingent composed of two-third Afghan troopers and one third those of other ethnicity.<sup>379</sup> How stringently these rules were followed in practice is not known. But there is no doubt that the Mughal army was a conglomerate of troopers with numerous ethnic, religious and social backgrounds. For instance, identification records dated 16th and 17th September 1662 of 158 troopers in the contingent of a *mansabdar* named Ismail Khan show that it included Shaikhzada, Rajput, Mughal, Barha Sayyid, Afghan, Maratha and even Brahmin troopers.<sup>380</sup>

Each cavalryman used to be armed with a sword, shield, spear and the long bow.<sup>381</sup> His mounts were of the Turki, Tazi or Yabu breeds.<sup>382</sup>

Mansabdars who received their salaries in cash (*naqdi*) on a twelve month or eleven month pay scale had to maintain, according to their pay scale, one, two or three horses per trooper. But these scales were actually very rarely given.

*Naqdi mansabdars* on a pay scale of 6 to 10 months had to maintain, according to their pay scale, one or two horses per trooper in proportion of their sawar rank. The lower grades could do with one mount per trooper.

*Mansabdars* who were paid in jagirs and were on 7 month to 12 month pay scales had to maintain one and two mounts per trooper according to their pay scale, while those on lower pay

scales were required to maintain only one mount per trooper.

Pay scales of more than 8 months were rarely awarded.<sup>383</sup> So by and large, one horse-one trooper must have been the norm, two horses per trooper uncommon and three, very rare.

There were no set rules about the manner in which *mansabdars* organized and managed their contingents. The *mansabdar* could appoint a *bakhshi* or a *diwan* for general administration purposes and *jamatdars* to maintain discipline in the ranks.

Other than the cavalry contingents employed by *mansabdars*, the Mughal army had a separate category of horsemen, called *ahadis*, who were in the service of the Emperor and were directly paid from the Imperial treasury.<sup>384</sup> The word ‘*ahad*’ is Arabic and means ‘one’ or ‘alone’. They were probably given this name because they were not attached to any *mansabdar*’s contingent. The *ahadis* could be both Muslim as well as Hindu; there were also some Maratha *ahadis*.<sup>385</sup> A *mansabdar* called the *bakhshi-i ahadiyan* was appointed to oversee the administration of this force.<sup>386</sup> An *ahadi* could only be recruited by express permission of the Emperor.<sup>387</sup>

Each *ahadi* usually maintained from one to four horses of the Turki, Tazi or Yabu breed.<sup>388</sup> The number of mounts must naturally have depended on his salary. Each was expected to have Turki mounts, but if he happened to keep *Tazi* or *Yabu* breeds, a deduction at fixed rates called the *tafawut-i tazi* or *tafawut-i yabu* was made from his salary.<sup>389</sup> He also had to maintain two pieces of armour — i.e. some kind of body armour (like a cuirass or mail) and a helmet.<sup>390</sup>

*Ahadis* were armed with bows and arrows or muskets. The *ahadi* wielding the bow was called the *ahadi-i tirandaz* and the

other, the *ahadi-i barkandaz*. [391](#)

The salary paid to *ahadis* ranged between Rs. 20/- and Rs. 100/- per month. [392](#) It seems that an *ahadi* drawing less than Rs.30 per month was obliged to keep one mount, while those drawing higher salaries were expected to have two or more. [393](#)

Attendance sheets (*tasdiq-i haziri*) were maintained; the horses and weapons were inspected regularly. Any shortcoming or irregularity resulted in deduction from the salary. [394](#) Like a *mansabdar*, the *ahadi* too had to provide either an *ahadi* or a *mansabdar* as guarantor. [395](#)

The Badshahnama states that there were 7,000 *ahadis* in the Mughal army at the end of two decades of Shah Jahan's reign. [396](#) *Ahadis* were not necessarily assigned to serve wherever the Emperor was for the time being. Some *ahadis* could also be assigned to fort garrisons as well as to contingents given under command of various officials. [397](#) A detachment of *ahadis* was usually included in armies dispatched on various expeditions.

The Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates assigned mukasas or jagirs to their noblemen to defray the cost of maintaining troops. But no information is available about the number of horsemen and foot soldiers each nobleman was expected to maintain, the breeds of horses kept, the systems for inspection of the military force, their salaries or other details. However, judging by references in contemporaneous sources to such noblemen in the Adilshahi Sultanate who maintained independent contingents, it may be said that their number could not have exceeded fifty. Thus, it seems likely that contingents of individual Adilshahi noblemen might generally have been larger than those of their more numerous Mughal counterparts. The situation in the Qutbshahi was not likely to be too different.

Apart from the troops under noblemen, a unit called the *khaskhail* was maintained under the direct control of the Adilshah himself.<sup>398</sup> The Qutbshah too maintained a similar force, also called the *khaskhail*.<sup>399</sup>

The Adilshahi and Qutbshahi armies were equipped with spears, swords, shields and long bows and arrows.<sup>400</sup>

#### THE ARTILLERY

European artillery pieces of the 15th and 16th Centuries were heavy and difficult to manoeuvre and their operators, not sufficiently skilled. The situation in 17th Century India was no different. The low effectiveness of these pieces hardly justified their bulk. Huge trains of bullocks were needed to transport them. Waris informs us that two (out of eight) guns – the *Fath Lashkar* and the *Laili* - that were used in the siege of Kandahar by Aurangzeb and Sadullah Khan in 1652, needed bullock trains of 70 and 80 beasts respectively, besides elephants and gangs of men.<sup>401</sup> Bernier and Tavernier, on separate occasions, had also witnessed the cumbersome transport of such heavy guns.<sup>402</sup> Heavy pieces, inefficient gun carriages and bad – or even non-existent – roads perhaps necessitated more animals to move them. The inclusion of such heavy guns in an army on the move severely hampered its mobility.

Guns made in brass were usually cast, while those of iron were fabricated. The metallurgical technology needed for casting was still in its infancy. Fabrication of iron pieces involved the initial building of a cylindrical earthen core of a diameter approximating the intended bore of the gun. This was then clad with iron strips placed next to each other along the length of the core. These were joined together with molten brass and the

gaps between them were blocked with molten lead. To further strengthen the cylinder so fabricated, numerous red hot rings of iron would be slipped over the entire length, one next to the other, so that the contraction on cooling would result in tightening of the cylinder. The earthen core would then be removed. [403](#)

No standardization of the inner diameter of such guns seems to have been contemplated then. Since guns of varying bore were being made and used, the inventory of projectiles to fit each must have been a major management issue. In Europe, guns began to be made to certain standard dimensions only in the second half of the 16th Century.

All guns were muzzle loading. Gun powder was loaded in the muzzle and rammed, after which the ball or projectile was inserted. A wick placed in a hole in the breach was lit to discharge the cannon. Once fired, it took a long time to reload.

The projectiles generally used were solid iron or stone balls. [404](#) An explosive shell fired from a gun explodes after striking its target and could cause a good deal of damage to the immediate surroundings. But a solid ball is not as effective. Used against hard surfaces like the stone ramparts of forts, such solid balls only succeeded in chipping it minimally, unlike an exploding shell which was likely to take down a portion of the wall. Even protracted bombardment with solid balls had little effect on ramparts constructed in stone. The solid ball would also have minimal effect on men, animals or houses built in mud and brick. However, since a solid ball tended to bounce after hitting the ground or caused chips and splinters to fly in all directions after hitting hard surfaces, it was more effective on rocky ground in causing casualties to the enemy. Moreover, despite its relative ineffectiveness, solid balls impacting in a formation of soldiers caused considerable disorder and panic in the rank and file.

Explosive shells had begun to be manufactured in 17th Century Europe and came to be variously called '*granado shells*', '*granadoes*' or '*granadoos*'. [405](#) They were shells of iron filled with explosive material and fitted with a slow burning fuse usually in a tube extending to the core. After loading the cannon with gun powder (propellant), this *granado* shell would be inserted, and the fuse of the shell was lit. The explosion of the propellant sent the shell on its way to the target. The shell itself exploded as soon as the burning fuse reached the core but, of course, it was on its way in its trajectory towards the target well before this happened. However, there was no saying how quickly or slowly the fuse ignited the core. To facilitate ease of lighting the fuse of the shell, they were usually fired from cannons with very short barrels known as mortars because they resembled the common mortar used for grinding. [406](#) The trajectory of the projectile fired from a mortar had greater curvature and shorter range. Granado shells were very effective in hitting targets that were rendered invisible by some obstacle like a high rampart wall. But firing a mortar needed more paraphernalia and more precautions than firing a conventional piece.

No eastern power in 17th Century India produced mortars or granado shells. It was only in the middle of that century that the English first began selling mortars and granado shells to them, followed perhaps by other European traders. [407](#) Nevertheless, it does not seem that eastern powers in India began extensive use of mortars, since those imported by European traders remained unsold for long periods. [408](#) The impracticability of devoting the requisite attention and precaution attendant upon the deployment of mortars (as compared with conventional pieces) on the battlefield, where quick action could make the difference between victory and defeat, had precluded their wide use even in Europe in the 16th

and 17th Centuries. But they seem to have been commonly used in Europe in comparatively more relaxed undertakings like sieges of forts. However, there is no source which tells us why they had not become accepted in 17th Century India.

The Mughal artillery may be roughly classified as follows. This classification is merely for convenience of analysis; no such categories existed in reality at that time.

1. Super Heavy Artillery: Heavy guns mounted on bastions in forts. Shots ranging from 1 kg to more than 100 kg in weight could be fired from these cannons. For obvious reasons, large cannons were generally not brought to battle fields.

2. Siege Artillery: Cannons used in sieges for breaking down walls and doors. Generally, shots weighing up to about 50 kg could be fired from these. Also, these cannons could be transported from place to place. Shots weighing between 20 and 50 kg were normally used against fortifications.<sup>409</sup>

3. Field Artillery: Used in actual battle. It could be sub-divided further into three classes:

(a) Guns mounted on carriages and capable of firing shots of 3 or 4 kg. These would usually be placed before the main fighting force in a pitched battle.<sup>410</sup>

(b) Guns transported on and fired from the backs of elephants (*hathnal* or *gajnal*) and camels (*shutarnal*). These could be swiveled sideways as well as up and down.<sup>411</sup> A wooden platform was fastened on the back of the elephant and an iron gun about five feet in length was fixed on it. The mahout sat on the animal's neck and the cannoneer sat in a wooden frame behind him.<sup>412</sup> Terry writes that a shot about the size of a tennis ball was fired from the gun placed on the back of the

elephant.<sup>413</sup> As for guns mounted on camels, the animal would be made to sit before discharging the shot.<sup>414</sup>

(c) Rockets<sup>415</sup> (called *bans*), very similar to ones fired on festive occasions even in our times, but much larger.<sup>416</sup> According to a description provided by Major Alexander Dirom in the 18th Century, their bamboo stems would be about 3 or 4 meters in length with a tube of iron about 30 cm in length and 2½ cm in diameter attached to them which held the solid propellant. These devices had a range of about 1,000 meters. Some rockets had a 'chamber' containing more explosives which, presumably, ignited on impact with the target.<sup>417</sup> This description of rockets from the 18th Century could well apply to those of the 17th. Rockets would be transported in bullock carts or on camelback. They were fired by placing them on bamboo supports. While their actual destructive potential might be doubtful, they were good enough to cause the enemy's horses to stampede and thus disrupt enemy formations.<sup>418</sup>

The artillery corps was staffed by the *gola-andaz* or *deg-andaz* (cannoneer), the *ban-dar* (rocketeer), *barudsaz* (for preparing gunpowder), *ahangar* (blacksmith) or the *topsaz-i ahangar* (blacksmith skilled in making cannons), *najjar* (carpenter), *beldar* (for digging the earth with a pickaxe) and others.<sup>419</sup> They were paid directly from the Imperial treasury. The cannoneer and rocketeer normally earned between Rs.5 and 14 per month, while the artisans were paid about Rs.7 per month.<sup>420</sup> The soldiers and the artisans attached to the artillery corps had to provide guarantors.<sup>421</sup>

Europeans enjoyed special preference in employment in the Mughal artillery and were also paid more than their Indian

counterparts. [422](#) Cosme de Guarda makes the following interesting observation: [423](#)

“The Indians imagine with strange persistency that all Europeans are artillerymen but greater is the deception practiced by the Europeans who take advantage of this foolishness, for, when, they want to fly either for crimes or for licence, they pass to their [i.e. the Indians’] country under this name (as an artilleryman) and get enough for their subsistence.”

And Bernier writes: [424](#)

“...Their artillerymen . . . receive great pay particularly all the franguis or Christians – Portuguese, English, Dutch, Germans, and French; fugitives from Goa, and from the Dutch and English companies. Formerly when the Mogols were little skilled in the management of artillery, the pay of the European was more liberal, and there are still some remaining who receive 200 rupees a month: but now the king [i.e. the Emperor] admits them with difficulty into the service, and limits their pay to 32 rupees.”

Not much is known about the artillery under the Adilshahi or Qutbshahi. But available information suggests that various types of cannons and rockets were being used and that Europeans were given preference for employment in their artillery corps. [425](#)

#### THE INFANTRY

The Mughal army had no separate classification called the infantry. Foot soldiers were usually assigned to the charge of

the artillery corps.<sup>426</sup> Their units were assigned to various forts, military stations and government offices.<sup>427</sup> At the end of its account of the first twenty years of Shah Jahan's reign the Badshahnama says the Mughal army had 40,000 infantrymen comprising *tufangchi* (musketeers), *top-andaz* (gunners) and *baandar* (rocketeers); 10,000 of these were assigned to remain with the Emperor, and 30,000 assigned to various subas and forts.<sup>428</sup>

Officers of the infantry were known as mirdah, sadiwal and hazari. A unit of the infantry called *sadi* (hundred) was commanded by the *sadiwal*.<sup>429</sup> It may be estimated from some documents that a *sadi* did not necessarily have a hundred soldiers, but usually around 40 or 50.<sup>430</sup> A *sadiwal* had several mirdahs under him while a *hazari*, several *sadiwals*.<sup>431</sup>

The infantryman was paid Rs. 4 to 5 per month, the *sadiwal* Rs. 7½ to 25 and a *hazari*, Rs. 50.<sup>432</sup> *Hazaris* were required to keep two horses, and some of the *sadiwals*, evidently depending on their salaries, were required to keep one or two horses as personal mounts.<sup>433</sup>

Records containing descriptions of each infantryman and officer as well as their daily muster rolls and attendance sheets were maintained in government offices.<sup>434</sup>

Infantry soldiers in the standing army of the Mughals used to carry matchlock muskets.<sup>435</sup>

A match lock was a muzzle loading weapon. It had a small aperture (called the touch hole) in the side of the breech (i.e. the rear part of the barrel). There was a small shallow pan (called the flash pan) below the touch hole and on the outside of the barrel. After the gun powder (called the propellant) and a

ball of lead were rammed into the barrel, a small quantity of powder (called the primer) was placed in the flash pan. When a burning piece of coir rope (called the match) was applied to the primer in the flash pan, its flash passed through the touch hole and ignited the propellant. The resulting explosion propelled the ball of lead on its way to the target. Holding the stock of the musket against the shoulder and applying the match by hand to the primer in the flash pan was clumsy business. A small improvement on this was a curved lever (called a serpentine), with a clamp at the end, attached to the side of the musket. The burning match was held in the clamp. When a lever (in later models a trigger) was pulled the serpentine dropped in the flash pan igniting the primer. When the lever (or the trigger) was released the serpentine moved back. Then a fresh charge of the propellant followed by a lead ball had to be rammed into the barrel and the primer had to be placed in the flash pan for firing the next shot. This type of musket could only be used under fair weather conditions. Also, the risk of accidents could not be ruled out.

As the name suggests, the wheel lock musket used a small steel wheel with a deliberately roughened edge. Pulling the trigger made the wheel spin and rub against a small piece of sulphide held against it in a clamp, causing sparks to be generated. The wheel and sulphide were so placed that the sparks fell into the flash pan and ignited the primer. (The operation was similar to a modern cigarette lighter.) Manufacture of these wheel locks had begun in Europe in the 16th Century. While this design eliminated the need for a match and considerably reduced the risk of accidents, the more complicated and expensive mechanism of the wheel lock put a limitation on its widespread use.

A development on these muskets was the flint lock, appearing in Europe in the early 17th Century. When the trigger is pulled, a flint held in a pincer impacts on a small iron piece above the flash pan causing sparks that ignite the primer. Its simple

design and comparatively low cost made the flint lock very popular and soon half a dozen variants emerged. Flintlocks were used in European armies up to about 1840 and were replaced thereafter by percussion cap and cartridge based systems.

Infantries of 17th Century Indian rulers were equipped with match locks which, in all probability, must have been of the hand held match type. As these were heavy and cumbersome their muzzles (forward tip) were rested on a forked stick like a crutch while firing.<sup>436</sup>

Not much is known about the infantry of the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi rulers. All that may be said is that their infantrymen used muskets.<sup>437</sup>

### *Sihbandi*

It appears that, besides the regulars in the Mughal army, another class of soldier, known as the sihbandi, was also maintained. When Shaista Khan was subadar of Gujarat (1646-1648), he was being paid a sum of Rs.500,000 per year, in addition to what his *mansab* entailed, for enlisting 3000 horsemen as the *sihbandi*.<sup>438</sup> Likewise, a newsletter dated 7th May 1661 reports that Muhammad Mumin, fauzdar of the Ramgir Sarkar sent 30 footmen and five horsemen belonging to the sihbandi of Nasarullah [the diwan of the sarkar] to deal with dacoits who had laid waste the village of Dharmavarampet.<sup>439</sup>

Except for occasional references to the sihbandi in source documents, nothing is known about their number in the Mughal army, the weapons they carried or how they were organized. The corps consisted of both horsemen and foot soldiers but they were neither part of a *mansabdar's* contingent, nor did they belong to the artillery or the standing infantry

attached to the artillery division, nor indeed were they ahadis. It seems they were more like a paramilitary force, recruited at the local level as and when need for their services arose, and were assigned to serve under the *subadar*, *faujdar* or other official for work like collection of revenue, dealing with robbers and similar other jobs.

#### ELEPHANTS

The use of the elephant as regular fighting corps in battle had ceased in India by the 17th Century. However, elephants protected by armour of chain mail were used as mounts for noblemen during battle, perhaps because it facilitated easier observation of the conduct of the battle and also because soldiers could see their commander and rally around him. [440](#) However, in the event that such commander was wounded or killed, his soldiers, realizing this occurrence, were quite likely to break out into a panic or abandon the battle altogether and flee. The Alamgirnama provides an instance of this. In the course of the Battle of Samugarh (29th May 1658), Dara Shukoh, who was mounted on an elephant, was positioned in the centre of his forces. A few rockets launched by Aurangzeb's artillery fell around Dara's elephant. A terrified Dara, deciding to seek a safer position for himself, got off the elephant and mounted a horse. This act caused his soldiers to panic and flee the field. [441](#) Bernier corroborates this, adding that it was on the treacherous advice of a certain Khalilullah that Dara was prompted to act thus. [442](#)

Besides this disadvantage, an elephant is a large enough target to hit even from a distance. A wounded elephant is quite capable of getting out of control, running amok and trampling one's own soldiers.

The Badshahnama provides the following figures pertaining to the twentieth year of Shah Jahan's reign (1646-47).<sup>443</sup> These do not include the *sihbandi* (assigned to administrations in the *parganas*) and there is no source extant to ascertain their numbers.

200,000 horsemen including

8,000 mansabdars

7,000 ahadi and barkandaz

185,000 troopers, by the 1/4th rule

40,000 [including gunners and foot soldiers] *tufangchi*, *top-andaz* and *gola-andaz*<sup>444</sup> (of whom 10,000 were with the Emperor and 30,000 were distributed over the *subas* and forts)

Bernier corroborates the figures stated about horsemen by the Badshahnama.<sup>445</sup> Moreover, the numbers stated are not in variance with the estimates of Imperial revenue. It may be presumed that these figures were not too different during Shivaji's times.

A substantial part of this standing force must have been engaged in maintaining law and order in the various subas. The geographical expanse of the Empire and the tardiness with which the Mughal army moved over long marches must have made it impossible to quickly reassign troops from one part of the Empire to another. Inefficient supply systems and bad (even non-existent) roads could have placed limitations on the number of troops that could be kept at any one place. All these factors together contributed in limiting the number of men that could be deployed in a theatre of war at any one time to about 50000–60000 cavalry and 5000–10000 infantry.<sup>446</sup>

Bernier writes that the Mughal cavalry force in the Deccan was twenty or twenty-five thousand (sometimes, thirty) and that this number was not in excess of the strength ordinarily needed to keep the Qutbshah sufficiently compliant, or to prosecute the

war against the Adilshah and the local chieftains who joined hands with him out of the need for mutual protection.<sup>447</sup> Fryer says the Mughal forces in the Deccan numbered not less than forty thousand cavalry besides infantry and that this was sufficient to easily annex Bijapur and Golconda one after another.<sup>448</sup> It could thus be concluded that the Mughal forces in the four subas of the Deccan at times when war was not imminent, numbered about thirty-five thousand cavalry besides eight to ten thousand in the artillery and infantry.

No records exist to ascertain the strengths of the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi armies. However, the Basatin-us Salatin, in its concluding comments about Muhammad Adilshah's reign, states that the Adilshshi army then had 80,000 cavalry, 200,000 *hasham* (infantrymen) and 530 elephants.<sup>449</sup> The *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* says that the Adilshshi cavalry was 120,000 strong during the reign of Muhammad Adilshah and 80,000 in Ali's when Mirza Raja Jai Singh invaded Bijapur.<sup>450</sup> However, neither source is reliable so far as this information is concerned. It is evident from a number of sources that the Adilshahi generally fielded no more than 30,000 horsemen in any theatre of war, from which it could be said that it had a standing cavalry of about fifty or sixty thousand.<sup>451</sup> It needs to be appreciated in this connection that the central Mughal administration had a greater control over affairs in its subas as compared with the hold the Adilshahi had over its *mukasas*. A *subadar* appointed to govern a Mughal suba was assigned some mansabdars with their respective contingents to assist him. The mukasdar in the Adilshahi governed the mukasa all by himself; no troops were assigned by the central Adilshahi administration to a mukasa. As such, the proportion between the total standing army and the force that was commissioned to any particular theatre of war was different for the Mughals and the Adilshahi.

The strength of the standing Adilshahi infantry could have been about twenty or twenty-five thousand, excluding the men enlisted by the deshmukhs and those employed by the mukasdars for maintaining order in their mukosas.

The Qutbshahi was certainly not as robust as the Adilshahi, and did not offer as much resistance to Mughal expansionism as did the Adilshahi. For instance, when the Mughals opened a campaign in 1630-31 against both these Deccan Sultanates, the Adilshah offered resistance but the Qutbshah agreed to pay tribute. Again, in 1636, when the Mughals annexed the Nizamshahi, the Qutbshah meekly agreed to pay tribute but the Adilshah resisted till, finally, a treaty was signed and a part of the erstwhile Nizamshah's territory was divided between the Mughals and the Adilshah. Moreover, the Qutbshahi had often needed to bow down before the stronger Adilshahi. It could thus be surmised that the Qutbshahi army was smaller than its Adilshahi counterpart; perhaps it had no more than twenty or twenty-five thousand cavalry and an equal number of foot soldiers.

#### **DISCIPLINE, TRAINING AND UNIFORMS**

Discipline was very lax in the Mughal army, as was the general state of affairs in every other Indian army in the 17th Century. Bernier's prescient remarks are worth quoting in this respect:

**452**

"These immense armies frequently perform great feats; but when thrown into confusion it is impossible to restore them to discipline. They resemble an impetuous river which has burst its banks; and whose waters, unrestrained in their course, disperse over the surrounding country, while no means can be devised to arrest them in their career of desolation. I could never see these soldiers, destitute of order, and marching with the irregularity of a herd of animals,

without reflecting upon the ease with which five-and-twenty thousand of our veterans from the army in Flanders, commanded by Prince Condè or Marshal Turenne<sup>453</sup> could overcome these armies, however numerous."

No army in 17th Century India had any system for training its officers and men, nor was any regular drill or combat practice done. However, archers and musketeers in the Mughal army were occasionally subjected to tests and classified according to their performance. <sup>454</sup> The German traveler Mandelslo witnessed such an examination when he called upon Azam Khan, the subadar of Ahmedabad in Gujarat on 20th October 1638. <sup>455</sup> Thevenot, too, mentions these tests of marksmanship in his description of the '*Maidan Shah*' ground in Ahmedabad where, he says, archers used to practice hitting a ball placed in the highest reaches of a tall tree planted in the middle for that purpose. <sup>456</sup>

The system of uniforms for soldiers was non-existent. <sup>457</sup> But it seems that the various ethnic groups, such as Rajputs, Afghans, Persians and Hinusthani Muslims, were distinguishable from one another by their characteristic traditional apparel. <sup>458</sup> The Mughal Emperor had a standard on which was depicted, according to Terry, a "couchant lion shadowing part of the body of the sun" and according to Mundy, "a tiger couching with the sun rising over his back." <sup>459</sup> This standard and several other signs used to be carried as a set, collectively called the qur, whenever the Emperor set out on campaigns or hunts. Only some very senior noblemen would occasionally be honoured by presenting them with some of the subsidiary signs like the tuman-tok or the mahi-maratib and granting them the right to brandish them. <sup>460</sup>

The *Basatin-us Salatin* states that the Adilshahi standard was yellow in colour.<sup>461</sup>

Nothing at all is known about the standards and ensigns of the Qutbshahi.

#### THE ARMY IN THE FIELD

##### *Organization*

An army assembled for undertaking a military campaign comprised contingents of a number of mansabdars and, sometimes, a detachment of ahadis. Artillery and infantry would also be included, their number depending on the objective of the campaign. A veritable mobile marketplace, with traders of various goods required by the troops, went along with the army. <sup>462</sup> Those traders, their servants, their families, servants of the soldiers and even the families of the servants all went along with the marching army. Although no actual figures are available, this number was considerable, often likely to be, as a conservative estimate, half of the number of combatants. For example, Careri visited Aurangzeb's camp at Galgali (50 km south-south-west of Bijapur) in 1695. He was told that some sixty thousand cavalry and a hundred thousand foot soldiers besides fifty thousand camels and three thousand elephants to carry their supplies were in the camp. Sellers of foodstuffs, traders and artisans exceeded the number of combatants, so that the entire camp was a mobile city with a population of five hundred thousand. Each nobleman had a separate marketplace and anything one desired, not to speak of food and grain, was available in abundance in the two hundred and fifty such markets.<sup>463</sup>

The command of the field army was entrusted to the senior most mansabdar and another would be assigned to assist him in the capacity of bakhshi and waqai-nawis.<sup>464</sup> The Emperor could receive reports about the progress of the campaign

through communications from both the commander and the waqai-nawis.[465](#)

**Before** the battle was actually joined, the entire force would be arranged in various groups.

Almost the same pattern of organization was followed in the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi. Occasionally, a unit of the khaskhail would be included.[466](#)

### *Supply*

Some arrangement for unbroken supply of essential commodities from the base had to be made for a force of ten or twenty thousand that was encamped at a place that did not facilitate ready availability of goods. In a wider sense, the base of any military force could be considered as the area from which essential supplies could be conveniently drawn.[467](#) In a more limited sense, the small area where essentials could be gathered from surrounding regions and stored, to be later supplied to the campaigning army, could be considered as its base.[468](#) If the force is small or spread over a large area, it would be possible to procure provisions from the surrounding country. Yet, it had to depend upon a base for its supply of munitions and reinforcements. Moreover, if the enemy was in proximity or there existed a possibility of him coming close, such dispersion for the sake of obtaining supplies locally would leave it open to the risk of being defeated in detail. For this reason, any campaigning army had to have a base for its supply even of provisions and grain.

A party of a few persons can trek for several days through roadless terrain, across hills and dales, rivers and forests. They can obtain food and shelter even in a small hamlet. But an army of 10 or 20 thousand men cannot cover large distances in such manner. Their requirements are too great to be supplied from a

few villages on the way. So, roads are necessary for supplies to reach the campaigning army from the base, just as they are indispensable for heavy artillery to be moved on the march and for replacing stocks of ordnance. The typical mount used by the cavalry, such as an Arab, Turki or similar breed, stood about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  meters tall, weighed four or five hundred kg and consumed 6 kg each of grain and fodder.<sup>469</sup> A human being needs about 1 or  $1\frac{1}{2}$  kg food every day. A force with ten thousand horsemen (each with a single mount) would mean a daily requirement of grain amounting to 70 MT, not to speak of hay. If we add to this the feed required for beasts of burden such as bullocks, camels and elephants, the requirement for grain would easily cross 100 MT. A lightly equipped army might be able to subsist for some time even if it cuts itself loose from its communications with the base. But even that would entail setting up a new base, or the good prospect of establishing a new line of supply to the old base after reaching a certain objective. Obviously, taking heavy artillery pieces would be out of the question. Such a force could live off the surrounding areas, but only temporarily, for essential commodities would soon become exhausted. It would be unable to remain in one place for too long. As it would have chosen to leave artillery behind, and also because it was untenable to remain rooted in a single place, such an army would be unable to capture forts by laying siege. At the same time, it would not be able to retain control over any enemy territory that it might have captured, and would merely have to lay the territory waste and return to base.

The difficulties in maintaining steady supplies increased in proportion to the distance the army had covered from its base, and stores of some supplies would need to be set up at convenient intervals along the route, perhaps needing an altogether new base if it went too far. If the supply route traversed enemy territory, it would be constantly under the threat of being cut off or impeded by enemy attacks. All the energy of such an advancing army would then be spent in protecting its lines of supply.

Communications in 17th Century India were of the most primitive nature. Indeed, there were no roads that had been intentionally prepared so that mere paths that had been naturally created by frequent passage of men, beasts, pilgrims, armies or caravans were all that were ordinarily available. These usually went along places affording convenience of travel like mountain passes, fords for crossing rivers or ready availability of water, fodder and grains. The north Indian plains facilitated transportation by lading beasts of burden like bullocks and camels or by bullock carts but few routes in the mountainous regions of the Deccan were suited for transportation by bullock carts. Most of the transportation was done entirely on the backs of animals. European travelers have left accounts of having seen banjaras, who did the work of transportation for a living, and their goods-laden animals in the thousands.<sup>470</sup> A single banjara used to own many bullocks, sometimes as many as a thousand.<sup>471</sup> They mainly engaged in transportation but at times also dabbled in trading the goods they carried.<sup>472</sup> Peter Mundy says he saw a train of as many as 14,000 bullocks on one occasion and says that the number of banjaras and their families would have been six or seven hundred.<sup>473</sup> These banjaras carried arms like bows and arrows and muskets for self protection.<sup>474</sup> After a day's march, bullocks had to be unladen and again laden before setting out the next day.<sup>475</sup> At the end of each day, after reaching the place of halt, they had to be let off for grazing.<sup>476</sup> Land was plentiful and there was no dearth of pastures.<sup>477</sup> But because of the large number of bullocks, and the time required for grazing and for loading and unloading of goods, these convoys could not cover distances of more than 10 to 15 km per day.<sup>478</sup>

Few rivers had bridges across them.<sup>479</sup> It was therefore necessary to cross them either at fords or by ferries. Wherever possible, carts were taken across the fords without unloading.

<sup>480</sup> Where this was not possible they had to be unloaded before going across; goods were then taken across by ferries and again loaded in the carts. <sup>481</sup> This involved a great deal of inconvenience to these caravans and further slowed down their pace.

In the rainy season when rivers were in spate and routes turned into quagmires, all traffic came to a standstill. Therefore, generally speaking, all military operations were suspended during the monsoons (June to September).

Cooked food was never provided, either by the central government or the respective officers, to soldiers of any of the Indian armies in the 17th Century. Soldiers had to buy their own supplies from traders who always accompanied them and also do the cooking. Several Europeans mention that the khichadi, made of pulses and rice and eaten with ghee, was the most popular staple of soldiers on the march, evidently because it was both nourishing and convenient to prepare. <sup>482</sup>

To supply the markets traveling with the army, banjaras with convoys of thousands of bullocks laden with grain came to the camp. <sup>483</sup> They were encouraged to ply their trade and were occasionally even provided with an escort for their security. <sup>484</sup>

Irrespective of whether a campaigning force was in its own territory or that of the enemy, the surrounding country was ravaged for firewood, fodder and other needs. When this depletion was especially severe, the administration was forced to reduce or even waive revenue collection for that year. <sup>485</sup>

Primitive communications, the problems of supply and storage and the large number of non-combatants accompanying the army placed an upper limit on the size of the force that could be maintained in a given area. [486](#)

### *Marches and Camps*

The Mughal army on the march would move in three generally distinct groups – the van guard, the main body and the rear guard – each led by the senior most mansabdar among them. The route to be followed as well as the destination for the day used to be determined after considering the availability of fodder and water on the way and the distance to be covered in the day's march. A mansabdar used to be appointed as the mir-i manzil to ride in advance of the main body to locate a suitable place for the next camp and plan its layout. [487](#) Bernier mentions the presence of such an officer in one of the Emperor's entourages, calling him Le Grand Maréchal des Logis (or Grand Quarter Master) instead of mir-i manzil. [488](#) At times, outposts used to be set up on the way to guard the supply route, and advance parties of labourers dispatched ahead to improve the route. Where rivers had no suitable fords, pontoon bridges needed to be constructed or boats arranged in sufficient numbers to ferry the army across. [489](#) During Shah Jahan's march from Kabul to Shahjahanabad (Delhi) in 1652, pontoon bridges were built on the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Satluj comprising 55, 56, 50 and 104 pontoons respectively; the one on the Jhelum was built in six prahars (18 hours). [490](#) Ferrying was of course more time consuming. While pursuing Dara during the Mughal Civil War, Aurangzeb's army had to cross the Satluj by ferry as there was no ford and no suitable boats for building bridges. Due to the paucity of boats, it took eleven days for the army to cross over. [491](#) Generally, no campaigns were initiated or prosecuted during the rainy season. [492](#)

The speed of movement of the Mughal army was about 30 km a day. [493](#) If we assume two days of halt per week, this rate, including days of marches and halts, gives an average of about 20 km per day. This speed could reduce on account of a number of factors like exhaustion, absence of the need to make haste, awaiting smaller straggling units to join up, want of sufficient number of boats for ferrying across rivers and others that might force it to wait in the same place for a few days.

Instances may be found when the Mughal cavalry covered long distances – even as much as 80 km – in a day. [494](#) But these were short bursts and could not be maintained over protracted periods.

A *mansabdar* or a special official called the *gurzbardar* used to be appointed as the *sazawal* to ensure that a *mansabdar* summoned to Court or assigned to a campaign hastened to promptly comply with Imperial orders without tarrying. It became the *sazawal's* responsibility to keep coaxing the *mansabdar* and actually reach him at the appointed place within the appointed time. [495](#)

Astrologers would be consulted to determine the auspicious time for important undertakings like setting out on campaigns or investing forts. [496](#) Perhaps this was only done when an undertaking did not demand urgent action, and the astrologers, too, in a spirit of pragmatic accommodation, suggested a time that was convenient to all concerned. [497](#)

The typical Mughal camp used to be well planned and organized. Each contingent had a predetermined place and would occupy it irrespective of where the army encamped. [498](#) Each had its own sentries and the whole camp, too, was guarded. Places were also assigned for the different bazars accompanying the army. Sometimes, a trench would be dug all

around the camp and filled up with thorny brambles. Pickets, too, would be placed.

Detachments of horsemen used to be sent out of the camp every day for gathering fodder for the mounts and firewood for the soldiers.<sup>499</sup>

No source mentions the practices followed in marching armies of the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi, but it could be assumed that they were similar to those followed by the Mughals.

### *Communication*

The system for conveying official state correspondence was known as the *dakchauki* in the Mughal Empire.<sup>500</sup> This facility was not available to the general public.<sup>501</sup> Government mail used to be carried by relays of couriers.<sup>502</sup> Sometimes the work of carrying mail used to be assigned to private contractors.<sup>503</sup> According to a *Dastur-ul Amal* (c.1706-07) the speed of mail moving through the *dakchauki* was 30 *jaribi kos* (or about 120 km.) per day.<sup>504</sup> A special line of *dakchaukis* would be set up for communicating with a campaigning army.<sup>505</sup>

Special horsemen would be appointed for carrying *farmans* from the Emperor. The person to whom the *farman* was addressed was required by prevailing protocol to go some distance out from his place of residence to ceremonially and respectfully receive it.<sup>506</sup> A communication from the Emperor personally was known as a *farman*, that from princes and other members of the Imperial family, a *nishan*. Even potentates like the Adilshah and Qutbshah had to observe this protocol while receiving the Mughal Emperor's *farman*.<sup>507</sup> No records have survived to tell us what practice was followed in the case of

farmans sent by the Adilshah to his subordinates, but there exist records of two farmans (once in 1674 and again in 1683) from the Qutbshah being received by the English by going out of the town of Madras (Chennai). [508](#)

The Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates, too, had systems similar to the Mughal dakchauki for carrying government correspondence. [509](#)

### *Medical Facilities*

No formal or organized medical help was even contemplated, much less available, in the armies of Eastern powers in 17th Century India. However, there is mention of a kind of dispensary, referred to as a dar us-shifa, at Aurangabad during the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, with a hakim (Muslim physician) as its darogha (superintendent), who was also a mansabdar of 100 dhat rank. [510](#) That a mansab was given to him does not necessarily mean the man was a soldier besides being a doctor and that the dispensary was set up to satisfy needs of the army; mansabs used to be given to civilian officials, too.

However, it is quite possible that physicians of one kind or another used to be employed individually by mansabdars to treat the men in their respective contingents.

### *Battle Tactics*

Horsemen of Central Asia based their tactics on a combination of swiftness and their archery skills which involved charging the enemy at a gallop, simultaneously shooting arrows at him and, when they had reached a point very near his lines, turning round with equal rapidity and galloping away in the opposite direction. They would turn their torsos around and shoot more arrows even as they were receding. While this frontal attack was being executed, some groups would approach from the

flanks and repeat the similar tactic. If the enemy pursued them, they feigned flight and, as soon as an opportunity occurred, turned around and shot showers of arrows upon him. This would be repeated time and again till the enemy lines were disrupted and he was fully exhausted. Only then would a decisive attack be launched, closing with the enemy and engaging in hand to hand combat with the spear and sword. In the Battle of Tarain (1192), Shihabuddin Ghori employed the same tactic against Prithviraj Chauhan with success. [511](#)

Explaining these tactics Monserrate writes: [512](#)

"The Mongols, Persians, Parthians, Turks, Sogdians, Bactrians and Scythians (or Tartars) all use the same fighting tactics. To pass over details, they are most dangerous when they seem to be flying in headlong riot. For, turning round on their horses, although they are going at full gallop, they fling their javelins with such deadly aim that they can transfix the eye of an enemy....If they invite battle with six thousand troops, they are sure to have twenty thousand hiding in ambush; and in the rear of these again several thousands more are held in reserve, that they may support the advance-guard in case of a reverse, or rally them, if routed. Such reserves often turn defeat into sudden victory by checking the pursuit, by restoring the fight through their freshness and unimpaired vigour, and by compelling the weary enemy to retire....On advancing to the attack Mongol generals extend one or both wings in the endeavour to outflank and encircle the enemy."

The Mughals had come into India from Central Asia, too. But they had abandoned this tactic soon after they had settled down. They were threatened by no formidable political entity, their artillery and cavalry were far superior to any in the land and, as their boundaries began to expand with new conquests,

they also gained the advantage of numbers. By the 17th Century, the place of fighting skill was slowly but surely taken by dependence on brute strength.

The system that had thus evolved under Indian conditions was something like this. [513](#) The commander of a Mughal army advancing towards the enemy, or one that was waiting for the enemy to approach, would send out a detachment of horsemen, called the qarawul, as scouts to acquire intelligence about enemy movements. The commander would draw up his formation when the two armies were close to one another. The artillery was placed in front and guns were tethered together with iron chains or thick leather ropes to prevent ingress of enemy horsemen through gaps between adjacent guns. [514](#) These would be followed by gajnals, shutarnals and companies of musketeers. The cavalry, divided into several divisions with the senior most mansabdar among them as commander, was placed behind them. [515](#) These divisions usually followed the following formation: [516](#)

1. Kol – The central division with the commander-in-chief
2. Baranghar, Dast-i Rast and Maimana – all three words mean the right side or hand. One to three divisions would stand on the right of the kol and each of these would be given one of these names.
3. Jaranghar, Dast-i Chap and Maisara – all three words mean the left side or hand. One to three divisions would stand on the left of the kol and each of these would be given one of these names.
4. Altamash (or Iltamash) – the division placed directly in front of the kol.
5. Harawal – the division placed ahead of even the altamash

6. Harawal-i Jaranghar – the division placed before the jaranghar

7. Harawal-i Baranghar – the division placed before the baranghar

8. Chandawul – a division placed behind all of these to protect the camp.

Thus, in brief, the Mughal army stood for battle in three main lines: artillery with musketeers in the first line, harawal with its left and right wings in the second line and kol (including altamash) with its left and right wings in the third line.

Hostilities would begin with artillery fire, musket fire and rockets.<sup>517</sup> Within a little time, one of the cavalry groups in either of the contending armies would launch a charge, shooting arrows while closing in upon the other.<sup>518</sup> Bernier says nine out of ten such arrows either sailed over enemy heads or fell too short to do any harm.<sup>519</sup> However, the mainstay was invariably brute force. Hand to hand combat with swords, spears and like weapons would ensue as soon as the rival forces closed in. Other units, too, followed the first and joined in battle. It was this phase of the battle that decided the outcome. The losing side would start fleeing and its camp would be looted by the victors.

The technique followed by the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi for pitched battles was generally similar to the Mughals.<sup>520</sup> However, when fighting against the Mughals, the Nizamshahi, Adilshahi and Qutbshahi forces avoided pitched battles, perhaps because the mere cavalry numbers and artillery of the Mughals were decidedly superior. Instead, they wore out the enemy by hovering around him on the march, picked off

stragglers and, when an opportunity presented itself, closed in and attacked a part of the enemy army, retiring quickly before the enemy could organize a counter attack, attacked the enemy's camp at night with muskets and rockets, retired hastily if the Mughals stood out to fight and turned around to surround and attack an enemy detachment which might have come too far forward, again kept hovering around the enemy as he retired towards the camp in frustration and fell upon foraging parties and convoys of bullocks bringing supplies to the enemy, [521](#) In Persian these tactics were called *bargigiri*, *qazzaqi* (also *jung-i qazzaqana*) or *jang-i gurezi*. [522](#)

#### FORTS

##### *Their Efficacy*

Forts played a significant role in both defence and offence in 17th Century India. Should an invading army march ahead without first gaining control of a fort on its route or in proximity of its route, it was taking the great risk of letting the garrison attack and disrupt its communications and supplies. A lightly equipped army on a plundering expedition would not be dependent for a continuous supply from its base. But one intending to prosecute a protracted campaign could not afford to advance without capturing or neutralizing enemy forts, especially the large ones, on its route. It would either have to lay siege and capture them or leave part of its force to ensure that the garrisons do not sally forth. [523](#) However, such measure would only be possible if there were just one or two forts on or near the route. If it attempted such measure with numerous forts, the invading army would be divided into several small parts and would be exposed to attack in detail. On the other hand, laying siege and awaiting capitulation would slow down the advance, affording the enemy time to prepare. Thus, forts facilitated preventing, or at least slowing down, the advance of

an invading army, for which reason they came to be constructed on or near important routes. [524](#)

Large settlements obviously are located along important routes and had to be made secure by either constructing defensive walls around them or building a fort nearby. They also served the important tasks of keeping treasury and lines of communication secure, and also provide asylum to important personages when enemy troops approached. For instance, the cities of Delhi, Agra and Ahmednagar have forts near them, while the whole city of Bijapur is surrounded by protective walls.

Some forts were constructed to provide bases to facilitate attacks on the enemy who might have besieged an important fort nearby. Tung, Tikona, Lohgad and Visapur are four such mutually supporting forts in the Maval Taluka of Pune District. The distance between them is not more than 10 km.

Fortifications used to be made on high hills near a fort to prevent the enemy from using them to bring the main fort under cannonade. Vajragad, half a kilometer north east of Purandar, and Pavangad, one kilometer east of Panhala, seem to have been constructed with this purpose.

Very small fortresses, incapable of holding significant garrisons, were perhaps only built to secure treasury and stores of grain, or to afford refuge to important persons from sudden attacks of local rebels.

Forts near borders served as storehouses for ordnance and supplies for an invasion of neighbouring territory and also as refuge in case a hasty retreat had to be executed.

### *Construction of Forts*

Large forts in the plains generally had ramparts between 10 and 30 meters high, and 5 and 15 meters thick. [525](#) To build such massive ramparts, the inner and outer walls were first constructed, the space between them filled up with rubble and then plastered. [526](#) A parapet with a series of loopholes or slits (called jangi or bari) in it would be constructed on the top of the rampart to provide protection to soldiers of the garrison firing at the enemy.

A narrow strip along the length of the rampart close to its base cannot be sighted and brought under fire from the parapet. Towers or bastions jutting out from the line of the rampart were constructed to enable the defenders to also bring this area under enfilading fire. As these bastions had more space, cannons would be placed on them with mechanisms to rotate them in any direction.

Some forts have two ramparts, the outer one slightly lower than the inner one to facilitate fire from the inner wall in case the outer one fell into enemy hands. This outer wall used to be known as the sher haji. Aurangzeb had one built around the Agra fort; it was completed six years after its commencement in 1659. [527](#) Other forts like Solapur, Paranda and Kandhar also had sher hajis. [528](#)

The entrance to a fort usually has two towers on either side. An enclosure would be constructed before the gate to shield it from enemy fire.

A moat, usually 5-6 m deep and 10-40 m wide, used to be sunk around the outer wall of the fort. It was filled up with water from live springs of groundwater or from a nearby river or lake. A drawbridge across the moat facilitated ingress and egress. The Red Fort at Agra had such a drawbridge which could be raised and lowered with iron chains running over pulleys. [529](#) Sometimes a causeway below the edge of the moat with steps

leading down to it from both sides was built with walls on both sides of the causeway to keep it dry. Pegs in those walls could be removed to submerge the bridge when needed. [530](#)

A slight raised area, some distance away from the moat and sloping away from it, running all around may be observed in some forts. The slope of the outer periphery of this raised area was so made that the rampart could not be seen by anyone approaching it from without. It was thus impossible to target the rampart from this position. This was known as the '*glacis*' (*revan* or *revani* in Marathi) and the area between the glacis and the moat, the 'covered way'. Dharwad, Harihar, Holehonnur, Bijapur, Naldurg, Paranda and Ahmednagar forts have the *glacis*. [531](#) Soldiers from the garrison could come out and fire at the enemy from behind the cover of the *glacis*, and the enemy could not bring its cannons forward until these soldiers had been driven away.

Forts used to be built on hills where possible. South India, especially the Sahyadri Range, provided many sites suitable for this purpose. A single plateau with no prominence around it would be selected for fortification. Where necessary, the sides would be scarped to some distance to render them steep and inaccessible. Such a plateau required minimal fortification; all that was needed was to build a parapet to provide cover for the defenders. Bastions would be added at places where the periphery of the plateau projected sharply outward or inward.

Only a few winding pathways were built, if necessary by cutting into the rock, to pass between one or more gates as they ascended. These gateways had towers on either side and the pathway winding up to it was always exposed to fire from the gateways as well as the fort. Fryer has left us an account of the seven gates of the Shivneri Fort. [532](#)

A prominence rising above the rest of the main plateau would also be fortified and called the bala-i qila, as would any ledges or terraces lying below it whence it might be possible to climb up to the fort. These fortified terraces below the top were called *machi*. Rajgad and Torna have both these features.

Rain water stored in tanks hewn out of rock provided water for the garrison. Some forts have plateaus large enough to make even crop cultivation possible. The Panhala fort, for instance, has a periphery of seven km.

It was ordinarily impossible for a besieging army to completely encircle and starve the garrison of mountain forts, which were constructed on top of massive outcrops of rock. However, this type of fort also had its shortcomings. Usually, it had no ditch or moat and the ground around its base was broken and strewn with boulders which offered excellent cover for night escalades. It was therefore necessary to throw a ring of outposts around the fort to watch possible approaches.

### *Administration of Forts*

A mansabdar would be appointed by the Emperor as commandant of a fort. He was prohibited from leaving the fort without the express permission of the Emperor.<sup>533</sup> He would occasionally be replaced. A waqai-navis was appointed in each fort to report on events.<sup>534</sup>

The fort was staffed with a garrison comprising horsemen belonging to the commandant's own contingent, those of other *mansabdars* that might have been assigned to assist him, *cannoneers*, *rocketeers*, *musketeers*, and occasionally some *ahadis* and *naikwadis*.<sup>535</sup> Besides, carpenters, labourers, stone cutters and other artisans would also be assigned.<sup>536</sup> Large and

important forts could have a garrison of as many as five thousand men.<sup>537</sup>

Periodical inspection of the garrison, cannons and ordnance, grains and other stores by a mansabdar deputed by the central office of the suba would be done. An official newsletter dated 18th April 1662 from the Baglan Sarkar says that a certain mansabdar called Malik Husain Muhammad had arrived with a letter of authority, stamped and sealed by Muhammad Hadi, the *bakhshi* of the Khandesh Suba, to conduct inspection of the forts of Baglan.<sup>538</sup>

Not much is known about the total number of forts in the Mughal Empire and the strength of their garrison. However, the Badshahnama says that when the Nizamshahi was annexed in 1636, the four subas of the Deccan had sixty-four, of which fifty-three were hill forts.<sup>539</sup> The kingdom of Baglan, which had nine forts, was annexed in 1638.<sup>540</sup> No figures are available about the strength of the garrison in these seventy-three forts. But considering the strength of the Mughal army in the Deccan it seems that most of these forts could not have had a garrison of more than 100 to 125 footmen besides two or three hundred troopers from the contingents of *mansabdars*.<sup>541</sup>

In the Adilshahi Sultanate, commandants of some forts were appointed and occasionally changed by the Adilshah himself.<sup>542</sup> The commandant was known as the *havalidar* and was assisted by the sarnaubat, thanadar, sabnis and other officials.<sup>543</sup> The revenue of some villages used to be earmarked for expenses of maintaining the fort.<sup>544</sup> Some forts, situated in *parganas* awarded as mukasas, were administered by the *mukasdar* himself, almost independently of the king.<sup>545</sup>

No source gives details of the total number of Adilshahi forts and the strength of their garrisons.

### *Siegecraft*

Massive preparations were needed to capture an important fort by laying siege. For example, when Prince Dara Shukoh invested the fort of Kandahar in Afghanistan in 1653, he had under his command: [546](#)

- 1) 56,000 troopers
- 2) 10,000 foot soldiers (which included musketeers, cannoneers and racketeers)
- 3) 60 elephants (excluding those of the mansabdars)
- 4) 7 large cannons
- 5) 7 hawai cannons (perhaps mortars)
- 6) 30 small cannons
- 7) 25 gajnals
- 8) 100 shturnals
- 9) 30,000 small and large cannon balls
- 10) 5,000 maunds (about 150 metric tons) of gunpowder
- 11) 1,500 maunds (about 45 metric tons) of lead (evidently for making bullets).
- 12) 14,000 rockets
- 13) 3,000 camels for transporting treasury, artillery stores, and miscellaneous items
- 14) 1,000 beldars from his own contingent plus those from his mansabdars, plus 6,000 additional beldars
- 15) 500 men for digging tunnels
- 16) 500 bhistics (water carriers)

Three of the seven large cannons were manufactured especially for this campaign. Two of them were capable of firing iron balls of 29 kg, and the third, 34 kg. [547](#) The siege lasted from 25th April to 28th September 1653 during which period the besiegers fired a total of 27,000 cannon balls and had, within

the first 56 days of the siege, dug trenches almost a kilometer long up to the ditch.<sup>548</sup>

The artillery in those times could seldom breach the walls of strong forts. Fortifications were well nigh impregnable and siegework was a laborious business. Even a small fort defended by a few resolute men could hold out for months against the strongest besieging army. The surest way of reducing a fort was blockade and starvation – a protracted process.

The first task of the besieging army was to establish outposts and block all approaches to the fort so as to cut it off from all outside succour. Zigzag approach trenches were then opened, from a line beyond the range of the guns in the fort and towards the bastion or front chosen for attack, to shelter the infantry moving forward under cover of artillery fire.<sup>549</sup> The earth dug up for making trenches was heaped on both sides to afford protection from the fire of guns and muskets in the fort.<sup>550</sup> The trenches were dug in a zigzag pattern so that guns in the fort could not sweep down their length.<sup>551</sup> From these, a trench was dug parallel to the fortress wall and connecting the approach trenches to protect the batteries against sallies of the defenders; the guns were then moved forward.<sup>552</sup> Then, if necessary, the trenches were pushed forward and a second or third parallel was dug.

Artillery fire, when the range was achieved, would initially be concentrated on the parapets of the rampart, as their demolition left little or no cover for the defenders to fire at the attackers so that fire from the portion so demolished would cease.<sup>553</sup> This eased the task of pushing forward the trenches. At times, big ramps of earth and stone (called damdams) taller than the ramparts of the fort were erected and guns and musketeers were mounted on these to sweep the inside of the

fortress. [554](#) While these operations were going on, tunnels (mining galleries) were pushed forward to prepare the mines. When the trenches and tunnels reached the ditch, part of it was filled up with sacks filled with earth. [555](#) If necessary, separate trenches and tunnels were dug to drain the water from the moat. [556](#) When the mine galleries reached the rampart, a big chamber was carved out and filled with a ton or two of gun powder to prepare the mine. [557](#) The defenders could thwart mining attempts by counter mining to flood the mine galleries with water or to burn out the mine before it was ready. [558](#)

When a part of the fort wall was blown up by mining or was demolished by artillery fire, the besiegers rushed forward to storm the breach. If the breach was to be made by firing the mine, the commander of the besieging army fixed the time for it in advance and kept the storming party ready to rush forward as soon as the wall was blown up. If the wall was demolished by gun fire, the lower portion of the wall usually remained more or less intact. If it was blown up by a mine, the breach would get blocked by the settling debris of the wall. So in either case the attackers had to carry scaling ladders with them to enter through the breach. [559](#) The defenders standing in the breach and on the rampart on both sides of it used muskets, arrows, stones, burning sacks of cotton steeped in oil and *hukkahs* (pots of gun powder with a match attached) to repel the assault. [560](#) But as the besieging army was always numerically far superior to the garrison, the fate of the fort was sealed once a practicable breach was made.

At times, when mines were primed and all was in readiness for an assault, the commander of the attacking force would send an emissary offering to grant safe passage in return for possession of the fort; at times the fort commandant offered to deliver the fort in return for amnesty.

When a fort was besieged, the defender's army started making attacks on the besiegers from the outside. Therefore, the commander of the besiegers had to assign a portion of his army to protect the siege. It was also necessary to provide escort for the convoys of bullocks bringing grain and ammunition for the besiegers. Every day, foraging parties had to go out to collect fodder and firewood. These parties, too, were attacked by the defending army. Fodder in the immediate vicinity was soon exhausted and the foraging parties had to go farther and farther day by day [561](#) As the siege prolonged, the besiegers would begin suffering from a growing dearth of food and especially of fodder, and quite often had to raise the siege. It was difficult to continue the campaign in the rainy season and that, too, sometimes forced the besiegers to raise the siege.

No detailed descriptions of the sieges laid by the Adilshahi army are available, but the few references that have survived suggest that their siegework was similar to that of the Mughals. [562](#)

### *Intelligence*

Special reporters called the waqai-nawis and khufiyawanis were appointed to keep the Emperor informed of the smallest event in the remotest part of the Empire. Envoys appointed to foreign courts would also report on happenings in that state. When Abdul Mabud was appointed as the Imperial envoy at Bijapur, he was handed a dastak (commission) dated 15th January 1671 which specifically charged him to submit a weekly report on events there. [563](#) Some of these, which also make for interesting reading, tell us of the detail to which the Emperor had to keep himself informed. A few examples of such reports sent to Aurangzeb from Hyderabad are as follows: [564](#)

17th August 1661

'News received at the time of writing is that a ship belonging to Khan-i Khanan Sipahsalar<sup>565</sup> [Muazzam Khan] has arrived from Arakan and anchored in the Ishaqpattan harbour near Srikakulam. I have sent a man to the master of the vessel to ascertain from him the truth about the news that Nashuja<sup>566</sup> has been killed. I will include the report in the newsletter.'

#### 18th August 1661

'The Qutb-ul Mulk [i.e. the Qutbshah] has sent through his own courier, Kaka, twenty-five embroidered fabrics for Ali Adil's [i.e. Ali Adilshah's] servant, Sayyid Ilyas.

'Also, Qutb-ul Mulk has sent two plates of fruit for Muhammad Muqim who is the envoy of the Wali [i.e. Shah] of Iran.'

#### 19th August 1661

'Three hundred rockets and a hundred and fifty iron balls have been sent to the Golconda fort by the havaldar of Velconda.'

#### 1st September 1661

'As communicated on 13th August 1661, the Qutb-ul Mulk had not come out as per the protocol because he was ill with toothache and sore throat. Then the illness abated. But now the toothache and sore throat has again started. Whatever happens henceforth will be communicated in the newsletter.'

#### 15th September 1661

'Abdul Jabbar [a Qutbshahi nobleman] employed an Afghan jamaatdar [a group leader] as his servant. Now he has dismissed him from service after paying him the dues according to his [i.e. Abdul Jabbar's] own reckoning. The Afghans were clamouring for their

salary. Because Sayyid Muzaffar [another Qutbshahi nobleman] was at variance with Abdul Jabbar, he instigated the Afghans to seize an opportunity to kill him whenever he would be going from the fort to the town, or vice versa, without his retinue. On this date, Abdul Jabbar was going from the fort to the town with only a few men. The Afghans stopped him on the way and demanded settlement of their dues, threatening that they would kill him if he refused, even if they should die in the process. Finding no way to extricate himself, Abdul Jabbar alighted from his palanquin and signed a note at the Bibi Mosque in the caravanserai that his shroff should pay the amount. It appears that Abdul Jabbar will avenge himself on the Afghans. Developments will be communicated in newsletters.'

Another task occasionally assigned to envoys was bringing about defection of noblemen from other states to the Mughal Empire.

When Prince Aurangzeb, the subadar of the Deccan, was about to invade the Adilshahi Sultanate in 1656, he learnt from a dispatch of Muhammad Aman, the Mughal envoy at Bijapur, that several Adilshahi nobles were willing to come over into Mughal service but were precluded from doing so because they lacked sufficient money for expenses. So Aurangzeb wrote to Multafat Khan, the commandant of the Ahmednagar Fort, ordering him to make an advance payment from the treasury to such Adilshahi noblemen who produced letters of recommendation from Muhammad Aman.<sup>567</sup>

When the Adilshahi Sultanate was embroiled in internece strife during the reign of Sikandar Adilshah, Malik Barkhurdar, the Mughal envoy at Bijapur, had camped at Nauraspur for the express purpose of gaining defectors. He succeeded in winning over several noblemen and sent them to Diler Khan, the Mughal

subadar of the Deccan. These defectors subsequently obtained mansabs in the Mughal Empire.<sup>568</sup>

While the waqai-nawis and the envoy also performed the task of communicating intelligence to the Emperor, neither they nor indeed the khufiyawanis were ‘spies’ as such. All of them operated from their assigned stations within the Mughal Empire. But, in order to ferret out information about the enemy, a different group of persons called the harkara or jasoos was used. They primarily reported intelligence about military movements of the enemy. <sup>569</sup> Mansabdars were appointed as daroghas (administrators) to supervise their functioning. <sup>570</sup>

#### NAVY

The Mughal Empire was essentially a land power and had no navy in the real sense of the term. Without exception, all other political administrations in 17th Century India were most deficient when it came to sea power. None had anything even resembling a ‘navy’. Not just traders and senior state officials but even kings themselves had to obtain permits from various European naval powers in India for plying their vessels on the seas. Trading vessels owned by Mughal princes, noblemen and merchants would ply between the west coast of India to places like Gobrun (Bandar Abbas), Basra, Aden, Mokha and such, and from the east coast to places like Achin. The Mughals had no naval force on the west coast, which was infested by pirates of the Malabari, Sanjani and Vadhel communities. <sup>571</sup> All three were Muslim. The Sanjanis and the Vadhels were active mostly in the sea off the coastline between Gujarat southwards up to Mumbai; the Malabarlis from Mumbai southwards. No eastern power resisted them.

Bengal has a number of big rivers which simultaneously fostered transportation of goods by boat and hampered

overland communications. Most of the transportation was therefore done by river. The Mughals had a naval force at Dhaka, consisting of armed vessels and boats, which was used for campaigns in Bengal and Assam. [572](#) It was confined mostly to rivers and was useless against the Magh and Portuguese pirates who operated in the Bay of Bengal and even raided the coast of Bengal with impunity. [573](#) In 1665-66 Shayista Khan, the Mughal subadar of Bengal won over Portuguese pirates with money and, with their naval support, captured the port of Chatgaon in the kingdom of Arakan which was a refuge of Magh pirates. [574](#) This seems to have stopped the Magh depredations on the coast of Bengal.

The mansabdar appointed as chief of the Mughal Marine in Bengal was known as the Darogha-i Navara. [575](#)

The Adilshahi had no navy till the year 1636. It was only when the Nizamshahi was dissolved that the Adilshahi acquired nominal suzerainty over the sea fort of Janjira, built on an outcrop of rock a kilometer into the sea off the Danda-Rajpuri creek. This was held by Abyssinian adventurers called Siddis. They had the semblance of a naval force consisting of just about twenty galiots and a few gurabs.

The Qutbshahi possessed not even this.

#### DEFECTS IN THE MUGHAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

Babar brought into India an army of disciplined and hardy veterans. Concurrent with the expansion in territorial holdings, their treasuries began overflowing with lucre which, in time, seduced them to trade their characteristic verve for a life of lustful, emasculate luxury and degeneration. Military skill was the chief victim of their new-found lifestyles, which was by now reeking of gaudery, luxury and sensual extravagance.

The size of the army gradually increased with the expansion of the Empire. It thus became multinational and mercenary in character, consisting principally of Afghans, Persians, Hindustani Muslims and the Rajputs. Even such an army would remain loyal if it was properly disciplined and a sense of loyalty to the state was instilled and developed.<sup>576</sup> But discipline was extremely lax in the Mughal army.

Thus, by the seventeenth century, the Mughal army was not what it had once been. Notwithstanding these defects, however, it was a formidable instrument of war, at least as far as Indian states were concerned. Few of them could defy its power and Shivaji was the successful pioneer to do so.

The various shortcomings of the Mughal military structure may be explained as follows:

1. The organizational structure itself was defective. The army consisted largely of cavalry made up of contingents of individual mansabdars. As seen earlier, the total strength of the army was about 200,000 which included 8,000 mansabdars, 7,000 ahadis and 185,000 horsemen.

Every mansabdar's contingent was a distinct unit. He was obliged to serve with his contingent under the chief officer of any place where the Emperor ordered him to go. But there was no mechanism in place to organize such separate contingents into larger, more permanent formations. In effect, the Mughal cavalry was really a hotchpotch of a large number of groups of widely varying sizes. When the army was mobilized for a campaign, it would be divided into various temporary divisions with a number of mansabdars and their contingents under each. Command of the division would be given to whoever held the highest mansab. But this was merely a temporary arrangement and the divisions were not subdivided into more manageable formations. For instance:

In 1646, Shah Jahan dispatched an army of 50,000 horsemen and 10,000 foot soldiers (including cannoneers, rocketeers and musketeers) under Prince Murad Bakhsh. It was organized into various divisions [577](#) as follows: [578](#)

Harawal – 12,000 troopers (contingents of 470 mansabdars plus 1,000 mounted ahadi musketeers) and 2,000 foot soldiers

Iltamash – 2,000 troopers

Kol – 12,000 troopers (contingents of 401 mansabdars) and 2,000 foot soldiers

Baranghar – 6,000 troopers (contingents of 460 mansabdars plus

700 ahadis) and 2,000 foot soldiers

Dast-i Rast – 6,000 troopers (contingents of 379 mansabdars plus

700 ahadis) and 1,000 foot soldiers

Jaranghar – 6,000 troopers (contingents of 250 mansabdars plus

2,000 ahadis) and 2,000 foot soldiers

Dast-i Chap – 6,000 troopers (contingents of 205 mansabdars plus

700 ahadis) and 1,000 foot soldiers

The harawal of this army comprised contingents of 470 mansabdars, i.e. 470 separate contingents of various sizes! How could the commander of the harawal make any kind of dispositions, leave alone execute manoeuvres, with such a motley force? How could he communicate his plans and his orders to all these mansabdars without any intermediate levels of command? It would seem that all these mansabdars could do was to look at their leader and follow his example.

The limitations on the variety of possible battle formations and manoeuvres imposed by such a loose assortment can be appreciated when compared with the organization Shivaji had introduced. According to the Sabhasad Chronicle the organization of Shivaji's army was as follows:

Twenty-five horsemen in Shivaji's cavalry formed a havala which was commanded by a havaldar. Five havalas constituted a jumla, commanded by a jumledar. The officer commanding ten jumlars was called hazari. Five hazaris were under command of a panch hazari. The panch hazaris were under the command of the sar-naubat (commander-in-chief). [579](#)

The infantry was similarly organized. Ten foot soldiers served under the naik. Five such sections made up a havala commanded by a havaldar. Two or three havalas constituted a jumla which was placed under a jumledar. Ten jumlars came under a hazari. [580](#)

Shivaji's army was not a conglomerate of different groups of varying size. Its division into smaller subordinate units was as well defined and coordinated as it could be in any modern army. This imparted to the Maratha army the propensity to engage in various battle formations and the agility that was denied to the Mughals. If, for example, a Mughal army ranged itself for battle in three parts – the centre and the left and right wings and if one of its wings was intended by the commander-in-chief to go around the opposite section of the enemy's formation, he would be in no minor predicament about how his intention was to be conveyed to each individual mansabdar in the wing and, worse, how he was going to ensure its implementation. If he wished to attack the enemy according to the plan he had formulated, he would necessarily need to fix the position of each mansabdar. The presence of a large number of uncoordinated mansabdars and their contingents, each with different numbers of men, compounded by the absence of any officer with intermediate responsibility to convey his orders to each mansabdar and ensure their implementation, the commander-in-chief would be unable to achieve the desired formation quickly. At best, he might be able to initiate action by giving a previously agreed signal, but such attack would lack order and unity of direction.

His army being no better than a large throng of groups temporarily brought together just for the ongoing campaign, one group would have no experience of acting in conjunction with the other, and the entire effort would lack the team spirit that is so vital in war. Possibly, some groups might perceive the signal incorrectly in the chaos of battle, might hamper the movement of others, or their movements might not be in coordination with or supportive of those of others. On the other hand the commander of an articulated organization like that of Shivaji's army would have a limited number of subordinates to whom he could easily communicate his plans and orders and in a similar fashion these could percolate in a few steps to the smallest unit in the army. Besides, these units and formations being permanent, better coordination and team work between them could be expected.

An apt illustration can here be cited to show the relative advantages that Shivaji's organization of his army had over the system followed by the Mughals (and other Muslim states), by imagining the respective armies as the human forearm.<sup>581</sup> The hand with all its fingers and digits intact is able to perform a wide range of actions – holding, pulling, pushing, lifting, squeezing, twisting, striking, pinching, throwing, catching, punching and the like. But the forearm without the benefit of the hand is incapable of this variety of actions. In like manner, Shivaji's army with its units capable of independent but coordinated movement (like the fingers and their digits) had a distinct advantage, in terms of the ease and speed with which a variety of formations could be executed and altered, over the Mughal force, which entirely lacked this quality. An ability to execute military formations and movements with ease is a quality intrinsic to well organized and disciplined armies. Making the greatest use of this ability is the forte of the general. Insufficiency of information in sources prevents a determination of the extent to which Shivaji's army could exploit this quality in actual engagements, but it is sufficient to

note that it was far better placed in this respect than its Mughal (or other Muslim) counterpart.

2. The vast expanse of the Empire necessitated movement of troops over huge distances. An efficient supply and transportation system must be in place if these movements are to be executed within reasonable and predictable time. However, the Mughal Empire had neither a dedicated organization to provide supplies nor a good transport system. It was, thus, unable to maintain speed over long marches. And when deployment of the army is delayed, either more troops are needed to achieve the same end or they are unavailable at the required place and time.
3. Expense on salaries to mansabdars was in excess of what might have been just. Had this expenditure been curtailed, it might have been possible for the Mughals to enlist more troops or augment the efficiency of the existing army by improving supplies, communications and transport by investing in roads.
4. The numerical strength of the infantry in the Mughal army being small, garrisons on forts had to include mansabdars' contingents, which were cavalry units, and it became difficult to provide fodder to the mounts in the event of starvation by a siege. Moreover, keeping cavalry locked in a fort is a waste of its true potential as a mobile fighting force.

Numerous other shortcomings like the practice of remuneration through jagirs and the complete lack of a naval force may be pointed out. Yet, from the aspect of other eastern powers in India, the Mughal army was a powerful and formidable war machine. The defects within the Mughal military system were equally shared by other Muslim powers like the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi, and it was only because of the superior numerical strength, horses and artillery of the former that it prevailed over the others.

It was this magnitude, might and avaricious megalomania of the Mughal Empire and the two comparatively inferior, though in no way less vicious, sultanates that Shivaji had to surpass in his quest for nationhood.

If these three powers relied on brute strength to get their way, there were the newly incursive subtle elements backed by a vastly superior technological culture who came in the guise of harmless traders but were possessed with such cunning and guile that they soon developed the gall of claiming chunks of India for their respective governments, thus undermining the integrity of the sub continent.

In the next chapter we shall see who these numerically insignificant seafarers were and how they exploited the internal – and amazingly tenacious – weaknesses of vastly superior indigenous numbers.

## **European Colonies in India**

In the fifteenth century, the lucrative carrying trade in the Indian Ocean was controlled by the Arabs. Their ships carried oriental goods to Basra and Suez. They were then carried to the Mediterranean coast by the land route, after which European seafarers took over. The ingress of Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean, however, dramatically altered the situation and marked the decline of Arab domination.

### **(1) THE PORTUGUESE**

Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope towards the end of 1497 and arrived at Calicut (Kozhikode) the next year. The Portuguese drove them out and established themselves at various places on the coast of India. Sometimes they used force; sometimes they took advantage of the internal bickerings among the Indian states. They built forts to defend their colonies. It was difficult to reduce them by siege as long as they could be supplied by sea. Defending themselves on the landward side with the help of their forts and using their sea power to keep supply routes of these forts open, were the abutments of their strategy. Besides, they could also use their sea power to descend upon and devastate the enemy's coast. As none of the Indian states had a naval force worth the name, they could not dislodge the Portuguese from their strongholds.

The Portuguese also established their colonies at several other places on the shores of the Indian Ocean. About 1600 they had about 50 settlements, protected by fortifications, on the shores of the Indian Ocean: at Sofala, Mozambique, Mombasa, and other places on the east coast of Africa; Socotra in the Gulf of Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea; Muscat and Suhar in the Gulf of Oman on the east coast of the Arabian peninsula; Hormuz in the Persian Gulf; several places on the west coast of

India; Mannar, Negombo, Colombo, Trincomalee, and the like in Sri Lanka, and Malacca on the west coast of Malaysia.

His dominance thus established in the Indian Ocean, the King of Portugal styled himself as its emperor. The Portuguese made it a rule, and strictly enforced it, that all ships belonging to subjects of the Oriental states had to buy their permits (*cartazes*) if they wanted to sail in the Indian Ocean.<sup>582</sup> These ships were forbidden by the Portuguese to carry certain goods like horses and spices. The Portuguese also laid down the maximum number of *cartazes* a state would be allowed to buy.<sup>583</sup> Ships belonging to merchants, noblemen and even members of royal families of the big Indian states like the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates had to buy Portuguese *cartazes*.<sup>584</sup>

By 1630, the Portuguese colonies on the west coast of India comprised the island of Diu, the coastal strip about 30 km wide stretching from the Par River about 10 km north of Daman to Karanje, Chaul (including Korlai), Goa (including Sashti and Bardesh), Honavar, Gangolli (Cambolim), Basrur (Barcelore), Mangalore, Kannur, Kodungallur, Kochi, and Kollam. The king of Portugal did not have a colony on the east coast, but there were settlements of Portuguese traders at Nagapattinam and Meliapur (San Thomè or Saint Thomas), and at Hugli in Bengal, which, backed by Portuguese prestige, did not pay much heed to local rulers.

The English and the Dutch East India Companies arrived in India in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, which led to the decline of Portuguese dominance in the Indian Ocean. The new European entrants displaced the Portuguese from many places in India and the Indian Ocean. They lost their settlement at Hugli to the Mughals in 1622.<sup>585</sup> In 1652-53 Shivappa Nayak of Ikkeri drove them out of Honavar, Gangolli, Basrur and

Mangalore.<sup>586</sup> The Dutch dislodged them from Sri Lanka by 1658, from Nagapattinam in the same year, from Kodungallur in 1661, from Kannur in 1662, and from Kochi and Kollam in 1663. <sup>587</sup> They helped the Qutbshah to expel the Portuguese from Meliapur in 1662. <sup>588</sup>

### *Administration of Portuguese Colonies*

The Portuguese colonies stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Macau (in China) constituted their Indian empire: *Estado da India*. Its chief administrative officer was the viceroy appointed by the king of Portugal. A council of principal officers, which included the archbishop of Goa, assisted and advised him in the affairs of the state. <sup>589</sup> In the event of the viceroy's death a sealed letter of the king was opened and the officers nominated in it took over until the arrival of a new viceroy. <sup>590</sup>

The capital of this empire was at Goa.<sup>591</sup> The empire was divided into three parts: northern, central, and southern. The northern part included Diu, the coastal strip from the Par river to Karanje, and Chaul. <sup>592</sup> The central part consisted of the island of Goa, Bardesh and Sashti. The southern part included Honavar, Gangolli, Basrur, Mangalore, Kannur, Kodungallur, Kochi and Kollam. The civil administration of these three parts was staffed by 1000 to 1200 personnel altogether.<sup>593</sup> Corruption was rampant at all levels.<sup>594</sup> Posts were sold to the highest bidder. In fact, owing to a cash crunch, the King himself ordered an auction of posts in 1614. <sup>595</sup>

### *Portuguese Naval Power in India*

In the early years, the Portuguese used ships of about 400 ton burden for their Indian voyages.<sup>596</sup> By the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century, bigger ships – 1000 to 1500 ton – came into use.<sup>597</sup> Though used for transportation, these ships would also have guns for self-protection.<sup>598</sup> On an average, seven ships sailed for India from Portugal every year in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century<sup>599</sup> The number dwindled later and came down to only two per year in the latter half of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>600</sup>

The fighting ships in the empire consisted of around 100 galiots (*galiots or small galleys*), a couple of galleys, and five or six galleons (large galleys).<sup>601</sup> Galiots had sails, but they could be rowed too. Each was manned by 30-40 seamen and 20-30 soldiers. Some were equipped with a small cannon.<sup>602</sup> Galleys too were propelled by sails and, if necessary, by oars. Galleons were bigger ships, of 700 or 800 tons, each manned by up to 200 seamen and an equal number of soldiers, and up to 60 cannons. They were propelled by sails alone.<sup>603</sup> Ships were built at Daman, Vasai and Goa, where quality teak was available.<sup>604</sup>

A flotilla of eleven galiots was stationed at Diu. They patrolled the coast from Diu to Daman for seven or eight months after October.<sup>605</sup> The main naval base was Goa; it would have a fleet of 80 to 90 galiots, a couple of galleys, and five or six galleons.<sup>606</sup> These warships were divided into three fleets, of 15-20 galiots each:<sup>607</sup> 1. *Armada do Norte* (Northern fleet) – This fleet sailed from Goa after the end of the monsoon, and would go up to Khambayat. Merchant ships in the ports along its route would join it for protection against Malabar pirates. 2. *Armada Do Canara* – This fleet patrolled the sea routes between Goa and southern Portuguese settlements in Karnataka and Kerala. It would also carry pepper, to be loaded

on Portugal-bound ships. 3. *Armada do Cabo Comorim* (Kanyakumari), also called *Armada de Sul* - This fleet made trips between Goa and the Portuguese forts in Malabar. It would start from Goa after the monsoon, and go as far as Kochi or Kanyakumari and, sometimes, even Sri Lanka.

Seamen were recruited in Portugal, sometimes by force. Many of them would be outlaws. They had to serve in India for about eight years. They would get long leave without pay in the monsoon. Contemporaneous writers tell us that Goa had become unsafe after sunset because of them. [608](#)

Altogether, the Portuguese warships at Goa were served by three or four thousand Portuguese soldiers, and four or five thousand seamen comprising mostly Muslims and a few Africans and Portuguese. [609](#) Besides, about 1000 soldiers and seamen serving in ships arriving from Portugal were usually available at Goa at any time. [610](#)

This was not a large navy compared to other European powers. The Dutch and the English had worsted the Portuguese several times in the naval battles fought in the Indian Ocean. But the oriental states barely had any navies at all; therefore, at sea, they were helpless against the Portuguese.

### *Portuguese Military Strength in India*

#### *North* [611](#)

In the north, the Portuguese had their forts at Diu, Daman, Sanjan, Asheri, Vasai, Karanje and Chaul. Except for the hill fort of Asheri, these forts were on the coast. The fort of Chaul was on the northern shore of the Roha creek. The hill of Korlai on the opposite shore was also fortified. The Portuguese called it *Morro de Chaul*. Steps, flanked by walls, descended to a redoubt just above sea level. The flanking walls had three cross walls.

The guns in the redoubt commanded the entrance to the creek. On the landward side was a ditch crossed by a wooden draw bridge. Besides these forts, the Portuguese had built walled enclosures at Dahanu, Tarapur and Mahim. At Manor, they had a stockade with a tower inside. There were stockades at Saiwan and Karanjon also. There were three bastions equipped with cannons in the island of Sashti. A fortified house with a tower was also built on the Mumbai Island.

A garrison of 500 troops was stationed at the fort of Diu. Besides, some 80 troops were stationed at Daman, 300 at Asheri, around 600 at Saiwan, a hundred at Karanjon and 50 at Morro de Chaul (Korlai). The strength of the garrison at other places in the North was less than 50; in most places there were hardly 10 or 20 soldiers. But at every settlement there were from 50 to 500 armed civilians, including Portuguese and Indian Christians and their slaves. These could be enlisted in times of emergency. Portuguese estate-owners residing in Portuguese colonies too had built towers and manors at various places. The total number of Portuguese and native soldiers in the North was around 1800. Besides them, there were some 5000 armed civilians.

### *Central Region*<sup>612</sup>

The Island of Goa<sup>613</sup> is flanked by two rivers: the Mandavi in the north and the Zuari, also called the Aghashi, in the south. The district of Bardesh to the north of the Mandavi and that of Sashti to the south of the Zuari was also in the possession of the Portuguese.

The mouth of the Mandavi River was guarded by two pairs of forts. The western pair was formed by Aguada in Bardesh and, opposite it, and Nossa Senhora do Cabo (Our Lady of the Cape) in the Goa Island. Three kilometers to the east stood the other pair – Reis Magos in Bardesh and, facing it, Gaspar Dias in

the Goa Island. To the east of Gaspar Dias stood the fort of Panaji, also on the southern bank of the Mandavi.

There were several small islands, formed by the branches of the Mandavi, between Bardesh and Goa Island. In the northeastern corner of the island was a ford at Daugim (called Madre de Deos) for crossing over into the Diwad island and at Narwe in that island for crossing over into the mainland. Narwe was guarded by a small fort. There were three fords on the east coast of Goa island – São Braz, also called Passo Secco (or dry ford), Banastarim (or São Tiago) and Carambolim (or São João Baptista). One could cross at Passo Secco without wetting one's feet; hence the name. The Portuguese had built a wall which ran along the coast from Daugim to Carambolim and from there struck northwestwards to Panelim to the west of Goa city. The length of the wall was about 15 km. There were bastions at Passo Secco and Banastarim mounted with guns. A suitable ford at São Lourenço in the south of the island enabled crossing over into Sashti. It was guarded by a small fort.

The port of Murgaon<sup>614</sup> was in the estuary of the Zuari, south of Goa Island. The estuary was guarded by the fort of Nossa Senhora do Cabo in Goa Island and the fort of Murgaon in Sashti. There was a fort at Raitur, called Rachol by the Portuguese, in Sashti.

The eastern border of Bardesh was protected by four forts – Fort Novu, Fort Tivim, Fort Meio, and the fort at Colvale – linked by a rampart.

There were very few soldiers in the forts in Goa island, Sashti and Bardesh. Some had none at all; in others the garrison numbered from 10 to about 50. Garrisons in these forts totaled about 400 soldiers. They were backed by a large number of armed civilians – Portuguese and native Christians. <sup>615</sup> However, this militia does not seem to have helped defend Goa in times of

war. Armed civilians did not help check incursion by Bijapur forces into Bardesh and Sashti in 1654, though the Portuguese had advance knowledge about the campaign. In fact, the inhabitants helped the invaders. A detachment of 370 Portuguese, including many civilians, had to be sent from Goa to repulse them.

Taking into account the garrisons, soldiers aboard the warships at Goa, and those aboard the ships that arrived from Portugal, some 3000 regulars and 2 to 3 thousand civilians were available for the defence of the central region at any given time.

### ***South***

The southern region of the Portuguese settlements on the west coast included the forts at Honavar, Gangolli, Basrur, Mangalore, Kannur, Kodungallur, Kochi and Kollam. They were garrisoned by about 500 soldiers backed by around 1800 armed civilians.[\*\*616\*\*](#)

Portuguese military strength in India was not considerable but they possessed the resilience which immigrants naturally acquire. Besides, their naval supremacy gave them an advantage over oriental powers. If attacked from the land, they could launch counter offensives along the coast, destroying enemy's ships and attacking coastal towns. So, expelling them would become a costly and time-consuming affair. Besides, the Portuguese controlled a very small part of India. Oriental peoples lacked a sense of urgency compared to Europeans. Therefore, local powers in India and other oriental countries never desperately tried to dislodge the Portuguese from their settlements.



## *Financial condition*

According to Antonio Bocarro, the annual revenue of the Portuguese colonies in India was around 800,000 xerafins<sup>617</sup> and the outlay, around 700,000 xerafins. <sup>618</sup> These figures are for the year 1635 or thereabout. The Portuguese settlements in Canara and Malabar did not contribute much to the revenue or the outlay. So it may be assumed that the same financial state of affairs prevailed during Shivaji's times when they had lost those settlements.

Trade between Portugal and oriental countries was the monopoly of the King of Portugal. <sup>619</sup> Revenues earned by the King from this trade and the expenditure on acquisition of new ships, construction of forts, and other such costs have not been accounted for in the above calculation. Still, it would seem that Indian colonies were not very profitable.

Padres wielded a significant clout in the administration of the Portuguese colonies. The Archbishop was a member of the Viceroy's advisory council. It seems from the figures given by Bocarro that the Church received a grant of 100,000 xerafins every year. Also, the Church owned large estates, which did not earn anything for the colonial government.<sup>620</sup> Indeed, from 1635, the king of Portugal granted to the Society of Jesus the monopoly of supplying ammunition to the Indian colonies!<sup>621</sup>

In the administrative hierarchy, the higher officials were overpaid, compared to those at the lower levels. The Viceroy's annual salary was 24,465 xerafins, that of the Captain of Goa city was 2000 xerafins, captains of galleons earned only 400 xerafins and a native soldier was paid as less as 12 xerafins. <sup>622</sup>

## *Religious Persecution of Hindus in Portuguese Colonies*<sup>623</sup>

The Portuguese came to India as traders, but they were also evangelists. In the early years, Christian preachers tried to promulgate Christianity in Goa, but without much success. Jesuit evangelists followed them to India. The Portuguese government supported them wholeheartedly. This led to increasing persecution of native non-Christians, mainly Hindus. Laws favoured new converts to Christianity. Financial incentives were offered to neo-converts. The Portuguese demolished several ancient Hindu temples and banned construction of new ones. The property of demolished temples would be handed over to the Church. Non-Christians were not allowed to celebrate their festivals, or conduct religious rituals. Even the last rites of a Hindu or a Muslim could not be conducted within Portuguese territory; the dead body had to be taken to the neighboring Adilshahi areas for the appropriate last rites. Hindus were forced to attend sermons of evangelists. If a Hindu father died his minor children, even though their mother was alive, were handed over to the padres and converted.

As conversions were often effected by force or enticement new converts reverted to their old faith at the first opportunity. A Jesuit priest Nicolau Lancilotto, lamented in his letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> October 1547 to Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus:<sup>624</sup>

“The people of this country who become Christians do so purely for temporal advantage as is inevitable in a land where slavery reigns. Slaves of the Moors or Hindus seek baptism in order to secure their manumission at the hands of the Portuguese. Others do so to get protection from tyrants, or for the sake of a turban, a shirt, or some other trifle they covet, or to escape

being hanged, or to be able to associate with Christian women. The man who embraces the faith from honest conviction is regarded as a fool. They are baptized whenever or wherever they express a wish for the sacrament, without any instruction, and many revert to their former paganism.”[625](#)

But the missionaries surmised that the Hindu brethren of these apostates would not welcome them back into the Hindu fold, and they were proved right. Forsaken by their former Hindu co-religionists, the children of these new Christians were completely alienated from the religion of their forefathers in course of time. Besides, to suppress heresies and speed up conversion, the Inquisition (“an ecclesiastical tribunal for the suppression of heresy and punishment of heretics”) was set up in Goa in 1560 mainly at the instance of Francis Xavier. Those accused of transgressing the faith were tried by the Inquisition. The accused was not informed of the charges he was facing, or the evidence against him. He would be only told to confess and to disclose the names of his accomplices. Very often, the hapless victim would be incapable of confessing to the satisfaction of the Inquisition simply because he did not know the charge against him. The Inquisition would then order resort to torture. Those found guilty at the end of this bizarre process would receive punishment; many would be burnt at the stake.

Not just delinquent Christians, but even non-Christians — accused of hindering conversions or violating the special laws for non-Christians — would be tried by the Inquisition. Those who could not be persuaded by sermons yielded to physical torture. Within the next 150 years, the Christianization of Goa was more or less complete. Gradually, the converts became completely alienated not only from the religion of their forefathers, but also from their language, customs, attires, and even names. It was a cultural conquest.

(2) THE ENGLISH

### *Formation of the East India Company*<sup>626</sup>

The East India Company was conceived at a meeting chaired by the Lord Mayor of London on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1599. The gathering decided to form a trading company for trading with oriental countries. An equity of 30,133 pounds was raised. This was the beginning of the East India Company (EIC), but in the early years it was called the “Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies”. On 31<sup>st</sup> December 1600, Queen Elizabeth issued a charter that granted it monopoly rights of trade in the region between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan.

The EIC’s board of directors was made up of a governor, a deputy governor, a treasurer and 24 committee-men. The Company was not a joint stock company; it was a syndicate. Members could invest in individual ventures (trading expedition); it was not necessary that a member should invest in every venture. Every venture would be supervised by a sub-committee. An individual venture was called “separate voyage”.

Four ships were dispatched in 1601 for the first trading expedition to the East. The ships returned in 1603. In 1609, King James I granted a new charter to the EIC. Its monopoly over trade in the East was retained, but it was made conditional upon the trade being profitable for the state.

After a few years, the Company realized that it needed to set up permanent Factories (trading outposts) in the oriental countries for storing goods. Gradually, the system of individual ventures – separate voyages – gave way to the Terminable Joint Stock system. In the new system, equity would be raised for a longer duration; it would not be restricted to a single trading expedition. In 1623, James I conferred upon the Company the

criminal jurisdiction over its staff as well as English subjects living in oriental countries. King Charles granted a new charter to a rival company formed by William Courteen in 1635. In 1650, this company was merged with the EIC. But the monopoly over eastern trade had been abolished. Any English citizen could trade with oriental countries. This led to rise in prices of importable commodities in the oriental markets. Finally, in October 1657, Oliver Cromwell restored the Company's monopoly over eastern trade. Soon thereafter, the EIC became a Joint Stock Company on the lines of modern corporations. King Charles II granted a new charter to the Company in 1661. The new charter authorized the EIC to build forts, to keep an army and to make war or peace with non-Christians in oriental countries.

### *Administration of Factories*<sup>627</sup>

Factories were the trading posts and were set up at various places in the East. In 1650, the administration was bifurcated into two divisions, each under a president. One division was headquartered in Surat. Factories in western and northern India, Iran and Arabia — such as those at Rajapur on west coast of India, Mokha on the Red Sea and Basra in the Persian Gulf — came under its jurisdiction. The other division was headquartered in Java. It was later shifted to Madras (now Chennai). It controlled factories on the east coast of India and those in Orissa, Bengal and the Far East. Each division was headed by a president.

In 1657, the Company divided its factories in four Agencies under the overall control of a president. These four Agencies were: Coromandel Coast (Madras), Bengal, Persia (Iran) and Bantam (in Java). The President lived in Surat. Later, in 1661, the Bengal Agency was merged with Madras. When, towards the end of that year, George Oxenden was appointed as the President, the Agencies of Madras and Bantam were removed from his jurisdiction. Since then the Company's factories were

divided in three separate divisions: the Surat Presidency, and the Madras and Bantam Agencies. In 1666, the Agent at Madras was upgraded and styled 'Governer and Agent'.

Overall, less than hundred Englishmen staffed EIC factories in India in Shivaji's times. The Surat Factory employed around 20 Englishmen. All the staff – even the President – lived within the Factory premises. Employees were allowed to trade in all commodities except those barred by the Company. In 1658, the President at Surat got the annual salary of 500 pounds. Every Factory had its governing council. The Surat Council, for instance, comprised the President and some senior staff members. The Council would hold meetings ("consultations") for taking important decisions. At many places, the EIC appointed Indian traders as its brokers for the purpose of sale and purchase of goods. The Company employed Indians in certain lower positions: cooks, stable-hands, torch-bearers, palanquin-bearers, interpreters and the like. Some of the big factories employed more than a hundred natives at a time. Wherever possible, factories were fortified.

Apart from trading, several other things kept the Company's employees busy – entering into contracts with suppliers, buyers and transporters, keeping accounts, writing minutes of Council meetings, carrying out correspondence with other factories, making copies of all written transactions to be sent to the board of directors, and such other tasks.

The company wanted its English staff in India to learn the local languages in order to decrease dependence on brokers and interpreters. In 1671, the board of directors sent a letter to the Madras Council, asking it to appoint a language teacher, and to give a reward of £20 to those who achieved proficiency in the native languages.

Peter Mundy was at the Agra Factory from 1631 to 1633. He writes in his account that he and his compatriots had

adopted the Indian cuisine, attire, and lifestyle. They even ate in Indian manner: squatting on the floor. According to him, Englishmen led a contented life at the Factories.

### *Maritime Prowess of the East India Company in India*

The Company initially sent only its own ships to India. From 1639, it started using chartered vessels, and later their number grew.<sup>628</sup> In 1680, the board of directors took a decision to use only chartered vessels.<sup>629</sup>

The ships which made voyages to India and other oriental territories were mostly in the 200-500 ton range, though a few were bigger with capacity of upto 1000 tons.<sup>630</sup> Though these were not warships, they mounted guns for self-defence.<sup>631</sup>

Between 1641 and 1660, 99 ships of the Company (i.e. those owned or hired by them) set sail for oriental countries, while 66 came to England, carrying oriental cargo loaded by the Company.<sup>632</sup> In the next ten years, 85 ships of the company sailed for the Orient and 73 returned to England.<sup>633</sup> And in the next five years (1671-1675) 73 ships of the company sailed for the Orient and 64 returned to England.<sup>634</sup>

The ships would usually sail in three batches:<sup>635</sup> To Surat, to Madras and to Bantam in Java apiece. Three or four ships would sail for Surat each year. After offloading cargo for that port, they would proceed to Malabar, offload there, take on board goods stored there for Europe and then return to Surat. There they would take on board the goods stored there for Europe and then sail for England. These ships spent around four to six months along the Indian coast. After the Company acquired the island of Mumbai, it became another port of call

for English ships bound for and returning from Surat. Similarly, every year since the establishment of the Company's colony at Madras, four or five ships would sail for Madras. From there they would travel onward to Bengal for offloading and collecting goods and then return to Madras on the way back to England. These ships, too, spent around four to six months along the Indian coast.

Apart from ships coming from England, the Councils at Madras, Surat, and Mumbai possessed five to six ships each. These were small vessels, mounting guns, but were not proper warships. <sup>636</sup> They were used for transporting cargo in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Bengal.

Compared to contemporaneous European sea powers, the Company's naval power was insignificant. In fact, during Shivaji's times, the Company had no warship, in the real sense of the term, in Indian waters. On the west coast of India, their naval strength never went beyond some 10 to 15 small ships used for transporting goods, and three to four medium sized ships from Europe which would be in Indian waters for four to six months every year. But the English were very able and aggressive seafarers. And, as in many other fields, the Indian states were very backward in both seamanship and the science of navigation.

Like the Portuguese, the Company too issued licenses to Indian ships. <sup>637</sup> But the Company's policy in this regard was not as stringent. Apparently no fee was charged for a license. The Portuguese embargoed certain kinds of cargo; the EIC is not known to have imposed such restrictions. However, sometimes, the Company would order that no license be issued to a state obstructing their trade, or that its ships be seized. <sup>638</sup>

### *The Company's Forts in India Armagaon and Madras*

The Company obtained permission in 1626 from the local Nayak (who owed allegiance to Vijaynagar Empire) to build a Factory and a fort at Armagaon and mint its own coins.<sup>639</sup> It likewise obtained permission in 1639 from Damarla Venkatadri Nayakudu, another Vijaynagar satrap, to build a Factory and a fort at Madras (now Chennai) and mint its own coins.<sup>640</sup> In 1640 it gave up Armagaon because the location was not suitable, and set up a factory at Madras.<sup>641</sup> The piece of land which the Company had obtained at Madras was about five kilometres from north to south and about a kilometer and a half from east to west.<sup>642</sup> Construction of a fort at Madras began in 1640; it was completed in 1653 and named Fort St. George.<sup>643</sup> It was about 100 meters from north to south and 90 from east to west, with a bastion at each corner.<sup>644</sup> Construction of an earthen wall around the town began in 1644 and was completed in 1648.<sup>645</sup> The population of Madras was around 15,000 at that time.<sup>646</sup> By 1674, it had risen to a little less than 50,000.<sup>647</sup>

There was a small garrison at Fort St. George. It was assisted by an auxiliary company of Portuguese and half-caste residents of the town. These volunteers were exempted from tax.<sup>648</sup> Besides, in times of hostilities, Indians were recruited as soldiers.<sup>649</sup> Towards the end of 1676, the garrison numbered 235 soldiers and 20 officers; besides, 163 Portuguese residents were employed, evidently as auxiliaries, to man the walls of the town.<sup>650</sup> The fort bristled with 49 guns.<sup>651</sup> The garrison at Madras was armed with muskets and swords.<sup>652</sup>

### ***Mumbai***

King Charles II of England was betrothed to Princess Braganza of Portugal in 1661. The island of Mumbai was gifted to him in dowry. Charles appointed Sir Abraham Shipman as the governor of Mumbai and dispatched him with 500 troops to take possession of the island. Their ships arrived at Mumbai in 1662. But the Portuguese viceroy was not keen on handing over the island to the English. After prolonged negotiations, he relented and the English took possession of Mumbai on 8<sup>th</sup> February 1665. [653](#)

The island of Mumbai then consisted of seven villages: Mumbai proper, Mahim, Paral, Wadala, Worli, Sheev (Sion) and Mazgaon. [654](#) Mahim creek was its northern border, beyond which lay the Portuguese island of Sashti. [655](#) The island of Mumbai extended 13 km from north to south, and 4 km from east to west. A small island was situated to the south of Mumbai Island, which the Englishmen called Old Woman's Island. To its south was a small, unnamed, rocky island. Butcher's Island and Cross Island lay to the east of Mumbai Island. The English also received possession of the four islands along with Mumbai. [656](#)

The annual revenue of Mumbai was around £1,200 pounds (Rs.10,800) at the time. [657](#) The population ranged between 12,000 and 20,000. [658](#) Since the island did not earn much revenue, Charles leased it out to the EIC at a nominal rent of £10 a year. [659](#) (In return, the Company agreed to loan £50,000 to the King.) On 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1668, the Company's officials from Surat Council took possession of the Island. [660](#) The Company absorbed 141 European and 54 Topaz [661](#) soldiers on the island into its service. [662](#)



George Oxenden, President of Surat Council, was appointed as the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Mumbai. [663](#) Even after Oxenden, the President of Surat would be the ex-officio Governor of Mumbai. The Company had authorized the President and the Surat Council to appoint a deputy-governor who would reside in Mumbai. [664](#)

The Portuguese had built a house with two towers on the island for the purpose of defence. [665](#) Charles's officials had built a stockade around the house. [666](#) The Company started building a fort on this site in 1669. [667](#) It was a square structure with each side about 135 meters long. It was planned to build a bastion in each corner. The wall on the landward side, with two bastions, was completed by the end of 1670. The construction of the wall on the seaward side, with two bastions, was going on in stages till 1680 when it was stopped as an economy measure. [668](#) The fort had 50 guns in 1673. [669](#)

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A mint was started in Mumbai in 1672. It struck three types of coin: silver (which was worth a Mughal rupee), copper (worth a Mughal paisa) and tin (worth a Portuguese Buzruk). [670](#)

The English offered freedom of religion to non-Christian residents of the Island, who had faced persecution during Portuguese rule. The Company actively encouraged traders and artisans to settle in Mumbai. As a result, the population grew and, according Dr.Fryer, it reached 60,000 in 1675. [671](#) The Company wanted its compatriots to populate the island. [672](#) English soldiers were allowed to bring their wives and children to Mumbai. [673](#) The Board of Directors would sometimes send marriageable girls from England to Mumbai. The Company paid for their stay in Mumbai until they were paired off or, if they could not find suitors, for the duration of the first year. [674](#)

The population, the trade and the revenue increased after Mumbai passed into the Company's hands. But expenditures on account of garrison, fortification, ships, and so on also multiplied. In the financial year 1678-79, the revenue receipts were 104,835 xerafins while the expenditure was 182,254 xerafins. [675](#) In 1679 the Board of Directors instructed the Surat Council to curtail expenses. [676](#)

### *Naval Force in Mumbai*

The number of English ships at Mumbai during Shivaji's times never exceeded seven small vessels. [677](#) These ships could not have prevented a European enemy, like the Portuguese or the Dutch, from invading the island. The vessels, though meant to be used for naval purposes, were often leased to merchants,

or used for transportation. [678](#) This was necessary to finance their upkeep. The ships were also sent to escort merchant ships, or to patrol the coastal sea-routes infested with Malabar pirates.

[679](#)

### *Garrison at Mumbai*

Soldiers were recruited in England from time to time but as enough Englishmen did not respond, the Company had to enlist other Europeans and Topazes. [680](#) About October 1670, the garrison of Mumbai, divided into two companies, numbered 242 including 3 officers, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 4 drummers and 223 other enlisted men. Among the last, 87 were Englishmen, 73 Portuguese, 6 Dutch, 3 French and 54 Topaz. [681](#) In December 1680, the garrison comprised 322 men, including officers and enlisted men. 146 among them were Englishmen, 5 French and Dutch, 29 Portuguese, and 142 Topaz. [682](#) English soldiers earned 21 shillings per month; the topaz earned less than that. [683](#) The garrison was armed with muskets and swords. [684](#)

Some of the soldiers in the garrison would be deputed to the Company's vessels. [685](#) Sometimes they would be sent with private ships, owned by residents of Mumbai, to guard them against pirates. [686](#)

In 1672, the Mumbai Council decided to raise a troop of 50 horsemen, so as to rush to the threatened spot quickly in the event of a raid from outside. [687](#) But the troop that was raised usually had 25 to 30 horsemen. [688](#) In 1679, the Company ordered the disbanding of this troop due to reasons of economy.

[689](#)

Bhandaris, the original Indian inhabitants of Mumbai, were required to present themselves – at their own expense – for the defense of the islands.<sup>690</sup> Armed with spears and staffs, they were organized into three companies of 30 men each.<sup>691</sup> Extracting *Tadee* (or Toddy), a liquor made from the juice of the palm tree, was the traditional occupation of Bhandaris. As a reward for enlisting, the Mumbai Council decided to waive the tax on *Tadee*.<sup>692</sup>

Besides this, on the instructions of the Board of Directors, a militia of land-holders and native Christians, officered by Englishmen, was raised in 1668.<sup>693</sup> Except for a staff of 20 men, other members of the militia were not paid salaries. In 1674, the militia had some 400 native Christian volunteers, divided into three companies. The number rose to 600 by the end of 1676. A night-duty allowance was sanctioned for them.

Muslims and Rajputs were recruited as soldiers on ad hoc basis in emergencies. In 1673, when a Dutch invasion seemed imminent, 500 Muslims and Rajputs were recruited temporarily.<sup>694</sup> Of course, these ill armed, untrained and undisciplined men could be of little use except to swell the number of defenders.

### *Financial Condition of the EIC*

The following statistics give an idea of the financial condition of the Company:<sup>695</sup>

From 1<sup>st</sup> July 1659 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 1670, the Company exported goods worth about £14, 00,000 (around Rs.12.5 million) to oriental countries. Around 67 per cent of this amount was in gold and silver. The other exports included,

among other goods, woolen cloth, copper and lead. From 1<sup>st</sup> July 1671 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 1680 the Company exported goods worth about £34,30,000 pounds (about Rs.31 million) to oriental countries. Around 74 per cent of this amount was in gold and silver. Thus the balance of trade was in India's favour.

From 1<sup>st</sup> April 1664 to 31<sup>st</sup> March 1671 the Company imported goods worth £700,000 (about Rs.6.3 million) from Asia of which 83 per cent came from India. Cloth accounted for 71 per cent of the import bill. Other imports included indigo, pepper and saltpeter. In the next ten years, the Company imported goods worth £28,00,000 pounds (about Rs.25 million) from Asia;

74 per cent of this amount was spent on Indian goods.

The EIC became a permanent joint stock company in 1657. The first dividend (20 per cent) was announced in September 1661. On an average 20 per cent dividend per year was paid thereafter at least up to 1679. [696](#)

### (3) THE DUTCH

#### *The Dutch East India Company*[697](#)

Before 1602, several Dutch trading companies had dabbled in maritime trade with oriental countries. This led to rise in the prices of importable commodities in the oriental markets, and fall in the prices of imports in Europe. So, all these companies were amalgamated in 1602 to form the United East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie). The government of the United Provinces[698](#) granted it the monopoly of conducting trade for 21 years in the region between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan. It was extended in 1623. The charter empowered VOIC to keep an army, establish factories, build forts, mint its own currency and make war and peace with oriental countries. The Company's initial share

capital was 6.5 million florins (about Rs.6.4 million). There were six regional councils, which sent their representatives to the central board of directors. The board had 17 members. Therefore collectively it was known as *Heeren XVII* (17 Lords) or just *Zeventien* (Seventeen).

VOIC's first trading fleet sailed for the East in 1603. It visited some Indian ports and very soon the Company set up its factories (trading depots) at various places in India. A Governor General was appointed over this eastern trade empire. His headquarter was Bantam, Java (Indonesia). In 1619, it was shifted to Jakarta which the Dutch renamed as Batavia.

By the mid-seventeenth century, VOIC had set up colonies and factories across a vast swathe: from the eastern coast of Africa to Japan. This overseas empire was organized into divisions of which the larger ones were called Governments and smaller ones were called Directorates.

### *Administration of Dutch Colonies in India*

**Coromandel Government:** This division included factories on the Coromandel coast such as those at Machilipatnam and Petapuli in the Qutbshahi Sultanate, the colony at Pulicat in the Vijayanagar Empire, factories at Thirupapuliyur (near Devanapatan) and Porto Novo in the state of Gingee, and a colony at Karaikal in the state of Thanjavur. Pulicat (30 km north of Chennai) was the headquarters of this division. The Dutch built a fort there in 1613 with permission of the Emperor of Vijayanagar.

**Bengal Directorate:** Chinsurah (35 km north of Kolkata) was its headquarters. VOIC Factories at Bengal, Bihar and Orissa came under its jurisdiction.

**Surat Directorate:** It covered the factories in northern and western India such as those at Agra, Bharuch, Ahmedabad,

Khambayat, and Surat in the Mughal Empire and the one at Vengurle in the Adilshahi Sultanate. It also governed the Factories at Basra (Iraq) and Mokha (Yemen). In 1636, the Company built a small fort at Vengurle with permission of the Adilshah.<sup>699</sup>

The VOIC fleet attacked the settlement of Portuguese traders at Nagapattinam in 1658 and captured it. Later, the Dutch obtained a charter from the Nayak (Chief) of Thanjavur, Vijay Raghav, whereby the town and the surrounding ten villages were granted to the VOIC. The Company built a fort at Nagapattinam, which was named as Narden. It became a part of the Company's Coromandel Government.

Between 1661 and 1663, the VOIC Navy captured the Portuguese forts at Kochi, Kodungallur, Kannur, and Kollam. The Company appointed a commander at Kochi and placed these forts under his control. The commander was subordinate to the Dutch governor in Sri Lanka.

### *The VOIC's Naval Power in India*

Among the European navies in oriental waters, the Dutch navy was the most powerful. The VOIC had several colonies in Java, Sumatra and Sri Lanka; they could collect and dispatch a large naval force to any point in the Orient. For instance, when they captured the Portuguese forts at Kollam and Kodungallur on the Malabar Coast in 1661-2, they had assembled 4000 soldiers and a fleet of 24 ships from Batavia and Sri Lanka.<sup>700</sup> Similarly, when the Dutch and the Golkonda forces recaptured Fort St. Thomas from the French in 1673-74, the Dutch had assembled 2000 soldiers (including 1000 Dutch and 1000 Sinhalese) and a fleet of 20 ships from Batavia and Sri Lanka.

In short, the Dutch were capable of bringing a fleet of at least 20 ships and around 4000 troops at any point on the

Indian Coast.

Like the Portuguese, the Dutch too forced native ships to take their licenses for maritime passage. Even the Mughal Emperor could not defy them. In one instance, a ship belonging to the Mughal Emperor himself had obtained licenses from both the English and the Dutch. <sup>701</sup> The Dutch seized native ships which did not carry their license. <sup>702</sup> Sometimes a license would be denied by way of retribution. Zamorin, the King of Calicut, allowed the English to set up a Factory in his state. Annoyed, the Dutch stopped giving licenses to ships of the Malabar ports in 1665-66, virtually imposing an embargo. <sup>703</sup>

It can be surmised – from various accounts of Dutch garrisons at different times – that from 1663 to 1680 the VOIC had around 1500 troops, at best, in its various forts in India.

#### *Financial Condition:*

The VOIC was the biggest of the European trading companies operating in the orient during Shivaji's times. Between 1599 and 1650, the Dutch exported goods worth 80 million florins, equivalent to Rs.66.6 million from these countries. In the next 50 years, exports rose to 180 million florins (Rs.150 million). <sup>704</sup> The Company engaged in intra-Asia trade too, where goods from one oriental region were sold in another.

The VOIC's oriental trading operation was a profitable venture: since 1634 the Company was giving 15.5 to 50 per cent dividend to its share holders each year. <sup>705</sup>

#### **(4) THE DANES**

The Danske Asiatiske Kompagni (Danish Asiatic Company) was founded at Copenhagen in 1614. [706](#) It was a joint stock company. Christian IV of Denmark, gave the company a charter whereby it got a monopoly of trade with the oriental countries for a period of 12 years.

The first DAK ship reached Indian shores in 1620. Raghunath Nayak of Thanjavur allowed the Company to establish a settlement at Tharangambadi<sup>[707](#)</sup> (Tamil Nadu), a place which they called Tranquebar. They built a fort there and named it Dansborg.

In 1624, the Company ceded the fort to the King of Denmark in lieu of money owed to him. Since then an officer of the king resided there as commandant.<sup>[708](#)</sup>

Compared to other European powers, the Danes did not have much of a presence, either as merchants or as a military power, in the orient. Their naval power in Indian waters could not have exceeded 2 to 4 small ships for local trading and a couple of ships which sometimes came from Denmark and returned after five or six months..

François Martin, the chief of the French settlement at Pondicherry, visited Tranquebar and the Dane fort there in 1674. He writes that it had a garrison of 50 to 60 Danes along with some native and topaz soldiers, and that the fort, though small, was capable of withstanding attacks by native armies.<sup>[709](#)</sup>

Even with their few small ships the Danes could dictate terms to oriental states on the seas. Following a quarrel with the Qutbshahi minister Mir Muhammad Sayyid, they captured his ship in 1641 and released it next year only when he met their demands. <sup>[710](#)</sup> A Danish Factory had been set up in 1636 at Balasore (Orissa) within Mughal imperial jurisdiction. They quarreled with Mughals over trade concessions, and thereafter –

1640 onwards – the Danes regularly captured ships belonging to Mughal subjects. This was a sort of war on the Mughals, but they were incapable of attacking Tranquebar from the sea. Besides, they did not bother much about the Danes capturing ships of Mughal subjects. The dispute ended in 1674 when the Mughal officer at Balasore offered the Danes a place to start a Factory at Balasore, along with a grant of Rs.3000. [711](#)

#### (5) THE FRENCH

La Compagnie des Indes Orientales (The East India Company) was set up in 1664, with the initiative of the French finance secretary Jean-Baptiste Colbert. [712](#) (Before this, four companies had been set up for oriental trade, but they proved to be non-starters.) The King of France, Louis XIV, agreed to loan some money. The company got a royal charter to conduct trade with oriental countries with a monopoly for 50 years, to raise an army, to build forts, and make war or peace with oriental states. A share capital of 3.2 million livre was initially raised.

The constitution of the French East India Company was modeled upon the VOIC, with a Board of Directors in Paris.

The Company bought out an earlier settlement at Madagascar belonging to another French company. In 1665, the Company's ships sailed for Madagascar. Subsequently, two French representatives landed in Surat in 1666. They proceeded to the court of Aurangzeb at Agra, and obtained the Emperor's permission to set up a factory at Surat. An FEIC ship from Madagascar came to Surat in 1668, and the first French factory in India was set up there. Soon, French settlements came up at other places in India: Balipatna (Orissa), Tellicherry (Kerala), Rajapur, Balasore (Orissa), Kasimbazar, Machilipatnam, Pondicherry (now Puducherry) and some other places. The oriental headquarters first set up in Madagascar was shifted to Surat in 1671.

### *The Expedition of De La Haye*

The French monarch sent a fleet of nine ships to India under the command of De la Haye in 1670.<sup>713</sup> The objective was to put up a show of French naval strength to impress the Indian states so as to extract from them special concessions and also to intimidate European rivals. The fleet reached Surat in 1671.

The mission proved to be a disaster. De la Haye's fleet first attacked the Dutch outpost at Alikota, claiming that Zamorin, the local ruler, had granted the town to the French. The Dutch fled. The armada then proceeded to Trinkomali in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and with the approval of the ruler of Candy, started building a fort on a small island in the Trincomali harbour. The Dutch, who had a settlement there, took objection. Finally, in May 1672, a Dutch fleet under the command of Admiral Rickloff van Goens blockaded the town. De La Haye had no option but to pull out. After this setback, his fleet came to St. Thomas, on the east coast of India, in July 1672. There he opened war with the Qutbshah and captured the fort in August 1672. In June 1673, a Dutch fleet of 20 ships came to the east coast of India. The Qutbshahi army and the Dutch jointly laid siege to Fort St. Thomas. De la Haye surrendered the fort to the Dutch in October 1674. He and his soldiers were allowed a passage back to France on two Dutch ships. The whole affair exposed the inferiority of the French navy and their flawed strategic thinking.

### *The French Settlement at Pondicherry*

After taking Fort St. Thomas De la Haye had stationed a man at Pondicherry to obtain supplies.<sup>714</sup> During the siege François Martin, an employee of the French Company, escaped in a barge and arrived at Pondicherry to obtain succour from

outside. After the surrender of the fort to the Dutch, Barron, a director of the French Company, left St. Thomas and arrived at Madras with about a hundred Frenchmen who were in the Company's employ. In February 1675, he kept more than 80 of them under Martin and left for Surat by the land route.

Martin did not remain idle at Pondicherry. He had a considerable amount of money out of which he loaned some to Sher Khan, the Adilshahi war lord of that area. Soon after, he rented a village from the Khan. [715](#) Taking advantage of a civil war which broke out in the Adilshahi Sultanate Towards the end of 1675, Martin fortified the French house at Pondicherry, dug trenches, erected barricades of logs and manned outposts for the defence of the settlement.

# **Shahji**

## **THE BEGINNING OF SHAHJI'S CAREER, 1599-1625**

Maloji Bhosale, Shahji's father and Shivaji's grandfather, was a nobleman in the service of the Nizamshah. His elder son, Shahji, was born on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1599 and the younger, Sharifji, about two years later.<sup>716</sup> While Shahji was still a child, Maloji was killed in a battle at Indapur.<sup>717</sup> The Nizamshah continued Maloji's *mukasa* to his sons and Vithoji, Maloji's younger brother, raised the two brothers in their minority.<sup>718</sup> When Shahji had turned fourteen or fifteen, he was married to Jijabai, daughter of Lukhji Jadhavrao, a nobleman of prominence in the court of the Nizamshah.<sup>719</sup> He was also the hereditary *deshmukh* of Sindkhed. Like most of the local chieftains of his time, he changed masters frequently, alternating his allegiance between the Mughal Emperor and the Nizashah.<sup>720</sup> Perhaps, this was facilitated by the fact that his estate was located on the border of the territories of the Nizamshah and the Mughals.

The date of Vithoji's death is not known, but it seems from Marathi documents that he died sometime between 24<sup>th</sup> May 1621 and 27<sup>th</sup> February 1623. He had eight sons. Shahji took charge of his own *mukasa* after his uncle's death but the extent and location of his holdings are not known.<sup>721</sup>

Malik Ambar, Prime Minister of the Nizamshahi Sultanate, laid siege to Bijapur in 1624. The Mughals, being then in alliance with the Adilshah, went to the aid of Bijapur. Whereupon Malik Ambar raised the siege, retired towards Ahmednagar and, on 10<sup>th</sup> October 1624, decisively defeated the combined forces of the Mughals and the Adilshahi Sultanate at

Bhatavadi (20 km south-southeast of Ahmednagar). Shahji distinguished himself in the battle; however, Sharifji was killed.<sup>722</sup>

After the Battle of Bhatavadi, Shahji switched sides to serve Bijapur because of a quarrel with Vithoji's sons in which Malik Ambar took their side.<sup>723</sup> The exact date of this event is not known but, it may be concluded from a *mahzar* dated 19<sup>th</sup> December 1625, in which Shahji's name is mentioned with the suffix 'Adilshahi', that he must have joined the Adilshahi Sultanate before that date.<sup>724</sup> The probable date may be pushed back further. He is referred with the honorific *sarlashkar*,<sup>725</sup> which was never applied to him before, in an Adilshahi *farman* dated 10<sup>th</sup> January 1626.<sup>726</sup> That honorific is a distinguishing mark identifying him as an Adilshahi officer. The earliest extant letter in which he is styled as *sarlashkar* is dated 28<sup>th</sup> July 1625.<sup>727</sup> It may thus be said he must have defected to the Adilshahi Sultanate before that date. That he was an Adilshahi officer during the reign of Ibrahim Adilshah is established by other evidence also.<sup>728</sup>

Shahji styles himself as *sarlashkar* in his letters dated 28<sup>th</sup> July and 15<sup>th</sup> August 1625 to officials of the Pune Pargana regarding some grants.<sup>729</sup> There is evidence that shortly before that period, the *pargana* was in the Nizamshahi Sultanate.<sup>730</sup> It thus seems that Shahji held it as a *mukasa* before his defection and did not relinquish his hold on it thereafter. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that in July-August 1625 Shahji held it as a *mukasa* from the Adilshah and was forced out of it sometime before 19<sup>th</sup> December 1625 by Sabaji Anant, a Nizamshahi nobleman.<sup>731</sup>

Only scattered bits of information are available to provide details of Shahji's activities around this time. The *Shivabharat* mentions three events but does not provide dates: [732](#) (1) Shahji defeated Mudhoji, the Chief of Phaltan, who evinced insubordination to Ibrahim Adilshah. (2) He enriched Ibrahim Adilshah's coffers by conquering Kerala and Karnataka, which pleased the king immensely. (3) He won over other chieftains through his diplomacy. These find mention in no other source, and the claim that Shahji conquered Kerala and Karnataka is clearly an exaggeration because no evidence is extant to show that Adilshahi armies had campaigned in those regions during that period. Indeed, Adilshahi forces had never conquered the entire Karnataka region, having only gained control of the northern areas, and they had never even so much as stepped into Kerala at that or any other time.

An unpublished Marathi document shows that the Khatav Pargana of the Bijapur Sultanate was awarded to Shahji from 1625 to 1628 as his *mukasa*. [733](#)

In a letter to Maloji Ghorpade written in 1677, Shivaji mentions Shahji's tenure in Ibrahim Adilshah's service: [734](#)

"Previously, my father had left Nizamshah's service and joined the Adilshah. Ibrahim Adilshah had entrusted him with the responsibility of looking after the affairs of the Sultanate. My father contemplated utilizing his influence to raise his own Maratha community to positions of authority in the kingdom. With this in mind, he had taken your father Baji Ghorpade, who was a mere *sardar*, [735](#) to the Adilshah's Court, and made him a *wazir* of the Adilshahi kingdom."

Though Shivaji says in his letter that Shahji was entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the affairs of the Sultanate, it is doubtful if Shahji could have attained such a high position at that stage in his service with the Adilshah. It seems probable, however, that he could have helped Baji Ghorpade to rise in the hierarchy. Shahji used his influence to get the *deshmukhi* of Talbid Qaryat awarded to Sambhaji and Dharoji Mohite. The Adilshah's *farman* dated 10<sup>th</sup> January 1626 clearly mentions that the award was being made at Shahji's behest. [736](#) Shahji's second wife, Tukabai, hailed from the Mohite family. [737](#) The date he took her as his wife is not known, but it could possibly have been around this time.

Ibrahim Adilshah died on 11<sup>th</sup> September 1627. [738](#) He had desired that his third son Muhammad should succeed him instead of his eldest, Darvesh. Fearing that the succession might be contested, Mirza Muhammad Amin and Daulat Khan arrested all the suspected detractors as soon as Ibrahim Adilshah died. In order to disqualify the other princes as contenders for the throne, the eyes of Darvesh were gouged out and the ring fingers of the others were amputated. [739](#) The fifteen year old Muhammad was crowned Sultan and the arrested noblemen were set free. Mirza Muhammad Amin was honored with the title of Mustafa Khan and Daulat Khan with that of Khawas Khan. [740](#) Whether Shahji participated in these intrigues is not known.

In a letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> March 1628 written by Shahji to the officials of the Pune Pargana, Shahji uses for himself the prefix *sarlashkar*, implying his status as a nobleman of the Adilshah. It goes on to mention that 'recently Shahji has conquered this pargana.' [741](#) This shows that Shahji had captured the Pune Pargana from the Nizamshah before 8<sup>th</sup> March 1628 (the date of the letter), and the fact that Shahji was issuing orders to the

local officials indicates that the Adilshah had now conferred it upon Shahji as *mukasa*.

Of the three extant letters Shahji wrote during this period of his tenure in the Adilshahi, the latest is dated 8<sup>th</sup> March 1628. It appears that Shahji left Adilshahi service soon after this. The *Shivabharat* says he left because Muhammad Adilshah insulted him, but provides no details.<sup>742</sup> The *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, on the other hand, says he left because he felt that his services would not be appreciated under the new regime.<sup>743</sup> If this claim is indeed true, it would seem Shahji left the Adilshahi soon after Ibrahim's death. It is possible to fix the date of his departure with a little more precision. In his letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1628 to the officials of the Pune Pargana, Shahji is *not* styled as *sarlashkar*.<sup>744</sup> All the other extant letters of Shahji of a date later than this do not use the suffix *sarlashkar*. It implies that Shahji had left the Adilshahi and rejoined the Nizamshahi at some date after 8<sup>th</sup> March 1628 but before 25<sup>th</sup> July 1628.

#### **SHAHJI'S SECOND TENURE IN THE NIZAMSHABI (1628-29)**

Perhaps Shahji's exit from the Adilshahi and re-entry into the Nizamshahi was facilitated by the death in May 1626 of Malik Ambar, the Prime Minister of the Nizamshahi Sultanate with whom he had fallen out earlier.

As Shahji had rejoined to serve him, the Nizamshah recognized his title to the Pune Mukasa, as may be gleaned from a letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1628 (cited above) sent by Shahji to the officials of the *pargana*.

It also shows that Shahji had not relinquished his title over the Pune Pargana irrespective of who he was serving.

Soon thereafter, his son Sambhaji was wedded to Jayanti, daughter of Vijayraj Vishwasrao, at the Shivneri fort. [745](#) The wedding can be dated to the last quarter of 1628, which indicates the approximate period of his return into the Nizamshah's service.

### *Shahji's Campaign in Khandesh (1628)*

Mughal Emperor Jahangir died in October 1627. The situation in the Mughal Empire was chaotic during the interregnum between his death and the enthronement of Shah Jahan. By taking advantage of unsettled conditions, Khan Jahan Lodi, the Afghan *subadar* of the Mughal Deccan, harboured intentions of breaking away from the Empire and establishing his independence. He even transferred the Balaghat division of the province (except Ahmednagar proper) to the Nizamshah in order to win his support. He then marched into Malwa (the Indore–Burhanpur region) with the *mansabdars* under his command to capture more territory for himself.

In the meantime, the newly enthroned Shah Jahan was consolidating his rule. With the Rajput *mansabdars* deserting him, Khan Jahan realized that his enterprise was falling to pieces. So he wrote to Shah Jahan seeking his pardon, which the Emperor granted and retained him as *subadar* of the Deccan. However, because he could not retrieve the territory that he had earlier ceded to the Nizamshah, Shah Jahan transferred him to the *Subadari* of Malwa and appointed Mahabat Khan as the *Subadar* of the Deccan (Daulatabad), Khandesh and Varhad provinces. Since Mahabat Khan was occupied elsewhere, his son Khan Zaman was appointed as the deputy. The Emperor then demanded from Nizam Shah the return of the territory ceded by Khan Jahan Lodi. The Nizamshah obliged by returning all the territory except the fort at Beed, under the pretext that the commander of the fort was incompliant. Shah Jahan then ordered Khan Zaman to capture the fort. But the commander

handed over the fort without a fight when Khan Zaman arrived with his army.

When Khan Zaman was on his way to Beed, the Nizamshah ordered Shahji with a force of six thousand horsemen to raid Khandesh as a diversionary move to confuse the enemy. Darya Khan Rohila, who was in charge of the region on behalf of the Empire, succeeded in preventing Shahji's designs and drove him out of the Purna-Tapi doab. [746](#)This occurred in the last quarter of 1628.[747](#)

### *Murder of Lukhji Jadhavrao (1629)*

Fath Khan became the Chief Minister to the Nizamshah after his father, Malik Ambar's death. However, because of the intrigues of Hamid Khan, the Nizamshah had Fath Khan arrested and imprisoned. Hamid Khan was appointed in his place and Muqarrab Khan was made commander of the army. [748](#) The arrest of Fath Khan made some other noblemen uneasy about their own fate. One of them was Lukhji Jadhavrao (Shahji's father-in-law), who began seriously contemplating joining Mughal service. Somehow learning of Lukhji's wavering loyalty, the Nizamshah summoned him and his followers to court at Daulatabad. There, on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1629, according to a previously conceived conspiracy, they were set upon by assassins and Lukhji was murdered along with three of his sons, Raghav, Achaloji and Yashwant. [749](#) Lukhji's brother Jagdeorao and son Bahadurji, who were not present in court, escaped to Sindkhed taking Lukhji's widow, Girijai, with them.[750](#) Later (in July 1630) the surviving Jadhavraos became Mughal *mansabdars*. [751](#) It seems that the Nizamshah did not bother with them thereafter, probably because Sindkhed bordered upon Mughal territory or his attention was occupied elsewhere.

#### **SHAHJI LEAVES THE NIZAMSHABI**

Shahji, who was in the vicinity Paranda at the time of Lukhji's murder, lost no time in leaving Nizamshahi service and withdrawing to his own territory of Pune.<sup>752</sup> No action was initiated against him immediately, probably due to the onset of the monsoon. After the rains, however, it was not the Nizamshahi but Adilshahi army which attacked Shahji.

Muhammad Adilshah had been at war with the Nizamshah ever since he came to the throne.<sup>753</sup> The Adilshahi army had already fought a battle near Dharur with the Nizamshahi force in the very first year of Muhammad Adilshah's reign.<sup>754</sup> Towards the end of 1629, a Nizamshahi force under command of Hamid Khan had reached the environs of Bijapur and had engaged in a battle at Kannur.<sup>755</sup> In retaliation, Murar Jagdeo was dispatched with a large force by the Adilshah to attack Nizamshahi territory. He plundered the regions of Pune, Shirval and Indapur; Pune was sacked and destroyed; the walls of the town were demolished.<sup>756</sup> He then built a fort at Bhuleshwar<sup>757</sup> and named it Daulatmangal, appointing Rayarao as the commandant, with a force of 2,000 cavalry, before returning to Bijapur.

#### **SHAHJI JOINS THE MUGHALS**

Towards the end of 1629 Khan Jahan Lodi, who had been at the court for some time, fled from Agra and took refuge with the Nizam Shah. So the Emperor himself arrived at Burhanpur to direct the campaign against the Nizam Shah and Khan Jahan Lodi. The main Mughal army which invaded the Nizamshahi Sultanate was led by Azam Khan. It was at this juncture that Shahji wrote to Azam Khan conveying his desire to join the Mughal Emperor's service. The Khan conveyed the matter to the

Emperor who ordered him to make recommendations for the ranks to be conferred upon Shahji and his kinsmen. Shahji then joined Azam Khan with 2,000 horsemen when the Khan was marching from Beed to Shevgao in November 1630.<sup>758</sup> He was given the rank of 5,000 *dhat*/5,000 *sawar* and his son Sambhaji that of 2,000 *dhat*/1,000 *sawar*. Other kin like Mambaji, Ravirai Sathe, Maloji and Habaji were also given suitable appointments. Shahji was awarded a robe of honour, an elephant, a horse, an inlaid dagger, kettle drums, a flag, and Rs.200,000 in cash. Azam Khan sent Shahji to take possession of Junnar and Sangamner about mid November 1630.<sup>759</sup> Then, towards the end of March 1631, he was ordered to station himself at Nasik.

[760](#)

Khan Jahan Lodi, relentlessly pursued by the Mughals, was at last hunted down and killed in January 1631. In the meantime, towards the end of 1630, the Mughals came to an understanding with the Adilshah about sharing Nizamshahi territory.<sup>761</sup> Soon afterwards, Azam Khan laid siege to the fort of Dharur and captured it in January 1631. The Adilshahi generals claimed that the fort was a part of the territory which fell to the share of the Adilshah according to the treaty. But Azam Khan refused to hand it over to them on the pretext that the Adilshahi army had not exerted itself in capturing the fort. This, and Nizamshahi army commander Muqarrab Khan's pleas for support, with inducement of ceding some territory to the Adilshah, led to a rupture between the Mughals and the Adilshahi Sultanate.<sup>762</sup>

In February 1631, Azam Khan laid siege to the fort of Paranda. But supplies became so scarce after a month that he was compelled to raise it. Then he joined another Mughal army which had laid siege to the fort of Kandhar. Despite attempts by the Adilshahi and Nizamshahi armies to relieve the fort, the Mughals succeeded in blowing up a part of the wall whereupon

the garrison capitulated and handed over the fort to the Mughals in May 1631.<sup>763</sup>

As the condition of the Nizamshahi Sultanate deteriorated, some Nizamshahi noblemen persuaded the Nizamshah to release Fath Khan from prison and hand over the administration to him.<sup>764</sup> Aggrieved by this, Muqarrab Khan defected to the Mughals in May 1631 and obtained a *mansab* in Mughal service.<sup>765</sup> It was not long before the Nizamshah had to face the consequences of his fickleness. Fath Khan threw him into prison on the pretext that he was insane. Then he informed the Emperor of this act and begged for his favour. Whereupon he was told to first do away with his master. He complied at once, strangling the Nizamshah to death, enthroning the latter's 10 year old son, Husain, and sending a large tribute to the Emperor.<sup>766</sup>

In December 1631, Shah Jahan dispatched a large army under command of Asaf Khan to invade the Adilshahi Sultanate. Marching by way of Nanded, Kandhar and Gulbarga he arrived at Bijapur and commenced the siege. But it was doomed from the beginning. The Adilshahi army had laid waste the surrounding country and removed all grain to distant places. Just twenty days into the siege, Asaf Khan was compelled to raise it for want of supplies.<sup>767</sup> The Emperor left Burhanpur for Agra in April 1632.

#### **SHAHJI'S REBELLION AGAINST THE MUGHALS**

The Emperor had assigned to Shahji as his *jagir* a part of the Nizamshahi territory captured by the Mughals. After receiving tribute from Fath Khan, the Emperor, at his request, ordered restoration of that territory to him. Indignant at this, Shahji left Mughal service.<sup>768</sup> But he did not relinquish the

territory under his control, comprising the *parganas* of Nasik, Trimbak, Sangamner, Junnar, Chakan and Pune.<sup>769</sup> He also retained custody of a kinsman of the Nizamshah who was imprisoned in a fort.<sup>770</sup> According to the *Badshahnama*, he even managed to win support of the Adilshah in his rebellion against the Mughals.<sup>771</sup> This is corroborated by Muhammad Adilshah's *farman* dated 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1632 to the officials of the Gadag Pargana, informing them that some villages in the Pargana had been assigned to Sambhaji Bhosale.<sup>772</sup> That this Sambhaji was none other than Shahji's son is proved by a Marathi remark on the obverse of the document to the effect that the *pargana* was assigned to Shahji as a *mukasa* in Sambhaji's name. This Sambhaji, who could be no more than a boy at this time, had been given a *mansab* when Shahji joined Mughal service. He, too, must have left Mughal service along with his father. Shahji himself had not joined Adilshahi service yet. He was a rebel who owed allegiance to none. So this assignment to his son must have been a subsidy granted to him by the Adilshah.

Not remaining content with the territory he had in his control, Shahji began efforts to capture more. The commandant of the Galna Fort,<sup>773</sup> Mahmud Khan, had become alienated from Fath Khan because the latter had assassinated the Nizamshah. He showed an inclination to hand over the fort to Shahji. When Khan Zaman, then acting as *subadar* of the Deccan in his father Mahabat Khan's absence, heard of this, he instructed Mir Qasim Harvi, the commandant of the Mughal fort Laling situated nearby, to give Mahmud Khan an assurance of the Emperor's grace and ensure that the fort did not pass into Shahji's hands. Soon, Mir Qasim was able to coax Mahmud into handing the fort over to Imperial officials instead. Shahji's men, who were approaching to take possession of the fort, were sent back. A *farman* and various gifts were then sent for Mahmud who ceded the fort along with appurtenant territory yielding an annual

revenue of Rs.600,000 on 7<sup>th</sup> October 1632 to Khan Zaman's representative, Jafar Beg Baluch. [774](#)

#### SIEGE AND FALL OF DAULATABAD (1633)

Daulatabad, the capital of the Nizamshahi Sultanate, was one of the strongest forts in India. The main fort, called Kala Kot (black fort) is a rocky hill, about 180 meters in height. Its sides are scarped off up to a height of about 45 meters from the base. The only way up is through a tunnel. There was a ditch around, about 15 m broad and 10 deep. There were two walls beyond the ditch. The part between the ditch and the inner wall was called Mahakot and that between the inner wall and the outer one was called Ambar Kot. The circumference of the outer wall was about 4.5 km.

When Shahji left Mughal service, he incited the Adishah to capture the fort. [775](#) When Fath Khan got wind of these intrigues he wrote to Mahabat Khan offering to give up the fort to him. Mahabat Khan sent ahead his son, Khan Zaman, with the advance guard to take possession of the fort and himself set out with the main body from Burhanpur on 31<sup>st</sup> December 1632. When Khan Zaman neared the fort, he found his way blocked by Shahji with about 4,000 horsemen. As he drove them away, his left flank was attacked by three or four thousand horsemen led by the Adilshahi general Randaula Khan. But Khan Zaman counterattacked and put them to flight. Then he continued his advance and pitched his camp near Khadki. [776](#)

Meanwhile, Bijapuri ministers had learned of Fath Khan's plan and had opened negotiations with him. It was soon agreed that he should be allowed to retrain control of the fort and that the Bijapuris should provide him provisions and 300,000 hons in cash. When Mahabat Khan realized that Fath Khan would not abide by his offer, he ordered Khan Zaman to blockade the fort

at once. But before he could do so the Bijapuris reinforced the garrison with 600 troopers under Khairiyat Khan.

Khan Zaman commenced the siege on 11<sup>th</sup> February where Mahabat Khan joined him on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1633. The siege was pressed on with remarkable vigour. Shahji, Bijapuri generals like Murar Jagdeo and Randaula Khan, and Nizamshahi generals like Bahlul Khan and Yaqut Khan repeatedly tried to attack the besiegers and the convoys of bullocks which were bringing them supplies. But Mahabat Khan had made judicious dispositions to protect the besiegers and their line of communications. Just before dawn on 9<sup>th</sup> April 1633, a mine was fired which blew up a part of the outer wall. The Mughals stormed the breach and captured Ambar Kot before the end of the day.

There was a shortage of provisions in the fort since the beginning of the siege and by now the garrison was reduced to consuming dead animals. On 25<sup>th</sup> May a breach was made in the inner wall by firing a mine under it and Maha Kot too was captured by the Mughals. At last, on 17<sup>th</sup> June 1633, Fath Khan capitulated and the Mughals became masters of Daulatabad. Husain Nizamshah was handed over to the commandant of Gwalior and kept imprisoned in that fort.<sup>777</sup> An annuity of 200,000 rupees was granted to Fath Khan.

#### SHAHJI – KING MAKER (1633)

Sometime in the month of Bhadrapada Shaka 1555 (August- September 1633), in a daring move, Shahji enthroned a ten year old kin of the deposed Nizamshah, Murtaza, as the new Nizamshah at the Pemgiri Fort (also called Shahdurg or Shahgad) near Sangamner and took over the reins of power.<sup>778</sup> Murar Jagdeo, the Adilshahi general, was present at the coronation and returned to Bijapur soon thereafter.<sup>779</sup>

With the capture of Daulatabad and annexation of the Nizamshahi, the territories of that sultanate which had yet not been transferred to the Mughals had lapsed into a state of anarchy. The absence of central authority prompted erstwhile Nizamshahi noblemen to augment their military strength and seize as much new territory for themselves as possible.<sup>780</sup> However, many Maratha noblemen joined Shahji and acknowledged his leadership.<sup>781</sup> Although the Nizamshahi nobleman of Kalyan, Siddi Saif Khan, declined to join Shahji, he delivered possession of the territory to him before leaving to serve under the Adilshah.<sup>782</sup> Shahji thus controlled a region that stretched in the uplands roughly between the Godavari Valley in the north to the Nira Valley in the south and in the Konkan lowlands, from Kalyan in the north to Pali and Chaul in the south.<sup>783</sup>

Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Linhares records in his diary for 10<sup>th</sup> May 1634:<sup>784</sup>

"A Brahmin I had sent for gathering information has written to me - The Nizamshah had 84 hill forts<sup>785</sup> and 40 castles [in the plains]. The net revenue was 80 lakh Pagodas per annum. Besides, the Varhad region bordering the Mughals yielded annual revenue of 20 lakh pagodas. Out of these the Mughal Emperor has captured the following regions and forts:- The hill fort of Daulatabad, the capital of the Nizamshah with a revenue of 9 lakh; Galana fort, 1 lakh; Shahgad, 1 lakh; Jalnapur castle, 1 lakh; Beed castle, 3 lakh; the neighbouring castle of Kej-Dharur, 1 lakh; region and castle of Kandhar, bordering Qutbshahi territory, 3 lakh; Varhad desh, 20

lakh; castle of Ahmednagar, 1 lakh; Castle of Udgir, 1 lakh.

Shahji and the Nizamshah's son Murtaza have the following :- Hill fort of Junnar with a revenue of 3 lakh; Shahgad, where the Nizamshahi prince is, 1 lakh; Konkan territory, 11 lakh; Nashik-Trimbak fort, 1 lakh; Chembargonda, 75,000 and castle of Chakan, 1 lakh revenue. Other territories in his possession account for another 3 lakh in revenue.

The Adilshah has taken over the following Nizamshahi territories:- Paranda fort with a revenue of 3 lakh; Akalkot, 3 lakh; Pune, 75,000; Indapur, 50,000; forts and territory of Nilanga, 1 lakh; Konkan including upper Chaul, 3 lakh; other fourteen territories and forts yielding 14 lakh. Besides these Siddi Raihan a recalcitrant Nizamshahi noblemen has full control over the territory of Solapur with a revenue of 6 lakh pagodas and the fort of Ausa with a revenue of 1 lakh. But it is said that he is there as an Adilshahi nobleman and does not allow anyone to come there except his own men. The Nizamshah had some other territories but these are small and the *thanadars* and *havaldars* appointed by him over them have turned rebels. They do not allow anybody to come there. They claim that when the sovereign of the Nizamshahi is ascertained they will obey him....Shahji has 5,000 horsemen at Shahgad of which 2,000 belong to the Adilshah....He has appointed his cousin Mambaji over some forts. Mambaji in his turn has given three or four of those to Kheloji who disagrees with Shahji."

The statement in this report that the castle of Udgir was captured by the Mughal Emperor is incorrect. The Mughals captured it in 1636.

#### THE SIEGE OF PARANDA (1634)

After his return to Burhanpur, Mahabat Khan communicated to the Emperor that though the fall of Daulatabad had completely demoralized the Bijapuris, his fatigued army was not in a condition to embark upon a new campaign, but if a sufficiently large and well provisioned force under command of one of the princes was sent, it might even be possible to annex the Adilshahi Sultanate. In response, Shah Jahan ordered Prince Muhammad Shah Shuja to go to the Deccan at the head of a large force consisting of the contingents of several *mansabdars*.

Mahabat Khan had long entertained a desire to capture the Paranda fort. When Shuja arrived at Burhanpur, the Khan advised him to besiege and capture Paranda. Accordingly, Shuja and Mahabat Khan set out from Burhanpur towards Paranda on 20<sup>th</sup> October 1633. The siege commenced in February 1634.<sup>786</sup> The Nizamshahi army led by Shahji and the Adilshahi army led by Randaula Khan and Murar Jagdeo arrived in the vicinity of the fort and relentlessly harassed the besiegers by attacking their supply routes and foraging parties. At last the Mughals had to raise the siege on 21<sup>st</sup> May 1634 and retire to Burhanpur. Shuja returned to the Court. Mahabat Khan died of illness in October 1634 and was succeeded as *subadar* by Khan-i Dauran.

Taking advantage of Mahabat Khan's death, a Nizamshahi force led by Shahji started levying contributions in the territory around Daulatabad. But Khan Dauran chased them out of Mughal territory soon afterwards.<sup>787</sup>

#### REVOLUTION IN BIJAPUR (1635)

The Adilshahi Sultanate was torn by internecine feuds in the latter half of 1635.<sup>788</sup> Khawas Khan arrested his old rival, Mustafa Khan, and kept him in prison in the Belgaum fort. Sacking old civil servants and replacing them by his own men, he concentrated power in his own hands. This led to a widespread discontent among the nobility for Khawas Khan and, especially, his trusted Hindu lieutenant, Murar Jagdeo. With no power worth the name in his hands, even the Adilshah began conspiring with Randaula Khan, the leader of the disgruntled faction, who gathered together others like Farhad Khan, Khairiyat Khan, Yaqt Khan, Ragho Pandit Yaqutkhani, Kheloji Bhosle and Sarjerao Ghatge, and marched from Gulbarga towards the Capital.

Murar Jagdeo, at this time, had gone with a force of 10,000 horsemen to deal with the commandant of fort Yadgir who had refused to obey Khawas Khan's orders. Learning of Randaula Khan's advance upon Bijapur, he turned back, attacked the Khan's advance guard under command of Ragho Pandit that had just crossed the Bhima River, but was routed and fled towards Dharwad.

A trusted servant of Muhammad Adilshah, the Abyssinian Siddi Raihan, was in the meantime plotting the assassination of Khawas Khan. On a certain day, when Khawas Khan was returning home from the Court, Siddi Raihan's men attacked and wounded him. He managed somehow to reach his quarters and lock himself within. Siddi Raihan followed him with the *khaskhail*. The door was broken down, an entry was forced and the Khan, beheaded. Randaula Khan also arrived in Bijapur in the evening of the same day. A court was convened the next day when the Adilshah honoured various noblemen and bestowed on Siddi Raihan the title of Ikhlas Khan. Mustafa Khan was freed from the Belgaum fort, brought to Bijapur and restored at the helm of affairs.

Learning of Khawas Khan's assassination, Murar Jagdeo fled from Dharwad to Halyal where he was arrested by the local Adilshahi official and sent to Bijapur. His tongue was cut off and he was paraded through the streets of Bijapur before being executed.

#### FALL OF NIZAMSHAHI (1636)

#### *Shah Jahan's Arrival in the Deccan*

Shah Jahan left Akbarabad (Agra) on 20<sup>th</sup> September 1635 with the intention of personally directing the campaign against the remnants of the Nizamshahi Sultanate. [789](#) He crossed the Narmada at Handiya on 4<sup>th</sup> January 1636. A *farman* was dispatched on 9<sup>th</sup> January 1636 with Makramat Khan to the Adilshah asking the latter to stop giving aid to Shahji and other Nizamshahi rebels, and to send the agreed tribute in order that it reached Daulatabad by 10<sup>th</sup> March 1636 (which was *nauroz* or New Year's Day according to the Persian calendar). In return, the Adilshah was offered the erstwhile Nizamshahi fort of Solapur and the territory appurtenant to it along with the region of Vangi, together yielding revenue of 900,000 hons. Another *farman* was sent with Abdul Latif to the Qutbshah asking the latter to uproot the Shia persuasion from his Sultanate, replace the name of the Shah of Iran (as sovereign) with his own in the *khutba* (recitation in mosques) and remit the tribute before 10<sup>th</sup> March 1636.

Three forces were assigned under command of Khan Dauran, Khan Zaman and Shayista Khan, and dispatched on 5<sup>th</sup> February. Khan Dauran, with 20,000 troopers, was to make Kandhar and Nanded near the border between the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates his base and then capture the forts of Ausa and Udgir. Khan Zaman, with another 20,000 troopers, was to proceed to Ahmednagar and capture Shahji's territory of Chambhargonda and Ashti as well as the Konkan. Shayista

Khan was given command of 8,000 troopers and ordered to capture the Junnar, Nasik, Trimbak and Sangamner forts.

Makramat Khan informed the Emperor that the Adilshah was only feigning submission but was clandestinely engaged in mischief and rebellion. The Emperor also learned that the Adilshah was secretly sending money to the garrisons of the Ausa and Udgir forts and had deputed Khairiyat Khan to succour them and Randaula Khan to succour Shahji. So, on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1636, he dispatched a force of 10,000 troopers under command of Sayyid Khan Jahan to devastate Adilshahi territory approaching from Solapur and ordered Khan Dauran and Khan Zaman to do likewise approaching from Bidar and Indapur.

For the Qutbshah, on the other hand, a mere *farman* was sufficient to evoke compliance with Imperial orders. Agreeing to remit the tribute as demanded, he ordered the *khutba* to be changed in favour of Shah Jahan, struck coins of gold with the Emperor's name and even sent some for him to see, which the Emperor did on 9<sup>th</sup> April 1636.

### ***Mughal-Adilshahi Treaty (May 1636)***

The armies of Khan Dauran and Sayyid Khan Jahan invaded the Adilshahi Sultanate and started laying the territory waste. This, and the change in policy after the revolution in Bijapur, led the Adilshah to sue for peace. His envoys met Shah Jahan on 1<sup>st</sup> April 1636. Soon afterwards, a treaty was concluded and its terms were incorporated in a *farman* which Shah Jahan sent to the Adilshah about the middle of May. In brief, they were as follows: Adilshah was to get territories out of the Nizamshahi Sultanate with a revenue of two million hons [per year] comprising the region of Vangi, the forts of Solapur and Paranda and the territory appurtenant to them, along with the Nizamshahi Konkan and the forts situated within it; the rest of the Nizamshahi territories were to be annexed to the Mughal

Empire. The Adilshah was to pay a tribute of Rs.2 million to the Emperor. On his part, the Emperor promised, not to employ Shahji and Siddi Raihan of Solapur in Imperial service. If Shahji declined service with the Adilshahi Sultanate, he was to be arrested or driven out of Adilshahi territory. The Adilshah received this *farman* on 20<sup>th</sup> May and the very next day sent the Mughal envoy, Makramat Khan, with the tribute that had been demanded.<sup>790</sup>

### *Campaign Against Shahji (March–June 1636)*

As we have seen earlier, Khan Zaman had been ordered by the Emperor to capture Shahji's territories of Chembargonda and those in the Konkan.<sup>791</sup> Accordingly, he collected supplies and provisions at Ahmednagar and proceeded towards Junnar. He received news when he was at Akolner, about 18 km from Ahmednagar, that Shahji had won over the fort commander of Mahuli, taken possession of that fort and was planning to go to Paranda via Junnar and Pargaon. He therefore left Akolner and marched 50 km to Rajuri near Junnar. Marching another 60 km on the following day, he reached Pargaon to learn that Shahji, who was in the vicinity, had left towards Pune by a hilly and forested route at the approach of the Mughal force. Reports were then received that Shahji was at Lohagaon in the Pune Pargana in Adilshahi territory. Khan Zaman had specific orders against entering Adilshahi territory. Therefore, he reported this to the Emperor and awaited orders on the bank of the Bhima River, but dispatched Shahbeg Khan to capture Chembargonda, whose garrison offered resistance till late afternoon before surrendering the fort. Around the same time, while waiting for Imperial orders, Khan Zaman decided to take the Junnar Sarkar (administrative sub-division) and, keeping Bahadur Khan to protect the territory against Shahji, left towards that destination. But, while he was on his way to Junnar, he received Shah Jahan's orders that he should not go to Junnar since Shayista Khan had already been detailed there but,

instead, devastate Adilshahi territory and engage and scatter Shahji's forces, as well as any Adilshahi troops that were helping Shahji. Accordingly, he crossed the border on 16<sup>th</sup> March and, under constant threat of attack from enemy forces lurking about him and engaging in some intermittent skirmishes, he went as deep into Adilshahi territory as Miraj and Raybag. In the meantime, an understanding had been reached between the Adilshah and the Mughals. So Khan Zaman was ordered to suspend operations and return to Court to receive fresh orders. He met the Emperor on 19<sup>th</sup> June. He was awarded the title *Bahadur* (brave), honoured with many valuable presents, ordered to capture Junnar and other forts, and force Shahji into submission. Meantime Shayista Khan had captured the territory of Junnar and Sangamner.

By May 1636, although most of the objectives set by Shah Jahan were fulfilled, Shahji had remained to be subdued. But Khan Zaman had been sent against him and it was unlikely that Shahji, with virtually no one helping him, would be able to hold out too long. Ausa & Udgir were yet to be captured but with Khan Dauran having invested the forts, it was certain that they would fall sooner or later. So, Shah Jahan appointed his son, Aurangzeb, as *subadar* of the four provinces of the Deccan, viz. Daulatabad, Khandesh, Telangan & Varhad and left Daulatabad for Agra on 14<sup>th</sup> July 1636.

It was during his journey back to Agra that Shah Jahan received the news of the capture of Ausa and Udgir, and, on 1st December 1636, from Khan Zaman, that Shahji's rebellion had been crushed.

### ***Khan Zaman's Second Expedition against Shahji (June-November 1636)***

Khan Zaman had been assigned the task of dealing with Shahji when he met the Emperor on 19<sup>th</sup> June 1636. Accordingly, he

set out towards Junnar. [792](#) The Adilshah, on his part, dispatched Randaula Khan with orders to co-operate with Mughal forces in their task of capturing forts under Shahji's control.

Assigning Kartalab Khan, Rawati Singh, Aurang Khan, Sayyid Mirza and others along with Rana Jagat Singh's contingent of a thousand cavalry, and a thousand musketeers, to Bahadur Khan, Khan Zaman entrusted to him the task of investing the fort of Junnar (i.e. the Shivneri fort). He himself marched towards Pune in order to engage Shahji, who was known to be there. However, incessant rain and the fact that the Ghod River was in spate forced him to wait for almost a month on its banks. Thereafter, when the floods had subsided, he crossed the river and reached Lohagaon on the banks of the Indrayani River. Shahji, who was some 50 km away from Lohagaon when he received reports of the approaching Mughal force under Khan Zaman, had in the

## PARTITION OF NIZAMSHASHI TERRITORY, 1636

— Crest-line of the Sahyadri  
- - - Line of Partition.

Nizamshahi territory ceded

to the Mughals

Nasik o  
Aurangabad o

MUGHAL EMPIRE

Nanded o

Dharur o

Ahmednagar o

Bhivandi o  
Kalyan o

Mumbai

Danda  
Janjira o  
Rajpuri o

Pune o  
Kondhana (Sinhgad) o  
Purandar o

Parandha o  
Vangi o  
Nizamshahi territory ceded to Adilshahi

Satara o  
Pandharpur o  
Solapur o

Chiplun o

ADIL SHAHI

Miraj o  
Bijapur o  
Kolhapur o

Hyderabad o  
North

0 37.5 75 km  
Scale : 1 cm = 37.5 km

meantime gone towards Kondhana and Murumbdeo hills. Three rivers – the Indrayani, the Mula and the Mutha – separated Khan Zaman from Shahji and all three were running in spate. A little before this, Randaula Khan had written to Khan Zaman informing him that he would secure the keys to Nizashahi forts from Shahji, and further requesting him not to advance till he had received another letter from him (Randaula). Khan Zaman therefore sent a messenger to Randaula Khan seeking his advice on pursuing Shahji and, when he had received a response, crossed the Indrayani River. He then divided his force into three parts, one under Rao Chhatrasal, the second under Prithviraj and the third under his personal command, and marched towards the Bor pass.

Shahji had in the meantime reached the Konkan through the Kumbha pass and gone to seek asylum with the chief of Danda-Rajpuri and other local chieftains. But fearing the consequences, they refused to oblige him. With no alternative before him, he decided to return and, when he had reached the foot of the Kumbha pass, found the Mughal force negotiating the slopes on its descent. Randaula Khan, too, had arrived at the pass. Shahji therefore sped towards Mahuli and, when he found Khan Zaman in hot pursuit, thence to the Muranjan Fort. Khan Zaman followed him and arrived at a distance of about 10 km from Muranjan. By the time he had reached near the fort, he received intelligence that Shahji had just escaped by a different route. A chase followed and Khan Zaman was able to make contact and engage Shahji's troops. But despite heavy casualties, Shahji managed to break away to be further pursued to a distance of 35 km. However, extreme cold and slushy ground conditions forced the Mughals to abandon the chase but helped Shahji to reach Mahuli. Khan Zaman followed him up to the fort within a day and laid siege. Randaula Khan soon joined him.

Shahji had no alternative but to sue for peace. He offered to surrender the fort on the condition that he was given service in the Mughal Court. Khan Zaman responded by informing him

that he should approach the Adilshah if he wished his life to be spared. In desperation, Shahji requested a memorandum of treaty from the Adilshah. This was received in due time and, despite several conditions therein that Shahji found inconvenient, he was forced to submit to them under increasing pressure from the Mughals. He came down from the fort, met Randaula Khan, delivered custody of the Nizamshah, agreed to hand over Junnar and other forts such as Shivneri, Trimbak, Tringalwadi, Harsh, Jivdhan, Chavand and Hadsara to the Mughals, and formally entered service under the Adilshah.

Khan Zaman camped at Mahuli for some more time to conclude the affair of the Nizamshahi. Randaula Khan handed over the Nizamshah to the Mughals after receiving confirmatory orders from the Adilshah and then left for Bijapur with Shahji.

No reliable source exists to determine the date on which Shahji surrendered. But, since Shah Jahan received news of this event on 1<sup>st</sup> December 1636, it may be surmised that this must have happened around the end of October 1636.

Khan Zaman then went with the Nizamshah to meet Aurangzeb at Daulatabad. Aurangzeb left with his captive for the Capital and reached it on 17<sup>th</sup> April 1637. The Emperor ordered the prisoner to be kept in the Gwalior Fort.<sup>793</sup> It is interesting to note that two earlier Nizamshahs were already serving sentence there – one that Akbar had taken captive after the fall of Ahmednagar and another who was taken prisoner when the Mughals had captured Daulatabad.

#### **ADILSHAHI'S CAMPAIGNS IN KARNATAK (1637-1643)**

The Adilshahi army was engaged since 1637 in a series of campaigns devouring one after the other of principalities which had broken away from the Vijayanagara Empire. <sup>794</sup> These campaigns were led by Randaula Khan till his death in 1053

A.H. (1643- 1644). In the campaign of 1637-1638, he captured the fort of Ikkeri, extracted a large tribute from Veerbhadrappa Nayak, giving a morsel to Kenge Hanumappa Nayak of Basavapatna as a reward for the assistance rendered by him. Virabhadra shifted his capital to Bednur.

In the following year (1638-1639) the Khan, on the advice of Kenge Hanumappa, set out against Bangalore. He sent Afzal Khan ahead to capture Sira which was on the way. What occurred there is described in the *Muhammadnama* thus:

“When Afzal Khan reached near the fort of Sira, Kasturi Ranga [the Chief of the principality] lost his courage due to the terror of the warriors of Islam. He came out of the fort to meet and ask the Khan to spare his life. During the interview an incident took place which was indicative of mischief. So the Khan killed Kasturi Ranga then and there.”

The details of the incident are not given in the *Muhammadnama*. But it would seem probable that the Khan enticed Kasturi Ranga out of the fort with a promise of safe conduct and murdered him.<sup>795</sup> Soon afterwards Randaula Khan arrived on the scene, invested the fort and captured it after a stiff fight. Then he gave up the fort to Kenge Hanumappa as a reward for his assistance.

Randaula Khan marched on and laid siege to the fort of Bangalore. After a few days the Chief of the place, Kempe Gowda, capitulated through the intercession of Kenge Hanumappa and surrendered the fort. The Khan kept Shahji there and, marching onwards, laid siege to the fort of Shrirangapatna which was situated on the border of the Kingdom of Mysore. Here he met fierce resistance for the first time. The Mysore army began attacking the besiegers at night and cut off their supplies. Kempe Gowda, who had joined the Khan with his contingent, defected and took refuge with

Kanthirava, the King of Mysore. Finally, the Khan was compelled to raise the siege.<sup>796</sup>

The next year (1639-1640), he marched against Kenge Hanumappa who, according to *Muhammadnama*, was showing signs of recalcitrance. When the town of Basavapatna was captured by the Khan's army, which included among others a Shahji's contingent, the Nayak took refuge in the fort. But soon afterwards he begged Randaula Khan to spare his life and handed over the fort. Though his life was spared he was kept in prison. Many other petty chieftains surrendered after this victory. Randaula Khan stayed in the fort of Basavapatna and sent Afzal Khan ahead.

Afzal Khan marched to Chiknayakanhalli. The Raja of that place immediately surrendered and begged to be allowed to retain possession of the town. Out of the territory yielding annual revenue of a hundred thousand hons, the Khan let the Raja retain the town with an annual income of 20,000 hons and annexed the rest. He then marched to Belur. Randaula Khan arrived at Chiknayakanhalli and sent him reinforcements.

Afzal Khan laid siege to the fort of Belur. The Khan succeeded in blowing up a part of the walls by firing two mines. But Venkatpati, the Raja of Belur blocked the breach and kept up a stiff resistance. After four months the Raja agreed to give up the fort in return for a town named Sakrepatna. This was done. The Khan then marched on Tumkur while Randaula Khan arrived at Belur. The Raja of Belur capitulated without a fight and gave up the fort as well as all his wealth which was sent to Bijapur.

Shahji surrendered at Mahuli in 1636 and agreed to serve under the Adilshah. No information about his activity from that point up to 1643 is available in elaborate detail. Yet, it is certain that he was present in Adilshahi military expeditions at various places in the Karnataka.

A *farman* dated 30<sup>th</sup> January 1642, issued by Muhammad Adilshah to Shahji, is the earliest of all *farmans* of the Adilshah to Shahji after he had surrendered at Mahuli in 1636. Shahji has therein been addressed by the prefix ‘*farzand*’, or ‘son’. [797](#) In royal courts in those days, it was a practice to use this prefix in official correspondence for the very highest ranking nobles or tributary chiefs as testimony of the sovereign’s esteem, which demonstrates the regard the Adilshah evinced for Shahji. [798](#) It also implies that the title was conferred upon him before that date. In a *farman* to Shahji dated 28<sup>th</sup> March 1644 Muhammad Adilshah styles him as Maharaja and *Farzand*. [799](#) This is the earliest among the *farmans* in which he is referred to as Maharaja.[800](#) No other Hindu nobleman of the Adilshahi Sultanate is known to have been given the title of Maharaja.[801](#)

## Early Career of Shivaji

### SHIVAJI'S CHILDHOOD (1630-1642)

Shivaji, son of Shahji and Jijabai (daughter of Lukhji Jadhavrao), was born on 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630 at the Shivneri Fort.

[802](#) Shahji was in Mughal service at that time, which he left soon afterwards and lived independently, without lord or master, retaining control over a considerable territory. Then, after the Nizamshahi Prime Minister Fath Khan handed over the Daulatabad fort and delivered the Nizamshah into Mughal custody (in 1633), Shahji set about the task of reviving the Nizamshahi Sultanate. It is not known where Shivaji and Jijabai were residing during these tumultuous times, but it is most likely that they were at Shivneri. We know from a passing reference in the *Badshahnama* that Shahji's family was at Shivneri in March 1636. [803](#)

In the same year, i.e. 1636, Shahji surrendered at Mahuli and accepted service under the Adilshah. His new master assigned him to campaigns in the Karnataka under Ranadaula Khan's command. No reliable records exist to show that Shahji returned to Maharashtra after that. [804](#) The *Shivabharat* says that Ranadaula Khan was so pleased with Shahji's valour during the campaign that he bestowed the city of Bangalore on him. [805](#) Shahji shifted to Bangalore after Adilshahi forces had captured that region in 1638-1639. The *Shivabharat* gives a brief account of Shahji's lifestyle during his stay in Bangalore. [806](#) It also mentions that Shahji was deeply attached to both Jijabai and Shivaji. [807](#) It further says that when Shivaji turned seven, Shahji assigned a teacher for him and children of his officers who were

of the same age. [808](#) According to the *Shivabharat*, Shahji deputed the twelve year old Shivaji to administer his *mukasas* in the Pune province. [809](#) But the substance of the narrative in the Sabhasad Chronicle is that when Shivaji was 12 years old, Dadaji Kondadeo, the administrator of Shahji's *mukasas* around Pune, took Shivaji and Jijabai to Bangalore to visit Shahji and, while sending them back to Pune, Shahji dispatched a small staff with his son comprising Samrajpant Peshwa and others. [810](#) Though the chronicle cannot stand comparison with the *Shivabharat* in reliability, the description in the latter source is somewhat vague and lacking in details. So we are left with no certain knowledge as to where Shivaji and his mother were living from 1637 to 1642. But there is no doubt that for some period during those years they were living with Shahji at Bangalore and that they came to Pune when Shivaji was twelve. [811](#)

The Chitnis Chronicle says that, for some time after the treaty of Mahuli, Shivaji stayed with Shahji in Bijapur; that he abhorred Muslims and hated serving them; that he would become enraged at the sight of cows being slaughtered; that he had refused to bow in obeisance to the Adilshah when Shahji had once taken him to the Court; and that Shahji, fearing that such conduct might lead to dire consequences, dispatched Shivaji to Pune. [812](#) No reliable source corroborates this account, nor is there any evidence to say Shivaji had ever been in Bijapur. The chronicler seems to have imagined this account and included it to show that Shivaji had extreme pride in his religion and an abiding hatred for Muslims. Even if the details of the account are likely to be imaginary, the essential fact that Shivaji was generally inimical towards Muslims finds support in the *Shivabharat* in which Ali Adilshah is reported to have said to Afzal Khan before dispatching him against Shivaji: "...(Shivaji) has been insulting the *Yavanas* (Muslims) since his adolescence". [813](#) And Shivaji's son Sambhaji, in a Sanskrit deed

of grant issued in 1680, describes his father as “one who had vowed, at the very first blossoming of his youth, to reduce the *Mlechhas* (Muslims).” [814](#) But though he was a devout Hindu, was partial to his coreligionists and resented foreign rule, he was not a bigot and never indulged in persecution of Muslims or any other community. In fact, such persecution would not be in consonance with his faith.

#### SHAHJI'S MUKASAS AROUND PUNE

When Shahji was posted in the Karnataka in 1636, he was assigned *mukasas* in Maharashtra as well as in Karnataka. Of these, the *mukasas* in Maharashtra were mainly grouped around Pune. It was in this territory, with Pune as its centre, that Shivaji grew up from the age of twelve, and it was this region that became the cradle of the *Swarajya* (one's own state) which he founded.

Maharashtra is the homeland of the Marathas. In a wider sense, especially outside Maharashtra, the term ‘Maratha’ is used to denote all Marathi speaking Hindu people; in a narrower sense it is used to denote the caste of *kshatriyas* which by numbers is the largest among these people. Maharashtra forms a sort of right angled triangle with the west coast as far south as Karwar as its base, the line of the Tapi River a little beyond the Painganga River as the perpendicular, and an irregular line extending from Nagpur to Karwar as the hypotenuse. The Sahyadris running parallel to the coast throw off a number of branches eastward that gradually decrease in height.

The narrow strip of land between the Sahyadris and the Arabian Sea, over 550 km in length and varying in breadth from 40 to 80 km, is known as the Konkan. It is an extremely rugged and broken country, split up by a number of rivers and creeks and also by spurs of hills projecting from the main range. This coast had a number of flourishing ports in the seventeenth

century. Most of these, situated at the mouths of rivers, are now silted up. The forest clad Sahyadri range, some 30 km wide, could be crossed through a number of passes. In the seventeenth century, these were narrow foot tracks winding through the forests and over the hills, with frequent sharp bends and steep gradients. They were passable only on foot, and at best by pack animals, but none by carts. The Konkan, protected by the Sahyadris in the east and the sea in the west and crossed by barriers of rivers and hill ranges all along its length, was incapable of providing sustenance for a large army. Truly, it was a country where small armies could be beaten and big armies would starve.

A number of small spurs run eastward from the Sahyadris in the Pune region. The extremely rugged valleys enclosed by these are usually known as the Mavals or Kholes, each named after the stream running through it, or after the principal village. Collectively known as the Mavals, they spread 20 to 30 km eastward, gradually widening out and merging in the plains to the east. In the Pune region there were, from north to south, 10 Mavals or Kholes, viz., Rohid Khore, Hirdas Maval, Velvand Khore, Gunjan Maval, Kanad Khore, Mose Khore, Muthe Khore, Paud Khore, Pavan Maval and Nane Maval. To their east, the valley of the Shivganga, called Khedebare, also had the characteristic of a Maval. All these were administratively separate regions. To the north of Khedebare lay a subdivision of the Pune Pargana, called Karyat Maval, which, though not a separate region, may be included in the terrain called the Mavals. The inhabitants of the Mavals are called the Mavalas. Generally small in stature, they are an extremely hardy people and form excellent raw material for light infantry.

In 1656, Shahji's *mukasas* around Pune comprised the following: [815](#)

1. Pune Pargana – 290 villages.
2. Supe Pargana – 63 villages.
3. Indapur Pargana – 85 villages.

#### 4. Chakan Pargana – 64 villages.

5. The Mavals – Hirdas Maval (51 villages), Velvand Khore (33), Gunjan Maval (81), Kanad Khore (33), Mose Khore (71), Muthe Khore (19) and Paud Khore (82). Rohid Khore (42) in the south and Pavan Maval (80) and Nane Maval (89) in the north had never been assigned to Shahji. Khedebare (42) was assigned to Shahji from 1636 but was taken away from him in 1649.

All this territory was not assigned to him in 1636 and there had been occasional additions and subtractions.<sup>816</sup> But the Pune Pargana was continuously held by him since 1636, except, as we shall see, for a short interruption in 1644-45.

#### JIJABAI


Some historians proffer the conjecture that Jijabai was instrumental in inspiring Shivaji with the aim of founding an independent state. However, no evidence that could justly be considered supportive of this surmise has come to light so far. There is no doubt that Jijabai occasionally participated in the affairs of Shahji's *mukasas* around Pune. But that is insufficient to conclude that she was the driving force behind Shivaji's political enterprise. It was but natural for her to oversee the administration of her husband's estates while she was living so far away from him along with their young son. She intervened in some cases concerning minor issues like *watans* and *inams*,

<sup>817</sup> but there is no evidence of her participation in matters involving larger issues like policy. Even in such minor issues in which she did intervene, at least one instance may be cited when Shivaji declined to act according to his mother's wishes.

<sup>818</sup> In the absence of sufficient dependable source material, therefore, we can only say that she must have wielded as much influence on Shivaji's thoughts and actions as any caring mother of that period might justly be expected to have done.

Dadaji Kondadeo, who was an employee of Shahji, was appointed to administer Shahji's *mukasas* in the Pune region since 1636. In that capacity, he was styled as "subadar, fort Kondhana and the *mahals* [under its jurisdiction]."<sup>[819](#)</sup>

The Pune Pargana, which had remained in Shahji's control since before 1629 till after 1633, had been in a state of utter ruin after Murar Jagdeo's raid in 1629-30.



Moreover, the famine of 1631-32 had compounded the woes of the people. <sup>820</sup> Dadaji performed the arduous task of bringing the desolate land under cultivation once more. <sup>821</sup> He settled long standing disputes about *watans* and put down lawlessness. <sup>822</sup> His justness, honesty and integrity were remembered even a century after his death. Shivaji's grandson Shahu once observed, "Dadali Kondadeo was a small Brahmin, but the judgments passed by him were respected even by Emperor Aurangzeb." <sup>823</sup> Shivaji himself held him in great respect. He ordered, in not less than four letters, to ratify whatever had been decreed by Dadaji. <sup>824</sup>

The exact date of Dadaji's death is not known. But it is certain that he died sometime after 13<sup>th</sup> July 1646 and before 19<sup>th</sup> July 1647. <sup>825</sup> He was till then the administrator of Shahji's estates around Pune, of which only a small portion was assigned to Shivaji, evidently to provide him training and experience in administration. <sup>826</sup> It was only after Dadaji's death that Shivaji took complete control of Shahji's *mukasas* around Pune. <sup>827</sup>

#### PLACES OF SHIVAJI'S RESIDENCE

It seems from a written statement of the *deshkulkarnis* of Khedebare that Dadaji had built a house for Shivaji and Jijabai at Khed (near Pune), where they might have lived for some time in 1636 before going to Bangalore. <sup>828</sup> Dadaji had also built a mansion for them, the Lal Mahal (Red Mansion), at Pune. <sup>829</sup> After returning from Bangalore, they might have alternated residence between Pune and Khed till 1649 when, as we shall see, Khedebare was taken away from Shahji. Some entries in the Shivapur Chronology suggest that Shivaji shifted his residence

in 1658 to Rajgad that remained his capital till 1670 after which it was shifted to Raigad.

#### **SHAHJI AT VARIANCE WITH THE ADILSHAH (1644-45)**

Randaula Khan, Shahji's friend and benefactor, died in 1053 A. H. (i.e. between 12<sup>th</sup> March 1643 and 28<sup>th</sup> February 1644). [830](#) It appears that Mustafa Khan's influence in the Bijapur Court increased after this event. The following *farman*, dated 20<sup>th</sup> August 1643, suggests that Shahji harboured a feeling of discontent or suspicion about Muhammad Adilshah. There is no way of saying why this was so, but perhaps it was caused by some disagreement with Mustafa Khan, possibly after Randaula Khan's death. [831](#)

#### **Muhammad Adilshah to Shahji [832](#)**

“We learnt from Narsingrao that when you were ordered to present your contingent like all other officers you felt offended. You are our old servant. We know your loyalty, devotion, and service. Be contented and do not worry about anything. Our favour to you is increasing day by day.”

The next *farman*, dated 28<sup>th</sup> March 1644, shows that the Adilshah initially adopted a conciliatory policy towards Shahji, possibly because he did not wish to eliminate a potential check on Mustafa Khan's increasing self will.

#### **Muhammad Adilshah to Shahji [833](#)**

We have received with satisfaction your letter professing loyalty towards us. Nawab Khan Baba [i.e. Mustafa Khan] is a wise man and you are prudent. We have ordered him to do whatever is beneficial to the

state and conclude a treaty with Shivappa. Bring to the notice of the Nawab whatever you think proper.

However, all these seemingly conciliatory measures had little effect. The newsletter dated 25<sup>th</sup> June 1644 of the provincial Mughal headquarters at Aurangabad contains the following entry: [834](#)

“[Our] spy with Adil Khan brought the news that Shahji Bhosale, Siddi Farhan and Yaqut Khan have joined hands and have separated themselves from Adil Khan. Sayyid Abdul Husain is trying to reconcile them.”

But no reconciliation was effected. The newsletter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1644, also from Aurangabad, reports: [835](#)

“Uzbak Khan [836](#) had written to his representative that Adil Khan had cut off the hand of Shahji’s envoy. Therefore Shahji, Siddi Raihan and Siddi Yaqut had separated themselves from Adil Khan. Some persons are plying to and fro to bring about reconciliation. But he [Adil Khan] remained unyielding.”

Where Shahji and his accomplices were at this time is not known. But the following *farman* of Muhammad Adilshah dated 1<sup>st</sup> August 1644 shows that soon after the above report, the Adilshah dispatched a force against Dadaji Kondadeo.

Muhammad Adilshah to Kanhoji Jedhe [837](#)

Shahji Bhosale has been excluded from the exalted Court and Khandoji and Baji Ghorapde, with other *wazirs* have been appointed to dislodge his agent, Dadaji Kondadeo, who is towards Kondhana. Join them with your

contingent, under their instruction chastise and annihilate Dadaji Kondadeo and [other] associates of that traitor<sup>838</sup>, and capture that territory.

Kanhoji Jedhe, to whom this *farman* was addressed, was *deshmukh* of the Bhor sub-division of Rohid Khore which was adjacent to Shahji's *mukasas* around Pune. Similar *farmans* might have been addressed to other *deshmukhs* also, but this is the only one that has survived. Khandoji and Baji Ghorapade who led the expedition were of course Adilshahi noblemen (*wazirs*).<sup>839</sup>

The object of the expedition was to chastise Dadaji and capture the territory under his control. It is thus clear that Shahji was not present in the environs at the time; perhaps he was in one of his *mukasas* in the Karnataka.

No narrative of the expedition is extant. But letters, issued by Shahji and others, about *watans* and grants in the *parganas* of Pune and Supe show that sometime between February and November 1644, control over those *parganas* had passed into the hands of Khandoji and Baji Ghorapade, and others, and that they were restored to Shahji before the beginning of 1646 or, perhaps, even before that time.<sup>840</sup> Unfortunately nothing except these few letters have survived and many questions – what occurred in the meantime, how Dadaji Kondadeo faced the expedition against him, where Shahji was during this period, was an expedition sent against him, if so who led it and what was its outcome, or how Shahji regained his former position in the Adilshahi Sultanate – remain unanswered.

A passing reference in the *Shivabharat* almost certainly alludes to this expedition. When, in 1648, as we shall see, Fath Khan was dispatched against Shivaji, the latter, according to the *Shivabharat*, made a speech before his soldiers. In the course of that speech, he briefly recalled three of his past exploits – each

in a separate verse – thus: “I conquered Jawali and installed the Chandrarao there; the Ghorpades, terrible like an enraged Cobra, became pacified when they saw me, the snake charmer; I suddenly attacked the Chief of Phaltan, put him to flight, captured him alive and then released him.” [841](#) The second of these seems to allude to the expedition led by Khandoji and Baji Ghorapade. But it is too vague to tell us anything more than what little we already know. About the third, the attack on the Chief of Phaltan, no information whatsoever has survived.

### SHIVAJI'S SEALS

Among Shivaji's letters which have survived the earliest is dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1646.[842](#) At its top appears an imprint of Shivaji's principal Seal[843](#) with a couplet in Sanskrit that means:

“This seal [i.e. the authority behind the seal] of Shahji's son Shivaji, waxing like the crescent of the New Moon and revered by the world, shines forth[844](#) for the welfare [of mankind].”

An imprint of the closing seal, bearing the words, “*Maryadeyam Virajate*” (indicating, ‘here ends the letter’), appears at the end of the letter.

All original letters of Shivaji, even those after his coronation, carry either both these seals or only the closing seal.[845](#)

The Seals of contemporary Muslim Sultans and their Muslim noblemen were all in Persian. Even Seals of Hindu noblemen in the service of Muslim Sultans were ordinarily in Persian.[846](#) Only seldom do we find the Seals of such Hindu noblemen in Marathi.[847](#) Even the Seals of Shahji and Jijabai are in Persian.[848](#) The seals of Dadaji Kondadeo, too, is in Persian.[849](#)

In such a milieu, it was remarkable that the Seal of the son of a powerful nobleman of the Muslim Adilshah should have been fashioned in Sanskrit. Even more astonishing is the confident declaration that Shivaji's political prowess – compared in the Sanskrit couplet with the waxing Moon in the bright half of each lunar month – was on the ascendant. It may be noted that Shivaji's official biography, the *Shivabharat* of Paramanand, is also in Sanskrit. So is the lexicon commissioned by him, the *Rajvyavahar-kosh*, giving Sanskrit terms for Persian ones which were then in vogue in official Marathi correspondence. In fact, all the four literary works – the other two being the *Karan-Kaustubh* and *Shivarkodaya* – known to have been written at his behest are in Sanskrit.

Shivaji's Seal was made before 28<sup>th</sup> January 1646, or before Shivaji had turned seventeen. There is no way of knowing precisely when the seal was made, who originally conceived the idea of using a Sanskrit couplet or who actually composed it.

The seal was not rendered in Sanskrit as a consequence of momentary or transitory whim, but rather knowingly, deliberately and intentionally. With the exception of Netoiji Palkar, the seals of all of Shivaji's ministers and officials, so far found, are in Sanskrit or Marathi. Till 1657, the seals of the officers in charge of affairs of Shahji's *mukasas* in the Pune region were in Persian, but it must be remembered that they were in the service of Shahji, not Shivaji. During the period thereafter, with the exception of Netoiji Palkar, none of Shivaji's officers used a seal in Persian; they were all in Sanskrit or Marathi. Likewise, the seals of all of Shivaji's successor Maratha kings were in Sanskrit.


An English rendering of this, the earliest of Shivaji's letters found so far (cited above), is as follows:

28<sup>th</sup> January 1646

"From the office of Raja Shivaji to the officials of Khedebare Taraf

“The *Mokadam* of village Ranjhe, Taraf Khedebare, Babaji Bhikaji Gujar, committed an act of misdemeanour while serving in that office. The report of this reached the *saheb*.[850](#) Thereupon, the *saheb* had the said *mokadam* arrested and brought in his presence. The offence was proved after due inquiry. Babaji was therefore removed from office and his hands and feet were amputated.

“One Sonaji Banaji Gujar, fort Purandar, submitted that the said Babaji was a kinsman of his, and that he [Babaji] should be handed over to him. This request was taken into account and, after exacting a fine of 300 *Padshahi* Hons, Babaji was handed over to Sonaji. Since Babaji had no issue, and Sonaji was his kin, the *Mokadami* of village Ranjhe was awarded to Sonaji after recovering 200 *Padashahi* hons as a fee. None should interfere with Sonaji in the conduct of his new office. The original of this letter be returned to Sonaji for his record.”



Shivaji's letter (17th July 1673). No. 152 in the list given in *Shivachhatrapatinchi Patre*.

The seal at the top is Shivaji's principal seal, that at the bottom is his closing seal and that on the left is the seal of his prime minister.

By courtesy of Bharat Itihas Samshadak Mandal, Pune

## RAJGAD AND TORANA

An old fort - Murumbdeo – had evidently come into Shahji's possession along with the grant of the *mukasa* of Gunjan Maval in which the fort was situated. Shivaji added three *machis* (fortified ledges) to the fort and renamed it 'Rajgad'.<sup>851</sup>

It is not known exactly when these additions were made. However, it is certain that these were done early in Shivaji's career.

The Shivapur Chronology records that on 4<sup>th</sup> September 1656, Shivaji gave [new] names to his forts.<sup>852</sup> Perhaps, the Murumbdeo fort was renamed 'Rajgad' on this date.

While giving an account of Shivaji's early rule, the A. K. Chronicle mentions his conquest of Torana (renamed Prachandgad by Shivaji), but provides no details.<sup>853</sup> The account given in the Chitnis Chronicle is briefly as follows: In Shaka 1563 [1641-42] Shivaji won over the garrison, took possession of the Torana Fort and renamed it Prachandgad. He also built Rajgad. The Adilshah, on learning of these activities, asked Shahji for an explanation. Shahji replied that Shivaji took over the fort because of some squabbling and only wanted to restore order. He also asked the Adilshah to let him retain possession of the fort since it was situated contiguous to his *jagir*. Shahji then sent a letter to Dadaji Kondadeo and Shivaji expressing his displeasure about their activities. However, Dadaji wrote back complaining that Shivaji was paying no heed to him. This made Shahji unhappy. Shivaji found a large hoard of treasure buried on Prachandgad.<sup>854</sup>

However, both these chronicles are not reliable and it seems unlikely that Shivaji, so early in his career, could have seized the fort from the Adilshahi garrison.

The Kanad Khore in which Torana was situated had been granted as a *mukasa* to Shahji. It is therefore possible that the fort came into Shahji's possession along with Kanad Khore or, perhaps, the fort was left unoccupied. In fact, it had been left unoccupied some time before the Sultanate.<sup>855</sup> It is quite possible that the fort had again lapsed into a state of inoccupation and neglect before Shivaji occupied it. He seems to have repaired the fort or ordered some new construction thereon. The Jedhe Chronicle mentions that some construction was done on Torana and Rajgad forts just before Fath Khan's campaign against Shivaji (1648-49).<sup>856</sup>

#### MUSTAFA KHAN'S CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH (1646-47)<sup>857</sup>

In the latter half of 1645, or perhaps a little earlier, the Nayaks of Gingee, Tanjore and Madurai refused to acknowledge even the nominal suzerainty of Shriranga, the Emperor of Vijayanagar. According to a contemporaneous letter of a Jesuit missionary from Tiruchirapalli, Shriranga attacked the principality of Madurai as its Nayak was avoiding payment of tribute for a long time with support of the other two Nayaks. While Shriranga was engaged thus, Adilshahi and Qutbshahi armies invaded his dominion. The letter of the Jesuit missionary says that the Nayak of Madurai instigated the Qutbshah to invade Vijayanagar territory. Early in 1646, Mir Jumla, the Prime Minister of the Qutbshahi Sultanate, captured Udayagiri and two other forts. While Mir Jumla was steadily advancing southward Mustafa Khan at the head of an Adilshahi army was advancing eastward. He captured a series of forts and encamped near Vellore early in 1647. The next day, Damarla,<sup>858</sup> the commander of Shriranga's army, came out of the fort but was defeated in the ensuing battle. Shriranga then purchased peace by paying a large tribute. His 'empire' then became confined to a small territory around Vellore.

#### **SHIVAJI'S INTERVENTION IN JAWALI**

The statement which the *Shivabharat* attributes to Shivaji – viz., “I conquered Jawali and installed the Chandrarao there” – has already been cited. No other source makes any reference to the event. It is possible, however, to reconstruct what might actually have happened from information about Jawali provided by other sources.

The account given by a latter date chronicle of the More family of Jawali is briefly as follows: The principality of Jawali was founded by Chandrarao More. He had six sons. He kept the eldest son with him and the younger sons were assigned different territories in Jawali. After Chandrarao, seven of his descendants ruled the principality. The Chief of Jawali bore the title ‘Chandrarao’ by primogeniture. Daulatrao, the eighth in Chandrarao’s lineage, having died without issue, his mother, Mankai, adopted a certain Krishnaji Baji and installed him as the successor Chandrarao. Three years later this Krishnaji alias Chandrarao fell out with Shivaji, which resulted in the latter’s annexation of Jawali and the Chandrarao’s imprisonment and subsequent execution.<sup>859</sup>

However, it appears from contemporaneous sources that the name Krishnaji (or Krishnaji Baji) of this last Chandrarao is incorrectly stated in the Chronicle. The *Shivabharat* says Shivaji took the Chandrarao prisoner along with his sons Krishnarao and Bajirao, and captured Jawali.<sup>860</sup> The personal name of the Chandrarao is not stated; however, since Bajirao and Krishnarao were names of his sons, it seems unlikely that his name could have been Krishnaji Baji.<sup>861</sup> It appears from a *mahzar* dated 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1657 that his name was Yesaji.<sup>862</sup> It states that the dispute in question was going on for three generations, viz., “Balaji Chandrarao, his son Daulatrao and Yesaji Suryarao Chandrarao” and that Shivaji then obtained possession of

Jawali. It seems therefore that Suryarao and Chandrarao were titles assumed by Yesaji More. Suryarao was the title borne by the chief of a branch of the More family.<sup>863</sup> Probably Mankai had adopted that Suryarao as her son, his name was Yesaji and he is mentioned with both his titles – Suryarao and Chandrarao – in the *mahzar*. It could thus be inferred from these references in the *mahzar*, the *Shivabharat* and the More Chronicle that the name of the person Daulatrao's mother adopted was Yesaji, and that Krishnaji and Baji were his sons. It is obvious that the author of the More Chronicle was confused and had incorrectly stated that the name of the person adopted by Mankai was Krishnaji Baji.

The date of Daulatrao's death is not given in the More Chronicle. The Chitre Chronology has an entry leading to the inference that Daulatrao's father Balaji ruled over Jawali at least till 24<sup>th</sup> May 1644.<sup>864</sup> Daulatrao might have succeeded him sometime thereafter.

It appears that Mankai's adoption of Yesaji was opposed by Daulatrao's kin, perhaps out of frustration at the lost opportunity, and Shivaji helped Yesaji to establish himself in Jawali as the new Chandrarao. If this surmise is correct, the adoption must have occurred sometime between 24<sup>th</sup> May 1644 and 1648-49.

Afzal Khan, who was preparing to set out on a campaign against Jawali in 1649, wrote in a letter to Kanhoji Jedhe, "After the former Chandrarao's death some unauthorized people have assumed control [over Jawali]. Hence, an expedition has been launched against them."<sup>865</sup> It seems that Yesaji and his supporters were the 'unauthorized people' mentioned in Afzal Khan's letter. Perhaps Adilshahi officials were unhappy about the adoption, either because they did not approve of Yesaji or because they were not consulted, which explains why Afzal Khan refers to them as 'unauthorized' people.

A letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> June 1646 sent to Chandrarao of Jawali by officials of Bavdhan village in the Wai Pargana, mentions the Chandrarao only by his title without the first name.<sup>866</sup> It contains a statement that ‘no separation exists between *Saheb* and Chandrarao’. According to the custom prevalent in those times, the ‘*Saheb*’ must have been the lord and master of those who wrote this letter. About the date of this letter: The Wai Pargana was assigned as a *mukasa* either to Rustam-i Zaman or to Muhammad Adilshah’s son, Ali. Hence, the ‘*Saheb*’ in the letter refers either to Rustam-i Zaman or Ali, and since it evinces esteem for the Chandrarao, he must have been the one approved by the Adilshahi administration, not Yesaji who was not (according to what Afzal wrote). It must therefore have been either Balaji or Daulatrao. Thus, Yesaji must have become Chandrarao with Shivaji’s support only after 18<sup>th</sup> June 1646.

#### SHIVAJI LOSES KONDHANA AND RECAPTURES IT

As related earlier, Dadaji Kondadeo, who held the Kondhana fort as a representative of Shahji, died sometime between 13<sup>th</sup> July 1646 and 19<sup>th</sup> July 1647. Immediately thereafter Shivaji assumed control of Shahji’s *mukasas* around Pune.<sup>867</sup> Sometime before 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1644 the Shirwal Pargana, which adjoined the Pune Pargana, had been added to Shahji’s *mukasas* around Pune.<sup>868</sup> After Dadaji’s death the Shirwal Pargana was taken away from Shahji and entrusted to one Miyan Rahim Muhammad.<sup>869</sup> Moreover, the Kondhana Fort too was taken away from Shahji’s jurisdiction and put in Miyan Rahim Muhammad’s charge.<sup>870</sup> But he could not retain it for long. The *Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology* contains the following laconic entry:

“Shaka 1569 [27<sup>th</sup> March 1647 to 14<sup>th</sup> March 1648]: Bapuji captured Sinhgad and handed it over [to

Shivaji].” [871](#)

Sinhagad was the new name given to Kondhana, as is well known. However, the reference to the new name should not lead to the inference that the renaming was done after the successful coup. It only means that Kondhana was also known as Sinhgad when the Chronology was written.

The entry in the Chronology is corroborated by the Jedhe Chronicle. It tells us that Shivaji resorted to a ruse through Bapuji Mudgal, the Deshpande of Khedebare, and captured Kondhana. [872](#)

How exactly the fort was captured and what happened to Miyan Rahim Muhammad is not known.

#### **MUSTAFA KHAN ARRESTS SHAHJI (25<sup>TH</sup> JULY 1648)**

Mustafa Khan, the premier nobleman in the Adilshahi Sultanate, laid siege to Gingee in 1648. It was here that he arrested Shahji who was among the noblemen under his command. The narrative in the *Muhammadnama* of this event is briefly as follows: [873](#)

Shahji, who was very cunning and always changed sides like gambling dice, sent a messenger to Mustafa Khan and asked for permission to return to his estate with his contingent. However, the Khan dismissed his request saying that it would be disastrous to permit him to leave when the campaign was in progress. Shahji sent a message that he was going to leave without waiting for permission because of dearth of grain in the camp and also because his soldiers were unable to bear the hardship any longer.

Mustafa Khan realized that Shahji was looking for an opportunity to make trouble. So with great cleverness and finesse he had Shahji arrested and confiscated all his

wealth. Then in accordance with the Adilshah's orders he kept Shahji in prison and continued the siege.

The *Muhammadnama* gives us no details of Shahji's arrest.

The *Basatin-us Salatin* narrates it thus:<sup>874</sup>

Shahji had displayed hostility towards Mustafa Khan. So one day, very early in the morning, the Khan sent Baji Ghorpade, Yashwantrao and Asad Khan to arrest Shahji. Shahji was asleep when Baji Ghorpade and the others reached his camp. As soon as he learnt of their arrival, he escaped on horseback but Baji Ghorpade gave chase and apprehended him. Shahji had 3,000 horsemen. All of them fled.

The *Shivabharat* has a different story to tell. In brief it is as follows:<sup>875</sup>

Shahji established control over entire Karnataka by various tactics. Jagdeo of Kaveripattan and the Chiefs of Mysore and Madura conceded his authority without demur. Veerabhadra [the Chief of Ikkeri] was again installed on his throne with Shahji's help. It was through Shahji's sage influence that many forsook their fear of the Muslims. Randaula Khan himself came under Shahji's influence. After Randaula Khan's death, every general whom the Adilshah sent to the Karnataka started abiding by Shahji's counsel. Muhammad Adilshah, therefore, ordered Mustafa Khan to arrest Shahji.

Shahji went forward and met Mustafa Khan after pretending that he trusted him completely. He set up his camp not far from the Khan's camp.

Mustafa Khan was constantly seeking the right opportunity but whenever he contemplated taking action, he found Shahji ever alert and prepared. So he set about winning Shahji's confidence by every subtle word and gesture. Standing up to welcome him, going

forward to meet him, fraternally taking Shahji's hand in his, making him sit next to him, always maintaining a cheerful countenance, beholding him with a show of great amity, discussing various plans with him, bestowing valuable presents on him, flattering him, jesting with him, discussing philosophy or pretending to confide personal matters with him, were some of the means by which he worked his guile. To instill trust, he even swore by his son Atish.

Then, one night, Mustafa Khan summoned all the nobles except Shahji and revealed to them a clandestine plan to arrest Shahji early next morning according to the Adilshah's orders. Shahji's spies informed him that some scheme was being hatched against him in Mustafa Khan's camp; however, Shahji did not pay them heed.

Early the next morning, Mustafa Khan's nobles attacked the unwary Shahji. He and his followers fought back, but the Adilshahi nobles overcame them. Baji Ghorpade then arrested the wounded and unconscious Shahji.

The *Muhammadnama* and the *Basatin-us Salatin* on the one hand, and the *Shivabharat* on the other, give different reasons for Shahji's arrest. It would be surprising if there was no difference between accounts written by opposing camps. The first two are almost unanimous that Shahji's arrogance was the reason for his arrest; the *Shivabharat*, however, says that he was arrested because of his growing influence over the Karnataka chiefs. It must be noted that the *Muhammadnama* and *Basatin-us Salatin* are voicing opinions of Shahji's detractors, while the *Shivabharat* is a 'friendly' source.

The claim of the *Shivabharat* is supported by a letter, written about this time, which bears testimony to Shahji's influence among the Hindu chiefs in Karnataka.<sup>876</sup>

The Jedhe Chronicle states that the Adilshah was irked by Shivaji's seizure of Kondhana and that Shahji was arrested as a result.<sup>877</sup>

It therefore appears that Shahji's arrest was a collective result of his strained relations with Mustafa Khan, his growing influence over the chiefs in Karnataka, his ambitious nature, and Shivaji's capture of Kondhana.

The *Muhammadnama* only gives a sketchy narrative of the arrest; the *Basatin-us Salatin* is slightly more detailed; the *Shivabharat* is more elaborate. However, both the latter sources confirm that Adilshahi nobles attacked Shahji's camp early in the morning and it was Baji Ghorpade who actually apprehended him.

The *Shivabharat*, it must be noted, is generally a very reliable source. The details it gives are often corroborated by other sources.<sup>878</sup> As such, its elaborate account of Shahji's arrest, including names of the persons involved, cannot be cursorily dismissed as imaginary. It is certainly more trustworthy than the *Basatin-us Salatin*.

Neither the *Muhammadnama* nor the *Shivabharat* mentions the date of Shahji's arrest. However, sources like the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies, and the *Basatin-us Salatin* do. The chronologies state the date as 25<sup>th</sup> July 1648.<sup>879</sup>

The *Basatin-us Salatin* says Shahji was taken captive in the month of Rajab of 1058 A.H. [between 11<sup>th</sup> July and 8<sup>th</sup> August 1648].<sup>880</sup>

The *Muhammadnama* provides a narrative of what occurred at Gingee after Shahji's arrest. In brief, it is as

follows:<sup>881</sup>

“Mustafa Khan fell seriously ill and died during the siege of Gingee.<sup>882</sup> At that time Muzaffaruddin Khan-i Khanan<sup>883</sup> was campaigning in the Tadpatri province. The Adilshah ordered him to go to Gingee and continue the siege. Afzal Khan displayed great valour in the final assault on the fort. Soldiers in the fort fled. The Chief of Gingee took refuge in the citadel and after a while capitulated and handed over the fort with all its wealth to Muzaffaruddin Khan-i Khanan.<sup>884</sup> . . .

“Khan-i Khanan loaded the loot on 89 elephants and sent it to the Adilshah with Afzal Khan. Along with this loot, he also sent Shahji in fetters to Bijapur. When the Khan reached the Court the Adilshah was busy in the festivities of *Nauroz*.<sup>885</sup> He honoured Afzal Khan with various gifts and sent Shahji to prison.”

#### FATH KHAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST SHIVAJI (1648-49)

After arresting Shahji, Mustafa Khan sent a force under Tanaji Dure, Vitthal Gopal and Farhad Khan against Shahji's elder son, Sambhaji, who was at Bangalore.<sup>886</sup> At that very time, Muhammad Adilshah sent a force under Fath Khan against Shivaji.<sup>887</sup> Muhammad Adilshah's *farman* dated 8<sup>th</sup> August 1648 to Kedarji Khopade, *desai* of Utravali Taraf of the Rohida Fort, ordered him to join Fath Khan Khudawand Khan who had been dispatched to lead the expedition towards Kondhana.<sup>888</sup> Other *deshmukhs* too might have received similar *farmans* but this is the only one which has survived.

According to the *Shivabharat*, the force placed under Fath Khan's command comprised the contingents of Minad Shaikh, Ratan Shaikh, another Fath Khan, Aashrafshah, Musa Khan, Mataji Ghatage, Bajaji [Nimbalkar] of Phaltan and Balaji Haibatrao.<sup>889</sup> Of these, Ashrafshah's name receives corroboration from a contemporaneous Marathi letter which also gives us the name of one more officer in the force, Fajilshah.<sup>890</sup>

The strength of this force is not known, but at the most it might have been about four or five thousand.<sup>891</sup> Fath Khan did not belong to that class of senior Adilshahi noblemen like Mustafa Khan, Muzaffar-ud Din Khan-i Khanan, Rustum-i Zaman or Afzal Khan. So it seems the Adilshah had not attached much importance to this campaign. Perhaps he did not expect any serious or determined resistance, believing the aim would be achieved merely by a show of force.

As the representative of Shahji, Shivaji at the time exercised control over the Parganas of Pune, Indapur and Supe and a few Mavals, altogether some 800 villages and a few towns which were in fact little more than large villages. He also had possession and control of the hill forts of Kondhana, Torana and Rajgad located in the region. Mahadaji Nilkanthrao was commander of fort Purandar, which was located in the Karhepathar subdivision of the Pune Pargana. It appears from some contemporary documents that Shahji, and, as his representative, Shivaji, enjoyed some authority over him.<sup>892</sup> The strength of Shivaji's force at that time is not known, but it seems it could not have been more than two or three thousand comprising mostly foot soldiers and a small detachment of horsemen.

Around the time Fath Khan set out on the campaign, or perhaps when he was *en route*, Shivaji took possession of the

small fort at Shirwal.<sup>893</sup> The exact date of this takeover is not known, but it could not have been before 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1648 because of the mention of Miyan Rahim Muhammad as the fort commander in two revenue documents of that date.<sup>894</sup> It must have been at some time after this date that Shivaji, hearing of Shahji's arrest and being apprehensive of an attack on himself, took over the fortress.

Shivaji had arrived on the Purandar Fort when Fath Khan reached the vicinity of Shivaji's territory.<sup>895</sup> It is not known when Fath Khan reached the proximity of Purandar fort, but assuming that he had left Bijapur after the rains, it may be possible that he arrived there in or after October 1648.

Fath Khan pitched his camp at Belsar, which is about 15 km east of Purandar, and dispatched Balaji Haibatrao to take the fort at Shirwal.<sup>896</sup> The *Shivabharat* says Balaji was able to take Shirwal without resistance.<sup>897</sup> So it seems that Shivaji's men evacuated the fortification upon the approach of Balaji.

The subsequent events as related in the *Shivabharat* are:<sup>898</sup>

After learning of Fath Khan's arrival at Belsar and Balaji's occupation of Shirwal, Shivaji sent a force under Kavji – with lieutenants like Godaji Jagtap, Bhimaji Wagh, Sambhaji Kate, Shivaji Ingale, Bhikaji and Bhairav Chor among others – to recapture the fort.

Descending the Purandar fort, Kavji spent the night at the foot of the hill and attacked Shirwal in the morning. The fort had neither bastions nor moat. Despite the missiles showered on them by the Adilshahi defenders, Kavji's men used crowbars to breach the wall at several places, while some of them

scaled it with ladders and some others broke down the main gate. In the fight that followed after the attackers had forced their way into the fortress, Kavji killed Balaji. Many of Balaji's men were killed or wounded, and hundreds laid down their arms. The victorious Kavji then returned to Purandar.

Hearing of Balaji's death, Fath Khan launched an attack on Purandar. As his men started climbing the hill they were met by fire of guns and muskets, showers of arrows, rockets and slingshots and large boulders sent rolling down the hill. The Khan lost many men in this attempt. While the others persisted in the ascent, Kavji and others emerged from the fort, fell upon them and routed them completely. Godaji Jagtap killed Muse Khan in a duel. A defeated Fath Khan returned to Bijapur.

Sometime before Fath Khan's rout a small party of horsemen had been detailed by Shivaji to carry out a surprise attack on Fath Khan's camp at Belsar. Baji, son of Kanhoji Jedhe, *deshmukh* of Bhor subdivision of Rohid Khore, displayed conspicuous bravery during the raid and was therefore honoured by Shivaji with the title of Sarjerao.<sup>899</sup> Baji Pasalkar, *deshmukh* of Mose Khore, was killed in this campaign, but no details are known.<sup>900</sup>

By a deed of grant, dated 6<sup>th</sup> August 1650, Shivaji bestowed the perpetual grant of a village (i.e. the revenue of the village) on the *deshmukh* of Kanad Khore for the bravery he displayed during the "turmoil." (*galabala*) <sup>901</sup> Absolutely nothing more is mentioned about the "turmoil." There are two more deeds of grant of a similar nature. One of these bestowed the perpetual grant of a village on the *deshmukh* of Hiradas Maval; the other, the perpetual grant of another village on the three incumbent *deshmukhs* of Gunjan Maval.<sup>902</sup> These grants, too, were made for bravery displayed during the "turmoil." It is certain that the

“turmoil” mentioned in these three deeds refers to the Fath Khan expedition.

Thus, *deshmukhs* of at least five Mavals are known to have fought under Shivaji’s flag during the campaign. Four of these Mavals formed part of Shahji’s *mukasas* around Pune. One, Rohid Khore, had never been granted to Shahji as *mukasa*. But the *deshmukh* of the Bhor subdivision of that Maval, Kanhoji Jedhe, and the *kulkarni* of Bhor, Dadaji Krishna Lohakare, were in Shahji’s service and they too had been arrested and imprisoned after their master’s arrest.<sup>903</sup>

According to the *Shivabharat*, as seen at the beginning of this section, Mustafa Khan, after arresting Shahji, had simultaneously dispatched Tanaji Dure, Vitthal Gopal and Farhad Khan against Sambhaji at Bangalore. This force too was defeated and scattered.<sup>904</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH MURAD BAKHSH (MARCH – NOVEMBER 1649)

Shivaji had opened correspondence with the Mughal *Subadar* of the Deccan, Prince Murad Bakhsh,<sup>905</sup> when Shahji was in Adilshahi captivity.

Although the letters Shivaji wrote are not extant, copies of three letters that Murad Bakhsh wrote to Shivaji and one that he wrote to Shahji have survived.<sup>906</sup>

Murad Bakhsh to Shivaji

14<sup>th</sup> March 1649

Your petition professing extreme devotion was placed before me. You have prayed our *nishan* summoning you to our presence and giving you assurances of safety.

The true practice of devotion requires that first you should send a trustworthy envoy to our Court. After learning your demands [from him] we shall send you a gracious *nishan* with the impression of our auspicious palm.<sup>907</sup>

Be assured in every respect and send your envoy quickly.

Murad Bakhsh to Shivaji

14<sup>th</sup> August 16

Be honoured with our boundless favours and know that:

With extreme generosity the pen of forgiveness has been drawn across the offences of your father<sup>908</sup> and doors of pardon and favour have been thrown open to his true devotion. Therefore now is the time to come to us with your father. After your arrival you will be honoured with a *mansab* of 5000 dhat/5000 sawar and other favours. Your father too will be honoured with the same rank which he had enjoyed before. Your brothers and kinsmen who will come with you will also be taken in imperial service.

Be assured in every respect and receiving this gracious *nishan* adorned with the impression of our auspicious palm keep obedience and service in your heart.

In September 1649, Shayista Khan was appointed as the *subadar* of the Deccan in place of Murad Bakhsh.<sup>909</sup> The following letter was written when the prince was already on his way to Delhi.

Murad Bakhsh to Shahji

31<sup>st</sup> October 1649

Be honoured with our boundless favours and know that:

The petition of your son was placed before us and as it expressed true loyalty and devotion our extreme graciousness has been extended towards him. He has prayed for the pardon of your offences and your release [from prison].

We have now set out for the imperial Court. Be assured that after our arrival at the Court we shall submit your prayers before His Majesty and get them granted. But the way of devotion requires that you should send a trustworthy envoy to us so that a *farman* adorned with the auspicious palm [of His Majesty] will be sent with him. Sambhaji and your other sons will also be granted royal favours and their former *mansabs*.

We have out of kindness sent you robes of honour.

Murad Bakhsh to Shivaji

30<sup>th</sup> November 1649

The petition that you had sent with Ragho Pandit<sup>910</sup> was placed before us. You have prayed for the *deshmukhi* of Junnar and Ahmednagar. Rest assured that your prayers will be granted after our arrival at the imperial Court. It would be proper for you to speedily send your envoy to us so that we shall ask him about your prayers and submit them before His Majesty.

Exert yourself with growing devotion and be assured of our favours.

It appears from these letters that Shivaji had made attempts not only to bring Mughal influence to bear on the

Adilshah for Shahji's release, but had also tried to acquire revenue or other rights in territories held by the Mughals.

#### **SHAHJI'S RELEASE (16<sup>TH</sup> MAY 1649)**

The *Muhammadnama* relates the events that followed Shahji's imprisonment:[\*\*911\*\*](#)

Shahji had been taken by Afzal Khan to Bijapur, where he was merely sent to prison[\*\*912\*\*](#) by the Adilshah. This act of kindness and leniency on the part of the king astonished the residents and gentry of Bijapur, and it began to be said, 'Shahji Raja is fit to be executed, not kept in prison. Because he has been imprisoned, it seems he will be pardoned and let off.' The possibility of Shahji's release was not approved by many counselors of the Court because they were apprehensive that the 'wily fox' would lose no opportunity to resume his old tricks, or so they felt.... According to them, releasing Shahji was like 'knowingly stepping on a snake's tail, straightening the scorpion's sting, regarding thorns as a heap of flowers or resting with a beehive as one's pillow!'

The all-merciful king then put Shahji in the charge of *Sar-i Sarnaubat*[\*\*913\*\*](#) Ahmad Khan, and told him that Shahji could expect pardon, release and reinstatement if he agreed to peaceably hand over the unimaginably formidable Kondhana fort which had come into [his] possession during the interregnum in the Nizamshahi,[\*\*914\*\*](#) Bangalore and the fort at Kundurpi[\*\*915\*\*](#) to Adilshahi officials. Ahmad Khan kept him imprisoned in his house and gave him the happy news. Shahji realized that the thorny shrub of his ill deeds had, by the king's grace, sprouted white flowers

and decided to secure his release by writing to his sons to forthwith hand over the forts and territories to Adilshahi officials. The sons acted according to their father's wish. Thereupon, the king was pleased to summon Shahji to his presence and restore him to the *wizarat* [nobility] and honour him fittingly.<sup>916</sup> The territories that were in his possession prior to his arrest were restored to him."

The account appearing in the *Shivabharat* generally concurs with the *Muhammadnama*. It is, in brief, as follows:

After Fath Khan and Farhad Khan were defeated respectively by Shivaji and Sambhaji, Muhammad Adilshah released Shahji from prison. However, he demanded that Shivaji hand over Kondhana and that Sambhaji should relinquish Bangalore. Purandar was allowed to be retained by Shivaji. Accordingly, Shivaji and Sambhaji handed over the forts, and the Adilshah sent Shahji on a military expedition.<sup>917</sup>

There is no mention of the fort of Kundurpi in the *Shivabharat*. It states that Shivaji rued the fact that Kondhana had to be surrendered, blaming that loss on his father, whose lack of alertness and vigilance had resulted in his arrest. He had resolved, states the *Shivabharat*, to launch an attack on the Adilshahi. But the senior counsellor, Sonopant, pointed out to him the error in his derision of his father, giving him sound advice in statecraft in which Shivaji readily acquiesced.<sup>918</sup>

Neither the *Muhammadnama* nor *Shivabharat* give the date of Shahji's release. For that we have to turn to the Jedhe Chronology which gives it as 16<sup>th</sup> May 1649.<sup>919</sup> Contemporaneous sources confirm that the possession of the Kondhana, Khedebare Taraf and Shirwal Pargana passed to the Adilshah about this time.<sup>920</sup> Kondhana and remained in his

possession till a little before 13<sup>th</sup> August 1657 when, as we shall see, it again passed into Shivaji's hands.

Why the Adilshah released Shahji from prison, however, remains unanswered. The three letters Murad Bakhsh wrote to Shivaji and one to Shahji do shed some light, however dim, on the issue of Shahji's release. However, the letters Shivaji wrote to Murad Bakhsh are not available, and Murad Bakhsh's letters are not sufficiently elaborate. The earliest available letter that Murad Bakhsh wrote to Shivaji is dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1649, sent in reply to Shivaji's letter, and refers only to Shivaji's entreaty of serving under Murad Bakhsh. There is no reference to any request Shivaji might have made for securing Shahji's release. The date of Shivaji's letter, likewise, is not stated in that letter.

The second extant letter is dated 14<sup>th</sup> August 1649, and mentions that Shahji's past transgressions had been pardoned, and gives assurances that Shahji, Shivaji and others would receive due recognition, ranks and grants in Mughal service. Here, too, no mention of securing Shahji's release is made. Moreover, Shahji had already been released almost three months before this letter was written.

His third extant letter is dated 31<sup>st</sup> October 1649 and is addressed to Shahji. Surprisingly, this letter mentions Shivaji's letter and the request for securing Shahji's release that Shivaji had apparently made therein. But the date of Shivaji's letter is not stated. Five and a half months had elapsed since Shahji's release by this time. Yet, Murad Bakhsh makes no mention of whether he had made any efforts for Shahji's release or that he had any knowledge of the release. The letter that Murad Bakhsh says Shivaji wrote to him for securing Shahji's release must have been of a comparatively early date. In spite of this, he makes no mention of Shivaji's request in his letters of 14<sup>th</sup> March and 14<sup>th</sup> August 1649.

Thus, it must be presumed that either Murad Bakhsh was aware of Shivaji's request but the fact had remained to be mentioned in his replies, or that Murad Bakhsh had, earlier, sent at least one more letter to Shivaji that is not extant. The second alternative seems more plausible.

It may generally be deduced on the basis of these four letters that Shivaji had indeed sent a letter requesting Murad Bakhsh's intervention for securing Shahji's release and that he had expressed his and his father's willingness to enter Mughal service. It may also be conjectured that Shivaji was feigning his willingness to enter Mughal service only with an eye on Murad's intervention for Shahji's release. Perhaps he had intended that information of his ongoing correspondence with Murad would leak to the Adilshah, bringing the latter under some pressure. However, neither the four letters that are available nor any other known source provide any information about precisely when Shivaji wrote requesting Murad Bakhsh's intervention or the efforts that the Mughals made towards that end. Hence, all we can state on the basis of available sources is that Shivaji had sought Mughal intervention to secure his father's release. It would, however, be merely a conjecture to say that Shahji was released *only* because of Shivaji's efforts in seeking Mughal intervention. Even if this conjecture is correct, we are still at a loss to comprehend the Adilshah's lenient attitude towards Shahji following his arrest.

Shahji was arrested during the siege of Gingee on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1648 and remained incarcerated in the Adilshahi camp till the fall of Gingee on 27<sup>th</sup> December 1648. He was thereafter sent to Bijapur, which he reached in March 1649. Even if it is assumed that Shivaji commenced his diplomatic initiatives through the Mughals immediately after the news of Shahji's arrest had reached him, and that Murad Bakhsh also began making efforts promptly, it must have taken at least a month or six weeks for any kind of Mughal pressure to be brought to bear on the Adilshah. If it was indeed the intention of the Adilshah to

execute Shahji, he could easily have done so within that time. It will not do to say that the Adilshah intended to bring Shahji to Bijapur for the purpose of execution, because if that had been the intention, he could have summoned Shahji to Bijapur immediately after he was captured. However, the Adilshah did not do that either.

Thus the logical inference would be that although Shahji had been arrested, the Adilshah did not intend his execution. Perhaps, because the Adilshah was apprehensive of the possible unchecked increase in Mustafa Khan's influence if his opponents in the court were completely neutralized, he adopted the middle path. It is also likely that the Adilshah was influenced into adopting leniency through the efforts of Mustafa Khan's adversaries and Shahji's well wishers in court. Whatever the true reasons, it does not seem that Shahji's life was spared only because of Shivaji's efforts in seeking Murad Bakhsh's intervention.

Even if it is assumed that it was not the intention of the Adilshah to completely eliminate Shahji, at least when he was arrested, it cannot be asserted that he was safe or that his life was never imperiled during the period between his arrest and release. Whatever policies the Adilshah adopted were necessarily for his own convenience, not Shahji's. Politics and intrigue are dynamic and fickle factors, and the Adilshah's policies could have undergone change – or even reversal – at any time. Shivaji's efforts in bringing Mughal pressure to bear *might* just have ensured both the continuance of the Adilshah's initial policy of forbearance towards Shahji as well as his early release.

The Jedhe Chronology relates some of the events that followed Shahji's release:[921](#)

Shahji was released on 16<sup>th</sup> May 1649 after forcing him to give up Kondhana. At the same time, Kanhoji Jedhe and Dadaji Krishna Lohakare [who had

both been arrested along with Shahji] were also released. When they met him, the Maharaja [Shahji] said: 'You had to suffer incarceration because of me....I have been given Bangalore province worth 500,000 hons [a year] as *jagir*. So I shall have to go on military expedition into the Karnataka. Your *watan* is in the Mavals. Shivaba<sup>922</sup> is in Khedebare and Pune. Be with him along with your men. You enjoy great influence in that province. Ensure that all the *deshmukhs* of the Mavals submit to him and remain obedient to him. If Mughal or Adilshahi armies come against him be loyal to him and fight against them.' They took solemn oath in this sense to do Shahji's bidding. Then he gave them robes of honour and sent them with letters to Shivaji.

#### AFZAL KHAN PLANS TO INVADE JAWALI (1649)

Afzal Khan was about to invade Jawali in 1649. There is no coherent account of this episode, but eight Marathi letters that have survived throw some light.<sup>923</sup> In brief it is as follows:

Chandraraao of Jawali had never been a submissive and obedient *wazir* of the Adilshahi Sultanate. His dominion, in fact, was almost an independent principality. The ruling Chandrarao, as we have seen, was installed without seeking even the nominal consent of Adilshahi officials. Besides, either the ruling Chandrarao or his predecessor and their kinsmen had encroached on the adjoining Adilshahi territory.<sup>924</sup> That is why Afzal Khan had planned to invade Jawali in 1649. He and his officials repeatedly wrote to Kanhoji Jedhe, *deshmukh* of Bhor subdivision of Rohid Khore, urging him to join the expedition.<sup>925</sup> Kanhoji kept procrastinating and wrote to Shivaji asking his advice. The letter which Kanhoji wrote to Shivaji is not extant, but Shivaji's reply to him has survived. Shivaji advised him to be cautious, take precaution against

treachery, have a trustworthy intermediary before going, or, if he had any doubt, avoid going on every pretext and send a son instead.<sup>926</sup> We do not know the outcome. But Chandrarao continued to rule the principality till Shivaji invaded it in 1656. So, it seems that Afzal Khan's plan to invade Jawali was cancelled after all. Perhaps Chandrarao might have bought him off or perhaps the Khan might have become apprehensive of getting himself entangled in the forest-clad hills of Jawali.

#### KHAN MUHAMMAD'S CAMPAIGNS IN THE SOUTH (1651-1654)<sup>927</sup>

Soon after the Adilshahi army captured Gingee, Mir Jumla, the Prime Minister of the Qutbshahi Sultanate, captured the forts of Gandikota and Gooty.<sup>928</sup> He then began encroaching upon Adilshahi territory, which led to a war between the two sultanates in 1651. The Qutbshah made peace by paying tribute. Then Khan Muhammad, the premier nobleman of the Adilshahi Sultanate after Mustafa Khan's death, laid siege to the fort of Penukonda. When a breach was made the Raja of the place capitulated and surrendered the fort in return of the fort of Kundurpi.

Meanwhile, Shriranga, the 'Emperor' of Vijayanagar, had raised an army with the support of Mir Jumla and the Nayak of Mysore, and had even recaptured some of the territory which he had lost to the Adilshahi arms. Having learnt this, the Adilshah ordered Khan Muhammad to take the fort of Vellore, which he did in 1654 after a prolonged siege. Shriranga was allowed to retain the fort of Chandragiri and a small territory around it.<sup>929</sup>

This was the last major campaign in the south undertaken by the Adilshahi Sultanate. Hereafter, it was fully engaged in fighting for survival against Mughal expansionism and still more against massive inroads being made with impunity by the nascent state founded by Shivaji. This latter appeared at first to be the lesser threat but ultimately proved to be its nemesis.

But for Shivaji, the entire south would almost certainly have been conquered by Muslims in due course.

## SAMBHAJI'S DEATH

Shivaji's elder brother Sambhaji, who was living with his father, died in 1654 or 1655. According to the A. K. Chronicle he was struck down by a cannon ball during a campaign against the Chief of Kanakgiri.<sup>930</sup> The chronicle does not mention the date of this incident. The Chitnis Chronicle states that during the campaign, Afzal Khan took a bribe from the Chief of Kanakgiri to help him secretly and that during the ensuing battle Sambhaji was felled by a cannon ball.<sup>931</sup> It further tells us that before going to meet Afzal Khan, Shivaji promised his mother that he would avenge Sambhaji.<sup>932</sup> The ballad of Adnyandas, too, implies that Afzal Khan had been responsible for Sambhaji's death in some way. It says when Shivaji set out to meet Afzal Khan, Jijabai urged him to avenge Sambhaji.<sup>933</sup> The Sabhasad Chronicle also lays the blame of Sambhaji's death on Afzal Khan. It states that when Shivaji's counsellors advised him to make peace with Afzal Khan, Shivaji told them that Afzal might kill him the way he killed Sambhaji, and that he would rather be killed in the attempt to eliminate the Khan than ever make peace with him.<sup>934</sup>

The exact date of Sambhaji's death is not known. But it is possible to make an estimate. The Jedhe Chronology records that a son, Umaji, was born to Sambhaji on 25<sup>th</sup> November 1654.<sup>935</sup> Hence, it can be surmised that Sambhaji must have been living at least till 25<sup>th</sup> February 1654. A letter, dated 4<sup>th</sup> April 1654, sent by a certain Sambhaji to the officials of the Balaghat *Qaryat* under the jurisdiction of the Panhala Fort is extant.<sup>936</sup> The surname of this Sambhaji is not stated in the letter. However, it seems that he must have been Shahji's son Sambhaji, because no other Adilshahi officer bearing that name is known. If this assumption is correct, it can be said that Sambhaji was alive till 4<sup>th</sup> April 1654.

Shivaji's son, also named Sambhaji, was born on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1657.<sup>937</sup> According to a tradition among Hindus, no child is given a name borne by a close living relation, which custom might also have prevailed in Shivaji's time. In that case, Shahji's son, Sambhaji, must have died before the naming ceremony of Shivaji's son, or before 14<sup>th</sup> May 1657. The naming ceremony of a male child among Hindus is traditionally performed on the thirteenth day from its birth; so this date may be extended to 27<sup>th</sup> May 1657.

The likely date of the Kanakgiri campaign can be inferred from some contemporaneous documents. A letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> January 1655, sent by Shahji to the officials of the Pune Pargana regarding a grant, mentions a tax called the Kanakgiri Tax ('Kanakgiripatti'), which was levied on that *pargana*.<sup>938</sup> The same tax is mentioned in another letter, dated 21<sup>st</sup> January 1655, sent by Shahji to the officials of the Supe Pargana.<sup>939</sup> It was common practice in those times to levy a special tax to meet the expenses of military campaigns and it is reasonable to believe that the Kanakgiri campaign must have been launched around the time these letters were issued. We also know from a *farman* dated 20<sup>th</sup> March 1655 of Muhammad Adilshah, that the campaign against the Nayak of Kanakgiri was concluded by that date.<sup>940</sup> So it may be surmised that Sambhaji had died before that date. Thus, we may place Sambhaji's death between 4<sup>th</sup> April 1654 and 20<sup>th</sup> May 1655.

#### SHIVAJI'S INTERVENTION IN THE UTRAVLI SUB-DIVISION

The Rohid Khore consisted of two *tarafs* or sub-divisions, Bhor and Utravli. The Bhor subdivision comprised twenty-two villages with the Jedhe family as the *deshmukhs*, while the Utravli subdivision comprised twenty villages with the Khopade family as the *deshmukhs*.

Shahji and Shivaji had very close and cordial relations with the Jedhes of the Bhor sub-division. But these were only on a personal level. From the Adilshah's point of view, neither Shahji nor Shivaji had anything at all to do with the Rohid Khore sub-division.

A certain Gangaji Naik held Rohid Khore as his *mukasa* in the year 1638.<sup>941</sup> It is not known how long he held it or who succeeded him. However, there is no evidence to suggest that it was ever given to Shahji or Shivaji. On the contrary, there is evidence, as we shall see, that neither Shahji nor Shivaji had any control over it when Shivaji intervened in the affairs of the Utravli sub-division of Rohid Khore.

The appointment of the commander of the Rohida fort used to be made by the Adilshah and the administration of the sub-division of Rohid Khore, within which the fort was situated, was the charge of that commander.<sup>942</sup> The names of fort commanders appointed by the Adilshah from time to time during the period between 1638 and 1656 can be ascertained from contemporaneous *farmans* and other documents.<sup>943</sup>

A dispute had arisen between a certain Kedarji Narasoji Khopade and his kinsman, Khandoji Dharmoji Khopade, over their rights to the *deshmukhi* of Utravli.<sup>3</sup> The adjoining region of Hirdas Maval was Shahji's *mukasa* and was administered by Shivaji as his representative. Khandoji sought and secured Shivaji's support.

No sooner than he received it, Khandoji adopted an aggressive stance, whereupon Kedarji submitted a complaint to the Adilshah who sent the following *farman*, dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 1650, to the fort commander of Rohida:<sup>944</sup>

“It has become known to us that Khandoji, a relation of Kedarji, Desai, Fort Rohida, made an attack and killed Kedarji’s mother and is now staying in Shahji Raja’s Hirdas Maval. Since Kedarji is loyally serving us, it is not proper that he should suffer such injustice. Punish Khandoji wherever he may be so that he does not cause any more trouble to the Desai. Get our work done from Kedarji and continue his rights and titles. Give Kedarji all assistance so that the above-mentioned rebel [i.e. Khandoji] does not cause any trouble to Kedarji.

“The above mentioned Raja [i.e. Shahji] has also written to his son Shivaji on these lines.

“Act upon these orders without any lapses.”

The words, ‘Shahji Raja’s Hirdas Maval’, used in the *farman* are a clear indication of the earlier observation that the Rohid Khore sub-division had not been granted to Shahji. This terminology would not have been used if both Rohid Khore and Hirdas Maval had been granted to Shahji.

Even this *farman* from the Adilshah himself failed to reconcile Kedarji and Khandoji and the conflict persisted. A letter, dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 1655, sent by some Adilshahi officer to Kedarji reads as follows:<sup>945</sup>

“Your kinsman Khandoji Khopade is acting treacherously and laying waste the land. You are enjoying all the rights and revenues as *deshmukh* but are doing nothing to protect and prosper the territory. If we receive another complaint about your territories, you will be replaced as *deshmukh*. Be obedient to the commander of the above mentioned fort [i.e. Rohida] and punish the rebel. Let this be a warning to you.”

The name of the author of this letter does not appear in the text, and is probably not legible from the seal affixed on the letter either. It is obvious some high-ranking Adilshahi nobleman wrote it.

But Kedarji could not either apprehend or contain Khandoji, who not only enjoyed Shivaji's support, but was apparently also receiving help from the fort commander of Rohida. Indeed, Kedarji alleges as much in a complaint he submitted to someone referred to in his Persian letter as 'Khan Sahib'. This 'Khan Sahib' must have been some nobleman in the Adilshahi Sultanate. The date of the letter is not mentioned therein, but it seems from the names of the fort commanders mentioned in it, to have been written sometime during the period 1655 to 1657. It reads as follows:<sup>946</sup>

"This insignificant person [meaning himself] has nine kinsmen. I am the eldest and belong to the elder branch of the family. I enjoy the right of inscribing the symbol of the plough [on documents; a token of status as a land-holder]. Thus has been the conduct of affairs from year to year. The shares of all relations and kinsfolk that were due by right have been given. I serve and look after the welfare and administration of the territory on what I have received by right of my elder status in the family.

"Of late, the commander of the Rohida fort, Siddi Hasan, has begun interfering with my rights and authority. He has been supporting one of my nine kinsmen, Khandoji Dharmoji Khopade. With a force obtained from Shivaji, the son of Shahji Bhosale, he [i.e. Siddi Hasan] attacked Ambode, the village given in grant to me, and completely looted the town including my house. They killed three villagers and injured about a dozen others. They took away immeasurable cash, gold, valuables, cattle, weapons

and grain. They torched the stock of fodder as well as the entire village. The area has been laid waste. I fled with my life and my sons. So thorough was the loot that they even took away agricultural implements. Shivaji has a force of 4,000 horsemen. What can this lowly *desai* [i.e. himself] do with just 10 or 20 men from the village? Injustice has become rampant throughout the whole territory.

“More recently, Narsingrao Sadobaji has been appointed as the fort commander of Rohida and has arrived here. I have met him and I am looking after the administration of the territory by duly appointing my representative. I shall never fail in loyalty and in striving for the prosperity of the country. Khandoji has sent two of his men to you. Whatever incorrect information they may supply to you is all false. I am prepared to present myself whenever Khandoji goes to press his claim. I shall abide by the decision that might be given there. Sahib [i.e. the addressee] is well able to mete out justice with benediction and grace.”

These are the only available documents that shed some light on the dispute between Kedarji and Khandoji Khopade. The Jedhe Chronicle also supports the fact that Shivaji sided with Khandoji in his claim [947](#)

#### SHIVAJI ASSUMES CONTROL OF PURANDAR

No contemporary and reliable source makes any reference to this incident, nor can its date be ascertained. The period within which it must have occurred, however, can be fixed with the help of some contemporaneous sources. Some later sources give accounts of the incident, but they are confused and unreliable. Among such sources, nevertheless, one account appearing in the Sabhasad Chronicle and another recorded many years after the incident by one of the sons of a member of

the family from whom Shivaji took possession of the fort, seem to be the most credible. But the accounts are brief and sketchy.

The ancestors of the commander of the Purandar fort, Mahadaji Nilkanthrao, had been its hereditary *naikwadis*.<sup>948</sup> In time, Mahadaji's father's name, 'Nilkanthrao', began to be used as a title for Mahadaji and his descendants. In a condolence letter that Shahji wrote to Mahadaji's sons after his (Mahadaji's) death, the deceased has been referred to as 'Nilkanthrao'.<sup>949</sup> Mahadaji's descendants, too, used the name as their title.<sup>950</sup>

It is not known when the charge of the fort devolved upon Nilkanthrao or his son Mahadaji. But it is likely that around the time of the final years of the Nizamshahi, Nilkanthrao or his son Mahadaji took the opportunity occasioned by the prevailing chaos to seize the fort and appoint themselves as commanders.

Later, under the Adilshahi regime, too, Mahadaji seems to have managed somehow to remain the fort commander. It is very likely that he had forged some kind of understanding with the Adilshah to retain the control of the fort to himself. Whatever the circumstances, it is a fact that the fort had begun to be regarded almost as Mahadaji's *watan* [hereditary grant]. There is no evidence to suggest that someone other than Mahadaji had ever been appointed as commander by the Adilshahi court and after his death the command of the fort passed to his sons.

Although the fort proper had virtually become Mahadaji's hereditary grant, Shahji held the *mukasa* of the Pune Pargana, in the Karhepathar sub-division of which the fort was situated. Shahji as *mukasdar* and his representative Shivaji, therefore, enjoyed a somewhat superior or over-riding status over Mahadaji.<sup>951</sup>

A letter of condolence dated 7<sup>th</sup> May 1654 written by Shahji to Mahadaji's sons – Nilopant, Shankaraji, Visaji and Trimbak – shows that Mahadaji died a few days before that date.<sup>952</sup> Therein, Shahji writes about having sent robes of honour for them. Such robes of honour were necessarily bestowed by a superior upon a subordinate, never *vice versa*, and were an indication of the superior's consent to the subordinate's continuance in the office or authority that he held.<sup>953</sup> Thus, Shahji's act of sending such robes of honour is indicative of the fact that, as stated earlier, he bore sway over the Nilkanthrao family, and consequently also over Purandar. However, because the family enjoyed a virtual hereditary right to the custody and command of the fort, one must conclude that Shahji's authority had become limited to a certain extent, in that he did not have a free choice or say in the appointment of the fort commander. In his condolence letter, Shahji virtually makes an entreaty to the late Mahadaji's sons that the cordial relations prevailing between them in the days of the deceased should continue even thereafter; the fact that he enjoyed only a limited authority could be a reason why Shahji wrote so imploringly.

The import of a letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> August 1654, written by Shivaji to the Nilkanthrao (most probably Nilopant, the eldest son of the late Mahadaji), within a few months of Shahji's letter cited above, is as follows:<sup>954</sup>

We have received your letter that was sent to us with Babaji Naik<sup>955</sup> and have noted its contents. Babaji Naik also verbally elaborated to us everything you had asked him to convey. He told us of his agreement with you that you would conduct yourself with us in the same manner as the late Nilkanthrao had and we should, likewise, look after your welfare, just as we had looked after the late Mahadaji's.

We are in full agreement with everything Babaji Naik had settled with you. You should conduct yourselves with us in the same way as the late Mahadaji had, and we will also care for your interests as we used to for his.

We assure you on solemn oath that so long as you are loyal to us, we will remain steadfast to you. But if there is a breach of loyalty on your part, we too will not remain loyal to you.

Shivaji states quite explicitly and unreservedly that he would look after the interests of the Nilkanthrao so long as he continued to remain as loyal as the deceased had. This clearly shows that the relation between Shivaji and Mahadaji Nilkanthrao and his son was like that of a superior to his subordinate. Of course, this superiority was due to Shivaji's status as representative of Shahji.

Not only had Shivaji entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Nilkanthrao through Babaji Naik, but had also given such tokens of assurance of mutual trust and solidarity as were considered most binding in those days. It thus appears that either the relations between Shivaji and the Nilkanthrao had become strained and Shivaji had acted as he did to remove any real or perceived misunderstanding, or they had both entered into a pact against a third party. (If indeed such a pact was made, it is likely to have been against one or more of the Nilkanthrao's brothers.) Shivaji, nevertheless, warns the Nilkanthrao at the end of the letter that his favourable conduct would continue only so long as the Nilkanthrao remained loyal to him.

Shivaji appropriated the Purandar fort sometime after the above letter was written. Ganesh, son of Mahadaji's second son

Shankaraji, wrote in a statement submitted in a litigation, sometime between 24<sup>th</sup> May 1736 and 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1737, that:<sup>956</sup>

'Mahadaji Nilkanthrao passed away. Disputes arose between the four sons. The fort passed into the possession of Shivaji Raja because of these disputes....Shivaji agreed to make our uncle, Nilopant, the *sarnaik* and retained him in the fort. He appointed Netoji Palkar as the *sarnaubat* and returned to Pune. Nilopant remained on Purandar for a year thereafter; altercations and disputes occurred every day. Thereupon, [Shivaji Raja] awarded palanquins to all four brothers and kept them near himself.'

The term *sarnaubat* was the designation for the commander-in-chief of an army. However, it was also used to designate an officer of a lower grade who took orders from the fort commander.<sup>957</sup> The word has been used in the latter sense in Ganesh Shankaraji's averment. It is well known that Netoji was later appointed as the *sarnaubat* of the Maratha cavalry. However, Netoji was, at some time before he became the commander-in-chief, also the *havaldar* or commander of Purandar.<sup>958</sup> Ganesh Shankaraji's reference to him as the *sarnaubat* creates an anomaly, which could be resolved by assuming that Netoji was initially appointed as the *sarnaubat* and later promoted as commander (*havaldar*) of the fort. It is also quite likely that Ganesh Shankaraji had confused Netoji's later rank as commander-in-chief (*sarnaubat*) of Shivaji's cavalry with the office he had earlier held at Purandar.

Ganesh Shankaraji's statement cited above does not give details of the actual manner in which the fort passed into Shivaji's possession.

The Sabhasad Chronicle states that when a dispute arose between the two sons of the deceased Nilkanthrao, Shivaji went

to Purandar to mediate between them, but arrested the brothers and took possession of the fort.<sup>959</sup> The only deviation that this account makes from those of the other sources is that it says the deceased Nilkanthrao had two sons, not four.

Other sources that give some details of the manner in which Shivaji took over the fort are not very reliable and beset with factual inconsistencies; their accounts cannot be trusted. But there is no disagreement in any such source with either the Sabhasad Chronicle or the statement recorded by Ganesh Shankaraji that the fort passed under Shivaji's control because of the dispute between Nilkanthrao's sons.

Likewise, none of the sources mentions the date on which Shivaji executed the coup. But it is obvious that this must have been sometime after the date of the Shivaji's letter cited above, i.e. after 9<sup>th</sup> August 1654.

In a document dated 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1657 pertaining to a litigation within the Purandar jurisdiction, Netoji Palkar, as already mentioned above, has been referred to as the *havaldar* or commander of the fort.<sup>960</sup> Netoji must have been appointed to that office, at the very latest, at least a month before that date. It can thus reasonably be said that Shivaji took possession of the fort sometime between 9<sup>th</sup> August 1654 and May 1657. The latest date of Shivaji's take-over of the fort may also be determined from the fact that Shivaji's elder son, Sambhaji, was born in the fort on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1657.<sup>961</sup> Unless the fort was under Shivaji's complete control before that date, it is hardly likely that his expecting wife (Saibai) might have been taken there for the delivery.

Mahadaji Nilkanthrao, and his sons after him, held a one-third share in the right to the office of *mokadam* of Supe Khurd in the Supe Pargana, as well as some land grants in some places

in the Pune Pargana. Shivaji allowed them to retain those various rights even after he had taken control of Purandar.[962](#)

#### MUGHAL INVASION OF THE QUTBSHAHI SULTANATE (1656)[963](#)

The conquest of the Vijayanagar territory south of the Qutbshahi Sultanate was largely the work of Mir Muhammad Said upon whom the Qutbshah had bestowed the title Mir Jumla. His growing power and wealth had earned him many enemies in the Qutbshahi Court. The Qutbshah, too, had started doubting his loyalty. Once he had invited Mir Jumla to the Court and had planned to arrest him. But Mir Jumla got wind of the plan and escaped to the Qutbshahi Karnataka. Even thereafter the Qutbshah repeatedly tried to entice him to the Court, but Mir Jumla declined to swallow the bait and became more cautious. Thus by August 1654, there was an open breach between them.

The Qutbshahi Karnataka was under the control of Mir Jumla and he continued to exercise it even after his rupture with his master. A sizeable part of the Qutbshahi army too went over to him. The Qutbshah never tried to wrest the Qutbshahi Karnataka from his erstwhile servant. First, he had to reckon with a very able and astute man and secondly, he had already lost a part of his army. Just as the Qutbshah was beset with difficulties, so was Mir Jumla. Members of his family were stranded in Hyderabad and virtually held hostage by the Qutbshah. Besides, Qutbshahi territory was contiguous with Adilshahi territory and it would have been difficult for Mir Jumla to defend it against the Adilshahi army on his own. Therefore, the rupture between the Qutbshah and Mir Jumla did not flare up into open hostilities.

On the political front, Mir Jumla initiated several moves to ensure that he would not be required to fight on more than one front and would have other alternatives open in case he was

forced to give up the Qutbshahi Karnataka. He led the Adilshah to believe that he would go over to the Adilshahi Sultanate. He made friends with Khan Muhammad (also known as Ikhlas Khan), the leading noblemen in the Adilshahi Karnataka. He even initiated friendly relations with Shriranga, the 'Emperor' of Vijayanagar! He opened correspondence with the Shah of Iran declaring his willingness to join the Shah's service.

Aurangzeb, who was *subadar* of the Deccan at this time, learnt of the rupture between the Qutbshah and Mir Jumla from reports of spies and also of the Mughal ambassador at the Qutbshah's Court. He informed Emperor Shah Jahan of these developments and, with his consent, began urging Mir Jumla to join Mughal service. But Mir Jumla wanted only Mughal support; he was not willing to join Mughal service, perhaps because he wanted to become an independent ruler himself. At this time, Shahji too was in contact with Mir Jumla, had expressed his desire to join Mughal service and, with Aurangzeb's consent, was being encouraged by Mir Jumla to do so.<sup>964</sup>

While these intrigues were going on, the Qutbshah brought things to a head by arresting Mir Jumla's son, Muhammad Amin, on 21<sup>st</sup> November 1655. Aurangzeb conveyed this news to the Emperor and started making preparations to invade the Qutbshahi Sultanate. Meanwhile, the Emperor had written a *farman* to Mir Jumla appointing him to the rank of 5,000 *dhat*/5,000 *sawar* and his son, Muhammad Amin, to that of 2,000 *dhat*/ 2,000 *sawar*. Now, by the Emperor's order, Aurangzeb wrote a letter to the Qutbshah demanding, on pain of invasion, that Muhammad Amin must be released from prison at once and that he and Mir Jumla must not be hindered from going to the Imperial Court. The Emperor himself also sent a *farman* to the Qutbshah ordering him to release Muhammad Amin. Meantime Aurangzeb had dispatched his son Muhammad Sultan with the vanguard of his army towards

the frontier. He reached Nanded on 9<sup>th</sup> January 1656. About 15<sup>th</sup> January 1656 Aurangzeb wrote to the Emperor:[965](#)

“On 23<sup>rd</sup> [Rabi-ul Awwal, i.e. 11<sup>th</sup> January 1656] the *khanazad* [966](#) of Your Majesty [Muhammad Sultan] set out from Nanded towards Hyderabad. As I am going to make forced marches as per your order I hope to reach Hyderabad soon after him.

“I have learnt from the letter of our ambassador at Bijapur that Adil Khan [i.e. the Adilshah] had summoned his army and is endeavouring to collect supplies. Due to the instigations of short sighted people he will certainly send his army to succour Qutb-ul Mulk [i.e. the Qutbshah]. Shivaji, son of Shahji Bhosale, is in his territory on the frontier of Junnar and is in rebellion.”

This is the earliest reference to Shivaji in Aurangzeb’s letters.

Even before the Qutbshah received the *farman*, Muhammad Sultan had crossed the frontier. On receipt of the *farman* the Qutbshah released Muhammad Amin from prison and handed him over to the Mughal ambassador at Hyderabad. Muhammad Amin met Muhammad Sultan 12 *kos* from Hyderabad. But Muhammad Sultan continued his advance on the pretext that the Qutbshah had not released Muhammad Amin’s property yet, whereupon the Qutbshah fled to the fort of Golconda.

Aurangzeb opened the siege on 7<sup>th</sup> February 1656. In the meantime, the Qutbshah had sent a letter to the Emperor suing for peace and the Emperor had, probably because of mediation of his daughter Jahan Ara and his eldest son Dara Shukoh, ordered Aurangzeb to raise the siege. So on 9<sup>th</sup> March Aurangzeb concluded a treaty by the terms of which the Qutbshah agreed to pay a tribute of Rs.10 million, give his daughter in marriage to Muhammad Sultan and cede the fort of Ramgir with

appurtenant territory yielding Rs.600,000 a year. Mir Jumla was marching from the Qutbshahi Karnataka towards Hyderabad. He met Aurangzeb on 21<sup>st</sup> March 1656. The marriage agreed upon in the treaty was performed on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1656 and on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1656, Aurangzeb, with Mir Jumla, commenced his return march. On the way, Mir Jumla received a *farman* of the Emperor conferring the title of Muazzam Khan upon him.

Aurangzeb had forced the Qutbshah to make a secret agreement that the latter, who had three daughters and no son, would nominate Muhammad Sultan his heir and that after him the sultanate would fall to the lot of the Mughal prince. But the Emperor learnt of it soon enough, and though he was consumed by suspicion and anger, did not seem to have taken any objection.

#### **SHIVAJI'S JAWALI CAMPAIGN (1656)**

The Jedhe and Shivapur Chronicles, the *Shivakavya*, Jedhe Chronology and More Chronicle are the chief sources for what is known about Shivaji's accession of Jawali. The *Shivabharat* does not give a detailed account, but only makes some passing references. Marathi chronicles contain accounts that have little verity and much imagination, and are so full of inconsistency that they are more of a nuisance for an understanding of what actually transpired in this campaign. As realistic an account of the Jawali campaign as emerges from a culling of these several sources is as follows:

With an ambitious neighbour like Shivaji, it was inevitable that the Chandrarao of Jawali would either be obliged to accept his overlordship or engage in conflict with him. As already discussed elsewhere, after Daulatrao died without an heir, his widow Mankai adopted Yesaji and installed him as the next Chandrarao. It is likely that Shivaji had provided some kind of help to Mankai and Yesaji in the latter's accession to that title. If

indeed it was so, it was natural for Shivaji to expect Yesaji to be favourably, if not also ingratiatingly, disposed towards him. However, Yesaji was loath to do so, giving rise to a serious rift between the two and leading to the annexation of Jawali by Shivaji.

It is apparent from evidence that relations between Yesaji and the Adilshah were strained in the year 1649. It is not known how they were thereafter, but it may fairly be assumed that they were far from cordial. So, the Chandrarao would have had little hope for any assistance from those quarters. Moreover, at about the same time as Shivaji advanced upon Jawali, i.e. in January 1656, Aurangzeb had commenced his campaign against the Qutbshah. There was a distinct possibility that Adilshahi forces might have been mustered to provide support to the Qutbshah. Indeed, Adilshahi forces had begun grouping along the Qutbshahi border.<sup>967</sup> In such circumstances, the chances of receiving any immediate help from Bijapur must have seemed even dimmer.

It is not known whether Shivaji had taken these circumstances into consideration before deciding to move into Jawali when he did, or whether there was some other reason that dictated the timing. Whatever the reason, there is no denying that he could not have found a more suitable time to capture Jawali.

The campaign began with an attack and capture of the Jor valley. The Jedhe Chronicle describes these initial events as follows:<sup>968</sup>

“Then the Jawali campaign was undertaken. Kanhoji Naik [Jedhe] and all other *deshmukhs* were summoned with their respective forces. The Jedes had already chased away the Mores inhabiting Jambhli. Hanmantrao More was in

Jor. Shivaji sent Raghunath Ballal Sabnis with a cavalry force from Pune against him. He [Raghunath Ballal] killed Hanmantrao and captured Jor. Jawali, however, still remained [to be taken]."

Thereafter, Shivaji left Purandar with a force of ten thousand for the invasion of Jawali. He divided his force into two groups. The larger group advanced by the Radtondi pass, but was forced to halt in its advance by Chandrarao's forces. Shivaji had reached Mahabaleshwar by this time with the smaller group, and descended by the Nisani pass into Jawali, apparently without encountering any resistance. By afternoon, all resistance on the Radtondi route had also ceased, and Shivaji entered Jawali.<sup>969</sup> The date of this event, provided in the Shivapur Chronology, is 15<sup>th</sup> January 1656.<sup>970</sup>

Chandrarao fled and took shelter in the Rairi fort.<sup>971</sup> It is likely that Shivaji immediately dispatched a force in pursuit, but he himself remained in Jawali for two and a half months. The Shivapur Chronology states that he left Jawali on 30<sup>th</sup> March 1656 and reached Rairi on 6<sup>th</sup> April 1656.<sup>972</sup> The reason for his prolonged stay in Jawali is explained in the *Shivakavya*, the substance of which is as follows:<sup>973</sup>

Chandrarao's men, in spite of the loss of Jawali, had taken refuge in the surrounding forests and caves, and were harassing Shivaji's force for eight days with constant hit-and-run attacks, thefts and looting. Shivaji secured necessary supplies in a short while, ordered that the forest be cut down to a distance of half a *kos* [about 1½ km] and kept his men on full alert at all times. The enemy used a previously reconnoitered approach to raid Shivaji's force by night and scamper off into the forest and hills. Shivaji employed surreptitious tactics, too. One day, when he learnt from his spies of the hideout of the enemy, he speedily

sent a force which caught them unawares and completely annihilated them.

It seems from this account that Shivaji had to prolong his stay in Jawali to eliminate resistance of remnants of the Chandrarao's forces. Perhaps a part of his troops was at this time engaged in the siege of Rairi.


According to the Jedhe Chronology Chandrarao surrendered in the month of Vaishakha of Shaka 1578 [between 15<sup>th</sup> April and 14<sup>th</sup> May 1656].<sup>974</sup>

Shivaji imprisoned the Chandrarao and his sons, Krishnaji and Baji. The course that events took after the capture of the Chandrarao is not cogently stated in any of the contemporaneous sources. But it can be inferred from available records that a few months after his capture, the Chandrarao attempted an escape from prison and Shivaji had him and his son Krishnaji executed; Baji managed to escape.<sup>975</sup>

Marathi chronicles as well as some sources of a later date say Shivaji had a fort constructed in Jawali which he named Pratapgad.<sup>976</sup> A decision given in a lawsuit on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1657 mentions the name of Ganoji Govind as *havaldar* or commander of the Pratapgad fort, implying that the fort had already been named and a fort commander was appointed before 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1657.<sup>977</sup>

# JAWALI

## 1655



Foot track

Boundary of Chandrarao More's Dominion

Low lands

Valleys

High lands

Crestline of the Sahyadri

North  
↑

Scale : 1 cm = 4 km  
0 4 8 km

The capture of the principality of Jawali facilitated Shivaji's entry into the Konkan, the coastal regions of the Maratha country. It appears that soon afterwards Shivaji came into armed conflict with the Siddis of Danda-Rajpuri. The background of the conflict is as follows.

The *Shivabharat* says that after appointing Afzal Khan to deal with Shivaji in the year 1659, Ali Adilshah told the Khan that 'had his [Ali's] father, Muhammad Adilshah, not repelled Shivaji, he would have drowned the Chief of Danda Rajpuri in the sea'.<sup>978</sup>

Muhammad Adilshah died on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1656. If the above statement of the *Shivabharat* is assumed to be factual, skirmishes between the Siddi and Shivaji must have begun before that date. No available source indicates that Shivaji had entered the Konkan region before establishing himself in Jawali. Therefore, if conflicts had arisen between the two during the reign of Muhammad Adilshah, they must necessarily have occurred after Shivaji took Jawali. However, no source except the *Shivabharat* mentions that such conflicts had taken place during Muhammad Adilshah's reign.

The *Shivabharat* further mentions that after Shivaji's assumption of Jawali, Suryarao Surve of the Prabhavali principality had conceded his [Shivaji's] overlordship and even offered assistance to Shivaji from time to time.<sup>979</sup>

It is not unlikely that Suryarao might have done so, although no source except the *Shivabharat* mentions such an occurrence.

Shahji had been awarded the *pargana* of Supe as his *mukasa* and he had appointed his second wife Tukabai's brother, Sambhaji Mohite, to the office of *havaldar* of the *pargana*.<sup>980</sup>

In 1656, Shivaji arrested this Sambhaji Mohite and assumed control of the *pargana*. The reasons leading to this action are not traceable in available sources. However, the fact that Shivaji intended to establish self-rule was reason enough.

The Shivapur Chronology gives Ashwin Vadya 1, Shaka 1578 (24<sup>th</sup> September 1656) as the date of this incident.<sup>981</sup> A letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> October 1656, concerning the division of the rights of *deshmukhi* of the Supe Pargana, also provides indirect corroboration of this date.<sup>982</sup>

The Sabhasad Chronicle gives some details of the event without, however, mentioning its date.<sup>983</sup> According to what it says, Shivaji went to Supe purportedly to receive what was known as the *post*<sup>984</sup> during the Shimga festival from Sambhaji Mohite, his maternal uncle [by virtue of being his step-mother's brother], arrested him and relieved him of his charge of the *pargana*.

It is possible that Shivaji might have sought – and found – some excuse like this to pay his uncle a visit. But it could certainly not have been Shimga because it is observed in the month of Falgun, not Ashwin, the month in which both the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronicles say Shivaji went to Supe. If at all Shivaji used such a pretext to go to Supe, it could not have been on the occasion of Shimga, but possibly Diwali [which is observed in Ashwin]. Even if the author of the Sabhasad Chronicle is given leeway for mistaking Shimga for Diwali, his account of Shivaji's excuse for going to Supe does not seem very credible. Exactly how the takeover of Supe occurred, whether there was a skirmish, what happened to Sambhaji Mohite

thereafter, what was Shahji's reaction on the affair, are questions to which available sources provide no answers.

#### **STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE QUTBSHAHI KARNATAKA (1656-1658)<sup>985</sup>**

After the war against the Qutbshahi Sultanate was over, Muazzam Khan went to the Imperial Court which he reached on 8<sup>th</sup> July 1656. The Emperor promoted him to the rank of 6,000 *dhat / 6,000 sawar* and appointed him the *Diwan (Wazir)* of the Empire.<sup>986</sup> The Qutbshahi Karnataka was yet under the control of Muazzam Khan's men and both Muazzam Khan and Aurangzeb wanted to keep it that way. The Qutbshah naturally was opposed to that. He had appealed to the Emperor and had even offered to pay 1.5 million rupees a year as additional tribute if the Qutbshahi Karnataka was restored to him. But the Emperor gave a ruling against him. Meanwhile, the Qutbshah had started taking other measures to snatch the Qutbshahi Karnataka from Muazzam Khan's men. He incited Shriranga, 'Emperor' of Vijayanagar who had been left only with a small territory around Chandragiri, and other chieftains in the region to rise in revolt against Muazzam Khan. He obstructed the *dakchauki* passing through Qutbshahi territory which Muazzam Khan had set up to communicate with his officers in the Qutbshahi Karnataka. He sent a force under Abdul Jabbar to dislodge Muazzam Khan's garrisons from the Qutbshahi Karnataka.

Shriranga commenced his uprising in July 1656 and by October 1656, with the help of local chieftains in the Qutbshahi Karnataka, captured some territory around Pulicat and Poonamallee, and laid siege to both those places. Throughout this period Aurangzeb was repeatedly warning the Qutbshah to desist from interfering in the Qutbshahi Karnataka and though the latter feigned compliance and even recalled Abdul Jabbar, he continued to incite revolts in the region. While these intrigues were going on, Shahji was in touch with Muazzam Khan and

also with Aurangzeb. There are several references to him in Aurangzeb's letters to Muazzam Khan, but they are not sufficiently clear to enable us to surmise what he had in mind.<sup>987</sup> But both he and Siddi Jauhar, another Adilshahi nobleman, who had his seat at Kurnool, had started taking advantage of these events to make incursions into Qutbshahi Karnataka.<sup>988</sup>

Shriranga's successes in the Qutbshahi Karnataka did not last long. Soon, Muazzam Khan's garrisons in Qutbshahi Karnataka easily routed Shriranga's levies.<sup>989</sup> Shahji's and Siddi Jauhar's troops too were driven out by August 1657.<sup>990</sup> But Muazzam Khan, too, could not retain his hold on the Qutbshahi Karnataka for long. Shah Jahan fell seriously ill on 6<sup>th</sup> September 1657. This was a signal for the beginning of the Mughal War of Succession. Aurangzeb set out from Aurangabad towards Delhi on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1658 and crossed the Narmada on 4<sup>th</sup> April. For a year and a half thereafter he was fully engaged in the War of Succession. While he was thus engrossed in a life and death struggle, the Qutbshah sent a strong force into the Qutbshahi Karnataka which inflicted a decisive defeat on Muazzam Khan's forces in October 1658. Soon thereafter, the Qutbshah's control was fully established in the region.

#### MUGHAL INVASION OF THE ADILSHAHI SULTANATE (1657)

Muhammad Adilshah died on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1656 after a protracted illness.<sup>991</sup> On the same day, Khan Muhammad, the premier nobleman of the Adilshahi Sultanate, enthroned Muhammad Adilshah's 18 year old son Ali with the consent of Badi Sahiba, the chief consort of the deceased Sultan.<sup>992</sup> Ali was not Badi Sahiba's son, but had been brought up by her. According to the *Tarikh-i Ali*, he was the son of one of the women in Muhammad Adilshah's harem and, at the request of

Badi Sahiba, was handed over to her.<sup>993</sup> Various rumours were afloat about his pedigree. Fryer says that he was the offspring of a *mahout* and Badi Sahiba.<sup>994</sup> According to Manucci, Muhammad Adilshah had no son and had therefore brought up Ali, the son of a *mahout*, as his own.<sup>995</sup> Be that as it may, there were widespread doubts about Ali's legitimacy. This, together with his tender age, led to a situation akin to an interregnum. A power struggle ensued among the noblemen and some of them refused to recognize the new sovereign.<sup>996</sup> The various chieftains in the Karnataka took advantage of this state of affairs and recaptured their lost territories.<sup>997</sup>

Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb were aware that Muhammad Adilshah's death would lead to chaos in the Adilshahi Sultanate and had planned to embark upon invasion when he died. In 1652, Shah Jahan had appointed Prince Aurangzeb as *subadar* of the Deccan. While he was on his way from Afghanistan to take charge of his new office, Shah Jahan learnt that Muhammad Adilshah had fallen ill and imparted the news to the Prince. In reply Aurangzeb assured him, "I shall not be lax in speedily reaching that province and, God willing, shall not miss this opportunity."<sup>998</sup> But the expected opportunity had not materialized then and Aurangzeb could only rant in frustration for Muhammad Adilshah's failure to oblige him.<sup>999</sup>

So when Aurangzeb learnt on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1656 the news of Muhammad Adilshah's death from a letter from the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur, he lost no time in conveying it to Shah Jahan.<sup>1000</sup> The Emperor immediately ordered him to invade the Adilshahi Sultanate, and dispatched Muazzam Khan from Delhi with 20,000 troopers to reinforce the Prince's army.<sup>1001</sup> The Emperor had given Aurangzeb two alternative objects for the campaign: if possible to annex the entire Adilshahi Sultanate, or

else to take the former Nizamshahi territory that had fallen to the lot of the Adilshah by the treaty of 1636, and a tribute of Rs.10 million for the Emperor and Rs.5 million for Aurangzeb.<sup>1002</sup> In the meantime, Aurangzeb started spending money to win over Adilshahi noblemen.<sup>1003</sup> In a letter, written about 29<sup>th</sup> December 1656, he urged Muazzam Khan to make haste and observed, "If this opportunity is lost, this picture, [i.e. Ali Adilshah] drawn on water by short sighted people, would acquire colour and this unknown person [Ali Adilshah] would attain stability and independence."<sup>1004</sup>

Muazzam Khan, who had left Delhi on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1656, arrived near Aurangabad on 18<sup>th</sup> January 1657 and on the same day Aurangzeb set out with him towards Bidar.<sup>1005</sup> There were three principal routes from Aurangabad to Bijapur: the western by way of Ahmednagar and Pandharpur, the central by way of Beed and Solapur and the eastern by way of Udgir and Gulbarga. Aurangzeb had already issued instructions to make arrangements for his halt at Ahmednagar.<sup>1006</sup> It is not recorded why he changed his plan and took the eastern route instead. But it is possible to make a guess. Aurangzeb did not have a good siege train with him at this time, but Muazzam Khan had a good artillery park which he had left at Nanded while going to Delhi and Aurangzeb wanted to use it in the forthcoming campaign.<sup>1007</sup> Taking the western route would have entailed a great loss of time in moving those heavy guns thither, whereas they could have easily joined the army on the eastern route. So, logistic considerations might have led Aurangzeb to change his original plan of taking the eastern route. Or, perhaps, his instructions to make arrangements for his halt at Ahmednagar might have been part of a deception plan as well. The strength of Aurangzeb's army during this campaign is not known. But with the reinforcement brought by Muazzam Khan, it could have been around 40 or 50 thousand troopers.

Aurangzeb reached Bidar on 28<sup>th</sup> February 1657 and commenced the siege on the next day.<sup>1008</sup> The assault was delivered and the fort was captured on 29<sup>th</sup> March 1657.<sup>1009</sup> On 27<sup>th</sup> April, Aurangzeb left Bidar and marched towards Kalyani.<sup>1010</sup> The siege of Kalyani was commenced on 4<sup>th</sup> May 1657.<sup>1011</sup> Within a few days the besiegers pushed their trenches up to the ditch and started filling it up. Meanwhile an Adilshahi army of about 30,000 horsemen had arrived in the vicinity of the fort and had started firing rockets on the besiegers' lines by night. On 29<sup>th</sup> May, Aurangzeb left a skeleton force to man the trenches and with the main body stood out to face the Adilshahi army. In the ensuing battle, the Adilshahi army led by Khan Muhammad was routed. The assault on the fort began on 29<sup>th</sup> July; the garrison capitulated and handed over the fort on 1<sup>st</sup> August 1657.

The Adilshah had made overtures of peace to the Imperial Court even before Aurangzeb laid siege to Kalyani.<sup>1012</sup> These had succeeded, most probably due to Dara Shukoh's mediation, and while the siege of Kalyani was in progress Aurangzeb had received the Emperor's *farmans* ordering him to conclude a treaty.<sup>1013</sup> But Aurangzeb continued the siege on the pretext that it would not be politic to abandon it before the treaty was concluded.<sup>1014</sup> The treaty was concluded after the fall of Kalyani. The Adilshah agreed to pay a tribute of Rs.15 million and to cede Paranda fort with the appurtenant territory, the Nizamshahi Konkan with the forts situated in it and the Vangi region, or, in short, all the Nizamshahi territory which the Adilshah had acquired by the treaty of 1636.<sup>1015</sup> Later, the Emperor granted a concession of Rs.5 million in the amount of tribute.<sup>1016</sup>

#### CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN AURANGZEB AND SHIVAJI (1656 -1657)

It seems that since Shivaji's correspondence with Prince Murad Bakhsh in 1649, there was no contact between Shivaji and the Mughals till 1656 when, in July, Shivaji is known to have sent a letter to the fort commander of Ahmednagar, Multafat Khan. The original letter has not survived, but it is mentioned in the following letter.

Aurangzeb to Multafat Khan [1017](#)

c. August 1656

"We have received both your letters – the one containing congratulatory sentiments about Muazzam Khan's success [1018](#) along with the letter you received from Shahji's son [Shivaji] and a copy of your reply to him, and the other sent after receipt of our *nishan*.

"You will, henceforth also, keep the corridor of correspondence with the aforementioned [i.e. Shivaji] open and active, and continue writing letters that would encourage him to act loyally towards the Imperial court. This will make him increasingly eager to serve us."

There is no way of determining precisely what Shivaji had written to Multafat Khan, or what his reply contained, but it appears from another letter written by Aurangzeb around 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1656 that Shivaji had sought support of the Mughals in his activities against the Adilshahi Sultanate.

Aurangzeb to Muazzam Khan [1019](#)

c. 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1656

"Shahji Bhosale's son has recently sent to us his trusted envoy to convey his request that if he is permitted to retain that part of Adilshahi territory that is now in his possession, if he is honoured by the award of a good rank, and the territory held by him is

confirmed on him in lieu of salary, he would follow the path of loyalty and service and also ensure that the said territory is brought under the imperial rule. Therefore, we have sent him a letter stating our conditions regarding loyalty and service, and have also sent a letter to Shahji. We will inform you when we receive a reply. If they obey our orders well and good; otherwise they too would be trampled by our army and will receive the fruit of their own deeds.”

The letters written to Shahji and Shivaji, mentioned in the above letter, have not survived.

Shivaji's envoy met Aurangzeb with a letter sometime during the latter half of February 1657 or the first half of March 1657. That letter is not traceable, but is mentioned in the following communication.

Aurangzeb to Multafat Khan [1020](#)

c. 15<sup>th</sup> March 1657

“We have seen your letter, along with Shivaji Bhosale's letter.

“A few days ago, his envoy too had called on us with his letter, and had submitted his requests and demands. We shall soon send him our *nishan*. When you receive a copy thereof write to him on the lines of our letter.

“The imperial army has laid siege to the fort of Bidar. Our trenches have reached the edge of the ditch. The towers, walls and parapets of the fort have been demolished by cannon fire. Every effort is being made to fill up the ditch. [1021](#) We hope that by the end of the month the town will be in our hands and soon thereafter the fort as well.”

Aurangzeb to Shivaji [1022](#)

23<sup>rd</sup> April 1657

“The petition which you have sent after the receipt of our *nishan* has been placed before us and made your demands known to us.

“Whatever was necessary to be conveyed to you in every matter has already been communicated to your envoy, Sonaji. [1023](#) He must have conveyed it to you and set your mind at rest.

“All the Adilshahi territory and forts in your possession have been bestowed upon you as before, and we are also pleased to grant to you the Dabhol port and all the area under its jurisdiction as per your request.

“This is the right moment to manifest your loyalty and devoted service. Once you have done so, and after you have attained the honour of meeting us, all your other requests would be granted. You will then receive such measure of our grace as is beyond your imagination.

“Your envoy was in a hurry [to return]. We permitted him to depart so that he should return and apprise you of our ever-increasing grace upon you.....

“Of late... Muhammadabad [alias] the fort of Bidar – which is so formidable that none had even imagined capturing it, and which is the veritable key to the conquest of the entire Deccan and Karnataka – was won in a mere day by the unbounded grace of the Almighty and the fortitude of our army. The victory was attained after a siege of one month. This is the prelude to victories beyond imagination. It is not

possible for others to achieve a triumph of such a kind in several years”

As we shall see, within a mere week of this letter, however, Shivaji started raiding the Mughal territory around Junnar. What was the reason for such a *volte-face* in Shivaji's policy *vis-à-vis* the Mughals? Some historians have proffered the explanation that Shivaji only engaged in amiable correspondence with Aurangzeb to lull the Mughals into a trusting attitude. But this rationale does not seem very plausible. In the first place, there was no need for keeping the Mughals off-guard at that juncture because a very large portion of the Mughal army was then engaged in the Adilshahi campaign with its battlegrounds comfortably remote from the Junnar-Ahmednagar area, in the far-away Bidar-Kalyani region. Indeed, there was no force worth the name in or around Junnar, and it was superfluous to engage in friendly banter with Aurangzeb and catch him unawares before raiding that area. Secondly, even if it is assumed that Shivaji made some short-term gains by adopting such a perfidious policy, he would have had to suffer tremendous loss in the long run. Aurangzeb would have spared no effort to avenge this injury with all his might no sooner than he found the time to do so.

So, what was reason for Shivaji's attacks on Mughal territory at that time? The attacks were not made to annex territory, for there is no evidence even remotely suggesting his intention or action to do so. Moreover, he had already invited the Adilshah's displeasure, which was inevitable, and there was no reason for him to add to it the enmity of the Mughals also. He had sufficient scope within the Adilshahi to both annex territory and appropriate booty. Even after a lifetime of incessant conflict, Shivaji was unable to capture all of the Adilshah's territory. Hence, it was hardly necessary for him to provoke the Mughals by such an act. On the contrary, it was not in Shivaji's interests to jeopardize amiable relations, much less invite hostility, by open acts of aggression. It is unlikely that this simple fact had escaped an astute man like Shivaji. His

attacks on Mughal territory, therefore, indicate that he had fairly accurately anticipated the nature of a prospective Mughal-Adilshahi treaty. That treaty, when concluded, would have left Shivaji with no option except open conflict with the Mughals.

Before Aurangzeb embarked upon the Adilshahi campaign, Shah Jahan had placed two alternative objectives before him: either conquer the entire territory and abolish the Adilshahi or make a treaty that ceded to the Mughals the entire Nizamshahi territory that had been received by the Adilshah in the earlier treaty of 1636 along with the tribute of a sum of Rs.15 million.<sup>1024</sup> The *mukasas* held by Shahji in the Pune region were located in the territory that the Adilshah had received out of the old Nizamshahi kingdom. While it was a fact that the actual control of these *mukasas* vested with Shivaji and that he had ceased to do the Adilshah's bidding, technically the land comprising those *mukasas* was still very much a part of the Adilshahi. On the fulfillment of either of the two objectives before Aurangzeb, the Mughals would have staked a claim to proprietary rights of the lands comprising Shahji's *mukasas*. Under such circumstances, Shivaji would have had to choose between two options. Accepting the suzerainty of the Mughals without demur was the first. Shivaji might then have been made a *mansabdar*, and perhaps the territory held by him might have been granted to him in lieu of salary. But he would then not have enjoyed as much freedom under the Mughals as he undoubtedly had 'under' the Adilshah. He might have had to move to any place where he was ordered to serve, and might even have been called upon to surrender some of the forts he held. Moreover, there was no guarantee that the territory he held would have been assigned to him as a jagir or that such jagir, even if awarded, would permanently remain with him. In short, if Shivaji had accepted this first option, he might have had to abandon his ambition of becoming independent. Obviously, he did not even contemplate considering it. The second option was to refuse to acknowledge Mughal suzerainty, in which case armed conflict with the Mughals was inevitable.

The Mughal campaign against the Adilshahi resulted in a treaty, by the terms of which the Adilshah agreed to cede the old Nizamshahi territory in the Adilshah's possession and to pay a tribute of Rs.15 million. This treaty was concluded after Aurangzeb captured the Kalyani fort, i.e. after 1<sup>st</sup> August 1657. But from the time the Bidar fort had been invested, the Adilshah had been suing for peace, and Aurangzeb had indeed received *farmans* from Shah Jahan to relent when the siege of Kalyani was underway. Shivaji's forays into Mughal territory must therefore have been prompted by the intelligence he must have received about not only Adilshahi efforts to make peace, but also the terms and conditions upon which the Adilshah was prepared to make a compromise. It would have harmed Shivaji's interests in no way at all had the Adilshahi noblemen, emboldened and encouraged enough by his offensive against the Mughals, decided to continue the war with them. In fact, a continuation of the war between the Adilshah and the Mughals was distinctly to Shivaji's advantage. Moreover, had a treaty been signed on the terms discussed above, a conflict with the Mughals to preserve his own freedom was going to become inevitable. Hence it would not have compromised his interests in any way to launch an early offensive against the Mughals without waiting for the treaty between them and the Adilshah to be concluded.

Shah Jahan fell seriously ill soon after the treaty was concluded. His death seemed imminent and the war of succession between his sons, inevitable. Realizing that Aurangzeb was engrossed in preparations for such a war, the Adilshah, as we shall see, did not implement the treaty. Around the same time, as we shall also see, Shivaji once again made efforts to establish amicable relations with Aurangzeb. If it had been Shivaji's intention to make war with the Mughals under any circumstances, the internecine war of succession was a golden opportunity. But there is no evidence that Shivaji violated Mughal territory during the period of that war. The

fact that Shivaji made friendly advances towards the Mughals once he realized that the treaty was not going to be implemented, and his non-aggressive posture towards the Mughals even when the war of succession presented him the opportunity, further supports the view that Shivaji launched his offensive mainly because he perceived at that time that the treaty would be signed and that the territory under his control would be ceded to the Mughals.

Briefly stated, the correspondence with the Mughals in July 1656, i.e. before Aurangzeb's invasion of the Adilshahi, was evidently initiated by Shivaji only with the object of seeking Mughal support against Bijapur, and Shivaji had no intention, or even thought, of an offensive against the Mughals. This exchange culminated in the letter of assurance that Aurangzeb wrote to Shivaji on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1657 (cited above). The Mughal invasion of Bijapur had commenced before this date; Aurangzeb had already captured the Bidar fort and was in fact encamped there when he wrote that letter. He advanced towards Kalyani four days later. As stated earlier, Shivaji must have received news of Adilshahi overtures for peace, and perceiving the deleterious effects of the resulting treaty on his independence, must have decided upon the offensive against the Mughals within a week of that letter from Aurangzeb.

## SHIVAJI'S RAIDS INTO MUGHAL TERRITORIES (1657)

With Aurangzeb's departure from Aurangabad towards Bidar for the campaign against the Adilshahi, the region around Ahmednagar had no significant military force. Being anxious about this fact, Aurangzeb sent an order while he was *en route* Bidar that Shahnawaz Khan, Mirza Khan and Rao Karna, who were expected to join him on the way, should go to Ahmednagar. But when, during the siege of Bidar, he heard of the approach of Khan Muhammad towards Bidar with the Adilshahi force, he ordered Shahnawaz Khan and Rao Karna to

Bidar, leaving Mirza Khan to proceed to Ahmednagar as per the first order.<sup>1025</sup>

In April 1657, Aurangzeb received the news that the peasantry in some parts of the Ahmednagar division had been dispersed because of the marauding activities of a detachment of the Adilshahi forces.<sup>1026</sup> He therefore ordered a *mansabdar* named Hoshdar to proceed to Ahmednagar, taking Rao Karna with him on his way there.<sup>1027</sup> He dispatched Nasiri Khan, Iraj Khan and Kartalab Khan from Bidar with a force of 3,000 horse towards Ahmednagar.<sup>1028</sup> He also wrote to Khan Jahan,<sup>1029</sup> the governor of Malwa who had been transferred temporarily to Daulatabad, ordering him to send a detachment of 1,000 cavalry under an experienced commander to Ahmednagar.<sup>1030</sup> Aurangzeb thus sent a total force of about 5,000 cavalry as reinforcements to Ahmednagar.

But before these reinforcements could reach, the commander of the Ahmednagar fort, Multafat Khan, had left the fort to deal with enemy raiding parties. A fort commander was obliged not to leave the fort under any circumstances, unless he received especial orders to that effect from the Emperor himself.<sup>1031</sup> In view of that inviolable rule, what Multafat Khan had done was highly irregular. Aurangzeb wrote a letter of strong disapproval of this '*unexpected and strange*' conduct, ordering him to immediately return to his station and leave the task of dealing with the raiders to Hoshdar and the others appointed for that purpose.<sup>1032</sup> He further ordered in the same letter that the force, when it had been grouped together, should invade enemy territory and lay waste all the villages therein without restraint – that it should be utterly destroyed in every possible manner.

The Adilshahi nobleman Mambaji Bhosale<sup>1033</sup> had made incursions into Mughal territory and captured the

Chambhargonda<sup>1034</sup> Pargana.<sup>1035</sup> Multafat Khan and Mirza Khan's son, Abdul Munim, took Chambhargonda back from him on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1657.<sup>1036</sup> At the same time, Shivaji also invaded the Mughal country and Aurangzeb received news from Bakhtan Beg, the *faujdar* of Junnar, that he was near that town.

### Aurangzeb to Nasiri Khan <sup>1037</sup>

[Beginning of May 1657]

“We have so far heard nothing from you; whether you are still on your way, or have reached Ahmednagar. It was necessary for you to keep us informed constantly.

“We have learned from Multafat Khan's letter that considering the situation he sallied out of the Ahmednagar fort to drive out the enemy who had captured the Chambhargonda Pargana, captured the post on 29<sup>th</sup> April [1657] and inflicted as much vengeance as possible on the enemy. But those miscreants have not altogether left the area and are raising dust of revolt. You are therefore ordered:

“If you have already reached Ahmednagar, well and good; otherwise move as swiftly as possible to reach that place, and punish and drive the enemy out of the Imperial territory with the assistance of Rao Karna, Hoshdar and Mirza Khan's son, Abdul Munim who is there with his father's contingent.

“After you have re-established order in the subdivisions that have recently been disturbed, invade the Adilshahi territory near the border, thoroughly ransack it and lay it waste. Do not flinch even a wee bit from slaughtering and taking captives....Teach the enemies such a lesson that they will be too engrossed in worrying about their own affairs to repeat another misadventure like this one.

“We have given the faujdari of Junnar to our servant Bakhtan Beg. We learnt from his letter that Shivaji, son of Shahji Bhosale, took advantage of the lack of a sufficient force in that area to enter the Junnar region with the intention of rebellion. Therefore you are ordered:

“Evict those persons who have raised the dust of revolt in the Ahmednagar area without any loss of time and proceed speedily to Junnar. Invade that ill-fated person’s [i.e. Shivaji’s] territory, and do not hesitate in plundering, slaughtering and taking captives. Observing this situation, he will be so worried about his own territory that he will become unable to implement his aforementioned plans.

“We are confident you will strive hard and well in the matter.”

But Shivaji had already sacked Junnar before Aurangzeb wrote this letter. The Jedhe Chronology records that Shivaji plundered Junnar in the month of Vaishakh in Shaka 1579 [4<sup>th</sup> April to 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1657].<sup>1038</sup> Many other contemporaneous and latter date sources mention that Shivaji sacked Junnar.<sup>1039</sup>

Around this time, Hoshdar and Muhammad Husain, commander of the contingent sent by Khan Jahan, had reached the environs of Ahmednagar.<sup>1040</sup> Kashi, an Adilshahi nobleman, had invaded the Rashin<sup>1041</sup> pargana.<sup>1042</sup> Multafat Khan sent Muhammad Husain towards Junnar and Karhe Nimone<sup>1043</sup> and dispatched Hoshdar against Kashi.<sup>1044</sup> Aurangzeb was pleased with these dispositions and ordered Multafat Khan to behead any *deshmukhs*, *patils* or peasants in the Imperial territory who had made common cause with the enemy.<sup>1045</sup>

Hearing reports of the approach of the Imperial force, Shivaji returned from the Junnar area in the beginning of May 1657.<sup>1046</sup> Nasiri Khan, however, had not yet reached Ahmednagar and was reprimanded by Aurangzeb.

### Aurangzeb to Nasiri Khan<sup>1047</sup>

c. 10<sup>th</sup> May 1657

“We have so far neither received your letter giving an account of events nor do we have any knowledge of what you are doing. But we have just learned from a letter from Shahbeg Khan’s son, Muhammad Amin, that you arrived in the Beed Pargana on 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1657 and left for Ashti on 6<sup>th</sup> May 1657, without driving out the enemy, in spite of having received the news that the enemy was raising the dust of rebellion a mere eight *kos* away and having seen the devastation of that territory. Therefore it is ordered:

“The complacency, reluctance and laxity displayed by you in the matter of chastising the enemy do not befit your fortitude and wisdom. Having received the news [of the enemy’s arrival near the Beed Pargana] you ought to have dealt with such of the enemy as were on your route, chased them out of Imperial territory and then, proceeding towards Ahmednagar and Junnar, invaded and plundered Adilshahi territory, especially that of Shivaji. We had not expected you to do this [i.e. go ahead without engaging the enemy that was on your route].

“Hearing of the arrival of the Imperial forces, the short-sighted Shivaji has withdrawn his hand of aggression from Junnar. Because of the joint striving of Multafat Khan and the son of Mirza Khan, Mambaji and others have left the Chembhargonda and other regions and headed for the border.

“It is necessary that the accursed Shivaji should be punished for his audacity and insolence. As such, execute the orders we have time and again issued to you. In conjunction with Rao Karna, Hoshdar, Abdul Munim and Khan Jahan’s detachment, invade, plunder and lay waste, without any fear or apprehension, the territory belonging to that ill-fated one [i.e. Shivaji], and plunder and do everything in your power. Invade and despoil his territory as far as your hand can reach. If he steps forward for a conflict, deflate his ego with your sword and punish him suitably.”

Soon thereafter, the Adilshahi force that had assembled near the Beed Pargana forayed into the region of Fathabad (i.e. Dharur).[1048](#)

Multafat Khan returned to Ahmednagar in May 1657.[1049](#) Nasiri Khan also reached the region around the same time. Aurangzeb was at that time conducting the siege of Kalyani. On learning from Multafat Khan’s letter that Nasiri Khan had reached the Ahmednagar region and was thence proceeding for an invasion of the Adilshahi territory in the area around Paranda, Aurangzeb ordered him in the beginning of June 1657 to first plunder Shivaji’s holdings in the Pune and Chakan region and then advance towards Fathabad and Beed to oust the Adilshahi force that had made inroads there.[1050](#) He simultaneously ordered Multafat Khan to dispatch Hoshdar, and Abdul Munim and Tatar Beg who had been posted at Chambhargonda, to plunder the Pune and Chakan region.[1051](#)

The Sabhasad Chronicle states that Shivaji sacked Ahmednagar after plundering Junnar.[1052](#) The *Shivabharat*, too, says that Shivaji inflicted severe punishment upon Nagar

[i.e.Ahmednagar] and other Mughal towns.<sup>1053</sup> Both these sources have not mentioned the date of the sack of Ahmednagar. But the following letter shows that it took place towards the end of May or the beginning of June 1657.

Aurangzeb to Multafat Khan<sup>1054</sup>

[Beginning of June 1657]

“The news of your excellent efforts and foresight in ensuring the safety of Ahmednagar town, and in moving [to the fort] valuables belonging to the inhabitants, and your loyalty manifested in each and every matter became the source of much joy and have received our approbation. We have reported your devoted service to the Imperial Court.

“As a token of our increasing grace we are sending you special robes of honour.”

Aurangzeb does not name in his letter the attacker from whom Multafat Khan protected Ahmednagar, but the event to which reference was made is most certainly Shivaji's raid. The fact that Aurangzeb praises Multafat Khan, informs the Emperor of the action, and sends robes of honour for the Khan, indicates that Shivaji's raid was not very successful.

Around this time, most probably after his raid on Ahmednagar, Shivaji and Nasiri Khan met in a battle near Ahmednagar. The Shivapur Chronology records that it took place on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1657.<sup>1055</sup> The precise outcome of the engagement is unclear, because sources from opposite sides give conflicting versions. While the *Shivabhushan* by Kavi Bhushan states that Nasiri Khan suffered defeat at Shivaji's hands, the *Amal-i Salih* records the exact opposite.<sup>1056</sup> The following letter shows that Nasiri Khan had reported that he had defeated Shivaji.

Aurangzeb to Nasiri Khan [1057](#)

c. 10<sup>th</sup> June 1657

“We have received your letters and learned at length the account of the battle that the Imperial officers fought with Shivaji, who had approached Ahmednagar from the Junnar region, as also of the excellent work and deeds you did.

“The aim of deploying Imperial forces in that region, and for issuing to you all those warnings, which made you disconsolate, was to punish that leader of the ill-fated people [i.e. Shivaji]. Through the grace of the Almighty, he has tested the strength vesting in the hands of the brave, becoming a refugee in the wilderness of oblivion, and the Imperial servants have been victorious. May grace be multiplied a hundredfold upon you, and May you be felicitated a thousand times for reaching the appointed destination by forced marches in the shortest time possible and fulfilling our expectations of you. We are informing the Imperial court about these events in order that your exemplary and dedicated service really becomes known, and are trying to ensure in every possible way that your loyalty has due and early effect on your fortunes.

“You should inculcate and encourage an attitude of hope of our grace and an eagerness for service and sacrifice in Iraj Khan, Kartalab Khan, Abdul Munim, Rustum, Abdun Nabi and others appointed to this task.

“Now that Shivaji has relied upon flight and the morale of that ill-fated one [i.e. Shivaji] and his worthless followers has been broken, lose no opportunity for completely uprooting him; pursue

him as far as you are able to and do not withdraw your arm from undoing him."

It is extremely doubtful how much substance Nasiri Khan's claim of having defeated Shivaji held. Shivaji had launched the attacks with the primary aim of gathering loot. Quite understandably, his tactic must essentially have been to gather as much plunder as possible and withdraw to avoid a battle whenever one seemed inevitable. It is therefore very possible that the Marathas retired after only a minor skirmish once Nasiri Khan finally caught up with them, an occurrence that Nasiri Khan incorrectly reported as a Mughal victory. Something like this seems to have actually happened, for Aurangzeb soon had another occasion to reprimand Nasiri Khan, as stated in the following letter.

#### Aurangzeb to Nasiri Khan [1058](#)

c. 15<sup>th</sup> June 1657

"There was no slackness on your part in punishing the accursed Shivaji, and we approve of your actions. However, you ought to have gone in full pursuit of that ill-fated person as soon as he fled from the battlefield, or at least as soon as your mounts had been rested. That would have prevented him from extending his arm towards areas within Imperial territory by shifting his camp to the Paranda region, and posting his own men for extortion at various locations.

"It is necessary to crush the rebellion initiated by that person of evil disposition [i.e. Shivaji]. If, as you have reported, he has already fled the area [i.e. Paranda] for his own territory and there is not even a sign remaining of him or his followers, then in such case you will encamp along with your men before Paranda in the Chambhargonda and Kadevaleet [1059](#) region. Keep Rao Karna at Junnar and Abdul Munim at

Karhe Nimone with instructions to remain there for the duration of the rainy season so that the peasantry will be protected from the attacks of the rebels and will be able to concentrate on cultivation. The task of uprooting that leader of wayward people [i.e. Shivaji] should be kept pending till the next season, and you should make all efforts to reassure and comfort the peasantry and strengthen the administration there. Do other acts as per the demands of the situation."

This letter, read with the one cited immediately before it, make it amply clear that Nasiri Khan had not won anything in the nature of a decisive victory over Shivaji. Indeed, it even raises doubts whether there was any victory at all. Even after this so-called victory, Shivaji not only did not leave the territory, but on the contrary advanced towards Paranda and commenced collecting revenue from that area! There is no source which tells us of the casualties suffered by the two sides in the battle. Nasiri Khan did not pursue Shivaji – perhaps he did not dare to do so. However, all that can be said on the evidence of available sources is that Nasiri Khan did catch up with Shivaji near Ahmednagar on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1657, after a brief skirmish Shivaji retired, but Nasiri Khan did not follow up on the victory he felt he had gained in order to make it comprehensive and conclusive.

Shivaji returned to his territory after spending only a few days in the region of Paranda. Nasiri Khan stationed Rao Karna and Kartalab Khan at Junnar and Karhe Nimone respectively, giving additional charge of the post at Khed to Kartalab.<sup>1060</sup> He himself proceeded in June 1657 from the Ahmednagar area towards Paranda.<sup>1061</sup> Aurangzeb entrusted the *faujdari* of Chembargonda and Kadevaleet to Hoshdar.<sup>1062</sup> The detachment sent by Khan Jahan to Ahmednagar was recalled.<sup>1063</sup>

It appears that Shivaji suspended his offensive in Mughal territory in June 1657. However, Aurangzeb continued issuing instructions to remain vigilant against him.

Aurangzeb to Nasiri Khan [1064](#)

[Beginning of August 1657]

“By the grace of God the fort of Kalyani has been captured....

“Beware of Shivaji and other enemies in that area, and try always to obtain even the smallest piece of information about them. Strive ceaselessly so that the dispersed peasantry may be enabled to return and concentrate on cultivation, the administrative machinery may be brought back to normalcy, and the dust of rebellion that had been raised may really and truly settle.”

As stated earlier, Aurangzeb had issued orders to Nasiri Khan and others to enter and plunder Shivaji's territories of Pune and Chakan. Persian sources make no mention of these officers having done so, but there is a reference in a letter of grant dated 10<sup>th</sup> November 1658 to some kind of unrest caused by the Mughals around that time, and it may be estimated that the Mughals conducted one or more raids between June and September 1657. [1065](#) No source other than the aforementioned letter makes reference to these raids and it would not be unreasonable to conclude that they were of a very minor nature, and that the Mughals had gained nothing substantial. There is also no way of determining the name of the Mughal nobleman who made these forays.

It has been stated earlier that Shivaji seemingly suspended his raids into the Mughal territory sometime in June 1657. Thereafter he attempted to reconcile with the Mughals by writing a letter to Nasiri Khan. That letter is not traceable, but it

has been referred to in a letter Aurangzeb subsequently wrote to Nasiri Khan.

Aurangzeb to Nasiri Khan [1066](#)

c. 10<sup>th</sup> October 1657

“We approve of the letter you have sent to Shivaji in reply to his. That ill-fated one must be completely uprooted, and having rebelled thus, he cannot entertain even the thought of receiving any assurance or pledge of peace and goodwill from us. But if he does conduct himself along the lines you have conveyed to him in your letter, and if he sends some trusted envoy to you with requests worthy of our consideration, you should communicate his say and expectations to us in writing. Do not for a moment relax in your vigilance and alertness.”

Shivaji’s letter, to which Aurangzeb makes reference in the above, may be presumed to have been written at some time during the period July to September 1657. Probably, it might have been written sometime towards the end of September 1657, when Shivaji had learned of the conclusion of a treaty between the Mughals and the Adilshah, as also that the Adilshah had no intention of implementing the terms thereof. This could explain Shivaji’s second *volte-face* in his policy towards the Mughals. His invasion of Adilshahi territory during or before October 1657 is also consistent with this premise.

Even after this, Aurangzeb was never relaxed in his mind about the possibility of Shivaji’s attacks on Mughal territory and continued giving cautionary instructions to his noblemen. [1067](#) The bitterness, anxiety and distrust with which Aurangzeb regarded Shivaji’s propensity and acumen for rebellion is illustrated in one letter in which he refers to Shivaji as ‘son of a dog’ (*sag-bachcha*)! [1068](#)

#### COMMENCEMENT OF THE MUGHAL WAR OF SUCCESSION

Shah Jahan suddenly fell seriously ill on 6<sup>th</sup> September 1657<sup>1069</sup> just after he had accorded his sanction to the treaty with the Adilshah.<sup>1070</sup> For the next eight days, only his son, Dara Shukoh, and some selected noblemen were permitted to see him. On 14<sup>th</sup> September 1657, he is said to have given a *zaroka darshan* (i.e. shown himself to others from the window of his bedchamber). For a month thereafter, he saw none except those mentioned earlier. Two more *zaroka darshans* were repeated on the 15<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> October 1657 after his condition had improved slightly, and he proceeded on his way from Delhi to Agra on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1657 for a change of weather. He reached a place called Sami Ghat, three *kos* from Agra on the banks of the Yamuna, on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1657 and encamped there awaiting the auspicious time for his entry into Agra as calculated by his astrologers. His health showed a marked improvement during this short stay at Samighat. On 15<sup>th</sup> November 1657 he proceeded thence to Bahadurpur and traveled by boat on the following day to Agra to encamp in Dara Shukoh's *serai*. He entered Agra fort nine days later.

Because the Emperor had met nobody for a long period during his illness, rumour was rife that he was dead.<sup>1071</sup> News that his father had taken seriously ill, and was reportedly very close to death or had even died, must have reached Aurangzeb for the first time around 21<sup>st</sup> September 1657, and the Adilshah a few days thereafter. It was clear that a war for succession would soon be waged if indeed Shah Jahan was dead. Fearing this internecine war and the uncertainty it would create, a feeling of panic and frenzy had prevailed in the Empire. The general atmosphere is best expressed in the following extract from a letter, dated 5<sup>th</sup> November 1657, sent by the English at Surat to their headquarters in England:<sup>1072</sup>

“Since the ships come out this year will want goods, through the non-arrival of *caphillaes*<sup>1073</sup> out of the country, occasioned through a report of Shah Jahan’s death, which has continued very credible this month; insomuch as all trade is laid aside and *caphillaes* stopped, and many robberies committed, and several armies abroad; which has caused such a distraction in the course of trade that there is at present nothing to be done but calling in what cloth was formerly delivered to the washers, and hiding and securing other goods from the danger of the times; and all persons so amazed that none think of anything more than to secure what they already have, by hiding it under ground and flying away themselves with their wives and children, leaving only their walls standing to defend what they have within. And in this condition is this city at present; and for certain the King [Shah Jahan] is dead, by the common report of all men.... What the event of these civil dissensions will be we cannot foretell, but this much we know: if the three youngest sons will not subordinate themselves to the authority of the elder, it will not be a year, two, or three that will end the differences; and then all trades will be spoiled, both inland and foreign.”

Because of conflicting reports from his envoy at the Imperial court, Aurangzeb himself did not know precisely what the condition of the Emperor was.<sup>1074</sup> If the Emperor was indeed dead, it was necessary for Aurangzeb to proceed towards Delhi before Dara Shukoh stabilized his control. However, if the Emperor was still living, or was not mortally ill, such a move would have proved deleterious for Aurangzeb because it might have appeared premature, even rash. So Aurangzeb decided to enforce the treaty and collect as much tribute from the Adilshah as possible till such time that a confirmed report, either way, about the Emperor was not received.

He therefore detailed Muazzam Khan on 30<sup>th</sup> September 1657 to take possession of the Paranda fort.<sup>1075</sup> Qazi Nizama set out with Muazzam Khan and proceeded towards Bijapur on his appointed task of exacting the agreed tribute from the Adilshah.<sup>1076</sup> However, news of the Emperor's illness – and perhaps even death – must have reached Bijapur by then, and the Bijapur court must quite easily have anticipated the inevitable internecine war of succession. For, the Adilshahi ministers had started avoiding or delaying either handing over territories or remitting tribute.<sup>1077</sup>

Aurangzeb himself commenced his return journey on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1657 , leaving behind a detachment of musketeers under Ali Beg's command at Kalyani, and reached Bidar on 9<sup>th</sup> October 1657.<sup>1078</sup>

All the powers of governance had devolved upon Dara Shukoh ever since the Emperor had taken ill, which position continued even after his recovery.<sup>1079</sup> The effects thereof had begun to become apparent by that time. Muazzam Khan was sacked from his post of Wazir and his son, who had been handling that office as his father's representative, was ordered not to attend office.<sup>1080</sup> Further, some of the noblemen who had been sent to the Deccan for the invasion of the Adilshahi Sultanate, like Mahabat Khan, Nasiri Khan, Rao Chhatrasal and others, were recalled to Delhi, according to which order most of them began their northbound journeys.<sup>1081</sup> Either because of Aurangzeb's withdrawal towards the North or because he had been weakened by the recall of many noblemen, Adilshahi nobles began getting intrepid, commencing attacks on Mughal military posts in Adilshahi territory that had been set up by Aurangzeb for the implementation of the treaty.<sup>1082</sup>

Aurangzeb's envoy at the Imperial court sent him an encrypted letter that reached him at Bidar on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1657 in which it was stated that power no longer vested in the Emperor's hands, that he might have been dead, and that the news of his death was being kept secret till the noblemen recalled from the Deccan reached the capital.<sup>1083</sup> Thereupon, Aurangzeb wrote to Muazzam Khan, enclosing a decoded copy of the envoy's message, ordering him to hasten the possession of the Paranda fort and return to him in order that future plans for their northward journey could be made.<sup>1084</sup>

Appointing his own Bakhshi, Mir Jafar, with a contingent of 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 musketeers for the security of the Bidar fort, Aurangzeb proceeded towards Pathri with the rest of his army on 19<sup>th</sup> October 1657.<sup>1085</sup> The northbound route bifurcated at Pathri, one leading towards Aurangabad and the other towards Burhanpur.<sup>1086</sup> Aurangzeb decided to make a slow march up to Pathri in anticipation of some reliable report about the Emperor's condition. If news of Shah Jahan's death was confirmed by the time he reached Pathri, he would proceed towards Delhi via Burhanpur. If, on the other hand, no reliable information was received till then, he would proceed to Aurangabad and await the arrival of such a report.<sup>1087</sup> Being aware that the Adilshah would vacillate about implementing the treaty if he learned of Aurangzeb's imminent departure for Delhi, he had contemplated dispatching Muhammad Sultan with a detachment from Pathri to Ahmednagar and thence to Paranda if need be, in order to pressurize the Adilshah.<sup>1088</sup>

Aurangzeb was on his way to Pathri when he received a report dated 6<sup>th</sup> October 1657 from his envoy in Delhi stating that the condition of the Emperor had improved.<sup>1089</sup> But the very next day he received another report dated 11<sup>th</sup> October 1657 from the same source indicating that the Emperor's illness

was increasing in severity.<sup>1090</sup> He therefore considered sending Muhammad Sultan ahead with a detachment towards Burhanpur in order to intercept and halt noblemen like Nasiri Khan who were at that time making their northward journeys on the Emperor's orders, as also to garner support in combat forces from local chieftains in that area.<sup>1091</sup> However, Muazzam Khan was still hopeful about getting possession of Paranda, and on his advice, Aurangzeb decided instead to send Muhammad Sultan to that fort; in case of a definite report of the Emperor's recovery he himself would go there to enforce the fulfillment of the treaty.<sup>1092</sup> On 28<sup>th</sup> October 1657, he sent Malik Husain Koka with some cavalry to Handiya in order to secure all the fords of the Narmada River as also to recruit fresh troops.<sup>1093</sup> He also wrote to the Rajas of Deogarh and Chanda to join his forces at Burhanpur.<sup>1094</sup>

Around that time, some people from Aurangzeb's court received a letter sent by some officials in Agra, from which Aurangzeb came to the inference that the Emperor was either already dead or very seriously ill with little chance of recovery, and also that he had lost effective control of his power.<sup>1095</sup> He therefore began urging Muazzam Khan to return without any more delay after entering into an understanding with the Adilshah to the effect that the Mughals would forego their right to the territory and tribute ceded to them by the treaty if the Adilshah gave up his right over Jafarabad [i.e. Bidar] and Kalyani and also ceased inciting anyone in Mughal territory to rebellion.<sup>1096</sup>

Aurangzeb was apprehensive that many noblemen would not support him if he rebelled while his father was yet alive. On the other hand, he could not afford to procrastinate in staking a claim to the throne. Few people remain loyal on the sole basis of either a commitment to principle or good personal relations.

Most, however, take sides because they expect the person they propose to support to be successful, and because of the prospect of being able to share in the lucrative consequences of such success. From the news that Aurangzeb had been receiving, he had estimated that Shah Jahan did not have too long to live. If he remained inactive under such circumstances, he was worried that those siding with him at that time might read into his inactivity a signal of hesitation, lack of conviction or diffidence, and abandon his cause. It was necessary to move into action for another reason. The route to Delhi passed through the Malwa province, and the incumbent governor of that province, Khan Jahan (i.e. Shayista Khan) was favourably disposed towards him. Passing through Malwa might have been a great deal easier when someone partial to him like Khan Jahan was still in charge of the province. But it was clear by now that Dara Shukoh was not going to allow Khan Jahan to hold that office for too long. It was thus necessary in Aurangzeb's interests to commence the northward march before Khan Jahan was replaced as governor. Aurangzeb informed Muazzam Khan of all these considerations in the following letter:[1097](#)

"We are in receipt of the reply you sent to our encrypted letter.

"It was necessary to inform you about the intention of our well-wishers [that we should succeed as Emperor]. That intention will be implemented when confirmation is received about the inevitable event [i.e. Shah Jahan's death] and that distressing news is received. If, however, that has not happened [i.e. Shah Jahan was not dead, or did not die in the near future], how sagacious or feasible would it be for us to act thus, and further to cross the [Narmada] river while the Emperor is yet living, and the innermost thoughts of our associates [i.e. Prince Shuja and Prince Murad Bakhsh] are as yet undisclosed. But, as is obvious from the extreme audacity and gumption of that party [i.e. Dara Shukoh], and from

what our envoy has written, it is ordinarily impossible that he [i.e. the Emperor] will survive his illness. We have informed you of this situation often before this.

“If, despite this obvious turn of events, we do not diligently commence amassing the means [for our succession] in right earnest and proclaiming our intention [of becoming Emperor], on what basis or hope would people accept to become our followers? Those with us today who are as yet uncertain in their loyalty to us, observing the laxity and lack of conviction and commitment on our part, would leave our side, enabling the Imperial courtiers to reckon the real situation in our camp. Moreover, it is not possible to win over materialistic people hankering after ranks and appointments [unless we make our intentions clear and provide them with a hope of success].

“Hence we regard it most desirable that we are relieved of the Bijapur affair as soon as is possible. This will enable our forces to reach Burhanpur before the veil of uncertainty is lifted from the present situation, before Khan Jahan is replaced [as governor] in Malwa, and before they [i.e. Dara’s party] are able to exploit the undecided loyalty of the *Zamindars* [landholders] [in Malwa], lure them to their side and take control of Raisen, Mandu and other forts in that province. The Raisen fort, which is under Nasiri Khan’s control, can easily be appropriated in the meantime; the troops in that region can be instilled with the hope of our success and taken with us, as also new recruitments can be effected.

“If the Bijapur affair takes too long, or our forces that have been dispersed at various places do not regroup at the right moment, and confirmed news of

the Emperor's death is received, the time for achieving most of the above tasks will clearly and most certainly have passed.

"Our strict directives to you [for joining us at the earliest] had, or have, no motive other than what has been elaborated above. How else would we have given in to a rushed and injudicious handling of such vital matters [as the occupation of Paranda and other Adilshahi territories]?"

Although Aurangzeb was incessantly ordering Muazzam Khan to return, the latter was unable to curb his desire for Paranda. Therefore, on Muazzam Khan's advice, Aurangzeb sent Muhammad Sultan towards Paranda on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1657, as a tactic for pressurizing the Adilshah, and himself reached Aurangabad on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1657.<sup>1098</sup>

At about the same time that Muhammad Sultan reached Paranda, or perhaps just a little before that Khan Muhammad, the chief minister of the Adilshahi, was murdered, thus extinguishing even the dimmest hope of occupying Paranda.<sup>1099</sup> Aurangzeb therefore ordered Muhammad Sultan and Muazzam Khan to go to Beed from Paranda, in consequence of which they left Paranda and arrived at Beed towards the end of November or the beginning of December 1657.<sup>1100</sup> Muhammad Sultan was recalled to Aurangabad and replaced by his brother, Muhammad Muazzam.<sup>1101</sup>

A *farman* recalling Muazzam Khan to the Imperial Court reached Aurangzeb on 19<sup>th</sup> December 1657.<sup>1102</sup> Accordingly, Muazzam Khan commenced his journey towards Delhi from Beed and reached Aurangabad towards the end of December 1657, where Aurangzeb promptly arrested him on his arrival.<sup>1103</sup>

Aurangzeb had by this time finalized his plans to advance towards Delhi. An advance detachment left for Burhanpur under the command of Muhammad Sultan on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1658.<sup>1104</sup> Muhammad Muazzam was appointed as governor of the Deccan with Shahbeg Khan and other noblemen to assist him in the administration of the province.<sup>1105</sup> Aurangzeb left Aurangabad with the rest of his army on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1658 and reached Burhanpur on the 18<sup>th</sup>.<sup>1106</sup> Leaving Burhanpur on 20<sup>th</sup> March 1658, he crossed the Narmada at Akbarpur on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1658.<sup>1107</sup>

For a year and a half thereafter, Aurangzeb became embroiled in the Mughal war of succession.

In the ultimate analysis, Aurangzeb gained nothing out of the treaty between the Mughals and the Adilshah made after the fall of Kalyani, a matter that must have caused him much mental torment. But he was obliged to present an outward conciliatory posture because he needed to secure his rear when the imminent war of succession was finally waged. The Adilshah, too, continued to similarly conduct himself. Before Aurangzeb left Aurangabad, Qazi Nizama returned from Bijapur bearing a letter from the Adilshah, expressing his loyalty, and some gifts.<sup>1108</sup> Aurangzeb sent a reply advising the practice of like exemplary loyalty in the future, too.<sup>1109</sup> Thereafter, an envoy from the Adilshah, Mir Abul Hasan, met Aurangzeb and presented a letter of request.<sup>1110</sup> When Aurangzeb was in Burhanpur, he bestowed customary honours upon Mir Abul Hasan, gave him gifts of an elephant and Rs.10,000 cash, and sent him back to Bijapur, along with a *nishan* bearing an impression of his palm, granting the Adilshah's request for the fort of Paranda and the waiver of a sum of three million rupees from the tribute, but ordering the early remittance of the

balance.<sup>1111</sup> Moreover, the *nishan* asked the Adilshah to depute a force of 10,000 cavalry to serve in Aurangzeb's army, assuring him of the title 'Shah' in return.<sup>1112</sup> The *nishan*, not stopping there in its favours, went on to assure the Adilshah of the entire territory up to the Godavari River if Aurangzeb became Emperor. Aurangzeb's thoughts, it would seem, were never too far from Shahji and Shivaji even at such a critical juncture, for, in the same *nishan*, he warned the Adilshah about Shahji and Shivaji:

"If you desire to enlist the services of the evil-intentioned and accursed Shivaji, who has trespassed upon some forts in the Konkan and raised the dust of rebellion, be sure to assign him a jagir in the Karnataka so that he will be far away from Imperial territory and will be unable to incite revolt."<sup>1113</sup>

"...If Shahji Bhosale, Bahlul's sons or any of your other officers express an intention of seeking service with us, their request will not be entertained and we will not help them."

#### INTERNAL FEUDS IN THE ADILSHAHI (1657–58)

The internal feud for power between noblemen of the Adilshahi following Muhammad Adilshah's death, seemed to have temporarily subsided by Aurangzeb's invasion. However, the power struggle again reared its head once a treaty had been concluded with the Mughals, and the chief minister of the Adilshahi, Khan Muhammad, was murdered. The Jedhe Chronology gives the date of this event as 11<sup>th</sup> November 1657, and states that he was done to death by the orders of the Badi Sahiba (or Queen Mother).<sup>1114</sup>

Aurangzeb was of the view that Khan Muhammad met his violent end because of the intrigues of Mulla Ahmad Natiya, a Bijapuri nobleman. In a letter written to Muazzam Khan, he

mentions this bloody incident in Bijapur, and comments: "That imbecile Black<sup>1115</sup> [i.e. Khan Muhammad] had become prey to the intrigue and envy of the ill-fated Natiya and was eliminated on charges of disloyalty and treachery. He was slack in vigilance and foresight and in spite of many warnings from us to be alert, he remained careless."<sup>1116</sup>

According to the *Basatin-us Salatin's* account of the murder, Prince Aurangzeb had been caught in a tight corner by Khan Muhammad on one occasion during his invasion of Adilshahi territory, but had been allowed safe passage as a consequence of a letter of request from the Prince. Learning of this, Afzal Khan apparently sought Khan Muhammad's permission to pursue him. The permission had not been granted because Khan Muhammad was apprehensive of the dire consequences that might have befallen the Adilshahi had a Mughal prince been apprehended and made captive. An infuriated Afzal Khan abandoned the campaign in a huff to return to Bijapur and apprise the Adilshah of the event. The Adilshah recalled Khan Muhammad to Bijapur and, as he was entering the Mecca Gate of the walled city, was done to death by assassins who had been stationed there in all readiness.<sup>1117</sup>

This account, incidentally, is the only one available that gives some details of the manner of Khan Muhammad's death. To the extent that he was murdered on Afzal Khan's instigation, it might even be factual. However, the story about Aurangzeb having been cornered, and other related matters, seems unreliable and is most probably fabricated and imaginary. If such an incident had in fact occurred, there would have been some remark, reference, mention or notice thereof in at least one of the innumerable letters that Aurangzeb is known to have written during that period, or in other contemporaneous source material. But there is none.

But the power struggle did not end with the murder of Khan Muhammad. The Jedhe Chronology records two other equally gory incidents: Fath Khan was poisoned to death in the month of Pausha, Shaka 1580 (15<sup>th</sup> December 1658 to 12<sup>th</sup> January 1659), and Bahlul Khan was murdered in the month of Shravan, Shaka 1580 (21st July to 18<sup>th</sup> August 1658).<sup>1118</sup> This Bahlul Khan was most probably Bahlul Khan Shah Jahani or his son Abdul Qadir Bahlul Khan.

#### SHIVAJI'S OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ADILSHAHİ SULTANATE (1657-1658)

##### *Shivaji Captures Kondhana*

Under the terms of Shahji's release from Adilshahi imprisonment in 1649, Shivaji had to relinquish possession and control of the Kondhana fort as well as the Khedebare sub-division in which that fort was situated. It appears from two contemporaneous documents that the Khedebare sub-division, and perhaps also the fort, came once again into Shivaji's possession sometime before 13<sup>th</sup> August 1657.

The first is a letter dated 13<sup>th</sup> August 1657 sent by Shivaji to the officials in the Khedebare sub-division ordering them to continue unchanged the grants in that sub-division as per the previous year.<sup>1119</sup> Obviously, that sub-division had come under Shivaji's control before that date, a reason why the officials were making demands for fresh letters of grant. The Kondhana fort is situated within the Khedebare sub-division, so it may be presumed that the fort also came under his control along with the sub-division.

The second is a *mahzar*, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1658, in the matter of a dispute about a *watan* in the village of Pargaon Mala in the Patas sub-division of Pune Pargana which lists the names of the persons present.<sup>1120</sup> At the head of the list appear the names 'Ramaji Ballal, Havaldar' and 'Yado Narayan Sabhasad,

Officer-in-charge of Fort Kondhana'. It is stated in the document that the assembly was convened in the Supe Pargana by the order of Raja Sahib. This Raja Sahib must be an allusion to Shivaji since the Pune and Supe Parganas were in Shivaji's possession and control at that time. It is evident from the fact that an official appointed on Kondhana was present in a council that had been convened on Shivaji's orders that the fort, too, had come into Shivaji's possession before that date.

It may thus be concluded from the evidence of the two documents cited above that the Kondhana fort had passed under Shivaji's control probably before 13<sup>th</sup> August, but definitely before 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1658. However, there are no means available to determine precisely how and when that occurred.

### *Campaign against the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri*

Shivaji had made ingress into the Konkan since the time he had captured Jawali. Consequently, a clash of interests with the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri was inevitable. The Shivapur Chronology says that Raghunathpant went to Rajpuri on 31<sup>st</sup> July 1657.<sup>1121</sup> It is not mentioned why he was sent. It is somewhat difficult to assume that he was sent on a military expedition because the Konkan receives very heavy rainfall around the time of year he was sent. There are, however, instances to show that campaigning in the Konkan at that time of year is not altogether impossible. For example, Shivaji captured the forts of Mahuli and Karnala in the Konkan on 16<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1670 respectively, right in the middle of the rainy season, but it was as an extension of a campaign already in hand.<sup>1122</sup> Nevertheless, conducting an activity like a military campaign in the Konkan during that season is not without its difficulties, and it is not likely that an entirely fresh campaign in that region and at that time would be planned by choice. Perhaps, he was sent at that time to make preparations for a move envisaged immediately after the rains.

The Sabhasad Chronicle gives a sketchy account of a campaign undertaken against the Siddi by Raghunath Ballal Sabnis. It states that by Shivaji's order, he set out at the head of five or six thousand infantry, captured the territory up to Danda-Rajpuri including the forts of Tala and Ghosala, defeated the Siddi's forces in a couple of battles, and, after overtures for peace from the Siddi, concluded a treaty with him.<sup>1123</sup> Perhaps the 'Raghunathpant' mentioned in the Shivapur Chronology [above] was this Raghunath Ballal Sabnis.<sup>1124</sup>

It is certain from a reference in the *Shivabharat* that Shivaji had indeed captured some territory held by the Siddi before the commencement of Afzal Khan's campaign against Shivaji, i.e. before June 1659 or thereabout. The *Shivabharat* states that Afzal Khan wrote a letter to Shivaji after he had arrived in Wai, and quotes that epistle.<sup>1125</sup> It begins by listing all of Shivaji's innumerable past 'crimes', and ends with the demand that he surrender all the forts and territories captured by him. Of the several crimes so listed, one concerns us here:<sup>1126</sup>

"You have brought under your possession that territory replete with hill-forts, which had been won by the Adilshah after the dissolution of the Nizamshahi, and which he had ceded to the Mughals with the desire to sue for peace.

"Because of your constant good fortune, you have captured at every possible opportunity more and more of the territory belonging to the ruler of Rajpuri, because of which he has been encircled and is infuriated."

For want of other reliable source material, we have perforce to remain content with mere conjectures and very sketchy particulars about this affair for the present.

## *Shivaji's Incursion into the North Konkan*

All four Mughal Princes set about preparing for the war of succession immediately after Shah Jahan fell seriously ill on 6<sup>th</sup> September 1657, while the Adilshah, seeing Aurangzeb thus preoccupied, threw off the burden of the treaty. The situation in the Nizamshahi Konkan must have become very uncertain from the time the treaty was concluded till the Adilshah decided to disregard it. This region had been agreed in the treaty to be ceded to the Mughals, but actual possession had yet to be delivered. It should not have been surprising if the Adilshahi officials in the region had become relaxed in their vigilance and alertness during this period of transition. No one spends time and effort in maintaining or protecting his house once it has been decided to vacate it and move out! At such a juncture, the principal Adilshahi official of the Nizamshahi Konkan was absent from his post. The *Alamgirnama* states that the ailing Muhammad Adilshah had summoned this official, Mullah Ahmad, to Bijapur when internal intrigue and conflict was rife in the kingdom during his last illness, leaving the territory and forts in the Nizamshahi Konkan without a military force capable of defending them, and this situation was exploited to the hilt by the daring and crafty Shivaji to foment rebellion.<sup>1127</sup> Peace and tranquility had generally reigned in the region since the Mughal-Adilshahi treaty of 1636, and it is quite likely that the maintenance and repair of forts and strongholds had been neglected. Moreover, any possibility of military aid arriving from Bijapur, at a time of intense internal feuds, was bleak. It therefore appears that a combination of these factors must have proved propitious for Shivaji's success in his North Konkan Campaign of 1657-58.

Shivaji left Rajgad on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1657, marched by way of the Telbaila Pass, descended into the Konkan, and captured Chaul whence he proceeded towards Mahuli.<sup>1128</sup> Kalyan was

captured by his troops on 24<sup>th</sup> October 1657.<sup>1129</sup> Kalyan is located 80 km North of Chaul and 40 km South of Mahuli. It is obvious that he must have passed through and perhaps halted at Kalyan on his way from Chaul to Mahuli. Shivaji's capture of Chaul has also been reported by a Portuguese document<sup>1130</sup> dated 28<sup>th</sup> November 1657.<sup>1131</sup> The Sanskrit *Shivakavya* has the following to relate:<sup>1132</sup>

Shivaji, accompanied by the mountain troops,<sup>1133</sup> descended upon Chaul through the Telbaila Pass, captured the place and proceeded north. Multitudes of Hindus from the area, who had long sustained every conceivable torture and indignity at the hands of the Muslims, came and took refuge with Shivaji all along the route. He heard from them their accounts of religious fanaticism and injustice of the Muslims, consoled them, and asked them to fear not. Then, being inflamed with wrath at such gross inhumanity, and being pained at the decline of righteousness, he reached the town of Bhiwandi<sup>1134</sup> which is surrounded by the sea. There he fought an intense and decisive battle against the Muslims and killed many of them. Many of them, frightened by his fury, boarded small boats and escaped across the sea, while others fled into the forests in the hills. Shivaji found a vast hoard of buried treasure which he caused to be excavated. Then he went to the place where the Muslims had sought refuge, and fettering them, sent them in captivity to his various hill-forts. Thereafter, he marched with an infantry thirty thousand strong and invested Mahuli fort, the garrison capitulating on the fifth day.

Mahuli was captured on 9<sup>th</sup> January 1658 and Shivaji returned to Rajgad on 14<sup>th</sup> January 1658.<sup>1135</sup>

Shivaji initiated his campaign of North Konkan at just the right time, and succeeded in frustrating Mughal plans to occupy

the region. The relevant portion of a letter dated 21<sup>st</sup> October 1657, written on Aurangzeb's orders by his secretary, Abul Fath, to Muazzam Khan states:[1136](#)

“By rapid marches, the *faujdar* of Junnar, Muhammad Yusuf, went beyond even Kalyan and beheaded the [Adilshahi] commander in the region, Habash Khan. At that time about two hundred of Shivaji’s horsemen had reached the place for Habash Khan’s assistance. In the skirmish that ensued, the Imperial servants [i.e. Muhammad Yusuf and his men] both sustained and inflicted casualties. But the Imperial force could not hold the enemy back, many were killed or wounded, and Muhammad Yusuf retreated with only handful men to Junnar. It is left to the discretion of your Honour [i.e. Muazzam Khan] to send reinforcements to that area.”

Information about the incident referred to in the above letter must have reached Aurangzeb through either Muhammad Yusuf himself, or through the report dispatched by the official Imperial *waqai-navis*. It is therefore likely that he incorrectly presumed that Shivaji’s two hundred horsemen had come to ‘assist’ Habash Khan. In actual fact, it is plain that this cavalry force, far from having arrived to help Habash Khan out of his predicament, had gone there to wrest Kalyan from him.

Even two hundred horsemen proved formidable, and Muhammad Yusuf was forced to retreat from the Konkan. Obviously, the force under his command must also have been puny. In spite of this, he could vanquish and kill Habash Khan! This event illustrates how destitute militarily Habash Khan must have been. On the one hand, Mughal forces in the Deccan were initially engaged against the Adilshah, and subsequently in making preparations for the war of succession. The Adilshahi forces, on the other, were initially busy fighting the Mughals, and were subsequently embroiled in their own internal power feuds. This was perhaps the reason why the Mughal garrison

commander of Junnar and the Adilshahi commander in North Konkan were both so pathetically weakened. Shivaji saw the opportunity provided by this situation and took full advantage of it.

The skirmish with Shivaji's men mentioned in the above letter must have occurred a few days before its date, or around 10<sup>th</sup> October 1657. Soon thereafter, on 24<sup>th</sup> October 1657, Shivaji's troops captured Kalyan – Bhiwandi.

According to the Jedhe Chronology, Shivaji had assigned Dadaji Bapuji, with a force of infantry and cavalry, to capture Kalyan–Bhiwandi.<sup>1137</sup> The horsemen that chased Muhammad Yusuf away must have been a detachment of the main force led by this Dadaji Bapuji.

The fort of Asheri, about 50 km North of Bhiwandi, was in possession of the Portuguese at the time. There seem to have been a few skirmishes between the Portuguese and Shivaji during this campaign.<sup>1138</sup> A Portuguese letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1658, sent to their king by the Portuguese governors, Francesco de Melo de Castro and Antonio da Souza Coutinho, says:<sup>1139</sup>

“A rebel captain named Shivaji, son of another captain of Adilshah, named Shahji, does not obey his father. He has molested the [Portuguese] territory of the North. This has compelled us to maintain eighty soldiers in Chaul during winter to have a watch in camps as well as in Korlai.”<sup>1140</sup>

Various sources aver that Shivaji came by a great quantity of wealth in Kalyan.<sup>1141</sup> Cosme da Guarda says Shivaji attacked Kalyan most unexpectedly, collected vast loot there and advanced upon Bhiwandi where he not only plundered the inhabitants but also excavated vast quantities of buried wealth

that was not known even to them.<sup>1142</sup> Tavernier gives a similar account.<sup>1143</sup>

From a culling of information provided by the various sources cited above, Shivaji's movements during the North Konkan campaign may be summed up as follows:

August 1657: Raghunathpant advances upon the Siddi and captures some of his territory.

3<sup>rd</sup> October 1657: Shivaji leaves Rajgad, descends into the Konkan via the Telbaila Pass, captures Chaul and proceeds northwards.

October 1657: The Mughal *faujdar* of Junnar advances beyond Kalyan and kills the Adilshahi commander of the region, Habash Khan. He then engages with about two hundred Maratha horsemen, sustains heavy losses and returns to Junnar.

24<sup>th</sup> October 1657: Dadaji Bapuji captures Kalyan and Bhiwandi. Shivaji reaches Kalyan from Chaul and makes necessary appointments and arrangements for purposes of administration.

5<sup>th</sup> January 1658: Shivaji invests Mahuli.

9<sup>th</sup> January 1658: Mahuli is captured.

14<sup>th</sup> January 1658: Shivaji reaches Rajgad.

The Sanskrit *Shivakavya*, which describes this North Konkan campaign more elaborately than does any other source, only makes mention of one fort - Mahuli. However, Shivaji had captured many more forts at that time. The *Alamgirnama* states the following:<sup>1144</sup>

“Towards the end of Shah Jahan’s reign, because Muhammad Adil Khan fell mortally ill the dominion of Bijapur was beset with rebellions. Muhammad Adil Khan therefore summoned his nobleman in the Konkan, Mullah Ahmad, to Bijapur, due to which the forts of the region, for want of cavalry and infantry which could defend them, fell vacant. Taking advantage of this situation, Shivaji began his rebellion and, gathering people of his own clan around himself, first usurped some forts by guile and then began stretching out his hand over others that were rendered vulnerable by the paucity or lack of defenders, equipment and supplies. Muhammad Adil Khan died and was succeeded by his young son, Ali Adil Khan. Defections, treachery and anarchy reigned supreme in Bijapur because he had no knowledge of administration. He was thus unable to take cognizance of this situation [i.e., Shivaji’s incursion in North Konkan]. With increasing boldness Shivaji took possession of all the forts in that region, amassed all the means necessary for rebellion, and relying on the support provided by the hills, forests and forts, girded up for a fully-fledged revolt. He constructed new forts and, along with the old ones, fully equipped as many as forty old and new forts and virtually declared war on Ali Adil Khan.”

Reference to this old Nizamshahi territory that was captured by Shivaji also figures in the *Shivabharat*. That work quotes the Adilshah’s speech just before he sent Afzal Khan against Shivaji in 1659, the relevant part of which is as follows:[1145](#)

“That independent, audacious, and insolent Shivaji, in total disregard of us as well as the Mughals, has taken forcible possession of that [old] Nizamshahi territory – replete with mountains, forests and mines

– which I had given to Aurangzeb for securing a treaty.”

In short, Shivaji must have captured about twenty-five or thirty forts in the North Konkan region that had once been part of the Nizamshahi Sultanate, including those of Mahuli, Lohagad, Tung, Tikona, Visapur, Songad, Karnala, Tala and Ghosala, among others. The entire Nizamshahi Konkan (i.e. the area of the Konkan that had once belonged to the Nizamshah), except the Siddi's possessions of the fort of Janjira and the areas around and including Danda-Rajpuri, thus came under Shivaji's control. Except for the Mahuli fort, there is no way of determining the precise manner in which the other forts came into his possession. But it is very likely that quite a few of them had been in an abandoned state, while some might have had few defenders and had capitulated without any real resistance. The fact that an important fort like Mahuli had been won in a matter of a mere five days reflects the degree of neglect.

The Rohida fort had not passed into Shivaji's possession at least till 1656.<sup>1146</sup> However, the fort was in his possession when Shivaji signed a treaty with the Mughal commander, Mirza Raja Jai Singh, in 1665.<sup>1147</sup> No source sheds any light whatsoever on when it came under his control. But it is most likely that it had been taken over by Shivaji at about this same time, i.e. about 1657 or 1658, because he had practically declared a war on the Adilshah and, as the territory around Rohida was already in his possession, it is hardly likely that he would have allowed Rohida to remain in the Adilshah's control longer than was inevitable.

Once he had assumed control of the forts in North Konkan, Shivaji must have had to conduct repairs, equip and garrison the forts and otherwise make them combat-worthy. This enterprise on Shivaji's part invited the notice and action of the Mughal officials in the region. In a letter dated 11<sup>th</sup> March 1659 in Marathi, written to Dinkarrao, *Deshmukh* of the Wankhed

sub-division of the Konkan, by a certain Mughal nobleman (name not known), it is stated:<sup>1148</sup>

“It has come to the notice of the Nawab Sahib from Ahmad Khan’s letter that the rebel Shivaji is commandeering cattle and other property belonging to the people and is in the process of moving cash, valuables and other goods from the region to the Mahuli fort. This has been causing damage to the territory and nuisance to the public. As soon as you receive this letter, you will warn the officials, *deshmukhs* and residents of the region that they are to permit nobody to remove anything to the fort. Post guards on the stocks of grain, fodder and hay. We are in the meantime also dispatching a suitable force at the earliest. Whoever serves Imperial interests will be honoured and rewarded. Let this be a warning.”

It is clear from the letter that Ahmad Khan and Nawab were Mughal officials. The former was probably an officer in the Junnar area, and ‘Nawab’ was perhaps a senior *mansabdar* in the Deccan province, while the author of the letter was his subordinate. Like this Dinkarao, it is likely that other *deshmukhs* in the Konkan had also received similar letters. However, none are extant to positively make that inference.



## SHIVAJI'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ADILSHAHİ SULTANATE, 1657-58

- Boundary of Shivaji's Dominion, June 1657.
- Expansion in Shivaji's Dominion till the beginning of 1658.
- Mughal Boundary.
- Portuguese Boundary.
- [Yellow Box] 600 meters & above.

North

Scale : 1 cm = 25 km  
0      25      50 km

#### AURANGZEB'S LETTER TO SHIVAJI (1658)

Aurangzeb crossed the Narmada River on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1658 on his northward march.<sup>1149</sup> Soon thereafter, Murad Bakhsh joined him from Gujarat and together, at Ujjain on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1658, they defeated a force under Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan that had been sent by Dara Shukoh.

Before Aurangzeb had crossed the Narmada River, Shivaji had sent him a letter sometime in February 1658, expressing his repentance over the ‘crimes’ he had committed, and had simultaneously written to a Mughal official called Krishnaji Bhaskar.<sup>1150</sup> These two letters are not traceable, but Aurangzeb’s reply thereto dated 24<sup>th</sup> February 1658 is. This reply was not sent on the date mentioned but was dispatched after the battle of Ujjain, as is evident from a postscript to the reply. Shivaji is here addressed, among others, by the epithet ‘*Muti-ul Islam*’, which means “one who is obedient to Islam”, and is not in any way suggestive of Shivaji’s acceptance of or favourable inclination to Islam! This used to be the manner in which Hindu recipients of *farmans* were generally addressed – a trifle contemptuously perhaps – by their Muslim correspondents.<sup>1151</sup> The letter reads:<sup>1152</sup>

“Your petition sent with your envoy, Raghunath Pandit, was placed before us along with the letter addressed to Krishna Pandit Bhaskar.<sup>1153</sup>

“Your offences are too numerous to merit our forgiveness, but you have expressed a desire for rendering loyal service to us and are repenting over your misdeeds. Because our court is not oblivious to such sincerity, your crimes have been forgiven on the condition of your commitment to adhere to the

straight and undeviating path of service and obedience in future. Loyalty is a means of attaining fortune. Strive hard to manifest it.

“You have requested that if you are granted all the territories of your *watan*, along with the territories and forts in the Konkan, after the old Nizamshahi territory which now belongs to Adil Khan comes into possession of the imperial officials, you would send Sona Pandit<sup>1154</sup> to our court, and, once you receive our letter granting your request, you would assign an officer with a contingent of not less than 500 troopers to our service, besides co-operating with Imperial officials for protection of our borders, and would not allow the dust of rebellion to rise in the land in any way.

“Therefore, the order is:

“You will conduct yourself in strict accordance with your assurance. Immediately upon receipt of this letter, send us a written request with Sonaji stating your demands and requests, so that they may be granted. Consider this as a strict warning to you not to stray from the royal road of loyalty.

“Be it known that our grace rests upon you.

Written on 24<sup>th</sup> February 1658.

“[Post Script] Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan were at Ujjain with a force of 25,000 troopers and a large park of artillery. When they learned of our advance to 6 *kos* from Ujjain, they insolently came forward to give us battle, but they were soundly beaten, lost five or six thousand troopers, and fled away. Their camp with its entire treasury, artillery, elephants and other

valuables was plundered. Thus, thanks be to God, a great victory was attained.

“By the grace of God, we shall soon achieve new victories, so that the wishes of all loyalists and well-wishers would be fulfilled and the enemies will experience frustration.[1155](#)

“You should experience greater joy and exultation by these happy tidings and adhere to the straight path of loyalty and hope for rewards in proportion to your fidelity.”

The territory that Shivaji had brought under his control in the Konkan had been in the possession of the Nizamshah and was annexed by the Adilshah in conformity with the terms of the treaty of 1636 between himself and the Mughals. After the new treaty of 1657, this region was actually to be delivered to the Mughals. But it was amply clear by now that the Adilshah was not likely to honour the commitment. In any case, Shivaji had by this time captured most of that territory, in spite of which Shivaji sends a written request to Aurangzeb to let him keep it!

#### **SHAHJI DENIES ONUS FOR SHIVAJI'S ACTIONS (1658)**

In 1655, Shivaji had been in charge, as a representative of Shahji, of the Pune, Chakan and Indapur *parganas* as well as the seven Mavals (including Hirdas Maval, Velvand Khore, Gunjan Maval, Kanad Khore, Mose Khore, Muthe Khore and Paud Khore) out of his father's *mukasas*. The Supe Pargana in the same region was also part of Shahji's grants and was administered by his appointee, Sambhaji Mohite.

Shivaji captured Jawali in January 1656. In September of the same year, he forcefully took control of the Supe pargana

from Sambhaji Mohite. In 1657, he appropriated much of the old Nizamshahi territory held by the Adilshah. In other words, Shivaji had practically declared war on the Adilshahi since the end of 1656. Because Shahji was an Adilshahi nobleman, it may logically be assumed that Shivaji had also all but set aside his father's authority from the year 1656. It is pertinent to note that the most recent extant letter written by Shahji concerning the affairs of his *mukasas* in the Pune region is dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1655.<sup>1156</sup> Not a single letter written by him about his holdings in that region after that date has come to light.

Under such circumstances, therefore, it was necessary for Shahji to deny all responsibility for Shivaji's actions. Ali Adilshah had accepted the position and had agreed not to hold Shahji accountable, as is seen from the following *farman*.

Ali Adilshah to Shahji<sup>1157</sup>

27<sup>th</sup> May 1658

"Be it known to Maharaja Farzand Shahji Bhosale:

"Of late, an apprehension has been created in your mind that the blame for the treason and arrogance of Shivaji Bhosale might be laid on your head. However, let it be known to you that we are fully cognizant of his improper expressions and actions. You are therefore wholly unconnected with them. The responsibility of his transgressions and crimes rests upon him alone. So keep your mind completely composed in this regard.

"Our grace rests upon you in greater measure than in the past. As a token thereof, we are bestowing on you your entire previous *jagir*. There would be no change therein. We also command that the chieftains in the vicinity of the Bangalore Fort should maintain relations with you.

“Any person expressing anything adverse about you will be subject to our wrath.”

Several other supporting references may be cited for the fact that Shahji had disowned all responsibility for Shivaji's actions. The *Shivabharat* recounts a speech attributed to Ali Adilshah just before Afzal Khan left Bijapur on his campaign against Shivaji in 1659 in which there appears the following remark: “*His father Shahji, too, is incapable of instructing that arrogant person [i.e. Shivaji]*”.<sup>1158</sup> This suggests that Shahji had been exonerated from all responsibility for his son's actions. The Portuguese governors, Francesco de Melo de Castro and Antonio da Souza Coutinho, in their letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1658 to their king, state that “Shivaji... does not obey his father.”<sup>1159</sup>

Manucci states in his *Storia do Mogor*:<sup>1160</sup>

“Shivaji... lived in the family territory while his father was at the court, and began to realize money without sending any to his father. Next he began to enlist men and attack the lands of Bijapur in all directions, giving no heed either his father or the king. The latter complained to Shahji of Shivaji's temerity, and Shahji replied that his Majesty might act as he pleased. His son neither obeyed him nor remitted to him revenues of their lands, and had already declared himself a rebel to the crown.”

The A.K.Chronicle says Shahji had informed the Adilshah that he had disowned his wife and son, that they do not obey him and that the Adilshah was free to deal with them as he deemed fit.<sup>1161</sup> While it is most unlikely that both Manucci as well as the author of the chronicle were privy to precisely what Shahji had conveyed to the Adilshah, it is not difficult to surmise that Shahji had completely denied all accountability for his son's actions because Shivaji was fully engaged in open hostilities against the Adilshah while Shahji was still in service of the same potentate. It must have been owing to such an

inference that the both Manucci and the author of the A.K.Chronicle have imagined what they state, and it is evident from the letter reproduced above, that they were quite correct.

#### THE BEGINNINGS OF SHIVAJI'S NAVY

Shivaji was able to command a coastline almost a hundred kilometers long because of his acquisition of territory in the North Konkan. It did not take him long to realize how crucial sea power was for the security and prosperity of his kingdom. The Siddi was a thorn in his side. The Janjira Fort that the Siddi controlled was impregnable. It was virtually impossible to take that fort, and thereby neutralize the menace of the Siddi, unless supplies reaching the garrison by sea were blockaded. Shivaji needed a strong naval force not only to restrict and cut that supply line, but also to protect his own territory from the Siddi's depredations. A strong navy was also required to protect merchant ships and ports in order to secure and enhance revenue incomes derived from maritime trade and customs duty at ports of call.

Very soon after the capture of the so-called Nizamshahi Konkan, Shivaji commenced building warships at Kalyan, Bhiwandi and Pen. However, these places were not strictly suitable as naval bases. Kalyan and Bhiwandi are located on a creek almost a hundred kilometers from the open sea. The Portuguese controlled the fort of Vasai at the seaward end of the creek. Pen, likewise, is situated about 40 km from the sea on the banks of the Bhogavati River which flows into the Dharamtar creek. The Karanje Island at the seaward end of the creek was occupied by the Portuguese, who had built a fort there. It was thus a simple matter for the Portuguese to regulate all maritime traffic to and from Kalyan, Bhiwandi and Pen. The fact that Shivaji commissioned shipbuilding at those places in spite of this obvious disadvantage implies that he enjoyed control of no other suitable port at the time. In addition, his activity was beset by another disadvantage. He had employed Portuguese

ship-builders and sundry craftsmen in his dockyards. Apparently, the lack of expertise among the then-available indigenous craftsmen required for building warships had initially forced him to depend upon Portuguese workmen. The Portuguese Captain of Vasai forwarded information about Shivaji's shipbuilding venture at Kalyan, Bhiwandi and Pen to the governors at Goa. Thereupon, a policy regarding Shivaji's naval activities was formulated in Goa on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1659 at a meeting of the state advisory council. This happens to be the earliest extant reference to Shivaji's maritime enterprise. The minutes of that meeting are as follows:[1162](#)

“Governor Francesco de Melo de Castro and Antonio da Souza Coutinho were present when a meeting of the members of the Advisory Council ... was convened in the Hall of the Goa Fort on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1659, at which the subject was stated that:

“A letter received from Shivaji Raja states that:

“He is at variance with the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri and the Abyssinians in that port. When he had sent to the frontier some horsemen and infantry against the Siddi, the captains at Chaul and Vasai supplied provisions and gave all manner of help to the Siddi. The Abyssinians were therefore living there without worry. This is detrimental to the amity this administration enjoys with Shivaji. He is aware that they [the governors at Goa] do not know the captains at Chaul and Vasai are acting against him. The governors ought to write to the captains that they should maintain good relations with Shivaji and stop helping the Abyssinians.

“The matter was discussed with due consideration of all necessary allied issues and the above mentioned members of the council of advisors unanimously concluded that:

“The captains, Antonio de Melo de Castro and Dom Francisco de Castel Branco, of Vasai and Chaul respectively, should be sent letters according to Shivaji’s request. It is necessary to maintain amiable relations with him because he is powerful, has control over Kalyan, Bhiwandi and the entire Konkan [in the region], and can cause immense harm to Portuguese interests. A second letter should be written instructing the captains to ostensibly stop giving help to the Abyssinians of Danda, but permitting them at their discretion to continue doing so, but so secretly that neither should anyone get wind of it nor make Shivaji aware of it.

“The governors concurred with this.

“In the course of the same meeting, the governors directed that an extract from the letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June received from the captain of Vasai, Antonio de Melo de Castro, be read out. He had conveyed thereby:

“Shivaji has an armada of 20 sanguíeis<sup>1163</sup> at Bhiwandi, Kalyan and Pen for the purpose of fighting the Siddi of Danda. He has entrusted responsibility thereof to Rui Leitão Viegas, and has ordered him to seek permission of the Portuguese for transportation of timber required for its completion as also for securing an exit to the open sea via [our] ports. That captain has replied that such permission had to be sought from the governors, and that till such permission had not been received, he [i.e. the captain] was entirely unconcerned with the matter.

“However, [it is the opinion of that captain that] the exit of the armada needs to be prevented for very substantial and valid reasons. One of the reasons is

that [if the exit is not prevented] it will give rise to a pirate at home. It is not certain what gains would be made by it if this armada of 20 ships emerges [to sail on the open sea]. If it succeeds by capturing some ships, its strength will increase each time. Moreover, the amiable relations we have with him are not so strong or close that we can afford to not be apprehensive or wary about him. He may well have other secret motives along with the professed one of dealing with the Siddi of Danda, and that would be very prejudicial for the island of Sashti [near Mumbai]. It is the river that protects the island. Because of the readying of his fighting ships, that protection would be rendered inconsequential.

“The second reason is that seafarers have been employed by him on regular salaries, and because they have thereby become bound to him, we are unable to find even a single sailor for our fleet. That he is employing Europeans is even worse.

“The governors should urgently direct the captain about the course of action after giving these matters serious thought.

“It is not enough merely to block all of his [Shivaji’s] routes. The power of the [Portuguese] State is limited, and we face several threats. For this reason, the governors should order the commissioning of 10 or 12 warships in Vasai. Whenever these are not needed on active duty, they could be utilized to provide escort to merchant fleets. Orders should also be issued to strengthen the forts [at Vasai]. This would instill and ensure due respect and apprehension among all.

“All these reasons aside, it would be enough to accord due consideration to news through reliable persons from Surat regarding the certain intention of the Mughal Emperor of attacking us this year. Irrespective of whether this news is true or false, all-pervasive caution can never be misconceived. [The narration of the Vasai captain’s report ends here.]

“All the members gave due consideration to the report submitted by the Captain of Vasai and unanimously concluded – with the governors concurring – that:

“A letter should be written to the Antonio de Melo de Castro that he is not to permit Shivaji’s above mentioned sanguçeis to sail down the River or make an exit from the Vasai creek. If Shivaji makes an attempt to do so, all necessary resistance must be offered to defeat such attempt. If and when Shivaji writes to the captain seeking an exit for his armada, he should be informed that he [the captain] does not have permission of the [Portuguese] government to do so, and that permitting the passage of non-Portuguese vessels would be a novel thing to do [i.e. it is without precedent]. The captain should secretly impede the transportation of timber and other material necessary for finishing the sanguçeis. Since it is necessary to prevent the exit of the sanguçeis being built at Pen, some duly manned galiots should be kept in readiness at Mazgaon, Mumbai and Karanje in order to move in and block their movement. The expenses incurred for this exercise should be borne by those people because the [Portuguese] king will be served and their own towns and property would be protected. If they are reluctant to incur and meet this expenditure, or are not in a position to afford it, they should be given money from the [Portuguese] royal

treasury. For, it is absolutely vital that Shivaji's armada does not reach the open sea."

Not too much later, the governors at Goa, Francisco de Melo de Castro and Antonio da Souza Coutinho, mentioned Shivaji's enterprise in a letter they wrote to their king on 16<sup>th</sup> August 1659. The relevant portion thereof reads as follows:[1164](#)

"One of the sons of the rebel Adilshahi nobleman, Shahji, has captured territory in the vicinity of Vasai and Chaul. He is powerful. So it has become necessary for us to exercise greater caution and vigilance. He has built many warships in the Kalyan and Panvel areas of the Vasai region. We have ordered the captain at Vasai to prohibit their exit to the sea. The emergence of this new affair at a time when we are threatened by possible trouble from the Dutch is no mean matter."

The captain of Vasai had assigned João de Salazar de Vasconcelos the task of inducing the Portuguese and Topaz craftsmen employed on his ship building facilities by Shivaji to leave his work and go over to the Portuguese side. He performed the task successfully. A certificate issued on 30<sup>th</sup> September 1659 by the captain of Vasai reads as follows:[1165](#)

"I, Captain of the Vasai fort and town and territories of Asheri, Manori and others within that jurisdiction, Antonio de Melo de Castro, certify that:

"Shivaji, who controls the Bhiwandi and Kalyan regions in the Konkan up to the Creek, had been readying 20 sanguiceis at Kalyan and Pen under the guise of his intention to blockade the Siddi of Danda. Such a thing has never been witnessed in the land and is a disgrace to the military prowess of the

[Portuguese] king. That armada cannot reach the open sea except through our rivers and creeks. That Gentoo [i.e. Hindu, Shivaji] would have waxed in strength with the help of this armada to cause great ruin to the towns in Sashti Island, and would have used captured vessels to build up larger armadas and become as powerful and fortunate on the seas as he is on land.

“Shivaji had been readying these sanguçeis relying upon the proficiency and expertise of Rui Leitão Viegas and his son, Fernão Viegas. The responsibility of management of the armada as well as that of the 300 Portuguese and Topaz workmen employed for the purpose was entrusted to him.

“The armada was entirely dependent on the support of Rui Leitão, his son and their Portuguese and Topaz helpers. In order to induce him to leave the service of that Gentoo [i.e. Shivaji], move to this town along with all the Christians in the gang and bring that armada to a complete standstill, I felt that it would be a foolproof and appropriate yet speedy and effective method to proffer the convenient reasons of service to God and king and thus bring them back onto the right path. The great advantage of doing this was that the [future] risk of damage and apprehension would have been averted, and these people would be back in the service of the [Portuguese] king at a time when we are faced with an acute shortage of manpower for our armada, which is ordered to be made battle-worthy in this town under the captaincy of Nuno de Melo de Silva for the protection of [our] Northern forts.

“I found only João de Salazar de Vasconcelos qualified to undertake and complete this important task. I therefore dispatched him to Kalyan in order to

hold talks with Rui Leitão and induce him and the others to return to the king's territory. He discharged that responsibility with such dedication and efficiency that all of those people accepted the advice and returned to this town.

“The work that João de Salazar de Vasconçelos performed in this respect is commendable.”

More details are contained in a statement Rui Leitão Viegas wrote on 7<sup>th</sup> October 1659 at Mumbai:[1166](#)

“I, Rui Leitão Viegas, state that:

“I was working at Kalyan in the service of Shivaji Raja along with many white and black Christians under me, and was engaged in the construction of 20 sanguiceis and other big ships at Pen and other ports. Shivaji had issued an order to impose a blockade on the Siddi of Danda from the seaward side with the help of this armada. João de Salazar de Vasconçelos came to Kalyan under orders from the captain of Vasai, Antonio de Melo de Castro, to communicate to me the great service that I would be performing for the [Portuguese] king and this State if I and the others in my gang were to flee to our country so as to impede the exit of that armada. This great service was for the master [the King of Portugal] whom I have always obeyed as a loyal subject. João de Salazar and I, together persuaded the others to leave Shivaji Raja's service and return in the [Portuguese] king's service as true Portuguese soldiers. They were about 340, more or less, white and black soldiers and more than 400 along with their families and servants some of whom had previously deserted and fled [Portuguese service]. All of these have now come over to this side. Twenty-five of them have since gone with my son,

Fernão Viegas Leitão, aboard a ship in Captain Nuno de Melo de Silva's armada. He [Fernão Viegas Leitão] is the captain of that ship.

"All this has been possible by incurring expense out of my property, and because of the industry, hard work and grave risk that João de Salazar undertook.

"By orders of the captain of Vasai, I have reached this Mumbai port to resist the European enemy [i.e. the Dutch] along with other white and black soldiers who fled with me."

There is no way of knowing the fate of the ships Shivaji was building after these Portuguese and Topaz craftsmen deserted. But it is certain that Shivaji's maritime enterprise did not come to a halt.

#### AURANGZEB'S LETTER TO SHIVAJI (1659)

After defeating Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan, Aurangzeb and Murad Bakhsh continued their march towards Delhi and vanquished Dara Shukoh at Samugarh on 29<sup>th</sup> May 1658. Thereafter, Aurangzeb detained his father, Shah Jahan, inside the Agra Fort, imprisoned Murad Bakhsh and enthroned himself at Delhi on 21<sup>st</sup> July 1658.

A letter sent by Aurangzeb to Shivaji around 20<sup>th</sup> April 1658 has been dealt with earlier. As informed in that letter, Shivaji had sent his envoy, Sonaji Vishwanath Dabir, to Aurangzeb along with a letter. The Jedhe Chronology records that Sonaji was sent to Delhi on 30<sup>th</sup> August 1658.<sup>1167</sup> Shivaji's letter sent to Aurangzeb at that time is not traceable but Aurangzeb's reply thereto is extant. It was as follows:<sup>1168</sup>

Aurangzeb to Shivaji

14<sup>th</sup> July 1659

“Be it known to Shivaji that:

“God has glorified our flag with victory and vanquished the enemies of the religion [Islam] so that religious performances, purity and justice may be enhanced and injustice exterminated.

“We made the throne resplendent by our accession on Sunday, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1659.[1169](#)

“The petition you sent with your servant[1170](#) has passed, at this auspicious time, under our eyes and the contents noted. Remaining steadfast on the path of loyalty and service to this court, you should work in obedience to Amir-ul Umara [Shayista Khan] – who has been appointed governor of the Deccan – and not deviate from his advice.[1171](#) Strive to diligently perform the tasks you have undertaken to perform and remain hopeful that your requests will be granted.

“The important tasks we had in our mind have all been completed, thanks be to God. The state has reached a position of stability and there is no need to worry for any reason. By the grace of God, the rebellious Be-Shukoh [i.e. Dara Shukoh] has received the fruits of his own deeds and arrested along with his family at the frontier of Bhakkar.[1172](#) If Allah so wills, the roots of the ungrateful Shuja [Aurangzeb's younger brother] would also be dug out soon.

“Bearing in mind that our grace rests upon you, continue to hold the expectation of Imperial favours according to good service. We have ordered a robe of honour [to be sent herewith] to honour you.”

## OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST PHASE OF SHIVAJI'S CAREER

It could be said that the first phase of Shivaji's career ended by the time he had to contend with the threat posed by the Adilshahi general, Afzal Khan – a threat he handled so dexterously that its success may well be regarded as a tribute to his astuteness, courage, sense of timing and generalship. Shivaji's conquest of the North Konkan was complete by January 1658, while Afzal Khan marched against him in May 1659. There is no evidence that he had undertaken a major campaign in this interval of about fifteen months. It is most likely that he had been preoccupied with the administration of the newly conquered territory, strengthening and equipping his forts against any possible future military threat from the Adilshah and the Mughals, building a new naval force and other similar tasks.

The territory that Shivaji had appropriated during this initial phase may be divided into four broad regions: 1) Areas within Shahji's *mukasas* in the Pune region which Shivaji controlled as his father's representative, 2) The area captured from Chandrarao More, 3) The territory captured from the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri and 4) The areas captured from the Adilshah over and above those captured from Chandrarao and the Siddi. Shivaji did not need to give battle for the acquisition of the territory that was part of his father's *mukasas*. His campaign against the Chandrarao was effectually an invasion of the Adilshahi, but it can be said to have been of an indirect nature because all available records show that the Chandrarao himself had disowned suzerainty of the Adilshah. Moreover, when Shivaji moved against the Chandrarao, the attention and resources of the Adilshahi were directed towards the Mughal invasion of the Qutbshahi, and even troops had been assigned to group at the Qutbshahi borders. Few in the Adilshahi had any interest in the first place to run to the aid of the Chandrarao and, moreover, their forces were at the time engaged elsewhere. The situation regarding the territory held by the Siddi was not

too different. The Siddi, like the Chandrarao, was not entirely subservient to the Adilshah. The situation in the North Konkan, however, was quite different when Shivaji annexed it. The authority of the Adilshah over the region was defined and firm. But a fluid situation emerged when Shah Jahan fell seriously ill immediately after the Mughal-Adilshahi treaty – a situation that Shivaji exploited to the hilt to capture that territory. At that time, too, the possibility of either the Adilshah or the Mughals doing anything substantial for the protection of that territory remained bleak.

To sum up, it may be said that in the initial phase of his career, Shivaji annexed only such territory where the source of authority was uncertain, or in the protection of which no major power was likely to strive to any significant extent. A good strategist wins battles without engaging in actual combat or, if engage he must, in circumstances most favourable to him. Sound statesmanship, likewise, prepares the most favourable setting for the imminent battle, or grasps the advantage offered by prevailing favourable circumstances. The more advantageous the background, the greater is the possibility of victory with minimum casualties. All the above campaigns that Shivaji undertook were launched on the backdrop of conditions extremely favourable to him. This is not to say that the background was prepared entirely by him in every case, but he had seized every opportunity that presented itself, and had planned his strategy within the prevailing framework. This is one of the principal reasons why he could annex so sizeable a territory with relatively few losses. There is, of course, no extant source that could tell us precisely what the scale of Maratha casualties was during this period, but considering the fact that all these campaigns were successfully completed in remarkably short spans of time, it would not be incorrect to presume that these were the bare minimum that might have been expected. In that sense, he can be said to have been amazingly astute and pragmatic in his ability of sensing and seizing opportunities.



## The Elimination of Afzal Khan

### APPOINTMENT OF AFZAL KHAN AGAINST SHIVAJI

Shivaji had waged an open war against the Adilshahi by capturing (in 1657-58) the Nizamshahi territory which had been ceded to the Adilshah by the treaty of 1636. However, the Adilshah was at that juncture distracted as much by internal feuds as Aurangzeb's invasion. He was therefore not in a position to deal with the lesser threat posed by Shivaji. Aurangzeb set out northwards for Agra on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1658 with his forces for staking his claim to the Mughal throne, and crossed the Narmada River on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1658.<sup>1173</sup> Internecine conflicts in the Adilshahi abated towards the end of 1658. Now freed somewhat from the internal and external crises, Ali Adilshah embarked upon a campaign, that he had been forced to postpone, to deal with Shivaji's incursions. In summary, what the *Tarikh-i Ali* says is as follows:<sup>1174</sup>

When the late King [Muhammad Adilshah] fell ill, the banished infidel [*Kafir*], Shivaji Bhosale, who was the virtual mentor of malevolent Satan in trickery and deceitfulness, plundered the entire province of Konkan and captured the fort of Rahir [Rayri]. When the King died, that malicious infidel [Shivaji] regarded that news as more joyous than the tidings of one's victory and captured [some more] forts in that province [Konkan]. He was extending the hand of repression and injustice like a greedy and hungry dog, that does not feel satisfied with the bone it gets and wants more, and was oppressing the faithful [Muslims] who were engrossed in prayers to God.

After the King [Ali Adilshah] received this news — because he thought that [the tree of] the observance of Muhammadi faith [Islam] would not bloom without the water of his bloodthirsty sword and the thorny bushes of infidelity and polytheism [i.e. Hinduism] would not burn without the fire of the enemy-consuming sword — appointed Afzal Khan with 10,000 horsemen with orders to fan the flames of anger and melt the balance of Shivaji's life in the crucible of destruction and to trample the harvest of his life under the hooves of horses....

At the time of giving leave to Afzal Khan to depart, the King had instructed him that even if that black-faced infidel [Shivaji] sent a deceitful letter, he [the Khan] must not listen to his false words of flattery and do nothing but to fling the fire of death on the harvest of his life and pull down the fort of his life.

The above passage leaves little doubt that Ali Adilshah had ordered Afzal Khan to kill Shivaji. The *Shivabharat*, the ballad of Adnyandas and Sabhasad Chronicle say that Ali Adilshah's order and Afzal Khan's intention was to capture Shivaji alive.<sup>1175</sup> However, the *Tarikh-i Ali*, being an official history of Ali Adilshah's reign, is more reliable on this point.

Both Adnyandas and Sabhasad say Muhammad Adilshah's widow, the queen mother who was generally known as Badi Sahiba, had called an assembly of Adilshahi generals in order to assign one against Shivaji. However, none was willing to undertake the campaign. Nevertheless, according to the Sabhasad Chronicle, Afzal Khan said, 'Who is this Shivaji? I will not even need to dismount to arrest and bring him here.'<sup>1176</sup> Adnyandas' ballad says that at the time when Ali Adilshah ordered his generals to go and arrest Shivaji, Afzal Khan

accepted the challenge.<sup>1177</sup> The A. K.Chronicle and Fatanji's ballad also say Afzal Khan accepted the challenge and set out from Bijapur.<sup>1178</sup>

However, it seems that this dramatic incident is imaginary; neither the *Shivabharat* nor the *Tarikh-i Ali* corroborates it. However Ali Adilshah was only 20 years old at the time.<sup>1179</sup> As such, the decision to send an army to deal with Shivaji is most likely to largely have been his mother's.

Different sources give varying figures for the strength of the force dispatched under Afzal Khan's command.<sup>1180</sup> But again, the *Tarikh-i Ali* being an official history of Ali Adilshah's reign, the figure given in it, viz. 10,000 cavalry, is the most reliable.

According to the *Shivabharat* noblemen like Ambar Khan, Yaqt Khan, Musa Khan, Hasan Khan Pathan, Ranadaula Khan's son Ranadaula Khan (the younger), Ankush Khan, Siddi Hilal, Ghorpade, Naikji Pandhare, Naikji Kharade, Kalyanji Yadav (or Jadhav), Mambaji Bhosale, Rajaji Ghatge and Kate were assigned to serve under the Khan.<sup>1181</sup> A *farman* issued by Ali Adilshah shows that some soldiers belonging to the garrison of the Khelna fort were ordered to join in the campaign against Shivaji.<sup>1182</sup>

#### **AFZAL KHAN'S ANCESTRY**

No reliable information is available about Afzal Khan's ancestry. However, what little we can glean from the scanty sources, it seems he was born to a family of commoners. Adnyandas, in his narration of the meeting between Afzal Khan and Shivaji, has the hero of his ballad say to the Khan, "I know the caste whence you derived your birth. You are the son of a

*bhatarni* (one who cooks and sells foodstuffs on the streets).<sup>1183</sup> The *Shivakavya* has Shivaji say to the Khan (12:74), “Oh, you vile, despicable man, son of a woman who sold food on the streets, you do not even know who your father is!”<sup>1184</sup> The Chitragupta Chronicle too, attributes similar remarks about the Khan to Shivaji.<sup>1185</sup> Whether such an exchange really occurred between the two can only be conjectured and is most likely to be a figment of the poets’ imaginations. One of the most reliable sources, the *Shivabharat*, does not mention it at all; nor does Fatanji. However, the Khan was known as a *bhatari* at least to the Mughals, for Aurangzeb, in a letter he wrote to Shah Jahan in the year 1656, states that a *bhatari* by the name of Afzal Khan was *sarnaubat* (commander-in-chief) of Ranadaula Khan and that, since the Adilshah regarded him as his son, he had appointed him to very senior rank.<sup>1186</sup> *Bhatari* is a caste among Indian Muslims.<sup>1187</sup> It is quite likely that Afzal Khan belonged to it or his parents worked as *bhataris*.

#### AFZAL IN THE SERVICE OF RANADAULA KHAN

Aurangzeb’s letter (cited above) mentions that Afzal Khan was the commander-in-chief of Ranadaula Khan’s contingent. Letters dated 21<sup>st</sup> August 1638 and 31<sup>st</sup> March 1639, sent by Ranadaula Khan to the officials of the Wai Pargana, bear remarks, ‘by permission of Afzal Khan’.<sup>1188</sup> While both are stamped with Ranadaula Khan’s seal, they were sent *by the permission of Afzal Khan*. This suggests that, in 1638-39, Afzal Khan was in the service of Ranadaula Khan and had worked as his trusted official. Perhaps soon after 1638-39, Afzal Khan was awarded independent appointment, as is evident from a letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> October 1645 written by him to officials of the Shirale Pargana in his capacity as *mukasdar*.<sup>1189</sup>

## MILITARY ACHIEVEMENTS

The *Muhammadnama* says Afzal Khan had participated in the campaigns launched by the Adilshah in 1637-38 for capture of principalities like Shire, Basavapatna , Chiknayakanhalli, Belur, Tumkur and Gingee in the Karnatak.<sup>1190</sup> The *Shivabharat*, *Shivakavya*, Fatanji as well as rock inscriptions Afzal Khan himself ordered, say he had participated in the Karnatak campaigns.<sup>1191</sup> Aurangzeb's letter to Shah Jahan (cited above) states that, in 1656, when Aurangzeb invaded the Qutbshahi, the Adilshah had dispatched an army under command of Afzal Khan for the Qutbshah's succour.<sup>1192</sup> Afzal Khan had fought in battles when Aurangzeb invaded Adilshahi territory the following year.<sup>1193</sup>

In 1658 Ali Adilshah appointed Afzal Khan as the *subadar* of the entire Karnatak province in response to Shahji's report that the administration of the Karnatak province was in a state of disarray and that the territory would be lost unless a governor was appointed.<sup>1194</sup> That Afzal Khan had been so appointed and dispatched with a suitable force, is also stated in *farmans* sent separately to the Desai of Gadag Pargana (12<sup>th</sup> February 1658), Koneti Nayak (16<sup>th</sup> May 1658) and Kanthirava Narasaraja of Mysore (also 16<sup>th</sup> May 1658).<sup>1195</sup> It seems therefore that Afzal Khan was *subadar* of the Karnatak at least from January to 16<sup>th</sup> May 1658.

## PERSONALITY OF AFZAL KHAN

A Marathi letter sent by Afzal Khan to the *mokadam* of Afzalpur<sup>1196</sup> alias Mahidiri town on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1654 sheds light on the Khan's nature. The letter reads:<sup>1197</sup>

“We received your petition and have become aware of the situation. You have given a comprehensive account of the town, prevalent affairs

and your situation. We have comprehended the circumstances.

“You are a loyal *mokadam*. It would have been proper for you to report to us immediately when excessive tax was collected or when the officials committed any misdemeanour. Instead, you have chosen, at this crucial period of sowing the fields to go along with the peasants in a village of another *mukasdar* and are thus delaying the work of sowing. What is the meaning of your conduct?

“You know us well enough not to indulge in such folly. Such unwise behavior will not augur well for you.

“Feel re-assured in every respect and come to see us along with the peasants. We will hear from you all that has transpired, issue orders accordingly and send you back to your after due honours. Your well being lies in visiting us. Why should we countenance or justify the misdemeanor that may have been prosecuted by officials? We will teach him such a lesson that no other official will dare to repeat such transgression. We regard cultivators as our children. We will not subject them to slightest harassment. Only that which is fair shall be administered. We give you our solemn assurance in this respect.

“So, be re-assured and come to see us or, if you so desire, go to your village to oversee the cultivation. You may visit us at such later date as you deem fit.

“But if you do not do so and continue to remain away from your office, it will not be good for you. Take notice that we will dig you out of any place where you go, cut to pieces the one who gives you refuge along

with his family and extrude them through an oil mill.”

The last sentence of the letter shows how cruel Afzal Khan could be. The *Shivakavya* says Afzal Khan used to demolish Hindu temples and actually saw devotees in twain.<sup>1198</sup> This may well be exaggeration; however, it is sufficient to suggest that Afzal Khan was especially cruel. A Dutch letter sent on 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 from Vengurla says, “There was not much mourning about Afzal Khan’s death, as he was very cruel in all his deeds.”<sup>1199</sup> According to a legend, when Afzal Khan set out on the campaign against Shivaji, he slaughtered his 60 or 70 consorts because he was apprehensive about not returning alive.<sup>1200</sup> Even this legend gives a fair idea of his cruelty.

Afzal Khan could be as deceitful as he was cruel. As we have seen, he had Kasturi Ranga, the Chief of Sira, murdered during a meeting for talks of a treaty. Sabhasad and Adnyandas believed that it was Afzal Khan’s perfidy that led to the death of Sambhaji, Shivaji’s elder brother.<sup>1201</sup> According to the *Basatinus Salatin*, Afzal Khan also had a hand in the assassination of Khan Muhammad.<sup>1202</sup>

Afzal Khan’s religious fanaticism and bigotry were well known. We have already seen how a contemporaneous Portuguese letter says Afzal Khan had given orders for demolition of Hindu temples in Upper Chaul.<sup>1203</sup> A stone inscription found in Afzalpur describes him as ‘one who slaughters the rebels and infidels’ and ‘one who smashes idols’.<sup>1204</sup> The *Shivakavya* and *Shivabharat* too say Afzal Khan had demolished Hindu temples.<sup>1205</sup>

Despite his religious fanaticism, deceit and cruel disposition, it is clear from the following account in the *Basatin-*

*us Salatin* that he was also worldly wise.<sup>1206</sup>

The Mughal Emperor used to regard the sultans of the Deccan provinces as his tributaries. It seems that Muhammad Adilshah committed some acts, considered the exclusive prerogative of the Emperor,<sup>1207</sup> which irked Shah Jahan. He sent a letter to Muhammad Adilshah through his envoy calling upon him to cease doing these things, and threatening him of military action if he failed. Thereupon, the Adilshah sought the advice of his noblemen all of whom said they were prepared, nay anxious, for war. So he drafted a fitting – if not also indignant – reply to Shah Jahan and dispatched it with a messenger. On the evening of that day, the Adilshah was whiling away his time in entertainment in the company of his nobles in the upper floor of the Palace of Justice when, gazing out of the window, sounds of lilting music came to his ears. He turned to Afzal Khan who was standing near him and asked, ‘What is this city saying to us?’ and Afzal replied that there was contentment all around. After a little thought, the Adilshah inquired, ‘What will be the result if war broke out with the Emperor of Delhi?’ Afzal responded, ‘The sounds of contentment you are now hearing will turn into moans of despair; you will hear the lamentation of widows. You have the power to stop the enemy on the banks of the Narmada River, but thousands of soldiers will be killed and thousands of women will be widowed. As such, it will not be improper to contemplate the real need of the hour and accept the momentary setback.’ On reflection, Muhammad Adilshah ordered the interception of the messenger and retrieval of the letter he had sent to Shah Jahan. Another letter, replete in modesty, was re-drafted and dispatched.

While the veracity of this incident cannot be ascertained, it is enough to tell us about Afzal Khan’s practical sagacity.

Aurangzeb writes in the letter cited above that Muhammad Adilshah regarded Afzal Khan as his son. In Muhammad Adilshah's (and, later, in Ali Adilshah's) letters he is addressed by the prefix 'Farzand Rashid' (wise or learned son).<sup>1208</sup> In some letters written by Afzal Khan as well Muhammad and Ali Adilshah, he is styled as 'Afzal Khan Muhammadshahi', which shows that he took great pride in calling himself a servant of Muhammad Adilshah.<sup>1209</sup> The same suffix is also found in stone inscriptions in Shahpur, Afzalpur and Bijapur.<sup>1210</sup>

Not much information is available about Afzal Khan's age. We could, nonetheless, venture an estimate. As stated earlier, Ranadaula Khan's letter dated 21<sup>st</sup> August 1638 to the officials of the Wai Pargana, has a remark, 'by the permission of Afzal Khan.' This is the earliest available reference to Afzal Khan. He would have been at least in his twenties at the time. His son, Fazil Khan, held the *mukasa* of Dabhol in 1660.<sup>1211</sup> He was commandant of Parali Fort in 1662.<sup>1212</sup> He must have been at least 25 years old then. Therefore, we can say Afzal Khan must have been at least 40 years old in 1659 when he met Shivaji.

The *Shivabharat*, and the Sabhasad and A.K.Chronicles say he was large built.<sup>1213</sup>

Afzal Khan used a rather distinctive seal that contained a couplet. In translation, it reads: "If heaven on high exhibits [for comparison], the excellence of learned men and the excellence of Afzal [Khan] every angel instead of singing praises to Allah, will only say Afzal is *afzal* [i.e. more excellent]!"<sup>1214</sup>

At least three villages were named Afzalpur and one given the name Afzalnagar during Afzal Khan's lifetime. Among the three villages that were renamed Afzalpur, one was the Bavdhan village (in the Wai Pargana). However, Bavdhan did

not bear the name Afzalpur for too long; the name Bavdhan is prevalent even today. The second village that was named Afzalpur was a market place situated 3-4 km to the west of the Bijapur. We have no source to tell us the old name of this market place. Possibly, it was settled as Afzalpur and is known even today by that name. The village that was named Afzalnagar was in the Wai Pargana. According to available sources, it seems that Afzal Khan had renamed the Rahimatpur village (also in the Wai Pargana) as Afzalnagar. However, the name Afzalnagar soon went out of use. One more village, Mahidiri, the principal village of the Mahidiri Pargana, was renamed Afzalpur and is still known as such.

#### **AFZAL KHAN'S ARRIVAL AT WAI**

Afzal Khan set out from Bijapur sometime in May 1659, although no source gives the exact date.<sup>1215</sup> According to the Ballad of Adnyandas and the Sabhasad Chronicle he desecrated the idol of Bhavani at Tuljapur on his way.<sup>1216</sup> The *Shivakavya*, too, says Afzal Khan broke the idol of Tuljambika (i.e. Bhavani), but does not say that the vandalism was committed during his campaign against Shivaji.<sup>1217</sup> Even the *Shivabharat* mentions that he insulted Tulja (i.e. Bhavani) of Tuljapur, but does not provide details of the insult.<sup>1218</sup> Like the *Shivakavya*, the *Shivabharat* does not say he did so during the campaign. The A. K. Chronicle also mentions Afzal Khan had caused harm to Bhavani of Tuljapur, again without stating what constituted the act or that it was committed during the campaign against Shivaji.<sup>1219</sup> On the contrary, this chronicle suggests that Afzal Khan had committed the act at some time *before* he was dispatched against Shivaji. If a trustworthy source like the *Shivabharat* states that Afzal Khan had vandalized the temple, it must be true. However, a glance at the map will show that the Khan could not have gone to Tuljapur *on his way to Wai from Bijapur*.<sup>1220</sup> He could have visited Tuljapur before his campaign

against Shivaji; both Adnyandas and Sabhasad must have confused the chronology of events in their respective narratives.

The Ballad of Adnyandas says that on his way to Wai Afzal Khan broke the idol of Vithoba of Pandharpur.<sup>1221</sup> The Sabhasad Chronicle, too, states that the Khan, while on his way to Wai, caused harm to the God of Pandharpur but does not detail its nature.<sup>1222</sup> Even the *Shivakavya* says Afzal Khan, on his way to Wai, demolished the idol of Vitthal (Vithoba) and His temple in Pandharpur.<sup>1223</sup> The *Shivabharat* makes no mention at all of this incident. However, a *mahzar* dated 20<sup>th</sup> January 1668, about a dispute regarding the office of Kulkarni of Pandharpur, refers to the nuisance Afzal Khan had caused to the *Kshetra* (place of Hindu pilgrimage) of Pandharpur.<sup>1224</sup> From internal evidence of the document such as other incidents mentioned therein, their chronological sequence and the dates of some others given in it, it seems certain that Afzal Khan had caused some severe disruption in Pandharpur, which is indeed located on the route from Bijapur to Wai, sometime after 1<sup>st</sup> July 1657 or possibly during his campaign against Shivaji.

Adnyandas mentions names of some other Hindu religious places which were also vandalized by Afzal Khan.<sup>1225</sup> It is possible that Adnyandas was mistaken, was given to exaggeration or even imagined some incidents. Nevertheless, it seems that there is some substance in what he says. Even Cosme de Guarda writes that Afzal Khan had issued orders for demolishing several Hindu temples in order to humiliate Shivaji, who was a Hindu.<sup>1226</sup>

The reason why Afzal Khan went to Wai is not given in any other contemporaneous source except the *Shivabharat* which states:<sup>1227</sup>

“Shivaji won the invincible Jawali by capturing Bajirao, the insolent Krishnarao and their mighty father Chandrarao. At that time Chandrarao’s brother, Prataprao, fled in terror of Shivaji and went to the Adilshah. The conspirator Prataprao, who desired to obtain the title ‘Chandrarao’... served the Adilshah and won his approbation. The Adilshah told Chandrarao that he would seize the kingdom of Chandrarao protected by dense woods and forests from the Raja [Shivaji] and hand it over to him. Adilshah’s promise dispelled Chandrarao’s anguish and he assisted Afzal Khan in the campaign [against Shivaji]. Then that proud kinsman of Chandrarao [i.e. Prataprao] revealed the secret to Afzal Khan and took him to Wai. The mighty *yavana* [the Muslim, Afzal Khan], realizing that the possession of Jawali would ensure control over the entire Wai region as well as the Sahyadri and the sea coast, decided to first capture Jawali, and advanced quickly to Wai.”

Moreover, since he held the Wai Pargana as a *mukasa* from 1649, it is quite possible that Afzal Khan considered it as a convenient base for his operations against Shivaji.

No source provides the date of the Khan’s arrival at Wai. The *Shivabharat* says Shivaji went to Jawali *after* he learnt that Afzal Khan had arrived at Wai.<sup>1228</sup> We know from the Jedhe Chronology that Shivaji reached Jawali on 12<sup>th</sup> July 1659.<sup>1229</sup> This suggests that Afzal Khan had reached Wai at some time before that date.

## PRELIMINARY MOVES

*Ali Adilshah issues Farmans to the Deshmukhs of Maval*

With Afzal Khan's departure for Wai, Ali Adilshah issued *farmans* to the *deshmukhs* in the Mavals, ordering them to join Afzal Khan. The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1581:[1230](#)

"During the month of Vaishakha [12<sup>th</sup> April to 11<sup>th</sup> May 1659] the *Deshmukhs* of Maval received a *farman* from Ali Adilshah ordering them to join Afzal Khan. Kedarji Khopade was already with Afzal Khan. [After the *farman* was received] Khandaji son of Dharmoji Khopade Deshmukh of Taraf Utravali went to join Afzal Khan."

The *farman* mentioned in the entry in the Jedhe Chronology has not survived. However, another, which was received by Kanhoji Jedhe, Deshmukh of Bhor Taraf in Rohid Khore, a little after the first, is extant. It says:[1231](#)

Ali Adilshah to Kanhoji Jedhe  
16<sup>th</sup> June 1659

"Shivaji out of thoughtlessness and evil propensities has started troubling the followers of Islam residing in the Province of the Nizamshahi Konkan. He has also plundered them. He has captured many forts in the royal territories... Therefore, we have appointed Afzal Khan Muhammadshahi as the *subadar* of that province and have sent him with a formidable army.

"Obey the said Khan, discharge your duties as servant, and defeat and extirpate Shivaji. Do not give quarter to Shivaji's men; kill them wherever they may be or from whatever place they may come and thus manifest your devotion and service to the Court.

“Your loyalty will be recognized by the Court in accordance with the said Khan’s report and would earn for you promotion and prosperity.

“You should comply with whatever the above-mentioned Khan would write or tell you about the welfare of the state and the royal policies. Whoever does not obey the orders of the above-mentioned Khan will have to face severe consequences.”

The Jedhe Chronology records Kanhoji Jedhe’s reaction after he received the *farman*:<sup>1232</sup>

“Like the other *deshmukhs* of Maval, Kanhoji Naik<sup>1233</sup> Jedhe received a *farman* [issued by Ali Adilshah]. Kanhoji took the *farman* and went to Rajgad along with his five sons for a meeting with Shivaji. When Kanhoji showed the decree to Shivaji, he said: ‘Your neighbours Kedarji and Khandoji Khopade, *deshmukhs* of Taraf Utravali, have joined Afzal Khan. If you refuse to comply with the royal order, your *watan* might come in jeopardy. As your life might be in danger you too go [to the Khan].’ On this Kanhoji Naik said: ‘The solemn promise I had made to the Maharaja [Shahji] when he assigned me to your charge remains constant. I place my *watan* at your feet. My sons and I are ready to sacrifice our lives for you, come what may.’ Kanhoji Naik said this and took an oath. Shivaji asked him to renounce his *watan* (by taking up a handful of water and letting it flow to the ground, as a symbolic gesture of renouncement). Kanhoji did so and renounced his *watan*. Shivaji said [to Kanhoji], ‘Your family is at Kari. Take them to Talegaon.’ Kanhoji then asked Dadaji Krishna,<sup>1234</sup> who was *havaldar* at Kalyan, to meet him. Retaining Dadaji’s elder son Rakhmaji with him, Kanhoji sent

both families – his and Dadaji's – to Talegaon.<sup>1235</sup> Kanhoji Naik and Shivaji exchanged solemn oaths. Thereafter, the Bandals, Haibatrao Silimbkar, Pasalkar, Marane, Dhamale, Maral and Dohar<sup>1236</sup> were summoned and all of them also took solemn oaths of allegiance and raised a force of infantry."

The *Shivabharat* says that after Afzal Khan reached Wai with his army, Shivaji ordered his cavalry commander Netoji Palkar to lay enemy territory waste, and himself went to Jawali with his infantry.<sup>1237</sup> The Jedhe Chronology records that Shivaji arrived in Jawali on 12<sup>th</sup> July 1659, as we have seen earlier.

### INCURSIONS INTO ONE ANOTHER'S TERRITORIES

The *Tarikh-i Ali* describes Afzal Khan's invasion of Shivaji's territory thus:<sup>1238</sup>

"Afzal Khan set out according to the order of Ali Adilshah and within a few days he transformed Shivaji's territory into a riding ground for the horses of the victorious army. The leaders of the rebels went deaf hearing the thunderous sounds of kettle drums of the warriors on the battlefield. The enemy was blinded by the dust storm thrown aloft by the hooves of the swift horses. The holy warriors were pleased by the wafts of wind bearing the aroma of victory.... The brave soldiers shot arrows, which carried with them the message of death to the rebels."

What this describes is metaphorical and sketchy. It does not provide any details, much less a comprehensive account. All that we can gather from it is that Afzal Khan's forces had invaded Shivaji's territory. The *Shivabharat* gives an account of it thus:<sup>1239</sup>

“When enemy-vanquishing Shivaji left for Jawali, fully prepared to kill the demon called Afzal Khan, his commander, by his orders, conquered enemy provinces and laid waste the enemy towns. Meanwhile, the proud Muslim of Wai [i.e. Afzal Khan], who had devoted his entire life in the service of his master, sent his valorous chieftains, who gradually began invading Shivaji’s provinces. Yadav [or Jadhav] attacked the Supe province, Pandhare invaded Shirwal, Kharade marched into Saswad, Siddi Hilal invaded Pune and Saif Khan, the Abyssinian, marched into Konkan occupied by Shivaji’s soldiers, and conquered those provinces.”

The *Shivabharat* (23:13) also adds that Afzal Khan’s forces invaded Shivaji’s territory and reduced Shivaji’s provinces to a woeful plight.[1240](#)

The statement in *Shivabharat* that Shivaji’s army devastated Adilshahi provinces finds confirmation in a letter Afzal Khan wrote on 7<sup>th</sup> September 1659 to the officials of the Terdal Pargana.[1241](#)

#### **AFZAL KHAN’S LETTERS TO THE DESHMUKHS OF MAVALS**

The *Deshmukhs of Mavals* had already received *farmanas* issued by Ali Adilshah ordering them to join Afzal Khan. Besides, Afzal Khan had continued his own efforts to woo the *deshmukhs*. Three of Afzal Khan’s letters sent to the *deshmukhs* of Maval after he left Bijapur are extant.

The first of these, dated 17<sup>th</sup> September 1659, informs the *deshmukhs* of Rohida Fort that a village named Karanje has been given as grant to Kedarji Khopade.[1242](#) It does not mention any reason for making the grant. However, it is obvious that it was given because Kedarji Khopade had joined Afzal Khan.

The second letter addressed to a son of Kanhoji Jedhe is as follows:[1243](#)

Afzal Khan to Shivaji Jedhe

30<sup>th</sup> September 1659

“Letter of Assurance:

“I have learnt everything about you from the letters written to me by the *havaldar* of Wai Pargana, Krishnaji Pundit, and Amaji Anandrao of the Rohida fort.

“I know that your father and brother are in the service of Shivaji Bhosale for the last 10- 20 years. However, you need not entertain any vacillation about that; come for an interview with me. Their service with Shivaji will not be held against you. You are a faithful servant of Adilshah. Hence, without any kind of hesitation or apprehension, have full faith in me and come to meet me. After you meet me you will be given appropriate grants and promotion. Be assured and meet me immediately. This is my assurance.”

The third letter addressed to Vithoji Haibatrao, Deshmukh of Taraf Gunjan Maval, does not bear the full date but only the year 1060 of the Shuhur Era which began on 24<sup>th</sup> May 1659 and ended on 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1669. It reads:[1244](#)

“Krishnaji Bhaskar, *havaldar* of Wai Pargana, spoke to me about you and praised your work. You are well known for your work and this is the time for service. Therefore, trust me, come to Jawali with your men and follow my orders. Join in the campaign and manifest your goodwill [towards the state]. You will be promoted as per your wish.”

#### NEGOTIATIONS (OCTOBER 1659)

The Jedhe Chronology has the following entry under Shaka 1581:[1245](#)

“Afzal Khan sent his envoy Krishnarao to Pratapgad to meet Shivaji in the month of Kartik [7<sup>th</sup> October to 4<sup>th</sup> November 1659]. Shivaji gave him robes of honour and sent him back with the decision that the interview [between Afzal Khan and Shivaji] would be held below the Pratapgad fort.”

This Krishnarao must have been Krishnaji Bhaskar[1246](#) – the *Havaldar* of Wai Pargana. Marathi chronicles also say that the envoy Afzal Khan sent to Shivaji was Krishnaji Bhaskar.[1247](#) Shivaji and Afzal Khan met on 10<sup>th</sup> November 1659. If we consider the time the envoys took going to and fro, the time spent in negotiations and the time Afzal Khan took to reach Jawali from Wai, Krishnaji Bhaskar must have met Shivaji at some time before 31<sup>st</sup> October 1659.

The *Shivabharat* also says Afzal Khan sent a letter to Shivaji when he learnt that Shivaji was in Jawali, all prepared for the war against him.[1248](#) However, it does not give details like the name of Afzal Khan’s envoy who took Khan’s letter to Shivaji or the date when the envoy met him. The letter, according to the *Shivabharat*, had the following import:[1249](#)

“Your frequent insolence these days is causing much anguish to the Adilshah. You have brought into your possession that territory replete with hill-forts which had been won by the Adilshah after the dissolution of the Nizamshahi, and which he had ceded to the Mughals with the desire to sue for peace.[1250](#) Because of your constant good fortune, you

have captured at every possible opportunity more and more of the territory belonging to the ruler of Rajpuri, because of which he has been encircled and is infuriated. You invaded and captured by force the invincible and extensive kingdom of the Chandrarao. You conquered Kalyan and Bhiwandi and demolished the mosques there. Muslims are still angry with you as you have thoroughly plundered and humiliated them. Taking no cognizance of your own strength, you have imprisoned Muslim priests and dared audaciously to block the path of Islam. You audaciously brandish the trappings of an Emperor; sit without authority upon a golden throne; bestow rewards or mete out punishments to people; you have willfully stopped paying obeisance to those deserving respect since you have become independent. You have grown incorrigible and are not afraid of lesser persons [compared to me, i.e. Afzal Khan]. Therefore, the triumphant Adilshah has sent me [against you].

“An army of six kinds [of troops]<sup>1251</sup> sent under my command by orders of the Adilshah, has been persuading me to open hostilities against you without further delay. Musa Khan and others, who are eager to fight against you and desire to conquer Jawali, have been encouraging me to wage war. Therefore, obey my orders, conclude a treaty and surrender all your forts and provinces to me. You should hand over the strong forts like Sinhgad and Lohagad, Prabalgad, Purandar, the Chakan town and the territory between the Bhima and Nira rivers<sup>1252</sup> to the powerful Emperor of Delhi and surrender yourself to him. Ali Adilshah demands Jawali, which you have seized from Chandrarao.”

The letter that the *Shivabharat* says Afzal Khan sent to Shivaji may well not have been exactly as stated in the above rendering. At least some portion of it is quite likely the poet's own interpolation. However, it is possible that Afzal Khan could have written on somewhat similar lines to Shivaji.

Shivaji, says the *Shivabharat* sent a brief reply to Afzal Khan:[1253](#)

“It is gracious of you, who subdued in battle all the chieftains of the Karnatak, to show me at least this much compassion. You are incomparably powerful. You are a man of great strength. Your existence has embellished the earth and you are not deceitful in the least. Come to Jawali in order to drink in the scenic beauty of the woods. I feel at this juncture that it would be appropriate for you to come to Jawali. Your visit will dispel my fear and, moreover, it will add to my prestige. I feel that, but for one as valorous as you, neither the forces of the arrogant Mughals nor those of the Adilshah are worth anything. Proceed cautiously towards Jawali. I will hand over Jawali and the forts you have demanded to you. It is difficult even to look you in the eye, but after seeing you I will place my sword before you without any doubt or misgiving. Your soldiers will experience pleasures of the nether world (*patal*) in this vast and pristine forest.”

The *Shivabharat* does not name Shivaji's envoy that carried the message to Afzal Khan. However, the Jedhe Chronology and the Sabhasad Chronicle state his name as Pantaji Gopinath.[1254](#)

The ballads and chronicles provide accounts of the discussions between Afzal Khan and Shivaji through their envoys.[1255](#) It appears that Afzal Khan had assured

confirmation of the provinces which Shivaji had conquered, as a *jagir* from Adilshah but insisted on a personal meeting. Shivaji, pretending that he was afraid of the Khan, requested that the meeting take place in Jawali. The Khan approved of Shivaji's request. The accounts vary in their details, but according to the *Sabhasad Chronicle*, Pantaji Gopinath contributed immeasurably in convincing Afzal Khan to go to Jawali.

Sources partial to Afzal Khan naturally have a different interpretation. The *Tarikh-i Ali* says Afzal Khan's invasion of Shivaji's territory brought the latter to his knees so, in desperation, he sent a letter seeking pardon and invited the Khan for a meeting at the Jawali (i.e. Pratapgad) fort.<sup>1256</sup> The *Basatin* says all this and adds that Afzal Khan, who being Muslim and thus pure in heart and gullible, did not suspect Shivaji's guile and accepted an invitation to a feast in Jawali.<sup>1257</sup>

The *Shivabharat* says the Khan, deciding to go to Jawali, told the officers in his army that the move would not be fraught with any great risk as they had well equipped and vigilant soldiers.<sup>1258</sup> Afzal Khan's advisers did not approve of the plan and tried to dissuade him from his resolve. They argued that if Shivaji had such complete trust in him, he should come out of the dense forest of Jawali for the meeting; that since he was coaxing the Khan to go there, he must have thought up some daring plan; that the hilly and thickly wooded terrain was unsuitable for deployment of cavalry. However, Afzal Khan did not listen to them.<sup>1259</sup> A Dutch letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 sent from Vengurla, too, says his advisers tried to persuade him away from his decision but that the vainglorious Khan punished them – the nose of one was cut off, another was spitted (placed upon a sharpened stake so that the victim's weight drove the stake up his entrails), but that the third being Rustum-i Zaman's brother, got off with only a rebuke.<sup>1260</sup> No other source

corroborates this statement, but it is sufficient to show that the Khan dismissed the advice of his subordinates.

He left some of his soldiers, elephants, horses, heavy luggage and treasury at Wai and started towards Jawali with the remaining force.[1261](#)

When Shivaji received this intelligence, he summoned his infantry commanders at Pratapgad and instructed them to conceal themselves in the forest, well prepared, close to Afzal Khan's camp, yet in such a way that enemy would not suspect their presence. He also instructed them to fall upon and annihilate the enemy, on the signal of the beating of drums, should the Khan refuse to make peace.[1262](#)

Netozi Palkar, who had on Shivaji's orders made incursions into Adilshahi territory, had returned by this time. The instructions Shivaji gave him are described by the *Shivabharat*:[1263](#)

“When Shivaji's commander-in-chief, who was renowned, devoted, valiant and as swift as an eagle, heard about the plight to which the country had been reduced by the enemy's army on the orders of Afzal Khan, he returned to Shivaji's happy and contented country with 7,000 cavalry besides infantry, eager to subdue the enemy. He vowed to kill Kharade, Pandhare, Jadhavrao, (Siddi) Hilal and Saif Khan. When Shivaji learnt about the resolve of his commander, he sent him a message by the hands of his emissary that 'the adamant Muslim demon named Afzal will be coming to Jawali to make peace. Hence, do not start hostilities with his soldiers till negotiations about the treaty are concluded, yet keep yourself fully prepared. You must definitely go to Wai

the same day I meet the Khan.' So, Netoji stopped halfway<sup>1264</sup> and did not wage war against the enemy."

### **AFZAL KHAN REACHES JAWALI**

Afzal Khan reached Jawali with his army, passing over the difficult mountain slopes.<sup>1265</sup> The *Shivabharat* writes,

"When the mighty Afzal Khan came near Jawali he felt as if he had already conquered it. When Shivaji learnt that Khan was near Jawali, he knew that he was now in his clutches."<sup>1266</sup>

The Adilshahi army encamped near a village by the name of Par, on the banks of the Koyna River, amidst thick growth of bamboo.<sup>1267</sup> Both Shivaji and Afzal Khan sent their respective envoys to inquire after one another's well being.<sup>1268</sup> The *Shivabharat* adds,

"Shivaji perceived what was passing through the Khan's mind, the Khan guessed what Shivaji was contemplating; but only the Almighty knew what was really happening. The common people assumed a treaty was in the offing."<sup>1269</sup>

However, considering the outcome of the campaign, it hardly seems likely that Afzal Khan had any notion of what Shivaji was planning.

Shivaji asked the traders of various goods who had accompanied Afzal Khan's entourage to go to him (atop the fort), under the pretext that, as per custom and protocol, gifts could be purchased for Afzal Khan, his sons and other noblemen.<sup>1270</sup> The *Shivabharat* records:

“The traders showed the precious stones to Shivaji who was eager to buy them. He took all the precious stones from the traders he had invited from Afzal Khan’s camp and asked them to stay on the fort. The greedy and foolish traders who had lost their sense of reason owing to their lust for quick profit, failed to realize that they were confined on the mountain top from all sides.”[1271](#)

Terms of the meeting between Shivaji and Afzal Khan were finalized by their envoys. The *Shivabharat* says:[1272](#)

“Afzal Khan would go to the meeting place in a palanquin, leaving his force where it is. He would be armed and take with him just two or three servants, reach the place of the meeting on a *machi* of the Pratapgad fort and await Shivaji’s arrival in the pavilion. Shivaji, too, would be armed and would arrive there to welcome and honour the guest according to custom. Ten armed, brave and loyal bodyguards of each party would then place themselves at a distance of an arrow-shot. After the two have met, they would proceed with such secret discussions as would bring happiness to all.”

#### THE SLAYING OF AFZAL KHAN (10<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 1659)

Shivaji had already given specific instructions to his infantry and cavalry, as we have seen earlier. The Jedhe Chronology records Shivaji’s instructions to the Bandal and Silimbkar contingents:[1273](#)

“In a confidential meeting that Shivaji held with his ministers and Kanhoji Jedhe, it was agreed that the Muslim [Afzal Khan] is perfidious. The Bandal

Deshmukh with his force will be in Jawali and in the forest of Par. If the Khan should act treacherously during the meeting, the Bandal Deshmukh should not let the Khan's army camped in Par ascend the mountain [fort], and support me [Shivaji] with select men. If, by the blessings of goddess Shri Amba, Afzal Khan is killed, the Bandals will attack and thoroughly destroy the enemy army in Par after receiving a signal from the fort. Haibatrao and Balaji Naik Silimbkar are positioned in the Bochegholi pass<sup>[1274](#)</sup> with their troops. They will not let the enemy ascend the pass. Thus it was resolved and arranged in the secret meeting."

It appears from this extract that Shivaji had assigned the task of controlling the route between the place of meeting and Afzal Khan's camp at Par to the Bandals and their contingent. They were also told to attack the enemy camp at Par once they got the prearranged signal. Likewise, the task of defending the Bochegholi pass was given to the Silimbkars. However, no reliable information is extant to tell us precisely where the other *deshmukhs* and their contingents or the regulars of Shivaji's force were stationed. Details given in later date sources are unreliable.

Shivaji and Afzal Khan met on 10<sup>th</sup> November 1659. It is well known that Shivaji killed Afzal Khan in course of this meeting. However, there is no agreement in what various sources say about the event.<sup>[1275](#)</sup> What is certain, nevertheless, is that Shivaji killed Afzal Khan as he had previously resolved.

The *Shivabharat* describes the scene thus:<sup>[1276](#)</sup>

"Shivaji began preparing for the meeting after learning that Afzal Khan had started towards the meeting place at the foot of the Pratapgad Fort. He

worshipped God Shiva in various ways as advised by the priests, gave away alms as per daily routine, had a light lunch, sipped pure water from time to time, silently prayed for a moment to goddess Tulaja, dressed appropriately for the occasion and glanced at the reflection of his face in a mirror. He rose at once, made obeisance to the priest and other Brahmins and obtained their blessing. He viewed the Sun and then gave away a cow along with her calf and some gold in alms to a virtuous Brahmin. He secretly positioned his brave followers, who were eager to go with him, for the defence of the Pratapgad fort. Then he left to receive the Muslim [Afzal Khan] who had come there with treachery in mind, as amicably as somebody welcomes his guest. Shivaji had donned excellent armour [under his robe]. He was wearing a white turban with a hackle and a robe sprinkled with saffron. With a sword in one hand and a *patta*<sup>1277</sup> in the other, he looked like Lord Vishnu incarnate who bears a sword in one hand and a mace in the other.

“Shivaji, pacing briskly, descended the fort on foot and Afzal saw him approaching. Shivaji, too, exchanged a glance at his foe with a smile.

“The Khan, desirous of dispelling any feeling of mistrust in Shivaji’s mind, handed over his sword to an attendant standing nearby and, feigning friendliness, said to him in a loud voice:

“Oh! You who pretend to be eager for war and act in an extremely willful manner! You have treading the wrong path and, in your vanity, evince no respect for the Adilshah, the Qutbshah or the mighty Mughal Emperor. I have come to chastise you for your arrogance. Give up these mountain forts and your avarice, and surrender to me. I will personally

conduct you to Bijapur, make you bow before the victorious master, Ali Adilshah, make an entreaty to him on your behalf and have him bestow great wealth on you. Oh! Son of Shahji! Child! Rid yourself of pride in your wisdom and let me take your hand in mine. Come, embrace me.'

"Saying this, the Khan pressed Shivaji's neck under his left arm and struck a blow with his dagger in Shivaji's side. The agile Shivaji worked himself free of the Khan's grasp, parried the stroke of the dagger and drove his own sword into the Khan's stomach. The Khan, stunned by the blow, tried to hold his entrails with his hands and cried out that he had been killed. His servant suddenly rushed at Shivaji with the Khan's sword poised for a stroke. The Khan had included this man in his entourage knowing well that Shivaji would never kill a Brahmin. Shivaji parried the stroke with his sword and, using his *patta*, cleft the Khan's head into two....

"Thus on Thursday noon, 10<sup>th</sup> November 1659, Shivaji slew the enemy of the gods, Afzal Khan."[1278](#)

The *Shivabharat* neither names Afzal Khan's Brahmin servant who, it says, attacked Shivaji, nor does it provide any information about what happened to the man afterwards. However, it appears from other sources that the Brahmin was Krishnaji Bhaskar. Some copies of the A. K.Chronicle say Krishnaji Bhaskar aimed a blow at Shivaji but missed and, since Krishnaji was a Brahmin, Shivaji spared him, letting him go away.[1279](#) However, one version of the chronicle says that even though Krishnaji Bhaskar struck at him, Shivaji did not kill him because he was a Brahmin; that he was killed by Jiva Mahala.[1280](#) There is little to choose between the reliability of these later date accounts. Killing a Brahmin was indeed

considered a sin in those times and Shivaji was no exception to that belief.<sup>1281</sup> However, it is difficult to concede that Shivaji spared Krishnaji Bhaskar in the *mélée* just because he was a Brahmin. Perhaps Krishnaji Bhaskar was not killed at the hands of Shivaji and some authors, taking advantage of the fact probably in an attempt to add to their protagonist's renown, recorded that Shivaji did not raise his sword against Krishnaji Bhaskar because he was a Brahmin. Only one copy of the A.K Chronicle states that Krishnaji Bhaskar escaped alive from the fracas. Taking this into account and from the silence maintained by the *Shivabharat* about Krishnaji Bhaskar's fate, it appears that he was killed.

Realizing that Afzal Khan had been cut down, his ten bodyguards – Abdul Sayyid, Bada Sayyid, Afzal Khan's nephew Rahim Khan, Pahlawan Khan, four other Muslims,<sup>1282</sup> and Pilaji and Shankaraji Mohite<sup>1283</sup> – charged towards Shivaji to kill him. Shivaji defended himself with his sword and *patta*. In no time at all, Shivaji's ten bodyguards – Sambhaji Kawji, Kataji Ingale, Kondaji Kank, Yesaji Kank, Krishnaji Gayakwad, Suryaji Kakade, Jiva Mahala, Visaji Murumbak, Sambhaji Karwar, and Siddi Ibrahim<sup>1284</sup> – also rushed forward. Jiva Mahala cut down Bada Sayyid before he could strike at Shivaji. The others quickly killed the remainder of the Khan's guards.<sup>1285</sup>

Sabhasad writes:<sup>1286</sup>

“The Raja [Shivaji] himself killed in single combat the Khan who was by nature a veritable Duryodhan; as much in strength of body as in wickedness of heart. Bhima killed him single-handed. Similarly did [the Raja]. Shivaji Raja was Bhima himself. It was he who killed Afzal. This deed was not that of a human being.

An incarnation he surely was, and so indeed could he perform this deed. Success was attained."

Adnyandas, expressing a similar sentiment, says that Shivaji was an incarnation of God, like Rama who single handedly killed Ravana.[1287](#)

#### THE BATTLE OF JAWALI (10<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 1659)[1288](#)

After Afzal Khan was slain, the Marathas beat kettledrums from the Pratapgad Fort as a signal. Immediately after receiving the signal, a Brahmin named Narayan with 5,000 foot soldiers and Kamloji Salunkhe, Yesaji Kank, Tanaji Malusare, Kondaji Wadkhale and Ramaji Pangere with a thousand foot soldiers each, encircled the Adilshahi army and fell upon it with fury. This Maratha attack caused panic among the Adilshahi soldiers, now rendered leaderless, and they started fleeing. Musa Khan Pathan, riding a horse, rushed out of his camp with his troopers and, in an attempt to rally the soldiers, mounted an attack on the Marathas. Some Adilshahi officers like Hasan Khan, Yaqut Khan, and Ankush Khan also followed him with their men but Shivaji's infantry broke them up.

The *Shivabharat* says (23:29):

"That mountainous region was not suitable for cavalry, but favoured the infantry. Hence those Muslims were defeated."

Musa Khan Pathan, Hasan Khan, Yaqut Khan and Afzal Khan's elder son Fazil Khan escaped with their lives and managed to reach Wai with Chandrarao's kinsman Prataprao as their guide through the forest. Mambaji Bhosale, cousin of Shahji, was killed. Ranadaula Khan [the younger], Ambar Khan, Rajaji Ghatge, two younger sons of Afzal Khan and many other noblemen were taken prisoner. Thus, the Marathas destroyed Afzal Khan's army in the dense forest of Jawali. Shivaji had

ordered Netoji Palkar to attack Afzal Khan's base at Wai on the same day he (Shivaji) was to meet Afzal Khan. However, Netoji did not reach Wai on time. By the time he arrived there the next day, Muse Khan, Fazil Khan, and others who had escaped from the carnage, had fled from Wai. Though Netoji Palkar went in pursuit, he failed to catch them and returned to Wai.

Shivaji, intending to capture as much of the Adilshahi province as possible, reached Wai with a large force without any loss of time.[1289](#)

#### EXPLOITATION OF VICTORY (NOVEMBER 1659-MARCH 1660)

Shivaji dispatched Netoji Palkar from Wai and followed him shortly thereafter.[1290](#) The *Shivabharat* says Shivaji's troops besieged the Chandan-Vandan forts.[1291](#) However, it is silent about the outcome of this siege. Therefore, it is possible that it was a failure.[1292](#)

Naikji Pandhare, Naikji Kharate and Kalyanji Yadav (or Jadhav), demoralized after Afzal Khan's elimination, and being driven out of the Pune province by Shivaji's troops, persuaded Siddi Hilal to take a lead to end hostilities with the Marathas. Thus, they sought refuge with Shivaji and joined the Maratha forces.[1293](#)

Shivaji's troops collected tribute from many places up to Kolhapur. Shivaji later gave them assurance of safety and established Maratha dominion over these places.[1294](#) He then suddenly besieged the Panhala Fort. The enemy fired cannon balls, rockets and threw huge boulders at the besiegers. The Marathas also struck back, scaled the fort and captured it after a brief skirmish on 28<sup>th</sup> November 1659.[1295](#)

Shivaji himself visited and inspected the fort on 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1659.<sup>1296</sup> Around the same time, and certainly before 15<sup>th</sup> February 1660, the Marathas had also captured the Khelna (Vishalgad) fort.<sup>1297</sup>

Meanwhile, Muse Khan and other Adilshahi nobles had reached Bijapur.<sup>1298</sup> The Adilshah had already heard from his spies that Shivaji was at Wai and might attack the Panhala fort. So he dispatched another force under command of Rustum-i Zaman against Shivaji.<sup>1299</sup> In his *farman* dated 22<sup>nd</sup> November, the Adilshah ordered the *desais* of the Hubli Muamala to join, with their horsemen and foot soldiers, Rustum-i Zaman who had been sent against Shivaji.<sup>1300</sup> Perhaps, similar *farmans* were also issued to other *desais* too, but none except the one cited here have survived.

Rustum-i Zaman had already left Bijapur when the Adilshah received news that Shivaji had captured Panhala.<sup>1301</sup> Having learnt that an Adilshahi army was marching against him, Shivaji left a garrison to defend Panhala and marched out to confront the enemy.<sup>1302</sup> The opposing armies met near Kolhapur on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1659 and Rustum-i Zaman was routed in the ensuing battle.<sup>1303</sup> The booty included 12 elephants and 2,000 horses.<sup>1304</sup> None of the sources mentions the numerical strength of the opposing armies, but the number of elephants and horses captured by Shivaji suggests that Rustum-i Zaman's army must have comprised at least 10,000 horsemen and Shivaji's army must have been at least as strong and probably stronger.

After defeating Rustum-i Zaman, Shivaji sent his commander in chief Netoji to strike deep inside Adilshahi territory and himself went to Panhala in order to oversee its defenses.<sup>1305</sup> Netoji's

cavalry plundered the territory as far south as Dharwad and Gadag and as far east as Tikota, 20 km west of Bijapur!<sup>1306</sup>

While Shivaji, with the bulk of his forces, was invading, capturing and ransacking Adilshahi territory to the east of the Sahyadris, some of his troops had been dispatched to the west to capture Adilshahi territory in the Konkan. They encountered almost no resistance and rapidly pushed southwards.<sup>1307</sup> On 12<sup>th</sup> January 1660 a detachment of about 500 Maratha troops reached Rajapur.<sup>1308</sup> On 15<sup>th</sup> January they resumed their march, reached Kharepatan in the night and captured the fort there.<sup>1309</sup> About 15<sup>th</sup> February they captured the small fort at Kudal.<sup>1310</sup>

### SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH

When Shivaji launched the Konkan campaign after eliminating Afzal Khan, the chief of the English East India Company's Rajapur factory, which functioned under authority of the Company's President at Surat, was a meddlesome Englishman called Henry Revington. Mathew Andrews had been *pro tem* President at Surat from the time the previous president died in May 1659. Revington was not at all on good terms with Mathew Andrews and his Council.

The Rajapur factory was established in 1658 and Revington had assumed charge in March 1659. But he went to Raibag and stayed there for some time.<sup>1311</sup> In a meeting with Rustum-i Zaman at Hukkeri in October 1659, he discussed several issues of which one was the Janjira fort.<sup>1312</sup> It is not known who broached the subject, but Revington came away with the belief that Rustum-i Zaman had assured him that, should the English assist with their ships in reducing the fort, Shivaji would provide the troops and that, after the successful outcome of the plan, Shivaji would get part of the loot from the

fort while the English would get the fort and the remaining wealth. Revington had narrated all of this to Andrews in private correspondence, but the latter had turned down all these schemes and had warned him not to take any action without informing the Surat Council.<sup>1313</sup> No available source confirms the veracity of Revington's claims but, if they are true, it will go to justify the widespread belief that Rustum-i Zaman was secretly allied with Shivaji.<sup>1314</sup> However, Revington was a troublemaker, and it is quite likely that some of the information he conveyed to Andrews was a figment of his imagination.

Had Shivaji desired to enlist assistance of the English, he could have approached them directly. Why would he have needed Rustum-i Zaman as a mediator? Likewise, why would Rustum-i Zaman have disclosed any 'understanding' he may have had with Shivaji to a stranger like Revington? At most, he would have merely heard what Revington had to say and then secretly advised Shivaji about it. Moreover, how could Rustum-i Zaman have, on his own and in his first meeting with the Englishman, given Revington an assurance on behalf of Shivaji that Janjira would be handed over to the English if they assisted in its capture? It is thus quite clear that what Revington informed Andrews about Shivaji was either a blatant lie or failure of the interpreter to convey the meaning correctly, or a reflection of Revington's pre-conceived ideas.

Andrews and his Council summoned Revington to Surat in November 1659 and appointed Randolph Taylor, who was in Rajapur then, as the head of the Rajapur factory. However, Revington refused to leave Rajapur, and his colleagues like Randolph Taylor also supported his decision. Andrews and his council sent them a letter, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1660, asking them to either obey orders or face dismissal to which Revington and his colleagues sent an arrogant reply.<sup>1315</sup> While this dispute was in progress, both the Rajapur and Surat personnel were

complaining against one another in letters to the head office of the Company in London.<sup>1316</sup>

Meanwhile, Revington wrote a letter, dated 10<sup>th</sup> December 1659, to the head office of the English Company in London explaining his various plans thus:<sup>1317</sup>

“Rustum-i Zaman ... is a friend of Shivaji and is now upon his march toward him, and within few days we shall hear of his joining with him, and then we shall (according to H[enry] R[evington's] promise unto him at his coming down) send him all the granadoes which last year he desired, and advised us to spare Shivaji some, promising him that, if we would lie with our ships before Danda Rajpuri castle, that Shivaji's men should assist us ashore, he having already taken the town of Danda Rajpuri, but not the castle, wherein there is a great treasure, part of which we may have and the castle to[o] [and] give him but the rest. And this is the business that we have to recommend unto you; which H. R. [i.e. Henry Revington] hinted unto Mr. Mathew Andrews in a particular [i.e. private] letter, but he presently puts it into his next general [letter]... and commands us to act nothing in it; which he need not have done, for how can we or he act anything in this business before you send out two or three ships and men for the purpose? But we may bring the things in the meantime to such maturity and ripeness as that hereafter they may be ready for you to pluck; and so much we are resolved to do.

“One months time more will, we believe put an end to this trouble; for Shivaji's father Shahji, that lies to the southward, is expected within eight days with his army, consisting of 17,000 men, and then they

intend for Bijapur, the King [Adilshah] and Queens residence, whose strength consists only in men, and they are not above 10.000 soldiers; so that in [all] probability the kingdom will be lost. And if it proves so, all that Rustum-i Zaman has promised us, of a tancksall,<sup>1318</sup> of remitting you part of the saltpeter customs, and of assisting you in taking Danda Rajpuri castle, which are three things we do desire to be instrumental in, will as certainly be performed. We only want power and means, and a good head at Surat."

That Shahji and Shivaji were planning to invade Bijapur was a mere rumour.

Shivaji's forces, in the meantime, had captured many of the ports in the Konkan. Mahmud Sharif, who was chief official of Fazil Khan at Dabhol,<sup>1319</sup> had fled from there and arrived at Rajapur, bringing with him three ships belonging to Afzal Khan.<sup>1320</sup> The chief Adilshahi official at Satavali, too, had arrived there. Subsequently, Shivaji defeated Rustum-i Zaman. Abdul Karim, who was Rustum-i Zaman's chief official at Rajapur,<sup>1321</sup> learnt about his master's defeat, and fled to Jaitapur during the night of 11<sup>th</sup> / 12<sup>th</sup> January 1660. The English at their Rajapur factory learnt of his flight the next day. As he owed them some money, they immediately followed him to Jaitapur.<sup>1322</sup> Abdul Karim had taken shelter in one of the ships that had come from Dabhol. A ship called the *Diamond* was anchored in Jaitapur. It was owned by a person called Benidas who was working as a broker for the English at Surat. The English boarded this ship, which had a crew of twenty native and six English sailors, and maneuvered it so that it blocked the passage of the ships on which Abdul Karim had taken shelter and asked Abdul Karim to come aboard their ship. When he came aboard the *Diamond* along with the chief officers of

Satavali and Dabhol, the English demanded return of the money they had lent him. Abdul Karim gave them some merchandise in lieu of part of the money he owed and promised to make good the balance later.



### EXPLOITATION OF VICTORY, 1659–60

- Boundary of Shivaji's Dominion, Oct. 1659.
  - Expansion in Shivaji's Dominion till Feb. 1660.
  - Mughal Boundary.
  - Portuguese Boundary.
  - 600 meters & above.
- North ↑
- Scale : 1 cm = 30 km  
0 30 60 km

It was when affairs had come to such pass that some five or six hundred Maratha soldiers reached Rajapur and some 200 others arrived at Jaitapur. Those in Jaitapur wanted the English to help them in seizing Afzal Khan's ships. However, the English refused to take part in this affair and replied that they (i.e. the Marathas) were free to do anything they wished after the English had settled their account with Abdul Karim. Thereupon, the Marathas asked for custody of the chief officials of Rajapur, Dabhol and Satavali, which too the English denied. This stance raised the spirits of the Adilshahi officers. Upon their request, the English agreed to represent to the Marathas that one three hundred tonner out of the three Adilshahi ships was actually theirs, provided the Company could keep it till the Adilshahi officials repaid their loan, could use it for their trade, and would not be responsible in the event of any damage. The Adilshahi officials agreed and gave a written statement that the ship belonged to the English to enable them to show it to the Marathas. But their request to be conducted to Vengurla was turned down by the English. Instead, they advised the officers to go to Surat or to seek shelter in some other place under Mughal jurisdiction. However, in the meantime, soldiers in the bigger ship had declared their allegiance to Shivaji. So the Adilshahi officials rented a boat and went to Vengurla with Revington's letter of recommendation addressed to the head of the Dutch factory there.

Henry Revington then went to meet the Marathas on the shore where he told them that since they were traders and foreigners they would not be able to take sides with anybody. He also told them that the Adilshahi officials had gone away leaving their two ships behind, the crew of which might surrender to Shivaji. He also informed them that the third ship belonged to the English in lieu of the amount due to them.

The English had even renamed the ship the *Rajapore Merchant*, appointed William Mingham<sup>1323</sup> as its captain and left for Rajapur. A day later, Randolph Taylor met the commander of the Maratha force at Rajapur who demanded custody of the Adilshahi officials. Taylor said that was not possible since they had already left. The commander asked him to get hold of Afzal Khan's ships (which had come to Rajapur) for the Marathas. Taylor refused to do that as well. Thereupon, he asked Revington to hand over to the Marathas the ship along with wares acquired from Adilshahi officials. Taylor agreed to do this but demanded an order of payment on Rajapur for their money. In this meeting, they also discussed the fort of Danda-Rajpuri.

After their meeting with the Maratha commander, the English went back to Jaitapur where the Adilshahi officials had left two ships behind. The soldiers on the larger ship had earlier decided to surrender to the Marathas. But they changed their mind out of anxiety for their womenfolk who they feared might be molested by the Marathas. So they took aboard the men on the other ship and, firing their guns, sailed forward and anchored out of range of Maratha cannons. Maratha soldiers were watching this maneuver from the banks of the river. Since the English did nothing to stop the ships from sailing beyond range or to apprehend them on their behalf, the Marathas arrested a prominent local merchant called Vagjee and a certain Veljee who worked as a broker for the English. The English sent a message to the Marathas that they would burn down the village unless the Marathas released their broker. The Marathas sent Veljee up on a hill and followed him at the double. The English also climbed the hill only to find the Marathas waiting at the foot of the hill on the other side. The English then sent Giffard along with the captain of the *Diamond* to hold talks with the Marathas. Instead of releasing Veljee, the Marathas detained Giffard but sent the captain back to warn the English to advance no further.

The Marathas left for Kharepatan on the same day along with Giffard and Veljee and reached their destination in the night. In letters Giffard sent to the English at the Rajapur factory from Kharepatan, he mentioned that he was told by the Marathas that the hostages (i.e. himself and Veljee) would be released only after the English had taken control of Afzal Khan's ships and made over the merchandise to the Marathas.

In a letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> February 1660, Henry Revington, Randolph Taylor and the other English factors at Rajapur narrated this account to their superiors at Surat. They expressed their firm opinion that it would be imprudent on their part to accede to the Maratha demand just because Giffard and their broker were being held captive by them, articulating their conviction that Shivaji, who was both powerful and fair, would never tolerate his own people acting thus for such an unjust reason. In conclusion, they wrote that it might be far more honourable to let Giffard suffer incarceration than concede a demand that would only be a blot on the fair name of their nation by betraying the trust of our friends to their enemy.[1324](#)

Soon thereafter, Revington wrote letters to Shivaji, Rustum-i Zaman and Fazil Khan seeking Giffard's release. Among these, the one sent to Shivaji is the earliest extant communication between him and the English. It reads:[1325](#)

Henry Revington to Shivaji  
13<sup>th</sup> February 1660

“To Sevagy, General of the Hendoo Forces

“How much friendship the English hath promised to act for you against Danda Rajpuri castle your servants Dorogy etc. we believe hath informed you;

but how much injury we have received from them we are ashamed to tell you.

“Only thus much be pleased to understand: that because we would not take the junks lying in Rajapur River, and be enemies to those who were our friends, therefore hath our broker and one Englishman been carried away by your servants and kept and abused in prison for 25 days; and although now our broker is released, yet still the Englishman is detained and imprisoned in Kharepatan castle, to the sorrow of us and fear of all merchants in the port towns under your command, believing that this action will hinder their and our trading.

“But we are patient and hope for satisfaction by a letter from you unto the chief of these your forces. Therefore we pray that this may come to your hands, and entreat your answer to this for the restoring of our Englishman and what else hath been taken, against your command.”

The English factors from Rajapur sent a letter on 4<sup>th</sup> February 1660 through a messenger to the English at Surat. However, the courier returned to Rajapur ten days later with the letter because he was too scared to proceed. This letter was then dispatched once again to Surat with a new messenger along with another dated 15<sup>th</sup> February.<sup>1326</sup> The later communication also says Rustum-i Zaman’s *amaldar* (executive officer) had arrived in Rajapur along with one of Shivaji’s men and also that the Maratha chief, Doroji, who carried away Giffard was dismissed.<sup>1327</sup>

A letter sent from Rajapur to London, dated 20<sup>th</sup> February 1660, too, mentions that the commander of those men who carried away Giffard and the broker of the English was

dismissed by Shivaji and that 'Rustum-i Zaman's servant sits down in Rajapur, in the custom house.<sup>1328</sup> Rumours that Shivaji and Rustum-i Zaman were secret allies seem to have had some substance in them. Witness mention in the letters of Rustum-i Zaman's *amaldar* having come to Rajapur with Shivaji's man and that a servant of Rustum-i Zaman was sitting in the custom house there.<sup>1329</sup>

These letters do not say how the English of Rajapur learnt that Shivaji had dismissed Doroji. There is no way of ascertaining if this was indeed true. However, it does not seem probable that Shivaji would dismiss his officer for detaining Giffard and an English agent.

Revington had written to Shivaji seeking Giffard's release. However, he did not wait for Shivaji's reply and engineered his release when he was being transferred from Kharepatan to another location (probably Satavali or Khelna). This is narrated in the following letter written by Revington and others from Rajapur to Surat on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1660:<sup>1330</sup>

"Since our last general [letter] we received advice from Mr. Philip Giffard of the Governor of Kharepatan Castle's intention to send him from thence (where we supplied him every day with meat and drink) unto Satavali or Khelna Castle; and having notice which way they intended to steer , we waylaid them with about 30 men, some ten miles up from Rajapur, and (thanks be to God) met him in a town, tended upon by 25 soldiers, from whom we rescued him without any prejudice to either side. This action, we confess, was done out of passion, because we had not patience to stay till our friend Shivaji's answer came unto our letter in our last mentioned, having so good opportunity before."

It is not clear how Revington achieved this. The letter says that the English took with them 30 men for this purpose. These must have been local men they had in their service.

The Surat Council was displeased with these questionable dealings of the English at Rajapur and reported them in their letter to the Board of Directors of the English East India Company in the following letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> April 1660:[1331](#)

“Shivaji a Gentoo [i.e. Hindu] of great power in Deccan raises an army in January last to oppose the new reigning King [Adilshah] there, and [hath] taken many towns there, among which was Rajapur. A shroff employed by H.R. [Henry Revington] etc. had some months before lent a great person Rustum-i Zaman pagodas[1332](#) [and] took a bill (as is the custom of many baniyas that are in your service) in the Englishes name; therefore desires Mr. Revington to assist in this hurly-burly, to procure him his money.

He proclaims war[1333](#) and flies Rajapur, with the rest of the English, into a small ship of Benidases lying in the river; engages your servants; puts you to charges excessive of peons' and lascars' wages for the vessel detained; seizes on three junks there riding in the river also; and in treating with the pre-mentioned Shivaji's soldiers, Philip Giffard is seized on and Veljee the broker, both carried away to prison; keeps one of the junks, on pretence of money owing by them unto you (when they owe not one pice), and intends to make use of her. The consequences are left for Your Honours to judge. We fear another Mir Jumla business,[1334](#) unless you please to go to war with them; for none urged him to this action; only he would be meddling with that which concerned him not. Mr. Giffard sometime after was released, and the

junk still kept, to trade (say they) when they can get money..."

The ship which was supposed to carry this letter was delayed for some reason, and the Surat Council attached the following postscript dated 13<sup>th</sup> April 1660 to their delayed dispatch:[1335](#)

"It is written from Daman etc. places near Rajapur that he [i.e. Revington] with the rest by the country people of the Deccan are put in prison, the house on which he laid out so much of your money (upon promise of repayment by Rustum-i Zaman) is burnt, the horses which he carried away with him from hence, under notion of his own, and without leave or license (scorning it) put to Your Honours account, are taken away, and they restrained; all proceeding from his rash precipitating himself into those dangers rehearsed, which concerned him not. We hear as yet nothing from them knowing they will not write unto us so long as they can have any hope of delivery, because they have so much abused and slighted our power as persons... Yet our charity shall not be in word only, but in deed, and so soon as we are ascertained of their condition, shall not fail to remedy and deliver them; but with all shall not employ them in your service which by your orders are secluded till further order."

But these were no more than rumours. What had actually happened was that Abdul Karim, who was earlier working as the chief officer at Rajapur for Rustum-i Zaman, had returned to Rajapur before 19<sup>th</sup> March 1660 with some 100 soldiers and had resumed charge. Earlier when he had fled leaving his post, the English had tried to obstruct his flight. Now, after returning to Rajapur, he seized the *Rajapore Merchant* vessel with all the merchandise loaded on it, imposed an embargo on selling goods

like grain or cereals to the English and issued an order that nobody should seek employment with them.<sup>1336</sup> As a result of this action, rumours spread far and wide and must have found their way into the Surat letter to the Company. It appears that the Surat Council realized the falsity in these reports after writing to the Board of Directors of the Company.<sup>1337</sup> Nevertheless, the Surat Council had taken Revington's unwarranted activities in the matter very seriously and in a meeting held on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1660, they passed a resolution in which, after stating the entire course of events, the Council held Revington and his associates at Rajapur guilty of acting against the interests of the Company and indulging in unjustifiable conduct. It also said that Revington had already been dismissed and that Randolph Taylor, who had acted in insubordination and supported Revington's unwarrantable activities, would also be removed from service. It also concurred that communications be sent to the officials of the territory disowning Revington's initiatives. The Council further resolved that its members were sufficiently considerate to appreciate that other factors at Rajapur had merely acted on the instigation of others and were not primarily guilty of any misdeed.<sup>1338</sup>

Letters were subsequently sent, in accordance with these resolutions, to Rajapur from Surat. One of these letters was addressed to Revington and Taylor by which Taylor was informed of his dismissal.<sup>1339</sup> A letter was sent to Roland Garway and other Englishmen in the Rajapur factory. They were told to go to Surat without paying heed to Henry Revington and Randolph Taylor, failing which, they were warned, their salaries and allowances from December would be frozen.<sup>1340</sup> Letters to be delivered to Rustum-i Zaman and Abdul Karim were also enclosed with these letters.

In the meantime, as we shall see, an Adilshahi army under command of Siddi Jauhar had invested the fort of Panhala. Henry Revington, along with his two English colleagues from Rajapur and the English broker Veljee, left Rajapur on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1660 for Panhala taking with them a mortar and fifty grenades in order to give a demonstration.<sup>1341</sup> Later, Randolph Taylor and Roland Garway also set out for Panhala from Rajapur, receiving *en route* the two Surat letters, one affirming Taylor's dismissal and the other ordering Garway to come to Surat with other Englishmen. Despite clear instructions, they did not return to Surat.<sup>1342</sup>

The Company's Board of Directors learnt from the letter sent by the Surat Council that Revington had been guilty of insubordination. In their letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> October 1660 to Revington, they expressed strong disapproval of his conduct and ordered him to comply with the Surat Council's orders and instructions.<sup>1343</sup> A letter was also sent to the Surat Council, clearly stating that all the factors including Revington must comply with the orders of the Surat Council or the Board of Directors would dismiss those who defied the Council.<sup>1344</sup>

But, Shivaji had apprehended Revington and some other Englishmen from Rajapur in March 1661, well before these letters sent by the Company's Board of Directors could reach India.

It is thus clear that relations between Shivaji and the English had soured from the very beginning due to the unwarranted and meddlesome activities of Henry Revington. The Surat Council had neither asked Revington to get involved in such affairs nor did it favour his initiative.

## War on Two Fronts

### THE ADILSHAHI OFFENSIVE

The destruction of Afzal Khan's army and the rapid progress of Shivaji's arms impressed at last the gravity of the situation upon the Bijapur court. Considering their abject lethargy and internecine squabbles, it is remarkable that they organized a new army in three months and put it under command of Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian Muslim who held a jagir at Kurnool, about 260 km east-southeast of Bijapur.<sup>1345</sup> This recalcitrant and haughty war-lord was probably among those who had refused to recognize the new sovereign.<sup>1346</sup> Now his past crimes were forgiven and he was honoured with the title of Salabat Khan.<sup>1347</sup> The army given under his command comprised, according to a dispatch dated 5th May 1660 by the Dutch resident at Vengurla, 35 to 40 thousand infantry and 16 to 20 thousand cavalry.<sup>1348</sup> The principal noblemen in the army included Rustum-i Zaman, Jauhar's son-in-law Siddi Masud, Afzal Khan's eldest son Fazil Khan, commander of the infantry Bade Khan, Sadat Khan, Bhai Khan (son of Wali Khan), Baji Ghorpade and Pid Naik.<sup>1349</sup>

In the meantime, the Adilshah was trying to raise disturbances in Shivaji's acquisitions, where some elements, who had failed to recognize the revolution that was overtaking them, had refused to co-operate with Shivaji. Among them was Vithoji Haibatrao, one of the three incumbent deshmukhs of Gunjan Maval. On his behalf, one Sayyid Abdulla prayed to Ali Adilshah to confer upon him (Vithoji) certain grants and privileges so that he would "assemble a force and demonstrate his loyalty to the state by restoring to the control of the crown the territory captured by the accursed [Shivaji]." This prayer was of course granted and a farman<sup>1350</sup> dated 5th January 1660 was issued to Vithoji granting him four villages and other privileges in Gunjan Maval.<sup>1351</sup> This farman seems to have been issued before Jauhar's appointment against Shivaji. Two other

persons specifically offered to join Jauhar's army. One of them was Gondaji Pasalkar of Mose Khore. He petitioned to Ali Adilshah that if he was granted one village and some lands in two other villages he "would serve faithfully with Salabat Khan [i.e. Siddi Jauhar]." A farman<sup>1352</sup> dated 9th March 1660 conferred these grants upon him.<sup>1353</sup> The other was Kedarji Khopade who had a grievance against Shivaji.<sup>1354</sup> He too submitted to Ali Adilshah that he would serve with Salabat Khan if he was granted two villages and lands in three others along with some other privileges. His prayer, too, was granted and a farman to that effect was issued on 9th March 1660.<sup>1355</sup> Farmans dated 22nd March 1660 with identical import were issued to deshmukhs of various parganas, a copy of which, served to Kedarji Khopade, has survived.<sup>1356</sup> It ordered the recipients to take the enemy's men captive and send them to the Court, and also granted to the captors any enemy property which they might take.<sup>1357</sup>

About this time, Siddi Jauhar was also put in charge of the frontier districts of Wai and Khatav.<sup>1358</sup>

While Netoji was plundering Adilshahi territory, Shivaji, according to a Dutch letter dated 5th May 1660 from Vengurle, had laid siege to the fort of Miraj. At Siddi Jauhar's approach, he fell back towards Panhala.<sup>1359</sup> Ali Adilshah regarded Shivaji's retreat as a great victory, as is evinced by the following farman:<sup>1360</sup>

Ali Adilshah to Ekoji Bhosale

3rd March 1660

"As our aim is to spread the religion of the Chief of the Prophets [i.e. Muhammad] we are always blessed with victory. For instance, as the infidel (kafir) rebel, Shivaji, has raised rebellion we have sent Siddi Jauhar Salabat Khan at the head of our army to extirpate him. When the Khan marched out, Shivaji, unable to fight against him, took to flight and his army of disbelievers was scattered. Now the army of Islam is pursuing him and will, in a short time, either make him a

captive or annihilate him. On hearing these glad tidings offer thanks for our good fortune."

Shivaji entered the Panhala fort on 2nd March 1660.<sup>1361</sup> Shortly afterwards, Jauhar closely invested the fort from all sides.<sup>1362</sup> Maratha sources do not tell us why Shivaji allowed himself to be cooped up in a fort, especially in one which was on the frontier of his recently won domains. But probably, as surmised by the Dutch resident at Vengurle in his letter dated 23rd July 1660, he might have thought that the Adilshahi army would be compelled to raise the siege at the approach of the rainy season which was drawing near.<sup>1363</sup>

The strength of the garrison at Panhala is variously given by contemporaneous sources. Henry Revington, the Chief of the English trading station at Rajapur, wrote on 5th June 1660 that Shivaji was besieged in Panhala with five or six thousand men.<sup>1364</sup> A Dutch dispatch dated 27th July 1660 from Vengurle places the figures at 8,000 infantry and 60 horsemen.<sup>1365</sup>

#### THE MUGHAL INVASION

While the Adilshahi army was marching against Panhala in the south, a Mughal army was menacing Shivaji's dominions from the north. The Mughal Emperor had not forgotten Shivaji's recent aggression in Mughal territory. As soon as his hands were free from the war of succession and he was securely installed on the throne, he appointed Shayista Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan in place of Prince Muhammad Muazzam, ordering him to invade and annex Shivaji's dominions.<sup>1366</sup> According to the *Shivabharat*, the Adilshah himself had invited the Mughal army against Shivaji when he learnt of the loss of Panhala.<sup>1367</sup>

Shayista Khan was born on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1605.<sup>1368</sup> He was a Persian by birth — son of Asaf Khan and brother of Aurangzeb's mother, Mumtaz Mahal. His given name was Mirza Abu Talib. He was honoured with the title of Shayista Khan in the 21<sup>st</sup> year of Jahangir's reign. In 1656, Shah Jahan bestowed upon him the title of Khan Jahan and promoted him to the rank

of 6,000 *dhat*/6,000 *sawar*/5,000 *du aspa sih aspa*. He was a partisan of Aurangzeb during the Mughal War of Succession. In June 1658 Aurangzeb rewarded him with the title of Amir-ul-Umara (chief among the peers) and promoted him to the rank of 7,000 *dhat*/7,000 *sawar*/7,000 *du aspa sih aspa*. In July 1659 the Emperor conferred upon him the very high honour of being allowed to beat his drums in the Emperor's presence — a privilege which, in the times of Shah Jahan and Jahangir, was enjoyed only by his father and grandfather respectively. He was a veteran of several campaigns — against Khan Jahan Lodi and the Nizamshahi Sultanate in 1630-31, against Shahji in 1635-6, and against the Qutbshahi Sultanate in 1656. He had also served as governor of Bihar, Malwa (thrice), Gujarat (twice) and the Deccan.

According to the *Shivabharat*, the army given under Shayista Khan's command comprised 77,000 cavalry, excellent Buxar infantry and elephants.<sup>1369</sup> From various sources such as the *Shivabharat*, *Alamgirnama*, *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, *Maathir-ul-Umara* and some documents of the period, we know the names of at least 68 principal *mansabdars* in Shayista Khan's army.<sup>1370</sup> Twenty-nine among them were Muslim and thirty-nine Hindu. Of the Muslims, five were Turks and Uzbeks, three Abyssinians, three Pathans, one Persian and one Indian. The origin of the rest is not known. Of the Hindus, seventeen were Rajputs and twenty-two Marathas.

Shayista Khan set out from Aurangabad, the provincial capital, on 28<sup>th</sup> January 1660 with this vast army and reached Ahmednagar, 105 km to the southwest, on 11<sup>th</sup> February. He left from there on 25<sup>th</sup> February 1660, crossed the Bhima which formed the southern boundary of the Empire on 29<sup>th</sup> February and reached Sonavadi on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1660.<sup>1371</sup>

#### LAKHAM SAVANT'S OFFENSIVE (MARCH 1660)

While these powerful armies were advancing to destroy Shivaji and his nascent state, yet another foe appeared in the Konkan. It was Lakham Savant, the *Sardesai* of Kudal Pargana,

with his seat at Wadi. He had adopted a policy of neutrality and allowed the unhindered occupation of Kudal by Shivaji's forces about February 1660. Soon afterwards, according to a dispatch dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 by the Dutch Resident at Vengurle, 4000 infantry and 7000 cavalry reinforced Shivaji's forces at Kudal.<sup>1372</sup> This, says the Dutch Resident, alarmed Lakham Savant and caused him to change his policy. But the Dutch Resident's estimate of the strength of reinforcements seems excessive. For one thing, Shivaji, with his hands full against the Mughal and Adilshahi armies in the uplands, was not in a position to divert such forces to the Konkan. Secondly, had such reinforcements really arrived they would have rather deterred Lakham Savant from declaring war against Shivaji. Thirdly, the campaign which followed bears no evidence of the existence of such a large Maratha force in the Konkan. On the contrary, it shows their extreme weakness. It is more probable that the change in Lakham Savant's policy was caused by what he perceived as the impending doom of Shivaji.

Be that as it may, the results of the ensuing campaign were out of all proportion to the forces engaged.<sup>1373</sup> Our sole authority for its details is the dispatch dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 of the Dutch Resident at Vengurle which described it thus:<sup>1374</sup>

Having decided to enter the war against Shivaji, Lakham Savant dispatched his troops at night, and at different times, with an order to raise false alarms and fool Shivaji's forces into abandoning Kudal. But the failure of this stratagem compelled him to swallow his pride and woo his erstwhile allies, the *desais* in the Konkan, whose advice he had formerly forsaken. Once more a force of 4000 troops was assembled and sent against Kudal. They made a small attack in the night of 7<sup>th</sup>/8<sup>th</sup> March 1660. The garrison defended it till sunrise when, seeing that their powder was exhausted, they set the town ablaze and retired by different routes. As soon as they were expelled from Kudal, the feudal chief of Achare, 30 km to the northwest, rose against them and drove them out of their newly acquired seaports [in his territory]. Having learnt of the retreat of Shivaji's forces from Kudal, Rustam-i Zaman reported to the

Adilshah that the victorious campaign was carried out by his order, and sent a detachment of infantry and cavalry to take Kudal into his possession.

Rajapur, likewise, was evacuated by Shivaji's forces about this time, apparently without a fight, as is revealed by the English letter from Rajapur of 19<sup>th</sup> March 1660, which speaks of the arrival of Abdul Karim, the former governor of Rajapur, with some 100 soldiers.<sup>1375</sup>

Dabhol was also lost about the same time. Although no direct evidence about this exists, it may be inferred from the fact that Shivaji had to recapture it from Adilshahi forces in February 1661.

Thus, within less than two months, Shivaji's precarious hold along some 150 km of the coastline from Dabhol to Kudal came to an end.

#### SHAYISTA KHAN'S MARCH TO PUNE (MARCH - MAY 1660)

Shayista Khan's advance from Sonavadi, where he had reached on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1660, is described in the *Alamgirnama* as follows:<sup>1376</sup>


"From Sonavadi, Shayista Khan marched to Supe, occupied the small mud fort at that place which had been evacuated by the Marathas, and appointed Jadhavrao there to arrange the supply of grain and other provisions to the army.<sup>1377</sup> It was observed at this time that the enemy forces, as is the usual practice among people of the Deccan, were lurking around the Mughal army to make harassing attacks. It was decided therefore to detail by turn one officer, with three or four thousand cavalry, to protect the foraging parties. The army encamped at Baramati in the Supe Pargana on 5<sup>th</sup> April 1660. Shayista Khan left a detachment there to repair the small dilapidated mud fort at the place and remain on guard. Then the army resumed its march and encamped on the bank of the Nira River. It was reported at this time that

Shivaji's forces had arrived and remained concealed at a distance of about 10 *kos* [30 km] from the Mughal army. Shayista Khan dispatched Sharza Khan with 3,000 cavalry against them. The enemy forces were unable to stand their ground before him and fled. The army reached the village of Hol on the south bank of the Nira River on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1660. After two stages, they reached Shirwal to find the fort at that place destroyed by the enemy. Here they encamped for three or four days. It was decided to construct new works and leave a detachment at that place. News was brought at this time that enemy forces had assembled around the Rajgad fort, 10 *kos* [30 km] from Shirwal, and four or five other of Shivaji's forts in its vicinity. Shamsuddin Khan with the vanguard, Rao Bha Singh with his followers, Sharza Khan with several *Deccanis* and the artillery commander Mir Abdul Mabud with 1,000 musketeers were ordered to destroy them. The enemy forces did not have the power to stand their ground and fled. Then the Mughals laid waste the villages around Rajgad and encamped there on that day. They joined the main body on the evening of the next day. When the army resumed its march on the following day the enemy made a bold attack on their baggage. As soon as Rao Bha Singh, the officer of the rear guard, learnt of this he arrived there and drove them away. The baggage did not suffer any damage. On this day the army encamped at Shivapur, 25 km from Shirwal. The ridge between Shirwal and Pune was crossed by two very difficult tracks which branched off from the village of Garade. It was reported that enemy forces had assembled at the foot of the pass. From Shivapur, Shayista Khan sent Shamsuddin Khan with some diggers and axemen towards one track to improve it if it was found practicable for the passage of the army. He himself went to reconnoiter the other track and

established outposts near the ridge. It was reported after some time that there was a third track in the centre of the ridge which, if repaired, would be easily negotiable by carriages. Whereupon, Shayista Khan sent some diggers and axemen, escorted by 1,500 troopers of his own, to improve that track. This was done by the evening. On this day Raja Rai Singh had gone for foraging. Some 4,000 enemy troopers advanced to attack him. Having received this news, Shayista Khan dispatched Sar-afraz Khan with several *Deccanis* and 1,000 of his own troopers to Raja Rai Singh's succour. With the arrival of this reinforcement the enemy thought the better of it and retired. The next day Shayista Khan set out from Shivapur and by mid-day arrived at the foot of the pass. After crossing it the army covered three and a half *kos* [11 km] more and encamped at the village of Garade. Rao Bhaos Singh was appointed with the rearguard to arrange the passage of the baggage and the rest of the army. When the Mughal army descended the pass 3,000 enemy horsemen appeared below the foot of the pass. He boldly attacked and scattered the enemy. But they rallied and attacked again. Having learnt this, Shayista Khan dispatched Shamsuddin Khan to support the rearguard. He hastened to the scene and attacked the enemy. Finding it impossible to stand their ground the enemy fled.

"The next day the army encamped at Saswad.<sup>1378</sup> Thence Shayista Khan dispatched a party of his own musketeers to devastate the villages around Purandar which was one of the best of Shivaji's forts, situated seven kilometers from Saswad. This detachment was attacked by 3,000 enemy horsemen. Though outnumbered and unsupported it made a determined stand, assailed the enemy with musket-fire and, when its ammunition was exhausted, set to with

swords. Twenty-four of its men, including three or four *jamaatdars*,<sup>1379</sup> were killed and twenty-five were wounded. A loss of several men, in killed and wounded, was inflicted upon the enemy. As soon as Shayista Khan learnt this he left Raja Rai Singh and Rao Bhaosingh to protect the camp and with others hastened thither. As the enemy did not have the power to fight with them, he fled. Shayista Khan chased them up to the plateau below fort Purandar. The enemy assailed the Mughals with rockets and musket-balls. Some of Shamsuddin Khan's men advanced further whereupon perceiving their small number the enemy attacked them. But despite heavy fire from the towers and walls of the fort Shamsuddin Khan advanced up to the fort, attacked the enemy, killed many of them and drove away the rest. As the sun was about to set and the army had come seven kilometers from the camp, Shayista Khan gave up the chase and returned to the camp.



“The next day he resumed his march and encamped at Rajewadi. A large hill was situated astride his direction of march and it was necessary to construct a track across it which required some time. Besides, news was received at this time that the enemy had set fire to grain and fodder and had removed all traces of habitation around Pune and Chakan.<sup>1380</sup> Shayista Khan encamped there for four days so that the army could go out and obtain provisions of some days.

“On 7<sup>th</sup> May 1660 he set out thence and arrived at the top of the plateau. After most of the army and part of the baggage had crossed the pass he himself went ahead leaving Sar-afraz Khan and Jadhavrao with a detachment, including his own contingent, to protect the baggage from enemy attacks while it was crossing the ridge. The enemy persisted in boldly seizing opportunities to plunder the baggage, and the Mughals kept destroying them. At last the entire baggage safely descended the ridge and encamped below. After two more stages Shayista Khan arrived at Pune.”

The *Alamgirnama* is silent about the devastation that was carried out by the Mughal army. The ‘Memorandum regarding Administrations over Supe District’ has, under 1071 A.H. (28<sup>th</sup> August 1660 to 16<sup>th</sup> August 1661), the following laconic entry:<sup>1381</sup>

“When Shayista Khan came all the country was devastated.”

The *Shivabharat* is a little more elaborate. It states:<sup>1382</sup>

“Then Shayista Khan . . . arrived near the Bhima River which formed the boundary of the enemy’s territory. The Muslim army destroyed temples,<sup>1383</sup> demolished monasteries, razed the houses of the principal men to the ground, cut down trees in gardens and laid waste many ancient villages and

towns. Thus the country bore the appearance of the moon in total eclipse."

Why did Shayista Khan take this roundabout route to Pune? It would appear that his idea was to advance into the heart of the enemy's territory and bring them to battle or overawe them into surrender by demonstration of his strength. But the Marathas refused battle and kept hovering around his army, waylaying them at every difficult defile and cutting off stragglers and foraging parties. This Fabian strategy<sup>1384</sup> must have disillusioned the Khan of all his hopes of ending the campaign by a swift single blow. He must also have realized that with the onset of the rains it would be difficult to bring in supplies along his long line of communication across the Bhima. Nor would his immense host be able to subsist on the surrounding country. It is for these reasons that he appears to have changed his mind and decided to fall back to Pune.

#### THE SIEGE OF PANHALA

As Jauhar's army approached Panhala, Shivaji made an attempt to divert them by a raid to the very gates of Bijapur. It is described in a Dutch letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 from Vengurle thus:<sup>1385</sup>

Shivaji seeing that Siddi Jauhar had arrived quite near to the fort of Panhala, to which he had retired as a place of refuge, speedily dispatched four or five thousand cavalry from his army by another route to Bijapur, which, within an incredibly short time attacked at night unexpectedly the suburb of Bijapur called Shahpur and took it into possession after some feeble resistance and freely plundered it, which caused an unusual terror at the royal Court. But as it was learnt that the enemy was not strong, the Adilshah sent his bodyguard consisting of 5,000 cavalry, which was the whole army that was left in Bijapur, under the command of Khawas Khan,<sup>1386</sup> the feudal lord of Vengurle, against the cavalry of Shivaji.

The armies struggled very long and it was doubtful which party would be successful. But the men of His majesty [i.e. the Adilshah] achieved so much that Shivaji's people finally retreated six miles not without a great loss. The Siddi general [i.e. Siddi Jauhar] when he was informed of the surprise attack, sent to Bijapur 4,000 to 5,000 cavalry for the safety of Ali Adilshah.

Another Dutch letter, dated 27<sup>th</sup> July 1660, from Vengurle which describes the siege of Panhala, is probably referring to the same raid when it states:<sup>1387</sup>

“In the meanwhile Shivaji’s people appeared now and again with a flying army about Bijapur and tried unsuccessful attempts to decoy Siddi Jauhar from his camp, but they had to flee with some loss every time they tried to do so.”

The Englishmen too came to know about this raid. In their letter from Rajapur to Revington, who was on his way to Panhala, they wrote on 5<sup>th</sup> April 1660:<sup>1388</sup>

“Yours of the 2<sup>nd</sup> instant from Raypatan<sup>1389</sup> and another of the 3<sup>rd</sup> ditto from Anuskura<sup>1390</sup> were delivered us yesterday....We are now glad to hear of the victory you say the King [i.e. the Adilshah] has obtained against Shivaji, and hope your next will confirm the truth thereof.”

And in another, dated 17<sup>th</sup> April 1660, they wrote to Revington who had reached Panhala:<sup>1391</sup>

“We should be very glad that Shivaji’s forces that were at Bijapur were gone towards home, as is reported, so that there might be the more hopes of gaining that castle out of his hands.”

The Rajapur letter of 5<sup>th</sup> April 1660 quoted above enables us to fix the date of this raid. It is evident that Revington’s colleagues at Rajapur had learnt of the Adilshahi victory against Shivaji’s forces from Revington’s letter of 2<sup>nd</sup> April from Raypatan or of 3<sup>rd</sup> April from Anuskura, or from both. Considering the time required for this news to reach Raypatan

or Anuskura from Bijapur, we could place this raid in March 1660.

The *Shivabharat*, too, briefly mentions this foray. It states that Netoji with a large army burnt Shahpur, put the enemy to flight and then, on receiving Shivaji's message, returned to Rajgad with [Siddi] Hilal.<sup>1392</sup> This shows that it was Netoji who led this raid on Shahpur. However the poet's assertion that Netoji defeated the enemy cannot be accepted because it is contradicted by the Dutch and English sources quoted above. Though the *Shivabharat* is a very reliable authority, it was written by Shivaji's order and therefore its author might have been tempted to distort facts which were, in his opinion, discreditable to his master. That he dismisses this incident in a couple of verses is significant.

So much about Netoji's raid on Bijapur. His further and direct attempts to raise the siege of Panhala are described in the *Shivabharat* thus:<sup>1393</sup>

When Netoji returned to Rajgad, Shivaji's mother Jijabai reproved him for having returned out of fear of the enemy, leaving his master in the beleaguered fortress and declared her resolve to go herself to the rescue of her only son. Netoji dissuaded her from her determination and himself set out towards Panhala. When Jauhar learnt of the enemy's approach he dispatched a part of his army to intercept them. In the ensuing battle the relieving force was routed and Siddi Yahya, son of Siddi Hilal, was wounded, unhorsed and taken prisoner.

After this repulse Netoji appears to have made some more unsuccessful attempts to raise the siege of Panhala, for the *Shivabharat* states:<sup>1394</sup> "Thus though those led by Netoji were fighting day after day they did not get an opportunity to enter the fort".

An event occurred now which was to have far-reaching effects upon the relations between Shivaji and the English. Henry Revington, the meddlesome and presumptuous chief of the English trading station at Rajapur, was trying to sell some

mortar pieces and grenades to the Adilshahi nobleman Rustam-i Zaman.<sup>1395</sup> To him the siege of Panhala appeared to be an excellent opportunity to strike a good deal and he immediately opened correspondence with the Adilshah and Siddi Jauhar. The latter asked for a sample and sent some of his men to Rajapur.<sup>1396</sup> Whereupon Revington with two of his colleagues — Philip Giffard and William Mingham, the gunner employed by the Rajapur factors — and the Rajapur factory's Hindu broker Veljee set out on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1660 with one mortar and fifty "granado shells" to give an on-site demonstration.<sup>1397</sup> Marching by way of Raypatan and the Anuskura pass they arrived at Kolhapur, met an escort, including a palanquin and a horse sent by Jauhar, and were conducted to the besiegers' camp to be courteously received by the Adilshahi commander himself.<sup>1398</sup> How the demonstration went we do not know but it appears from a letter from Revington's colleagues who were left at Rajapur that Jauhar showed his willingness to buy the English wares and that Revington had proposed to accept, in lieu of cash payment, the remission of duty on any saltpeter the English might buy in future.<sup>1399</sup> By 15<sup>th</sup> May 1660, Richard Taylor and Rowland Garway, who were at Rajapur, had also joined their colleagues at Panhala.<sup>1400</sup> By 5<sup>th</sup> June 1660 Richard Napier too was with them at Kolhapur where Jauhar might have set up his base camp.<sup>1401</sup> The correspondence of these Englishmen shows that they alternated between Panhala and Kolhapur at least till 12<sup>th</sup> October 1660.<sup>1402</sup>

#### CAPTURE OF WASOTA (6TH JUNE 1660)

The Jedhe Chronology states that Shivaji (or his forces) captured Wasota fort<sup>1403</sup> on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1660.<sup>1404</sup> This is supported by two contemporaneous documents. Maratha forces plundered Rajapur in March 1661 and took some Englishmen prisoner. From Rajapur the Englishmen were sent to Wasota and, before 8<sup>th</sup> June 1661, were removed to the Songad fort. In their letter to Surat dated 10<sup>th</sup> June 1661, they informed the Surat Council that they had received the Council's letter at Songad on 8<sup>th</sup> June,

and that they had previously written a letter to Surat from Wasota castle.<sup>1405</sup> It follows that Wasota had come into Shivaji's possession sometime before 8<sup>th</sup> June 1661.

Bapuji Ratnoji, the *Deshmukh* of Kudal district (in the uplands), was taken captive by Shivaji's forces and kept imprisoned at Wasota for a year. He was then released on a bond against ransom for which some persons stood security. Bapuji sold some of his land to raise the necessary amount. The deed of sale, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1664, is extant. Therein Bapuji explains the circumstances, including his imprisonment at Wasota, which compelled him to sell the land.<sup>1406</sup> As the deed of sale was made sometime after Bapuji's release and as he was kept imprisoned at Wasota for about a year before that, the fort must have come into Shivaji's possession sometime before that date.

#### **SHIVAJI'S ESCAPE FROM PANHALA (JULY 1660)**

In his letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> July 1660, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle remarks that Shivaji's idea in going to Panhala was that the onset of monsoons which was drawing near would force Jauhar to raise the siege.<sup>1407</sup> However, despite the commencement of the rainy season, Jauhar showed no inclination to do so. The same letter tells us that the Adilshahi commander erected hovels to shelter his men and pressed on with the siege. The resident also mentions 'strong rumours' that there was a shortage of provisions in the fort. But just as the prize appeared to be within his grasp, Jauhar's hopes were dashed with Shivaji's escape from Panhala.

The *Shivabharat*, Jedhe Chronology and a dispatch dated 15<sup>th</sup> September 1660 of the Dutch Resident at Vengurle are our main authorities for this episode. The last source mentions the receipt of a letter from the besieging army by a Hindu merchant at Vengurle and draws part of its information from that letter.

Panhala is perched on an immense mountain-mass covered with thick vegetation, strewn with boulders and cut by

brooks and ravines. The periphery of the fortifications on the summit is about seven kilometers and that of the mountain mass at its base is much greater. The siege therefore could not be an unbroken cordon but was rather a chain of outposts established below the mountain.

Shivaji first sent out scouts who reconnoitered a route to slip through the besiegers' lines.<sup>1408</sup> Then, one day, he sent an envoy named Gangadhar with a message to Jauhar that he was willing to meet the Adilshahi commander personally and deliver all his possessions if Jauhar promised to pardon him for his past offences and protect him as would a father.<sup>1409</sup> We do not know the effect of this overture but it might possibly have relaxed the vigilance of the besiegers. Shivaji appointed Trimbak Bhaskar as the commandant of the fort before setting out.<sup>1410</sup> In the first quarter of the following night, i.e. 13<sup>th</sup> July 1660, Shivaji sneaked out of the fort under cover of darkness aided by stormy weather and torrents of rain.<sup>1411</sup> He was carried in a palanquin and was accompanied by 600 infantry.<sup>1412</sup> The party slipped out of the besiegers' lines and headed for Vishalgad.<sup>1413</sup> But their nocturnal adventure was spotted by some enemy scouts and was reported to Jauhar.<sup>1414</sup> Though his heart sank in bitter disappointment as all the exertions and vigilance of the past three or four months had proved in vain, Jauhar kept his head and dispatched a pursuing force, comprising 1000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, under his son-in-law Siddi Masud.<sup>1415</sup> What followed is briefly described in an entry in the Jedhe Chronology thus:<sup>1416</sup>

“13<sup>th</sup> July 1660: His Highness [i.e. Shivaji] came down from Panhala and went to Khelna [i.e. Vishalgad]. Siddi Jauhar's army came in pursuit. A great *mêlée* occurred during which Bandal's<sup>1417</sup> men fought valorously. Men perished. Baji Prabhu, the *deshkulkarni* [of Hirdas Maval], was killed.”

The Jedhe Chronicle is slightly more explicit. It states:<sup>1418</sup>

“Siddi Jauhar laid siege to Panhala. When Shivaji came down from the fort and was coming to Khelna [i.e. Vishalgad], Siddi Jauhar came in pursuit. At that

time Shivaji stationed Baji Prabhu, the Deshpande, and the contingent of Bandals in the Gajapur pass and went to Khelna. Baji Prabhu and [his] men fought valorously. Baji Prabhu and some men perished. The enemy was not allowed to ascend [the pass]. Siddi Jauhar went back.”

The term ‘Siddi Jauhar’ in the above excerpt should be taken to mean the force dispatched by him, and not himself in person. This action in the Gajapur pass is described by some chronicles.<sup>1419</sup> But the *Shivabharat* makes no mention of it. However, it tells us of one more obstacle which Shivaji had to overcome before reaching the safety of Vishalgad.

Siddi Jauhar had stationed the contingents of Suryarao Surve, the Chief of Prabhanvalli,<sup>1420</sup> and Jaswantrao Dalvi, the Chief of Palavani,<sup>1421</sup> and some other chieftains before Vishalgad.<sup>1422</sup> Their strength is not known but these petty Chiefs could not have mustered more than a few hundred men and apparently they were stationed not to besiege the fort but only to establish pickets to prevent the garrison of Vishalgad from making harassing sorties on the besiegers of Panhala. Shivaji forced his way through them and entered Vishalgad fort.<sup>1423</sup> By this time, he and his escort had covered some 64 km in 21 hours.<sup>1424</sup>

Meanwhile, Siddi Masud joined the detachment that was watching Vishalgad whereupon the garrison sallied out and fell upon them. The Adilshahi troops, according to the *Shivabharat*, broke into a headlong flight. Masud rallied them for a while but ultimately they were routed and returned to Jauhar’s camp.<sup>1425</sup> Soon thereafter, Shivaji went to Rajgad.<sup>1426</sup>

Shivaji honoured the Bandals for the conspicuous bravery their contingent had displayed in delaying Siddi Masud.<sup>1427</sup>

Khandoji Khopade had sided with Afzal Khan despite the fact that Shivaji had intervened on his behalf in the Utravali subdivision. Kanhoji Jedhe’s intercession had somehow managed in sparing Khandoji’s life, but Shivaji caused one hand and one leg of the traitor to be amputated as punishment.<sup>1428</sup>

Kanhoji, trusted servant, colleague and counsellor of Shivaji, died about September 1660.<sup>1429</sup>

#### SIEGE AND FALL OF CHAKAN (JUNE-AUGUST 1660)

As related earlier, Shayista Khan arrived in Pune on 10<sup>th</sup> May 1660. He initially intended to camp there for the rainy season which was expected to begin soon. But during his stay of about 40 days at Pune, his troops on foraging expeditions had to fight with the enemy very frequently. Furthermore, the rivers in flood astride his communications between Mughal territory and Pune made it difficult to obtain provisions. He therefore decided to fall back towards Chakan where it would have been easier to obtain supplies because only one river — the Bhima — separated that town from Mughal territory. Once this was decided upon, it followed that the period of enforced inactivity during the rainy season should be put to good use by reducing the fort at Chakan.<sup>1430</sup> Apart from shortening Mughal communications to Ahmednagar, its possession would have also opened a subsidiary line of supply via Junnar and Nashik.

The small fort (*gadhi*) of Chakan lies about 25 km north of Pune.<sup>1431</sup> Its defences comprised a square built in stones and eight towers — four at the corners and one in the centre of each side. The walls were surrounded by a ditch.<sup>1432</sup>

The *Alamgirnama* describes the siege of Chakan as follows:<sup>1433</sup>

Shayista Khan left Pune and on 21<sup>st</sup> June 1660 arrived at Chakan. After reconnoitering the fort he detailed the various contingents in the army to invest it from all sides.<sup>1434</sup> The contingents of Giridhar Kunwar, Biramdev Shisodiya, Habash Khan, Trimbakji Bhosale, Dawaji and Shayista Khan himself were stationed in the north. The gate of the fort was in the eastern wall. Contingents of Shamsuddin Khan, Sayyid Khan, Uzbek Khan, Khudawand (the Abyssinian), Mir Abdul Mabud (the commander of artillery), Vijay Singh (the commander of Rana Raj

Singh's contingent which was stationed in the Deccan<sup>1435</sup>), Sultan Ali Arab and Alayar Bukhari took post on that side. Troops of Rao Bhao Singh, Sar-afraz Khan, Jadhavrao, Johar Khan the Abyssinian and several Deccani officers were appointed in the south and those of Raja Rai Singh Shisodia and others in the west. Then the besiegers began running trenches and saps towards the fort and erecting *damdamas* (high ramps) to mount heavy cannons brought from the Mughal forts in the Deccan.

Chakan proved formidable. Despite a heavy downpour, a hot exchange of fire was kept up night and day. The Mughals attacked the *gadhi* with their guns and muskets. The garrison replied with their rockets and, whenever an opportunity occurred, sallied out and attacked the besiegers in their trenches.

Fifty-six days passed thus. By that time a mine from the trenches of Shayista Khan's contingent was carried to the bastion before them. It was filled up with explosives and the men were ordered to attack the fort from all sides as soon as the mine was ignited on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1660. When three hours of the day remained, i.e. at about three o'clock, the mine was ignited on Shayista Khan's signal, the bastion was blown up together with the men on top of it and the besiegers attacked the fort from all sides. But the explosion created a high mound of debris in the breach and, standing on it, the garrison showered rockets, balls, grenades (*huqqas*) and stones on the attackers.<sup>1436</sup> The attack was thus held up. The Mughals resumed the attack the next morning and forced their way inside the fort whereupon the garrison fell back to the citadel. In these two assaults the Mughals lost 268 killed and 600 wounded. The position of the garrison was now untenable. So negotiations were opened through Rao Bhao Singh, and the garrison capitulated.

Shayista Khan inspected the fort on the following day and gave orders for its repair and maintenance. The fort was renamed Islamabad in accordance with the Emperor's orders

and Uzbek Khan was appointed its commandant. Then Shayista Khan returned to Pune.

The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1582 that in the month of Ashwin (25<sup>th</sup> September to 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1660) Shayista Khan captured the fort of Chakan and then came to Pune.<sup>1437</sup>

According to the *Alamgirnama*, as related above, the fort was captured on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1660. It appears therefore that the entry in the Jedhe Chronology refers to Shayista Khan's second arrival at Pune and not to the capture of the fort. A news report dated 28<sup>th</sup> September 1660 from Aurangabad reports that Rahimdad, son of Adam son of Darya, *mansabdar* of 100/10 who was killed in the operations at Chakan, was recommended for a daily allowance of one and a half rupees but the Emperor had sanctioned only one rupee.<sup>1438</sup>

Tactically, Chakan was a relatively minor affair but it appears that the valiant defence of the fort made a deep impression on Shayista Khan. Even after the rainy season was over, he desisted from any serious attempt to besiege Maratha hill-fortresses. Instead, he adopted the strategy of occupying as much of Shivaji's dominions as possible. He sent some troops to occupy north Konkan.<sup>1439</sup>

Shayista Khan received some reinforcements shortly after the capture of Chakan. The *Alamgirnama* records between the entries for 13<sup>th</sup> October and 6<sup>th</sup> November 1660:<sup>1440</sup>

"Jafar Khan, the *subadar* of Malwa, was ordered that he should keep some of his men there [i.e. in Malwa] and go with the rest in the south to reinforce Amir-ul Umra."<sup>1441</sup>

We do not know how long Jafar Khan stayed in the Deccan. He seems to have returned to Malwa soon afterwards. It is certain that in the latter half of 1663 he was summoned to Court and was appointed the *wazir* of the empire in place of Fazil Khan who had died in June 1663.<sup>1442</sup>

Chakan capitulated soon after Shivaji's arrival at Rajgad. As Shivaji thought it difficult to continue the war on both fronts, he sent a message to Trimbak Bhaskar, the commandant of Panhala, to surrender the fort to the Adilshah. Accordingly Trimbak Bhaskar delivered the fort to Jauhar and returned to Shivaji.<sup>1443</sup> The Jedhe Chronology says Shivaji ceded Panhala to Salabat Khan on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1660 and made peace.<sup>1444</sup>

Meanwhile the Adilshah, having learnt of Shivaji's escape from Panhala, had set out from Bijapur on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1660.<sup>1445</sup> But apparently Jauhar had taken possession of the fort while the Adilshah was on his way to Panhala.

At the same time Shivaji was also trying to end the war with the Mughals as is evident from the following entry in the Jedhe Chronology under Shaka 1582:<sup>1446</sup> "In the month of Kartik [24<sup>th</sup> October to 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1660] Sonaji Pandit took leave of Shayista Khan and came to the Raja [i.e. Shivaji] at Rajgad." Sonajipant was Shivaji's Minister for External Affairs. What transpired in his meeting with Shayista Khan is not known. But it is evident that Sonaji's mission was unsuccessful.

#### THE MUGHAL GAIN OF PARANDA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (NOVEMBER 1660)

While the Adilshah gained an important fortress in the south he lost another in the north. Ghalib, the commandant of the Adilshahi fort of Paranda, sent his son to Shayista Khan and offered to give up the fort to the Mughals. When the Khan reported the offer to the Emperor he ordered the Khan to assure Ghalib of Imperial favour and send a force to take charge of the fort. Accordingly, Shayista Khan sent Sar-afraz Khan, Jadhavrao, Kartalab Khan and some other *mansabdars* to Paranda. Ghalib handed over the fort to them on 21<sup>st</sup> November 1660. Then he came to Shayista Khan along with Kartalab Khan and met him on 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1660. Shayista Khan gave him robes of honour, an elephant, nine horses, a jeweled dagger and Rs.75,000 in cash. When the matter was reported to the Emperor he conferred upon Ghalib, as he had desired, the

*mansab* of 4,000 *dhat*/4,000 *sawar*, and the title of Khan and appointed Mukhtar Khan as commandant of Paranda.<sup>1447</sup>

The acquisition of Paranda was an act of shortsighted policy on the part of the Mughals for, though the Adilshah could not be unaware of the forward policy of the Mughal Empire, the loss of Paranda was bound to make him doubly aware of it. This, it seems, led him not only to question the wisdom of destroying Shivaji in conjunction with the Mughals but to look upon him as a bulwark against Mughal expansionism. At the same time he would also want to check Shivaji's incursions into the Adilshahi Sultanate and, if possible, to recapture the territory which had been lost to him. These two divergent motives determined the course of the tortuous policy which he pursued thereafter. Whenever Shivaji was fiercely at war with the Mughals, the Adilshah either remained neutral or restricted himself to some minor operations. He never opened an all out offensive against Shivaji at such times. Whenever Shivaji's war with the Mughals languished, the Adilshah tried to intensify efforts to restrain Shivaji. The course of Shivaji's wars with the Mughals and the Adilshahi Sultanate is sufficient in itself to reveal this policy. The Dutch merchant Zandluliet in his letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1664 from Vengurle, wrote to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies that Shivaji "is even called by many the only preserver of this Empire [of Bijapur], which otherwise...would have been conquered long before by the Mughal."<sup>1448</sup> This perception is also touched upon in contemporary English letters.<sup>1449</sup> The earliest of these is a letter from Surat quoted by Benjamin Lannoy, the English Consul at Aleppo, in his letter of 14<sup>th</sup> April 1665. It says that the Adilshah was "looking upon Shivaji as a bulwark against the King of India [i.e. the Mughal Emperor]."<sup>1450</sup>

Bernier writes:

"Shivaji, the gentle leader lately spoken of profiting of the distracted state of the kingdom, has seized upon many strongholds, situated for the most part in the mountains. This man is exercising all the powers of an independent sovereign; laughs at the

threats both of the Mughal and of the King of Bijapur; makes frequent incursions and ravages the country on every side from Surat to the gates of Goa. Yet it cannot be doubted that notwithstanding the deep wounds which from time to time he inflicts upon Bijapur, the kingdom find in this daring chieftain a seasonable and powerful coadjutor. He distracts the attention of Aurangzeb by his bold and never ceasing enterprises, and affords so much employment to the Indian armies, that the Mughals cannot find the opportunity of achieving the conquest of Bijapur. How to put down Shivaji is become the object of chief importance.”<sup>1451</sup>



In 1665, Jai Singh too wrote to Aurangzeb that though the Adilshah had made a show of loyalty and service to the

Emperor, in reality he had considered help to Shivaji as security to his own territory.<sup>1452</sup>

Since Shivaji ceded Panhala to the Adilshahi Sultanate and thereby removed the immediate threat to Bijapur, he was never faced by a powerful Adilshahi offensive while he was locked in mortal struggle with the Mughals. This may be due partly to other distractions and limitations imposed upon the Adilshahi Sultanate but its perception of Shivaji as a bulwark against the Mughal Empire also appears to have played an important part in it.

#### REVOLT OF SIDDI JAUHAR (1661)

After Shivaji ceded the fort of Panhala to the Adilshahi, Ali Adilshah planned the invasion of Malnad (Kingdom of Ikkeri) but he was faced by a new crisis.<sup>1453</sup> It was the rebellion of Jauhar. The *Shivabharat* states that Ali Adilshah sent a letter to Siddi Jauhar in which he accused the Siddi of being bribed by Shivaji and conniving at his escape, and ordered him to come and deliver that money on pain of death.<sup>1454</sup> The *Tarikh-i Ali*, too, accuses Jauhar of conspiring with Shivaji.<sup>1455</sup> But the *Shivabharat* asserts that Jauhar was innocent and had nothing to do with Shivaji's escape.<sup>1456</sup> The Dagh Register, evidently on the basis of a dispatch from India, records under 30<sup>th</sup> April 1661, that Siddi Jauhar Salabat Khan, owing to some grievance he felt, disowned Adilshahi standards and replaced them with new ones "after the Mughal fashion."<sup>1457</sup> If this is correct, Jauhar's rebellion would appear to be instigated by the Mughals. Perhaps the Adilshah's accusation of conspiracy with Shivaji, as the *Shivabharat* tells us, might have caused him to revolt and adopt the Mughal standard entirely on his own initiative to obtain support of the Mughals without actually being instigated by them. But the cause of the Adilshah's suspicion remains unknown. Perhaps Jauhar's enemies at the Court had poisoned his mind. Perhaps Shivaji might have leaked out this disinformation.

Be that as it may, Ali Adilshah suspended the invasion of Malnad for the time being and set out from Bijapur on 26<sup>th</sup> January 1661 to deal with Jauhar.<sup>1458</sup> In a battle fought near the Mudgal fort, Jauhar was defeated and fled to his *jagir* at Kurnool.<sup>1459</sup> Then he suddenly died while Ali Adilshah was marching against him thither.<sup>1460</sup> It is alleged by some contemporaneous sources that he was poisoned by the Adilshah.<sup>1461</sup> Jauhar's son Abdul Aziz and son-in-law Siddi Masud were pardoned by the Adilshah at the intercession of Prime Minister Abdul Muhammad and Abd-ur Rahim Bahlul Khan, and retained in service.<sup>1462</sup>

A Mughal newsletter dated 30<sup>th</sup> September 1661 from Hyderabad reports that the Qutbshah's spies had brought the news that Siddi Jauhar had died and Ali Adilshah had marched towards fort Kurnool.<sup>1463</sup>

#### BATTLE OF UMBARKHIND


Sometime after January 1661, Shayista Khan appointed Kartalab Khan with some *mansabdars* on an expedition into North Konkan. Its object, according to the *Shivabharat*, was to capture Nagothane, Chaul, Panvel, Kalyan and Bhiwandi — in short, North Konkan.<sup>1464</sup> The strength of the force placed under Kartalab Khan's command is not known. All that the *Shivabharat* tells us is that it included contingents of Kachhwah, Chauhan, Amar Singh, Mitrasen and his brother, Sarjerao Gadhe, Rai Baghan, Jaswantrao Kokate and Jadhavrao.<sup>1465</sup> Altogether, the force placed under Kartalab Khan's command probably numbered rather less than 10,000 troopers and perhaps a detachment of the Imperial infantry.

As for the route by which Kartalab Khan crossed the Sahyadri range, the *Shivabharat* says:


“Then he [i.e. Kartalab Khan] began to descend the Sahyadri range by the north-south route of [i.e. near] Lohagad. While marching along that narrow foot-track which resembled the barrel of a gun, the army was hindered at every stage.”<sup>1466</sup>

It further relates that some distance below this pass the army entered a thick forest called Udumbarkhand.<sup>1467</sup> From this brief description, this pass has been identified as the Kuruwande Pass which is situated about five kilometers south of the Bor Pass.<sup>1468</sup> The village of Umbare lies about six kilometers to the west of the Kuruwande Pass. The track between the pass and the village runs through a precipitous gorge completely commanded by forest-clad hills rising on both sides. At Umbare, the track turns south along the eastern face of a hill which blocks its westward progress. Thus, it is here shut by hills in front, rear and on each side so that it corresponds extremely well with the *Shivabharat* which compares it with the ‘barrel of a gun’. This gorge seems to be the place which the *Shivabharat* has called Umbarkhand.<sup>1469</sup> An army strung out along this track would have no room for retreat nor to rally and deploy, and there is no point where they could easily break out into the open. On the other hand, their adversary could conceal his troops in the forest-clad hills or in dead ground at a comparatively short distance away from the track and assail them with musket-shots and arrows without coming to close quarters. In short, it is a virtual death-trap.

The reasons why Kartalab Khan chose this unfrequented and difficult route are obscure. Perhaps the other and more usual pass in the neighbourhood — the Bor pass — was held in strength by Shivaji’s troops and the Khan was trying to outflank them.



## UMBARKHIND, 1661



1 foot = 0.3048 metre  
1 metre = 3.28 feet

— Foot track

North  
Scale 1 cm. = 1.25 km.  
0 1.25 2.5 km.

Ref. : Survey of India Toposheet Number 47F  
Scale 1 : 2,53,440, Year of publication :1925

Evidently, Shivaji knew his enemy's intentions and had not failed to notice the exceptionally good opportunities of surprise which the terrain offered. Furthermore, he must have perceived that trapped in this gorge, the enemy would lose their advantage in artillery and heavy cavalry. He concealed his infantry in the forest and awaited his quarry. The strength of his force is not known but we know that immediately after this battle he marched southward at the head of some 20,000 infantry and a detachment of cavalry.

What occurred after Kartalab Khan descended the Sahyadri range and entered the forest is related in the *Shivabharat*:<sup>1470</sup>

The Khan, evidently without taking the most elementary precautions, entered the trap unsuspectingly. Then, when they were well inside the snare, the stillness of the forest was suddenly broken by the ominous beating of Maratha war-drums, proclaiming their doom, and was followed by showers of musket-balls and arrows. This sudden onslaught caused a stampede in the Mughal army. Mitrasen and Amar Singh checked the rout for a while and tried to fight back by shooting showers of arrows. But their position was hopeless and to this was added the scorching heat of the mid-day sun. Caught in such desperate plight, Rai Baghan reproached the Khan for having led them into such a snare and advised him to surrender and save their lives. The Khan at once sent an emissary to parley with the enemy.<sup>1471</sup> Some Maratha troops took him to their master. The emissary found Shivaji seated on a magnificent horse surrounded by armour-clad mounted archers. Shivaji himself was also clad in armour and helmet and held a long spear in his right hand. A scabbard hung from his golden belt and a large shield was tied in his sash.

As the emissary, with his head bowed in humility, approached near, Shivaji raised his eyebrows. Whereupon the former conveyed Kartalab Khan's

entreaty that they would surrender everything they had and should be allowed to go back alive. Shivaji granted the request and his cane-bearers immediately carried his order to cease fighting to the commanders of various Maratha contingents in the forest. Shortly afterwards the ransom was sent to Shivaji. In fact, the Mughal army abandoned their elephants, horses, treasure-chests and other effects and quickly left the forest.

This is how the *Shivabharat* describes the battle. But it does not record the date of the event, for which we have to turn to the chronologies. Though there is some confusion in the date given by them it would suffice to say that the battle was fought about 15<sup>th</sup> January 1661.<sup>1472</sup>

It may be asked why Shivaji allowed safe passage to Kartalab Khan instead of taking his entire army captive or slaughtering them to a man. Contemporaneous sources are silent on this point. As we have seen, Shivaji's Minister for External Affairs Sonajipant had recently returned from a visit to Shayista Khan. This shows that Shivaji was trying to bring about some treaty with the Mughals. Had Shivaji slaughtered Kartalab Khan's force, the Mughals would have done everything in their power to vindicate their honour. Driving them to such desperation might have jeopardized all chances of ending the war. It might be argued that taking the entire force prisoner would have strengthened Shivaji's position during the negotiations. But this would have occurred only if he had the status of a power comparable with the Mughal Empire. However, they considered Shivaji a petty rebel and such disaster to their arms would only have hardened their attitude towards his overtures of peace. They would have taken it as a challenge to the prestige and power of the Empire and would have refused to negotiate with such a victorious rebel. In any case, the Mughals had immense manpower at their disposal and the loss of such a comparatively small force would have strengthened their resolve to crush the rebel rather than forcing him to negotiate. On the other hand, Shivaji would not have attained

any material advantage by capturing a few thousand men. With their vastly superior manpower, the Mughals would not have felt the loss prohibitive and, for Shivaji, such a large number of prisoners would have merely proved an additional burden on his scarce resources. In short, the moral and political consequences of slaughtering or capturing Kartalab Khan's force would have far outweighed its dubious military gains. This however does not mean that Shivaji could have taken a unilateral decision to stop fighting. That would have been suicidal. His policy was to keep the campaign on as low a key as possible and simultaneously to try to end the war through negotiations. There was no point in doing anything which would hurt the pride of the Mughals and destroy all chances of diplomatic negotiation. Shivaji's decision to allow safe passage to Kartalab Khan's force was, thus, political.

War, as Clausewitz wrote, is an instrument of policy or a continuation of policy by other means. To inflict maximum damage upon the enemy is not, as is often believed, its fundamental aim. It is only to force the enemy to accept the political settlement you desire. Infliction of maximum possible damage upon the enemy may sometimes, but not always, serve this purpose. The means at Shivaji's disposal were not adequate to inflict such damage upon the Mughals. His war-policy therefore was to convince the Mughals, on the one hand, of his determination to defend his dominions and, on the other, their inability to impose their will upon him at a reasonable cost, while simultaneously trying to end the war by negotiation or political means. What strategy he adopted to convince the Mughals of their inability to force a decision, we shall see presently.

The Battle of Umbarkhind has a close tactical resemblance to the battle of Lake Trasimene (217 BCE). Hannibal had deliberately lured the Romans into a trap by threatening Rome and placing himself astride their route as they were hurrying to its relief. We do not know whether Shivaji had deliberately baited his trap by some such move or had merely exploited the opportunity presented by the enemy's carelessness.

#### THE SOUTH KONKAN EXPEDITION (FEBRUARY – APRIL 1661)<sup>1473</sup>

After his victory at Umbarkhind, Shivaji left Netoji Palkar to guard North Konkan and marched southward. According to the *Shivabharat*, Shivaji, having captured Dabhol, Chiplun, Sangameshwar, Rajapur and Palavani, had with him 15,000 infantry when he marched against Shringarpur during this campaign. The *Shivabharat* says he left 2,000 soldiers at Dabhol and placed a garrison in the fort of Mandangad. He must have also left garrisons at other places. According to a Dutch report from Vengurle, Shivaji sent 1,000 cavalry and about 3,000 infantry to take possession of Rajapur.<sup>1474</sup> It may be surmised from these figures that the total strength of the force with which Shivaji marched into South Konkan was around 20,000 infantry and a small detachment of cavalry. It seems that most of the cavalry was left with Netoji Palkar.

Apparently, no strong Adilshahi forces were present in South Konkan at this time and those that had been posted there fled at Shivaji's approach. Leaving a garrison of 2,000 at Dabhol, Shivaji pressed on southward.<sup>1475</sup> It would be remembered that Jaswantrao Dalvi (Chief of Palavani) and Suryarao Surve (Chief of Prabhavali) had participated in Jauhar's campaign against Shivaji. Fearing Shivaji's wrath now, Jaswantrao sought refuge at Shringarpur — the seat of Suryarao Surve's holdings. Bypassing Palavani, Shivaji entered Chiplun three or four days after he had left Dabhol. Sangameshwar and Devrukh were occupied next. Muslim officers fled from Sangameshwar at his approach. To guard and improve communications, Shivaji left a detachment at Sangameshwar under Pilaji Nilakanthrao and the veteran infantry officer Tanaji Malusare. He then sent a message to the Chief of Prabhavali to acknowledge his suzerainty and assist his detachment at Sangameshwar.

Shivaji arrived at Rajapur, about 50 km south-southwest of Devrukh, early in March.<sup>1476</sup> Foreign merchants in the town were summoned and compelled to pay a ransom.<sup>1477</sup> Many of them, it appears, were completely despoiled and even their houses were dug up in the quest for hidden wealth. Henry

Revington, the Chief of the English trading station at Rajapur, and seven other Englishmen were taken into captivity and their factory was dug up.<sup>1478</sup> Some Persians and Arab merchants were also taken captive for ransom.<sup>1479</sup>

The Dagh Register (1661) records:<sup>1480</sup>

“Concerning the English, the Resident [at Vengurle] writes that ... they have received no compensation for the munitions of war which they lent to the King of Bijapur for use against Shivaji; but they have suffered great damage from that rebel on their account. For he ... raised his head once more, and, reflecting on the injury he had received at the hands of the English, about the middle of March sent 1000 horse and about 3000 foot-soldiers to take possession of Rajapur. This force, on reaching the town, invited the principal inhabitants to come out and escort it in, according to custom, promising to do no harm. These simple [*sic*] men, suspecting no evil, went to the place of meeting, accompanied by the English Resident, Revington, with two or three other Englishmen, who thought it well to pay this mark of respect. They were all immediately seized and their property confiscated, after tortures had been inflicted. Revington and those who accompanied him were placed in one of Shivaji's fortresses; while the Englishmen who had remained behind in Rajapur were likewise imprisoned, and one died under torture. Their factory was entirely stripped, even the floor being dug up in search of hidden treasure.”

The passage mentions “the munitions of war which they [i.e. the English factors at Rajapur] lent to the King of Bijapur for use against Shivaji.” This evidently refers to the help which these Englishmen gave to Siddi Jauhar during his siege of Panhala in 1660. This also explains the harsh treatment Shivaji meted out to Revington and his colleagues. The allegation in the above passage that one of the Englishmen died under torture is not corroborated by contemporaneous English sources. In their

letter written from Songad prison in June 1661, Revington and his colleagues merely say that “Mr. Napier died about a month since in Rajapur.”<sup>1481</sup> Further, in their letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> February 1661 to Surat — a fortnight before the sack of Rajapur — Revington and his colleagues had written that Napier was dangerously ill and not expected to live.<sup>1482</sup>

The *Shivabharat* gives a long list of items included in the booty that comprises gold, silver, other metals like brass, copper, iron and lead, jewels, silk and woolen cloth, and precious articles like ivory, musk, saffron, sandalwood and spices. In their letter to the President of Surat written from the Songad prison in June 1661, Henry Revington and his colleagues estimated the Company’s losses at two or three thousand hons and their private loss, eight or nine thousand hons.<sup>1483</sup> But after their release, Randolph Taylor and his colleagues wrote to the Surat Council on 18<sup>th</sup> February 1663: “we believe the whole amount of what was lost will be 23,000 or 24,000 pago[das] [i.e. Hons] ... besides interest.”<sup>1484</sup>

The *Shivabharat* gives a list of many other towns in the surrounding country which also paid tribute. The southernmost among these is Kharepatan. It may be inferred from this that the campaign pushed the boundary of Shivaji’s acquisitions as far south as Kharepatan. This is corroborated by a letter Henry Revington and his colleagues wrote from the Songad prison in June 1661, in which they wrote: “He [i.e. Shivaji] commands all the coast from Danda Rajapur Castle to Kharepatan which he threatens and resolves the next monsoon to command as far as Goa, and then farewell Goa in a short time.”<sup>1485</sup>

While Shivaji had gone south, Suryarao Surve surprised and surrounded the Maratha detachment at Sangameshwar in an attack at midnight. Pilaji Nilakanthrao was so demoralized by this surprise night attack that he deserted his followers and tried to seek safety in flight. But his lieutenant Tanaji Malusare caught hold of him, derided him for his cowardice and bound him with ropes to a boulder. Tanaji’s courage saved the day. The

Marathas held the enemy at bay and at daybreak he fled the field.

Shivaji quickly returned from Rajapur, learnt of Suryarao's attack and dispatched a message that he should come to Palavani where Shivaji was marching and receive an assurance of safety from him. Suryarao sent a reply with a messenger that he would comply with Shivaji's message.

Meanwhile Shivaji reached Palavani and occupied and garrisoned that district.<sup>1486</sup> Suryarao however did not arrive as promised. Perhaps he contemplated that Shivaji was marching northwards and would not return. If this was his assessment, he was mistaken. It seems that Shivaji was expecting this and his northward march was a deliberate ruse to lull Suryarao into a false sense of security. Suryarao was a petty chieftain and most of his strength must have consisted of feudal levies mobilized only in time of need, for the *Shivabharat* relates that he had given leave to his captains to go home. While he did this, Shivaji doubled back from Palavani with startling rapidity at the head of 15,000 infantry and, marching through the forest, suddenly appeared before Shringarpur. Taken completely by surprise, Suryarao barely had time to escape with his life. The Jedhe Chronology records that Shivaji captured Shringarpur and Suryarao fled on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1661.<sup>1487</sup>

Hundreds of Suryarao's troops came to pay homage to Shivaji and were evidently taken into his service. The neighbouring hill-fort was occupied and renamed Pratigad.<sup>1488</sup> The entire Prabhavali district came under Shivaji's rule and Trimbak Bhaskar was appointed as officer-in-charge.<sup>1489</sup> Then, marching by way of Mahad, Shivaji arrived at Rajgad in June 1661.<sup>1490</sup>

Shivaji's civil administration will be dealt with in a later chapter. Here we may briefly mention the system which he introduced in these new conquests as revealed by contemporaneous letters. After the acquisition of Prabhavali, Shivaji gave his assurance of safety to the *watandars* of the district. However he confiscated their grants and privileges and, instead, assigned them fixed remuneration.<sup>1491</sup>

Another important point may be mentioned before we close this section. Dabhol and Prabhavali were officially renamed Mustafabad and Muzaffarabad respectively during Muslim rule.<sup>1492</sup> Shivaji did away with these new Persian names to restore the original indigenous ones.<sup>1493</sup>

Peace between Shivaji and the Adilshah — perhaps by tacit understanding or by a treaty — ensued for about two years after this campaign. The Englishmen of Rajapur seem to have believed that the latter was the case. Randolph Taylor and other Englishmen in Shivaji's prison were brought to Rajapur in January 1663 and were set free early in February of the same year.<sup>1494</sup> Then they had a long discourse with Raoji, the Maratha governor of the place, about reopening the English trading station at Rajapur, as reported by them to the Surat Council in their letter of 6<sup>th</sup> February 1663. Therein they wrote:<sup>1495</sup>

“We are thoroughly possessed that friendship being once concluded between us [i.e. between Shivaji and the English], we may afterwards trade with safety in all Shivaji's ports (having satisfaction for our former losses); for now it is certain that the King [i.e. the Adilshah] has given Shivaji a *farman* for Rajapur etc. places that he is in possession of, to enjoy the benefit thereof. But for our better security we may get the King's *farman* to secure us in all parts of his dominions and that [then?] we shall be safe. At least, if anything should happen [that is] not suspected the company will have ways enough to satisfy themselves, this being still part of the King's dominions and Shivaji his subject.”

(It bears notice that Shivaji was certainly not a 'subject' of the Adilshah or any other ruler; but the Englishmen were under that misapprehension for some time.)

#### **WAR OF ATTRITION (SEPTEMBER 1661 TO MARCH 1663)**

To achieve the aim of war — viz., to force the enemy to accept the political settlement one desires — two basic forms of

strategies are possible: the strategy of annihilation and the strategy of attrition. In the first, the aim is achieved by annihilation of the enemy's fighting forces. In that case, to bring about a decisive battle to destroy enemy forces becomes the strategic aim of the war for the attainment of one's political goal. But, at times, the strategic aim has to be more limited either because the political goal itself or the forces at one's disposal are limited. In that case one has to resort to a strategy of attrition in which the aim is to exhaust the enemy and coerce him to accept one's political goal.

The means at Shivaji's disposal were not adequate to resort to a strategy of annihilation. He recognized that his forces were too weak to hazard a bloody decision by battle. His grand strategy, therefore, was to gradually drain the enemy's endurance by a long drawn out war in order to make them realize that *they* could not force a decision. The strategy by which he carried out this Fabian grand strategy was to avoid battle with the main Mughal army and wear down their will to fight by military pin-pricks. When the enemy committed his forces to besiege a fortress, he was to be counter-attacked by mobile striking forces based on fortress pivots which formed their protected supply depots and places of refuge. Simultaneously the Maratha light cavalry were to make deep raids in the enemy's rear — cutting off convoys, cutting up detachments and attacking isolated outposts to distract the enemy's strength and attention and interrupt his lines of supply. At the enemy's approach, the villages and towns were to be abandoned and the inhabitants were to seek refuge in the woods and hills. Nothing was to be left which could offer either shelter or subsistence to the invader. Shayista Khan's army was thus practically paralyzed by a mere few thousand cavalry. The constant threat and frequent incidence of Maratha raids forced him to stretch his forces more and more widely. Cosme da Guarda describes this strategy as follows:<sup>1496</sup>

“Shayista Khan was surprised that Shivaji never suffered any loss; and this was due to the execution of the order that they should never [permit themselves

to] be caught but should do what they could without risk and having done so, should immediately leave with all the booty, for Shivaji said that he prized the lives of his soldiers above all the interests of the world. They delivered an assault, robbed and killed whom they met, and by the time the Mughals were mounted not a single enemy could be seen, and they stood stupefied listening only to the complaints of the wounded, robbed and despoiled."

And again:[1497](#)

"They [i.e. Shivaji's forces] were more familiar with the night when they delivered so many and so repeated assaults that offered Shayista Khan much cause to fear."

Thevenot too gives a similar description. He writes:[1498](#)

"Shayista Khan having far more forces than Shivaji had, vigorously pursued him, but the Raja, having his retreat always in the mountain, and being extremely cunning, the Mughal could make nothing of him."

The Chitnis Chronicle describes this strategy as follows:[1499](#)

"The Mughal army should be immobilized by capturing its supplies, grass, wood and provisions. Why should we go out to seek battle? We should cut off his supplies and exhaust him. We should [lure and] destroy him in some difficult place. We should let him besiege some fortress and then beat him there. Thus by several cunning means we should wear him out."

Thus the war which Shivaji was fighting against the Mughals during this period is not built around a single memorable event such as the siege of a formidable fortress or a decisive battle. It comprises a series of small actions, hit and run raids, and punitive expeditions. The chroniclers knew few details. The information they had, was of a very vague and general nature. Where they knew something about a great event they could supply the details from their imagination. But here they were baffled for want of a central event around which

they could weave a story. Therefore, they are silent about the war which was being fought during this period. But a few bits of information are to be found in surviving documents.

When Shivaji was fighting against the Mughals he naturally tried to secure his internal front by reconciling disaffected elements in his dominions.

Here is the Letter of Assurance, dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1661, which Shivaji issued to Kedarji Khopade, Deshmukh of the Utravali sub-division of Rohid Khore.

“When Afzal Khan came against His Highness [i.e. Shivaji] you joined the enemy. Thereafter the enemy’s rule was displaced. Therefore harbouring suspicion and doubt you have not come to the said district and are molesting the villages to enforce your rights. What, do you think, is your gain from this? Who has taught you to be disobedient to His Highness and [thereby] lose your rights? Heretofore come to your hereditary office (*watan*) without harbouring any suspicion and doubt and live happily enjoying the grant and privileges of your *Deshmukhi*. We have great favour upon you. Remain assured in every respect. Do not harbour any suspicion.”<sup>1500</sup>

Sometime during the period 21<sup>st</sup> March 1661 and 10<sup>th</sup> March 1662, the Mughal army laid siege to the fort of Deiri<sup>1501</sup> in Konkan. The Jedhe Chronology, our sole authority on this event, records under Shaka 1583 [21<sup>st</sup> March 1661 to 10<sup>th</sup> March 1662]:<sup>1502</sup>

“Bulakhi came and laid siege to the fort of Deiri. Kavji Kondhalkar went there, killed 400 men [of the enemy] and broke the siege.”

The event probably took place towards the end of 1661 or early in 1662 because from February to June 1661, a large part of the Maratha army was engaged first in the Umbarkhind campaign and then in the South Konkan expedition.

Examples of Maratha incursions in Mughal territory are found in contemporaneous Mughal documents. A newsletter dated 10<sup>th</sup> November 1661 from Paranda fort reports that a

sword for sale was in the custody of the agents of the court of justice pending the fixation of its price, but that the matter was delayed owing to the insurrection of Netoji.<sup>1503</sup>

A news-report dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1661 from Junnar says that one thousand of Shivaji's foot soldiers were reported to be collecting revenue in Vade and other villages in Junnar district.<sup>1504</sup> Another dated 30<sup>th</sup> November 1661 from Junnar reports the receipt of news that two thousand more had arrived in the Vade subdivision of Junnar district.<sup>1505</sup>

A news-report dated 17<sup>th</sup> January 1662 from Aurangabad reports that a *mansabdar* named Muhammadi, son of Daulat, who had been wounded and captured during an enemy raid, escaped and rejoined the Imperial army.<sup>1506</sup>

Such a war of attrition was bound to impose great sufferings on the people in Shivaji's dominions. A news report dated 26<sup>th</sup> January 1662 from Aurangabad provides an illustration. It runs:<sup>1507</sup>

“News was received that the villages belonging to the wretched enemy were situated at the foot of Lohagad and other forts, about 20 *kos* from Pune. On Thursday the 12<sup>th</sup> [of Jamadi-al Akhir, i.e. 23<sup>rd</sup> January] the *Subadar* [i.e. Shayista Khan] sent Namdar Khan and other *mansabdars* in that direction. The said Khan went there and on the same day set fire to about 70 or 80 roadside villages. He plundered grain and other material. Then he encamped at the foot of fort Tikona which is near the said fort. The inhabitants of the villages had taken their cattle and other belongings to the hills. Therefore next day the Khan halted at the place and sent his followers up the hill to search for them. They went there and captured about 1000 or more cattle and some 300 men and women. On the third day the Khan marched ahead, plundered and burned the villages situated between the forts Tikona, Lohagad, Visapur and Tung and returned [to Pune].”

In the latter half of December 1661 the Emperor ordered Maharaja Jaswant Singh, the *subadar* of Gujarat, to go with his contingent to reinforce Shayista Khan's army in the Deccan.<sup>[1508](#)</sup> The *faujdar* of Junagarh was to take charge of the administration of Gujarat till the arrival of a new *subadar* there.

A news report dated 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1662 from the *thana* of Supe says that 300 horsemen of the enemy (i.e. Shivaji) who had assembled near Holer carried away the grass sellers in the Mughal army who had gone out for forage with four bullocks.<sup>[1509](#)</sup>

A news report dated 25<sup>th</sup> May 1662 from the same place states that Namdar Khan and Sar-afraz Khan defeated Netoji and captured from him, among other things, 40 sacks of gunpowder, 153 bullocks, 8 mares and foals, 1 *chalani* (rupee), 7 *laris* and 17 *tankas* in cash, 34 *tolas* and 3.5 *masas* of silver and 7 *masas* of gold, further stating that these spoils were sent to the Emperor!<sup>[1510](#)</sup> The bullocks were evidently those taken by the Marathas to carry the loot. The amount of the booty retrieved by the Mughals — particularly the small number of horses taken — and the absence of any prisoners in the list shows that the depiction in the Mughal news report of 'Netoji's defeat' was no more than his refusal to give battle and flight homewards, probably with a large portion of the plunder. Further, the fact that the Mughals considered the small amount of booty they had retrieved from the enemy important enough to be sent to the Emperor suggests that even such successes were few and far between.

Another news report, again from Supe, reports the movements of Mughal detachments engaged in patrolling. The purport of the relevant portion of this news report is as follows:<sup>[1511](#)</sup>

Rai Baghan had been on patrol with her troops on 24<sup>th</sup> May 1662 and returned in the evening of the same day.

The troops with Chaturbhuj Chauhan, Abdulla Khan Shirazi, Said Abdul Aziz, Adil Khan, Said Burhan, Ashraf Khan, Muhammad Akbar, Husain

Khan Dawri, Qamar Said Khan, Uday Karan Bundela and others who had been on patrol under Ghalib Khan arrived on 24<sup>th</sup> May and departed on 26<sup>th</sup> May.

Kishan Singh with his troops left for Pune.

The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1584 (11<sup>th</sup> March 1662 to 27<sup>th</sup> February 1663):

“The Raja went in person to Mira hill and made a surprise attack on Namdar Khan at Pen. In the battle of Pen Waghoji Tupe as well as [some other] men were wounded; some perished.”<sup>1512</sup>

No more information about this battle has survived.

Shivaji's letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1662 to Sarjerao Jedhe, the *Deshmukh* of Rohid Khore, shows his concern about his subjects. It reads:<sup>1513</sup>

“Spies have brought the news that the Mughals are going to make a raid in your district. Therefore as soon as you receive this missive warn every village in your entire district and send all the subjects with their womenfolk and children to the lowlands at some secure place where they would be safe from the enemy's depredations. Do not be slack in this task. Carry out as written as soon as you receive this missive. You would bear the sin if the Mughals would carry away any captives because of your failure to do this. Go around all the villages, turn night into day and send womenfolk of the people to some place in the lowlands. Do not lose a moment in this work. Remain vigilant at your place. Tell those also who would remain behind to maintain the fields in various villages to stay in inaccessible places in the mountain and flee away as soon as the enemy is sighted from a distance avoiding the route of his raid. Remain vigilant at your place.”

A Persian document states that Khwaja Muhammad Beg was killed on duty during a skirmish with Shivaji but, despite recommendations from the *Subadar*, according to the report

dated 10<sup>th</sup> August 1662, the sons of the deceased, Tauqir Muhammad and Jamil Beg, were not favoured with *mansabs*.[1514](#)

A news letter dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1663 from Aurangabad reports that Haji Ibrahim, a merchant who was imprisoned by Shivaji, had arrived in the city.[1515](#)

Maratha forces were active in hit and run operations and extended their raids deep inside enemy territory.

Philip Giffard from Rajapur to Surat [1516](#)

30<sup>th</sup> March 1663

“The news here stirring is that the Mughal with 12,000 horsemen is in upper Chaul building houses to winter in; 7,000 horse more are in Rahimatpur being returned from pursuit of Netoji, Shivaji’s Lt. General, who was gone to plunder into the Mughal’s country. They followed him so close that he was fain to travel 45 and 50 mile a day and yet much ado to escape with a small booty he had got. They left not of the pursuit till they came within 5 leagues of Bijapur, which put the King and Queen [of Bijapur] into so great a fright that with a 100 horse they presently marched to Bankapur. Rustum-i Zaman met the Mughals and made his own peace. What will follow here is uncertain but all here think that Mughals will take all the King’s country.”

Giffard’s information that the Adilshah had fled from Bijapur out of fright of the Mughals appears incorrect for we know that he had gone thither to direct the campaign against the kingdom of Ikkeri. His departure from Bijapur at about the same time when a Mughal force in hot pursuit of Netoji entered Adilshahi territory might have caused such misconception.

Philip Giffard from Rajapur to Surat [1517](#)

8<sup>th</sup> April 1663.

“Rustum-i Zaman has certainly met the Mughals, but upon what conditions we cannot hear. After he had met the Mughals he persuaded them from pursuing Netoji any further by telling them that the

country was dangerous for any strange army to march in, likewise promising them to go himself and follow him [i.e. Netoji], by which deceit Netoji got away, though not without the loss of 300 horse and himself wounded."

It may be inferred from these two letters that the Maratha cavalry was trying to distract the Mughal forces by raiding deep inside Mughal territory. But too much reliance on details narrated in these letters may lead us to erroneous conclusions. Rajapur was far away from the scene of action. As has often been found, unofficial reports — particularly the details therein — received at such distance are all too often adulterated with rumours though their broad substance may be correct.

While this war of attrition was going on, Shivaji wrote a letter to the Portuguese Viceroy asking him not to provide any supplies to the Mughal forces from the Portuguese fortresses in the north and promising that he would maintain good relations with the Portuguese as long as they complied with this demand. The letter is not extant but its substance is mentioned in written instructions dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1663 given to Dom Alvaro de Ataide, the envoy who was sent to Shivaji.

"A few days ago I had a letter from Raja Shivaji in which he promises me to maintain good relations with this state and those fortresses (of the North) as long as I would warn their captains not to allow any foodstuffs or provender to go to the people of the Mughal Emperor. For this reason it occurred to me to order you to continue with the said Shivaji and his people the same relations which he promised to have with us, and it would be expedient to prevent with all dissimulation that any kind of provision should go to the camp of the Mughal, in order that for want of it he would leave this neighbourhood and thus Shivaji would have a chance of being able to accomplish his intentions of injuring the enemy who, as he is so powerful, would be better far away and not such a close neighbour."<sup>1518</sup>

The Viceroy's reply dated 26<sup>th</sup> April 1663 to Shivaji, which this envoy was to carry with him, was as follows: [1519](#)

"I am in receipt of Your Honour's letter. It paves the way to mutual interest. I send to the North an experienced noble with such authority so as to confer with Your Honour everything that is to be worked out for mutual benefit, but with great secrecy because it involves the success that I wish your Honour's valour. ...This person who is called Dom Alvaro de Ataide is also ordered not to consent anything which may affect the people of Your Honour in whom I have particular interest. I will always assist your Honour with good heart within the limitations I am permitted. If anything happens against this without my knowledge I [shall] order a probe to secure a suitable punishment to the defaulters. I hope Your Honour will come out successfully in the present encounter and thus will enhance the fame of your victories."

Though the Portuguese were willing to cooperate with Shivaji in his war against the Mughals they had not changed their policy about keeping the growth Shivaji's naval power in check, as is illustrated by the following letter sent by the Portuguese Governor to the Captain of Vasai in April or May 1662: [1520](#)

"We have received a letter of Shivaji's *Subadar* at Dabhol, Ragho Ballal. In it he has demanded that their five *sanguiçais* and a *pataxo* [1521](#) which are detained at Karanje should be allowed a passage [to the sea]. I have informed him that I do not know anything about this matter and have assured him that I would issue an order to release them if they are detained. Even then do not release these ships. Continue the same policy which we had adopted in 1659 when 29 [*sic* 20?] *sanguiçais* were being built at Kalyan-Bhiwandi."

The Governor even ordered his officers to find some courageous person to secretly set fire to those ships. [1522](#) There is

no evidence that the scheme was ever executed.

#### RAID ON SHAYISTA KHAN (APRIL 1663)

In the night of 5<sup>th</sup>/6<sup>th</sup> April, Shivaji performed an audacious feat which caused his name to reverberate throughout India: he raided the very headquarters of Shayista Khan. That he led the party in person instead of deputing one of his lieutenants to carry out the operation has lent to his life a halo of romanticism and legend.

Shayista Khan was occupying Shivaji's palace called the Lal Mahal in Pune.<sup>1523</sup> Khafi Khan tells us that he had taken elaborate precautions for his security. Apart from persons in service, no one, especially no Maratha, was allowed to enter the town nor were Marathas taken into service as horsemen.<sup>1524</sup> However, we cannot vouch for the truth of Khafi Khan's hearsay account. Shayista Khan's army included several Maratha officers whose contingents evidently included Maratha troopers. In an army which comprised men from such diverse races and religions, stringent enforcement of security precautions was impossible.<sup>1525</sup> The perfection with which this raid was carried out testifies to the accuracy of the *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*'s guess (for its author could not have obtained firsthand information of this) that Shivaji had obtained thorough information of Shayista Khan's camp.<sup>1526</sup>

Shivaji set out on horseback with a select force and, dropping cavalry detachments on the way evidently to cover his withdrawal, arrived at Pune on 5<sup>th</sup> April 1663.<sup>1527</sup> Here, at night, they dismounted, left their horses with a cavalry detachment under Sarjerao Jedhe on the bank of the Mula river and infiltrated into the town.<sup>1528</sup> No authentic source tells us how they managed to do so. However, the following account given by Khafi Khan, though undoubtedly imaginary, is plausible:<sup>1529</sup>

One day some Maratha infantry soldiers in Shayista Khan's army went to the prefect (*kotwal*) and obtained a permit for 200 Marathas purported to belong to a marriage party of an unknown person.

Early in the night, a young boy dressed and adorned as a bridegroom was brought into the town with the drum beats of a wedding procession. At about the same time, some Maratha soldiers brought into the town some Maratha prisoners with their hands tied behind their backs, who they claimed to have captured in one of the outposts. Holding the ends of the ropes tied round the prisoners' necks and whipping their backs the captors passed through all the check posts. Having thus infiltrated into the town, both the parties assembled at a rendezvous and armed themselves.

Sabhasad's account is as follows:<sup>1530</sup>

"From place to place in the camp [of the Mughal army] the Rajah was asked: 'Whose men are you? Who are you? Where had you been?' Babaji Bapuji and Chimnaji Bapuji [who were at the head of the party] kept replying: 'We belong to the army. We had been on outpost duties.'"

The kitchen of the palace had a small door which was closed up with bricks and mud. A breach was made, and Shivaji and his soldiers entered through it.<sup>1531</sup> As it was the month of Ramazan some cooks had woken up to prepare the pre-dawn meal. They were quickly dispatched. But hearing the noise, some maid servants went to convey what was afoot to Shayista Khan, who was in his bed chamber.<sup>1532</sup> In the scuffle which followed, Shayista Khan lost some of his fingers and barely escaped with his life.<sup>1533</sup> His eldest son Abul Fath, his son-in-law, some 40 or 50 men and a few women were killed.<sup>1534</sup> Two other sons of Shayista Khan and a few women were wounded.<sup>1535</sup> Shivaji lost 6 killed and 40 wounded.<sup>1536</sup>

The raiding party then left the palace through a wicket gate in the backyard, joined the cavalry detachment that was left across the river and rode towards Karyat Maval collecting other cavalry detachments on the way.<sup>1537</sup> They arrived safely at Sinhgad the next day.<sup>1538</sup>

Jaswant Singh was encamped near Pune with his contingent and it was widely believed that the raid was carried out with his connivance.<sup>1539</sup>

Shayista Khan did not remain for long in Pune. Frightened and mortified by this daring attempt on his life, he entrusted command of the army to Jaswant Singh and himself returned to Aurangabad.<sup>1540</sup> Soon afterwards, at the beginning of May 1663, he was dismissed from the *subadari* of the Deccan and replaced by Prince Muhammad Muazzam,<sup>1541</sup> under the guardianship of Wazir Khan.<sup>1542</sup>

News of this daredevil raid resounded throughout India.<sup>1543</sup> It must have resulted in an immense increase in Shivaji's prestige and fame. The Emperor learnt the news while he was on his way from Lahore (which he had left on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1663) to Kashmir.<sup>1544</sup> Unfortunately, but quite understandably, the *Alamgir Nama*, the *official* history of Aurangzeb's reign, disposes off the incident very briefly between the entries for 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> May 1663 thus:

“Amir-ul Umara [i.e. Shayista Khan], Raja Jaswant Singh and others had been appointed to extirpate the accursed Shivaji. Now he, with audacity and malignity, made a night attack on the Amir-ul Umara's camp. As this incident occurred due to the negligence of that grandee, it became the cause of the Emperor's displeasure and he decided to dismiss Amir-ul Umara from the *subadari* of the Deccan.”<sup>1545</sup>

The best, though very brief, contemporaneous account of this incident is given in Philip Giffard's letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> April 1663 from Rajapur to Surat.<sup>1546</sup> It reads:<sup>1547</sup>

“Raoji Pandit<sup>1548</sup> is returned. Presently upon his arrival he desired me to write to your Worship to send somebody to make an end of the business;<sup>1549</sup> he declared a great desire thereto. Yesterday arrived a letter from the Raja [Shivaji] written himself to Raoji, giving him an account<sup>1550</sup> how that he himself with 400 choice men went to Shayista Khan's camp. There, upon some pretence (which he did not insert in his

letter) he got into his tent to Salam,<sup>1551</sup> and presently slew all the watch, killed Shayista Khan's eldest son, his son in law, 12 of his chief women, 40 great persons attending him, their General [Shayista Khan], wounded Shayista Khan with his own hand<sup>1552</sup> (and he thought to death, but since hears he lives), wounded 6 more of his wives, 2 more of his sons, and after all this he returns, losing but 6 men and 40 wounded, *10,000 horse under Raja Jaswant Singh standing still and never offered to pursue him, so it is generally believed it was done with his consent,*<sup>1553</sup> though Shivaji tells his men his [Shivaji's] permisera<sup>1554</sup> bid him do it. This is all at present."

At the beginning of December 1663 the Emperor, who was then in Punjab, on his return journey to Delhi, ordered Shayista Khan to take charge of the *subadari* of Bengal and to go there immediately without coming to the Presence.<sup>1555</sup>

#### **SHIVAJI'S LETTER TO AURANGZEB'S OFFICERS**

A Persian letter incorporated in two Persian letter books, *Durj-ul Gawahir* and *Khutut-i Shivaji*, is attributed to Shivaji.<sup>1556</sup> It is clearly stated in both compilations that it was a letter from Maharaja Shivaji to the officers of Emperor Alamgir and that it was drafted by Nil Prabhu. The text of the letter given in the letter books is undated, though from internal evidence it could be placed soon after Shivaji's raid on Shayista Khan. The original of the letter, if ever there was one, has not survived. It is not possible to say whether the text given in the letter books is a copy of an authentic letter or merely a piece of fiction. But, even if it is regarded as fiction, it may be viewed as a true reflection of Shivaji's sentiments. It is as follows:<sup>1557</sup>

"Written [i.e. drafted] by Nil Prabhu Munshi.<sup>1558</sup> From Maharaja Shivaji to Emperor Alamgir:

Let it not be concealed from the minds of prudent and thoughtful men that for a period of three years powerful and renowned noblemen [of the Mughal Emperor] are coming to these parts. The Emperor orders them to conquer my country and forts. They write in reply that these will be conquered soon. They do not know that it is hopeless to gallop the steed of infinite imagination in this intractable land and to conquer it is difficult. It is surprising that they do not expect at all the fruit of shame by writing such falsehoods and cast away truthfulness which is the cause of salvation.

My homeland, unlike the forts of Kalyani and Bidar<sup>1559</sup> is not situated in wide plains where trenches might be run to launch an assault. It has lofty hill ranges 200 leagues long and 40 leagues broad; everywhere there are streams difficult to cross. Sixty strong forts have been built and some are situated on the sea coast also. Afzal Khan, an officer of the Adalat Panah [i.e. the Adilshah], came with a large army to Jawali and perished hopelessly. Why don't you report to the

Emperor truthfully what has occurred so that the same fate may not befall you? After the late Khan, the Amir-ul Umara [i.e. Shayista Khan], who was appointed to campaign in these sky touching mountains and abysmal valleys, laboured hard for three years and submitted reports that I was completely defeated and my country would be conquered in a few days. At last in consequence of these falsehoods he encountered such calamity and went away in [such] disgrace, that it is clearer than the sun.

Verse: It is not everywhere that the charger can gallop; there are places where one has to throw away the shield [i.e., run away]. [Attributed to Shaikh Saadi.]

It is my duty to guard my land. Although to save their reputation they have written to the Emperor the opposite of the true state of affairs, yet, by the grace of sublime god, the rose bud of desire of no invader of the beloved country of this recluse has blossomed forth.

Verse: The wise should beware of this river of blood, from which no man [has ever] carried out his boat [to safety].”

#### THE BIJAPUR-IKKERI WAR

Soon after the suppression of Jauhar's rebellion, the Adilshahi army had turned against the kingdom of Ikkeri. Its able ruler, Shivappa, had died in 1660. He was succeeded by his younger brother Ventappa, who died in 1661. Bhadrappa, the eldest son of Shivappa, ascended the throne on 29<sup>th</sup> August 1661. He continued his father's policy, annexed the principality of Sonde — a tributary of the Adilshahi Sultanate — and even made inroads into Adilshahi territory.<sup>1560</sup> Ali Adilshah dispatched an army under Sharza Khan towards the end of 1662 to chastise the King of Ikkeri.<sup>1561</sup> By the beginning of 1663,

the Raja of Sonde, with the help of the Adilshahi army, had regained his country.<sup>1562</sup>

Ali Adilshah himself set out from Bijapur on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1663 and marched towards Bankapur.<sup>1563</sup> The contingents of most of the principal nobles of the Sultanate like Prime Minister Abdul Muhammad, Said Ilyas Sharza Khan, Abd-ur Rahim Bahlul Khan, Sayyid Khan Zaman, Mulla Ahmad, Muzaffar Khan and Shahji set out with him or joined him on the way. The Adilshahi army defeated the Keladi forces in battle and then besieged and captured the fort of Bednur where the Adilshah set up his headquarters. The army marched forth and laid siege to the fort of Bhuvanagiri (Kaveledurga<sup>1564</sup>) where Bhadrappa had retired. Then a stalemate appears to have ensued, for a treaty was concluded and Bhadrappa's dominions, including Bednur, were restored to him on payment of a large indemnity. The Adilshah turned back towards Bijapur on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1663.

Bhadrappa died soon afterwards and was succeeded by his younger brother Somashekhar. As he was but a child, the court was torn by feuds.<sup>1565</sup> This gave way to another Adilshahi invasion of the kingdom of Ikkeri. But it seems the campaign was not concluded with much vigour. We have no more information about this war except the bits and pieces provided by some English letters. The offensive soon petered out and did not lead to any decisive result.

#### THE SOUTH KONKAN EXPEDITION (MAY – JUNE 1663)

On 13<sup>th</sup> April 1663, soon after his raid on Shayista Khan, Shivaji again marched into South Konkan.<sup>1566</sup> On 13<sup>th</sup> May 1663 Shivaji entered the district of Kudal with 10,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry.<sup>1567</sup> Rumours were rife at the time that Shivaji had marched as far as Vengurle and Banda.<sup>1568</sup> The Portuguese Viceroy at Goa, too, had heard these rumours. So he sent an envoy with a present and the following letter dated on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1663 to Shivaji:<sup>1569</sup>

“Here we received the news of Your Honour’s arrival at Vengurle. I, however, doubted the veracity of it since I expected to have an advance intimation from Your Honour regarding Your Honour’s arrival at such a close vicinity. I send Honourable Ramoji Sinai Kothari to congratulate Your Honour on my behalf on Your Honour’s victory over the Mughal as well as your present undertaking.... He has been entrusted with other matters to discuss with Your Honour.... Your Honour may discuss with him confidentially.”

However, Ramoji, on his way to Vengurle, learnt that Shivaji had returned northwards, so he came back to Goa without delivering the present and the letter.<sup>1570</sup>

But Shivaji did not go beyond Kudal. He even sent letters to the Dutch Resident at Vengurle that the Adilshah had granted him the district of Kudal and that he had arrived to take possession of it.<sup>1571</sup> The Dutch did not believe him and there were rumours that the Adilshah had ordered his officer at Phonda, Trimbak Kalo, to drive out Shivaji.<sup>1572</sup> But it seems that Shivaji was indeed at peace with the Adilshah and he was telling the Dutch the truth when he wrote to them saying the district of Kudal was ceded to him by the Adilshah. When Badi Sahiba, the Queen Mother, arrived at Vengurle in March 1664 for embarking on her pilgrimage to Mecca, Raoji Somnath, Shivaji’s *subadar* in South Konkan, had escorted her with a detachment of 150 foot soldiers and 50 horsemen from Patgaon to Vengurle.<sup>1573</sup>

#### SIEGE OF KONDHANA (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1663 TO MAY 1664)<sup>1574</sup>

Maharaja Jaswant Singh, who was left in command of the Mughal army of the Deccan after Shayista Khan’s departure, laid siege to the fort of Kondhana (renamed Sinhgad by Shivaji) in November-December 1663. But it dragged on without any apparent effort to press it with vigour. An assault was finally delivered on 14<sup>th</sup> April 1664 but was beaten back. The Maharaja raised the siege on 28<sup>th</sup> May 1664. On 30<sup>th</sup> May, Shivaji inspected the fort.

While Jaswant Singh was preoccupied with the siege of Sinhgad, Shivaji executed another audacious feat. He struck some 300 km in Jaswant Singh's rear and from 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> January 1664, plundered Surat, the richest port in India.

#### FIRST SACK OF SURAT (JANUARY 1664)

##### *The City of Surat*

Surat, "the greatest emporium of the Orient and the richest jewel of the Mogol", was situated on the south bank of the Tapi River, some 20 km inland from the mouth of the river as well as its port, Swally, on the opposite bank.<sup>1575</sup> Large vessels could not go up to the city. They were unloaded at Swally and the goods were transported from there by carts or boats.<sup>1576</sup>

The city sprawled around a castle on the south bank.<sup>1577</sup> A place of no great strength, the castle comprised a square enclosure with four towers in four corners but no platforms inside the walls, the guns being mounted upon wooden scaffoldings. The walls were protected by a deep but narrow moat on three sides and the river on the fourth. The entrance to the castle was in the west wall. The treasury of the province was housed inside the castle. There were two separate commandants at Surat, one for the city and the other for the castle.

Surat was the only notable port on the west coast which belonged to the Mughal Emperor. A place of boundless wealth, its customs duty alone brought revenue of Rs.1.2 million annually into the Imperial coffers.<sup>1578</sup> The population of the city was more than one hundred thousand.<sup>1579</sup> Besides Hindus, merchants of many other religions including Muslims and Parsees, and nations including English, Dutch, Portuguese, Turks, Armenians, Persians, Arabs and Jews lived here.<sup>1580</sup> Viraji Vora, a Hindu, and Haji Zahid Beg, a Muslim, were among the leading merchants of the city.<sup>1581</sup> The former, reputed to be the wealthiest merchant in the world, was reckoned to be worth Rs.8 million.<sup>1582</sup>

The city was ill-contrived into narrow lanes. Mansions of rich people built in stone and wood were few and not more than

two or three could be seen in a street. Most of the inhabitants lived in simpler houses whose walls as well as the roofs comprised bamboos tied together with cords of coconut rind and plastered with mud.[1583](#)

Situated upon an immense plain, this wealthiest city of the east was defended neither by art nor by nature. All its semblance of defense comprised some weak and ill-built gates in the chief avenues and, in some parts, a dry and shallow ditch, easily passable on foot and without a wall on the inner side.[1584](#) Apart from the garrison of the castle, there used to be a detachment of one thousand cavalry under the city commander, Inayat Khan.[1585](#)

### *Shivaji's March to Surat*

The chronologies contain the following entries about Shivaji's march to Surat.

The Shivapur Chronology:[1586](#)

6<sup>th</sup> December 1663: “[Shivaji] went to [i.e. set out for] Surat.”

31<sup>st</sup> December 1663: “[Shivaji] visited [the temple of] Trimbakraj.”

The Jedhe Chronology:[1587](#)

6<sup>th</sup> January 1664: “[Shivaji] went to and plundered Surat.”

The Shivapur Chronology shows that Shivaji marched to Surat by way of Tryamabakeshvar. Apparently, he went there by the up-country route and then descended into the Konkan.

The Mughal forces at Surat were completely unaware of Shivaji's approach till he arrived at the head of about 10,000 cavalry within striking distance of the city.[1588](#) The first alarm that Shivaji had reached Gandevi, about 50 km to the south, and was advancing upon Surat, was raised in the morning on 5<sup>th</sup> January.[1589](#)

It appears that Shivaji was giving out, as he approached that doomed city, that he was a Mughal nobleman. Volquard Iversen, who was one of the staff at the Dutch factory at Surat, records:[1590](#)

“In the year 1664, on the 15<sup>th</sup> January<sup>1591</sup> about 9.00 a.m. the Mughal governor [of Surat] Inayat Khan received tidings in the town from one of his sergeants who was quartered about two miles off, that a great army was on the march, the leader of which refused to give his name except as a servant of the Great Mughal [Emperor], and that he intended to go to the town of Ahmedabad with 10,000 men. The sergeant, however, found out from the troops, that their general was said to be the freebooter Shivaji though many of them refused to believe it.”

This is corroborated by Bernier who states that Shivaji “pretended during the march to be a Raja going to the Mughal's court.”<sup>1592</sup>

That night (5<sup>th</sup>/6<sup>th</sup> January), Shivaji camped about eight kilometers from the city.<sup>1593</sup>

### *Alarm at Surat*

On 6<sup>th</sup> January came the news that the approaching army was at Udhana, about eight kilometers from Surat, whereupon the commandant sent a message requesting the chief — who professed to be a servant of the Mughal Emperor “sent [for] by Amir Mahabat Khan to put down the tumult arisen in Patan”<sup>1594</sup> — not to approach the city, for the inhabitants were taking to flight and that would displease the Emperor. Irritated by this stupidity, Shivaji retained the messenger and continued his advance.<sup>1595</sup> He then sent two messengers with a letter demanding that the commandant and three eminent merchants of the city — Haji Zahid Beg, Viraji Vora and Haji Qasim — should go to him in person immediately to negotiate terms on pain of fire and sword. To this, the commandant sent no reply.<sup>1596</sup>

Meanwhile the alarm had caused great consternation and the city was deserted in a few hours. The people fled where they could with their families while the commander, other officials and merchants took refuge in the castle.<sup>1597</sup> Reverend John L'Escalot, the chaplain of the English factory at Surat says that

the merchants had to purchase safety by bribing the commander of the castle.<sup>1598</sup>

### *Preparations of the English and the Dutch*

While Surat was thus swept by panic, the house of the English East India Company was all activity.<sup>1599</sup> The President of the Company in India (excluding Bengal and Madras) at this time was Sir George Oxenden, who had taken charge on 20<sup>th</sup> September 1662. Born in 1620, he was in the prime of his life at the time.<sup>1600</sup>

The Company's house in Surat contained over a hundred thousand rupees in cash besides goods — cloth, ivory, vermillion and the like — imported for sale or bound for Europe, all worth about eighty thousand pounds.<sup>1601</sup> The strength of the English house comprised some 50 Englishmen and 50 Indian peons.<sup>1602</sup>

The Dutch diary of 5<sup>th</sup> January records:<sup>1603</sup>

“The Director was informed that the English President Mr. George Oxenden had requested permission from the Governor (i.e. the commander of Surat) to remove to Swally and that the Governor had angrily refused it, saying that if the English and Dutch were to leave the town nobody would feel safe and the rush would become general.”

On 5<sup>th</sup> January, the President dispatched a message to Swally requesting commanders of the English ships that were being laden with goods for Europe, to send 40 armed men for the defence of the English house.<sup>1604</sup> There were two English ships, the *Loyal Merchant* and *African*, at Swally at that time.<sup>1605</sup> Both were hired by the company and had arrived from Europe.<sup>1606</sup> Besides, a small English ship, the *Surat Frigate*, which belonged to the company and was placed at the disposal of the company's agent at Bantam, was also at anchor in the port.<sup>1607</sup> It was being laden for her return voyage to Bantam when the raid came.<sup>1608</sup> Another English ship, the *Chestnut*, was probably also at Swally at this time. This 12 gun pinnace of the Royal Navy was part of the English force that had arrived to take possession of Bombay.<sup>1609</sup>

The message of the President reached Swally at about 3 O'clock in the afternoon and the reinforcement of 40 armed men with two brass guns arrived at the English house the next morning.<sup>1610</sup> Meanwhile, two brass guns were procured from a merchant in Surat and two more with shot were brought from a ship in the river.<sup>1611</sup> The house was stocked with provisions, water and powder and men were set to melt lead and make bullets. Ports were cut in the gate to fire through and two guns were placed to command the short passage that led to the house. The remaining four guns were mounted on top of the house — three to scour two great streets and one to cover the top of the adjoining house of Haji Zahid Beg.

The house of Henry Gary, a servant of the Company, was also close by and was included in the defended area.<sup>1612</sup> L'Escalot states that an adjoining temple on one side and a mosque on the other — whose windows overlooked the outer yard of the English house — were also occupied by the English.<sup>1613</sup>

On 6<sup>th</sup> January, the Surat council passed a unanimous resolution to defend the house to the last man.<sup>1614</sup> The Company had sold some broadcloth to Khwaja Minaz<sup>1615</sup> and it was lying before the customs house. His request to keep it in the English house at his own risk was granted.<sup>1616</sup> Sundry parcels of cloth, brought for safe keeping by dyers and beaters to whom the company had advanced money, were also accepted.<sup>1617</sup>

The 40 armed men from the ships arrived in the morning of 6<sup>th</sup> January, bringing the total strength of the English house to some 100 Englishmen and 50 Indian peons whereupon the President, putting himself at their head, marched with drums and trumpets to the castle and returned through the city.<sup>1618</sup> According to the Dutch diary, the English President called on the Dutch Director to ascertain his intentions, whereupon the Director told him that the Dutch would defend the lives and property of their company but would not make any demonstration unless they were first attacked.<sup>1619</sup> By the time the English party returned to their house, the Marathas were at the gates of Surat.<sup>1620</sup>

At about half past two in the afternoon on 6<sup>th</sup> January, English ships at Swally received another urgent message from the President asking them to send more reinforcements in their longboats up the river.<sup>1621</sup> Some 40 men were sent and they safely reached the English house, probably on the same day.<sup>1622</sup> This brought the total strength of the English house to some hundred and fifty Englishmen and fifty Indian peons.<sup>1623</sup>

In the meantime, the Dutch were preparing to defend their house, too.<sup>1624</sup> The chief of the Dutch factory in the city was Director Dirck van Adrichem. The Dutch house was on or near the river, about a mile away from that of the English, and there was thus no possibility of mutual support.<sup>1625</sup> They enlisted 60 Muslims at an exorbitant salary on 5<sup>th</sup> January. This brought their strength to about 80 armed men.<sup>1626</sup> A message was dispatched on the same day to the Dutch President, Coenredt Roermondt, who was at Swally, to send from the Dutch ship *Leerdam* 15 armed sailors with muskets and ammunition. Eight Europeans in the city also offered their services. At about ten in the morning of 6<sup>th</sup> January, the mate of the vessel *Leerdam* arrived with 15 sailors and two guns, bringing the total strength of the Dutch house to over 100. Goods which had arrived from Bharuch and those given to weavers and dyers were also brought into the house. Scarcely had these preparations been completed and the outer gates closed when they saw great flames rising from the centre of the city.

Two servants of the Dutch who were sent out to get information were taken prisoner by the Marathas but were disarmed and released in the evening. They returned to the Dutch house and confirmed reports that it was indeed Shivaji, whom one of them had once seen at Rajapur.<sup>1627</sup>

### *The Sack*

*Wednesday, 6<sup>th</sup> January*

While Shivaji encamped in a garden on the outskirts of Surat, Maratha horsemen entered the city at about 11 O'clock in the morning.<sup>1628</sup> There was no resistance.<sup>1629</sup> L'Escalot writes:<sup>1630</sup>

“In less than half an hour we might behold from the top of our house two great pillars of smoke, the certain signs of a great desolation, and so they continued burning that day and night. [On] Thursday [i.e. 7<sup>th</sup> January], Friday and Saturday still new fires raised, and every day nearer and nearer [they came] approaching our quarter of the town.”

A detachment of Maratha musketeers entrenched before and fired at the castle to frighten the garrison and prevent them from sallying out.<sup>1631</sup> The garrison returned the fire, but their guns, records the Dutch diary, “inflicted more damage on the town than on the assailants.”<sup>1632</sup> While the garrison was thus wasting its fire, other Maratha parties were busy despoiling the city of its fabulous riches. House after house was broken open, then dug up in search of hidden treasure and, at last, set afire.<sup>1633</sup> The customs-house was plundered on the first day where the English lost their bales of cloth, worth about £1,000, which were lying there to be sent down for export.<sup>1634</sup>

While this despoliation and destruction was continuing, Anthony Smith, a servant of the East India Company,<sup>1635</sup> ventured to come alone from Swally. He landed near the Dutch house and was making his way to the English house when he fell into the hands of the Marathas.<sup>1636</sup> He was taken to their camp outside the city where, so writes L’Escalot, he was told by Shivaji himself “that he [i.e. Shivaji] was not come to do any personal hurt to the English or other merchants, but only to revenge himself on Aurangzeb,<sup>1637</sup> the Great Mughal [Emperor] because he had invaded his country [and] had killed some of his relations, and that he would only have the English and Dutch give him some treasure and he would not meddle with their houses, else he would do them all mischief possible.”<sup>1638</sup>

Smith was then pinioned along with several merchants and the ambassador of the King of Ethiopia.<sup>1639</sup> Then followed a hot exchange of messages between Shivaji and the English which continued for three days.<sup>1640</sup> The English letters do not give us a coherent account of the timing of these messages but are more or less unanimous about their purport. The import of

Shivaji's messages was that the English must give him some "gift" towards the maintenance of his army, he having been at great expenses to come so far, or else he would raze their house to the ground and shall leave no man alive. The replies of the English were that they would give him nothing and his men should not come within the reach of their guns. Finally they dared him to come himself with his army and attack them, and warned that if he sent any more messages they would kill the messenger.

In the afternoon, a party of Marathas broke open the adjoining house of Zahid Beg who had fled to the castle.<sup>1641</sup> L'Escalot states that they could hear the sounds throughout the night as the Marathas broke open chests and doors.<sup>1642</sup> Since they entered Zahid Beg's house the Marathas began to appear on top of it, two or three at a time, to spy upon the English.<sup>1643</sup>

#### *Thursday, 7<sup>th</sup> January*

On this day occurred an event in the Maratha camp which added fuel to the raging fire. It was witnessed by Anthony Smith, the English prisoner, who related it after his release to his colleagues at the English house and was repeated in the Log of the *Loyal Merchant* as well as L'Escalot's letter of 28<sup>th</sup> January thus:<sup>1644</sup>

In the morning a young Muslim came at the Maratha camp to convey some conditions from the governor (presumably regarding ransom). This displeased Shivaji and he asked the emissary – "whether his master, being now by him [i.e. Shivaji] cooped up in his chamber, thought him a woman to accept such conditions." The emissary replied: "And we [too] are not women; I have somewhat more to say to you" and drawing his dagger rushed towards Shivaji. But an alert guard who stood by with a naked sword struck at and almost cut off the man's hand "so that [it] hung but by a piece of flesh." The impetus, however, carried the man forward. He stumbled upon Shivaji staining him with blood and both of them fell

down together. The blood being seen upon their master there was uproar in the camp that he was killed and the cry went: 'Kill the prisoners'. Some were immediately hacked. By the time Shivaji disentangled himself, the guard had cloven the assailant's skull. So the command was given to stop the execution and bring the prisoners before Shivaji. This was immediately done and he went on issuing orders to cut off one man's head, the right hand of the other and both the hands of a third. When Smith's turn came his right hand was ordered to be cut off whereupon he cried out to Shivaji in "Indostan" [i.e. in Hindustani] rather to cut off his head. So his hat was taken off but before the executioner's sword fell Shivaji stopped the execution and Smith was saved.<sup>1645</sup> By that time 4 heads had rolled and 24 hands were cut off.<sup>1646</sup>

This account, given by Smith, has not been corroborated by any other source. All English letters from Surat which tell this story have derived it from Smith and he, as we shall see, is not a trustworthy source.

At about 2 O'clock, a party of some 25 Maratha horsemen stealthily came near the English house.<sup>1647</sup> The English saw the points of their lances protruding beyond the roofs of neighbouring houses and, perceiving that they intended to set fire to those, the English President sent out a party of twenty men under Gerald Aungier<sup>1648</sup> to drive them away and another of about similar strength to secure the retreat of the first. The fire of the English muskets killed a horse and wounded a man whereupon the rest of the Marathas took to their heels carrying their wounded comrade with them. Two men in the English party were wounded — one was shot in the leg with an arrow,<sup>1649</sup> the other, who had ventured to go too far ahead of the others, suffered a deep wound in the shoulder.<sup>1650</sup>

The Surat letter of 28<sup>th</sup> January says that a mosque which was close by was cleared by the English at this time.<sup>1651</sup>

In the morning, a Greek merchant at Surat named Nicholas Colostra, came at the Dutch house with a Maratha trooper and said in Portuguese that he was taken prisoner by Shivaji and had come to deliver Shivaji's message to the Dutch Director and the English President.<sup>1652</sup> The message he brought was that Prince Shah Shuja<sup>1653</sup> had formerly given the city to Shivaji and as he (i.e. Shivaji) wanted money to pay to his troops they should supply him with it. The Director knew that Shuja had died in Arakan three years previously. He replied that being merchants they did not keep their money lying idle and therefore had very little money in their house but he was ready to offer a present of spices if Shivaji would accept it. He also asked the Greek merchant to remind Shivaji that he had never troubled the company at Vengurle but had rather shown himself friendly by giving them free escorts and therefore hoped that Shivaji would protect the Company's servants against the evil-minded.

An alarm was raised at the Dutch house in the afternoon but, records the Dutch diary, their menacing posture kept the Marathas away. Then flames broke out in several places at once and it was thought that the Marathas intended to burn down the Dutch house. Iversen says:<sup>1654</sup>

“New and fierce fires arose in the east and north, so that it was as piteous a sight as one pictures Sodom or Troy to have been.”

As a precautionary measure, the Dutch pulled down part of the roof of their store-house and raised barricades of goods inside the gate. But just as the fires rapidly approached them, a sudden change in the direction of the wind saved them.<sup>1655</sup>

By this time, the Director had learnt that the English had made several sorties against the Marathas and sent a note to the English President asking for news and informing him of the reply he had given to Shivaji's messenger. In his answer, the English President informed the Dutch Director of the warm welcome the English had given to the Marathas.

The Dutch diary also records a rumour that Shivaji had about 40 frigates in the river at this time.

*Friday, 8<sup>th</sup> January*

The English President sent a message in the morning to Zahid Beg who was in the castle, requesting permission to occupy his house which would be vital in preserving both his estate and the English house. Zahid Beg immediately gave his permission whereupon the English entered the house from the top by means of a ladder, and found that the Marathas had already abandoned it. So, they barricaded the doors and put a party in the balcony — which they secured by tying thick planks to its posts leaving only narrow openings through which to fire their muskets — to cover the approaches to the house.<sup>1656</sup>

Anthony Smith was released on parole in the afternoon, after being deprived of Rs.300 as ransom, and was sent with an Armenian, who also was despoiled, and one of Shivaji's men with a threatening message. The English President replied in defiance as before and refused to send Smith back.<sup>1657</sup> Then came the ambassador of Ethiopia, an Armenian named Khwaja Murad, who was set free after being dispossessed of twelve horses and other presents sent by his King for the Mughal Emperor, to convey fresh threats from Shivaji. The English President reiterated his defiance whereupon the ambassador went his way.<sup>1658</sup>

In the morning, the Dutch Director received a message from the commandant of the castle offering to send some ammunition, which the Dutch gratefully accepted.<sup>1659</sup> Iversen tells us that on 8<sup>th</sup> January the Secretary of the Court of Justice sent a letter in Persian from the castle asking the Dutch to rescue a chest from his house and take it into their factory for safety. But the Dutch replied that he must defend it himself so that no claim might be made in the case of harm coming to it.<sup>1660</sup>

A large part of the city was now ablaze. L'Escalot writes:<sup>1661</sup>

“On Friday, after he had ransacked and dug up Viraji Vora's house, he fired it and a great number more towards the Dutch house; a fire so great as turned the night into day, as before the smoke in the

day-time had almost turned day into night, rising so thick as it darkened the sun like a great cloud."

### *Shivaji's Departure from Surat*<sup>1662</sup>

On 8<sup>th</sup> January, Shivaji withdrew his men from the city and, according to Valentine, encamped half a mile from it:

"So as to make it appear that he intended to remain there for a time, but he departed at the first gleam of daylight [on 9<sup>th</sup> January], delighted to have plucked such a fine feather from Aurangzeb's tail."<sup>1663</sup>

As the pandemonium appeared to have subsided a little, the Dutch thought that the Marathas were preparing to leave. To ascertain this, they sent out an Indian peon who volunteered to go to the Maratha camp in the disguise of a faqir or a mendicant monk. They also gave with him a note for the English President. Later in the day, the Dutch received an answer from the English President suggesting that if they received another demand from Shivaji, they should inform him that they and the English would join their forces to defend themselves. The peon in disguise returned in the evening and reported that he had been to all parts of the town and saw the houses of principal merchants laid in ashes.<sup>1664</sup> He had been to the Maratha camp outside the city and passed through it without being suspected. There were no tents. Shivaji himself was sitting on the ground and had not had a tent pitched but only a cloth hung from a tree for protection against the heat of the sun. The booty laden on oxen and horses had been brought in and laid before him.<sup>1665</sup>

Shivaji finally departed from the city on 9<sup>th</sup> January.<sup>1666</sup> Iversen writes:<sup>1667</sup>

"With this immense booty Shivaji took his departure saying: 'I have long since wished to pull Aurangzeb's beard and now my wishes are fulfilled.'

The Dutch Director received a proposal from the castle on 9<sup>th</sup> January for a joint attack on the Marathas. The Director replied that he could not spare any men from the defence of

their factory and it was rather the Governor's duty to defend them and the city.<sup>1668</sup>

### *Condition of the City after the Sack*

The destruction of the city was complete. The Surat letter of 28<sup>th</sup> January runs:<sup>1669</sup>

“He has carried away in gold, pearls, precious stones and other rich goods to the value of many hundred thousand pounds, and burnt off other goods and houses to the amount of as much more. The town is utterly ruined and very little [is] left either of riches or habitation.”

Valentine also states that:<sup>1670</sup>

“Many considerable merchants lost all that the enemy had not plundered through this terrible fire.”

According to the Surat dispatch of 10<sup>th</sup> February, over half the houses in the city were laid in ashes.<sup>1671</sup> Henry Gary, a servant of the English East India Company, wrote that over 3,000 houses perished in flames.<sup>1672</sup> Only the English and the Dutch houses and a party of Turkish and Armenian merchants who had put up in a serai<sup>1673</sup> close to the English house, defended themselves.<sup>1674</sup> That quarter of the city in which the English house stood was also saved due to the resistance put up by the English.<sup>1675</sup>

### *The Quantum of Loot*

The booty gained was immense. Relating what Anthony Smith reported on his return, L'Escalot writes:<sup>1676</sup>

“When he [i.e. Smith] came away he could not [but] guess, by the money heaped up in two great heaps before Shivaji's tent, than that he had plundered 20 or 25 lack (hundred thousand) of rupees; that the day when he came away in the morning there was brought in near upon 300 porters, laden each with two bags of rupees, and some he guessed to be of gold, that they brought in 28 ser of large pearl, with many other jewels, great diamonds,

rubies and emeralds (40 *ser* make 37 pounds weight), and these, with an incredible quantity of money they found at the house of the reputed richest merchant in the world (his name is Viraji Vora, his estate having been esteemed to be 80 lack [i.e. eight million] rupees): that they were still, every hour while he [i.e. Smith] was there, bringing in loads of money from his house."

Iversen says that Viraji Vora's house was reduced to ashes and he lost six tons of gold, money, pearls, gems and other precious wares.<sup>1677</sup> Two other rich *baniyas*, he further tells us, wished to cross the river with their valuables but were refused permission to do so by the Governor, and in consequence they lost, in Dutch reckoning, about 30 tons of gold.<sup>1678</sup>

In their letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> January, the Surat Council wrote that the total plunder was generally reported to be a *crore* (i.e. ten million) rupees.<sup>1679</sup> Gary gives the same estimate as being "credibly reported" in his letter to the Earl of Marlborough.<sup>1680</sup> Benjamin Lannoy, the English Consul at Aleppo, heard, evidently from Surat, that the plunder was "above one million pounds sterling."<sup>1681</sup> According to an official Mughal news report from Surat, quoted in the newsletter of the Imperial Court dated 17<sup>th</sup> January 1671, the loot in Shivaji's second sack of Surat (in October 1670) was 6.6 million rupees.<sup>1682</sup> So, it seems that the estimate of the loot in the first sack as 10 million rupees is fairly close to the truth.

### *Some French Accounts*

Bernier writes:

"I forgot to mention that during the pillage of Surat, Shivaji, the holy Shivaji! respected the habitation of the Reverend Father Ambrose, the Capuchin missionary! 'The Frankish Padres are good men,' he said, 'and shall not be molested.' He spared also the house of a deceased *Delal* [i.e. Dalal, broker] or Gentile [i.e. a Hindu] broker of the Dutch, because [he was] assured that he had been very charitable while

alive. The dwellings of the English and the Dutch likewise escaped his visits not in consequence of any reverential feelings on his part, but because those people had displayed a great deal of resolution, and defended themselves well. The English especially, assisted by the crews of their vessels, performed wonders and saved not only their own houses but those of their neighbours. The pertinacity of a Jew, a native of Constantinople, astonished everybody. Shivaji knew that he was in possession of most valuable rubies, which he intended to sell to Aurangzeb; but he persevered in stoutly denying the fact, although three times placed on his knees to receive the stroke of a sword flourished over his head. This conduct was worthy of a Jew whose love of money generally exceeds his love of life.”[1683](#)

It seems that the Hindu broker of the Dutch mentioned by Bernier was Mohandas Parekh. Tavernier writes:

“In the month of January of the year 1661, the Shroff or moneychanger of the Dutch company, named Mohandas Parekh, died at Surat. He was a rich man and very charitable and bestowed much alms during his life on the Christians as well as on the idolaters; the Rev. Capuchin Fathers of Surat used to live for a part of the year on the rice, butter and vegetables which he sent to them.”[1684](#)

Carré, too, says that “the Capuchin Fathers... were exempted on account of the general regard for them as good *religieux* and in order that he might not have the appearance of scorning popular respect for their persons.” [1685](#)

Jean de Thevenot relates:[1686](#)

“And none but the Christians of Europe [viz. the English and the Dutch] made good their post and preserved themselves. All the rest of the town was plundered except the monastery of the Capuchins. When the plunderers came to their convent, they passed it by, and had orders from their general to do

so, because the first day in the evening Father Ambrose, who was superior of it, being moved with compassion for the poor Christians living in Surat, went to the Raja and spoke in their favour, praying him at least not to suffer any violence to be done to their persons. Shivaji had a great respect for him, took him into his protection, and granted what he had desired in favour of the Christians."

All these four account writers — Bernier, Tavernier, Carré and Thevenot — were Frenchmen like Father Ambrose, and all of them had visited Surat soon after this raid. What they say could, therefore, be accepted as reliable.

### *Surat after the Sack*

About the middle of January, some Mughal forces reached Surat only "to behold the ruin and desolation that he had made."<sup>1687</sup> When the English President and the Commandant of Surat came out to visit the nobleman in command, the people applauded the courage of the English and derided, and even flung dirt at the Commandant. Whereupon, records the log of the *Loyal Merchant*, the son of the Commandant shot an arrow at a poor merchant — who had just come across the river with his pack on his back — and killed him.<sup>1688</sup> The English President did not fail to capitalize on the courage which he and his compatriots had displayed.<sup>1689</sup> Laying down his pistol before the nobleman he said that now he was leaving the future care and protection of the city to them. The nobleman wanted to honour the President by presenting him a horse, a sword and a vest. But the President replied that those were things becoming a soldier but they were merchants and expected the Emperor's favour in their trade. The nobleman assured him that he did not doubt the Emperor would gratify them to their content. The President then hinted that he expected an exemption from custom duty for the English. Later, he followed up this discourse with a petition to the Emperor, endorsed by the nobleman, the Imperial public and private news writers in Surat and the Chief Customs Officer of the port. He did not forget to ask for

satisfaction for the goods lost at the customs house. He also took care that this would be inserted in the report of the Governor of Gujarat, Mahabat Khan, and wrote several letters to his friends at the Court such as Mustafa Khan and Roshan Zamir.<sup>1690</sup> He also sent a delegation of three Englishmen to Mahabat Khan — who was much troubled at the ruin of Surat, “the choicest flower in his garden” — to procure his letter to the Emperor for a recommendation of reward. The Dutch also lodged a complaint to the Mughal Emperor and pressed the governor for compensation.<sup>1691</sup>

Soon afterwards, the Emperor, by his decree of 15<sup>th</sup> March 1664, granted an exemption from customs for one year to all the merchants of the city including the Dutch and the English companies.<sup>1692</sup> The Surat letter of 4<sup>th</sup> April further reported of an advice from Mahabat Khan that on his request and the solicitations of their friends at the court, the Emperor had rewarded the English with a remittance of one-fourth of all their custom dues.<sup>1693</sup> Then in their letter of 19<sup>th</sup> May, the Surat Council informed their colleagues at Madras of their receipt of a letter from Jafar Khan, the *Diwan*, that after the expiry of the customs-free year the English were to enjoy forever a remittance of one half of their customs duties.<sup>1694</sup> However, their expectation, repeated in their letters of 26<sup>th</sup> November 1664 and 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1665, was ill-founded.<sup>1695</sup> They had under-rated the Emperor’s parsimony, and misunderstood the decree dated 15<sup>th</sup> March 1664, by which they as well as the Dutch were granted a reduction of one-half per cent (or, a reduction from 2½ % to 2 %) in their customs dues.<sup>1696</sup> This extra concession seems to have been applied only to imports, and the duty paid by the English on exports continued to be three per cent until 1667.<sup>1697</sup> It also appears from their trading figures that this concession would have amounted to some £250-500 (i.e. Rs.2,250 to 4,500) per year at that time.<sup>1698</sup> In his letter to the Board of Directors, the Dutch Director at Surat, Dirck van Adrichem, wrote that this concession would amount to 5 to 6 thousand guilders (Rs.4,000 to 5,000) per annum.<sup>1699</sup>

However, this concession was revoked in 1679! Streynsham Master recorded in his diary in November 1679:

“The King, being informed how our customs were paid at Surat, demanded [the payment of] ½ per cent again, both of the English and the Dutch, that was taken off for service done at Shivaji’s first plundering that town, and turned out all the writers for letting it pass free so long.” [1700](#)

For his courage, Sir George Oxenden, the President, received a gold medal and £200 from the company in 1668. At the same time, John Goodier (the ‘Second’ in the Surat factory) received £100, and Henry Gary and Gerald Aungier (both members of the Surat Council) £60. In addition, the company directed the Surat council to distribute £400 among those who took part in the defence of the factory.[1701](#) Officers and men of the two ships, the *Loyal Merchant* and *African*, some of whose crews had participated in the defence of the factory, were also rewarded in 1664-65.[1702](#)

Aurangzeb summoned Inayat Khan, the Commandant of the city, to Court and appointed Ghiyasuddin Khan in his place.[1703](#) He also ordered building of a stone wall around the city.[1704](#)

As Surat was returning to normalcy, new alarms were raised of Shivaji’s approach and caused a fresh stampede.[1705](#) But they proved groundless. In their letter of 28<sup>th</sup> January, the Surat Council predicted: “He has become so terrible that report of his approach is sufficient at any time to disperse the small remainder of the city.”[1706](#)

### *Shivaji’s Return to Rajgad*

Shivaji arrived at Rajgad on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1664.[1707](#) Little is known about the route he took on his return journey. In his letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1666 to the King of Portugal, the Portuguese Viceroy wrote that Shivaji “happily reached his dominion sheltering himself all along our territory.”[1708](#) It seems, therefore, that Shivaji returned along the narrow coastal strip of the Portuguese dominions in the Konkan. The Mughals

thought, or at least suspected, that Shivaji's safe return was due to the connivance of the Portuguese in his raid on Surat. In retaliation a Mughal officer named Lodi Khan made a punitive raid in the Vasai district of the Portuguese dominions, laid waste several villages and carried off foodstuff of the villagers.<sup>1709</sup>

### *Effects of the First Sack*

The Sack of Surat spread Shivaji's fame throughout India. In their letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> June 1664 to Karwar, the Surat Council wrote:<sup>1710</sup>

“Shivaji is so famously infamous for his notorious thefts that report has made him an airy body and added wings or else it was impossible he could be at so many places as he is said to be at, all at one time.

“Sometimes he is certainly believed to be in one, and in a day or two in another place, and so in half a dozen remote one from another, and there burns and plunders all without control, so that they ascribe to him to perform more than a Herculean labour that he has become the talk of all conditions of people. We are here alarmed to expect him by sea, for which intent report speaks him to be fitting up some and building of others to the number of 60 sail of frigates to surprise all junks and vessels belonging to this port and that he intends to waylay them in their return from Basra and Persia, and others give out [that] he has another design to run up the river at Khambayat<sup>1711</sup> and land an army, that they are to transport, who are to march up to Ahmedabad and do by that [city] as he has done by this town. That he will lay siege to Goa we hardly believe, in regard it is none of his business to lay siege to any place that is fortified against him, for it will not turn him to account. He is, and ever was, for a running banquet, and to plunder and burn those towns that have neither defence nor guard.”

And in reply the English factors at Karwar in their letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> August 1664 wrote:<sup>1712</sup>

“We are sorry to read that Shivaji should be so terrible and for ought we see is likely to continue so, for the army of Aurangzeb's that lay against him is returned home, so that he now ranges at liberty and hath certainly plundered Ahmednagar and, it's thought, will venture hard for Daulatabad.”

This was gross exaggeration. Though Jaswant Singh had raised the siege of Sinhgad by this time, the Mughal forces had retained possession of that portion of Shivaji's territory which they were already occupying. That Shivaji plundered Ahmednagar about this time was also incorrect.

In their letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1664 from Batavia, the Governor General and Councilors of the Dutch East Indies wrote to the Directors of the Company:<sup>1713</sup>

“The robber Shivaji has struck a great terror amongst the Moors. They think that they will be attacked by him from the sea also, although as far as is known, he never before sailed on the sea. If he did, the awe he has inspired would enable him to inflict still greater losses on the Mughals with robbing and plundering. He is a man, as it is said, of great conceptions and designs which he knows how to contrive and execute with ingenuity. This might raise him to such high latitude of power among the terrified Moors, especially now that he has come to perceive the timidity of these people in making his raid on the town of Surat, of which exploit he will no doubt be very proud and boastful.”

The letter was evidently repeating the information received from Surat.

#### *Unreliability of Anthony Smith's Account*

Anthony Smith was appointed as Chief of the English East India Company's trading station at Ahmedabad in 1658.<sup>1714</sup> In the following year, he was sent to Mocha<sup>1715</sup> as Chief of the

Company's trading station there. Before going there, however, Smith had left some private debts at Ahmedabad which caused considerable trouble to the Company as Smith's creditors would not allow the Company's goods to leave until they obtained some satisfaction. At Mocha, Smith mismanaged the Company's trade and did not return to Surat till 1663 despite repeated orders from the Surat Council since 1660 to do so. He also came into trouble with the governor of Mocha because he was suspected of having contacts with Hubert Hugo, a notorious pirate operating in the Red Sea at that time. In 1663, the Surat Council sent two servants of the Company to Mocha "to look after Mr. Anthony Smith and the Company's estate there."

On his return to Surat in 1663, Smith had a bad reception from the President who blamed him for having remained four years at Mocha without sending proper advices. He was also accused of quarrelling with the governor of Mocha, sheltering some of Hugo's men who were driven ashore in a boat and falsely reporting that the company's warehouse at Mocha had been robbed during his absence. Yet Smith did not mend his ways. He tried with the help of some Indian merchants to buy the whole lot of the Company's broadcloth — which was imported from England — at a cheap rate. The Company had permitted the Surat council to sell their broadcloth at a very low price. The plot was thus to corner the market and resell the broadcloth at a substantial profit. Had outside merchants alone been concerned in this syndicate there was nothing reprehensible in it. But Smith's participation in it was certainly objectionable. The syndicate hoped that Smith's influence would enable them to secure the broadcloth on especially favourable terms. Having failed in this, Smith proffered the President, if he would agree to sell the cloth at the price he was offering, a diamond worth about Rs.1,000. The President refused the bribe and put the matter before the Surat Council in their meeting of 10<sup>th</sup> December 1663. But apparently no immediate action was taken against him.

Shortly afterwards came Shivaji's raid and Smith's imprisonment and release. After his release, the Surat Council

was informed that he intended to betray their house and the Company's servants to Shivaji and this was avowed by the person whom Smith had appointed to write a letter intended to be sent to Shivaji. Here is the letter, dated 31<sup>st</sup> March 1665, in which the Surat Council reported the matter to the company:[1716](#)

"A more atheistical wretch [than Anthony Smith] never was suffered to live on the earth.... At the rebel Shivaji's being here he fell into his hands, and after his release would (as we are credibly informed) have betrayed your house, estate and servants up to him; and this is avouched by him that was appointed to write the letter which was intended to be sent the rebel.... For these and other misdemeanors too tedious to enlarge on here we warned him home to answer to you."

But, though dismissed from the Company's service, Smith stayed on at Surat as a free man with his family and died there on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1677.[1717](#)

Such was the man. The allegation that he had tried to betray the Company's house and servants to Shivaji makes his story of the attempt on Shivaji's life and the subsequent slaughter and mutilation of prisoners highly doubtful. The story may well be true but it is equally possible that Smith could have invented it. Therefore, the veracity of Smith's story, as long as it is not corroborated by any other source, shall always remain suspect.[1718](#) So would that of those portions of other English letters which refer to these decapitations and mutilations and — though some of these do not mention his name — are obviously based upon Smith's account.[1719](#) It is noteworthy in this respect that neither contemporaneous Dutch letters nor accounts of French travelers like Bernier, Tavernier and Thevenot speak of such carnage.

#### *Atrocities committed during the sack of Surat*

While Smith's narrative and those of others based on it is dubious at best, another incident, narrated by L'Escalot, is in no way based on Smith's account. He writes:[1720](#)

“A very great many there were who, hearing of his coming went forth to him, thinking to fare the better, but found their fault to their cost, as one who came to our house for cure. He went forth to meet him [i.e. Shivaji] and told him he was come from about Agra with cloth and had brought 40 oxen loaded with it, and that he came to present him with it all or else what part he should please to command. Shivaji asked him if he had no money. He answered that he had not as yet sold any cloth since he came to town, and that he had no money. The villain [i.e. Shivaji] made his right hand to be cut off immediately and then bid him begone; he [i.e. Shivaji] had no need of his cloth. The poor old man returns, finds his cloth burnt and himself, destitute of other harbour, comes to the English house, where he is dressed and fed.”

Some may doubt the cause, as recounted by the merchant of Agra, of his mutilation, but that he had lost his hand is undoubtedly true and many others might have suffered a similar fate.

A Persian poem, entitled *Qissa-i Rustam Manak* (History of Rustam Manak), was written in 1711, eulogizing Rustam Manak (1635-1721), a charitable Parsee businessman of Surat.<sup>1721</sup> Its revised and corrected version written in 1845 narrates an incident during Shivaji's sack of Surat, the substance of which is as follows:<sup>1722</sup>

Shiva, the plunderer, came to the city with a large army. He took men, women, and even milk-drinking children captive. He carried away from every house in the city silken cloth, gold, silver, household furniture and other goods. As a result, there was a general flight. He set fire everywhere. All were stupefied by his oppression. Several helpless people were imploring for exemption from ransom. Those who were captive sent word to their wives that they were much oppressed and they will not be free from the fetters of the unholy Shiva, the plunderer, unless

ransom was paid. Those to whom the errand was sent were quite helpless because they themselves were plundered and their houses burnt and they themselves were without food and clothes. So they went to Rustam Manak and prayed for help. They said: 'Shiva, the plunderer, has carried away men from our houses and is demanding 10,000 [rupees] as ransom. He has come like the devil and has become an enemy of the city and the villages. He has an army of 50,000 soldiers. That army has at its head two generals, one of whom is vicious and the other devilish. They are hostile to the Zoroastrians. They devastated the city and the villages and carried away from all houses silver, ornaments, apparel and grain as pillage and then set fire to the houses. They killed some and carried away others with their hands tied behind their backs. Among us there are some who have run away from captivity. Deliver us from this oppression.' Rustam Manak felt pity for them. He gave the sum of 10,000 [rupees], got the captives freed and gave them food and clothing.<sup>1723</sup>

Carré writes:<sup>1724</sup>

"The signal was given and the soldiers commenced the pillage. All of a sudden they fell upon whomsoever they found at hand irrespective of age or sex. They killed some of them while the rest fled away....

"There was no form of cruelty that they did not practice upon women and old people who had been detained in their lodgings through weakness or age. They wanted thereby to make them disclose where the rest of their treasures were concealed."

Bernier too speaks of Shivaji's "torturing the population to compel a discovery of their concealed riches."<sup>1725</sup>

Neither Carré nor Bernier were present in the city at the time of the sack; however, they did visit it some years later.

Guarda gives a different version. He writes:

"But no one was in the peril of life, for it was the strict order of Shivaji that unless resistance was offered no one should be killed, and as none resisted, none perished."[1726](#)

He goes on to say that rich merchants were taken before Shivaji and were assured by him that no harm would be done if they would tell where their treasures were hidden which they immediately did.[1727](#)

But Guarda's account is much less reliable than that of L'Escalot, Carré or Bernier because it was written several years after the event and the chronicler himself was not present at the time of the sack.

Be that as it may, it is certain that the sack of Surat must have meant a great calamity for many innocent people. Several people were rendered penniless and homeless, several must have died and several might have been tortured. But before condemning Shivaji for cruelty we must remember that this is the bane of every war of liberation. A people who rise in revolt against their foreign rulers have to fight, to a lesser or greater degree, their own kith and kin. As they have no state economy to sustain their forces they have to make war pay for war and despoil their own people who provide their rulers with the sinews of war. The only other alternative is to continue in slavery. The choice is indeed a difficult one and forms a fundamental problem of ethics. But once the choice is made, once a nation embarks upon a war for its own liberation, it cannot escape this dilemma. Shivaji's followers were not angels and "in the heat of the moment and under the impulses of fighting," as Dr. Sen observes, they "might have exceeded the original intentions of their leader."[1728](#)

#### SHAHJI'S DEATH

Soon after his return from Surat, Shivaji had to face the grief of his father's demise. The Jedhe Chronology states: "Shahji Raja expired on Saturday 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1664."[1729](#) This is corroborated by the Shivapur Chronology.[1730](#)

The Marathi Chronicles, Sabhasad and Chitnis, ascribe Shahji's death to a fall from his horse.<sup>1731</sup> This is borne out by the following extract from a Dutch letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1664 from Vengurle:<sup>1732</sup>

"The old preying bird Shahji, father of the great rebel Shivaji, was thrown by his horse in a full gallop, which fall hurt him so much that after a few days he had to pay for it with his life. We do not think that the King [i.e. the Adilshah] had gone into mourning for the said accident, but rather he wished to get rid of other rebellious ring-leaders of that sort in a similar way."

Though this might be true, the Adilshah did write a letter of condolence to Shahji's younger son Ekoji on 30<sup>th</sup> January 1664 and conferred Shahji's jagirs and *watans* on him.<sup>1733</sup>

Marathi chronicles state that Shahji died at the village of Hodigere<sup>1734</sup> in Chitradurg sub-division. This is borne out by a Marathi document of 1733, regarding a grant given for the maintenance of Shahji's cenotaph at Hodigere.<sup>1735</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S NAVAL PREPARATIONS (1664)

Soon after his return from Surat, Shivaji embarked upon a vigorous naval programme as is shown by a number of contemporaneous English and Dutch documents. Its first notice is found in the Surat Council's letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> June 1664 to Karwar, which has already been quoted.<sup>1736</sup> It repeats a report which "speaks him [i.e. Shivaji] to be fitting up some and building of others, to the number of 60 sail of frigates." The Portuguese captain at Chaul, João Borges da Silva, too had reported to the Portuguese viceroy that Shivaji was building 50 warships and that he had completed 7 at Upper Chaul and was going to send them to sea soon. He had further asked whether or not he was to resist this attempt and had requested a reinforcement of troops, as there was a deficiency of men in the fort of Chaul, if the answer was in the affirmative. In a meeting of the State Advisory Council held at Goa on 25<sup>th</sup> August 1664 it

was unanimously resolved, in accordance with the viceroy's advice, to adopt a policy of conciliation in view of Shivaji's strength. It was decided to instruct the captain of Chaul not to instigate Shivaji for the time being. However, it was also agreed upon to send a reinforcement of 50 soldiers from Vasai to Chaul for its defence.<sup>1737</sup>

The object of this fleet was variously guessed. Some thought that it was to attack the ships returning to Surat from Basra and Persia while others expected an attack on Ahmedabad.<sup>1738</sup> The Dutch also had heard a rumour that Shivaji would attack Surat by sea.<sup>1739</sup>

The Dagh Register records under 15<sup>th</sup> October 1664:<sup>1740</sup>

"The following is to be mentioned regarding the advices from Surat:

"The new governor with the name of Ghiyasuddin Khan has arrived in Surat on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1664.... Two days afterwards he has given to the Director a statement of the cargoes imported and exported by the company during this year. He further called him at his house on the 7<sup>th</sup> of the same month and told him that the King [i.e. the Mughal Emperor] had ordered him by *farman* to request the English and us to lend a ship each to His Majesty about 15<sup>th</sup> or 20<sup>th</sup> September in order to meet, near St John,<sup>1741</sup> His Majesty's ships, which are expected to arrive from Mocha,<sup>1742</sup> and to protect them against all hostilities of the robber Shivaji who, as people said, was going to fit out a fleet against the Mughal. He promised thereby that the charges which we should have to incur would be refunded either in cash or by granting more freedom in our business and exemption from toll, as we had last year. The English had already confirmed by letter that they would send the convoy [i.e. the escort]. Although the Director tried hard to get away from it, he could not refuse it now and granted the request on condition that the company would be exempted from the Surat and Bharuch toll for all their

exported and imported goods. The Director preferred this to asking refund out of pocket expenses, because usually the Moors are more liberal in exempting some of their privileges than in paying cash, which they need very much. We shall use the *Vlielant* or the *Claverskerke*, which are coming from Persia, for that purpose. It will only be a matter of 14 days. The Director thinks that it is only brag on the part of Shivaji, because he has never undertaken anything at sea. According to him, the worst of it is that Shivaji will be angry with us for our helping the Moors. But he [i.e. Shivaji] has given us sufficient reason to cause him some damage. Moreover, if the King's [i.e. the Mughal emperor's] ships would get into difficulties, business in Surat would be upset to such an extent that it would not be easy to restore it, and in that case the business of the company would also have to stop."

This extract from the Dagh Register is a summary of the Dutch letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> June 1664 from Surat, as is shown by the following entry dated 21<sup>st</sup> October 1664 in the Dagh Register:

"In the letter to Surat in reply to theirs of 6<sup>th</sup> June [1664] the following was advised : 'At the request of the Mughal [Emperor] to have a ship as convoy [i.e. escort] for the Moor ships which are expected from Mocha, we have consented to use the yacht *Vlielant* for that purpose.'"<sup>1743</sup>

Surat to Amsterdam<sup>1744</sup>

7<sup>th</sup> December 1664

"In May, June and the following months of this year there were persistent rumours that the robber Shivaji was fitting out a goodly number of frigates in all his sea-ports with the intention of capturing His Majesty's and other ships coming from Mocha, so that by that means he might draw the commerce from here to his seaports. Having heard of this, King Aurangzeb commanded the Governor Ghiyasuddin

Khan to request or to order us and the English in a friendly way that we should each keep ready a ship against the latter part of August or the beginning of September, cruise with them up to the highland of St. Joan [Sanjan] and thereabouts, also protect His Majesty's ships against those hostile attempts and accompany them for safety up the river of Surat. He promised us to refund the expenses, or to grant us some additional privileges in trading. This matter having been submitted to us and to the English friends by the Governor, it was the English who first accepted this proposal, on the condition, as we were told, that His Majesty should allow them what was reasonable. They would use for this purpose their President's private ship *The Royal Welcome* arrived here last June from Persia with freight goods and wintered in this river. This matter caused us some uneasiness, for if we refused and the English accepted, it was certain that the Company's respect among this haughty Moorish nation would decline and that of the English, on the other hand, would increase. We therefore resolved to promise the Governor that we too should fit out a small ship at the time required, and hoped to use for that purpose the yacht *Vlielant* or another that should be sent us by Mr. Van Wijck, on the condition that we did not desire any repayment for our expenses but exemption from the Surat and Bharuch tolls either in part or entirely, according to His Majesty's pleasure. The Governor expressed his readiness to inform the King of this in the most proper way for our benefit. Of this transaction he passed us a written declaration."

(It may be mentioned that the Mughal ships safely came back from Mocha with the English and the Dutch vessels.)

Attention was also being paid to the Maratha merchant marine as is shown by an extract from a report dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1664 by

Pieter Van Antvliet to the Governor General and Council of the Dutch East Indies. It runs:[1745](#)

“.... Both that rebel [Shivaji] and his subaltern governors have not yet shown us any hostile feeling, but have openly tried to keep up friendly relations which, however, must by no means be trusted. But Shivaji's inclination towards us chiefly arises from the fact that he knows the Company's maritime power, which might inflict great losses on him. He intends to open up an intensive traffic in many quarters, and tries to obtain a busy navigation in the parts he has taken under him. This is also in some measure to be seen from the fact that at the time of his raid upon Surat he did not attack our lodge there, although he certainly would have been able to capture it, or at least set fire to it.”

More evidence is provided by an entry dated 13<sup>th</sup> August 1664 in the Dagh Register. Internal evidence shows that it is based on a communication from India dated sometime after 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1663.[1746](#)

“The said Pandit [i.e. the previously mentioned ‘grand governor Raoji Somanath Pandit’] has received two small ships back from Mocha, which brought him such a nice profit that he at once made eight or nine ships ready to sail to Mocha, Congo,[1747](#) Persia, Muscat, etc., but we shall not give passes for those.”

In August 1664, the Portuguese Viceroy received a letter from the captain of Chaul that Shivaji was building 50 ships in Upper Chaul out of which 7 were about to sail out. In view of Shivaji's strength, the Portuguese decided not to hinder them from sailing out to sea.[1748](#)

One more extract about Shivaji's ship building programme is found in a Dagh Register entry dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664. Internal evidence shows that it is based on a communication from India, dated sometime after 1<sup>st</sup> August 1664. It reads:[1749](#)

“The robber Shivaji has got 50 frigates on the stocks along the straits. They are very busy building them

and they are due to be ready at the end of August. It could not be ascertained what the object was. In Surat they think that it is against the ships of the Mughals to Mocha, but for several reasons we cannot believe that."

The next entry in the Dagh Register which mentions Shivaji's naval preparations is dated 17<sup>th</sup> December 1664. Internal evidence shows that it is based on a communication from India, dated sometime after 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1664. It reads:<sup>1750</sup>

"He [i.e. "Shivaji"] has got 40 good frigates which are all lying in the rivers of Kharepatan and Rajapur and another 60 new frigates are on the stocks. It is daily confirmed that he is after something big. It appears from many circumstances that he will choose battle and that this will take place on the seaside not far from Vengurle. On an island opposite the village Harnai, he is building a very strong castle."

The fort referred to in the last sentence is evidently the one named Suvarndurg which still stands on an island opposite Harnai.

The Resident at Vengurle, Leendert Lenartsz, wrote in his letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies that on 3<sup>rd</sup> November 1665 Shivaji's ships captured, in the port of Vengurle, a small ship belonging to the old Queen of Bijapur and carried it away to Kharepatan.<sup>1751</sup> Then, Lenartsz says, the goods in the ship were unloaded and stored "in the fortress of Giria." The fortress mentioned here is the one built on a rocky promontory at the mouth of the Vagothan River. Tavernier mentions it as a fort at the mouth of the Kharepatan port lying unoccupied during the Adilshahi regime.<sup>1752</sup> As it was situated near the village of Giryé it was called 'Gheria'. Shivaji renamed it Vijaydurg and repaired it.<sup>1753</sup> He might have expanded it as well.

It was about this time that Shivaji commenced the construction of a fort on a small island near Malvan and named it Sindhudurg.<sup>1754</sup> The earliest mention of this fort is found in an original letter dated 13<sup>th</sup> April 1668. It is written by Shivaji to

the commandant of Sindhudurg informing him of the appointment of a muster clerk (*sabnis*) at the fort.<sup>1755</sup> This shows that the fort must have come into existence in some form before 13<sup>th</sup> April 1668.

#### WAR IN SOUTH KONKAN (MAY - DECEMBER 1664)

##### *Fall of Kudal*

In May 1664, a small Adilshahi force opened an offensive against Shivaji in South Konkan. It appears to have been initiated at Aurangzeb's instigation. The *Ali Nama* states that Aurangzeb had sent an envoy to the Adilshah to suggest a two-fronted attack against Shivaji.<sup>1756</sup> An entry dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664 in the Dagh Register corroborates this. It says that Aurangzeb had written several times to the Adilshah asking him to send an army against Shivaji and promising him to redeem the 30,000 hons of annual tribute if he did so. He had also threatened that he would lead an army in person against the Adilshahi Sultanate and would not stop till it was completely conquered, if the Adilshah refused to comply.<sup>1757</sup> But though the Adilshah did open an offensive against Shivaji, the Dutch at Vengurle thought it to be no more than a sham war to placate the Mughal Emperor.<sup>1758</sup>

The opening moves of the campaign, till 21<sup>st</sup> April 1664, are narrated in a report dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1664 from Vengurle by Pieter Van Antvliet. The substance of his narrative is as follows:<sup>1759</sup>

On 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1664 a report reached Vengurle that the Adilshah has sent 'Tais' Khan<sup>1760</sup> to Kudal with 2,000 cavalry "to harass Shivaji", has favoured Lakham Sawant with some present and has ordered him to secretly enlist soldiers without letting Raoji, the Maratha governor, know of it till 'Tais' Khan's arrival. After 'Tais' Khan's arrival Lakham Sawant was to join him for the recapture of Kudal.

On 29<sup>th</sup> April 1664, the Dutch at Vengurle were informed by one of their Hindu brokers that Lakham Sawant had shown the Adilshah's order to Raoji and was told by the latter that no difference had arisen between Shivaji and the Adilshah and that he should adhere to his agreement with Shivaji. Further Raoji was reported to have advised Lakham Sawant that even in case of a dispute he should leave it to be settled between the armies of Shivaji and the Adilshah, "who were sure to bring matters to a conclusion without his having a finger in the pie."

But Lakham Sawant was already affected by the impending arrival of the Adilshahi forces. On 26<sup>th</sup> April 1664, the Dutch factors at Vengurle had heard that Narahari, Lakham Sawant's agent with Raoji, had absented himself from Kudal and that after receiving the Adilshah's order Lakham Sawant had prohibited Shivaji's officers at Kudal to collect taxes. The latter news was confirmed by one of Lakham Sawant's clerks.

On 1<sup>st</sup> May 1664, the Dutch factors at Vengurle were informed that Shivaji's men were breaking the roads in the mountains to prevent the Adilshah's army from coming down. The next day, they heard that the Adilshahi infantry as well as 100 horsemen had arrived at Raybag — about midway between Bijapur and Vengurle — which was the point of assembly of the Adilshahi army.

This account in the Dagh Register is corroborated and supplemented by some contemporaneous Adilshahi *farmans*. They tell us that the command of the army which was being assembled in South Konkan was entrusted to Aziz Khan. Ali Adilshah's *farman* dated 5<sup>th</sup> April 1664 to the officials of Telur district and Kanji Kanakavali sub-division is extant.<sup>1761</sup> Its substance is as follows:

“War has started between Shivaji’s people and Lakham Sawant, the *sardesai* of Kudal. *Sar-i Sarnaubat* Aziz Khan is dispatched to support Lakham Sawant. The said Lakham Sawant would visit Aziz Khan and [they] will decide how to resist Shivaji’s people. But if he fails to withstand Shivaji’s people and takes refuge in your district or sub-division, assist him in the best possible way.”

Two more *farmans* of Ali Adilshah, bearing the same date and similar in substance, are extant. One of these is addressed to Aziz Khan and Amin Khan, officers-in-charge of Rangana fort and Khanapur district.<sup>1762</sup> The other is addressed to the officials of Kapshi sub-division.<sup>1763</sup>

On 14<sup>th</sup> May 1664, an English letter from Karwar reported that the Adilshahi army against Shivaji, comprising about 4,000 cavalry besides infantry, had arrived at “Corollee,<sup>1764</sup> which is two days journey from Goa.”<sup>1765</sup> Evidently this was the same army which, according to a Dutch letter from Vengurle, had arrived at Kudal in May 1664 under command of Aziz Khan.<sup>1766</sup> The campaign which then followed is described in the Dagh Register entry dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664 thus:<sup>1767</sup>

After his arrival, Aziz Khan deputed Lakham Sawant to besiege the town of Kudal and kept his own force in reserve to support the besieging force if necessary. The garrison of Kudal made a few sallies against the besiegers and some of these were successful. If sometimes Lakham Sawant was hard-pressed and the force under Aziz Khan moved forward to support him, the Marathas went in without firing a shot although they had ample opportunities to do so. Aziz Khan’s horsemen often came near the town but were never fired at by the garrison. On the other hand, as soon as Lakham Sawant’s men put their heads outside their entrenchments they came under heavy fire. All this led Resident Leendert Lenartsz to conclude that the Adilshahi forces were merely indulging in a sham

fight with the Marathas to placate the Mughal Emperor.

The garrison did not hold out for long and surrendered the town to Aziz Khan. They were allowed to go with full armament and everything they could carry and were escorted within the borders of Kharepatan with 200 Adilshahi horsemen to protect them from Lakham Sawant who was an inveterate enemy of Shivaji's people."

Thus had the Dagh Register narrated the siege and fall of Kudal. Aziz Khan's capture of Kudal is confirmed by the minutes of the meeting of the State Advisory Council of Portuguese India held on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1664.<sup>1768</sup> The Portuguese viceroy, Antonio Melo de Castro, informed the council that he had received two letters informing him of Ali Adilshah's military commander Aziz Khan's capture of Shivaji's outposts at Kudal. One of these was sent by the captain of Thivi and the other by Haraba Rane of Nandode, Rivode and Pirn. Both the correspondents had reported that Aziz Khan was marching towards the port adjoining the border of Bardesh and had asked what they should do if he crossed into Bardesh. The council unanimously advised the viceroy to send a detachment from Fort Reis Magus to Thivi and another from Fort Aguada to Kolwal to strengthen the defence of the border.

The commencement of the rainy season was bound to suspend operations for four or five months. Shortly, after the reduction of Kudal, Aziz Khan and Bhikaji Pandit, 'grand governor' of Vengurle, visited Vengurle and the Dutch had to give them a present.<sup>1769</sup> On 18<sup>th</sup> June 1664, Aziz Khan died<sup>1770</sup> and Fath Khan in the fort of Kudal was left in charge of affairs for the time being.<sup>1771</sup> Soon afterwards Rustam-i Zaman was appointed to succeed Aziz Khan.<sup>1772</sup>

A Dagh Register entry dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664 informs us of Rustam-i Zaman's plan of campaign:<sup>1773</sup>

"The said Bhikaji Pandit has traveled on 11<sup>th</sup> August to Bijapur to report to the King [i.e. the Adilshah] about

the lower countries. In the meantime the new commander [Rustum-i Zaman] will stay with his army in Hukeri and will wait till the said Bhikaji Pandit comes down whose advice Rustum-i Zaman will have to follow. They will then together continue the war against the rebel Shivaji as fiercely as possible. The fortress Pratapgad<sup>1774</sup> situated on the mountain under the Balaghat [the uplands] on the road to Patgaon<sup>1775</sup> would come first and Kharepatan and Rajapur would be attacked later on."

Rustum-i Zaman came to Kudal in September 1664.<sup>1776</sup> But before he could open the campaign, he was deprived of his command. The Dagh Register entry dated 17<sup>th</sup> December 1664 states:<sup>1777</sup>

"Rustum-i Zaman had arrived to take over from Fath Khan the fortress of Kudal and the war affairs. He had sent his son already earlier.<sup>1778</sup> But Fath Khan did not agree to this. After that there came orders from the King of Bijapur that Fath Khan would stay in the said fortress Kudal and would not give it over. And Rustam-i Zaman has gone up again by order of the said King [i.e. Adilshah]. The people of Pratapgad, a fortress occupied by Shivaji's men, have therefore been given again an opportunity to start looting ...

"He [i.e. Shivaji] still occupies the fortress Pratapagad whereby he manages to warn his troops continuously of any alarm and from where he makes his profit as soon as an opportunity rises. And although the king of Bijapur has got a considerable army in Kudal, he is not strong enough to make Shivaji evacuate that district."

The new commander, appointed to replace Rustam-i Zaman, was Khawas Khan who arrived at Kudal in October 1664.<sup>1779</sup>

Khawas Khan was an Abyssinian.<sup>1780</sup> He was the son of Khan-i Khanan Ikhlas Khan (Khan Muhammad), the prime minister of the Adilshahi Sultanate who was murdered in Bijapur in 1657, and son-in-law of Rustam-i Zaman.<sup>1781</sup> It was he who had checked Netoji Palkar in 1660 on the outskirts of Bijapur. He was in the left wing of the Adilshah's army in the battle against Siddi Jauhar in 1661.<sup>1782</sup>

The Jedhe Chronology records, under Shaka 1586, the campaign which followed, thus:

"In the month of Kartik [10<sup>th</sup> October to 7<sup>th</sup> November 1664] there occurred a rupture between the Adilshah and Shivaji. Khawas Khan arrived at Kudal. Shivaji went with the army and killed [Baji] Ghorpade. [Then he] fought with Khawas Khan. He [i.e. the Khan] fled to the uplands."<sup>1783</sup>

The Sabhasad Chronicle is somewhat more elaborate. Its account of this campaign is as follows:<sup>1784</sup>

Khawas Khan with 10,000 cavalry and Lakham Sawant with 12,000 infantry were marching against Shivaji. Baji Ghorpade was also coming from Bijapur to join them with 1,500 cavalry. He descended into the lowlands and halted. The cavalry force sent by Shivaji annihilated Baji Ghorpade and all his kinsmen and captured 1,200 horses. Then Shivaji marched against Khawas Khan who was at Kudal. However, having heard of Ghorpade's defeat he fled straight to Bijapur. Then Shivaji marched against Lakham Sawant and killed several of his men. So Lakham Sawant left Kudal district and fled to Bardesh<sup>1785</sup> in the Portuguese dominions.

It may be inferred from this brief account that Shivaji took advantage of the enemy's lack of concentration and defeated them in detail. But Sabhasad gives us few details, and his information about the strength of the Adilshahi forces appears exaggerated.

The best account of this campaign is found in a letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 by the Dutch Resident from Vengurle, which is only 30 km south-west of Kudal, providing him ample opportunity to acquire details. However, he is not as elaborate about Baji Ghorpade's defeat as he is about that of Khawas Khan and Lakham Sawant. The substance of his account of Ghorpade's defeat is as follows:<sup>1786</sup>

Captain Ghorpade, an excellent commander, who was in charge of the treasure that was sent for paying Khawas Khan's army, was surprised and defeated by Shivaji in the Balaghat [i.e. the uplands]. Ghorpade himself was fatally wounded and lost 200 men besides all cash.

The Dutch Resident further tells us that not more than 300 horsemen from Ghorpade's detachment escaped but they made it so hot for Shivaji near Kharepatan and in the uplands that he hastened the breaking up of his camp from here. This, however, was not true and Shivaji continued his victorious advance.

The Dutch Resident gives an elaborate description of Shivaji's battles against Khawas Khan and Lakham Sawant. The substance of his account is as follows:<sup>1787</sup>

On 29<sup>th</sup> October 1664, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle sent a complimentary letter to Shivaji requesting him to grant them security. The bearers of the letter returned to Vengurle at midnight on 31<sup>st</sup> October 1664 and made the following report:

Shivaji was retreating with his army before Khawas Khan and therefore had no time to write a letter. However, he had given a verbal message that his word pledged to the Dutch should be considered firm and steadfast. Shivaji's army comprised 10,000 infantry and five or six thousand cavalry. They were followed by seven or eight thousand labourers and four to five thousand pack animals carrying provisions and other supplies. There was also a flotilla of 90 frigates under command of Darya Sarang and "Mocquery."<sup>1788</sup>

Khawas Khan's small army comprising 2,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry had already beaten back a Maratha attack.<sup>1789</sup> Shivaji then regrouped his army, divided it into three or four groups and again advanced to attack Khawas Khan. There was a heavy exchange of rockets between both armies which frightened the bearers of the Dutch Resident's letter and caused their return.<sup>1790</sup>

On 1<sup>st</sup> November 1664 the Dutch factors at Vengurle heard from several persons that most of the rockets fired by Shivaji's army went over the heads of their enemy. As soon as Shivaji perceived that this attack on Khawas Khan had failed he launched a vigorous attack on the *desai's* [i.e. Lakham Sawant's] foot soldiers. He was met with stiff resistance but "after a good deal of skirmishing and firing of muskets" he defeated the enemy. "Want of powder and the absence of Lord Khawas Khan" were the main causes of the *desai's* defeat.

When Khawas Khan learnt of Shivaji's attack on Lakham Sawant he sent word to him that he had acquitted himself very well and should continue to resist. He also assured Lakham Sawant that he himself would come to his rescue "as soon as the field-marshall of Shivaji's cavalry Netoji by name, should come a little more to the front."

Netoji did attack Khawas Khan but was repulsed after a four hour battle. But Khawas Khan lost some of his best captains "by the missiles of Netoji's horsemen, some of whom carried carbines." Khawas Khan's losses were 100 men killed and a few wounded whereas those of the Marathas were 400 killed and 800 to 1000 wounded.

Let us review the events that had taken place and outline the principal features of the campaign from this account. It appears that the regular Adilshahi troops under Khawas Khan and the levies of Lakham Sawant were stationed at some distance from each other and the sole purpose of Maratha attacks on Khawas

Khan — the first before 30<sup>th</sup> October, the second on the 30<sup>th</sup> October, and the third on or after 30<sup>th</sup> October — was to pin him down while an overwhelming force was concentrated to eliminate Lakham Sawant. Despite his tactical successes in repulsing the attacks by a part of the Maratha army, Khawas Khan lost the campaign strategically because with the elimination of Lakham Sawant the Marathas were free to turn against him with their full strength. That this was so is proved by the sequel of the campaign.

On the very day on which Khawas Khan repulsed Netoji's cavalry attack he left Kudal on the advice of Lakham Sawant "who directed his attention to his weakness compared with his enemy." Shivaji closely followed him and demolished the fort of Kudal. Then, on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1664, he sent Netoji to Banda with the pick of his cavalry to surprise Khawas Khan who was staying there. But as soon as he heard of Netoji's approach he fled with all his soldiers to Chandgad<sup>1791</sup> above Maneri in the Balaghat i.e. the uplands.<sup>1792</sup>

In his letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> January 1665 to the King of Portugal, the Portuguese Viceroy wrote that Shivaji compelled Khawas Khan to give up the Konkan and climb the Ghats [i.e. the Sahyadris] and himself entered deep into Adilshahi territory reaching up to a short distance from the Adilshahi capital.<sup>1793</sup>

Lakham Sawant took refuge in the Portuguese settlement of Goa.<sup>1794</sup> Shivaji then conferred the *deshmukhi* of Kudal on Krishna Sawant.<sup>1795</sup>

That Lakham Sawant was in exile is also proved by two Adilshahi *farmans*. But they do not mention the place of his refuge.

Ali Adilshah to Officers of Halyal Fort<sup>1796</sup>

24<sup>th</sup> February 1665

"As Shivaji caused him much harassment and he could do nothing against it, Lakham Sawant had to desert from his *watan*. Give him refuge at some place and all possible assistance if he arrives near your fort with his sons and other people."

The second *farman* also confirms that Shivaji had conferred the *Sardeshmukhi* of Kudal district on Krishna Sawant.

Ali Adilshah to Lakham Sawant<sup>1797</sup>

26<sup>th</sup> May 1665

"Your agent, Pitambar Shenavi, petitioned through Diyanatrao that you continued to resist Shivaji in accordance with our order. Shivaji overran your district, drove you out, and is now getting the work of the *sardeshmukhi* of the district done from Krishna Sawant who has joined him. Some provision must be made for you. Now the *sar-subadari* [of the province] has been conferred upon Muhammad Ikhlas Khan<sup>1798</sup> and Shripattrao has been sent to manage the revenue affairs of the said district. Your grants and privileges will be continued as before. You should join the *sar-subadar* and capture the district of Kudal."

On 25<sup>th</sup> November 1664, the Portuguese Viceroy wrote a letter of congratulation to Shivaji on his arrival near Goa.<sup>1799</sup> On 29<sup>th</sup> November he told a meeting of Padres that Shivaji was near Goa with a large army.<sup>1800</sup> Shivaji meanwhile had demanded the expulsion of Lakham Sawant and others from Portuguese territory. On 30<sup>th</sup> November 1664, a spy in the service of the Dutch sent a dispatch to the Dutch Resident at Vengurle.<sup>1801</sup> In it he reported that Shivaji had sent some cash to the Viceroy of Goa to obtain provisions and had also sent a communication that the Viceroy ought not to give shelter to any *desais* or other persons of the Muslim side and ought to expel those who were already there. The spy further wrote that the Viceroy had sent word to Shivaji's ambassador that there were no provisions at Goa but had permitted him to see for himself if he could get any and that the ambassador had obtained with much difficulty only 20 *khandis* of grain at 20 sherafins per *khandi*.

In his letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665, Lenartsz, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle, wrote that at the approach of Shivaji's forces, the Governor of Vengurle left the place and fled to Goa more than a month and a half ago.<sup>1802</sup> The Dutch Resident himself took alarm at the approach of Maratha forces. On 5<sup>th</sup> December 1664

he arrived at Goa in a boat laden with spices and other goods to save them from Shivaji.<sup>1803</sup> But soon afterwards, he himself returned to Vengurle as is shown by his letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies.<sup>1804</sup> In it he also states that till that time Shivaji's officers "had not shown us the least courtesy in anything whatever." Even then for a greater security of the Dutch house he asked for a reinforcement of nine men and two thousand pounds of gunpowder from the yachts *Naerdan* and *Vlissingen*, and the flyboat *Leerdam*. He also enlisted ten more [Indian] peons.<sup>1805</sup> Not just the Jedhe Chronology and Marathi chronicles, but even contemporaneous sources like a Dutch dispatch from Vengurle, reports of a Dutch spy from Goa, letters of the Portuguese Viceroy and two Adilshahi *farmans*, undoubtedly prove that Khawas Khan was defeated and expelled from the lowlands in this campaign by Shivaji's forces. But the *Ali Nama* gives a completely false account of this campaign. In substance, it is as follows:<sup>1806</sup>

One day Ali Adilshah asked in the Court who would defeat Shivaji. Khawas Khan accepted the task. He descended into the lowlands before Shivaji could block the passes and unaware of Shivaji's whereabouts encamped at a place. One night Shivaji suddenly attacked the enemy camp with his agile troopers. While his soldiers were advancing under cover of a screen of wagons he sent a message to Khawas Khan that he should go back before morning. When the Khan refused to do so Shivaji encircled him. As the place was not suitable for deployment of the army, the Khan ordered the tents to be dismantled to make room for battle. In the ensuing action Shivaji was defeated.

After Khawas Khan's precipitate retreat, Maratha forces broke out in the uplands and pillaged the southwestern parts of the Adilshahi Sultanate. Dispatches of the servants of the English East India Company from Goa and Karwar tell the story.

Henry Gary from Goa to Surat<sup>1807</sup>

6<sup>th</sup> December 1665

"Yesterday, as I was going down to the powder house I met the Dutch chief of Vengurle and another coming up the river in a great boat laden with goods, which he brought hither (as the viceroy told me) to secure in this city from Shivaji's fury, who is now destroying by fire and sword all that he can of the King of Bijapur's country. It is credibly reported that he has an army of 8,000 horse and 10,000 foot, all small, short men."

The English ship *London*, with Randolph Taylor and John Petit as supercargoes, had arrived at Karwar on 27<sup>th</sup> November.<sup>1808</sup> Three days later it sailed out and arrived at Goa.<sup>1809</sup> From there, Taylor and Petit wrote to the Surat Council on 14<sup>th</sup> December 1664:<sup>1810</sup>

"As yet we have not disposed any of the company's goods aboard us, for in regards of the troubles Shivaji has made in the adjacent parts, these markets are dull, and we fear they will now be as bad as Karwar and those parts, for we are now informed from thence that it is certain Shivaji has robbed Hubli and many rich towns thereabouts, taken several eminent merchants prisoners, others hardly escaping, and doubtless they are too much frightened to return hither again suddenly, although the departure of the said forces should permit them."

Karwar to Surat<sup>1811</sup>

6<sup>th</sup> January 1665

"What Shivaji did at Hubli... was thus.

He sent about 300 horse, robbed the town, and carried away some prisoners; so that Hubli is but little better than spoiled....

Thanks be to God, at Shivaji's arrival at Hubli the company had nothing there, only 1185 pagodas in ready money, 500 of which we have received and the rest we hope there is no reason to misdoubt, the shroff having secured himself; but our broker has lost several things to a good value."

A dispatch dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 of the Dutch Resident at Vengurle, reports the sack of Khanapur, Bommasamudra<sup>1812</sup> and Hubli.<sup>1813</sup> The Dutch factors at Vengurle, too, suffered in the plunder. They had bought some cotton yarn and cotton sheets at Bommasamudra. The greater part of these goods was plundered by Maratha forces.<sup>1814</sup>

Among the victims of the pillage was included a Portuguese merchant in Goa, Dom Francisco da Lima. This is revealed by two reports sent from Goa on 17<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> December respectively by a spy in the service of the Dutch.<sup>1815</sup> Two Indian brokers had bought some linen, worth over 30,000 sherafins, on behalf of da Lima in the uplands. Having learnt that they were confiscated by Maratha forces, da Lima sent his broker Narayan Shenavi with a sample of the cloth to Shivaji's men at Sankhali to show that the confiscated cloth was his. He was told that he might take away the linen after paying the balance of their price to Shivaji, deducting the amount which he had already paid!

The pillage in the Adilshahi Sultanate not only gained immense wealth for Shivaji but, as reported in English letters from Goa and Karwar, also paralyzed the trade in those parts of the Sultanate.<sup>1816</sup>

An English letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> January 1665 from Karwar repeats a rumour that the Adilshahi noble Rustam-i Zaman was an active participant in the pillage of Hubli in co-operation with Maratha forces.<sup>1817</sup> The Dutch Resident's letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 from Vengurle reports another suspicion, which they thought "not altogether unlikely", that the plunder of Adilshahi territory was made with the connivance of Khawas Khan, who was bribed by Shivaji.<sup>1818</sup> Reporting on this campaign to the King of Portugal, the Portuguese Viceroy remarked in his dispatch of 7<sup>th</sup> January 1665 that Adilshahi

officers were “hand in glove with Shivaji” and were contributing to the ruination of the Sultanate for personal benefit.<sup>1819</sup> It is difficult to check the veracity of these allegations.

#### PILLAGE ON THE SEA

As stated earlier, the bearers of the Dutch Resident’s letter to Shivaji had returned to Vengurle at midnight on 31<sup>st</sup> October 1664, and reported, among other things, the presence of a flotilla of 90 frigates under command of Darya Sarang and “Mocquery”. Even before Khawas Khan’s defeat and the subsequent pillage of Adilshahi territory by the Maratha army, this Maratha naval force had begun attacking ships coming to Adilshahi ports from Persia and Muscat. In his dispatch of 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle wrote:

“Thus from the last day of October to the 7<sup>th</sup> of December [1664] he [i.e. Shivaji] seized at sea several Moorish frigates arriving at this roadstead from Persia and Muscat; some of these belonged to his own lord and master [i.e. the Adilshah against whom he had rebelled] and others to the inhabitants.”<sup>1820</sup>

The dispatch of 6<sup>th</sup> October 1664, sent from Goa by a spy in the service of the Dutch, reveals that some vessels in Portuguese dominions were also captured by the Maratha navy. The Viceroy had been informed, says this spy, that eight boats laden with ivory that had left for Chaul were captured by Shivaji’s frigates. Two of these boats belonged to Dom Francisco, two to some persons at Chaul and four to Gujaratis. Having learnt this, the spy reports, the Viceroy expedited the Northern Armada and sent a boat on 5<sup>th</sup> November to Canara to communicate his order to Don Manuel that he should leave an officer with four frigates and should himself come to Goa with the eight other boats.<sup>1821</sup>

A dispatch dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 by the Dutch Resident at Vengurle contains more details about the ships captured by the

Maratha navy in that port. The substance of the relevant portion of this dispatch is as follows:<sup>1822</sup>

On 3<sup>rd</sup> November 1664, a Maratha flotilla of some 65 ships entered the port of Vengurle and captured two small ships that were lying there. One of these belonged to Canara and was taken by surprise while it was riding at anchor and was carried away without firing a shot. The other belonged to the Queen Mother [Badi Sahiba] and had not yet cast its anchor when the Maratha flotilla entered the port. It made a fierce resistance and was captured only after a four hour battle. The ship was then taken to Kharepatan and the goods in it were unloaded and stored in the fort of Gheria. The Dutch Resident says that, while the Marathas were unloading the prize, not less than one third of the rowers ran away, and remarks that: "This act need not excite any wonder, for many of them were peasants who had never plied an oar before, nor had even been at sea."<sup>1823</sup>

On 8<sup>th</sup> November 1664 two more shf414ips arrived at Vengurle from Muscat. One of these, hearing the news of Maratha depredations on sea, went homeward to Canara. The other ship was from Yemen. It was manned by Arabs and its captain was a Christian named Manuel d'Andrade. He came ashore, inquired about Shivaji's whereabouts and asked the Dutch whether they advised him to stay there. The Dutch told him that Shivaji had promised a safe conduct to merchants and ships that came there and that he had obligations to the Arabs as, they said, the captain knew.<sup>1824</sup> On 14<sup>th</sup> November 1664, a Maratha flotilla of 30 sail again appeared at Vengurle. Having heard that the little ship belonged to Yemen, the Maratha commander Darya Sarang pursued it with all his ships. Manuel d'Andrade managed to get to the windward of the Maratha flotilla but when it became calm, the Marathas caught up with him by dint of

rowing at about 4 O'clock in the afternoon. They fired four shots at the ship. It returned the fire with grape shots killing and wounding some Marathas. The Maratha flotilla then broke off the action and retired. Manuel d'Andrade kept cruising before Vengurle for three more days but was left alone.

In the morning of 20<sup>th</sup> November 1664, the Maratha flotilla again entered the port of Vengurle in pursuit of a ship of about 200 tons burden. It was armed with 14 guns and was manned by over 100 men along which there were many topazes and 2 Englishmen employed as gunners. It had arrived from Surat and the Dutch director at that city, Adrichem, had asked his compatriots at Vengurle on behalf of Ghiyasuddin Khan [the new Mughal commander at Surat] to protect it. To prevent its falling in the hands of the Marathas, the crew ran her ashore but the Marathas boarded and captured it [evidently by sending in small boats] and divided its crew among their frigates. The ship was then towed out to their frigates which sailed away with it. This surprised all the inhabitants who firmly believed that the ship could not be captured by the Marathas.

On 7<sup>th</sup> December 1664, the Marathas added to their booty the little ship of the Company's brokers Kashiba and Santuba Shenavi which was anchored in the port of Vengurle. This ship, says the Dutch letter, "ignominiously suffered itself to be taken, although the Captain had been advised by Darya Sarang [the commander of the Maratha flotilla] to cut the cable and sail away." The ship was then taken to Kharepatan.

The Dutch Resident's dispatch narrates another incident that occurred on 26<sup>th</sup> December 1664.<sup>1825</sup> In substance, it was as follows:

At noon on that date the Dutch saw from a hill a little ship to the north being pursued by the Maratha

flotilla. The pursuit continued till late in the evening as far as Vengurle. Early in the morning of the next day, when the little ship was lying half a mile to the south of Vengurle and the Maratha flotilla lay anchored in the port, the Marathas perceived it to be a Dutch ship and sailed away. The Captain of that Dutch ship — a yacht called '*Cadt*' — then told his compatriots at Vengurle that he had been pursued by the Marathas for 24 hours.

The Dutch Resident also states in his letter that, on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1665, Shivaji left at night "in a great hurry, and without apparent reason, with his frigates by way of this place [i.e. Vengurle], and his horsemen by the country road."<sup>1826</sup> But his information that Shivaji left with the frigates seems to have been false because he writes later on in the same letter of his having received information that Shivaji had left for the fort of Jawali by way of the uplands.<sup>1827</sup>

#### ESTIMATE OF THE PLUNDER

In his dispatch of 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle wrote that the booty that Shivaji acquired by seizing the treasure which Baji Ghorpade was escorting, and by capturing the ships was estimated to be worth 800,000 "gold rups" and that the spoil taken on land [by plundering the towns], worth two million "gold rupees".<sup>1828</sup> By "gold rupees" the Dutch Resident seems to have meant *hons*. If this is correct, the entire plunder adds up to 2.8 million *hons*. i.e. about Rs.10.5 million at the rate of Rs.3.75 to a hon.

In another dispatch dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665, the Dutch Resident reports that the booty which Shivaji gained on land and sea "is presumed to exceed the Surat plunder of the last year."<sup>1829</sup> As the spoil of Surat was estimated to be worth Rs.10 million, this latter estimate fits in well with the Dutch Resident's former one. Yet, it appears excessive.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE

The Portuguese fleet was about to sail for Canara in October 1664.<sup>1830</sup> But its departure was delayed for some time. The reason for this delay, according to the Dutch Resident's dispatch dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665 from Vengurle, was as follows:

"It seemed that time would breed trouble. . . It was presumed that Goa or its lowlands would not be spared by Shivaji. For all these reasons the armada of Dom Manuel Lobo de Silveira, destined for the taking over of the Canara forts, was continually being held back in reserve till the 18<sup>th</sup> October of last year [i.e. 1664], so that according to what that Fidalgo [i.e. Don Francisco da Lima] said and the spy wrote, it was the viceroy who was most to blame for the delay in taking over the forts."<sup>1831</sup>

It will be remembered that the dispatch dated 6<sup>th</sup> November 1664 from Goa by a spy in the service of the Dutch, mentions that eight boats which had sailed from Goa towards Chaul were captured by Shivaji's frigates and that the Portuguese Viceroy had expedited the Northern Armada and had recalled eight out of the twelve warships that were sent to Canara. This incident must have made the Viceroy more than apprehensive about Shivaji's intentions. The dispatch of the spy mentioned above also reports that "on the approach of Shivaji the Viceroy had the soldiers paid and posted them on the frontier against him."<sup>1832</sup> In his dispatch dated 7<sup>th</sup> January 1665 to the King of Portugal, the Portuguese viceroy had reported that both Shivaji and the Adilshah had sent their envoys to him to seek alliance and that he had adopted a policy of keeping friendship with both.<sup>1833</sup>

But Shivaji, according to Dutch sources, had other designs in mind. Rumours were prevalent about this time of a rupture between the English and the Dutch and also between the Portuguese and the Dutch.<sup>1834</sup> On 14<sup>th</sup> January 1665, Lenartsz, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle, received a message from Raoji, the Maratha Governor, to send a reliable person to whom he would divulge matters of great importance. Lenartsz sent a Hindu clerk to whom Raoji confided that he had received letters

from his spies in Goa saying there was again an estrangement between the Dutch and the Portuguese and that Shivaji would be willing to enter into an agreement with the Dutch about the capture of Goa. Raoji also cautioned the clerk that Lenartsz should not talk about this offer if the news of an estrangement between the Dutch and the Portuguese was not true.<sup>1835</sup>

Despite their ostensibly good relations with Shivaji, the Portuguese were aware of this menace. They were keeping a strong watch on all frontier posts round Goa and were building up stocks of victuals and ammunition. The Viceroy had equipped selected Indians in Sashti, Bardesh and the islands of Goa with firearms, and these men were keeping a constant vigil.<sup>1836</sup> Goa was thus kept in relentless alarm by Maratha movements.

#### THE TULA CEREMONY (6TH JANUARY 1665)

On 18<sup>th</sup> December 1664, the Dutch Resident at Vengurle received information that Shivaji had left for the fort of Jawali by way of the uplands.<sup>1837</sup> By the fort of Jawali the Resident evidently meant Pratapgad, the most prominent fort in the district of Jawali. The Resident's information that Shivaji had gone there was correct, for a very special occasion was in the offing.

The Jedhe Chronology contains the following entry:<sup>1838</sup>

“On the day of the moonless night, on 6<sup>th</sup> January 1665, Mother Jijai’s *Tula* was performed at Mahabaleshwar. There was an eclipse of the sun [on that day]. Sonajipant too performed the *Tula*.”

To weight oneself against gold or some other article and distribute it in alms and donations is considered a mark of great wealth, generosity and righteousness in Hindu tradition. The word *Tula* is specifically applied to such ceremony. It is not stated in the Jedhe Chronology with what article this *Tula* was performed. The period of the eclipse of the sun is considered an auspicious occasion for religious ceremonies, particularly at

places of pilgrimage, which Mahabaleshwar is. The statement about Sonajipant's *Tula* is literally translated in the above excerpt from the Jedhe Chronology. But what is probably meant is that Sonajipant's *Tula* was performed by Shivaji — that is to say that the money required for it was provided by Shivaji. Sonajipant, the old and faithful counsellor of Shivaji, passed away soon after this ceremony, on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1665 according to the Jedhe Chronology.<sup>1839</sup>

## WAR ON TWO FRONTS

1664 – 1665

Area occupied by the Mughals  
 600 meters & above.



#### THE BASRUR EXPEDITION (FEBRUARY 1665)

Shivaji had embarked upon a vigorous naval programme and had built a large number of ships after the sack of Surat. It was speculated that these ships would be used to attack the Surat ships during their return from Mocha, Basra and Persia. Some had even thought that he would sail up the Sabarmati to land an army and attack Ahmedabad! In his letter dated 30<sup>th</sup> November 1664 from Gangolli, Dom Manuel Lobo de Silveira, commander of the Portuguese fleet that had gone to take over the Canara forts, informed the Portuguese Viceroy that people as far as in Mirjan, Ankola, Shiveshvar and Karwar were frightened on account of a rumour that Shivaji would arrive there.<sup>1840</sup> The report at Surat went even farther in its speculation. In their letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> November 1664 to the Company, the Surat Council wrote:

“Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled that he is a terror to all the kings and princess round about, [and is] daily increasing in strength. He hath now fitted up four score vessels and sent them down to Bhatkal and thereabouts, whilst he intends to meet them overland with a flying army of horse.”<sup>1841</sup>

The Jedhe Chronology contains the following entry under Shaka year 1586:<sup>1842</sup>

“In the month of Magh [7<sup>th</sup> January to 5<sup>th</sup> February 1665] His highness went to Basnur [i.e. Basrur] by ship and returned after plundering that town.”

About the same expedition, the Shivapur Chronology records:<sup>1843</sup>

“8<sup>th</sup> February 1665: Embarkation on ship. Expedition of Basnur.”

These two entries are not irreconcilable. The Jedhe Chronology alludes to Shivaji's departure on the expedition while the Shivapur Chronology, to his arrival at Basrur. This is also corroborated by an English letter dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1665 from

Karwar to Surat.<sup>1844</sup> The chronologies do not give us any more details about this expedition. But these are provided by this letter, the substance of which is as follows:

About the beginning of February Shivaji set out in person from Malvan<sup>1845</sup> with a fleet of 85 frigates and 3 great ships and landed at and plundered Basrur. Then he turned back and landed at Gokarna, a Hindu place of pilgrimage, and bathed there according to the ceremony of the place. From there he himself with 4,000 infantry set out by land keeping 12 frigates with him for the passage of the rivers on the way. The rest of the flotilla resumed its homeward journey.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1665, he arrived near Karwar. The English East India Company had a trading station in that town with an estate worth 8,000 hons. The English factors at Karwar received timely information of Shivaji's approach through spies which they had "kept for that purpose", and retired with the company's cash and portable commodities aboard a ship of about 100 tons belonging to the Imam of Muscat that was lying in the port. The Captain of the ship, Emanuel Donnavado, assured them that he would resist all attempts to take the ship and, if necessary, would sail out with them and land them at whatever port they desired. The 12 vessels which Shivaji had kept for the passage of the rivers had passed Karwar the day before the English retired to the ship.

The night on which the English got aboard, Sher Khan, a lieutenant of Bahlul Khan, providentially arrived at Karwar with about 300 infantry and 200 cavalry to arrange the dispatch of Bahlul Khan's mother to Mecca in a ship belonging to Rustum-i Zaman. He asked the English to use all possible means to secure the river and fortified himself with the goods which he had brought down to lade on the ship. On the night of his arrival, he sent a man to Shivaji to

let him know of his presence, ask him not to pass through the town and warn him that any attempt to do so would be resisted. After an exchange of several messages, Shivaji condescended to go a little out of his way and encamped at the mouth of the river. Then he sent an envoy to Sher Khan to ask him to deliver the Muscat ship and another belonging to Kung — both of which, he had heard, had prepared to resist him — or else to retire and permit him to revenge himself on those whom he styled his inveterate enemies. Sher Khan informed the English of this message and asked for their reply. They answered that they "had nothing on board but powder and bullets, which if he thought they would serve him instead of gold, he might come and fetch them." This infuriated Shivaji so much that the governor of the town persuaded all the merchants in the town to send him a present lest he should recall his fleet. Accordingly the present was sent, the contribution of the English being £112.

"With this", says the letter, "Shivaji departed [on] the 23<sup>rd</sup> February, very unwillingly, saying that Sher Khan had spoilt his hunting at his Holi which is a time he generally attempts some such design."

The letter concludes by stating that "Shivaji is now at Bingur, a place within 25 miles of this place."

Bingur could be a corruption of 'Bhimgad', a fort about 70 km northeast of Karwar.

The Dutch Resident's dispatch dated 29<sup>th</sup> April 1665 from Vengurle makes a brief reference to this expedition.<sup>1846</sup> It states that on 18<sup>th</sup> February 1665 Shivaji sailed from Malvan with 50 frigates, 3 small ships, some small craft, and 4,000 soldiers, and is said to have obtained from Basrur a contribution of 300,000 guilders<sup>1847</sup> and carried away 7 rich persons. It adds that, not satisfied with the booty, he put to death the spy who had recommended the enterprise to him. However, this is not corroborated by any other source.

The Sabhasad Chronicle, too, makes a brief mention of this expedition and states that the spoil taken in it was worth twenty million hons.<sup>1848</sup> This is gross exaggeration.

It may be asked why Shivaji plundered a port in a kingdom which had no enmity with him and which was not even contiguous with his dominion. There is no answer to this question except the fact that he was in need of money to continue the war against the Mughals. True, he had obtained enormous wealth from the sack of Surat and, recently, from the plunder of Adilshahi territory. But a large portion of his dominion was then under occupation of the Mughals, which meant a reduction in his income from land revenue, and he had to take it for granted that the war against the Mughals would soon be intensified. Shivappa, the illustrious king of Ikkeri, who could be called a man after his own heart, had died in 1660. In 1664, Somshekhar and his counsellors were offering on a platter to the Portuguese forts which Shivappa had captured from them — of which Basrur was one. Shivaji, who was so keen on obtaining intelligence, must have known about it and he could not be expected to have evinced any sympathy for such rulers.

#### CLASH WITH THE PORTUGUESE (MARCH - APRIL 1665)

In his letter of 26<sup>th</sup> March 1665, the Portuguese Viceroy complained to the Maratha *Subadar* Raoji Somnath that the Maratha fleet had captured a Portuguese boat.<sup>1849</sup> In all probability, the fleet in question was the one returning from the Basrur expedition.

This action seems to have led to another. The substance of Cosme da Guarda's account is as follows:<sup>1850</sup>

The Viceroy of Goa, Antonio de Mello de Castro, learnt that Shivaji's fleet was carrying off 120 barges captured from the ports of Canara like Honavar, Basrur, Gangolli and Mangalore. At this time the Portuguese fleet at Goa was commanded by the Viceroy's son Diniz de Mello de Castro. The Viceroy

ordered him to redeem the barges from the Maratha fleet. He set off with eight warships and intercepted the enemy near Murgaon. They had 25 warships of which 13 formed the van division and 12 the rear division with the barges in the centre. The Portuguese attacked the van division, captured all the 13 warships in it and took them and the barges laden with rice to Goa. Shivaji then sent an envoy to the Portuguese Viceroy to express an apology and plead that it was never his intention to offend the Portuguese, whereupon the Viceroy restored his warships.

Guarda's account is borne out by Portuguese documents of the time. In his letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> April 1665, the Portuguese viceroy informed the Maratha *Subadar* Krishnaji Bhaskar that the Maratha warships had been released.<sup>1851</sup> The number of warships is not mentioned in this letter. However, it is found in another dated 4<sup>th</sup> June 1665 from the Portuguese viceroy to two Portuguese brothers in Mughal service. It is mentioned therein that Shivaji was so puffed up by his previous victory that he sent his fleet near the islands of Murgaon and prohibited the ships bringing in provisions to Goa, and that the Portuguese fleet had captured eleven of his ships.<sup>1852</sup>

It does not appear that Shivaji intended to make war against the Portuguese at this time, and the clash seems to have been merely accidental.

## ***Chapter 8***

# Jai Singh's Campaigns against Shivaji and the Adilshah

## APPOINTMENT OF MIRZA RAJA JAI SINGH AGAINST SHIVAJI

As there was no progress in the campaign against Shivaji, Aurangzeb decided to appoint Mirza Raja Jai Singh<sup>1853</sup> to take command of the Mughal army in the Deccan. A number of *mansabdars*, like Dilir Khan, Daud Khan Quraishi, Raja Rai Singh Shisodiya, Ihtisham Khan Shaikhzada, Qubad Khan, Sujan Singh Bundela, Jai Singh's son Kirat Singh, Mulla Yahya Nayta,<sup>1854</sup> Raja Nar Singh Gaur, Puranmal Bundela, Zabardast Khan, Ba-dil Bakht-yar, and Barq-andaz Khan, were ordered to join him. All these contingents added up to 14,000 troopers. Jai Singh was to leave the capital on the occasion of the Emperor's 48<sup>th</sup> birthday (by the solar calendar), i.e. on 30<sup>th</sup> September 1664. Those *mansabdars* who were in Delhi at that time were to leave for the Deccan along with him and those like Dilir Khan or Ihtisham Khan, who were then in their *jagirs*, were to join him *en route*.<sup>1855</sup> Some *mansabdars* who had earlier been sent under Shayista Khan's command had later been assigned other duties but most were still in the Deccan; besides, reinforcements too had been sent to the Deccan from time to time.<sup>1856</sup> It could thus be estimated that the force that was already in the Deccan and that dispatched with Jai Singh might have together reached a numerical strength of about 70,000 troopers — or what had originally been placed under Shayista Khan's command a few years earlier.

## MIRZA RAJA JAI SINGH

Jai Singh, the son of a Rajput *mansabdar* Maha Singh, and great-grandson of Man Singh, the famed Rajput nobleman in Akbar's court, was born on 17<sup>th</sup> May 1611.<sup>1857</sup> Man Singh died in 1614; his eldest son Jagat Singh, who was given to excessive drinking, had predeceased him.<sup>1858</sup> After Man Singh's death, although Maha Singh, the elder son of Jagat Singh, was already a *mansabdar*, Jahangir awarded the *watan jagir* of Amber along

with the title Mirza Raja, to Bhamo Singh, Man Singh's younger son. [1859](#) Maha Singh, whom Jahangir gave the title of Raja in 1615, also died of excessive drinking, in 1617. [1860](#) At that time though Jai Singh was of a tender age, Jahangir gave him a *mansab* of 1000 *dhat*/1000 *sawar*. [1861](#) Bhamo Singh, too, was a heavy drinker and died in 1621, whereupon the *watan jagir* of Amber passed to Jai Singh, along with the title of Raja, and he was promoted to the rank of 2000 *dhat*/1000 *sawar*. [1862](#) By the time Shah Jahan had ascended the throne, Jai Singh had risen in rank to a *mansab* of 4000 *dhat*/2500 *sawar*. [1863](#) In 1639, Shah Jahan conferred upon him the title of Mirza Raja. [1864](#)

This Rajput family of Amber shared close relations with the Imperial dynasty. Man Singh's grandfather, Biharimal, had given his daughter in marriage to Akbar in 1562. [1865](#) Manbai — granddaughter of Biharimal, daughter of Bhagwandas and sister of Man Singh — was married to Prince Salim (later, Emperor Jahangir) in 1584. [1866](#) In 1608, Jahangir demanded in marriage the daughter of Jagat Singh, eldest son of Man Singh, and soon afterwards she, too, entered his harem. [1867](#) So, her father's aunt, Manbai, was in fact an earlier consort of Jahangir — her husband!

Jai Singh's physical courage was proved more than once during his distinguished military career. Two incidents bear notice. On 28<sup>th</sup> May 1633, Shah Jahan and his three elder sons were watching an elephant fight on the bank of the Yamuna River at Agra. The 14-year old Prince Aurangzeb moved forward on horseback to obtain a closer view of the fight. Suddenly, one of the two elephants, called Sudhakar, turned away from his opponent and charged upon the prince. There was a stampede among the bystanders. But, undeterred, Aurangzeb stood his ground, kept his horse under control and threw his spear at the elephant's head. Wounded, the brute kept up its charge and, with a swipe of its tusk felled the horse. Aurangzeb quickly rose from the ground and grasped the hilt of his sword. Meanwhile Aurangzeb's elder brother Prince Shuja and the young Rajput nobleman Raja Jai Singh had galloped forward. Shuja, too, wounded the elephant with his spear. But his steed reared and

the prince fell down. Jai Singh's horse was frightened and would not face the elephant, yet the Raja flung his spear at the elephant from the right side. By then the Emperor's guards came rushing forward; some had let off fireworks to frighten the elephant when the other elephant, too, came charging forth to attack Sudhakar. Thereupon, Sudhakar fled, with his rival in pursuit.<sup>1868</sup> The other incident occurred in 1641. Jagat Singh, a Rajput *mansabdar* of Nurpur had rebelled against Shah Jahan. Jai Singh was in the Mughal army that invested the Mau fort<sup>1869</sup> situated in Jagat Singh's *jagir* and was part of the forlorn hope, which stormed it in the end.<sup>1870</sup> Jai Singh's military experience was unsurpassed. His whole life had been spent in campaigning on the frontiers of the Empire.<sup>1871</sup>

Though there was no doubt about Jai Singh's physical courage, he was equally adept in cunningness and could even stoop to treachery not just to save his own skin, but also out of cupidity. In the war of succession that broke out among the Mughal princes when their father took ill, Shah Jahan was in favour of his eldest son, crown prince Dara Shukoh, succeeding him. Dara dispatched his son Sulaiman Shukoh and Mirza Raja Jai Singh against Prince Shuja. The real commander was, of course, Jai Singh. But as he had to fight against a prince, Sulaiman was sent with him for the sake of prestige. Jai Singh defeated Shuja by a surprise attack near Banaras in 1658 and was promoted to 7,000 *dhat*/7,000 *sawar*/5,000 *du aspa sih aspa*.<sup>1872</sup> Soon thereafter, Aurangzeb defeated Dara Shukoh at Samugarh. Seeing that Aurangzeb was gaining in the race to the throne, Jai Singh, who was marching back towards Agra, deserted Sulaiman Shukoh and joined hands with Aurangzeb against the Emperor.<sup>1873</sup> Soon afterwards, Aurangzeb rewarded his treachery by a grant of districts with [an annual] revenue of 10 million *dams* (250,000) rupees.<sup>1874</sup> Later, in March 1659, Aurangzeb once again defeated Dara at Deorai.<sup>1875</sup> On Aurangzeb's orders, Jai Singh led the force that was sent in pursuit of Dara.<sup>1876</sup> That unfortunate prince was subsequently brought in chains to Delhi and executed.

#### JAI SINGH'S ARRIVAL IN PUNE

Jai Singh left Delhi with Aurangzeb's orders on 30<sup>th</sup> September 1664 and crossed the Narmada River at Handiya on 9<sup>th</sup> January 1665.<sup>1877</sup> He reached Burhanpur on 20<sup>th</sup> January and stayed there for making due arrangements for the army before resuming his journey on 31<sup>st</sup> January. He reached Aurangabad on 10<sup>th</sup> February and met Prince Muhammad Muazzam, *subadar* of the four provinces of the Deccan. Leaving Aurangabad on 13<sup>th</sup> February, he reached Pune on 3<sup>rd</sup> March.<sup>1878</sup> There, Maharaja Jaswant Singh handed over the command of the army to Jai Singh and left for Delhi on 7<sup>th</sup> March.

Shivaji's envoys met Jai Singh twice while he was on his way to Pune with letters sent by their master.<sup>1879</sup> These letters are not extant but it is clear, however, that they were sent to initiate negotiations with Jai Singh for some kind of compromise for, in a letter to Aurangzeb, Jai Singh writes to the effect that, "I know that unless a strong hand was laid on him, his words and stories would not contain a particle of truth. I gave no answer and sent him back in disappointment."<sup>1880</sup>

Jai Singh stayed in Pune for a few days for establishing military outposts.<sup>1881</sup> He sent Qutb-ud Din Khan with 7,000 cavalry towards Junnar with orders to place 3,000 horsemen in front of Lohagad, to set up another post opposite Nardurg,<sup>1882</sup> and to patrol the area with the rest of the force. He positioned a force of 4,000 horsemen, comprising the contingents of *mansabdars* like Randaula Khan, Biramdev Shisodiya, Zahid Khan, Jan Nisar Khan and Khwaja Abul Makarim, under command of Ihtisham Khan in Pune. He also established a post with a garrison of 2,000 troopers between Pune and Lohagad. He ordered the *deshmukhs* and *deshpandes* of the region not to entertain any surreptitious relations with Shivaji, warning them of severe punishment if they disobeyed his orders. Further, Jai Singh also took letters of indemnity from them that they would not maintain any relations whatsoever with Shivaji.

Jai Singh was well aware that the Adilshah, fearing that the Mughals — if they succeeded against Shivaji — would make

Bijapur their next target would secretly send help to Shivaji. To dissuade him from doing so, Jai Singh decided to invest the Purandar fort so that he could remain between the Maratha and Bijapur territories.<sup>1883</sup> Thus, on 15<sup>th</sup> March, he set out from Pune towards Purandar.<sup>1884</sup>

#### POLITICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN

While still on his march to Pune, Jai Singh was resorting to diplomatic maneuvers to distract Shivaji's military force elsewhere and also to isolate Shivaji from his neighbours, so that he would get neither help nor support from them. Jai Singh also held the bait of a possibility before the Adilshah that a reduction in the amount of tribute he was obliged to pay to the Emperor could be considered if he assisted the Mughals in their campaign against Shivaji.<sup>1885</sup> The Adilshah was neither a friend nor a well-wisher of Shivaji. Indeed, Shivaji had carved out a kingdom largely by conquering Adilshahi territory. However, Shivaji was useful for the Adilshah because he kept the Mughals too preoccupied to contemplate a direct invasion of Bijapur. So, with a secret agreement with Shivaji, the Adilshah sent some troops under command of Muhammad Ikhlas Khan and occupied the Konkan as far as Dabhol before the commencement of the rainy season of 1665.<sup>1886</sup>

Jai Singh was not unaware of this Adilshahi policy. So he maintained contact with the disaffected elements in Shivaji's service as well as various Chiefs in the Deccan. In a letter sent about 25<sup>th</sup> January 1665 Jai Singh writes to Aurangzeb:<sup>1887</sup>

“Soon after I left [for the Deccan], I wrote to Your Majesty about the former zamindars<sup>1888</sup> of Javali, better known as Chandrarao. I had sent some men inviting them to visit me. A Brahmin called Mudha had arrived from Chandrarao and one of his brothers, along with the men that I had sent, in the hope that they would obtain travel allowance and an assurance

of safety. In accordance with that, I have given my word, assurance and money and have sent back Mudha ordering him to bring them immediately to me.

“Shivaji has appointed Almaji and Kahar Koli and two of his brothers for the artillery at the foot of the Purandar fort. They have 3,000 horsemen with them. The men I sent convinced them and as per their intention of joining Mughal service, their envoy came along to meet me. I have written a letter to them. After they meet me, I will appraise their performance, make them aspirants of a *mansab* and then send to Your Majesty a letter of request.”

“A representative of the *zamindar* of Jawhar came to Burhanpur and communicated to me his master’s wish to join the Imperial service.<sup>1889</sup> I told his representative to ask the chief to meet me in person or to send his son or brother to see me. I also asked him to perform some significant service so that Your Majesty would favour him beyond imagination. The *farman* Your Majesty has given for him is with me. I will deliver it to him at an opportune time. He will prove to be much useful in this campaign. I will write later regarding the titles and privileges he should be given.”

While trying to provoke the Adilshah against Shivaji, Jai Singh was simultaneously instigating local rulers in the Karnataka against the Adilshah so that the latter would be unable to help Shivaji. In a letter sent soon after 15<sup>th</sup> March 1665 while on the way to Purandar from Pune, Jai Singh wrote to Aurangzeb: <sup>1890</sup>

“I had communicated to Your Majesty my decision of sending someone to the zamindars of Karnataka. After I reached here, I found that Adil Khan and Shivaji have come to terms with each other; hence I decided to win over the zamindars of

Karnataka who were backing the Adilshah. With this intention in mind, I have sent some men to them. I am hopeful that these zamindars will enter the Imperial service. I will keep Your Majesty informed of developments."

Jai Singh continues in the same letter:[1891](#)

"Afzal Bhatyara Bijapuri's [i.e. Afzal Khan's] son Fazil wishes to join the Imperial service. According to the people who know him, it will prove much useful if we offer him a *mansab* of 5000 dhat/5000 sawar. He does not get lesser than this in the Bijapur court. He bears ill will against Shivaji since Shivaji killed his father. I have written asking him to write and submit a petition stating what he desires. Similarly, I intend to win over many others who might approach us. It seems likely that a few of Shivaji's men might also leave him and come to join the Imperial service. Awarding them *mansabs* and *jagirs* will be implemented as Your Majesty would order."

In a letter sent on 28<sup>th</sup> or 29<sup>th</sup> March 1665, on his way to Purandar from Pune, Jai Singh wrote to Aurangzeb:[1892](#)

"I had summoned Baji Chandrarao and Ambaji Govindrao — the *Zamindars* of Javali[1893](#) — and Mankoji Dhangar to an interview with me. They came and met me. You will come to know from the newsletters about the recommendations I have made regarding the *mansabs* that should be given to them. I have sent them with Sayyid Abdul Aziz Khan and have ordered them to exert their utmost from their end.

"The Prince [Muhammad Muazzam] wrote to say that the Bijapuri fort commandant of Nilanga,[1894](#) Malik Muhammad, wishes to surrender the fort to us and enter the Imperial service. In reply I wrote to the Prince: 'There is no objection in taking a fort if it is

strategically important and the surrounding territory is prosperous. However, Nilanga is a small fortress built of clay and, moreover, the region, too, is not rich. It is not advisable to act in haste without the Emperor's orders. I would advise you to keep the fort commander hoping, convey the entire matter to the Emperor and act according to his orders.'

"I have no doubt that Adil Khan and Shivaji have joined forces. I am however trying to sow dissension between them. I have sent some Afghans from the Mughal army disguised as merchants to visit some of Adilshah's forts. If the possibility of capturing a fort exists, I plan to capture it and arouse the Bijapur court with a shock.

"Siddi Jauhar<sup>1895</sup> has sent a message saying that he is in charge of the fort of Solapur and would hand it over to the Mughals if he is granted a *mansab* of 5000 *dhat* /3000 *sawar*. However, these southerners do not keep their word. Seldom should they be trusted. Nonetheless, if by sending some responsible persons we ascertain whether this move might succeed, what will be your instructions? It cannot be said what turn these negotiations might take. Hence, I beseech Your Majesty to send your suggestions secretly and as soon as possible."

In a letter sent from the siege of Purandar towards the end of April 1665, Jai Singh wrote to Aurangzeb:<sup>1896</sup>

"I had sent some people to the *zamindars* of the Karnataka. Shivappa Naik<sup>1897</sup> and the *zamindar* of Basavapatna have expressed their loyalty to Your Majesty. I have sent them letters and robes of honour. I shall keep Your Majesty informed of developments."

In January 1665, Jai Singh sent two Portuguese nationals in his employ, Francisco de Melo and Diogo de Melo, to Goa inviting Portuguese authorities to assist the Mughals against Shivaji.<sup>1898</sup> He had previously engaged in correspondence with Portuguese Viceroy Antonio de Melo de Castro. It appears from

one of those letters, written by the Viceroy to Jai Singh on 31<sup>st</sup> March 1665 that the latter had complained about some Portuguese who were working for Shivaji. But the Viceroy, in the said letter dated on 31<sup>st</sup> March 1665, stated:[1899](#)

“The fact that he employs some Portuguese is not enough to establish my consent. Similarly, there is a large number of Portuguese in the dominion of the King Mughal without my permission, some for the crimes committed and others devoid of the sense of duty. It is not within my powers to check them. Equally there are many Portuguese in the kingdom of Adilshah, Golconda and Canara as Your Honour may know. It can be understood from this that I would not have deprived myself of such a large number of soldiers when I could utilize them to punish my enemies....

“I issue orders to the North neither to show any favour to Shivaji nor to admit his people in our territory. I shall do the same here at the request of Your Honour whom I have in great esteem. If Your Honour has anything of particular interest here, I will be much pleased to offer my assistance.”

In accordance with this promise, the Portuguese viceroy had, on 30<sup>th</sup> March 1665, already ordered the Portuguese captain of Vasai not to admit Shivaji's people into Portuguese territory, nor show them any kind of favour.[1900](#) But within three weeks of the letter, he appointed Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho as the Chief Captain of the Northern Territory of Portuguese possessions in India and gave him the following written instructions on 18<sup>th</sup> April 1665:[1901](#)

“The affairs of the Mughals which give so much anxiety on account of the state in which we find them, even though at present they do not show much danger, are, however, worthy of great consideration and thus it is meet that we deal with them with great prudence so that we should neither give them occasion to break with us, nor should we show them

that we doubt them; and because all their complaint is born of their imagination that we show favour to Shivaji, you should order that nothing should be done from which they could have this suspicion. However, if without this risk you could secretly give any aid with munitions or foodstuffs to Shivaji you should do it for money because it is not desirable that if he is driven from his lands, the Mughal should remain the lord of them. But this should be done with such a great caution that never should he be able to guess, much less verify it.

"To Shivaji you will write how much better it is for him and for us that his retreat, in case it should be necessary to do so, should not be Chaul, but rather to Goa, where he could be more safe and we would not have to break with the Mughal, and in this way we would be able to be the intermediary in any conference when fortune changes the state of things. Also emphasize that he would obtain the greatest safety in this island of Goa, which he could not have in Chaul, and then he should be persuaded that it is best for him and we should save ourselves as far as possible for us to do so."

#### JAI SINGH'S MARCH TO PURANDAR

Immediately after leaving Pune Jai Singh received news that Shivaji was near Lohagad and was planning to attack Mughal territory as soon as he had moved on. At that time, Qutb-ud Din Khan had gone to Junnar to escort the treasury. So Jai Singh delayed his departure, stayed in the vicinity of Pune and ordered Qutb-ud Din to march towards Lohagad. Qutb-ud Din Khan left Junnar on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1665 and rode towards the Mughal military post near Lohagad. Jai Singh, learning of the Khan's departure for Lohagad, resumed his advance on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1665.<sup>1902</sup> On the same day, the Adilshah's envoy Mulla Khurram met Jai Singh where he had camped for the day.<sup>1903</sup>

Jai Singh halted at Loni (Kalbhor), which was a junction of two routes leading into Mughal territory from Purandar, for three days, repaired the small fortress at the place and put a garrison of 300 musketeers and 300 horsemen there.[1904](#)

The Mughals had no military post at Shirwal. So Jai Singh sent 3,000 horsemen under command of Sayyid Abdul Aziz Khan there. Chandrarao's son Baji Chandrarao (of Javali), Ambaji Govindrao and Mankoji Dhangar had met Jai Singh, as we have seen earlier. They were dispatched with Sayyid Abdul Aziz Khan.[1905](#)

Jai Singh resumed his march and arrived at a distance of one stage from Saswad on 30<sup>th</sup> March 1665. The route from there went through a mountain pass. Jai Singh repaired the track and sent the vanguard ahead under command of Dilir Khan with orders to cross the pass and camp on the far side. The next day, Jai Singh with the main body of the Mughal army crossed the pass after keeping the rearguard at the foot of the pass under Daud Khan's command with orders to cross after the main body had reached the far side.[1906](#)

In his search for a proper place for setting up camp, Dilir Khan reached the vicinity of the Purandar fort. The Marathas had set up outposts on the slope of the mountain on which the fortification stood. At the approach of the Mughal contingent, the Maratha defenders came down the slopes and opened fire with muskets and rockets. A counterattack drove them away. The Khan then ordered entrenchments to be made and conveyed this information to Jai Singh, who at once dispatched his son Kirat Singh, with Jai Singh's own contingent of 3,000 horsemen, Raja Ray Singh, Qubad Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela, Ba-dil Bakht-yar and several other *mansabdars* with their contingents as well as guns and siege material to succour Dilir Khan.[1907](#) He also sent an order to Daud Khan to join Dilir Khan with his men. So Daud Khan crossed the mountain pass and headed directly towards Purandar instead of going to Jai Singh's camp.[1908](#)

## THE FORT OF PURANDAR

The hill on which the fort of Purandar stands, rises some 1370 meters above sea level and more than 760 meters above the surrounding plain.<sup>1909</sup> Its fortified top is called the *Bala-i Qila* or the upper fort. On its northern side, about 90 meters below, is a narrow fortified ledge. This ledge is called the *machi* or lower fort. Towards the eastern end of the upper fort is a small hillock called Kandkada, around 90 to 120 meters long and only 3-3.5 meters wide. It is surmounted by a bastion. To the east of the upper fort is a saddle and beyond it, another hill crowned with the fort of Rudramal or Vajragad. The hill on which Rudramal stands is some 1345 meters above sea level. Rudramal commands the *machi*, or the lower fort of Purandar. In consequence, if Rudramal falls in the hands of the enemy, Purandar becomes untenable.

### THE SIEGE OF PURANDAR

Without waiting for the arrival of the main body of the Mughal army, Dilir Khan opened the siege. His own contingent of Afghan troops, with his nephews Ghairat and Muzaffar, and the contingents of some other *mansabdars* like Haribhan Kunwar and Udaybhan were posted in the saddle between Purandar and Rudramal. Others began making entrenchments around the fort. Jai Singh's son, Kirat Singh and a few other *mansabdars* commenced erecting a *damdama* (a tower built of wood, rubble and the like) opposite the northern gate of the lower fort. Chaturbhuj Chauhan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and some other *mansabdars* laid siege to Rudramal.<sup>1910</sup>

Jai Singh himself marched forward with the rest of the army on the following day and pitched his camp about six kilometers from Purandar. Then he visited the entrenchments of the besieging army and after inspecting the terrain, decided to first capture Rudramal, which he had realized, as he wrote in a letter to Aurangzeb, was the key to Purandar.<sup>1911</sup>

Around the same time, Jai Singh received intelligence that Shivaji's Cavalry Commander, Netoiji Palkar, had gone towards Paranda. He therefore dispatched Sayyid Munauwar Khan Barha, Sharza Khan, Hasan Khan, Jauhar Khan, Jagat Singh and

the *mansabdars* posted at Supe with their contingents to engage Netoji Palkar. They went up to Paranda but could not engage him because Netoji had fled immediately after receiving intelligence of their approach. The detachment had to return.<sup>1912</sup>

Jai Singh ordered cannons to be taken to the summit of a hill opposite Rudramal so that it could be brought under artillery fire. First, after three days' vigorous efforts, a cannon called 'Abdulla Khan' was dragged to the top. Then, in three and a half days more another, called 'Fath Lashkar' was moved there. This was followed by a third called 'Haveli'. Meanwhile, bombardment of Rudramal had begun.<sup>1913</sup> Jai Singh had moved his headquarters as far forward as the entrenchments. He visited the forward troops each day and inspected the progress of the siege.<sup>1914</sup>

The incessant bombardment at last demolished a bastion of the fort. On 12<sup>th</sup> April 1665, Dilir Khan pushed his men forward to ascend the mound of the demolished bastion. The slope was very steep and narrow and only two men abreast could move along it with great difficulty. Yet they persisted in their efforts, occupied the mound of the demolished bastion and planted their flag on top of it. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan with a detachment of his own Rajput soldiers. The Mughals pushed on the next day to the inner enclosure. Completely disheartened by now, the Maratha garrison of Rudramal asked for quarters. Jai Singh granted their request whereupon they handed over the fort to the Mughals.<sup>1915</sup> They were disarmed and allowed to leave. As Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor, this was to encourage the Purandar garrison to also surrender rather than continue fighting to the last in desperation. The Mughals lost 80 killed and 109 wounded as the price of Rudramal.<sup>1916</sup>

#### **DEVASTATION OF SHIVAJI'S TERRITORY**

Jai Singh shifted his focus to Purandar after he had captured Rudramal. At the same time, he appointed Daud Khan at the head of 7,000 cavalry comprising the contingents of

*mansabdars* like Raja Ray Singh, Sharza Khan, Amar Singh Chandrawat, Muhammad Salih Tarkhan, and Sayyid Zain-ul Abidin Bukhari. He was ordered, firstly, to ensure that the defenders inside Purandar would not get supplies or help from outside and, secondly, to devastate Shivaji's territory in order to force him to his knees. This force was dispatched on 25<sup>th</sup> April 1665.<sup>1917</sup> One of the reasons for selecting Daud Khan for this assignment was that he and Dilir Khan could not see eye to eye with one another. Daud Khan, during the siege, had been positioned at the postern gate of the fort. It had so happened that on a certain day a detachment of Maratha soldiers from outside managed to stealthily enter the fort through this postern gate. Dilir Khan had then severely admonished Daud Khan for his negligence; a bitter quarrel had ensued. To avoid these internecine quarrels, too, it was necessary to keep Daud Khan as far away from Dilir Khan as possible.<sup>1918</sup>

At about the same time as Daud Khan was dispatched on this new task, Jai Singh ordered Qutb-ud Din Khan (who was appointed at Junnar) and Lodi Khan (appointed in the Konkan) to enter and lay waste Shivaji's territory and take as many prisoners as possible.<sup>1919</sup>

Daud Khan and his detachment reached the environs of the Rohida and Rajgad forts on 27<sup>th</sup> April 1665. Torching about 50 villages and looting four prosperous townships, he stayed there for a day before proceeding towards Rajgad. He reached the foothills on 30<sup>th</sup> April 1665 after torching several habitations in that region, too. The Maratha garrison began heavy artillery, musket and rocket fire, upon which the Mughal force retreated to a safe distance but spent the night there. It left for Shivapur the next day and from there for Kondhana, devastating the territory.<sup>1920</sup>

While Daud Khan's forays across Shivaji's territory were wreaking havoc thus, Qutb-ud Din Khan entered the Paud Khore (approaching from the direction of Junnar) to carry fire and sword through the entire region. Many people were taken prisoner and a large number of cattle captured.<sup>1921</sup>

Daud Khan and Qutb-ud Din Khan joined forces at Pune on 5<sup>th</sup> May and the combined force headed for Lohagad. On their approach in the foothills, the Maratha garrison sallied out of the fort and mounted an attack on the vanguard. Daud Khan immediately reinforced the van with some more troops and succeeded in dispersing the sally. Then the Mughals burnt down the standing crop in the environs of the fort, made several people prisoner, captured cattle and set up camp near the fort. Leaving camp on the next day, similar devastation was visited upon areas surrounding Lohagad, Visapur, Tung and Tikona. They left the next day to camp near Pune. Since Qutb-ud Din Khan was ordered to set up his camp near Pune, he remained there with his contingent to continue devastation in the region. But Daud Khan returned to the main Mughal camp at the foot of Purandar on 10<sup>th</sup> May 1665.<sup>1922</sup>

#### PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE

While Daud Khan's troops were thus devastating Shivaji's territory, Jai Singh was prosecuting the siege with great determination and vigour.<sup>1923</sup> Several times had the Marathas sallied out at night to attack Mughal entrenchments and one day succeeded in even spiking a gun.<sup>1924</sup> However, as the besiegers were alert these sallies achieved little success.

A *damdama* was erected opposite the Safed Burj (or 'White Bastion') on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1665. Some soldiers mounted the *damdama* so as to dominate the bastion and drive away the enemy soldiers manning it. The defenders' attempts to dismantle the *damdama* by firing cannons and muskets and throwing grenades and stones at it were futile. Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh then climbed up and inspected the *damdama*.

The attackers went to the foot of the Safed Burj, which had suffered severe damage due to the bombardment, and started digging a tunnel. Defending it now had become impossible for the garrison. To check the enemy advance on the Kala Burj (or 'Black Bastion') in the event it took the Safed Burj, the Marathas mined the area between the two. When the Safed bastion became untenable, someone in the garrison, evidently in haste,

set fire to the mine and the resulting explosion killed about 80 men of the garrison. At nightfall the garrison vacated the Safed Burj. Scaling the walls with ladders the next day, the Mughals occupied that bastion along with another close to it. Two small cannons were mounted on a *damdama* erected opposite the Kala Burj in the next five or six days. Their fire made the Kala Burj untenable, whereupon the garrison evacuated it, as well as another one close to it. The loss of these bastions made it evident that very soon the entire lower fort would fall into enemy hands.

It was probably about this time that the sortie, so graphically narrated by the Sabhasad Chronicle, took place. The chronicle is silent about the date of the sortie but the story which it narrates is briefly as follows: Taking 700 select men, Murar Baji Prabhu, the commandant of the fort, sallied out and attacked Dilir Khan. In the desperate melee which ensued, 500 Pathans were slain while Murar Baji with a few desperate followers dashed forward right up to Dilir Khan's position. Most of his comrades were cut down but, undaunted, Murar Baji rushed straight on towards the Khan. In admiration of this bravery, the Khan called upon him to yield and promised he would be honoured. Murar Baji indignantly refused and charging forward was about to strike Dilir Khan with his sword when the Khan struck him down with an arrow. Then the Khan wondered: 'what a soldier God has created!' Three hundred Mawla soldiers fell with their gallant commandant and the rest retreated to the fort. But undaunted by their commandant's death, the garrison grimly continued the struggle exclaiming: "What if one Murar Baji has fallen? We are all equally brave and shall fight with the same courage!"<sup>1925</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE

While there was no sign of Jai Singh loosening his grip on Purandar, Shivaji was making every possible effort to obtain a reasonable peace. For the past five years, a large part of his domain was under Mughal occupation and the rest was frequently suffering terrible devastation by Mughal punitive

expeditions. Besides, Jai Singh was now trying to subvert Shivaji's domain from within. He had informed the Emperor in a letter how he had been seducing Shivaji's troops, how he had been inducing Shivaji's cavalry leaders to accept *mansabs* in Imperial service, and how he had been trying with promises of monetary rewards to "separate Shivaji's army from him."<sup>1926</sup> How far Jai Singh could have succeeded in these efforts is difficult to tell. But things had reached such a pass that Shivaji had to make peace while there was yet a possibility to save something; delay would have been disastrous.

He had already sent a long letter, written in Hindi, with a trusted officer, Karmaji (Girmaji?), who repeatedly beseeched Jai Singh to listen only once to the contents of the letter and oblige to give a reply. At last Jai Singh heard what Shivaji had to write. Its purport was that "it would be better for the Mughal army to invade Bijapur rather than to suffer hardship in this hilly region." To this Jai Singh replied: "Do not put your faith in your hills. God willing, it would be trodden flat...by the hoofs of the horses of the Imperial army. If you want to save your life, place in your ear the ring of servitude to the Imperial Court."<sup>1927</sup>

After receiving this reply from Jai Singh, Shivaji repeatedly sent further letters offering to pay tribute and cede some forts. But, as Jai Singh later wrote to Aurangzeb, these offers were not in proportion to the dire straits to which Shivaji was reduced by the success gained by Jai Singh. So Jai Singh's reply remained the same as the one he had given before. But he knew that driving Shivaji to desperation would in the end prove counter-productive. He had learnt, or perceived, that Shivaji had decided to choose one of the two alternatives: to make a last overture to Jai Singh and, if that failed, restore a part of the Adilshahi Konkan to the Adilshah and make common cause with him against the Mughals. Trustworthy spies had reported to Jai Singh that the Adilshah had promised Shivaji every possible help. He realized that rendering Shivaji hopeless would only drive him into an open alliance with the Adilshah. So Jai Singh, too, was now willing to negotiate terms.<sup>1928</sup>

At last, about 20<sup>th</sup> May 1665 Shivaji sent one of his most trusted and able lieutenants, Raghunath Pandit, to ascertain Jai Singh's terms. Jai Singh replied, "The Emperor has not at all permitted me to negotiate with Shivaji. I cannot of my own authority, negotiate openly with him. But if he comes unarmed and makes supplication for forgiveness, the Emperor might forgive him." On this, Raghunath Pandit went back and soon brought Shivaji's reply that he would send his son to Jai Singh. However, that offer was declined. Whereupon Shivaji demanded an assurance on solemn oath that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and return home in safety, whatever the outcome of the visit. Having secured such an assurance from Jai Singh, Raghunath Pandit returned to Shivaji on 9<sup>th</sup> June 1665.<sup>1929</sup>

#### THE TREATY

In the night of 10<sup>th</sup> June 1665 Jai Singh received news that Shivaji would be coming to meet him the following day.<sup>1930</sup> In the morning of 11<sup>th</sup> June, Jai Singh was told that Shivji, having arrived at Shivapur, was coming with Sar-afraz Khan who was *thanadar* there. Then, 'one *prahar* [three hours] of the day being past' [i.e. about 9 o'clock in the morning], Raghunath Pandit entered the tent where Jai Singh was holding court. He brought the news that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a palanquin accompanied by six Brahmins, besides the bearers of the palanquin.<sup>1931</sup> Whereupon, Jai Singh sent his secretary Udairaj and Ugrasen Kachhwah to meet him on his approach and charging them to tell him that he should come only if he agreed to surrender all his forts. On hearing this message Shivaji said, "I have entered Imperial service. Many of my forts will be added to the Imperial dominions."

After Shivaji arrived near the entrance of the tent, Jai Singh sent Jani Beg, the paymaster of the army, to receive and usher Shivaji in. As Shivaji entered, Jai Singh embraced him and seated him beside himself.<sup>1932</sup>

In anticipation of Shivaji's arrival, Jai Singh had already instructed Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh that they were to launch an assault on the fort on receiving a signal from him. After Shivaji arrived, Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh, in accordance with the plan, launched an attack that could be seen from the tent, as a result of which Shivaji offered to surrender the fort. In reply, Jai Singh said, "This fort has been (all but) conquered through the exertions and valour of the Imperial troops. In an hour, in a minute, the garrison of the fort would be put to the sword. If you want to make a present to the Emperor, you have many other forts (for the purpose)."

Shivaji begged for the lives of his men in the fort, whereupon Jai Singh sent Ghazi Beg with one of Shivaji's servants to take possession of the fort and told Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh to let its inmates leave. This was done. On the following day, 4,000 soldiers and 3,000 others — men and women — evacuated the fort and the Mughals took possession.

In the meantime, Jai Singh took Shivaji into his audience tent and himself came away, leaving the negotiations to be conducted by Jai Singh's secretary Udairaj and Surat Singh Kachhwah. The two sides haggled over terms till midnight.

The terms to which they finally agreed were:

1. Twenty-three out of thirty-five forts in the (former) Nizamshahi territory, now possessed by Shivaji, along with the lands appertaining to them, which yielded annual revenue of 400,000 hons,<sup>1933</sup> should be ceded to the Mughal Empire.

2. The remaining 12 forts in the (former) Nizamshahi territory, now in Shivaji's possession along with the lands appertaining to them, which yielded annual revenue of 100,000 hons, should be left to Shivaji.

3. Shivaji's son should enter Mughal service and be given the rank of 5000 *dhat*/5000 *Sawar*/5000 *du aspa sih aspa*, and should be given a suitable *jagir*.

4. Shivaji himself should be exempted from holding any *mansab* or service.<sup>1934</sup> However, he would perform any military duty assigned to him in any Mughal campaign launched in the Deccan.

According to the terms of the treaty, Shivaji had to hand over 23 forts to the Mughals. They were: Purandar, Rudramal, Kondhana, Khandakala, Lohagad, Isagad [i.e. Visapur], Tung, Tikona, Rohida, Nardurg [i.e. Sidhhagad], Mahuli, Bhandardurg, Palaskhol, Rupgad [i.e. Kohoj], Vikatgad, Muranjan [i.e. Prabalgad], Manikgad, Sarupgad [i.e. Karnala], Sagargad, Mrugagad, Ekola [i.e. Ghangad], Songad, and Mangad.<sup>1935</sup>

The remaining 12 forts in the Nizamshahi Konkan that were left to Shivaji were: Rajgad, Torana, Rairi [i.e. Raigad], Lingana, Mahadgad, Paligad [i.e. Sarasgad], Ghosala or Ghosalgad, Anasvari [?], Talagad, Bhorap [i.e. Sudhagad], Korigad and Udhedurg [Rajmachi].<sup>1936</sup>


To understand the full significance of this treaty we have to hark back to the Mughal-Adilshahi treaty of 1657. By its terms, the Adilshah had agreed to cede all the Nizamshahi territory which had fallen to his lot by the Mughal-Adilshahi treaty of 1636. But just as the treaty of 1657 was concluded, Shah Jahan had fallen ill and, taking advantage of Aurangzeb's preoccupation with the impending Mughal War of Succession, the Adilshah did not fulfill its terms. But he, too, was unable to retain all of it because, seizing the opportunity of the prevailing uncertainty, Shivaji had captured most of that old Nizamshahi territory! Naturally Aurangzeb felt himself cheated of the prize he had won in 1657 which he now wanted back. But the Adilshah himself was unable to give it to him, for most of that territory was no longer in his possession. So that was the territory, with its 35 forts, which Aurangzeb wanted Shivaji to surrender. After five years' war Shivaji had at last agreed to cede 23 out of those 35 forts and retained the remaining 12 with the Emperor's consent. Besides these, he had many other forts such as, for instance, Pratapgad, Wasota, Vishalgad, and Vijaydurg. But he had won these out of Adilshahi territory.

In addition to these terms, Shivaji made a conditional offer that if out of the Adilshahi territory, districts yielding 400,000 hon a year in the Konkan, which were already in his possession, and 500,000 hon a year in the uplands (Balaghat), which he aspired to conquer, should be granted to him by the Emperor

and if an Imperial *farman* was issued that these districts would be left to him even after the expected Mughal conquest of the Adilshahi Sultanate, he would pay a tribute of four million hon to the Emperor in installments of 300,000 every year. On Jai Singh's recommendation, Aurangzeb later accepted this offer.<sup>1937</sup> This additional protocol was in fact an agreement between Shivaji and Aurangzeb for the partition of the Adilshahi Sultanate. Shivaji was willing to pay four million hons as a fee to ensure that the Mughals would not claim it after their proposed conquest of the Sultanate.

The next day, or on 12<sup>th</sup> June, Jai Singh ordered Raja Sujan Singh Bundela to send his brother Indraman with a detachment to take possession of the Rohida fort. He also wrote to Qubad Khan, the *thanadar* of Pune, to take possession of the forts of Lohagad, Visapur, Tung and Tikona. Shivaji sent his officers to hand over these forts to the Mughals.<sup>1938</sup>

On 13<sup>th</sup> June, Jai Singh sent Shivaji, mounted on an elephant and with Raja Rai Singh as escort, to visit Dilir Khan at the foot of the Purandar fort.<sup>1939</sup> The Khan presented Shivaji with two horses (one Arab and one with golden trappings), a jeweled sword, a jeweled dagger and two pieces of precious cloth.<sup>1940</sup>



TREATY OF PURANDAR 1665

Some time before this, while Shivaji had been sending his envoys to Jai Singh, Jai Singh had written the Emperor entreating him to send to him the *khilat* (robe of honour) and a *farman* (addressed to Shivaji), both of which were to be delivered to him on the occasion of his submission. Coincidentally, both the *farman* and the robe of honour arrived on the day following Shivaji's submission. In accordance with the etiquette prevalent in the Mughal court, Shivaji went forward to welcome the *farman* and don the robe of honour.<sup>1941</sup>

Jai Singh presented two horses with harnesses of gold and a female elephant to Shivaji before the latter left for Rajgad with Kirat Singh on 14<sup>th</sup> June. The latter was to accompany Shivaji up to Kondhana and take possession of that fort. After a farewell interview with Daud Khan, they left the Mughal camp and reached Kondhana at noon. Shivaji delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and then left with Ugrasen Kachhwah, who was to escort Shivaji's son to Jai Singh's camp, and reached Rajgad on 15<sup>th</sup> June.<sup>1942</sup>

Jai Singh certainly had ample opportunity too seize or kill Shivaji while he was in the Mughal camp. Explaining to the Emperor why he did not do so he wrote that had he detained Shivaji, in spite of the solemn promise and safe conduct given to him, there would have been two consequences. First, all the rulers and chieftains of the country would have lost faith in the promises and oaths of the Emperor's officers. (This would have meant that the Mughals would have gained nothing thereafter by diplomacy.) Secondly, trustworthy informants had reported to Jai Singh that before setting out to visit him, Shivaji had made such arrangements that had he been detained (or killed) his followers would have given him up for lost and continued the fight.<sup>1943</sup>

Shivaji sent Sambhaji on 17<sup>th</sup> June with Ugrasen Kachhwah. They came to Kirat Singh (at Kondhana) in the evening and arrived at Jai Singh's camp the next day. Jai Singh lodged Sambhaji in his own tent. On the same day, reports were received that Indraman Bundela had taken possession of the Rohida fort and Qubad Khan, that of Lohagad, Visapur, Tung

and Tikona. Jai Singh dispatched the ‘keys’ of the nine forts — Purandar, Khandakala, Rudramal, Rohida, Lohagad, Visapur, Tung, Tikona and Kondhana — to the Emperor.<sup>1944</sup> Even before Shivaji’s submission, the Emperor had sanctioned the enlistment of 10,000 foot soldiers in the Deccan on a basis of monthly salaries and Jai Singh had already recruited 5,500. These were to be used to garrison the newly acquired forts.<sup>1945</sup>

On 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1665 the Emperor received the report of the successful conclusion of the campaign. Pleased, he rewarded Jai Singh with a special robe of honour, an excellent enameled sword, and an elephant with silver accoutrements and, with an increment of 2,000 *du aspa sih aspa*, promoted him to the rank of 7000 *dhat*/7000 *sawar*/7000 *du aspa, sih aspa*.<sup>1946</sup> This was the highest rank in Mughal hierarchy to which any one except a Mughal prince could aspire. Other senior officers in the army such as Dilir Khan, Daud Khan, Raja Rai Singh Shisodiya and Jai Singh’s son Kirat Singh, were also rewarded with robes of honour and promotions.<sup>1947</sup>

Jai Singh had assigned various *mansabdars* to take possession of the remaining forts which Shivaji had agreed to cede to the Emperor. This was done in due time. Keys to Nardurg [i.e. Sidhhagad], Ankola [i.e. Ghangad], Mrugagad, Mahuli, Bhandardurg and Palaskhol were sent to the Emperor on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1665 and those of Kohaj [i.e. Rupgad], Vikatgad (Basantgad in Haft Anjuman), Muranjan [i.e. Prabalgad], Manikgad (Nang in Haft Anjuman), Karnala [i.e. Sarupgad], Khedurg [i.e. Sagargad], Songad and Mangad in August 1665.<sup>1948</sup>

On 21<sup>st</sup> September 1665 Jai Singh went to inspect the fort of Kondhana, spent the night there and returned to his camp the next day.<sup>1949</sup> The terms of the treaty having been fulfilled by Shivaji, Aurangzeb had sent a *farman* dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1665 to him confirming the treaty.<sup>1950</sup> The *farman* reached Jai Singh the same day he returned from Kondhana. So he sent Ugrasen Kachhwah with a brief letter to fetch Shivaji who was then in the Adilshahi Konkan. Shivaji arrived on 27<sup>th</sup> September, and on the 30<sup>th</sup>, accompanied by Kirat Singh and Jani Khan,<sup>1951</sup> the

Bakhshi (paymaster) of the army, went forward and received the *farman* with due custom and ceremony. A letter expressing gratitude for the favours shown to him by the Emperor was then drafted on behalf of Shivaji by Jai Singh's secretary Udairaj and dispatched.<sup>1952</sup>

Since his submission, Shivaji had not worn any weapon on his person during his visits to Jai Singh. Now Jai Singh presented and caused him to wear a jewelled sword and a jewelled dagger.<sup>1953</sup> Then he granted Shivaji leave to collect his forces and make other necessary arrangements for the forthcoming invasion of the Adilshahi Sultanate.<sup>1954</sup>

Since Shivaji's treaty with the Mughals his secret alliance with the Adilshah was broken and his forces attacked and quickly recaptured the territory in the Konkan which had been taken over from him by the Adilshahi army under Muhammad Ikhlas Khan.<sup>1955</sup> Sometime after the treaty, Jai Singh reported to Aurangzeb that the Adilshah had offered to cede all that Adilshahi territory to Shivaji which the Emperor had agreed to allow Shivaji to take and retain, on condition that his brother's son would enter Adilshahi service, but that Shivaji, relying on the sanctity of Jai Singh's promises and "in hopes of the Emperor's liberality", had declined.<sup>1956</sup>

#### JAI SINGH'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ADILSHAH SULTANATE

In August 1665, the Emperor had summoned Prince Muhammad Muazzam, the *subadar* of the Deccan to the Court, leaving the charge of the province to Jai Singh.<sup>1957</sup> About the same time, he had also ordered Jai Singh to invade the Adilshahi Sultanate with the object of annexing it.<sup>1958</sup> On Aurangzeb's orders, Mirza Raja Jai Singh left Purandar with his army on 20<sup>th</sup> November 1665 and set off towards Bijapur.<sup>1959</sup> Dilir Khan was appointed in command of the vanguard, which consisted of about 7,500 horsemen from the contingents of *mansabdars* like Sar-afraz Khan, Ghalib Khan, Dattaji, Rustumrao, Sayyid Najabat Barha, Puranmal Bundela, Narsingh Kunwar, Lodi Khan, Chaturbhuj Chauhan, besides a thousand horsemen from the Rana of Mewar (which, according to a treaty signed between

him and the Mughals, he was obliged to provide) and Atish Khan, the Chief of the Artillery with about 500 musketeers and most of the artillery. The left wing, comprising some 6,000 horsemen, was placed under command of Daud Khan with the contingents of Raja Sujan Singh, Sharza Khan Dakkhani, Jauhar Khan Habashi, Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat, Muhammad Salih Tarkhan, Masud Khan, Trimbakji Bhosale, Raji (son of Afzal Khan Bijapuri whom Shivaji had slain in 1659), Indraman Bundela, Sayyid Zain-ul Abidin Bukhari, Sayyid Maqbul Alam and others. The command of the right wing, comprising over 6,000 horsemen, was entrusted to Raja Rai Singh Shisodiya. It included contingents of *mansabdars* like Jadhavrao, Babaji, Sharzarao, Trimbakji, Vithoji, Daulatmand Khan, Shubhkarna, Mitrasen Bundela, Harjas Gaud, Ibrahim Pati, and Ismail Niyazi. The main body of this army numbered about 12,000 horsemen and comprised contingents of *mansabdars* like, Mulla Yahya Nayta, Purdil Khan, Jagat Singh Hada, Mankoji, Naroji, Sayyid Ali Bijapuri, Bhojraj Kachhwah, Udaybhan Rathod, Sayyid Munauwar Khan Barha, Zabardast Khan, Ram Singh, Barq-andaz Khan, Ba-dil Bakht-yar, Jani Khan Bakhshi, Muhammad Latif, and Ghalib Khan's son Khwaja Abidullah, besides Jai Singh's own contingent. Shivaji, with his 2,000 horsemen and 7,000 foot soldiers was posted on the left flank of the main body. The command of the advance party of the main body was given to Jai Singh's son, Kirat Singh. Qutb-ud Din Khan was given command of the rearguard and included the contingents of *mansabdars* like Hilal Khan, Dilawar Khan, Udaji Ram, Chatroji, Sayyid Ali Akbar Barha, Khudawand Habashi, Shaikh Abdul Hamid, Abdullah Shirazi, and Mumriz Muhammad.

When the Mughal army had traversed two stages, Abul Muhammad, a grandson of the deceased Adilshahi nobleman Bahlul Khan, deserted the Adilshahi army and came to Jai Singh with his contingent.<sup>1960</sup> He was welcomed, presented with robes of honour, two horses and a sword, and appointed on the right flank of the Mughal army. Later, on Jai Singh's recommendation, Aurangzeb conferred upon him the rank of 5000 *dhat/4000 sawar*.

When the army reached about 10 *kos* from Phaltan, on 5<sup>th</sup> December 1665, Jai Singh assigned Shivaji's Commander-in-Chief Netoji with a detachment of troops to capture the fort. At their approach the Adilshahi garrison fled and Netoji was able to occupy it without difficulty. A detachment was then sent as the garrison of the fort.

The army camped on the bank of the Nira River on 9<sup>th</sup> December 1665 and as Phaltan (190 km northwest of Bijapur) was nearby, Jai Singh went personally to inspect the fort. Bajaji Nimbalkar, the *Zamindar* (or *deshmukh*) of Phaltan came there to meet him, entered Imperial service and was presented with robes of honour.<sup>1961</sup> Shivaji, under Jai Singh's instructions, had dispatched a detachment from the camp towards the Tathawada fort, 7 *kos* away from Phaltan and it was soon able to seduce the garrison and take possession of the fort.<sup>1962</sup> Meanwhile, Jai Singh again sent a detachment of Shivaji's soldiers under Netoji's command to capture the Mangalwedha fort 82 km north by west of Bijapur. Thereafter, the Mughal army resumed its march towards Bijapur. After they had covered some distance, Jai Singh received information that the garrison of the fort of Khawan (Khatav?) had vacated the fort at the approach of the Mughal army. Jai Singh sent Masud Khan with some *mansabdars* and 300 musketeers from Shivaji's contingent to occupy that fort.

Information was received on 19<sup>th</sup> December 1665 that that the garrison of the Mangalwedha fort had fled on learning of Netoji's approach. Jai Singh appointed Udit Singh Bhaduriya as the commander of that fort and Sar-afraz Khan as the *faujdar* of the region. On the next day, when the army reached two *kos* from Mangalwedha, Jai Singh visited and inspected the fort.

While Jai Singh's army was advancing towards Bijapur in this manner, Ali Adilshah II was not inactive either. He had summoned his nobles and chieftains from various places to Bijapur and was preparing for war. All the tanks and reservoirs in the vicinity of Bijapur were destroyed or drained and all wells were filled with earth. Munitions and provisions had been stocked in huge quantities within the fort. Some 30,000

Karnataki foot soldiers were enlisted to reinforce the usual garrison of the capital. The Qutbshah's help was sought for and he sent a strong force to Bijapur under command of Neknam Khan. It is indeed strange that Jai Singh's spies had completely failed him in providing true information on the preparations that were being made for the defence of Bijapur. In a letter to Aurangzeb written after the capture of Mangalwedha, i.e. about 20<sup>th</sup> December 1665, he stated that according to the information reported to him, the Adilshahi army was disunited, the officers were quarreling among themselves, the castle of Bijapur had no materials and provisions for standing a siege and that, as soon as his army reached near the capital, most of the Adilshahi noblemen would join the Mughals and the Adilshah would be brought to his knees. Disillusionment was not long in coming.

It was on 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1665 that Jai Singh learnt of the arrival of the Adilshahi army within striking distance of the Mughals. They made no attempt to engage during the day but, in the night, fired rockets on the Mughal camp. Jai Singh did not order an advance the next day as the enemy was too close, but sent Raja Rai Singh, Qutb-ud Din Khan, Qubad Khan, Kirat Singh, Fathjang Khan, Abul Muhammad (Bahlul Khan's grandson) and Shivaji with their contingents under Dilir Khan's command to scatter the enemy. The Adilshahi army, about 12,000 horsemen, had chieftains like Sharza Khan, Abul Muhammad (Bachtar's grandson), Khawas Khan, Kalyanji Yadav, Ekoji Bhosale (Shivaji's step brother), Yaqut Khan and others. They were driven away in the ensuing engagement; the Adilshahi nobleman Yaqut Khan Habashi was killed. The Mughals pursued the Adilshahi army for some distance and then turned back towards their camp. However, the Adilshahi army also turned back and kept following the Mughal army, firing rockets at them. If the Mughals stopped to retaliate, the Adilshahi soldiers would retire to a safe distance and again follow them when they turned back. In one such skirmish, the Adilshahi cavalry mounted an attack on Netoji, who was in the rearguard. However, Kirat Singh and Fathjang Khan came to his

relief and drove away the attackers. At last, in the evening, Dilir Khan reached the Mughal camp.

A dispatch from Udit Singh, commandant of Mangalwedha, reached the camp on the same day to convey news of the misfortune that had befallen Sar-afraz Khan, the *faujdar* of that territory. Adilshahi nobleman Sharza Khan had mounted a surprise attack on Sar-afraz Khan and his detachment and Sar-afraz Khan was killed in this skirmish.

Spending two days at the place where they had halted, Jai Singh resumed his advance on 27<sup>th</sup> December 1665. Spies brought the news on 28<sup>th</sup> December that they had sighted advancing enemy forces, upon which Jai Singh kept a few troops in the Mughal camp and with the remaining troops, proceeded to engage the enemy. After covering a distance of half a *kos*, the Adilshahi force was seen but fled after an inconclusive exchange. The Mughals pursued them for 7-8 kilometers and then turned back. Shivaji was in the vanguard of Jai Singh's army in this battle.

When the Mughal army had reached a mere five *kos* from Bijapur on 29<sup>th</sup> December, Jai Singh needed to decide on his future move. The Fabian policy (of harassing the enemy but avoiding pitched battle) adopted by the Adilshahi army had prevented him from inflicting a decisive defeat to neutralize enemy resistance. On the other hand, he did not have a force large enough to besiege the walled city of Bijapur and simultaneously keep the Bijapur field army at bay to safeguard his lines of communication; nor did he possess a powerful siege train to make a practicable breach and take the fort by storm. Thus baffled, he pitched camp and stayed there for a week. Yet, he could not remain there for long. Each day his foraging parties were being harassed and even attacked by detachments of the Bijapur army. Moreover, because of the scorched earth policy of the enemy there was a great shortage of food, forage and especially water in the Mughal camp.

Finally, a decision was taken on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1666 to break camp and make a retreat. The Adilshahi army followed closely, mounting attacks on foraging parties and rearguard of the

Mughal army whenever the opportunity presented itself. Jai Singh reached the Bhima River on 11<sup>th</sup> and stayed there till 16<sup>th</sup> January.

Shivaji had suggested to Jai Singh in the meanwhile that if he were detached from the main army, he would capture the Panhala fort and raise tumult in that territory so as to compel the enemy to divert a large force thither. Jai Singh accepted the proposal and sent Shivaji away about 11<sup>th</sup> January 1666.<sup>1963</sup>

For five months after retreating from Bijapur and reaching the Bhima River, Jai Singh kept moving from place to place on the Mughal–Bijapur frontier with his army. During this period, he fought a number of skirmishes against the combined forces of the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates. In one of these, Mughal *mansabdar* Dattaji Jadhavrao was killed and his sons Baswantrao and Raghoji wounded seriously. Baswantrao died soon afterwards. A Bijapur chieftain, Sayyid Ilyas Sharza Khan, was killed in another skirmish.<sup>1964</sup>

The Emperor ordered Jai Singh to return to Aurangabad as the rains were approaching. Jai Singh decided to extricate the garrison and the warlike material in the Mangalwedha fort because their position was untenable. After this was done, he broke camp, arrived at Beed and stayed there till 17<sup>th</sup> November. Then he left Beed and reached Aurangabad on 25<sup>th</sup> November 1666.<sup>1965</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S ATTACKS ON ADILSHAHİ TERRITORY

On the fifth day since leaving Jai Singh's camp, Shivaji attacked Panhala in the last quarter of the night. But being forewarned, the garrison was alert and offered stubborn resistance. Shivaji suffered casualties — killed and wounded — of about 1,000 men. Having realized the futility of further struggle, he withdrew his men when the sun rose and retired to Khelna (Vishalgad).<sup>1966</sup> Even thereafter, he continued his attacks on Adilshahi territory and kept some Adilshahi forces engaged under command of Rustum-i Zaman, Siddi Masud (Siddi Jauhar's son-in-law), and Abdul Aziz (Siddi Jauhar's son).<sup>1967</sup> A small force sent by him laid siege to the fort of Phonda, but the

Portuguese gave the garrison all possible help and they held out till Rustum-i Zaman arrived and broke the siege.<sup>1968</sup> But Shivaji gained success at another fort. According to an English letter from Hubli to Surat, dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1666, Rustum-i Zaman had surreptitiously delivered the fort of Rangna to Shivaji's officer Raoji Pandit and had then gone to Bijapur to plead for himself.<sup>1969</sup> There is no other source which throws any light on this incident. It was widely believed that Rustum-i Zaman was secretly in league with Shivaji and the accusation in the English letter might be a reflection of that rumour. Perhaps, the fort might have been captured by the Marathas by their usual method of night escalade. In any case, it seems correct that they won the fort about this time.<sup>1970</sup>

Soon after Shivaji's failure at Panhala, Netoji defected to the Adilshahi Sultanate and started raiding Mughal territory.<sup>1971</sup> But he did not stay there for long. Jai Singh seduced him, agreeing to his demand for a *mansab* of 5000 *dhat*/5000 *sawar* and, in March 1666, he went over to the Mughals.<sup>1972</sup>

During these several months, Shivaji had visited and returned from Agra. This episode has been narrated in the next chapter.

## ***Chapter 9***

# Shivaji's Visit to Agra

## RATIONALE FOR AGREEING TO VISIT THE IMPERIAL COURT

In his treaty with Jai Singh, Shivaji had stipulated that he would not be compelled to accept a *mansab* and also that he would not be required to attend the Mughal Imperial Court. Jai Singh had so informed Aurangzeb in his dispatch to him.<sup>1973</sup> Yet, Aurangzeb had ordered Jai Singh, before the latter set out from Purandar for the invasion of the Adilshahi Sultanate, to send Shivaji to the Imperial Court.<sup>1974</sup> Upon this Jai Singh had submitted that he would first take Shivaji along with him on the forthcoming campaign and then send him to the Mughal court.<sup>1975</sup>

Accordingly, Jai Singh, as he wrote to Aurangzeb, "used a thousand devices" to persuade Shivaji to present himself before the Emperor.<sup>1976</sup> There is no way to know what these inducements were. There is no doubt, however, that Shivaji would have scarcely risked the visit unless it was necessitated by dire compulsion or it promised some advantage that was too tempting to miss. It was dangerous in the extreme to virtually enter the jaws of a deceitful man like Aurangzeb. Moreover, it would be repugnant in the extreme to him to bow before a Muslim Emperor.<sup>1977</sup> The Sabhasad Chronicle tells us that Shivaji had offered to conquer the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates for the Emperor.<sup>1978</sup> Perhaps, this could be the reason why Shivaji agreed to go. The visit could well have resulted in his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Mughal army in the Deccan for the conquest of the two sultanates, with the vast resources of the Empire at his disposal. Then, at an opportune moment, he could cast off his allegiance to the Mughal Emperor and appropriate the conquered territories, or at least a substantial part of them, to himself.<sup>1979</sup> The risk in visiting Aurangzeb was too great, but Jai Singh had taken the most solemn oaths for his safety at and return from the Imperial Court.<sup>1980</sup>

The Chitnis Chronicle states that, before leaving for the Mughal Court, he made a surprise visit to a fort to ascertain how diligently his security regulations were being implemented.<sup>1981</sup> While this account is quite likely to be imaginary, it may well be assumed that Shivaji must have made thorough arrangements to ensure effective administration of his dominions during his absence. Later, during his house arrest at Agra, Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor that no benefit would be gained by arresting or killing Shivaji because he had already made such meticulous provisions that his government would function normally even in his absence.<sup>1982</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S JOURNEY TO AGRA

Although the capital of the Mughal Empire was at Delhi, Aurangzeb was at Agra at the time of Shivaji's visit. Shah Jahan, who was imprisoned in the Agra fort, had died on 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1666.<sup>1983</sup> Aurangzeb came to Agra from Delhi on 15<sup>th</sup> February and remained there till 8<sup>th</sup> October 1666.<sup>1984</sup> So, Shivaji, accompanied by his nine year old son Sambhaji, a few trustworthy officers and a select escort left for Agra on 5<sup>th</sup> March 1666.<sup>1985</sup> By the order of the Emperor Rs.100,000 were advanced to him from the Imperial treasury and Ghazi Beg, a Mughal officer who was then in Jai Singh's army, was deputed to accompany him.<sup>1986</sup> From his side, Jai Singh sent Tej Singh, a servant from his own household, to escort Shivaji.<sup>1987</sup>

Bhimsen Saxena, in his *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, narrates an interesting incident which occurred when Shivaji reached Aurangabad on his way to Agra. It is as follows:<sup>1988</sup>

A huge crowd had gathered to see him when Shivaji reached Aurangabad. The officer-in-charge in Aurangabad, Safshikan Khan, regarding Shivaji as nothing more than a petty Maratha landholder, sent his nephew to receive him. He himself waited with his staff in his audience hall for Shivaji to come up to him. Shivaji was displeased to see that Safshikan Khan had not personally presented himself, but had instead sent a mere nephew to receive him. When this nephew told Shivaji that the

Khan was waiting for him at the audience hall, Shivaji inquired who Safshikan Khan was, what he did in Aurangabad and why he had not presented himself to receive him. So, declining to accompany the nephew, Shivaji directly made for Jai Singh's mansion where arrangements had already been made for his stay. On hearing this, Safshikan Khan realized his own folly and went at once with all his staff to visit Shivaji. Shivaji welcomed him by coming forward up to the edge of the carpet (and not to the very door of the hall, perhaps to indicate his displeasure). Shivaji himself paid a return visit to Safshikan Khan on the following day.

It was during this journey that Shivaji must have received the following *farman* from Aurangzeb.<sup>1989</sup>

### Aurangzeb to Shivaji

5<sup>th</sup> April 1666

The letter which you addressed to me reporting your having started, by the advice of Mirza Raja, for saluting the threshold of my court was placed before me...

Come here without delay, with perfect composure of mind, in full confidence in my grace... After you have obtained audience of me, you will be glorified with my royal favours and given permission to return home. I am herewith sending you a resplendent robe of honour.

A letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> May 1666 written by Parkaldas, Jai Singh's officer at Agra, to Kalyandas, Jai Singh's *Divan* at Ambar, gives an idea of Shivaji's entourage. Parkaldas writes:<sup>1990</sup>

"Shivaji is accompanied by about two hundred and fifty horsemen of whom a hundred have their own horses (*khud aspa*), while the others are *bargirs* [i.e. those mounted on horses supplied by their master].

When Shivaji rides out in a palanquin many tall and hefty footmen, who wear Turkish attire, walk ahead of him. Shivaji's flag is saffron and made of silk

brocaded with golden embellishments. In his train the camels for carrying luggage are few and so they are very heavily loaded. There are a hundred *vanjaris* [porters] in his entourage. All the senior officers in his service have palanquins; so there are many palanquins with him.

Shivaji looks lean and short. He is very handsome and fair. The mere sight of him is enough to tell that he is a brave and courageous man. He keeps a beard. His son is nine years old. He, too, is very handsome and fair.

Shivaji has come with a rather small escort, but with great splendour. A big elephant goes before him carrying a flag. Also, a big horse with gold and silver trappings. Big Deccani footmen in magnificent attire walk before him. Two female elephants saddled with *haudas* [an open wooden platform with a railing fastened on the back of an elephant to provide seating for a few occupants] follow him. A big *sukhpal* [a type of palanquin] is also carried before him. Its poles are coated with silver. His palanquin is completely covered with silver plates and its legs and pegs with gold plates. Shivaji has come here in such magnificent manner."

Aurangzeb's 50<sup>th</sup> birthday, according to the lunar calendar, coincided with 12<sup>th</sup> May 1666.<sup>1991</sup> It was on that day that Shivaji was expected to arrive at the court.<sup>1992</sup> The Emperor had ordered Ram Singh and Fidai Khan to go out one day's march to welcome and conduct Shivaji to Agra.<sup>1993</sup> Shivaji reached the *serai* of Mulukchand on 11<sup>th</sup> May and camped there.<sup>1994</sup> Whereupon, Ram Singh sent his *munshi*, Giridhar, to convey his respects and present Shivaji with a horse attired in silver trappings and a robe of honour.<sup>1995</sup> We do not know why neither Ram Singh nor Fidai Khan went out to receive Shivaji as the Emperor had ordered them to do. But their negligence to honour the protocol must have irritated Shivaji. The *munshi*

went to Shivaji with a squadron of about 40 horses, conveyed to him Ram Singh's salutations (*Ram Ram*) and informed him of the arrangements made for his visit. Shivaji gave him a robe of honour and Rs.200 in cash.<sup>1996</sup>

It was Ram Singh's turn the following day on guard duty around the Emperor's palace.<sup>1997</sup> So, he sent the *munshi*, Giridharlal, to bring Shivaji to the court and himself rode out to meet Shivaji on the way after his guard duty ended. But there was some confusion because Ram Singh and Mukhlis Khan came by way of Ram Singh's camp at the garden of Firoz Khoja<sup>1998</sup> while Shivaji was being conducted by a different route. On realizing this, Ram Singh sent two of his servants to divert Shivaji to the route by which he himself was coming. They did so and Shivaji and Ram Singh met near the garden of Noorganj. Tej Singh, whom Jai Singh had appointed to accompany Shivaji, introduced Shivaji and Ram Singh to one another.<sup>1999</sup> Shivaji expected Ram Singh to come forward to meet him. So, he himself made no move, upon which Ram Singh himself came forward and they embraced each other without dismounting. Then Shivaji met Mukhlis Khan, also evidently on horseback. Shivaji's entourage consisted of eight elephants. When Ram Singh saw them, he suggested to Shivaji not to take them any further as there would be congestion on the route ahead. So the elephants were sent back and tethered near the tent which Ram Singh had erected for Shivaji near his own tents.

#### SHIVAJI'S AUDIENCE WITH AURANGZEB

What followed thereafter is reported in a letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1666, written by Parkaldas to Kalyandas thus:<sup>2000</sup>

By the time Ram Singh and Mukhlis Khan reached the court along with Shivaji the Emperor had left the public audience hall (*Diwan-i Aam o Khas*) and had retired to the antechamber (*ghuslkhana*). When Shivaji went there, the Emperor ordered Asad Khan, the *Bakhshi*<sup>2001</sup> (paymaster), to usher Shivaji forward to enable him to pay his respects to the Emperor, which Asad Khan did.<sup>2002</sup> Shivaji presented 1000 *muhars* and Rs.2000

as *nazar* and 5000 rupees as *nisar*.<sup>2003</sup> His son Sambhaji then paid his respects and presented 500 *muhars* and 1000 rupees as *nazar* and 2000 rupees as *nisar*.<sup>2004</sup> Then Shivaji was conducted to stand in the place of Tahir Khan in front of Raja Rai Singh.<sup>2005</sup> The Emperor did not say anything to him. The princes and noblemen were presented beetle leaves (*pan*) on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday. So was Shivaji. Then the princes, Jafar Khan and Jaswant Singh were presented robes of honour (*khilat*) to mark the occasion. By this time Shivaji had become highly displeased with the treatment he has received so far. He was consumed with anger and his eyes were filled with rage. The Emperor noticed it and ordered Ram Singh to ask Shivaji what the matter was. When Ram Singh approached him, Shivaji said: "You have seen, your father has seen, your Emperor has seen what a man I am, and yet you have deliberately kept me standing! I cast off your *mansab*. If you wanted me to stand, you should have done it with proper thought." Then he turned his back to the Emperor and immediately began to walk away. Whereupon Ram Sigh caught him by the hand, but Shivaji wrenched it away, came to one side and sat down. Ram Singh followed and tried to conciliate him. But Shivaji refused to listen and exclaimed: "The day of my death has arrived! Either you kill me or I shall kill myself! Cut off my head and take it there if you like; but I am not going into the Emperor's presence again."

As Shivaji would not listen, the Maharaj Kunwar went and reported the matter to the Emperor. Whereupon, the Emperor ordered Multafat Khan, Aqil Khan and Mukhlis Khan to go, console Shivaji, give him a robe of honour and bring him back to his presence. So these men went to Shivaji and asked him to accept the robe of honour. Shivaji replied: "I shall not take the robe of honour. The Emperor purposely made me stand below Jaswant Singh. I am such a man and yet I was deliberately kept standing. I decline the Emperor's *mansab*. I will not be his servant. Kill me if you like, imprison me if you want; but I will not wear the robe of honour." So they went back and reported the matter to the Emperor. Whereupon, he ordered Ram Singh to take Shivaji to his residence and conciliate him.

So Ram Singh brought Shivaji to his residence, sat with him in his private chamber and tried to pacify him. But Shivaji would not listen. After half an hour Ram Singh sent Shivaji to his own camp.<sup>2006</sup>

Let us pause here to consider what went wrong during Shivaji's audience with Aurangzeb. If one reads carefully what Parkaldas had reported in his letter of 15<sup>th</sup> May 1666 one would notice that, according to him, Shivaji was enraged because he was kept standing. But, one may ask, was it not the long established custom of the Mughal court after all? No one, except the Emperor himself, and, sometimes, the crown prince, was allowed to sit in the Mughal court. All princes and noblemen always stood. A man like Shivaji, who kept himself so well informed, must have been aware of that practice and must have been prepared to put up with it when he had agreed to go to the Mughal court. What then could have upset him so much? An answer might be obtained by delving deeper into his psyche and personality in an attempt to try to discern his aim. There is no doubt that it was Shivaji's ambition to establish his own independent kingdom. He had never been, and was never likely to be, anybody's vassal. When he had to sue for peace with Jai Singh he had accepted a *mansab* for his son; but he would accept none for himself.<sup>2007</sup> He had also stipulated in his treaty with Jai Singh that he would not attend the Mughal court. To bow his head in token of submission to Aurangzeb must have been abhorrent to him. He must have been prepared to suffer what he thought was dishonorable only because he felt it might prove useful in expanding his dominions with lesser effort and in a shorter period of time. Then, at an opportune moment, he could throw off his allegiance to the Mughal Emperor. To achieve this larger object he would have to swallow his pride but once. But when he found that his reception at the Mughal court was not what Jai Singh had led him to expect,<sup>2008</sup> when he had to stand before the Emperor among Mughal noblemen, especially below the despised lackey Jaswant Singh, steeped in abject servitude, he was unable to bear it after all. This was perhaps a major cause for his sudden and uncontrollable fury.

That he was not given a robe of honour was not the real cause of his anger. His anger, in fact, must have been directed against himself for having agreed to come there in the first place.<sup>2009</sup> He had certainly committed a grave error in doing so and now he had compounded it by betraying himself, by showing that he was not a mere rebel, as Aurangzeb might have thought, but a man made of altogether different stuff, of a far loftier character than Mughal noblemen, a man who could not bear to bow his head before the Mughal Emperor, a man born to be king. Had Aurangzeb realized this, Shivaji was doomed. But Aurangzeb had not. And yet Shivaji was in a grave predicament now. Not only had he made a gross breach of the etiquette of the Mughal court, he had also shown disrespect to the person of the Emperor himself. Why had Aurangzeb put up with such gross misdemeanour? Why did he not order Shivaji to be put to death then and there? We have no way of knowing this and all suggestions would be mere speculations at best. But it was certainly not out of forgiveness that Aurangzeb held his hand for the moment. Aurangzeb did no harm to Shivaji probably because Jai Singh had pledged his word for his safety or, perhaps, Aurangzeb might have wanted to gain the rest of Shivaji's fortresses by holding him hostage. But whims of Emperors cannot be relied upon. At any moment Aurangzeb himself might have changed his mind and decided to put Shivaji to death. Shivaji's life was now hanging by the slender threads of Jai Singh's pledge and Aurangzeb's avarice.

In the evening Ram Singh sent Giridharlal Munshi and another servant to persuade Shivaji to go to the court. Whereupon Shivaji relented a trifle and said: "Very well! I shall send my son with my brother [Ram Singh]. I too shall go [to the Emperor's court] after a couple of days."<sup>2010</sup> But, as we shall see, Shivaji never again presented himself before Aurangzeb.

#### SHIVAJI'S PREDICAMENT

On the following day, 13<sup>th</sup> May 1666, when Ram Singh went in the morning to the court to make obeisance, the Emperor asked:

“Is Shivaji coming?” Ram Singh replied: “He has fever, so he will not come today.” In the evening, when Ram Singh again went to the court, he took Shivaji’s son, Sambhaji, with him and kept him standing by his own side. The Emperor rewarded Sambhaji with a robe of honour, a jeweled dagger and a pearl necklace.<sup>2011</sup> Many noblemen who disliked Shivaji had by this time begun instigating the Emperor against him. The Emperor’s elder sister Begam Sahiba (Jahan Ara), the *diwan* Jafar Khan and Maharaja Jaswant Singh said to the Emperor: “Shivaji has behaved with rudeness and contumacy and Your Majesty is ignoring it. The report of this will spread from country to country.”<sup>2012</sup>

On 16<sup>th</sup> May 1666, according to a Rajasthani letter of that date, the Begam Sahiba (Jahan Ara), Jafar Khan and Jaswant Singh said to the Emperor: “Who is this Shivaji who comes here in Your Majesty’s presence and behaves with such rudeness and contumacy and still Your Majesty ignores such behaviour. In this way, many *bhumiyas* [petty land owners] will come here and behave rudely. Then how will proper order be maintained? The news will reach in every country that a Hindu behaved with such defiance. Then all will behave rudely.”<sup>2013</sup> The Emperor discussed with his confidants whether to kill Shivaji or to imprison him. He then ordered Siddi Fulad:<sup>2014</sup> “Take him to Rad-andaz Khan’s<sup>2015</sup> mansion.” This news reached Ram Singh. He at once rushed to Muhammad Amin Khan’s<sup>2016</sup> house and interceded with him saying: “The Emperor is thinking of killing Shivaji. But he has come here under a solemn assurance of safe conduct (*kaul*). So it is proper that the Emperor should first kill me, summon my son and kill him and only then kill Shivaji.” So Muhammad Amin Khan went to the Emperor and reported Ram Singh’s words. Whereupon the Emperor said: “Tell Ram Singh to stand surety for Shivaji. If Shivaji escapes or does any mischief Ram Singh will be responsible. Let Ram Singh give a security bond in writing.” When Muhammad Amin Khan returned and narrated this to Ram Singh, he agreed to give a security bond. He returned to his camp and briefed Shivaji in the night of 14<sup>th</sup> May 1666. Shivaji came to Ram Singh the following morning, performed worship (*puja*) of Shiva there and gave his solemn

assurance. Then Ram Singh wrote the security bond and gave it to Muhammad Amin Khan that afternoon in the antechamber (*ghuslkhana*). When the Khan reported this to the Emperor he took the bond and ordered: "Tell Ram Singh to take Shivaji to Kabul. Find an auspicious day to begin the journey."<sup>2017</sup>

Shivaji was in a great predicament now. However, without panicking he began initiating steps in a cool and calculated manner to extricate himself from Aurangzeb's clutches. While he was not actually imprisoned, there was no way he could have been able to leave Agra without the Emperor's express permission. But first he would have to pacify Aurangzeb to remove, or at least suspend, the immediate threat to his life. This he succeeded in doing by bribing Jafar Khan and some other noblemen.<sup>2018</sup> On 18<sup>th</sup> May 1666 he went to Jafar Khan's house and asked him to intercede with the Emperor on his behalf. Jafar Khan placed Shivaji's petition before the Emperor and obtained pardon for his offences. The Emperor also rescinded the order to send him to Kabul.<sup>2019</sup> But soon afterwards, perhaps on 19<sup>th</sup> May 1666, guards were posted around Shivaji's camp.<sup>2020</sup> But Shivaji was still free to go out of his camp for the next few days. About 25<sup>th</sup> May, another petition from Shivaji was placed before the Emperor through Muhammad Amin Khan. He had therein offered to pay the Emperor Rs.20 million if he was allowed to return home and all the forts which he had ceded to the Emperor were restored to him.<sup>2021</sup> On this the Emperor said: "He has gone off his head. How can he be given leave to depart? Warn him that he must not visit anybody, not even go to Ram Singh's camp."<sup>2022</sup> Since then, a very strict watch was maintained around Shivaji's camp.<sup>2023</sup> So Shivaji was now under house arrest. The Jedhe Chronology gives 25<sup>th</sup> May 1666 as the date on which guards were posted around Shivaji's residence.<sup>2024</sup>

Soon afterwards, probably on 5<sup>th</sup> June, it was reported to the Emperor that Shivaji's and Ram Singh's men were daily coming to Agra.<sup>2025</sup> The report was probably false. But it was enough to infuriate the Emperor. He ordered Siddi Fulad and the men of the artillery: "Go and seize Shivaji and kill him."<sup>2026</sup> But it would

seem that by this time Shivaji had won over not only Jafar Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan but the Emperor's elder sister Jahan Ara as well, for she at once urged the Emperor: "Mirza Raja [Jai Singh] is a sincere servant of Your Majesty. Shivaji came here relying upon his assurance. If you kill him now no one will have any faith in your word."<sup>2027</sup> It was due to her intervention that the Emperor rescinded the order.<sup>2028</sup> It was probably this incident which led Ram Singh to take additional precautions for Shivaji's safety. Since 5<sup>th</sup> June, Ram Singh's men began keeping watch around Shivaji inside the circle of guards which had been posted by the Emperor's orders. Ram Singh justified this saying that the Emperor had kept Shivaji in his custody and he would be held responsible if Shivaji escaped or committed suicide.<sup>2029</sup>

#### PEOPLE'S ADMIRATION FOR SHIVAJI

Shivaji was already renowned for his valour when he arrived at Agra. Now his defiance of the Emperor in open court won him nothing but praise from the people of Agra. In his letter to Kalyandas dated 29<sup>th</sup> May 1666 Parkaldas wrote:<sup>2030</sup>

"Even earlier people praised Shivaji's valour and courage. Now that after coming to the Emperor's presence he has shown such audacity and returned such strong replies the public extols him for his bravery all the more."

The respect he had won not only for his valour but for his wisdom and discretion is reflected in the following letter written by Parkaldas to Kalyandas on 18<sup>th</sup> July 1666:<sup>2031</sup>

"One day when Ballushah, Tej Singh and Reen Singh were sitting together Maha Singh Shekhawat remarked: 'Shivaji is very wise. Whatever he says he says it so correctly that nobody need say anything more on the subject. Truly a great Rajput!<sup>2032</sup> We have found him just as he was reported to be. His speech is so characteristic of a Rajput that if it is borne in mind it will prove useful some day.' Then Maha Singh said to Tej Singh: 'His fate brought him here. But when

there were four senior men like you with the Maharaja [Jai Singh], why did they not persuade him [against sending Shivaji here]? Whereupon Tej Singh replied; ‘Maharaja listens only to [his secretary] Udairaj. Who else will venture to counsel him?’ ”

#### SHIVAJI STARTS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR HIS ESCAPE

On 8<sup>th</sup> June 1666, Shivaji decided to send most of his men away. So they went to Ram Singh and told him that they were leaving; Ram Singh, however, asked them to stay in the garden behind his camp.<sup>2033</sup> But then Shivaji petitioned through Fulad Khan that he was sending his men away and the Emperor should grant them *dastaks* (travel permits) so that they could leave.<sup>2034</sup> These were granted and soon most of Shivaji’s men departed from Agra.<sup>2035</sup> About the middle of June 1666, Shivaji petitioned to the Emperor seeking permission to become a *faqir* [mendicant] and live at Banaras. On hearing it the Emperor exclaimed with ridicule: “Very well! Let him turn a *faqir* and stay in the fort of Prayag [as a prisoner]. Bahadur Khan, the *subadar* there, will watch over him.”<sup>2036</sup>

It was not difficult to imagine that sooner or later Shivaji would make an attempt to escape. In fact, as early as June 1666, Jai Singh’s *diwan* at Amber had started taking precautions against that eventuality. A letter written to him by a subordinate, Dhanraj Shriram, on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1666 is extant. It says:<sup>2037</sup>

“Your order to take precautions not to let Shivaji go in case he escapes and takes the route via Maujabad Pargana is received. Strict warnings are sent to all the villages in Maujabad Pargana immediately.”

After the incident of 12<sup>th</sup> May, the Emperor had written to Jai Singh informing him of what had occurred and had asked for his advice in the matter.<sup>2038</sup> To this, according to the *Alamgirnama*, Jai Singh had replied<sup>2039</sup> that as he had concluded a treaty and covenant with Shivaji, he would be obliged if Shivaji’s offences would be pardoned,<sup>2040</sup> and that such a policy would also be advantageous in view of the campaign against

Bijapur.<sup>2041</sup> He also instructed Ram Singh to ensure that Shivaji remained safe and the sanctity of his and Ram Singh's promises to Shivaji remained inviolate.<sup>2042</sup> At first Jai Singh had even beseeched the Emperor to let Shivaji return home.<sup>2043</sup> But soon afterwards he changed his mind. His campaign against the Adilshahi Sultanate had failed and the Emperor was contemplating to take the field himself. So Jai Singh instructed Ram Singh to tell the Emperor to keep Shivaji detained at Agra with a promise that he would be summoned to the Deccan after the Emperor reached there, and to keep Shivaji's son with himself.<sup>2044</sup>

The Emperor was repeatedly pressing Shivaji through Ram Singh to hand over all his forts, and Shivaji was steadfastly refusing to do so.<sup>2045</sup> Once, according to a Rajasthani letter, Shivaji wrote to Muhammad Amin Khan and Aqil Khan and through them petitioned the Emperor: "I am giving up all my forts to the Emperor. Let the Emperor give me leave to depart for my country. My officers there do not pay heed to my letters. I shall go there, fight with them, take forts from them and hand them over to the Emperor." Upon this the Emperor exclaimed: "If they will cede forts on his going there, will they not give them up on his writing to them?"<sup>2046</sup> And once when Ram Singh brought up the subject with Shivaji he scathingly said: "Your father gave the Emperor twenty-three of my forts and got the *pargana* of Tonk<sup>2047</sup> [as a reward from the Emperor]. You are now asking me to give up my remaining forts. Tell me what *pargana* you are thinking of gaining by it? Will it be Toda?"<sup>2048</sup>

Shivaji's poet laureate Kavindra Paramanand was with Shivaji during his enforced stay at Agra. But, on or about 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1666, Shivaji gave him two elephants,<sup>2049</sup> Rs.1,000 in cash and promised to give him a third elephant.<sup>2050</sup> He started saying: "I shall now give away all my horses and elephants and shall sit down here as a *faqir*."<sup>2051</sup> Soon afterwards, as we shall see, Paramanand left Agra.

Though Shivaji was under house arrest, the restrictions on his movements were not very stringent. About 18<sup>th</sup> July 1666 Parkaldas wrote to Kalyandas:<sup>2052</sup>

“The affairs of Shiva continue to be just as they were. The checkpoints (*chaukis*) around him are alert. Sobhachand Bakhshi and Vimaldas inspect the posts in the night. Shivaji will continue to stay like this for a good many days.

When Ram Singh had come to visit Shivaji, he [Ram Singh] said, ‘The Emperor is going out on a hunting expedition for three days. I am going with him.’ Shivaji said, ‘You submit to the Emperor that you are my custodian. The Emperor will then keep you here.’ Ram Singh said, ‘If you wish I shall take you along for the hunt.’ Shivaji asked: ‘Will the Emperor conclude my matter? Request him to take a decision about me.’

The Kunwar said, ‘I shall submit a prayer.’ ”

Since about 13<sup>th</sup> August 1666, the watch over Shivaji was made stricter and the Emperor issued an order for him to be moved to the mansion of Raja Vitthal das. When Shivaji learnt about this, he went to Ram Singh’s camp to make inquiries. But Ram Singh did not receive him and, after waiting for a long time, Shivaji got up and returned to his own camp. Then Ram Singh ordered: “Tell the Emperor’s men not to let Shivaji come even to my camp; tell them the Emperor has forbidden him even to go to the Kunwar’s [i.e. Ram Singh’s] camp.”<sup>2053</sup>

#### ESCAPE

Then, in the morning of 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666, the Emperor received the staggering news that Shivaji had escaped!<sup>2054</sup> How he escaped was not immediately known. But the accounts given in the Sabhasad Chronicle and Khafi Khan’s *Muntakhab-ul Lubab* of the manner in which Shivaji escaped are quite similar and are corroborated in the essentials by the Jedhe Chronology, a letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1666 by Parkaldas, an English letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> September 1666 from Surat to the Company, and a letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> September 1667 from the Portuguese Viceroy to the King of Portugal.<sup>2055</sup> The story in brief is as follows:<sup>2056</sup>

Since his house arrest, Shivaji had feigned illness and had then started sending out fruit and sweetmeats to Hindu and Muslim holy men as propitiatory alms and also to noblemen as gifts. These were carried in large baskets of cane, each slung from a pole borne on their shoulders by two porters. The guards on the watch at first searched the baskets, but after a few days their suspicions were allayed and they became slack. Then one day, Hiroji Farzand, a trusted officer of Shivaji who bore a likeness to him, wore his master's clothes and slept in his bed. His body was covered with a sheet but a hand with Shivaji's wristlet was left uncovered so that it was clearly visible even from a distance. A boy was massaging his feet. The baskets of fruit and sweets were made ready as usual. Shivaji and his son sat crouched in two baskets in the middle. As usual the porters set out carrying the baskets. As they passed through the watch, the guards searched one or two baskets and let the others pass without opening them. When they arrived at a secluded spot outside the city, Shivaji and his son emerged and went off with a few trusted officers who were waiting for them there. On the following day, the guards looked inside Shivaji's quarters and were satisfied that their prisoner was asleep. After a while, Hiroji got out of bed, donned his own clothes and went out on the pretext of fetching medicine for his ailing master. He did not come back.<sup>2057</sup>

The date of Shivaji's escape is recorded in the Jedhe chronology thus:<sup>2058</sup>

“17<sup>th</sup> August 1666: [Shivaji and his son Sambhaji] fled from Agra sitting in boxes”

It was only the next morning that the Mughals discovered the fact. The newsletter of the Mughal Court, dated 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666, records:<sup>2059</sup>

“(1) Khwaja Bakhtawar Khan reported that: ‘Ram Singh says that Shivaji has fled away.’ Fulad Khan, too, reported that: ‘There is no trace of him; no one knows how he has escaped.’

The Emperor ordered: ‘Go and find out.’ Fulad Khan went to Shivaji’s residence and saw that a turban and

a mirror were lying on the bed and Shivaji's shoes had fallen below. He had gone leaving behind three horses, two palanquins and a servant. Nothing else was left there. The said Khan came and reported the situation. The Emperor ordered: 'Search for him.'

Ray Brindaban reported that: 'Ram Singh is sitting at the entrance of the antechamber (*ghuslkhana*).' The Emperor ordered: 'Tell him that he stands surety for him [Shivaji], he should produce him or go where he has gone. Do not allow him to come to the public audience hall and the antechamber. Throw into prison the four Brahmins of Ram Singh who were keeping watch over Shivaji's bed.' And he ordered Fulad Khan to maintain vigilance in the city.

(2) The Emperor ordered the *Jumdat-ul Mulk* [Jafar Khan] to write to the *subadars* and *faujdars* in the Empire: 'Shivaji has fled from the court. Everyone should be alert in his territory. They should examine every person who passes through their borders. One through whose territory Shivaji will pass will be suspended.'

(3) The Emperor said to the Maharaja [Jaswant Singh]: 'See what Ram Singh has done. He has let Shivaji escape.' He replied: 'He [Ram Singh] is a hereditary servant. He won't dare to do so. And where will he [Shivaji] go? I shall bring him back in chains.'"

Jai Singh's agents at the court were prompt in reporting the news to Amber, the chief place of his *jagir*, and issuing instructions to arrest Shivaji if he was found.

Ballushah to Kalyandas<sup>2060</sup>

Agra

18<sup>th</sup> August 1666

"In the morning of Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666 Shivaji fled from here. As soon as this letter is received, warn all the check posts not to let him escape. Investigate if

anybody appears in the guise of a monk or hermit. Inform all the places including Aaweri, Malpura, etc. Give strict warnings. Anyone who captures him will be rewarded. Send letters of instruction and warnings on receipt of this letter. Shivaji's son, too, has escaped. Both have run away. This letter is being dispatched at one and half *prahar* of the day [about 10:30 a.m.] on Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666. If the bearer delivers it within three days give him three rupees as a reward. Close all the *ghats* [ferries]. Open them only when it is so ordered."

On 20<sup>th</sup> August 1666, Trimbakpant, Raghunathpant Korde<sup>2061</sup> and three other followers of Shivaji were arrested by Fulad Khan in the house of Kishan Rai, a petty *mansabdar*<sup>2062</sup> who was son-in-law of Pratit Rai, the chief of spies!<sup>2063</sup> Fulad Khan reported to the Emperor that the prisoners were saying that Jai Singh had written to his son Ram Singh to extricate Shivaji in any way he could and that Pratit Rai knew about it.<sup>2064</sup> Most probably either Fulad Khan or the prisoners were trying to implicate Jai Singh falsely in Shivaji's escape. Perhaps the Emperor perceived this fact and his reaction was mild. He dismissed Kishanrai from service, removed Pratit Rai from his post and demoted him,<sup>2065</sup> and appointed Itimad Khan<sup>2066</sup> in his place.<sup>2067</sup> Ram Singh was dismissed from service and Jai Singh's agent at the court was forbidden to come to the antechamber.<sup>2068</sup> On the same day, the following *farman* was dispatched to Jai Singh:<sup>2069</sup>

"With great effort and exertion you had subdued Shivaji and sent him to our Presence. And we, considering Ram Singh to be trustworthy and a well wisher, placed Shivaji in his custody. But he, digressing from good wishes and service, favoured Shivaji and, with deceit and deception, let him escape. Therefore we wanted to punish Ram Singh, remove him from our Presence and parade him through the city [in disgrace]. But because of you, who are firm and constant in service, we granted him his life and

dismissed him from service. Tender thanks to god because your son received such a small punishment for his offence.”

The Emperor continued to make inquiries into how Shivaji had escaped. On 21<sup>st</sup> August 1666, he ordered Jafar Khan to submit the names of *mansabdars*, musketeers, and the men of the household cavalry (*khaskhail*) who had been appointed for keeping watch over Shivaji.<sup>2070</sup> He also ordered Fulad Khan to draw a sketch of the *chaukis* [check posts] around Shivaji. Accordingly, on 26<sup>th</sup> August, Fulad Khan submitted a sketch to the Emperor explaining that the *chaukis* of Ram Singh's men were in the inner ring and the Khan's men were in the outer ring.<sup>2071</sup>

The first report about the fugitives was received on 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1666. It is recorded in the newsletter of the Court of that date thus:<sup>2072</sup>

A report was received from Ibadullah Khan, the *faujdar* of Narwar. It was written therein: ‘On Saturday [18<sup>th</sup> August 1666] at the time of the evening *namaz* [Muslim prayers] Shivaji went by this route with five horsemen. When inquired he replied: “We are Shivaji's men. We are going to our country.” They showed a *dastak* [travel permit] with the seal of Muhammad Amin Khan. Thereafter too he said “We are Shivaji.” It was not known to me [that he had fled from Agra].’

The Emperor said: ‘Ibadullah Khan has committed a grave error; he did not pursue them [after he learnt that Shivaji had fled from Agra] and he did not inspect the *dastak* properly.’”

Narwar is 200 km from Agra in a straight line and by the tracks which were in use in those days the distance could not be less than 225 km. Had Shivaji escaped even in the morning of 17<sup>th</sup> August, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, he could not have reached Narwar by the evening of 18<sup>th</sup> August. So

Shivaji could not have been among the party of men who passed through Narwar on 18<sup>th</sup> August claiming to be Shivaji's men. They could, quite possibly, have been Shivaji's men who had left Agra earlier.

Four Brahmins in Ram Singh's service who used to be in the inner circle of guards around Shivaji had been arrested after Shivaji's escape. Fulad Khan resorted to torture to extort from them a confession that Ram Singh had helped Shivaji to escape. When they confessed he sent them with some of his men to Fidai Khan.<sup>2073</sup> When, at their request, Fidai Khan took them aside they told him that Ram Singh had nothing to do with Shivaji's escape and that Fulad Khan had extorted the confession from them under torture. So Fidai Khan sent them back with instructions to stop torturing them.<sup>2074</sup>

Various rumours that Shivaji had been sighted were afloat. For instance Parkaldas wrote to Kalyandas about 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1666:<sup>2075</sup>

"It is heard that a boatman took Shivaji across the Chambal. The Emperor ordered that he be arrested and brought here. The boatman stated: 'There was a man with a boy preceded by a horse, a mare and two camels. After them were two women. I took them across. They showed me a *dastak* [travel permit].'..."

A soldier came and said: 'I saw Shivaji going towards Firozabad. When I was coming from Etawah I saw Shivaji and his son mounted on a camel. I saluted them and said, "How are you here Rajaji?" He answered: "The Emperor has seized all my property and told me to become a faqir. So we are going to Banaras." ' So Budh Singh and twenty horsemen are sent with him towards Firozabad. Three days have passed since then. No news has been received yet."

Since Shivaji's escape, his men were being arrested at various places. One such incident is reported in the following newsletter of the Court dated 29<sup>th</sup> August 1666:<sup>2076</sup>

“Fidai Khan reported that Mahabat Khan’s agent had written him a letter from the *jagir* of Dholpur province. It says that two envoys of Ali Adil Bijapuri had received leave to depart from *Jumdat-ul Mulk* [Jafar Khan] and had camped there. Three servants of Shivaji — two in white clothes and one [in the garb of a] monk — and five horses were with them. The envoys say that Pratit Rai had given these men and five horses with them to take to Bijapur. Therefore they have been arrested.”

The earliest conjecture that Shivaji had escaped in a sweetmeat basket is found in the following Rajasthani letter:[2077](#)

### Parkaldas to Gegrāj

[Agra] 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1666

“I have received a letter from the Diwanji [Kalyandas]. He has written: ‘I have received the news of Shivaji’s flight written by you. But you have not written any more details. With whom was the Emperor displeased after Shivaji’s flight? In what manner and from whose side of the watch did Shivaji escape?’

The news of the escape came when the day was four *gharis* old [i.e. about 7:30 a.m.]. As soon as I heard it I sent men to disseminate the news. How can it be said in what manner did he escape and from whose side of the watch? He fled through a guard of a thousand men. No one knew on that day at what time, in what manner and through whose watch did he escape. Later after some thought it was concluded that he had escaped by crouching in the *pitaras* [i.e. big baskets slung from poles] which used to come in and go out.”

Shivaji had left behind at Agra some cash, elephants, horses and other articles. These had been confiscated by Fulad Khan. On 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1666, he submitted a petition asking the Emperor what to do with them. The Emperor ordered that these should be deposited in the *Bait-ul Mal* (i.e. the effects of one who dies intestate or without heirs).<sup>2078</sup> When on 9<sup>th</sup> October 1666, the Emperor marched out of Agra for Delhi, a report was again submitted to him about Shivaji's property left in Agra. The Emperor ordered: "Hand it over to the *Qazi*. It is *bait-ul mal*. It is unlawful property (*haram ka mal* in Hindi). Sell it and distribute the proceeds among the *faqirs*." The jewelry, elephants, horses and camels fit for the Imperial government were to be purchased by the Emperor and the rest of the property was to be sold in the market.<sup>2079</sup> When Shivaji was under house arrest in Agra, he had handed over pearls and cash to a merchant banker named Moolchand for dispatching them to his home. Moolchand's servants who were carrying the property returned to him when they heard of Shivaji's escape from Agra. These articles were placed before the Emperor by Fidai Khan. The Emperor ordered them to be handed over to the *Mir-i Saman*<sup>2080</sup> Iftikhar Khan.<sup>2081</sup>

Shivaji's escape filled Jai Singh with anxiety and frustration.<sup>2082</sup> The Emperor was already displeased with him because of his failure in the campaign against the Adilshahi Sultanate. And now the Emperor suspected his son, Ram Singh, of conniving at Shivaji's escape. To this were added threatening activities of Shivaji's men in the Deccan. The Mughal commander of Rohida, one of the forts ceded by Shivaji in 1665, wrote to Jai Singh's paymaster (*bakhshi*) complaining of the lack of provisions in the fort and informing him that Shivaji's men had assembled in the neighbourhood with warlike materials. So Jai Singh ordered provisioning of the fort and reinforcing the garrison if necessary.<sup>2083</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S ARRIVAL AT RAJGAD

The first rumour that Shivaji had returned home reached Jai Singh's camp about mid October.<sup>2084</sup> It was soon followed by a definitive report which is recorded in the newsletter of the Court dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 1666, thus:<sup>2085</sup>

"It was learnt from the newsletter of the Deccan that Shivaji had reached Rajgad along with his son. The son, who was ill, died. Shivaji has written to the Mirza Raja [Jai Singh]: 'I had gone to the imperial court relying on your word, but having seen that I was not safe there I got away.' The Mirza Raja did not give any reply."

Another Newsletter of the Court, dated 15<sup>th</sup> November 1666, states:<sup>2086</sup>

"It was learnt from the newsletter of Aurangabad that a son has been born in Shivaji's house and that he himself is ill."

The following Rajasthani letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1666 from Delhi, provides some more details:<sup>2087</sup>

"A rumour that Shivaji reached his fort was afloat among the people for many days. Now the newsletters of the Deccan inform the Emperor that it was heard from the spies that: 'Shivaji left from there [Agra] at midnight and reached his fort in 25 days. His son who was with him died on the way and one other son has been born to him there [at Rajgad]. Shivaji had been ill for several days and recovered later.<sup>2088</sup> But now he is again suffering from some other malady.' This is what the *waqai-navis* has written."

So, if we are to believe this report, Shivaji must have reached Rajgad on 12<sup>th</sup> September 1666. But though his son was not with him then, he had not died as the *waqai-navis* was informed. Sabhasad tells us that after getting out of Agra Shivaji went to Mathura (50 km north northwest of Agra) and left Sambhaji in the care of three Brahmin brothers, who were brothers-in-law of Shivaji's prime minister, Moropant.<sup>2089</sup> This would have served a triple purpose. First, he would have thrown

off his pursuers by going in the direction opposite to the one which led to his homeland. Secondly, it would separate himself from his son during the long journey home to help avoid attraction and detection. Thirdly, leaving the boy behind would enable him to move speedily over a long and dangerous route. The report that his son died on the way might be explained as a deliberate rumour spread by Shivaji to forestall a search for the boy who was to arrive later. The chronicler further tells us that from Agra Shivaji came to Rajgad by way of Banaras, Bhaganagar [Hyderabad] and Bijapur and then, after receiving a letter from him, the three Brahmin brothers at Mathura brought Sambhaji to Rajgad.<sup>2090</sup> But if he had reached Rajgad 25 days after leaving Agra, as is reported in the Rajasthani letter of 19<sup>th</sup> November 1666, he could not have traversed such a circuitous route. It would seem therefore that Shivaji left his son at Mathura and with a select band of his companions rode by the shortest route as far as possible, always ahead of the Imperial messengers who were carrying orders to arrest him. In a straight line, Mathura is about 1,000 km from Rajgad. If we add half as much to it for distance by road, Shivaji and his party would have traveled at an average rate of 60 km per day to reach Rajgad in 25 days, a feat certainly very difficult but not impossible, especially for a man of Shivaji's resourcefulness and resolution.<sup>2091</sup> And he must have put his enforced sojourn at Agra to good use to make thorough preparations — such as *dastaks* (forged or tampered), reliable guides, and spare horses and provisions positioned at suitable spots — for its accomplishment.

This reconstruction of events has one hitch. The Jedhe Chronology says Shivaji fled from Agra, crouching in a box [or basket], on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1666 and then arrived at Rajgad, *along with Sambhaji*, on 20<sup>th</sup> November 1666.<sup>2092</sup> If we accept the date in the Jedhe Chronology for Shivaji's arrival at Rajgad we would have to reject not only the Sabhasad Chronicle's statement that Shivaji had left his son at Mathura but also the report in the Rajasthani letter of his arrival at Rajgad and the report in the newsletter dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 1666 of the Mughal Court, that

Jai Singh had received a letter from Shivaji. It would also leave unexplained the reports in the newsletters of the Court and the Rajasthani letters that Shivaji's son had died on the way. But we could reconcile all these sources if we assume that the date 20<sup>th</sup> November 1666 in the chronology relates only to Sambhaji's arrival at Rajgad. The sequence of events, which I accept, would then be as follows:

17<sup>th</sup> August 1666: Shivaji and his son Sambhaji escape from Agra. (Jedhe Chronology, newsletter of the Mughal Court dated 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666, Rajasthani letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666.)

Circa 12<sup>th</sup> September 1666: Shivaji arrives at Rajgad. There are rumours that his son died on the way. (Rajasthani letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1666, newsletter of the Mughal Court dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 1666). In fact, Shivaji had left his son behind at Mathura. (Sabhasad and A.Q. Chronicles, *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, etc.)

20<sup>th</sup> November 1666: Sambhaji arrives at Rajgad (Jedhe Chronology corrected.)

There is no reliable evidence about the route which Shivaji followed during his flight from Agra to Rajgad. Some authors have made various conjectures, but these are little more than the figments of their own imagination.

Shivaji's safe arrival at Rajgad was naturally met with great rejoicing. Sabhasad tells us that "big charities and great festivities were made, sugar was distributed and cannons were fired."<sup>2093</sup>

When Jai Singh learnt of Shivaji's arrival at Rajgad he started devising plans to ensnare Shivaji. In a letter to Jafar Khan, he wrote he would contrive matters in such a way that Shivaji would come to see him and then, he would cause "that luckless fellow" to be assassinated on the way. To lure Shivaji in a trap he was even ready to propose the marriage of his son to Shivaji's daughter.<sup>2094</sup>

#### ADVENTURES OF PARAMANAND

It seems that the poet Paramanand had taken leave of Shivaji about 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1666.<sup>2095</sup> Then, a month later, at the time of

Shivaji's escape from Agra, we find the poet in Jai Singh's *jagir* in Rajasthan. On 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1666, Vimaldas, an officer at some place in Jai Singh's *jagir*, wrote to Kalyandas:<sup>2096</sup>

"At the end of first *prahar* [about 9 a.m.] on Thursday, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1666 a pair of messengers came from Agra with a letter, written at the third *prahar* [about midday] on Monday 20<sup>th</sup> August. Thereafter letters ordering to stop the ferries were written to the following *parganas*. [Here follows a list of 13 *parganas*.]

The day on which orders were written to Purohit Manohardas and Nathuram at *pargana* Dausa,<sup>2097</sup> Shivaji's companion Kavishvar Paramanand arrived there with one elephant, one female elephant, two *sukhpals*, two camels, one horse, 40 retainers and one palanquin. There is a *hauda* on the female elephant. On being asked Paramanand said that all these were given to him by Shivaji. He says that there are two women in the palanquin and does not allow us to inspect it. Therefore he is detained. Now a letter has been written to Purohit Manohardas to keep him detained and inspect the palanquin."

Accordingly, Paramanand was detained at Dausa, but after a while the officers at that place received a letter from Ram Singh to release him! So they let him go.<sup>2098</sup> Several days later Ram Singh sent orders to detain him again.<sup>2099</sup> The officers at Dausa learnt that he was proceeding towards Banaras and sent four horsemen and fifteen footmen to intercept him!<sup>2100</sup> They caught up with him at Chandangaon in the *pargana* Hindau and brought him back with his party to Dausa on 26<sup>th</sup> December 1666.<sup>2101</sup> He had with him one *sukhpal*, two horses, two camels, and about twenty palanquin bearers (*kahars*) and footmen.<sup>2102</sup> We do not know what happened to him thereafter. But he was certainly set free, for he was residing at Poladpur in Shivaji's dominions in 1673. Shivaji, on his way from Raigad to Panhala which had been recently captured by his men, paid him a visit

there in March 1673.<sup>2103</sup> Paramanand was a trusted man and a biographer of Shivaji. He was with Shivaji at Agra. What was he doing in Rajasthan moving about in a mysterious way with elephants, camels, horses, several retainers, and perhaps a couple of women? Had this anything to do with Shivaji's escape? Why did Ram Singh first order his release? For want of sources the mystery may probably never be solved.

#### NETOJI PALKAR'S CONVERSION TO ISLAM

After Shivaji's escape from Agra, the Emperor ordered Jai Singh to arrest Netoji Palkar, lest he too should run away, and hand him over to Dilir Khan to bring him to the court.<sup>2104</sup> Netoji, it would be remembered, was the former commander-in-chief of Shivaji's cavalry who now held the rank of 5000 *dhat* in Mughal service. So Jai Singh sent a detachment to Fathabad<sup>2105</sup> where Netoji then was. He was arrested, brought to Jai Singh's camp on 24<sup>th</sup> October 1666, and, along with his son, was handed over to Dilir Khan.<sup>2106</sup> The Khan set out the next day from a place near Bid to go to the court with his prisoner.<sup>2107</sup> On their arrival at Delhi, the Emperor handed him over to Fidai Khan, the *Mir Atish*. After some days in prison he broke down and petitioned the Emperor, in February 1667, that he would embrace Islam if his life was spared. The "faith-promoting" Emperor accepted his prayer.<sup>2108</sup> After his circumcision and conversion to Islam, the Emperor presented him a dress of honour, a dagger and a sword studded with precious stones, a horse with golden trappings, a cow elephant, and bestowed upon him the rank of 3000 *dhat* / 2000 *sawar* with the title Muhammad Quli Khan.<sup>2109</sup> Netoji's family too was brought to Delhi by order of the Emperor. His two wives who were brought to Delhi were asked, by the Emperor's order, to embrace Islam. When they refused to do so the Emperor ordered Netoji, alias Muhammad Quli Khan, to try to persuade them and, if they still refused to turn Muslim, take a Muslim woman as wife. Netoji persuaded them to embrace Islam whereupon the Emperor ordered them to be remarried to him according to Islamic rites and presented

them ornaments worth Rs.5,000.<sup>2110</sup> He was posted to Kabul in June 1667.<sup>2111</sup> In November 1667, Netoji's paternal uncle Kondaji, induced by his apostate nephew, also converted to Islam and the Emperor presented the neophyte a dress of honour, a horse with golden trappings and a jeweled sword, and conferred upon him the rank of 1000 *dhat* / 800 *sawar*.<sup>2112</sup>

#### JAI SINGH'S DEATH AND RAM SINGH'S RESTORATION IN IMPERIAL SERVICE

According to the Emperor's orders, Prince Muhammad Muazzam left Delhi on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1667 to take charge of the *subadari* of the Deccan. He reached Aurangabad in May 1667 when Jai Singh handed over charge to him and left for Delhi.<sup>2113</sup> An injury in the leg that he suffered on the way while mounting his elephant, resulted in a protracted illness which culminated in his death at Burhanpur on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1667.<sup>2114</sup> Apprehensive that the Rajput soldiers might suspect him to have caused their master's death, Jai Singh's secretary and confidant, Udairaj Munshi, fled to the *subadar* of Burhanpur<sup>2115</sup> (Khandesh) and promptly embraced Islam. This had the effect of arousing the suspicion of Rajputs. But though Jai Singh's son Kirat Singh wanted to kill the Munshi, he was powerless to carry out that plan against a Muslim, especially a neophyte.<sup>2116</sup> Since Shivaji's escape, Ram Singh had fallen into the Emperor's disfavour. In fact he had been saved from Aurangzeb's wrath only because of his father's services to the throne.<sup>2117</sup> Then, on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1667, through the intercession of the *diwan* Jafar Khan, the Emperor granted him the *mansab* of 3000 *dhat* / 3000 *swar*, i.e. 1000 *dhat* / 1000 *swar* less than the *mansab* he held before Shivaji's escape from Agra.<sup>2118</sup> But Jai Singh did not hear this news; he had died on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1667.<sup>2119</sup> The news of Jai Singh's death reached Delhi just four days after Ram Singh's restoration in Imperial service.<sup>2120</sup> The Emperor then conferred upon Ram Singh his former *mansab* of 4000 *dhat* / 4000 *swar* and the title of Raja.<sup>2121</sup> Soon afterward, on 27<sup>th</sup> December 1667, Ram Singh was appointed to command the army of Bengal to

chastise the Assamese who had captured the fort of Guwahati and had slain the Mughal commander at that place.<sup>2122</sup> He spent several years first in those remote lands and then on the northwest frontier where he died in 1688.<sup>2123</sup> He never again came into contact with Shivaji.

#### **AN ANECDOTE**

A section of an old collection of anecdotes of Aurangzeb, entitled the *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri* [Injunctions of Alamgir], is supposed to be his last Will and Testament. It contains 12 clauses, the first 5 of which are instructions about the last rites to be performed after his death; the remaining 7 are counsels to his successor to the Empire. The last of these reads: “The main pillar of government is to be well informed in the news of the kingdom. Negligence for a single moment becomes the cause of disgrace for long years. The escape of the wretch Shivaji took place through [my] carelessness, and I have to labour hard [against the Marathas] to the end of my life [as the result of it].”<sup>2124</sup>

The Will, as given in the collection, may well be fictitious, but who will doubt that the sentiment expressed in it about Shivaji — Aurangzeb’s nemesis — is true?

## *Chapter 10*

# The Interlude

### THREAT OF A PERSIAN INVASION

Since the reign of Shah Jahan, relations between the Sultanate of Iran (Persia) and the Mughal Empire had always been strained. In 1638, the Persian commandant of Kandahar had betrayed the fort to the Mughals. Then, Shah Abbas II of Iran recovered it after a siege in 1649. Between 1649 and 1653, Shah Jahan launched three expeditions — twice under Prince Aurangzeb and once under Prince Dara Shukoh — to recapture the fort but failed. During the Mughal War of Succession, the Shah of Iran had intrigued with Dara and Murad and had also tried to instigate the Adilshah and the Qutbshah against the Mughals.<sup>2125</sup>

After Aurangzeb's triumphant emergence from the war, the Shah sent his envoy, Budaq Beg, to Delhi, who had an audience with the Emperor on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1661.<sup>2126</sup> Aurangzeb accorded grand treatment to the Persian envoy and gave him leave to depart on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1661. The return embassy, under Tarbiyat Khan, left Lahore on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1663.<sup>2127</sup> The Shah treated the Mughal envoy very rudely and often, in the presence of the latter, uttered threats of sending an army to invade India.<sup>2128</sup> After a year's sojourn in Iran, Tarbiyat Khan set out on his return journey from Farahabad, where the Shah was then holding Court. Soon afterwards, the Shah sent a large army towards the frontier of the Mughal Empire.<sup>2129</sup> Aurangzeb had received brief reports of the Shah's threats during Tarbiyat Khan's stay in Iran and elaborate ones after the Khan entered Mughal territory.<sup>2130</sup> Perturbed by these, he decided to send Prince Muhammad Muazzam and Maharaja Jaswant Singh with 20,000 troopers to Kabul. He himself was to follow them soon

afterwards. Several senior *mansabdars* in the Deccan, such as Bahadur Khan, Dilar Khan and Daud Khan, were recalled to the Court. The Prince left Agra on 4<sup>th</sup> September 1666.<sup>2131</sup> About this time, Tarbiyat Khan arrived at Agra, but as he had failed in his mission he was forbidden to appear at the Court.<sup>2132</sup>

There is a composition in a Persian letter book styled as a letter written by Shah Abbas II to Aurangzeb and sent with Tarbiyat Khan. It is extremely unlikely that such a letter was actually written and in all probability it is a piece of fiction. Yet, as it mentions Shivaji, it is quoted below, because it represents the writer's perception of Shivaji and Aurangzeb, even though that writer was not likely to be Shah Abbas II himself.<sup>2133</sup>

“Recently it became known [to us] from the travellers that at many places in the Empire of India seditious and refractory people, considering that Solomon-like [Emperor Aurangzeb] impotent and without resources, had raised high the dust of disturbance. They have captured some parts of the Empire and are oppressing the inhabitants and travellers of the country. The chief of them is an infidel (*kafir*) called Shivaji whose name and existence was not known to any one. Now the resourcelessness of that Exalted [Emperor Aurangzeb] has become the cause of power of that unknown person, who having risen in revolt, has captured many mountain forts, has defeated the army of that protector of the Empire with his sword, has taken captive many of them, has plundered the country, and is claiming equality with that exalted [Emperor Aurangzeb] of illustrious lineage. That Emperor calls *pidargiri* [imprisoning one's father] by the name of *Alamgiri* [world conquering] and setting his mind at rest by killing his brothers, who were heirs to the Empire, has given up practices of appreciation, generosity and charity, and keeps himself occupied in the company of men who

consider incantation and satanic magic to be the knowledge of God. Therefore in every game of chess he [i.e. Aurangzeb] has employed deceit and won by fraud and treachery. Now that the battle, requiring bravery, is before him, he is perplexed and confounded. To chastise the rebels and govern Hindustan is beyond his capability. As, by the grace of God and the help of sinless imams, to show kindness to the helpless is the practice of our illustrious house, it is our intention to succour that protector of the Empire [i.e. Aurangzeb] in the same manner as Emperor Humayun conquered Hindustan again with the help of our grandfather and Nazar Muhammad Khan, the ruler of Turan rekindled the lamp of his dynasty with the splendour of the star of our good fortune. Now that, that heir to the throne of Humayun is in distress it is our resolve and desire to proceed in person with our victorious army to the succour of that heir of sovereignty [i.e. Aurangzeb], fulfill the long cherished desire of each other's society, punish with our Zulfiqar-like sword those wicked oppressors of the poor, and thus relieving the people from the evil-doers make them pray for us. May the great Allah protect you from misfortunes! Farewell!"

Aurangzeb himself left Agra on 8<sup>th</sup> October 1666 and arrived at Delhi on 25<sup>th</sup> October.<sup>2134</sup> On 11<sup>th</sup> December 1666, he received the news at the hunting lodge at Palam that Shah Abbas had died on 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1666 and that his eldest son Safi Mirza had ascended the throne of Persia.<sup>2135</sup> This removed the threat of a Persian invasion at least for the time being. So Prince Muhammad Muazzam was ordered not to advance beyond Lahore, but to stay there for some time.<sup>2136</sup> He was later recalled, arrived at the Court on 11<sup>th</sup> March 1667, and left to take charge of the *subadari* of the Deccan on 23<sup>rd</sup> March.<sup>2137</sup>

However, although the threat of a Persian invasion gradually waned, its spectre seems to have continued to haunt Aurangzeb for a long time afterwards.<sup>2138</sup>

#### REVOLT IN AFGHANISTAN<sup>2139</sup>

The turbulent Afghan tribes inhabiting the mountains between India and Afghanistan had never been fully subdued and used to levy toll on the traffic between Lahore and Kabul. The Mughal government, after having launched a number of punitive expeditions against these tribes from time to time had been convinced at last that it was cheaper and more convenient to allow this practice as a means of keeping the roads open.

The mountainous tract which flanked the route from Lahore to the Khyber Pass was bounded on the south by the Kabul River and on the east by the Indus, and was inhabited by the Yusufzai tribe. Early in 1667, a chief of that tribe, named Bhagu, declared a pretended heir of their ancient kings as Muhammad Shah, and appointed himself as the *wazir*. A body of Afghans, some 5,000 strong, then crossed the Indus above Attock, overran the plains east of that river and levied contributions in that quarter. This success swelled their ranks and they began to plunder the territory on the banks of the Kabul, threatening to cut communications between Punjab and Afghanistan. Coming in the wake of the Persian threat, this revolt, which had now reached very serious proportions, must have produced a very disturbing effect upon Aurangzeb's mind. He ordered Amir Khan, the governor of Afghanistan, to send 5,000 men from his forces under Shamshir Khan to the troubled area and also dispatched a force of 9,000 troopers, under Muhammad Amin Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi*, from the Court. Meanwhile, Kamil Khan, the *Faujdar* of Attock, assembled a small force consisting of the loyal Khatak and Khokhar tribes and reinforced by detachments of Khokhars and Rajputs sent by Amir Khan's deputy at Peshawar. He then marched against the rebels, defeated them in April 1667 and drove them west of the

Indus. In the next month, Shamshir Khan arrived at Attock with a large detachment and took over command. He then marched into Yusufzai country west of the Indus and defeated the rebels in several encounters. Muhammad Amin Khan had also arrived on the scene by then. He crossed the Kabul River on the 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1667, took over supreme command, carried fire and sword through rebel territory and brought the situation under control. In October, he was recalled to the Court and handed over charge to Shamshir Khan. Apparently, the flames of resistance were completely extinguished.

#### **RENEWAL OF THE MUGHAL - MARATHA TREATY**

#### *Shivaji and Jai Singh*

Thus, the strategic situation in India was much changed by the time Shivaji escaped from Agra. The urgent commitment of the Empire on its sensitive northwestern frontier had led to a considerable reduction in the Mughal Army of the Deccan and the Emperor was not in a position to renew the war against Shivaji. Nor was Shivaji eager to do so. He had lost a large portion of his already small possessions and his military strength was considerably depleted. He therefore decided to use this respite to consolidate his position and await his opportunity to strike.

Meanwhile, the Adilshahi and Maratha forces were causing disturbances on the frontier. We know of one such incident from a letter written by Jai Singh's secretary. Shivaji's son-in-law, Mahadaji Nimbalkar, who was an Adilshahi officer, was causing disturbances around Pune and Supe. Thereupon, Jai Singh dispatched various detachments, such as Babaji Bhosle and others to Supe, Hilal Khan to Indapur, Ghalib Khan to Chembargonda and Trimbakji Bhosle and others to Raisin, to hold the frontier. Of these, Babaji Bhosle caught up with and defeated Mahadaji Nimbalkar. But only four days later Mahadaji, having received reinforcements, surprised, defeated and slew Babaji Bhosale near Daund. These Adilshahi activities upset Jai

Singh so much that he began contemplating marching there in person, but gave up the idea lest the Bijapur forces should take advantage of his absence to cause fresh troubles somewhere else. Instead, he decided to send Abdul Hamid with 5,000 men to that quarter.[2140](#)

Maratha forces, too, were showing signs of trouble. A letter by Jai Singh's secretary refers to one such incident. Sayyid Masud, the commandant of the Rohida fort, had complained about the lack of provisions and conveyed that the Maratha infantry was collecting gunpowder, lead and rockets in the vicinity of the fort. Thereupon Jai Singh ordered throwing provisions and, if necessary, a reinforcement of 500 infantry, in the fort.[2141](#)

On 5<sup>th</sup> November 1666, he wrote in despair:[2142](#)

"The times are bad for me. My anxieties are ceaseless. The lying Bijapuris are wasting time [by delusive negotiations]. There is no trace or news of the fugitive Shiva. My days are passing in distraction and anxiety. I have sent trusty spies, in various disguises, to get news of Shivaji."

At last, in the same month, his spies brought the news of Shivaji's safe arrival at Rajgad.[2143](#)

Utterly frustrated by these events, Jai Singh now began to think of a perfidious scheme to entrap Shivaji. In a letter to Jafar Khan, the prime minister, he wrote:

"I have not failed, nor will do so in future, to exert myself against Bijapur, Golconda and Shivaji in every possible way....I am trying to arrange matters in such a way that the wicked wretch Shiva will come to see me once, and that in the course of his journey or

return [our] clever men may get a favourable opportunity [of disposing of] that luckless fellow in his unguarded moment at some place. This slave of the court himself, for furthering the Emperor's affairs, is prepared to go so far, regardless of the praise or blame of his act by other people, — that, if the Emperor sanctions it, I shall set on foot a proposal for a match... of my son with his daughter — though the pedigree and caste of Shivaji are notoriously low and men like me do not eat food touched by his hand [not to speak of entering into a matrimonial alliance with him] and in case this wretch's daughter is captured I shall not condescend to [even] keep her in my harem. As he is of a low caste, he will very likely be caught by this bait. But great care should be taken to keep this plan secret. Send me a reply quickly to enable me to act accordingly."[2144](#)

We do not know whether Jai Singh actually made this proposal to Shivaji but in any event, the wily Maratha was not a man to be caught in such foolish traps. Meanwhile, Jai Singh was relieved of his command and Prince Muazzam was appointed in his place. So Jai Singh crossed the Bhima on 10<sup>th</sup> January 1667 and retired to Aurangabad. In May 1667, the prince arrived thither and took over charge of the viceroyalty. In extreme misery of mind, Jai Singh set out northward and, as related before, died on the way at Burhanpur on the 28th August 1667.

### *Shivaji's War with Bijapur*

The politico-military situation in the Deccan was extremely complex at this stage and had assumed a flexible triangular pattern. The Mughal forces, barely adequate to hold on to their gains, were not ready to take on any fresh enterprise either against Bijapur or Shivaji. Bijapur was trying to hang on

to its gains in South Konkan and at the same time regain the territory occupied by Mughal forces. Shivaji was trying, on the one hand, to patch up a truce with the Mughals and, on the other, drive out Adilshahi forces from South Konkan.

No comprehensive account has survived of the war that was being fought in South Konkan at this time between Shivaji and the Adilshahi Sultanate. All that we have are a few passing references in Portuguese records, a couple of entries in the Jedhe Chronology, a newsletter of the Mughal Court, and a Marathi document, and from them we shall now try to reconstruct events.

The arrival of two Adilshahi officers, Haibatrao and Miyan Abdul Muhammad, in the Konkan is mentioned in letters dated 10<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> November 1666 respectively of the Portuguese viceroy.<sup>2145</sup> We also have a letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> November 1666 from the viceroy to Shripatralo, who was appointed as the *Subadar* of the Adilshahi Konkan.<sup>2146</sup>

The Marathas launched their offensive while Bijapur, as it appears from the above documents, was building up its forces in South Konkan. The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1588: "In the month of Margashirsha [17<sup>th</sup> November to 15<sup>th</sup> December 1666] Pir Miyan and Taj Khan, who were at Devrukh, were killed in battle."<sup>2147</sup> Another entry in the Jedhe Chronology under Shaka 1589 states: "In the month of Vaishakha [14<sup>th</sup> April to 12<sup>th</sup> May 1667] Bahlol Khan and Ekoji Raja besieged Rangna. Shivaji attacked them and raised the siege."<sup>2148</sup>

The Marathas continued to push southwards. A newsletter dated 16<sup>th</sup> May 1667 of the Mughal Court records:

"*Jumdat-ul Mulk* reported that Shivaji has written a letter to his envoy which he [the envoy] had brought with him. The contents of the letter were as follows:

His servant Subhansing had captured the fort of Ankar in the Bijapuri Konkan. Having heard this, the Emperor kept silent."[2149](#)

A letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> September 1667 from the Portuguese viceroy to the King of Portugal says, "Shivaji is now our close neighbor at Phonda. Considering his cunning, valour, agility and military foresight he might be compared with Caesar and Alexander."[2150](#)

Thus, by August 1667, or even earlier, Shivaji had gradually driven out Adilshahi forces from his former acquisitions in South Konkan. An entry in the Jedhe Chronology under Shaka 1589 runs as follows: In the month of Bhadrapada [10<sup>th</sup> August to 8<sup>th</sup> September] a treaty was concluded between the Adilshah and Shivaji.[2151](#) This is corroborated by a letter sent by an Adilshahi officer to the *mokadam* of Rahimatpur in Shuhur year 1068 [24<sup>th</sup> May 1667 to 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1668].[2152](#) However, as the portion bearing the date of the month is missing, the exact date of the letter cannot be ascertained. The letter states that because of the disturbances caused by Raja Shivaji the horse fair in the town was not held for three years, but it may be held now because the Raja has concluded a treaty with the Adilshah.

The paucity of sources for an account of this campaign and its slow pace suggest that the forces deployed by both the contestants in this theatre were small. This is obvious because, owing to the uncertain nature of the situation, a large portion of their forces must have been locked up in the north.

While this campaign was being fought in South Konkan, Shivaji was raiding Adilshahi territory in the uplands, presumably to create a diversion. For want of comprehensive accounts we shall let the documents unfold the story.

Ali Adilshah sent the following order to Rataji Mane on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1667

"It is learnt that Shivaji's horsemen are coming towards Hirapur subdivision of Ahasanabad [i.e. Gulbarga]. As soon as you receive this *farman* join *Jamaatdar* of the *Khaskhail* Sayyid Asil, and Bajaji and Mahadaji<sup>2153</sup> [Nimbalkar], chastise Shivaji's men and manifest your loyalty to us. *Farmans* of this purport have also been sent to the said *Jamaatdar* and Bajaji and Mahadaji."<sup>2154</sup>

The newsletter dated 6<sup>th</sup> April 1667 of the Mughal Court runs as follows:

"It was learnt from the newsletters of the army of Mirza Raja Jai Singh that the spies of Mirza Raja brought the news that Shivaji went towards Gulbarga with 3,000 horse, 15,000 foot and a large number of oxen. His destination is not known."<sup>2155</sup>

Another, dated 10<sup>th</sup> April 1667, states:

"Mumtaz Khan, the commandant of Fort Paranda, reported that: 'The rebel Shivaji had gone towards Gulbarga. He returned after plundering the Bijapuri frontier."<sup>2156</sup>

### *Negotiations with the Mughals*

Meanwhile, Shivaji was trying to renew his treaty with Aurangzeb. The details of how he brought this about are not known. But, according to the Jedhe Chronology, Trimbakpant Dabir and Raghunathpant Korde were released from prison on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1667.<sup>2157</sup> The newsletter dated 20<sup>th</sup> April 1667 of the Mughal court records that the Emperor ordered *Jumdat-ul Mulk* [Jafar Khan] to release Shivaji's envoy from prison and to write

to Shivaji that he would be pardoned if he gave a good security and kept his son at the court.<sup>2158</sup>

Another, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1667, records:

"Shivaji's petition was received. He had written: 'My welfare lies in the service of the Emperor. The army of the Emperor of Hindustan is appointed against me. There is no one in the world who could fight against that army. I pray that my son Sambhaji would serve Your Majesty with a contingent of 400 troopers. If he is given a *mansab* well and good. But even if he is not given a *mansab* he will serve Your Majesty with a contingent of 400 troopers. I had already given as tribute whatever forts and strongholds I had and whatever forts and strongholds I now have, and even my life, also belong to the Your Majesty.' The Emperor read the petition and handed it over to *Jumdat-ul Mulk* [Jafar Khan]."<sup>2159</sup>

The next newsletter of the Mughal Court which has survived is dated 6<sup>th</sup> May 1667. It states:

"The Emperor ordered the *Jumdat-ul Mulk* to summon the envoy of Shivaji, reassure him, give him money [for travel] expenses and send him to Shivaji, on condition of returning in two months. He was to tell his master [Shivaji] that his [Shivaji's] offences had been pardoned by the Emperor, that his son had been enrolled as an imperial officer and that he [Shivaji] was at liberty to seize as much of Bijapur territory as he could, or else he should remain firm in his own place. Every district [so conquered] is to be reported to the Prince [who was *subadar* of the Deccan]. A letter according to this order was to be handed over to the envoy."<sup>2160</sup>

It is clearly revealed by many contemporary documents that the *sardeshmukhi* rights in the territory which Shivaji had ceded to the Mughals were also now conferred upon him. A newsletter dated 21<sup>st</sup> August 1667 of the Mughal Court records:

"Abd-ur Rahim Khan reported: Shafi Khan [the *Diwan* of the Deccan] has written to me that Shivaji had written to him thus: 'The Emperor has conferred the *Deshmukhi* rights on me but the men of imperial officers obstruct me and most of the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of the forts surrendered by me [to the Emperor] do not pay the due rent to me. If I am permitted, I would punish them and establish the administration. My son (*khanazad*)<sup>2161</sup> has been honoured with the rank of 5000 *dhat*/5000 *sawar* and hopes that a *jagir* in lieu of salary would be conferred upon him.' It was ordered that a letter 'by order' should be dispatched to the said Khan [Shafi Khan] that he should write to Shivaji that salaries are given only to those who serve either at the Court or in the provinces. How can a *mansab* and a *jagir* be given to one who serves neither at the Court nor in the provinces? As for the *deshmukhi* there should be no obstruction; it has been conferred upon him. He may take his dues from the revenue collected at the forts."<sup>2162</sup>

Marathi documents show that what have been called *deshmukhi* rights in this newsletter were actually *sardeshmukhi* rights and that Shivaji appointed his agents in the territory under Mughal occupation to collect his dues under those rights.<sup>2163</sup>

Shivaji continued to press for a *jagir* for his son. The newsletter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1667 of the Mughal Court records:

"A report from Prince Muhammad Muazzam [the new viceroy of the Deccan] was received to this effect: 'Shivaji has written a letter to me saying: "I am a hereditary servant of the Imperial Court and my son Sambhaji has been honoured with the rank of 5000 *dhat*/5000 *sawar* but he has received no salary. I hope that His Majesty would pardon the offence of this servant, restore the rank of my son and assign a *jagir* to him in lieu of salary. My son would render service wherever he would be posted."

As Shivaji is at present manifesting a great misery of heart, I hope Your Majesty would forgive his offences and restore the rank formerly [i.e. in 1665 as per the treaty of Purandar] granted to Sambhaji.'

"His Majesty, after reading the dispatch, handed it back to *Jumdat-ul Mulk* and remarked: 'I order the restoration of the rank to Sambhaji. Do you assign him *jagir* in the territory of the forts surrendered by him [Shivaji]. He [i.e. Sambhaji] should render service under the prince.' "<sup>2164</sup>

Thus the Treaty of Purandar was restored and the *sardeshmukhi* rights in the territory ceded by Shivaji were also bestowed upon him.

Sambhaji reached Aurangabad on 27<sup>th</sup> October 1667, visited Maharaja Jaswant Singh the next day and paid his homage to the Prince on 4<sup>th</sup> November and, as he was a minor, was permitted to return home the following day.<sup>2165</sup> This was not all. Aurangzeb now even conferred the title of Raja on Shivaji, an 'honour' he had not condescended to grant when Jai Singh had recommended it after the Treaty of Purandar.<sup>2166</sup> The 'happy' news was conveyed to Shivaji by Prince Muhammad

Muazzam, the new *subadar* of the Deccan, in his letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> March 1668. It reads:<sup>2167</sup>

“Raja Shivaji! Out of the kindness which I feel for you, I have written to His Majesty about your loyalty and firm devotion. His gracious Majesty has elevated your head by granting you the title of Raja, which was the extreme point of your desires. You ought, in due recognition of these imperial favour, be even more devoted in loyalty and service than before and thereby hope for further favours.”

On 5<sup>th</sup> August 1668, Sambhaji's contingent was sent to Aurangabad under Prataprao Gujar, the Commander-in-Chief of Shivaji's cavalry.<sup>2168</sup> Half of the force was stationed at Aurangabad and the other half was sent to Sambhaji's *jagir* in Varhad.<sup>2169</sup>

The Adilshah was isolated with the conclusion of the Mughal Maratha treaty. He also therefore made peace with the Mughals by ceding the fortress of Solapur about July 1668.<sup>2170</sup>

Thus was peace established in the Deccan at last.

#### **SHIVAJI AND THE PORTUGUESE**

On October 17<sup>th</sup> 1666, Antonio de Melo de Castro handed over the viceroyalty of the Portuguese settlements in India to Joao Nunes de Cunha, Count of Sao Vincente.<sup>2171</sup> The new Viceroy carried on the negotiations initiated by his predecessor and, in November 1666, reached an agreement with the Mughal envoy, Khoja Alauddin Muhammad, sent by Jai Singh, that the Portuguese should not give refuge to those who had rebelled against the Emperor.<sup>2172</sup> Evidently, this agreement was directed against Shivaji. In his letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> April 1667 to Jai Singh, the Portuguese Viceroy offered naval aid to the Mughals in their

war against Shivaji, provided the Mughals would bear their expenses.<sup>2173</sup> But the question never came up because of the Mughal-Maratha treaty and, on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1667, the same viceroy wrote a letter to Shivaji congratulating him on his escape from Agra.<sup>2174</sup>

As it was, the Portuguese, always apprehensive of Shivaji's growing strength, never wanted him to be their neighbor. It would be remembered that when Shivaji extended his sway over South Konkan, Lakham Sawant of Wadi and the Desais of Pendne and Kudal had taken refuge at Goa. From that sanctuary, they used to make depredations on his territory with the tacit consent and in at least once instance, actual participation, of the Portuguese. It is seen from a letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> February 1667 of the Viceroy to Shivaji's *Subadar*, that Keshav Naik, the former Desai of Pendne, entered Shivaji's territory and carried off the *Havaldar* of Pedne as captive.<sup>2175</sup> Then, on the night of 15<sup>th</sup> September 1667, Lakham Sawant's nephew, Narba Sawant, raided Vengurla with some Portuguese and molested the Dutch traders there.<sup>2176</sup>

To stop the depredations of the *desais* Shivaji now decided to launch a punitive expedition into Bardesh. The Portuguese Viceroy got wind that some such design was in the air. So he ordered his secretary on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1667 to give instructions to the commandants of the forts of Tivim and Chapora, the Ranes of Revade and Nanode,<sup>2177</sup> the *desais* who had taken refuge at Goa, and the commander of the Portuguese fleet to be in readiness.<sup>2178</sup>

On the night of 19<sup>th</sup>/20<sup>th</sup> November 1667, Shivaji invaded Bardesh with 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse, plundered the villages in the district and withdrew to Dicholi after three days, carrying some 1,300 men, women and children as captives.<sup>2179</sup>

Two Portuguese priests at Colvale came out of the church to see what was going on and were cut down.

That at least two padres were killed is true but an English letter dated the 30<sup>th</sup> November 1667 from Goa gave the incident a different twist. It said that the Portuguese Viceroy, being "Jesuit-ridden", had prohibited, on pain of banishment, the exercise of any religion except the Roman Catholic,<sup>2180</sup> and therefore:

"Shivaji deeply resenting this rigour, invaded the precincts of Bardesh, not far distant from Goa, and then cut off the heads of four padres that refused to turn Marathas [i.e. Hindus] of his own persuasion, they having counseled the destruction of all that were not opinionated as themselves; which so terrified the Viceroy that he was forced to revoke his fierce and severe edict. He [Shivaji] burnt and destroyed all the country, and carried away 150 lack of pagodas."<sup>2181</sup>

In view of the atrocities the Portuguese had committed against the Hindus, it was very natural for the English to interpret the incident as they did. But neither the Portuguese sources nor the Dutch letter quoted above support this story. On the contrary, they specifically state that the object of the raid was to capture the *desais*. Further it appears from a Franciscan account that the padres were killed because they came out of the church. It should also be borne in mind in this context that these Franciscan padres, who were residing in large numbers in Bardesh at that time, were not mere monks practicing non-violence but had no qualms at times to take up arms.<sup>2182</sup> That they were killed because they refused to turn Hindu appears, therefore, to be a mere bazaar gossip. The amount of loot, which according to the English letter Shivaji is said to have carried from Bardesh, is also purely fictitious. Even the plunder of Surat did not procure for him such a rich harvest.

The Portuguese viceroy, in his letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> December 1667 to the Municipality of Goa, wrote:

"When I fought with the enemy I had with me only 84 men, including the Fidalgos<sup>2183</sup> and soldiers. It was the will of God that we should attain a great victory, that the enemy should flee ignominiously and that he should beg us for a treaty on our own terms."<sup>2184</sup>

This was an empty boast. We know from a Portuguese report that for more than four days the dead bodies of the two padres and others were not removed, for the people had fled to the forts of Reis Magos and Aguada.<sup>2185</sup>

## SHIVAJI'S DOMINION

AUGUST 1668

  Area ceded to the Mughals  
  600 meters & above.



Shivaji's aim was not to engage in a war against the Portuguese but merely to persuade them to desist from giving refuge to the recalcitrant *desais*. His raid into Bardesh was merely a means to this end. Therefore, he now immediately sent his envoy to the Portuguese for negotiating a treaty. Then followed an exchange of envoys and letters, and a treaty was concluded in December 1665.<sup>2186</sup> The Portuguese Viceroy signed it on 5<sup>th</sup> December and Shivaji put his seal to it on 11<sup>th</sup> December.

The terms of the treaty were as follows:

- (i) Shivaji was to release, without taking any compensation, all the men, women and children, taken captive from Bardesh. He was also to restore all the cattle which he had carried away from Bardesh.
- (ii) Lakhram Sawant, Keshav Naik, Naraba Sawant and Mallu Shenavi were to be warned by the Portuguese to desist from any kind of hostilities against Shivaji and were to be expelled from Portuguese territory if they did not abide by that warning. The Desais were to stay within the limits of the city of Goa and were not to be allowed to go to Bardesh or Sashti.
- (iii) Shivaji was to allow, on payment of usual custom duties, unhindered passage of mercantile traffic between Goa and the Desh uplands even in event of war between himself and the Adilshah so that "the trade of merchants may develop in the common interest."
- (iv) There was to be good and firm friendship between the two parties and violation, if any, was to be reported by Shivaji to the Portuguese viceroy and vice versa.

Charge of the captives taken by the Marathas was given to the Portuguese envoy, Reverend Gonçalo Martins, who returned

from Shivaji's court with a Marathi version of the treaty.<sup>2187</sup> Necessary orders were issued on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1667 to the Desais by the viceroy in pursuance of this treaty.<sup>2188</sup>

A letter from the viceroy to the King of Portugal mentions that when the Portuguese envoy, Gonçalo Martins, was at Raigad for negotiating this treaty, he obtained Shivaji's permission to open a Portuguese trading station at Dabhol.<sup>2189</sup> In July 1668, the viceroy informed Shivaji of having appointed the *Feitor* (factor) to the Portuguese trading station at Dabhol.<sup>2190</sup> We do not know its later history but it appears that the trading station was soon closed down.

It would be interesting to note that, sometime after this raid, the viceroy learnt that Shivaji had distributed, during the raid, some circular letters or leaflets addressed to the inhabitants of Bardesh and that some of them had even complied with them. So, on the 4<sup>th</sup> May 1668, he appointed an officer named Dr. Francisco de Silva Fasch to inquire into the matter.<sup>2191</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know the contents of these circular letters nor do we know what came out of the inquiry.

There is not the slightest mention of the persecution of the Hindus in Goa in the correspondence between Shivaji and the Portuguese. In the Marathi version of the treaty, Shivaji clearly says that "we with our men led an expedition into Bardesh because the *desais* were [residing] there."<sup>2192</sup> Therefore it is clear that the sole object of Shivaji's Bardesh raid was political, viz., the expulsion of Lakhram Sawant and others from Goa, and not religious. In fact, by then, most of the population in the Portuguese territory had already become Christian and the few Hindus that were left could have fled, if they so desired, to the adjoining Maratha territory. The Portuguese rulers of Goa were

religious fanatics and broaching the religious issue at that time would have reduced the chances of an amicable settlement with them. To dislodge them from Goa was not easy and even if Shivaji had succeeded in doing so, the Portuguese, by waging war against him from their bases outside his striking range, could have destroyed his nascent navy and devastated the coastline. Shivaji was not a man to be carried away by emotions. Goa was lost for the time being. There was no point in trying to stop the persecution of the handful of Hindus that remained there — particularly when they had the option of seeking the safety of his territory — if that would have threatened the very existence of his naval power which he had been at so much pain to build. Therefore, though Shivaji must undoubtedly have resented the persecution of the Hindus in Goa, it appears he did not want to bring up the religious issue at that time but limited his object to the expulsion of the *desais* from Goa. If anything, this shows not his lack of concern for the Hindus, but his profound practical sense.

In spite of this treaty, the *desais* continued to induce their former subjects in Shivaji's territory to cause disturbances. After repeated complaints by the Maratha *subadar* of the district of Bhimgad, Rayaji Gangadas, the Viceroy informed him on the 26<sup>th</sup> February 1668:

“On repeated occasions, you have written to me regarding the disturbance created by the subjects of *desais* in the dominion of Raja Shivaji. I cannot impede nor am I responsible to impede them because the agreement says that the *desais* or their men will not leave the territory of the king of Portugal to fight in the dominion of Raja Shivaji. This has been kept up so far. However, with a view to appraising my will to Raja Shivaji and his subjects, to maintain friendship and public faith and to have the least occasion of a failure on my part I order Lakham Sawant and Keshav Naik to be immediately out of the lands of the State so that you and other subordinates of Raja Shivaji may

be free from the scare of the impression that the *desais* are favoured at our end.”<sup>2193</sup>

And again in a letter dated the 8<sup>th</sup> June 1668 to Viro Pandit, *subadar* of Pedne, the Viceroy communicated that all *desais* had already been out of the Portuguese Jurisdiction.<sup>2194</sup>

Driven out of their sanctuary, the Desais begged for pardon which was granted by Shivaji.<sup>2195</sup> They did not again create any problem throughout Shivaji's reign thereafter.

Though outwardly the Viceroy thus maintained peace with Shivaji he had not stopped his machinations and, in his letter dated 18th May, 1668 to Aurangzeb, within six months of the Portuguese-Maratha treaty, again offered naval cooperation against Shivaji.<sup>2196</sup>

Joao Nunes de Cunha, Count of São Vincente, died on 6<sup>th</sup> November 1668. According to the instructions which he had left behind, Antonio de Melo de Castro,<sup>2197</sup> Luis de Miranda Henriques and Manuel Corte Real de Sampaio were nominated as his successors pending the appointment of a viceroy from Portugal. As Henriques was absent de Castro and de Sampaio took charge as joint governors of Portuguese India.<sup>2198</sup>

In the same month, on 13<sup>th</sup> November 1668, Shivaji commenced the construction of the temple of Shri Saptakoteshvara at Narwe.<sup>2199</sup> Formerly the temple of Shri Saptakoteshvara, the family deity of the Kadamb dynasty that ruled over Goa in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, was in the village named Narwe (Naroa) in Divadi, a tiny coastal island. It was destroyed by the Muslims and the stone image of the deity was hidden by the devotees in the embankment of a field. When Goa came under the sway of Vijayanagar, Madhava, a minister of that Empire, built a new magnificent temple at the same place and

reestablished the deity.<sup>2200</sup> This, too, was destroyed in 1540 – this time by the Portuguese – along with many other temples.<sup>2201</sup> They built a chapel dedicated to Nossa Senhora Candelaria in its place. Some remains of the ancient temple could still be noticed in the chapel.<sup>2202</sup> The image of the deity was smuggled out of Goa and a temple was built in another village within Adilshahi territory also named Narwe (Naroa) in the district of Dicholi, opposite the one in Divadi.<sup>2203</sup> This temple, it seems, was in a very dilapidated condition. Shivaji was now building a new one at that site which he perhaps intended would serve as a beacon of hope for his Hindu brethren in Goa. This was all that he could do for them at the moment.

Shivaji's presence on their frontier and the large assemblage, which must have been gathered there for the ceremony, seems to have alarmed the Portuguese. In a letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> January 1669 to their king, the joint governors wrote:

"He [i.e. Shivaji] intended this year, in the beginning of our governorship to invade Bardesh and Salcette [i.e. Sashti] but with due precaution and promptness we prevented him. We kept our army in readiness and arranged the preparative. This diverted him. His envoy gave us a lie that the plans were different from those we imagined. But it is certain that preventive measures diverted his guns."<sup>2204</sup>

As usual, rumors travelled faster. An English letter dated the 12<sup>th</sup> November 1668 from Karwar to Surat says:

"The Vice King [i.e. Viceroy] of Goa died the [blank] of October of a fever. His place is supplied by three Governors, viz. Antonio de Melo de Castro, Luis Miranda Henriques (at present Governor of Diu) and Manuel Corte Real. The Vice King a little before his

death, searching narrowly through all his towns, found 4 or 500 men of Shivaji had [? hid] up and down in several places; upon which he sent for Shivaji's ambassador and with his own hand took him two or three cuffs in the ear, and turned him, and all the prisoners he had took, out of Goa. Immediately after which Shivaji raises a great army of 8 or 10000 foot and 1000 horse, and gives out he intends against Goa in person: which has put the Portuguese in arms, building new and mending all old forts, keeping very strict guards in all passages, and it's generally thought that Shivaji will not be able to do anything against it. The truth on it is, it is not absolutely known whither he intends; he as yet being with his army to the northward of Rajapur."[2205](#)

Had any such incidence occurred, the Portuguese governors would not have failed to mention it in their letter to the King of Portugal. But it finds no mention in Portuguese records. Therefore the story narrated in the English letter cannot be taken as more than a product of some fertile brain.

#### SHIVAJI AND THE SIDDI

Though the Siddi of Danda was nominally an officer of the Adilshah, for all practical purposes he was an independent chief. As he now found that the Adilshah was powerless to succour him against Shivaji, he acknowledged, in 1667, the nominal overlordship of the Portuguese so as to enable them to give him overt assistance.[2206](#)

Sometime around April–May 1669, Shivaji opened operations, both by land and sea, against the Siddi. The Portuguese were quick to give all possible succour to their

nominal vassal. The joint governors ordered the secretary of state, Antonio Pais de Sande, on the 28<sup>th</sup> May 1669:

"Yesterday, the 27<sup>th</sup> instance, we received a letter from Nuno de Melo de Silva which gives an account of the hard time that the fortress of Danda faced under the siege of Shivaji. This event is very important. We have come to the conclusion that the rule and neighborhood of such a mischievous enemy are not convenient to the State. We therefore decided to order you to assist, if the circumstances permit, the fortress of Danda with some soldiers and ammunition under the pretext that the Siddi is our tributary and it is obligatory for us to protect him, or under any other pretext that you may feel is more honest. In case the Siddi offers to hand over the fortress to us, as Nuno de Melo gives us to understand, do not miss the opportunity. We order you to take possession of it and to equip it with all the requirements for its defence till the month of August when we can help it in the manner most suited to the service of His Majesty."<sup>2207</sup>

And again on the 21<sup>st</sup> of August 1669 they wrote:

"The captain of Chaul informs us of the pressed situation of the Siddi who seeks our assistance. We also agree with you on the fear of Shivaji's naval power engaged to capture the fort of Danda. The Council of the Production of Material is of the opinion that it is impossible for us to declare a war against this enemy till we receive ships from the Reign [i.e. Portugal]. In the meanwhile the Siddi, as a vassal of this state is to be helped with all the efforts."<sup>2208</sup>

On the same day they directed the Captain of Chaul as follows:

"In case Shivaji lays siege to the fort of Danda with his navy you may let the captain of Shivaji or Shivaji himself know on our behalf that the sea belongs to us and the Siddi is our vassal; that in these circumstances our State cannot consent to his laying siege to the fort of Danda and thereby obstructing the security of our sea and that if this caution goes heedless it will be the duty of this State to employ all our means to ensure security of the sea and the safety of the vassals."<sup>2209</sup>

Meanwhile the Siddi was reduced to such straits that he appealed to the English that his people may be given refuge, in case of need, at Mumbai.

The English at Mumbai wrote to Surat on 9<sup>th</sup> June 1669:<sup>2210</sup>

"The Siddi of Danda Rajpuri has written to me, making his case known that Shivaji Raja is entered his country and done him a great mischief, and desires that his people may have admittance, in case they should be forced to fly hither for refuge. He is promised all civility in such case."

The President and Council at Surat however warned them, in their letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1669, to be cautious lest this might invite enmity with Shivaji for which they were ill-prepared.<sup>2211</sup>

The siege continued throughout the rainy season. On 16<sup>th</sup> October 1669, the English at Mumbai wrote to Surat:<sup>2212</sup>

"The 12<sup>th</sup> instant we wrote by express and have since received a message from the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri who is much straightened by Shivaji Raja,

[who] though he cannot storm the place, only thinks to starve him out notwithstanding the grand Mughal commands to withdraw his force, so the Siddi resolves to hold it out to the last and then has thoughts of delivering it up to the Mughal, who have an army about Kalyan, commanded by Lodi Khan."

This, they thought, was the opportunity they were seeking of taking possession of Danda-Rajpuri. The letter continues:

"This place [Danda Rajpuri] is doubtless of great concern, almost invincible, if not blocked up by sea. It has 572 pieces of ordnance in it, as good report speaks, and may be kept with a small force; and if occasion were, some number of Portuguese soldiers might be procured. The place would be much more considerable than this [i.e. Mumbai] The Company formerly had an eye towards it, and now may be the very nick of time to compass it."

They even had a plan ready. The ships from Europe that came to India every year had not returned yet. If they could touch at Mumbai during their return journey to Europe they would come handy for taking possession of the fortress. The letter continues:

"If the troubles of Surat should impede the dispatch of the Europe ships (which God forbid) their stay might contribute to the advance of the design; much might be said pro and con; we may err in being too zealous to promote our masters interest. But [ we] hope you will seriously consider what to do and pardon what [is] amiss herein and let us hear from you in answer hereunto with all speed and if 2 or 3 ships going down the coast were ordered to touch here and we empowered to appear with them at Danda Rajpuri, if occasion should present, some good

might come out by now having a good pretence to treat with him [i.e. the Siddi], he courting us at present for his own interest and the knowledge of the place may be advantageous in the future if no good should be now done ....and it is not impossible but [that] acceptable terms may be offered him now in this condition."

But the fortifications of Mumbai were not yet complete. Taking possession of Danda would have meant the denuding of the garrison of Mumbai and thus laying it open to Shivaji. Henry Young, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai, had thought of that also. On the same day he reinforced his argument in a private letter to President Aungier.

"I have written in [the] general [letter] touching Danda Rajpuri which is a place so considerable that if it could be purchased on any good terms, I think this [place, i.e. Mumbai] were not to be put in competition with it, which [i.e. Mumbai] will cost much, the fortifying and making [it] tenable, and if we were possessed of [it i.e. Danda Rajpuri] we should not fear Shivaji nor the Mughal in neither [place] ; and [I] know not what the former would advantage himself in Bombay, more than in taking the guns, which I would have removed to Danda till our works [at Mumbai] were complete ; which [i.e. the work on the fortification of Mumbai] might go on [even] if we have no force remaining on the island, since we have no water, and if we once had that [complete], they would both be unwilling to differ with us. I doubt not but you understand the commodiousness of the place [i.e. Danda] for security of the shipping under command, with the goodness of the Harbour. If the keeping the three ships would certainly put us into possession of the place, I should think it worth the charge, we need not doubt good supplies next year. Laskars [native

sailors] might supply the room of good number of men which might be spared out of the ships whilst they stay in India, and then both places might continue fortified. Once having made so good terms with the Siddi we might have the use of his small vessels to destroy all Shivaji's force by sea."[2213](#)

But the President again advised caution in giving refuge to the Siddi, because, he wrote, "we shall certainly exasperate a potent and desperate neighbor, Shivaji, whom we are at present in an ill condition to oppose in case he should design us a mischief." And, as for taking possession of Danda, he wrote: "But if the Siddi may be brought to deliver up the Castle to the Honourable Company, we shall then, on advice from you, resolve on something concerning it."[2214](#)

Meanwhile the Portuguese intervention had precipitated into a war between the Maratha and Portuguese navies. The English at Mumbai wrote to Surat on 6<sup>th</sup> November 1669:

"Shivaji Raja has made prize lately of some vessels belonging to the Portuguese, and they have taken one of his, which by agreement was to come to the port [of Mumbai], by the kindnesses used to another [of Shivaji's vessels] that come hither from Aden. This [vessel] now taken [by the Portuguese] came from the Gulf of Persia. It is certain Shivaji's principal minister is very near us, at Pen, within a few hours sail, and report speaks [Shivaji] himself [is] not far off. The Siddi is yet in distress, but we hear not from him, nor from you touching his shipping, people, etc. as we expected."[2215](#)

It would be incorrect to conclude from this letter, which shows us only a part of the picture, that the Maratha navy came off better in its war against the Portuguese. In fact, as future

events indicate and as was also natural in view of the inexperience of the Marathas and the smallness of their ships, the reverse was the case.

Foiled in his attempt against Danda on account of Portuguese intervention, and also because of the outbreak of the war against the Mughals, which we shall narrate hereafter, Shivaji sent his envoy, Vitthal Pandit, to Goa. The following notes were then exchanged between the Maratha envoy and the Portuguese governors.

The draft dated 10<sup>th</sup> February 1670 put up by the governors began thus:[2216](#)

"Adjustment and revalidation of the peace and friendship between the illustrious Governors and captains general of the [Portuguese] State of India on one side and Shivaji Raja on the other. Because there have been many instances of inconsistency and unfaithfulness in the behaviour of the captains of Shivaji Raja with the subjects of His Highness and because, now, his letter and his envoy, himself, intend a perpetual peace with this state the above cited gentlemen sanction his petition in good faith and revalidate the said friendship in the following form and on the following conditions."

The conditions which they set out were, in brief, as follows:

(i) That Shivaji would return within a period of two months 3,000 pagodas forcibly taken from two subjects of the Portuguese.

(ii) That he will allow, on payment of the old customary duties, unhindered passage of all mercantile traffic between Goa and the uplands. This will remain valid even in event of war between Shivaji and the Adilshah "in order to boost the commerce for mutual interest."

(iii) That the crafts taken from the Portuguese subjects shall be restored to them in the presence of our fleet that is sailing to the North. The subjects of Shivaji Raja may accompany his fleet to take charge of their vessels detained at Chaul and other forts of the North.

(iv) That he, Shivaji Raja, shall not construct a fortress or a house of lime and stones on the borders of the lands that he has conquered in the vicinity of those of the King of Portugal, notwithstanding their separation by a river."

(v) That there will be good and firm friendship between the two.

On their part, the governors proposed to abide by the following conditions:

(i) That they will restore the crafts belonging to Shivaji [or his subjects]

(ii) That every Cartaz asked for by a person under the Jurisdiction of Shivaji Raja will be issued to any port, except to an enemy port, on payment of every tax, in the manner the subjects of the Mughal Emperor pay.

(iii) That the small crafts sailing from Karanje to this city (i.e. Goa) with food-stuff, salt and other drugs of similar nature will not be required to obtain cartazes; the ships of the (Portuguese) Navy that may come across such small crafts will not impede them.

(iv) That both Shivaji and the Portuguese would allow each other's vessels to come to their ports and purchase anything on payment.

(v) That the Siddi of Danda is a feudatory of the King of Portugal. The Governors are, therefore, responsible to help and defend him. This is not possible to be fulfilled without injury to the friendship with Shivaji Raja that the aforesaid Governors revalidate, as he (Shivaji Raja) is an enemy of the Siddi. With a view to avoiding the distrust which may crop up in case of their support to the Siddi which is obligatory on them, the Governors will intercede with their power and authority to bring about a reconciliation between the Siddi and Shivaji Raja thus becoming mediators of a good and firm peace, satisfactory to either.

Then the draft says:

“Shivaji Raja will order and empower his ambassador, Vitthal Pandit, who is present in this Court, to adjust the composition in the form described herein.

“That there will be a good and firm friendship between the Portuguese and Shivaji Raja, on the land as well as on the sea. In case of a baseless cause of bitterness Shivaji Raja will first inform the Governors about it. The Governors in like circumstances will inform Shivaji Raja. Until this is complied with no part of this treaty of peace and friendship will be violated by either party. This treaty will be signed by the aforesaid Governors and Shivaji Raja. Goa. 10<sup>th</sup> February 1670.”

Thus the Portuguese were not ready to give a positive assurance that they would not assist the Siddi but wanted an undertaking from Shivaji that he would not construct a stronghold on their frontier. Shivaji could not accept these

terms. Not only did he want the Portuguese to desist from assisting the Mughals as well as the Siddi but also to allow his vessels to sail without their cartazes. He knew what might make them more amenable to his demands. The following notes were exchanged to which were affixed the signatures of the Portuguese Governors and the seal of Shivaji:[2217](#)

From Vitthal Pandit:

1. The vessels and crafts of Shivaji Raja while in sea will not be interfered with by the Portuguese.
2. The Portuguese will not shelter nor will they supply any material to the Abyssinians of Danda. They will issue orders to their posts in this connection.
3. The Portuguese will issue orders to release the crafts and vessels along with the material thereof captured by them.
4. The governor will depute a person to accompany the envoy with the letters of orders to the captains of all their ports to have good reciprocation with the *subadars* of Shivaji and to act in accordance with the governmental orders.
5. The Imam [of Muscat] proposed to us to allow him the use of our ports as sheltering and watering places on payment of charges to be decided by us. He also requested for the assistance of our crafts and vessels. We replied that we would not give anything nor would we show any favor to him because we were friends of the Portuguese. As a gesture of regard for our attitude towards the Imam, the Portuguese will favour and assist us whenever he enters into a war against us; we will likewise favour the Portuguese in

case of their having a war with the aforesaid Imam for which the Portuguese will pay the necessary cost and expenses.[2218](#)

6. There is a war between us and the Mughal. The Portuguese and we, therefore, remain united. The Portuguese will not allow the people of Mughal in their territory and will treat us favorably therein. They will write a circular letter [to their officers] in this connection.

7. The past events are not to be considered. We shall not have regard for these in dealing with the Portuguese in future.

The reply by Governors:

1. Small crafts may sail freely. Galiots and other ships of large size will have to obtain cartazes to sail along the coast or to pass through the gulf. The cartazes will be issued in the style similar to that applied to the subject of the Mughal.

2. This will be done. [This meant that the Portuguese would not give shelter or materials to the Siddi. See Article 2 of the draft proposed by Shivaji's envoy.]

“3. On receipt of the vessels and craft of the residents of this city [i.e. Goa] and those of other parts of this state, along with everything taken away from them by the Marathas, we shall return the ships attached from Shivaji Raja and his subjects.

4. A representative of the [Portuguese] state will be sent to the captains of the forts of His Highness with letters to have good reciprocation with the *subadars* and ministers of Shivaji who in turn will have similar behaviour with the aforesaid captains.

5. If Shivaji Raja, in case of war against the Imam, requests for our favour and assistance the same will be extended to him subject to his declaration that neither he nor his *subadars* nor captains will allow the aforesaid Imam to have any supplies or provisions, including water, from his ports.

6. The peace that exists between this state and the Great Mughal is very old. In consideration of these relations we cannot deny a shelter in our ports, forts and cities to his subjects in danger. We shall extend similar shelter to Shivaji Raja, his *subadars* and captains in case of need.

7. Each party will have friendship and good relations with the other and will forget the events of the past.

This document bears the signatures of the Portuguese governors, viz. Antonio de Melo de Castro and Manual Corte Real de Sampaio, and the seal of Shivaji.

Thus the Portuguese demands that Shivaji would not build any fortifications on their frontier and would allow to pass unhindered all mercantile traffic between Goa and the uplands, even when there would be a war between him and the Adilshah, were dropped. On the other hand Shivaji exacted from them an undertaking that they would not assist the Siddi and also

obtained a concession for his small craft to sail without their cartazes.

## *Chapter 11*

# **Shivaji's Civil and Military Administration**

Of Shivaji's greatness as an administrator, Dr. Sen observes: "His greatness as a military leader has never been contested, but his greatness as a civil administrator is perhaps still more undoubted." [2219](#) How true these words are we shall now see which, engrossed in the narrative of events, we have omitted to do so far. While doing so, we shall have to skip ahead in time a little, where necessary, so as to present readers with a comprehensive picture of Shivaji's civil and military administration.

### **GENERAL ADMINISTRATION**

Good government and the goodwill of the civil population are the real foundations of military power of a civilized nation. That Shivaji understood this well is borne out by the following memorandum, drawn up in 1670, about an agreement between himself and his *Muzumdar* or Finance Minister, Nilopant Sondev.[2220](#)

"Nilopant, the *Muzumdar*, was appointed to administer the country from Mahuli to Bhimgad, including Indapur, Pune, and Chakan. Thereupon the aforesaid Pandit [i.e. Nilopant Sondev] petitioned to His Highness [Shivaji]: 'These are the days to exert oneself. The administration of the country should be entrusted to someone else. I shall go [on expeditions] and carry out [military] duties like others. I shall capture forts when so required.' Upon this, His Highness replied: 'To stay in the country [for administrative work] is also an important task. So stay in the country [for administrative work]....

Whereupon the aforesaid Pandit said: 'It is all right if the work of [the administration of] the country is equally important. One should attain and the other should protect and maintain. If Your Highness considers both these duties [of] equal [importance] I shall stay in the country...' Having decided thus His Highness has appointed the aforesaid Pandit to administer the county. The aforesaid Pandit has also given his consent accordingly."

The *watandari* system which was then prevalent in Maharashtra has already been described elsewhere. The great merit of the system was that in those turbulent times it provided stability, certainty and law to its constituents and enabled them to survive through all the changes and revolutions. But it had many drawbacks. *Watans* were divisible and could also be sold or purchased. This led to many disputes and, in the case of *deshmukhs*, even blood feuds that dragged on from generation to generation. The second great drawback of the system was that generally the government did not interfere in the workings of the *watandars* as long as they paid the stipulated revenue. The *watandars* were thus left free to exact anything they liked from cultivators. On the one hand, it worsened the plight of the poor cultivators; on the other, the *watandars*, by which term we mean here only the *deshmukhs*, on the strength of the wealth they had thus amassed, became powerful, built fortifications, maintained large bands of retainers and at times did not hesitate to defy the authority of even the Sultan. This lawlessness of the *watandars* became particularly manifest in sequestered parts of the country, such as the Mavals. The third drawback of the system was the unreliability of the *watandars*, the ease with which they changed sides. A change of government, either by internal revolution or external invasion, hardly affected the position of *watandars*. The invader found it convenient to confirm the *watandar* in his office and such was his attachment to his *watan* that he immediately lent himself to his wiles and seduction,

giving him whole hearted support against his former master. This susceptibility to overtures of the enemy, be it remembered, was born out of his unremitting attachment to his *watan*, before which neither country nor even the religion mattered.

Shivaji was well aware of the evils implicit in the system he had inherited from his Muslim predecessors. But he was a practical statesman and knew that seeking to abolish the whole system at a stroke would alienate *watandars* and jeopardize the administration. Therefore, as Dr. Sen observes, he had “to strike a mean between the two extremes that would at the same time reconcile the *watandars* and ensure comparative order and peace.”<sup>2221</sup>

The regulations which he introduced in the system were, according to Sabhasad, as follows:

“In every village, from each individual cultivator, should the *karkun* [i.e. administrative officer] realize rent in grains from the crops [at the time of each harvest] according to the assessment. In the provinces the cultivators were not to be subject to the jurisdiction and regulations of the *Zamindar* [land lord, chieftain], the *Deshmukh* and the *Desai*.<sup>2222</sup> If they want to plunder by assuming authority [over the cultivators] it does not lie in their power. The Adilshahi, the [former] Nizamshahi and the Mughal provinces were conquered [by Shivaji]. In [these] provinces all subjects used to be under the *Patil* and the *Kulkarni* of those places and [their superiors] the *Deshmukhs*. They used to collect and pay an unspecified sum [as revenue]. For a village, where the *Mirasdars* [i.e. *watandars*] took one or two thousand [Hons] they used to render two or three hundred to the government as quit-rent. Therefore the *Mirasdars* grew wealthy and strengthened [themselves] by

building bastions, castles and strongholds in the village and enlisting footmen and musketeers. They would not come to wait on the revenue officers. If the revenue officers said that they could pay more revenue they [*watandars*] stood up to quarrel with them. In this way they grew unruly and forcibly misappropriated [the country]. On this account did the Raja [Shivaji] demolish the bastions, the castles and the strongholds, after conquering the country. Where there were important forts, he posted his [own] garrisons. And nothing was left in the hands of the *Mirasdars*. This done, [he] prohibited all that the *Mirasdars* used to take at their sweet will, by right of grant (*inam*) or revenue farming and fixed the rates of the dues in cash and grain, for the *zamindars* [landlords, chieftains], as well as the rights and perquisites of the *Deshmukh*, the *Deshkulkarni* and the *Patil* and the *Kulkarni* according to the yield of the village. The *zamindars* were prohibited to build bastioned castles. They were to build houses and live therein. Such were the regulations in the provinces.”<sup>2223</sup>

Contemporary documents throw more light on the subject. Shivaji's order dated 21<sup>st</sup> April 1662 to Pilaji Nilakanthrao, the *Subadar* of Prabhavali division, reads:

“Last year His Highness himself marched for the conquest of the Konkan and that country was brought under [his] sway. At that time the Surves of Shringarpur and the Padshahi officers in the Konkan behaved disloyally and were scattered as a result. After the *watandars* and the inhabitants of the country were given letters of assurance from the government, Keso Nayak, son of Ragho Naik Mavalangakar and all [other] *watandars* of the

aforesaid district presented themselves for government service.

This year Rango Naik, son of Keso Naik Mavalangakar, the *Sardesai* of the aforesaid district, came to His Highness at Rajgad and petitioned as follows:

'My *watan* of the *Sardeshmukhi* of the aforesaid district and the district of Dabhol has been continued from generation to generation till the last year. Now, after the Konkan had come in the possession of Your Highness, this servant has graciously been given a letter of assurance. Thereafter I presented myself for service of the *watan*. At present all *watans* are confiscated by the government. My perquisites and grants were also confiscated. If Your Highness would kindly grant me the *watan* and thus provide subsistence to my family I shall serve loyally and energetically.'

You have also written a recommendation about this matter. Considering the recommendation and in view of the well being of the inhabitants, the aforesaid Nayak, because he is an old *watandar*, has been granted the *Sardeshmukhi* of both the districts mentioned above. For his perquisites a sum of 2,000 Laris has been allotted to him from the revenue collection of Prabhavali district and [this sum] is to be levied on the inhabitants. Therefore levy a tax of 2,000 Laris on the inhabitants in the revenue collection of the aforesaid district and disburse [that amount] to the aforesaid Nayak every year.

Do not ask for a fresh grant every year. The perquisites in Dabhol district are to be settled yet. That would be done after the arrival of the officers

and *watandars* of the aforesaid district who are summoned to the Court. Take down a copy of this letter and send the original to the Nayak. ”<sup>2224</sup>

Another *watandar*, Narsoba, son of Kanhoba Naik Mavalangakar, who was the *Sardesai* of Prabhavali district, made a similar petition. He was granted a piece of irrigated land and a sum of 3,000 Laris which was to be collected by the *subadar* by levying a tax upon the inhabitants and defrayed to the *watandar* every year. Narsoba brought this order to the *subadar*, who then directed his subordinate, the *Havaldar*, to defray the sum of 3,000 Laris to Narsoba every year. The original order issued by Shivaji has not survived but the letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> August 1661 of the *subadar* to his subordinate is extant and therein the petition and Shivaji's order dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1661 thereupon are quoted.<sup>2225</sup>

A letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> November 1691 issued by Shivaji's son Rajaram, reads:

“Antaji Suryarao Desai [of] the district of Dicholi came to His Majesty [i.e. Rajaram] at Gingee and submitted the following: ‘When the aforesaid district came in the possession of His late Majesty [i.e. Shivaji<sup>2226</sup>] he considered [the administration of] the district end gave the [following] decision. [Formerly] there were many privileges of the *Deshmukhi watan*. Instead an assignment of 4,000 Hons per year was made. My grandfather Suryarao Desai had his heirs by three wives.... Three divisions of the *watan* were made and given to them....’ ”<sup>2227</sup>

It appears from the above documents that Shivaji confirmed existing *watandars* in their offices but at the same time forbade them to collect their dues directly from the cultivators, and instead assigned to them annuities from the

district treasuries. He thus put a stop to the *watandars*' practice of extorting money in excess of the stipulated revenue from cultivators, establishing direct relations with the peasants and strengthening the hold of the central government.

Occasionally some exceptions were made while implementing this reform. Shivaji's letter dated Shuhur year 1069 [1668-69] to the *Deshmukh* of Rohid Khore reads:

"Yesaji, son of Indroji Jedhe, petitioned to His Highness that: 'Formerly four villages and all other privileges were conferred upon the *Deshmukh* of the aforesaid district. At that time he continued to me, from the grants of the *Deshmukhi*, a [sub-] grant of a farm of three *takas* in the village of Ambavade in the aforesaid district. At present one village and privileges are continued to the *Deshmukh* and the other [three villages] are resumed. As a result, the farm granted to me is not continued [by him]. Therefore [Your Highness] should kindly continue the land granted to me.' Having considered this [petition] the three *taka* land in the village of Ambavade, formerly continued by the *Deshmukh* to the aforesaid Yesaji, is now continued [by the government]. It should be continued with all privileges including the rent....This grant of land should be continued from the year 1669-70."<sup>2228</sup>

Thus the Jedhes of Rohidkhore were allowed to retain the revenue of only one out of the four villages which they formerly enjoyed. They were among the earliest adherents of Shivaji which is perhaps why they were shown this special favour. Despite such concession, their ties with the local population were considerably weakened. Shivaji's first reform was thus aimed at the severance of ties of the *watandars* with the cultivators and making both of them increasingly dependent upon the central government. We do not know the extent of

this reform but it appears that only the higher echelons among them, such as the *Deshmukhs* or *Deshkulkarnis*, were subjected to it while those in the lowest tier, viz. the *Patil* and the *Kulkarni*, were allowed to collect their dues directly from cultivators as before.

The second reform which Shivaji, as Sabhasad tells us, introduced in the system was the demolition of the strongholds of the *watandars* and prohibition to build new ones.<sup>2229</sup> Shivaji's letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> April 1679 to the *Deshadhikari* of Bankapur Prant shows that this policy was indeed carried out. The letter orders that the village of Saunshi<sup>2230</sup> should be continued as grant to Kenchangauda, the *desai* of Lakshmeshvar Pargana, but that before handing over the charge of the village to him, the castle there should be demolished from its foundation.<sup>2231</sup>

Apart from these two reforms we know of an action on his part which was, perhaps, aimed at curtailing the power of *watandars*. This was the imposition of a super tax upon them to meet the expenditure of the coronation ceremony. It was called *miras patti*,<sup>2232</sup> because it was imposed on *watandars*, or *sinhasan patti* (throne tax) because it was imposed at the time of coronation.<sup>2233</sup> The rates were quite high. On the Shirval Pargana, which was very small comprising only 40 villages, a total of 1,000 Hons was charged: the *deshmukh* was required to pay 366 Hons, the *deshkulkarni* 134 Hons, the *mokadams* a total of 250 Hons (with rates varying from village to village), the *kulkarnis* a total of 200 Hons, the *chaugulas* a total of 14 Hons and the *shetyes* and *mahajans* 36 Hons.<sup>2234</sup>

Shivaji thus weakened the *watandari* system but he did not abolish it. Not only did he confirm old *watans* but there are instances of his having conferred even new ones.<sup>2235</sup> The *watandars* were the sons of the soil and their roots had gone

very deep. They could not be removed at a stroke without seriously compromising the administration of the countryside. Moreover, their military power was very limited and they did not pose a serious threat to the central government. All that was immediately needed, therefore, was to keep them under a firm hand. Unlike the *watandars*, the *jagirdars* were not hereditary officers. But the greater ones among them held entire districts in *jagir*. Once appointed, they wielded considerable economic and military power and posed a potential threat to the very existence of the central government. However, they were not as firmly emplaced in a particular locality as were the *watandars*.

The *watandars* did not leave their locality even if it was overrun by some other power, and their ties with it were far stronger than those with the government. But the *jagirdars* were automatically rooted out whenever their *jagirs* were overrun by another power. All that Shivaji had to do to abolish the *jagirdari* system, therefore, was to abstain from appointing new *jagirdars* in place of the old ones as he conquered new territories. And this he did without exception. There is no record of his having conferred *jagirs* upon any of his officers.

Sabhassad states:[2236](#)

“To the *Sarnaubat*, and the *Muzumdar*, and the *Karkuns*,[2237](#) and men on the personal staff of the Raja, were given assignments on land revenue, for their salary. Those who cultivated land were taxed like [other] cultivators and the sum credited as [part of] their pay. The balance, of their dues [was paid by] *varats* [orders of payment] either on the *Huzur* [Central Government] or on the District [establishments]. In this manner were their annual accounts punctually settled. *Mukasa Mahals* [i.e. *mukasa* or *jagir* districts], or villages with absolute rights, should on no account be granted to the [men in the] cavalry, infantry and the fort establishments.

Every payment should be made by *varats* or with cash from the treasury. None but the *karkuns* [civil authorities] had any authority over the lands. All payments to the cavalry, the infantry, and the fort establishments should be made by the *karkuns*. If *mukasas* were granted, the cultivators would grow powerful and there would be disturbances at various places. Those, who were given *mukasas*, if united with the *zamindars*, would grow unruly. Therefore *mukasas* should not be granted to anybody."

It should be noted that not only did Shivaji not assign any *mukasas*, but he even did not allow his officers to recruit their own contingents and pay their wages from the payment they received. In his kingdom every government servant, civil or military, officer or ordinary soldier, was paid directly by the government — either in cash or by orders of payment (*varats*) on the treasury.<sup>2238</sup> This was, indeed, a most revolutionary reform, the like of which was to be found nowhere in India, not only in Shivaji's times, but even thereafter till the advent of British rule.

As for the administrative machinery of the government, Shivaji followed more or less the same pattern that was then inherent to India. The administrative officer in charge of a *pargana* was known as the *Havaldar* and was paid about three to five Hons per month.<sup>2239</sup> His accounting officer was known as the *Muzumdar*. The *pargana* (or *muamala*) was the highest administrative unit in the Adilshahi Sultanate. About 1667 Shivaji, perhaps on the Nizamshahi or the Mughal pattern, created a higher unit called the *suba*, each comprising a number of *parganas*.<sup>2240</sup> These *subas* were comparable in size with Mughal *sarkars*, and not with Mughal *subas*. The officer in charge of a *Suba* (or division) was known as the *Subadar* who was paid 400 Hons per year and his *Muzumdar* or the

accounting officer, about 100 to 125 Hons per year.<sup>2241</sup> The *subadar* was given an allowance to maintain a palanquin.<sup>2242</sup> At the apex of the system was Shivaji himself assisted by a council of executive heads of departments. The occupants of these offices were appointed or dismissed by him at his will. Documentary evidence shows that they were transferred from one *pargana* or *suba* to another from time to time.<sup>2243</sup> He was not bound to consult them unless he thought it necessary to do so. That none of these offices was hereditary is considered by some as a novel feature of Shivaji's administration. This, however, was not so. These appointments were not hereditary in the Mughal and Bijapur administrations, either. The *watandari* system was the only hereditary system under these administrations and, as we have seen, it was continued by Shivaji in a modified form. Another important feature — though by no means an exclusive one, because it is also found in the Mughal and Bijapur administrations — was that all these officers, except for the heads of the ecclesiastical department and the judiciary, were required to undertake military expeditions.<sup>2244</sup> This would appear very strange to us today, but in those times all Indian states were military states. State service was not compartmentalized into specialized departments. All officers were soldiers primarily and civilian executives only subsequently. Of course, instances of primarily civil executives going on military expeditions are comparatively few, if not exceptional. The only executives whom we find performing frequent military duties are the Commander-in-Chief and the *Peshwa* or Prime Minister.

The heads of departments were as follows:

1. *Peshwa or Prime Minister, re-designated since Shivaji's coronation as Mukhya Pradhan*

Shivaji's first *Peshwa* was Samraj Nilkanth Ranzekar who, according to Sabhasad, was sent with him by his father when he was given charge of the Poona *jagir*, i.e. around 1642.<sup>2245</sup> Samraj is mentioned as the *Peshwa* in a document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657.<sup>2246</sup> He died in that office, according to the A. K. Chronicle, but Chitnis says that he was removed because of his failure against the Siddi.<sup>2247</sup> Narhari Anandrao was appointed as the *Peshwa* on 21<sup>st</sup> August 1661<sup>2248</sup> but remained in that office for a very short period. On 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1662, Moro Trimal Pingale was appointed to that post.<sup>2249</sup> Narahari Anandrao continued to serve in high office. In 1671 he was *sar-subadar* of Kudal.<sup>2250</sup>

Moro Trimal continued to serve as the *Peshwa* till Shivaji's death.<sup>2251</sup> He also led many military expeditions and particularly distinguished himself in the Battle of Salher in 1672 and the conquest of the principalities of Jawhar and Ramnagar in the same year.

## *2. Muzumdar or Finance Minister, re-designated as Amatya*

Shivaji's first *Muzumdar* was Balkrishnapant Dikshit who, according to Sabhasad, accompanied him when he came from Bangalore to take charge of the Poona *jagir*, i.e. around 1642.<sup>2252</sup> Vasudev Balkrishna is mentioned as the *Muzumdar* in a document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657.<sup>2253</sup> It appears therefore that Balkrishnapant died or retired before that date and was succeeded by his son. Moro Trimal Pingale was appointed as *Muzumdar* on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1661.<sup>2254</sup> We do not know whether Vasudev Balkrishna was removed from the office by Shivaji or by the hand of death. Moro Trimal was promoted as prime minister on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1652 when Nilo Sondev took over as *Muzumdar*.<sup>2255</sup> The only notable military expedition which the

latter led was the capture of Purandar by escalade in 1670. Nilo Sondev was alive at least till 10<sup>th</sup> November 1670.<sup>2256</sup> He seems to have died between that date and Shivaji's coronation on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1674 because Sabhasad mentions his son Naro Nilkanth as the *Muzumdar* in his account of that ceremony.<sup>2257</sup> This is corroborated by an entry in a letter-book of a later date which records a letter dated 13<sup>th</sup> March 1675 sent jointly by Moropant, as Moro Trimal was generally known, and Naro Nilkanth.<sup>2258</sup> Their designations are not mentioned therein but Naro Nilkanth's correspondence in conjunction with Moropant, the Prime Minister, suggest that he too must have held a senior position at that time.<sup>2259</sup>

We do not know whether Naro Nilkanth died in, or was dismissed from, this office but in September-October 1677 Raghunath Narayan Hanmante was appointed as *Muzumdar*.<sup>2260</sup> He was serving at that time as principal assistant to Santaji Bhosale, the governor of the newly conquered Karnatak, and therefore the office of *Muzumdar* was conducted by his younger brother Janardan as proxy.<sup>2261</sup>

### ***3. Surnis or Minister for Land Revenue re-designated as Sachiv***

We do not know when this post was created. In a document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657, Mahadaji Samraj is mentioned as the *Surnis*, who, so far as we know, is thus the first man to occupy that post in Shivaji's administration.<sup>2262</sup> Sabhasad tells us that Nilo Sondev was appointed as *Surnis* after the conquest of Javali and Shringarpur.<sup>2263</sup> This statement is very vague because we know, though Sabhasad did not, that *Javali* was conquered in 1656 and *Shringarpur* in 1661. It is possible however that Nilo Sondev might have held this office since the conquest of *Shringarpur*. On 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1662, Anaji Datto, generally known as

Anajipant, took over as *Surnis*.<sup>2264</sup> Anajipant retained that office till Shivaji's death.

#### *4. Vaknis, Minister for Internal and External Intelligence, re-designated as Mantri*

Under Mughal administration, special officers, designated as *Waqai-nawis*, were appointed in the provinces and field armies to submit periodical reports to the Emperor. They thus formed an independent network for internal intelligence. Oxenden, who attended the coronation ceremony at Raigad, refers to Dattaji, who then held this office, as "Vokanavice or Public Intelligencer."<sup>2265</sup>

According to the Jedhe Chronology, Anajipant was appointed the *Vaknis* on 21<sup>st</sup> August 1661 and as *Surnis* on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1662.<sup>2266</sup> Sabhasad tells us that Gangaji Mangaji who was appointed as *Vaknis* after the conquest of Javali and Shringarpur, died after Shivaji's escape from Agra and was succeeded by Dattaji Trimbak.<sup>2267</sup> So Gangaji Mangaji seems to have taken over this office after Anajipant.

The earliest extant document which mentions his successor, Dattaji Trimbak, as *Vaknis* is dated 17<sup>th</sup> November 1668.<sup>2268</sup> The Jedhe Chronology records that Dattajipant, the *Vaknis*, died on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1678.<sup>2269</sup> We do not know who succeeded to this office thereafter.

#### *5. Dabir or Minister for External Affairs, re-designated as Sumant*

Sabhasad says Sonopant accompanied Shivaji as *Dabir* when he took charge of the Pune *jagir*, i.e. around 1642.<sup>2270</sup> He is

mentioned as such in a document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657.<sup>2271</sup> He was sent as an envoy to Aurangzeb first in April 1657 and again in August 1658, and to Shayista Khan in 1660. He died on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1665. He was succeeded in this office by his son Trimbakpant who had accompanied Shivaji to Agra, was thrown into prison after his escape and released on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1667.<sup>93</sup> He died on 18<sup>th</sup> April 1677.<sup>2272</sup> It appears that he had, sometime before his death, retired from active service and was succeeded in this office by his son Ramchandrapant whom Sabhasad mentions as *Dabir* in his narration of the Coronation ceremony.<sup>2273</sup> He retained that office till Shivaji's death. That the office of *Dabir* remained in the same family throughout Shivaji's lifetime seems to be an exception to the general rule, made no doubt on the basis of merit rather than inheritance.

## 6. *Sarnaubat, or Commander-in-Chief, re-designated as Senapati*<sup>2274</sup>

According to Sabhasad, Tukoji Chor was appointed as *Sarnaubat* after the seizure of Supe, i.e. after 24<sup>th</sup> September 1656.<sup>2275</sup> We do not know whether he died or retired as *Sarnaubat* or was dismissed from that office, but Sabhasad tells us that Mankoji Dahatonde was appointed as *Sarnaubat* after the raids on Junnar and Ahmednagar, i.e. after 4<sup>th</sup> June 1657.<sup>2276</sup> He is mentioned as such in an earlier document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657.<sup>2277</sup> He died, according to Chitnis, in that office and was succeeded by Netoji Palkar.<sup>2278</sup> We do not know the exact date of Mankoji's death but as Sabhasad tells us that Netoji took over as *Sarnaubat* after the conquest of Javali and Shringarpur, the event might be placed around 1662. It would be remembered that Netoji deserted from the Maratha army in 1665 and Kadatoji Gujar was appointed in his place with the title of Prataprao.<sup>2279</sup> Prataprao Gujar was killed in action on

24<sup>th</sup> February 1674 and was succeeded by Hansaji Mohite with the title of Hambir-rao, who retained that post till Shivaji's death.

## ***7. Nyayadhish or Chief Justice***

There was no question of re-designating this office because *Nyayadhish* itself is a Sanskrit word. According to Sabhasad, Niraji Raoji was appointed as *Nyayadhish* after Shivaji's escape from Agra.<sup>2280</sup> We find him appointed on various diplomatic missions as well. In 1668 he was sent to Aurangabad followed by the Maratha contingent under Prataprao Gujar which was to be stationed there in accordance with the Mughal-Maratha treaty.<sup>2281</sup> We do not know in what capacity Niraji had gone there but probably sent there as the diplomatic representative of Shivaji. Then, in 1672, he was sent as an envoy to Bhaganagar (Golconda) to work out the Shivaji-Qutbshah pact. In 1675 he was sent to Bahadur Khan, the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, to spin out the negotiations for a Mughal-Maratha treaty while Shivaji reduced Phonda, an important Bijapur fortress in South Konkan.

## ***8. Panditrao or the Head of Religious Affairs***

*Panditrao* is a Marathi derivation of the Sanskrit with a very slight change. Sabhasad tells us that this office was re-designated as *Danadhyaksha*,<sup>2282</sup> but in all contemporary documents that are extant, this office is always referred to as *Panditrao* and never as *Danadhyaksha*. The latter term first appears in documents during the reign of Shivaji's son and successor, Sambhaji.<sup>2283</sup> The *Panditrao* had jurisdiction over all religious affairs, grants and scholarships.

Sabhasad tells us that Raghunathpant was honoured with the title of *Panditrao* when he was sent as an envoy to Jai Singh (in 1665). The last of Raghunathpant's extant letters is dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1672.<sup>2284</sup> In a document dated 30<sup>th</sup> August 1673, Moreshwar is styled as *Panditrao*.<sup>2285</sup> Therefore, Raghunathpant seems to have died or retired before that date. Sabhasad tells us that Raghunathpant's son held this post at the time of the coronation, but does not give his name.<sup>2286</sup> It appears then that Raghunathpant was succeeded in this office by his son Moreshwar<sup>2287</sup> who continued to serve as *Panditrao* till Shivaji's death.<sup>2288</sup>

Sabhasad tells us that as Shivaji's domain expanded, he divided it into three provinces. The northern province from Kalyan-Bhiwandi northward up to Salher was placed under Moropant, the *Peshwa*; the western province comprising all territory further south in the Konkan was entrusted to Anajipant, the *Surnis*; and the charge of the eastern province further south in the uplands was given to Dattajipant, the *Vaknis*.<sup>2289</sup> He does not give the date when this arrangement was adopted. In an English letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> February 1675 from Rajapur to Surat, Anajipant is mentioned as "not only one of Shivaji's great favourites but Governor in chief of all Konkan."<sup>2290</sup> It seems, therefore, that the arrangement was adopted soon after Shivaji's coronation in June 1674.

#### LANGUAGE REFORM

Since the advent of Muslim rule, Persian had been the official language in the higher echelons of government. Even in the Marathi language that was used in the lower echelons, literally thousands of Persian words had displaced Marathi ones and the syntax and style had been Persianised. This influence was not restricted to official correspondence; it had even

extended to literature as well as the language of everyday use.<sup>2291</sup> This influence of an alien tongue, it needs to be understood, was not the result of peaceful intercourse or syncretism. It was the consequence of alien rule established by force. Shivaji desired to shake off what he perhaps perceived as enforced affectation. His desire to do so becomes apparent since as early as 1646. The earliest of his letters which have survived is dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1646 and it bears his seal in Sanskrit for which there was no precedent for several centuries before him.<sup>2292</sup> Later, he ordered the compilation of a lexicon to remove the influence of the “language of Muslims” (i.e. the Persian language) by replacing Persian words that had crept into the indigenous lexicon by Sanskrit ones.<sup>2293</sup> At his behest, Raghunathpant Hanmante had Dhundhiraj Lakshman Vyas execute this work.<sup>2294</sup> This lexicon, called the *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, seems to have been compiled in 1676-77.<sup>2295</sup> Even before that, since his coronation, Shivaji had already begun using in his deeds of grant Sanskrit words in place of Persian ones.<sup>2296</sup> He had renamed several designations in his government to that end at the time of his coronation.<sup>2297</sup> The result was thus summarized by V.K.Rajwade, the doyen of Maratha historians:<sup>2298</sup>

Date of letter	Persian words	Marathi words	Total	Percentage of Marathi words
1628	202	34	236	14.4
1677	51	84	135	62.2
1728	8	119	127	93.7

## ***Agriculture and Revenue Systems***

The systems of revenue assessment and collection then prevalent in India were as follows:[2299](#)

In the first or sharing system (called *batai*) the cultivators paid a share of the actual produce to the government. The produce of the land, and hence the government's share in it, was determined by an estimate based upon visual inspection of the growing crop. The amount to be paid by a village, as the government's share, was thus determined, season by season, between the official assessor and the headman acting on behalf of the cultivators. In the second system (called *bighawani* or *katuban*), tax was levied at flat rates determined by the quality of the land. Both these systems could be further subdivided into two types. In the first type, the share of the government was realized in kind, such as wheat, paddy, jowar, bajra, sugarcane, coconut etc. In the second, the share of the government was commuted in money price and realized in cash. Land revenue was the main heading of the government's income. At the time under consideration, about the middle of the 17th Century, the cultivator had to pay about fifty per cent of the yield as tax. It was usually commuted in money price and realized in cash.

These then were the conditions which Shivaji found in the territories conquered from the Mughal Empire and the Bijapur Sultanate. We shall see what he did to improve them.

About Shivaji's policy of encouraging agriculture, Sabhasad writes:[2300](#)

“New cultivators who will come [to settle in our dominions] should be given cattle. Grain and money

should be given [to them] for [providing themselves with] seeds. Money and grain [should be] given for their subsistence [also and] the sum should be realized in a couple of years according to the means [of the cultivators]. In this manner should the cultivators be supported. In every village, from each individual cultivator should the *karkun* [i.e. the civil authority] realize, according to the assessment, rent in grain from the crops [at the time of each harvest]."

That this policy was actually adopted is borne out by Shivaji's letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1676, to Ramaji Anant, the *Subadar* of Prabhavali division. It reads:[2301](#)

"His Majesty has kindly appointed you to the division. You have taken a solemn oath that you will not appropriate anything for yourself and shall serve His Majesty loyally. Accordingly act justly without yearning for even the discarded stem of a leaf of vegetable [that does not belong to you]. Execute the work of sowing, storing and realization of the government dues at the proper time. Revenue settlement by sharing is adopted in the country. See to it that the cultivator gets his [proper] share, and the government its dues. Bear in mind that even slight injustice and oppression on the people would displease His Majesty.

"Secondly, there are no orders to take cash instead of corn. Do not take cash instead of corn. Revenue should be realized in corn which should then be sold so as to fetch a high price and prove beneficial to the state. Revenue should be realized and stored in [proper] time. Then it should be sold in the proper season. Coconut, *copra*, betel nut and pepper should be sold out in such a season that, on the one hand,

they would not be spoilt in storage and, on the other, would fetch a good price.

“Encourage the cultivators and promote cultivation. Exert yourself and go from village to village. The cultivators in the village should be assembled. If a cultivator has the manpower, oxen and grain to cultivate [his] piece of land, well and good. Then he can cultivate the land on his own. But if a cultivator has the ability and manpower to cultivate [his piece of] land but does not have the oxen, plough and grain and is therefore forced to remain idle then he should be given cash and made to purchase two or four oxen. He should be given a *khandi* [a unit of measurement] or two of grain for his subsistence. You should get him to cultivate the land according to his ability. The money advanced for oxen and grain should subsequently be realized gradually and according to his ability without charging any interest. You are authorized by His Majesty to spend up to two hundred thousand Laris for this purpose — to make inquiries about the peasants, support them, bring waste lands under cultivation and increase the revenue.

“If a cultivator is ready to exert himself but is unable to pay arrears of dues and is therefore in dire straits, then the realization of the dues should be suspended and a report made to His Majesty about the promotion of agriculture as well as about the cancellation of such dues. Then His Majesty would issue a decree about the remission [of the dues in such cases].”

Even in the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi and Sultanates the rulers exhorted the revenue collectors to exert themselves to bring every arable tract of land under tillage, to

advance money to such peasants as were unable to procure necessary implements, and not to exact anything over and above the stipulated amount.<sup>2302</sup> This benevolence seems to have been born out of necessity rather than concern for peasants, for driving the peasants to extremity might well have resulted in their flight from the land. We have already seen how the Adilshahi nobleman Afzal Khan, while assuring fair treatment to the peasants who had fled from his *jagir*, threatens them: "Take notice that we will dig you out of any place where you go, cut to pieces the one who gives you refuge along with his family and extrude them through an oil mill."<sup>2303</sup> In his *farman* dated 1079 A.H. (1668-1669) to Muhammad Hashim, the *diwan* of Gujarat, Aurangzeb wrote:<sup>2304</sup>

"At the beginning of the year inform yourself, as far as possible, about the condition of every *ryot* [cultivator] as to whether they are engaged in cultivation or are abstaining from it. If they can cultivate ply them with inducements and assurances of kindness: and if they desire favour in any matter show them that favour. But if after inquiry it is found that, in spite of their being able to till and having had rainfall, they are abstaining from cultivation, you should urge and threaten them and employ force and beating. Where the revenue is fixed proclaim to the peasants that it will be realized from them whether they cultivate the land or not."

W. H. Moreland's comments on this *farman* bear notice:<sup>2305</sup>

"Aurangzeb's orders, like those issued by Akbar, do not provide for the sale of a peasant's family for default; but we know from various authorities that this process was in the fact available to the local

officials. Thus Badauni records, as we have seen in the last chapter, that in the reign of Akbar, ‘the wives and children of the peasants were sold and scattered abroad.’ Pelsaert, writing in the next reign, tells of the wives and children of defaulters being made ‘prize’ and sold. Bernier states that defaulters were ‘bereft of their children, who are carried away as slaves.’ Manrique, in describing Bengal under Mughal rule, wrote that ‘when the wretched people have no means of paying this (the revenue demanded in advance) they seize their wives and children, making them into slaves and selling them by auction.’ We must not then read these orders [of Aurangzeb] as a complete code of procedure, providing for all possible exaggerations; the reasonable view is that they deal only with those matters on which a ruling was thought to be enquired and that the treatment of the defaulters was not one of these.”

We do not know of a single instance in which Shivaji ordered his officers to employ force and beating for the realization of revenue or threatened the cultivators to extrude them through an oil-mill, or sold the wives and children of peasants for their failure to pay the amounts demanded by the authorities. There were no *minars* with men’s heads embedded in them, men set up on stakes or heads strung up on trees in Shivaji’s dominion, as Mundy, Tavernier and Manucci witnessed in the Mughal Empire.

Chitnis tells us that three revenue settlements were made during Shivaji’s reign; the first by Dadaji Kondadeo, the second by Moro Trimal and the third by Anaji Datto.<sup>2306</sup> Dadaji’s settlement, made while he was managing Shahji’s Pune *jagir*, was merely an extension of Malik Ambar’s system to the waste lands that were reclaimed for cultivation.<sup>2307</sup> As for Moropant’s settlement, we have three documents about the survey

settlement of three villages in the district of Shirval.<sup>2308</sup> Two of these bear no date but in the third there is a reference to Moropant's letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> December 1669. Further, all these documents refer to Moropant's office as *Pradhan* which was a redesignation of the post of *Peshwa*. As we know that these redesignations were introduced at the time of the coronation, all these documents could be placed after that event, i.e. after 1674. Two of these documents record the measurement of lands under the respective village taken during the administration of Miyan Rahim Muhammad, the Adilshahi officer of the district in 1648. The lands of each village were classified under two heads — those that were brought under cultivation and those that were not. The cultivated lands were further classified into those that were charged with a rent and those that were assigned in grants and therefore were rent free. The former type was then classified into the lands that depended for cultivation on rain water and those that were irrigated by artificial means such as wells and canals. The area under each of these heads, as measured during the administration of Miyan Rahim Muhammad, is recorded in these documents. Each of these then relates that Moropant again made a fresh survey, to see whether the old records were correct and whether any new lands were brought under cultivation in the meantime, and found that the old records were correct. This was, it seems, what Chitnis calls Moropant's settlement. We do not know whether it was extended to other districts as well. These two documents merely record the measurement of lands. The third gives details of revenue collection — made both in cash and kind — as well as the measurement of lands in the village of Madaki.

The third settlement, made by Anaji Datto, seems to have been more extensive as it is referred to in many documents of a later date. In his letter, dated 12<sup>th</sup> October 1677, Anaji Datto mentions that it was decided to make a revenue settlement of the entire country during that year.<sup>2309</sup> His letter, written in

Shuhur year 1079 (1678-79) to the *deshmukh* and other *watandars* of the district of Rohidkhore in the Maval division, throws light on the procedure that he was following during this settlement.<sup>2310</sup> The *watandars* and peasantry of the district were not satisfied with the settlement that was already made. Anaji wrote to them that, as the government officials had no knowledge of the local conditions, they themselves should undertake, with the help of some responsible persons in each village, the survey of their own villages. Anaji himself would then conduct a sample survey selecting at least one village of each class in every district. The final settlement would then be made after comparing the results of this sample survey with the figure as submitted by the *watandars*.

The *watandars* and the peasantry of the country were thus taken into full confidence by the government and were made to participate in the revenue settlement of their own villages.

About the rates of revenue in Shivaji's dominion, Sabhasad writes:

"An estimate of crop per *bigha* should be made and after dividing the grains into five shares, three of the shares should be given to the cultivators and two of the shares should be taken for the government."<sup>2311</sup>

Since Shaka 1589 (1667-68), according to the Jedhe Chronology, Shivaji applied the crop sharing system (*batai*) in his domain.<sup>2312</sup> Anaji Datto's letter cited above and a *mahzar* recording a judgement given by Shivaji in Shaka 1591 (1669-70) mention that in the new system the share of the government had been raised to 50 per cent.<sup>2313</sup> A later date chronology records that since Shaka 1589 the revenue was realized in kind.<sup>2314</sup> This is also corroborated by Shivaji's letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1676 quoted above. All of this is borne out by two of

Shivaji's letters; the first dated 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1676 is addressed to the officials of Pavan Mawal and the second dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1676 to the *subadar* of the Junnar division.<sup>2315</sup> They also tell us that all other taxes and duties were abolished when crop sharing was adopted. The background of these letters as revealed by them is as follows:

The temple establishment of Chinchvad enjoyed many grants and privileges. One of these bestowed upon it by the *deshmukhs* of Pavan Maval and Nane Maval was the privilege to purchase certain provisions from those districts at a fixed price which was lower than the market rates. The resultant loss was made up by levying tax upon the inhabitants of those districts. Though such extra impositions were abolished with the increase in the rate of land revenue, the temple establishment of Chinchvad continued to enjoy that privilege. Shivaji wrote to the *subadar* of the Junnar division regarding this matter:<sup>2316</sup>

“His Majesty had made the settlement that the cultivators should pay half [of the produce] and that there should be no other taxes besides that....Since this settlement prices are rising day by day and are quite high at present. After paying half [of the produce] to the government the cultivators cannot bear the loss incurred by his purchase at a low rate. Also it is decided that there should be no other taxes [to be paid by the cultivators after paying half of the produce to the government]....Such practices are abolished by His Majesty.”

Shivaji further ordered the *subadar* to supply these provisions, at a subsidized price, to the temple establishment of Chinchvad from government stocks. A similar letter was also sent to the officials of Pavan Mawal.<sup>2317</sup>

This temple establishment also had the privilege of taking 30 oxen loads of salt from Pen, Panvel and Nagothane. Shivaji,

by his order dated 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1878, directed the *subadar* of Kalyan that this practice was abolished and thenceforward the stipulated quantity of salt was to be provided, free of cost, from the government stocks at Pen.<sup>2318</sup>

The document about the revenue settlement of Madaki village in the district of Shirval, which has already been cited, mentions the revenue demand as one and a half *khandis* of corn and thirty *takas* in cash per *chavar* (unit of land measurement) of land.<sup>2319</sup> The price of corn was about two Hons per *khandi* and the rate of exchange was about ten *takas* per Hon.<sup>2320</sup> This shows that about half of the revenue collection in the village of Madaki was being made in kind and the remaining half in cash.

It appears from these documents that at least a substantial part of the land revenue in Shivaji's dominions was being collected in kind instead of in cash. The difference between the effects of the two systems could easily be surmised. To meet the revenue demand in cash, as in the Mughal and Bijapur administrations, the cultivator would have to sell a large portion of his produce at the time of harvest. This would result in an excessive supply of grain, and the consequent steep decline in its price at the time of harvest, and a shortage of grain and the consequent steep rise in its price later in the year. But this price rise would not benefit the poor cultivator. On the other hand, Shivaji's practice of realization of the revenue in kind rather than in cash would mean that the cultivator would pay the revenue in grain which would be stored in government warehouses. As a result, the supply of grain in the market would be controlled and the cultivator would get a good price for his produce. This however would not adversely affect village artisans because remuneration for their services was paid, as related earlier, in kind. As the price of grain would go on rising with the progress of the year, the government would release its stocks for sale which, on the one hand, would fetch a good price to the government and, on the other, would arrest the rise in the

price of grain. To sum up, the realization of land revenue in kind would thus increase the government's income, ensure a good price to the cultivators and keep the price of grain steady. It would also give the government a powerful lever to control the price of grain by holding or releasing its stocks. Further, it would enable the government to meet needs in time of famine, either natural or artificial that may be created through enemy action or its own scorched earth policy in face of an enemy invasion. The full exploitation of these potentialities of the system would of course depend upon its skillful execution. It appears that Shivaji, like Frederick the Great, had created the required machinery by introducing the system of collection of land revenue in kind. However, no attempt has so far been made to investigate how he operated it in practice.

#### TRADE

Agriculture and trade were the two wheels of prosperity in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century. As Shivaji was keen about the smooth running of the first he was equally concerned about the growth of the other.

Carrè observes:[2321](#)

"He selected the maritime places as they were easier to defend and more difficult to attack. Apart from the convenience of the ports and the freedom (they offered) of putting out to the sea, his further reflection was that by occupying the coast and treating well the Europeans who came to India he might make them love him and serve him.

"In fact along the stretch of the sea where he was the master there never passed a ship of Europe to which his Governors did not send refreshments with all the good offices that could hardly be expected

(even) by an allied prince. I passed that way in 1668 with two ships of the company and we were treated in a manner which was beyond our expectations. It was an act of his policy, but it was also due to the preference he felt for the people of Europe and above all for our nation, whom he held in esteem....

“He practiced upon tradesmen and toiling merchants in such a way that during the different voyages they were obliged to make, they took care of speaking well of him, praising his method of governing and making men’s minds yield to it. He contrived it in such a way, all the more sure as it was imperceptible, that they spoke like disinterested persons. Then, on their advice he closely followed his reputation and did not allow the enthusiasm to cool down - an enthusiasm so much propagation had roused for him in the hearts of the people.”

Despite the affront offered by the English, first by participating in the siege of Panhala and then by giving shelter to the Siddi’s fleet at Bombay, Shivaji tried to maintain amicable relations with them and promised “to settle a warehouse of his merchants in Bombay.”<sup>2322</sup> The English reopened their trading station at Rajapur in 1674 and wrote on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1675 that “Shivaji in his own country gives us [as] great encouragement to your trade as we can reasonably desire.”<sup>2323</sup> And again, the English president wrote from Surat on 28<sup>th</sup> September 1675:

2324

“During my stay here I have found odd neighbours to deal with, the jealous and envious Portuguese have endeavoured all that lay in their power to obstruct our settlement, the Governor of Surat has not been wanting also to use his policy to undermine us; and Siddi Sambul with his Fleet has

been no small impediment. The Dutch with their powerful Fleet designed to have swallowed us up, but blessed be God who has hitherto preserved us, and rendered all their evil designs advantageous [to us]; Shivaji only has proved, and that for his own interest sake, our fairest friend, and noblest enemy."

He also invited the French to open their trading station in his dominions. The French East India Company had established its trading station at Surat on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1668. In the same year they opened their trading station at Rajapur where Shivaji "gave them a *farman* to trade freely in all his ports."<sup>2325</sup> It would be remembered that he also permitted the Portuguese to open a trading station at Dabhol in 1667.<sup>2326</sup>

Though Shivaji thus invited European companies to trade in his country, he was one of the few Indian rulers to see through their territorial ambitions and never allowed them to get a firm foothold in his dominion. His policy towards them, though not penned in any contemporaneous document, is evident from his actions; and its best exposition may be given in the words of Ramchandrapant Amatya, whose celebrated treatise on policy breathes the teachings of his great master. It runs:<sup>2327</sup>

"Among the merchants the Portuguese and the English and the Dutch and the French and the Danes and other hat wearing [i.e. European] merchants also do carry on trade and commerce. But they are not like other merchants. Their masters, every one of them, are ruling Kings. By their orders and under their control these people have come to trade in these provinces. How can it happen that rulers have no greed for territories? These hat-wearers have full

ambition to enter into these provinces to increase their territories, and to establish their own opinions [religion]. Accordingly at various places they have already succeeded in their ambitious undertakings. Moreover, this race of people is obstinate. Where a place has fallen into their hands they will not give it up even at the cost of their lives.

“Their intercourse should therefore be restricted to the extent of only their coming and going [for trade]. They should strictly never be given places to settle. They should not at all be allowed to visit sea-forts. If some place has sometimes to be given for a factory, it should not be given at the mouth of an inlet or on the shores of the sea. If land is given in such places, it may be that they remain obedient as long as they like; they would, however establish new forts at those ports at some time with the help of their navy to protect them. Their strength lies in navy, guns and ammunition. As a consequence so much territory would be lost to the kingdom. Therefore if any place is at all to be given to them, it should be given in the midst of two or four famous great towns distant about eight to sixteen [i.e. a few] miles from the mouth of the sea, just as the French were given lands at Rajapur [in 1668, during Shivaji’s reign]. The places must be such that it must be low lying and within the range and control of the neighbouring town so as to avoid trouble to the town. Thus by fixing their place of habitation, factories should be permitted to be built. They should not be allowed to build [strong] permanent houses. If they live in this way by accepting the above conditions, it is well; if not, there is no need of them. It is enough if they occasionally come and go, and do not trouble us; nor need we trouble them.”

As Shivaji encouraged foreign merchants to trade in his country, he also tried to secure his share of the carrying trade in the Indian Ocean. His merchant fleet included both his own ships and those of his subjects and plied, as the following extracts from English letters would show, as far as the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

“We are informed that the rebel, Shivaji by name, is fitting out two vessels of considerable burden, which he intends for Mocha laden with such goods as were by storms and foul weather drove upon his coast, which we are advised, is of very considerable value.”<sup>2328</sup> (Surat, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1663)

And again,

“There will two ships sail hence for Mocha, we think both on the Raja’s account, unless the merchants purchase one of them and her lading, which we hear some talk of.”<sup>2329</sup> (Rajapur, 6<sup>th</sup> February 1663)

“He...has possessed himself of the most considerable ports belonging to Deccan, to the number of eight or nine; from whence he sets two or three or more trading vessels yearly from every port to Persia, Basra, Mocha etc.”<sup>2330</sup> (Surat, 12<sup>th</sup> March 1665)

“Here being a junk of Shivaji’s arrived from Aden the past day with little or nought in her.”<sup>2331</sup> (Mumbai, 7<sup>th</sup> September 1669)

“This day coming in by stress of weather a vessel laden from Muscat belonging to Rajapore one of

Shivaji's port towns.”<sup>2332</sup> (Mumbai Consultation, May 14, 1673)

“I understand the *subadar* of Kalyan is building one large vessel, of what design I know not, besides, I hear, that he has at Rajapur, four or five three masted vessels which used to be employed in trade to Muscat and other places.”<sup>2333</sup> (Mumbai, 15<sup>th</sup> August 1674)

The production of salt in Shivaji's dominions did not meet the needs of his subjects and they had to depend on its import from Bombay and Goa. Shivaji's policy of protecting the salt industry in his own dominions is revealed by his letter, dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1671, to Narhari Anandrao, the *Sarsubadar* of Kudal. It runs:<sup>2334</sup>

“His Highness has settled a high price for salt from Prabhavali to Kalyan-Bhiwandi. The Merchants are purchasing salt from the salt ports in Bardesh [a district of the Portuguese settlement of Goa]. As the price of salt here is very high all the merchants would be attracted to Bardesh. Therefore, impose a high custom duty in the passes. Consider the high price of salt in Prabhavali and Sangameshwar as compared to Bardesh and fix the custom duties so that the salt of Bardesh should be dearer than that of Sangameshwar. If you fail to do this, all merchants would be drawn towards Bardesh and [the trade in] our ports would decline. Therefore the moment you receive this letter, raise the custom duties in the passes so that the price of Bardesh salt should rise above that of Sangameshwar. Do not hesitate in the least. This would be of great benefit to His Highness....This is a matter of revenue of a hundred thousand rupees. Therefore act as per these instructions.”

## COINS

Coinage of various countries were current in Shivaji's dominions. Striking of coins in one's own name was regarded as a symbol of sovereignty and Shivaji had also struck his own, perhaps for the small profits they gave him but more still as a proclamation of his independence. His coins found so far are of two types; the first, a small copper coin known as the *Shivrai* and the other, a Hon of gold.<sup>2335</sup> They are very simple and bore, on the obverse, the words "Shri Raja Shiva" in three lines and on the reverse "Chhatra Pati" in two lines, with a dotted circle around them. They do not bear the name of the mint at which they were struck nor the year in which they were issued. In his dispatch dated 27<sup>th</sup> May 1674 from Rairi (or Raigad), Henry Oxenden, the head of the English Embassy that visited the fort at the time of Shivaji's coronation, mentions that, "After his Coronation, he intends to set up a mint, and proposes to himself great advantages thereby."<sup>2336</sup> It is clear from this, as from the fact that striking coins in one's own name was then regarded as a indicator of sovereignty, and from the legend on these coins (*Shivachhatrapati*), which is the name he adopted for certain types of letters issued *after* the coronation, that he started striking coins in his own name since his coronation.<sup>2337</sup>

## CHARGES OF MISADMINISTRATION

Both the Mughal Empire and the Bijapur Sultanate considered Shivaji as an outlaw. And naturally, as these were long established regimes, the Europeans in India also thought of him as a mere rebel. Among them was Dr. Fryer who had little firsthand knowledge of Shivaji's dominions save a very short trip through them on his way from Mumbai to Junnar. His account of that journey runs as follows:<sup>2338</sup>

“When I came before the Governor I found him in State, though under a hovel, where were many Brahmins with account books, writing at some distance; nearer his Privy Council, with whom he seemed to advise: I was placed on his left hand, and desired my interpreter to acquaint him my errand, withal entreating his favour for my secure passing the Hill [the Sahyadris]. He made it a piece of difficulty, and told me I must return to Bhiwandi for orders, to whose *Havaldar* he was accountable, not to him of Kalyan, which was within half a day’s journey from whence I set forth. Hearing this I bore myself as sedately as I could, having been informed of the advantage they take of a disturbed countenance, and sweetened him with [the flatter of] his own authority being sufficient, telling him of his Master’s kindness to the English, and their friendship towards him; which worked him to a yielding temper; yet he scrupled [that] my canister, or trunk, might be lined with pearl, my horse [might be] sold to the enemy, hoping to suck somewhat out of me; I replying, what I brought were at his liberty to search, and that I went only on an amicable account to cure a sick person and should be ready to serve him, if he required; his fury was quite pawled [i.e. checked] but perceiving an hungry look to hang on them all, and suspecting lest they should serve me some dog trick, I made a small present, and he signing the pass, dismissed me with a bundle of pawn [betel leaf], the usual ceremony at parting.”

This of course is a firsthand experience but before drawing any general conclusion from it, we should bear in mind a few points. In the first place, the officer whom Fryer paid a visit was not a governor at all but, as his own account indicates, a petty officer, a mere subordinate of a *Havaldar*. Secondly, as already related, Fryer had made only a very short trip through Shivaji’s

dominions. Thirdly, he was an Englishman and Shivaji's strained relations with the English — due to the affront they gave him by giving shelter to the Siddi's fleet at Bombay — might have affected the treatment he received from Shivaji's officers. Fourthly, as Dr. Sen observes, "public opinion in those days was not offended if a *Havaldar* went out of his way to take a small present from a traveler for granting his passport or from an aggrieved petitioner for redressing his grievances."<sup>2339</sup> And this was so not only in India but in Europe as well.<sup>2340</sup>

But we need not rely on this merely negative evidence. Carrè who had traveled through Shivaji's dominions on his way from Chaul to St.Thome (i.e. Meliapur) and whose experience of that administration was certainly wider and deeper than Dr. Fryer's, records:

"What obliged me to pay a visit to King Shivaji's governor of Chaul was the indispensable necessity I had of traveling by land and traversing a very extensive country under his jurisdiction. There I was received with great complacence, and have every reason to be satisfied with the civility of the Governor."<sup>2341</sup>

And then

"I had a very pleasant journey while proceeding to St. Thome...I met, at all moments, King Shivaji's officers and troops from whom I received nothing but courtesy; for after the example of their master they evinced a proneness to strangers, and specially to the French "<sup>2342</sup>

Dr. Fryer's general account of Shivaji's administration is based, not on firsthand knowledge, but on hearsay and is no

more than a mere repetition of what he saw, or heard, in other parts of India. It runs:

“They are neither for public good or common honesty, but their own private interest only: They refuse no base offices for their own commodity, inviting merchants to come and trade among them, and then rob them, or else turmoil them on account of customs; always in a corner getting more for themselves than their Master, yet openly most seem mighty zealous for their Master’s dues; so that trade is unlikely to settle where he has anything to do; notwithstanding his country has all along on the sea-shore, and no goods can be transferred without his permission, unless they go a great way about, as we are forced to do.”[2343](#)

He continues:

“It is a general calamity, and much to be deplored, to hear the complaints of the poor people that remain, or are rather compelled to endure the slavery of Shivaji: The *Desais* have land imposed upon them at double the former rates, and if they refuse to accept it on these hard conditions (if moneyed men) they are carried to prison, there they are famished almost to death; racked and tortured most inhumanly till they confess where it is: They have now in limbo several Brahmins, whose flesh they tear with pincers heated red-hot, drub them on the shoulders to extreme anguish (though according to their law it is forbidden to strike a Brahmin). This is accustomed sawce [? sauce] all India over, the princes doing the same by the governors, when removed from their offices, to squeeze their ill got estates out of them; which when they have done, it may be that they may be employed again: And after this fashion the *Desais* deal with the *kunabis* or peasants; so that the great fish prey on the

little, as well by land as by sea, and bringing not only them but their families into eternal bondage.”<sup>2344</sup>

Shivaji's letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1662 to Sarjerao Jedhe, which has already been quoted, shows his profound concern for the security of his people.<sup>2345</sup> His letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> May 1674 to his soldiers, which shall shortly be quoted, illustrates his anxiety for the welfare of his subjects and the good name of his soldiery.<sup>2346</sup> On 5<sup>th</sup> September 1676, he writes to one of his district *Subadars* to act with justice “without yearning for even the discarded stem of a leaf of vegetable” and that “even slight injustice and oppression on the people would displease” him.<sup>2347</sup> His policy of encouraging cultivation by making interest free advances for seeds, oxen and even subsistence has already been described. We have also seen how his subjects were being made to participate in the survey of their own lands. Readers would also remember the promptness with which he relieves his people of a slight extra burden — which they were carrying without complaint — of maintaining the temple establishments of Chinchvad.<sup>2348</sup> This much about his subjects in general.

A devout Hindu, he had a great reverence for the Brahmin community. Dadaji Kondadeo, whom he held in great respect and whose memory he cherished long after his death, was a Brahmin.<sup>2349</sup> Many of his district *Subadars* and seven out of his eight ministers were Brahmins.<sup>2350</sup> One of his regulations was that Brahmins, even in the territory under enemy control, were not to be molested nor taken as hostages.<sup>2351</sup> Having learnt that one of his soldiers had committed suicide after attacking and wounding a Brahmin accountant, he wrote to the *Subadar* of the division: “Bapuji Nalavada picked a quarrel and inflicted a sword cut [on the Brahmin accountant] and at last committed suicide by stabbing himself in the stomach with a knife. You

have not written to us, though this incident has taken place. In spite of his being a Maratha he drew his sword against a Brahmin and suffered its consequence.”<sup>2352</sup> In another letter he specifically instructs an officer to look after the Brahmins residing at Chaphal to serve the deity and the saint, Ramdas.<sup>2353</sup> His government granted scholarships to many Brahmin pundits.<sup>2354</sup> We shall presently see how efficient his intelligence department was; they would not have failed to inform him had any excesses really been committed in his own dominions.

Against all this first class evidence — not to speak of the tradition which speaks of him as an incarnation of god — Dr. Fryer would have us believe that the subjects, and Brahmins at that, were being tortured in Shivaji’s kingdom! It is not necessary therefore to elaborate on the unreliability of his account. But Guarda’s account of Shivaji’s administration would bear quotation in this context. It runs:

“Moreover such was the good treatment he accorded to the people and such was the honesty with which he observed the capitulations that none looked upon him without a feeling of love and confidence.”<sup>2355</sup>

“He used to say no sovereign who rules should excuse excesses, much less those of his grandees, for such an oversight when rightly construed must be regarded as a consent whereby the Kings participate in crimes of their subjects. When he [i.e. the King] punishes them he not merely renders justice but avoids evils, which are ordinarily much greater than those he might overlook; and above all, it makes all contented, for when justice is administered equally to all without partiality, it does not cause discontent.

With such a procedure of justice without consulting any jurist, he [Shivaji] made his subjects very happy and his fame rose to such a height that throughout Hindustan, it became as dreaded as it was cherished.”<sup>2356</sup>

#### MILITARY SYSTEM

##### *Field Forces*

Before proceeding to review Shivaji’s military system, we should bear in mind Napoleon’s remark, namely, “It is very difficult for a nation to create an army when it has not already a body of officers and non-commissioned officers to serve as a nucleus, and a system of military organization.” Shivaji had to begin from scratch. He did not have an army like the one Alexander the Great had inherited from his father, nor a nation like the one upon which Napoleon built. And he created not only an army but, while doing so, created a nation as well.

Shivaji’s army was divided into two main branches — cavalry and infantry. The cavalry were of two classes, the *Bargir* or the *paga*, who were mounted, armed and equipped by the state, and *Shiledars*, who brought their own horses and equipment. Shivaji’s main reliance was on the *Bargirs* or the *Paga* rather than on *Shiledars*. Sabhasad tells us: “The strength of the *Paga* was rendered superior [to that of the *Shiledars*]. The *Shiledars* were placed under the jurisdiction of the *paga*.”<sup>2357</sup> At the time of his death, according to Sabhasad, his cavalry comprised 105,000 troopers including 45,000 *Bargirs*; the rest (60,000) must be regarded as *Shiledars*.<sup>2358</sup> It is inconceivable, as we shall see in the section dealing with war finance, that Shivaji could not have maintained so large a standing force of *Shiledars*, and the figure given by Sabhasad is evidently the maximum potential strength of *Shiledars* that could be mobilized as and when required. Summing up after narrating

Shivaji's death, Bhimsen in his *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha* states: "He [Shivaji] had 40,000 horses in his stables."<sup>2359</sup> So we may take it for granted that towards the end of his life Shivaji had a force of about 40,000 troopers, all mounted and equipped by himself and paid directly through his treasury. Martin states under November 1677: "All the horses belonged to that chief [i.e. Shivaji] who employed some grooms to take care of them the cavaliers did not in any way meddle with them."<sup>2360</sup>

The organization of cavalry was, according to Sabhasad, as follows: There were 25 troopers in each cavalry troop or *Havala* under a *Havaladar*. A water-carrier and a farrier were attached to each troop. Five troops formed a squadron or *Jumla* under a *Jumledar* and ten *Jumlas* a cavalry regiment under a *Hazari*. Five such regiments were organized in a cavalry division under a *Panch-Hazari*. The chief command of the cavalry — both *Paga* and *Shiledars* — rested with the *Sarnaubat* of the cavalry who was also the commander-in-chief of the army. An establishment of news reporters, couriers and spies was attached to each cavalry regiment and higher unit.<sup>2361</sup>

The cavalry were armed with swords, shields and spears. Some of them carried carbines as well.<sup>2362</sup> About the proportion of horses to troopers, Martin tells us: "There were ordinarily three horses for two men, this is what contributed to his usual celerity."<sup>2363</sup>

Bhimsen's description of the organization of Shivaji's cavalry is much like Sabhasad's with only some minor variations.<sup>2364</sup> We also find occasional, though very few, contemporaneous references to the designations of cavalry and infantry officers as given by Sabhasad.<sup>2365</sup>

Such articulate organization is a common feature in modern times and therefore its novelty might be overlooked. It has been related in the first chapter that all other armies in India of the time, except of course the European forces, consisted of a large number of un-uniform contingents. Shivaji's army, however, was organized on an entirely different pattern. How its articulate organization enabled it to perform a variety of maneuvers without confusion and thus outmaneuver the cumbrous, through heavily armed and numerous, Mughal masses has already been explained.<sup>2366</sup> Such organization was not a new invention. Since before the Common Era, the Greek, the Roman and, perhaps, even the Indian armies were organized in this fashion. Before and during the Middle Ages, these and such other well organized armies had degenerated into feudal forces. In Europe, the system was revived, largely at the suggestion and instigation of Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba (1453-1515), by King Ferdinand of Spain, in the early years of the sixteenth century and was soon copied by other European States. These developments, however, had not reached India where armies still consisted of a medley of un-uniform bodies raised and maintained by individual officers who held assignments of revenue for their expenditure. Shivaji's creation of an army which was raised, paid and equipped directly by the state and which was organized into well defined groups with a clear cut chain of command was, therefore, no less than a revolutionary departure from the methods which were then being followed in India.

According to Sabhasad, Shivaji's infantry was organized into sections of ten men, each placed under a *Naik*. Five sections formed an infantry platoon or *Havala* under a *Havaldar*. Two or three such platoons made an infantry company or *Jumla* under a *Jumledar*. Each infantry battalion consisted of ten such companies under a *Hazari*. All infantry battalions were placed under command of an infantry *Sarnaubat*.<sup>2367</sup> The weapons of the infantry comprised a sword, a shield and matchlock.

In a Marathi document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657, Noor Khan is mentioned as the *Sarnaubat* of the infantry and he seems to have been, so far as we know, the first officer to hold that post in Shivaji's army.<sup>2368</sup> Sabhasad tells us that after the conquest of Jawali (15<sup>th</sup> January 1656) Yesaji Kank was appointed to that post.<sup>2369</sup>

Shivaji's infantry was raised mostly in the Mavals and Konkan. In fact, his infantry is generally referred to as the Mavalas.<sup>2370</sup> As an English letter tells us that his soldiers were "all small shott [short] men".<sup>2371</sup> But they were hardy and nimble, and formed excellent raw material for infantry. Of them, Fryer says:

"These hilly people are of a rougher temper, more hardy and less addicted to the soft vanities of music, clothing, pomp and stateliness, being all naked, starving rascals; Shivaji's men thereby being fitter for any martial exploit, having been accustomed to fare hard, journey fast, and take little pleasure. But the other [i.e. the Mughal soldier] will miss of a booty rather than a dinner; must mount in state and have their arms carried before them, and their women not far behind them, with the masters of mirth and jollity; will rather expect than pursue a foe; but then they stand it out better; for Shivaji's men care not much for a pitched field, though they are good at surprising and ransacking."<sup>2372</sup>

According to the Sabhasad Chronicle Shivaji had selected as his body guards excellent men from among the Mavalas. They were organized into four units totaling 2,000 men. They were given uniform at government expense: embroidered turbans, jackets of broad cloth, gold and silver rings to be attached to the upper and lower ends of the scabbards, silver

rings for muskets and spears, and a pair of ear rings. They were to be ready at all the times to take the road and were to march on the four sides of his palanquin when Shivaji marched out.[2373](#)

The Artillery was the weakest arm of Shivaji's army. He had to dispense with it because, in the first place, the form of warfare to which he resorted called for extreme mobility and, secondly, his fledgling state lacked the necessary facilities for the production of artillery. His principal source of artillery equipment remained the European settlements in India. Of these the Portuguese, because they were his neighbours, and the English, because of their fear of Aurangzeb's wrath, and possibly because of the vicinity of Mumbai to his territory and the grudge they bore toward him for the Rajapur affair, were reluctant to oblige him with the supply of guns and ammunition.[2374](#) This left him only with the French as his principal source of artillery supplies. An English letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1673 from Mumbai to Surat tells us that "The French have furnished Shivaji with 88 guns and 3,000 *maunds* [a unit of weight] of lead which they themselves acknowledge, but say they were forced thereunto."[2375](#) This news of having been *forced* to supply Shivaji with guns and lead appears to have been deliberately spread by the French themselves to avoid any enmity with the Mughals. Another English letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> January 1674, from Surat to the Company, refers to the same incident but gives a slightly different quantity of lead. It says: "On the 25<sup>th</sup> of August arrived here the French ship the *Orient Sun* of 8 or 900 tons burden that came out of France the year before...They have privately sent down to Rajapur to supply Shivaji's fleet 88 small guns most of them, and 2,000 Maunds of lead."[2376](#) Again an English letter dated 30<sup>th</sup> December 1679 from Rajapur to Surat, tells us of his having bought forty guns from the French at Rajapur.[2377](#)

At times, he managed to buy a few from the English also. An English letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> January 1676 from Mumbai to the Company tells us: “The *Berkeley Castle* when here last, brought out 13 iron guns, 24 pounds, some of which were spared [for] Shivaji, by which means we are in great want of great guns.”<sup>2378</sup> Another English letter, dated 7<sup>th</sup> April 1671 from Mumbai, reveals some interesting information. It says: “The two guns formerly mentioned, the Deputy Governor has sold to a Frenchman, who sold them to a *fidalgo* [i.e. Portuguese nobleman] at Thana and he sent them, as we since hear, to Shivaji, they had them for 5 Rupees a Surat *maund* and though they are very bad within yet with their powder and stone shot they may last a good while.”<sup>2379</sup>

### ***Salaries***

We have already seen that Shivaji had abolished the *jagir* system in his dominions. Sabhasad’s statement that the annual accounts of salaries were settled punctually is corroborated by Cosme de Guarda. He writes: “Shivaji gave them...a good salary and with such punctuality that on the appearance of the New Moon each one received what had been promised him at the time of enlistment.”<sup>2380</sup> Tavernier also tells us that Shivaji “was well served by his forces because they were always very well paid.”<sup>2381</sup>

As for the scales of salary, Martin records under November 1677: “It will not be out of place to mention that the cavaliers of Shivaji ordinarily got for their pay two *pagodas* [i.e. Hons] per month.<sup>2382</sup> This is broadly correct because in an original appointment letter issued by Shivaji on 30<sup>th</sup> July 1677, the salary of each of the seven troopers mentioned therein is given as three Hons per month.<sup>2383</sup>

We do not have a complete chart of the salary scales in Shivaji's army. But Sabhasad records some of the figures. According to him, the (annual) salary of a cavalry *Jumledar* was 500 Hons and that of his *Muzumdar* or accounting officer, 100-125 Hons. The annual salaries of a *Hazari* and *Panch-Hazari* of cavalry were 1,000 and 2,000 Hons respectively. An infantry *Jumledar* received 100 Hons per year and his *Sabnis* or accountant, 40 Hons per year. The Annual salaries of a *Hazari* of the infantry was 500 Hons and of his *Sabnis*, 100-125 Hons. Judged from these figures, an infantry *Hazari* was equivalent to a cavalry *Jumledar*.<sup>2384</sup> Also, the gulf between the salaries of officers and men is greater than that at present but this was so in every other army of the period. And yet it was much less than that in the Mughal army. For instance, the personal (*dhat*) annual remuneration of a Mughal *mansabdar* with the rank of 3000 *dhat*/3000 *sawar* would be Rs.150,000 per year and if he was posted in the same province in which his *jagir* lay he would be required to maintain and command a contingent of 1,000 troopers for which he would be paid, in addition to his personal salary, at the rate of Rs.200 per year per *sawar* in his *sawar* rank figure, i.e. Rs.600,000.<sup>2385</sup> The annual salary of a *hazari* in Shivaji's cavalry, who would be commanding 1,250 troopers, would be 1000 Hons i.e. about Rs.3750 rupees, 1/40<sup>th</sup> of that of a Mughal commander of 1,000 troopers. And yet, judged by their performance, and by the fact that, despite great inducements, there were very few defections from Shivaji's army and, with the sole exception of Netoji Palkar,<sup>2386</sup> none from the higher ranks, the officers in Shivaji's army must have been a contented lot. It may also be noted that the officer class in the Mughal Empire was filled with the fabulously rich Muslim and Hindu aristocracy. The officers in Shivaji's kingdom were drawn from the commoners; few, if any, belonged to the Maratha aristocracy, including his close relations and in-laws.

One more point bears notice here. In Mughal service, *mansabdars* were expected to give to the Emperor, and received from him, costly presents like jewelled daggers and swords, and horses and elephants with gold and silver trappings. But the dazzling opulence of the Mughal Court and its magnificent buildings should not blind us to the misery of the peasants, the *minars* with the heads of 'rebels' embedded in them, women and children dragged into the streets to be sold as slaves. There was no extravagance in Shivaji's court, but there were no *minars* of heads in the background either.

### *Field Regulations*

According to Sabhasad, the cavalry subsisted off the enemy's country during the campaigning season. At the time of their departure on an expedition, an inventory of all the belongings of every trooper was made. All plunder was regarded as the property of the state. At the frontier of home dominions, the whole army was searched and everything found in excess of the former inventory was made over to the state.[2387](#)

This is corroborated by Bhimsen, Khafi Khan and Cosme de Guarda. Bhimsen writes:

"After the plundering expedition was over, whatever they gained over and above their needs and demands (for subsistence during the campaign) was deposited in the name of their government. He (i.e. Shivaji) had appointed spies who used to trace out the missing material of anybody in the army."[2388](#)

And Khafi Khan states:

"He had laid down a rule that whenever a place was plundered nothing except goods and chattels as are used by poor people, copper coins, and vessels of

brass and copper would belong to the man who had found them. No one who came into possession of other articles, silver and gold, whether coined or uncoined, ornaments, cloth and jewels had the power to withhold the slightest part from them. All these were confiscated by the commanders and officers and were made over to the government of that wicked fellow [Shivaji].”<sup>2389</sup>

And, according to Guarda,

“They gathered the spoils, all of which belonged to the soldiers, except gold and silver that had to be delivered in their entirety to Shivaji under grave penalties. This was done with rare punctuality.”<sup>2390</sup>

Shivaji’s regulations regarding the behaviour of his soldiers in enemy country were, according to Sabhasad, as follows:

“In enemy territories, women and children should not be captured. Males, if found, should be captured. Cows should not be taken. Bullocks should be requisitioned for transport purposes only. Brahmins should not be molested; where contribution has been laid, a Brahmin should not be taken as a surety. No one should commit adultery.”<sup>2391</sup>

Khafi Khan also records:

“Nevertheless he had made a regulation that wherever his army went plundering no one should stretch his hand against a mosque or the Book of God or women of any one. If [a copy of] the Holy Quran fell into his hands, he would keep it with respect and reverence and give it to his Muslim servants; if a Hindu or Muslim woman fell into the hands of his men no one had the courage to look at her with an evil eye and Shivaji strove to protect her till her heirs came and rescued her by paying a ransom according to their means.”<sup>2392</sup>

We have already seen how, during his first raid on Surat, Shivaji spared the habitation of Father Ambrose, the Capuchin missionary, and how he spared the house of a deceased Hindu broker of the Dutch "being assured that he had been very charitable while alive."

At the end of the campaigning season, the cavalry returned to its cantonments in the home country which, according to Sabhasad, were provisioned with grains, fodder and medicines and provided with barracks and stables thatched with grass.<sup>2393</sup> Shivaji's circular letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> May 1674 to his army fully illustrates his anxiety for the welfare of his people and the good name of his soldiery. It runs:<sup>2394</sup>

"To *Jumledars*, *Havaldars* and *Karkuns* (i.e. accounting officers) in charge of the army stationed at the village of Halvarn in the district of Chiplun of Dabhol division.

"His Highness has made arrangements for the cavalry at Chiplun and there is no intention to return to the upcountry hereafter. Owing to the stay of the army at Chiplun, all the grain and other necessaries, that were stored for the rainy season in the Dabhol division, have been almost exhausted, entailing hardships upon the people of the district for the army's requirements of fodder and other necessaries. The cavalry had to remain inactive for twenty days in the hot season of Vaishakh [i.e. about April-May]. As it was necessary corn has been supplied to the cavalry from various forts. Now you will ask for any amount of rations of grain and grass, feed recklessly while supplies are available and when they are exhausted will get nothing in the height of the rainy season. Then you will starve and the horses will start dying which will mean that you yourselves have killed them.

Then you will start molesting the people. Some of you would go and bring the grains from the peasant, some others would bring bread, some grass, some firewood, and some vegetables. If you behave in this fashion the poor peasants who are somehow eking out a bare livelihood will start leaving. Many of them will start dying of starvation. This would mean that you are worse than the Mughals. Such would be the curse of the peasants. Then you will be blamed for the plight of the people and the horses. So troopers and footmen, bear this in mind and behave properly. Some of you may be staying in cavalry cantonments or different villages. You have no business to molest the people in any way or to step outside your residence. His Highness has given you your salaries from the treasury. Whatever one wants, whether it be grain, or grass for cattle that you might be keeping, or fuel or vegetables, he should buy it in the market or when it comes round for sale. You must not quarrel with or oppress anybody.

“Authorities will issue rations in such a way that the supplies assigned for the cavalry should last for the whole season. You must take these accordingly so that you will not starve and will have your food everyday and the horses will also gain strength. There is no need to argue with the authorities for nothing or to say ‘Give me this’ or ‘Give me that’ or to break into store rooms and plunder the stores.

“Troopers are living in barracks. Some of them will light fire, some will make hearths at wrong places, some will take light for smoking tobacco without noticing that the hay is lying about or the wind is blowing, Then suddenly there will occur an accident. When one barrack catches fire all others shall also be burnt down. Then even if some peasants

are beheaded [as scapegoats] or the authorities are censured not a piece of timber would become available for constructing [new] barracks and not a single one can be built. This is understood by all. Therefore let due warning be taken by all. Officers should always make rounds to see that there is no danger from fires or hearths. If you keep the lamps burning at night, mice might carry away the lighted wick and cause mischief. This must not happen. Precautions should be taken against fires and everything should be done to safeguard barracks and grass. Then the horses will outlive the season. Otherwise there will be no need to stable the horses nor to feed them because that will be the end of cavalry! Then you will be free from all care! Therefore it is that I have written to you in so much detail.

“All *Jumledars*, *Havaldars*, *Karkuns* should hear this letter being read to them and remain vigilant. Often and often, day after day, you should keep yourself informed and give strict instructions. And whoever will fail to act according to this order, whoever will be guilty of this offence, whoever will be found to blame that Maratha will not be spared of his honour, not to mention service. Soldiers! Bear this in mind. You will not be spared if you commit excesses. Therefore bear this in mind and behave properly.”

The Maratha army was lightly equipped. Camp equipage was unknown among them. They lived off the country and could subsist on the scantiest of food. Officers of the army shared equally in the privations of their men. Shivaji's regulations regarding women were, according to Sabhasad, as follows: “There should be no women, female slaves or dancing girls in the army. He who would keep them should be

beheaded.”<sup>2395</sup> Fryer, too, states that “whores and dancing wenches he [Shivaji] allows none in his army.”<sup>2396</sup>

After narrating the first sack of Surat, Iversen, a Dutchman who was in Surat then, writes:

“Shivaji with his army withdrew two marches off and encamped. In order to learn whether he had fixed his camp there or intended to proceed further, a peon (that is a lackey) informed the Dutch that he intended to go to the enemy as a fakir or mendicant monk. He actually passed through the whole camp without being suspected, Shivaji had not had a tent pitched but only a cloth hung from a tree for protection against the heat of the sun. The booty in [on?] oxen and horses had been brought in and laid before him.”<sup>2397</sup>

Martin, the French governor of Pondicherry, whose envoy, St.Germain, had seen the Maratha camp during Shivaji’s Karnatak expedition in 1677, describes it thus:

“The camp of Shivaji was without pomp, without women, there were no baggages, only two tents but of simple cloth, coarse and very scanty, one for him and the other for his prime minister.”<sup>2398</sup>

It was this radical difference in supply and discipline that had endowed the Maratha army with such remarkable mobility.

All these regulations were strictly enforced. His injunctions on this point were, according to Sabhasad, as follows:

"If anyone had been guilty of violating the rules or of cowardice, an inquiry should be made and the truth ascertained with the consensus of many and the offender should be punished and dismissed. Investigation should be made quickly."<sup>2399</sup>

This system of 'Court Martial,' though not as advanced as that introduced in Europe by Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, in the first quarter of the 17th Century, was certainly a great improvement on the arbitrary methods that were then followed in India.

But if Shivaji was strict in enforcing discipline in the army he was also kind to his soldiers. Officers and soldiers who had distinguished themselves in action were honoured and rewarded. As for those who were wounded or had fallen in action, Sabhasad, after narrating the destruction of Afzal Khan's army, writes:

He [Shivaji] descended from the fort, met all his men as well as Afzal Khan's men, and as many of his soldiers' sons as were of fighting age, treated them kindly and reassured them, and took into his service the sons of combatants who had fallen [in the action]. He ordered that the widows of those who had no sons, should be maintained by [a pension] half [their husbands'] pay. The wounded were given [rewards of] two hundred, one hundred, twenty-five or fifty Hons per man according to the nature of their wounds."<sup>2400</sup>

And Tavernier writes of him:

"As he was both courteous and liberal he had as many followers, both cavalry and infantry, as he cared for, and in a short time he got together an army, the soldiers on the report of his liberality coming to join him from all sides."<sup>2401</sup>

Even Cosme da Guarda, a devout Catholic who regarded Shivaji an infidel and believed, therefore, that his [Shivaji's] soul would suffer "the eternal torments of hell", waxes eloquent in singing Shivaji's praises.<sup>2402</sup> He writes:

"By his people he was exceedingly loved, both in matters of reward and punishment he was so impartial that while he lived he made no exception for any person; no merit was left unrewarded, no offence went unpunished; and this he did with so much care and attention that he specially charged his Governors to inform him in writing of the conduct of his soldiers, mentioning in particular those who had distinguished themselves, and he would at once order their promotion, either in rank or pay, according to their merit. He was naturally loved by all men of valour and good conduct."<sup>2403</sup>

### ***Forts***

Shivaji was a great builder of forts. During his brief stay at Chaul in 1673, Abbé Carré had paid a visit to the Maratha governor of the place who, during the course of conversion, made the following remark about his master:

"Ever destined to conquer a part of the world, he had studied with extreme care everything about the duty of a General and that of a soldier and above all the art of fortification, which he understood better than the ablest engineers."<sup>2404</sup>

About the renovation of Gingee and other fortresses, made after the conquest of the Karnatak in 1677, Andre Freire, a Jesuit missionary, remarks:

“After the capture of the Kingdom of Gingee... Shivaji, as a sagacious and experienced man who knew the great strength of the Mussulmans in India... started to fortify himself for the future in order to resist the whole of their power. To attain this he strongly fortified the main fort of Gingee, though its situation is naturally impregnable. He pulled down great parts of its walls and built them again with new bastions so tactically constructed that it looks like a fortress built by Europeans than by Indians. Thus he fortified himself in the rest of this kingdom, by destroying some forts which he considered of no use, and by building new ones both in the plains and on the hills and highest mountains against all enemies. Following European methods he broke up tremendous boulders, built tanks, constructed edifices and all other requirements of warfare.”<sup>2405</sup>

As Shivaji was keen about acquiring, building and repairing fortresses, he was equally concerned about their proper upkeep. We have a memorandum, drawn under Shivaji's seal, about the maintenance of fortifications. All fortresses mentioned therein were old ones and therefore the money allotted for each was evidently to be spent on repairs and expansion. The memorandum runs as follows:<sup>2406</sup>

“Construction work decided to be undertaken in the year 1671-72....

If artisans are employed without planning they do not get their salaries [punctually]. Then they get discontented and do not work. Therefore it has been decided that constructions should be undertaken as per plan only...

Hons: 175000 One hundred and seventy-five thousand Hons only.

[Hons] [Forts]

50,000 Raigad

35,000

20,000 Tanks, Two

10,000 Terrace

5,000 Fort

35,000

15,000 Rampart

50,000

10,000 Sinhgad

10,000 Sindhudurg

10,000 Vijaydurg

10,000 Survarndurg

10,000 Pratapgad

10,000 Purandar

10,000 Rajgad

5,000 Pranchandgad

5,000 Prasiddhgad

5,000 Vishalgad

5,000 Mahipatgad

5,000 Sudhagad

5,000 Lohagad

5,000 Sabalgad

5,000 Shrivardhangad and Manranjan

3,000 Korigad

2,000 Sarasgad

2,000 Mahidhargad

1,000 Manohargad

7,000 Miscellaneous

175,000

One hundred and seventy-five thousand Hons to be spent as above."

The above list consists of only 25 forts. By the close of his life Shivaji, according to Sabhasad, had about 240 forts in his dominions.<sup>2407</sup> So, many such papers must have been drawn up from time to time. But all that is extant now is this single memorandum. But this single sheet shows that the upkeep and maintenance of the forts in Shivaji's kingdom was based on proper planning.

The garrisons in Shivaji's forts according to Sabhasad were organized into sections of ten men and though he does not mention so, it is evident that these in turn must have been grouped into higher units. The chronicler also tells us that it was laid down that the garrisons were to be selected by Shivaji himself and each man had to give a surety of one of the men on the royal staff for good conduct.<sup>2408</sup> The commandant of the fort was called *Havaldar* who was later re-designated as *Mudradhari*.<sup>2409</sup> He was assisted by two principal officers, the *sabnis* (muster clerk) and *karkhanis* (store keeper). These three officers, who served as checks on one another, were jointly responsible for the administration and protection of the fort. A memorandum regarding administration of the forts tells us that the accounts prepared by the *sabnis* or orders of payment drawn by him upon the treasury were to be checked and approved by both the commandant and the store keeper. Similarly the inventories prepared by the store keeper had to be checked and approved by the commandant and the accountant.<sup>2410</sup> The commandant had under him an officer called *sarnaubat* — not to be confused with the infantry and cavalry *Sarnaubats* which were much higher ranks — and one or more *tat-sarnaubats* responsible for the defence of the rampart or a part of it.<sup>2411</sup>

As for the salary scales of these garrisons we have four letters of appointment under Shivaji's seal, three of which dated 30<sup>th</sup> July 1677 are addressed to the commandant of fort Utalur and the fourth dated 26<sup>th</sup> July 1677 to that of fort Valgondanur.<sup>2412</sup> The monthly salary scales that become apparent from these letters are roughly as follows: *havaldar*, 12.50 Hons; engineer 10.50 Hons, *sarnaubat*, 8 Hons; *tat-sarnaubat* 4 Hons; clerk, 3 Hons.

Shivaji had captured many a fortress by surprise attacks and naturally he was very keen about maintenance of strict vigilance in them once they were his. According to Chitnis one of his regulations regarding forts was that the commandant was not to admit any one — friend or foe — during the night.<sup>2413</sup> Emphasizing the importance of this regulation, the chronicler relates the following anecdote.

One night Shivaji went to Panhala. His attendants shouted out to the *Havaldar* that the Maharaja himself was seeking admission, hotly pursued by the enemy. The officer came, stood on the rampart with his colleagues and submitted that the Maharaja had laid down the rule that the gate was not to be opened at night. He, however, offered to hold the enemy off with the help of the guards of the outposts while the Maharaja should wait below the rampart. Then Shivaji said: 'The regulation was laid down by me and I am myself seeking admission now; open the gate.' But the officer refused to do so. Then Shivaji tried threats: 'You are a servant, you must obey my commands, or else you will be punished.' But still the officer did not open the gate. Early in the morning he opened the gate, took Shivaji in, and said, 'I have done wrong; punish me as you like.' But Shivaji praised his sense of duty and promoted him on the spot.<sup>2414</sup>

As the chronicle is written at a much later date we cannot vouch for the veracity of the story. But what it is trying to

project, viz. Shivaji's eternal vigilance about the security of his fortresses, may not be disbelieved.

We have a few references of Shivaji's tours of inspection of his forts. The Shivapur Chronology records that on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1657 Shivaji went towards Kalyan to see (inspect) the forts and on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1664 Shivaji went to inspect Sinhgad.<sup>2415</sup> We also have a letter of Moro Trimal, the prime minister and Nilo Sondev, the finance secretary, in which they make inquiries about Shivaji's proposed inspection tour of forts. It reads:

“How long His Highness would stay at Shivapattan? Would he go towards Lohagad to see the works [i.e. fortifications] or not? From Rohida he was to go to see Pandavgad fort. Would he go there or not? You have not communicated any of this information. So send detailed information.”<sup>2416</sup>

It is remarkable that in those turbulent days when the loss of a fort through treason was not uncommon, Shivaji did not lose a single fort through treason or stratagem. On the other hand almost all the forts which Shivaji captured from the Mughals or the Adilshahi Sultanate were captured by surprise attacks.<sup>2417</sup>

### *The Intelligence Department*

It is natural that little is known about Shivaji's secret service except that its head, according to Sabhasad, was Bahirji Jadhav.<sup>2418</sup> But it is beyond doubt that it was very efficient. Narrating Shayista Khan's campaign against Shivaji, Guarda relates: “But in spite of all these precautions, he said or planned nothing that Shivaji did not immediately learn. Shivaji knew how to make new friends with money and, like his wealth, his

friends were innumerable, and they sent him information every hour.”<sup>2419</sup> It is evident, and the A.K.Chronicle tells us so, that Shivaji had obtained intelligence before his raid on Shayista Khan.<sup>2420</sup> Thevenot says that before Shivaji set out for the sack of Surat, he secretly disguised himself as a fakir, and went to find out the most convenient roads to reach Surat speedily; he entered the town to examine the place and reconnoitered it.<sup>2421</sup> That Shivaji himself had gone to Surat before his raid on that city is certainly fiction, but Sabhasad tells us, and it is plausible, that before Shivaji set out for the sack, Bahirji Naik had gone there in person and had secured the information about its riches.<sup>2422</sup>

It was very natural that Mughal officers saw the ghosts of Shivaji’s spies — real or imaginary — in every nook and corner of the Empire. Nicolas de Graff, a Dutchman, tells us that in 1669 two Portuguese were imprisoned in Monghir (or Munger, in Bihar) on the suspicion of being Shivaji’s spies!<sup>2423</sup>

It would be remembered that Siddi Hilal, an Adilshahi officer, had defected to Shivaji after the destruction of Afzal Khan’s army. Later, he defected to the Mughals. The newsletter dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 1670 of the Mughal Court informs us that Fath, son of Afzal Khan, who too had joined the Mughal army, had submitted to the Emperor about Siddi Hilal’s secret correspondence about Shivaji and the Emperor had ordered an inquiry into the matter.<sup>2424</sup> We do not know what transpired in the inquiry. But, it would be curious to note that this Siddi Hilal, according to an English letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> October 1672 from Mumbai to Surat, again defected to Shivaji with one Jadhavrao and two other officers of the Mughal army.<sup>2425</sup>

Abbé Carré had been in Chaul for a few days in 1673. During his stay, he paid a visit to the Maratha governor of the

place who, during the course of their conversation, made the following observations about his master:[2426](#)

“He had studied with extreme care everything about the duty of a General and that of a soldier, above all [the art of] fortification, which he understood better than the ablest engineers, and Geography, of which he had made a special study, and which he had mastered and to such an extent as to know not merely all the cities including the smallest townships of the country, but even the lands and the bushes, of which he had prepared very exact charts....

“Although Shivaji counted much upon his bravery and upon what he could do by open force, nevertheless, being a clever person, he had in every court his own men and spies, on whom he spends a big sum for informing him of everything that happened and herein he was served with such punctuality that never was anything mooted in the councils of the neighbouring kings that Shivaji had not learnt quite in time to attack them, or be on his guard.”

From Chaul he travelled to St. Thome (i.e. Meliapur on the east coast) via Bijapur. Narrating his stay in Bijapur he records:[2427](#)

“I met in the town a governor whom I had seen several years ago at Mirjan on the Malabar Coast. He was a Persian by nation and a man of very good sense....He told me... that, as for Shivaji, he was more absolute in Bijapur than the king [Adilshah] who reigned there, on account of the large sums of money that he gave liberally to those who served him as spies and on account of the pleasure they had in serving a

man who seemed to have been born to command. I understand that valour always has its reward and great men find praise even in the mouth of their enemies."

Martin, the French governor of Pondicherry, had the opportunity to observe Shivaji's conquest of the Gingee coast in 1677. He writes: "This chief [Shivaji] also paid his spies liberally, who had given him considerable facilities for his conquests, by the sure information they had supplied him."<sup>2428</sup> The minutes of the meeting dated 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1677 of the English Council at St. George (Madras, Chennai), also speak of "all these parts being spread with his spies."<sup>2429</sup>

An English letter from Mumbai, dated 28<sup>th</sup> March 1678, reports:

"There is in Surat one Vallabh Gangadas who formerly dwelt on this island and is indebted to the Hon. Company for goods bought out of their warehouse to the amount [blank] rupees. This man, we understand, is come into trouble, the Governor of Surat having clapped him into irons suspecting him to be a correspondence [sic] of Shivaji Raja."<sup>2430</sup>

In 1679 Shivaji sacked Jalna, a market town some 55 km east of Aurangabad. According to Sabhasad he was hotly pursued by the Mughal army while returning from that place but managed to escape because of Bahirji's knowledge of unfrequented hill-tracks.<sup>2431</sup>

All these excerpts, whether factual or fictitious, show the reputation of his secret service. But, in fact, his very successes are sufficient proof of his having complete information about the intentions and movements of his enemies.

## NAVY

We have seen that Shivaji had started building a fleet in 1659 for which purpose he had employed Portuguese technicians. The Portuguese Captain at Vasai, however, succeeded in inducing them to desert his service. This did not stop Shivaji from continuing to build warships. These, as we can glean from contemporaneous sources, were mainly of two types: galiots and *gurabs*. The Maratha galiot, called *galbat* in Marathi, had a sail and could be rowed too. Each was manned by 25 to 30 seamen and 20 to 25 soldiers and was sometimes armed with a small cannon.<sup>2432</sup> In a Marathi document of Shuhur year 1195 (1794-95) the cost of building a *galbat* is given as Rs.7,852.25.<sup>2433</sup> *Gurabs* were larger ships from 150 to 300 tons burden propelled by sails only. Each had two and sometimes three masts, with two square sails one on top of the other. *Gurabs* were armed with five to seven cannons, usually six to nine pounders, on each side at right angles to the length of the ship and one or two guns on the prow and at the back. Each *gurab* was manned by 50 to 60 seamen and a similar number of soldiers.<sup>2434</sup> In the Marathi document cited above the cost of building a *gurab* is given as Rs.33,157.<sup>2435</sup> The 18<sup>th</sup> Century Maratha navy had a larger type of warship called the *pal* <sup>2436</sup> but it does not seem to have been introduced in Shivaji's navy.

As we have seen, Shivaji had started building two forts on coastal islands, Suvarndurg and Sindhudurg, in 1664. About the same time he repaired and probably enlarged a fort named Vijaydurg built on a promontory connected to the mainland with a narrow neck of land. He also built a fort, named Padmdurg, on a small island towards the seaside of Janjira. It is mentioned in a letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> January 1675 written by Shivaji

to the *subadar* of Prabhavali as being built as a check to Janjira.<sup>2437</sup> It seems that it was built shortly before that letter was written. One more island fort, Kulaba, was probably built by Shivaji towards the end of his life.<sup>2438</sup> Lastly, he built a fort on an islet called Khanderi in the last year of his life, an account of which will be given in a later chapter.

We have no reliable information about the organization of his navy, about its units, ranks and salaries.<sup>2439</sup> It seems from references in contemporaneous English letters that Shivaji's navy comprised, towards the end of his life, about 100 warships, mostly *galbats* with a few *gurabs*.<sup>2440</sup> We know the names of three of his naval commanders, viz. Daulat Khan, Darya Sarang and Maynak Bhandari. It would seem that the last of these was a commander of what we would now call the marines.

#### WAR FINANCE

Fryer's estimate of Shivaji's army, about 1676, is that "30,000 horse is the most he can make, foot innumerable."<sup>2441</sup> At the time of his death, Shivaji's military strength, according to Sabhasad, comprised 105,000 cavalry including 45,000 regular cavalry (*paga*) besides 100,000 Mavalas (infantry) and 240 forts, 79 of them in Karnatak.<sup>2442</sup> According to Bhimsen, as we have seen, Shivaji's regular cavalry, at the time of his death, was 40,000 strong. This fits in well with the figure given by Sabhasad. The total number of troopers given by Sabhasad implies that the number of *shiledars* was 60,000. Of course, this was not a standing force and was raised only in the times of need.

We shall assume, then, that at the time of his death, Shivaji's army comprised 45,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry;

that is to say, an equivalent of about seven cavalry divisions and 80 infantry battalions, including officers and men. Most of the infantry must have been employed as garrisons in forts, with perhaps a striking force of about 20,000.

The organization and salary scales of Shivaji's army have already been dealt with. Its annual expenditure on salaries is calculated on that basis in the following tables.

1. Conversions are made at the rate of Rs.3.75 per Hon.[2443](#)
2. Figures are rounded off for convenience.
3. Approximate figures are used to fill in the gaps where data is not available. Such figures are marked with an asterisk.
4. Clerical staff (*sabnis* etc.) has been omitted from these calculations.

Table 1

Infantry Battalion

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Annual Salary in Rs.</b>	<b>Total Salary in Rs.</b>
Private	1,350	*50	67,500
<i>Naik</i>	150	*100	15,000
<i>Havaldar</i>	30	*200	6,000
<i>Jumledar</i>	10	375	3,750
<i>Hazari</i>	1	1,875	1,875
	<b>1,541</b>		<b>94,125</b>

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Table 2

Cavalry Division

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Annual Salary in Rs.</b>	<b>Total Salary in Rs.</b>
Trooper	6,250	135	843,750
<i>Havaldar</i>	250	*375	93,750
<i>Jumledar</i>	50	1,875	93,750
<i>Hazari</i>	5	3,750	18,750
<i>Panch-Hazari</i>	1	7,500	7,500
	<b>6,556</b>		<b>1,057,500</b>

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Table 3  
Total Expenditure on Salaries

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Annual Salary in Rs.</b>	<b>Number of units</b>	<b>Total Salary</b>
Infantry Battalion.	100,000	80	8,000,000
Cavalry Division	1,000,000	7	7,000,000
			<b>15,000,000</b>

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As for the proportion of horses to troopers in Shivaji's cavalry, Martin tells us, as we saw earlier: "There are ordinarily three horses for two men, this is what contributed to his usual celerity."<sup>2444</sup> At this scale, the number of horses for Shivaji's 45,000 troopers would be 67,500. The monthly expenses of the eight classes of horses recorded in *Ain-i Akbari* ranged from four to eighteen rupees each.<sup>2445</sup> Calculating at the rate of ten rupees

per month the annual expenses on Shivaji's 67,500 horses would amount to 8,100,000 rupees. This gives us a total of about Rs.23 million for the annual expenditure on horses and the salaries of officers and men. Besides this, the major heads of expenditure would be as follows:

1. Stationary and salaries of clerks, farriers, grooms, spies etc.
2. Purchase of horses
3. Horse-furniture, stables, barracks etc.
4. Guns, matchlocks, ammunition, swords, spears etc.
5. Fortifications
6. Pensions and awards
7. Salaries of other civil authorities and ministers and the expenses of the royal household
8. Navy
9. Bands of *Shiledars* when raised.

In those days, most of the government's income was spent on the armed forces, and the proportion of support services (including clerks, farriers, grooms etc.) to combat troops, and that of the expenditure on arms and equipment to salaries was very small. Even then, it appears from these figures that the annual expenditure of Shivaji's government was to the tune of, say, Rs.30 million. These figures are certainly not very accurate. But they serve to give us a broad idea of Shivaji's annual expenditure.

Little is known about the income of Shivaji's government. At the time of his death it was, according to Sabhasad, 10 million Hons, i.e. about Rs.37.5 million rupees.<sup>2446</sup> This figure, if correct, is remarkable indeed. With an area of some 2.2 million sq. km (in 1648) the actual annual income of the Mughal government was a little over Rs.120 million; in other words, about Rs.5.5 million per hundred thousand square kilometers. At this rate, the annual income of Shivaji's government, with its area of rather less than one hundred

thousand square kilometers, should have been about Rs.5.5 million. It is true that the Mughal Empire comprised vast tracts of barren lands like the desert of Rajasthan, but then it also had the most fertile region in India like the Ganga Valley. Shivaji's Kingdom did enjoy the advantages of the coastline, in the shape of custom duties and the carrying trade but, on the other hand, half of it straddled the barren range of the Sahyadris. How then are we to account for this high rate of the government income per unit area of Shivaji's Kingdom? For want of data we cannot say anything definite but part of the explanation possibly lies primarily in Shivaji's encouragement to agriculture by making interest free advances for seeds, oxen and even subsistence; secondly, in his centralized revenue system *vis-à-vis* the *jagirdari* and farming systems of the Mughal Empire; and thirdly, in his system of collection of revenue in kind instead of in cash. Even then it would be safe to say on the basis of available data that the annual income of Shivaji's government, derived from his own dominions at the time of his death, could not have been more than ten Rs.10 million. So there was an annual deficit — because of the disproportionately large army that he was compelled to maintain for the defence and expansion of his realms — of millions of rupees. The only way to make up the deficit was to make war pay for war or, simply stated, to plunder enemy territory. For at least three or four months a year his horses were being fed in enemy territory which alone would have saved him millions of rupees. Perhaps, the figure of the annual income of Shivaji's government given by Sabhasad included not only the revenue derived from his own domains but the money gained from the plunder in the enemy territory as well.

We shall close this section with an interesting memorandum, dated to the year 1671-72, drawn under Shivaji's seal, on the building up of a reserve fund. It runs:[2447](#)

“His Highness has decided, for the Shuhur year [107]2 [1671-1672], to collect money from the

districts. This money should form a [reserve] fund and should be spent only when war with the Mughals would break out and the Mughals would lay siege to forts and if money be not available from any other source; otherwise this money should not be spent for any other government work. So has His Highness decided and it had been settled to form a [reserve] fund of 125,000 Hons as follows:

(Place or Authority)	(Hons)
Kudal	20,000
Rajapur	20,000
Kole	20,000
Dabhol	15,000
Pune	13,000
Nagoji Govind	10,000
Javali	5,000
Kalyan	5,000
Bhivandi	<u>5,000</u>

(Place or Authority)	Hons
Indapur	5,000
Supe	2,000
Krishnaji Bhaskar	<u>5,000</u>
	125,000

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It has been decided to raise a [reserve] fund of one hundred and twenty-five thousand Hons as above."

Khafi Khan, as mentioned earlier, records that, “If [a copy of] the Holy Quran fell into his hands [during his raids], he would keep it with respect and reverence and give it to his Muslim servants.” That Shivaji entertained the services of Muslims in his armed forces is undoubtedly true but the number of such officers was very small.

Till 1655, there were some Muslim officers in prominent positions in the administration of Shahji’s *mukasas* in the Pune region. Zaina Khan Pirzade was *sarhavaladar* of Pune at least till 1655 and Siddi Ambar Bagdad was *havaldar* of Pune at least till 1654.<sup>2448</sup> That is the last we see of them. These were in fact Shahji’s officers. We have seen that since 1656 Shivaji practically declared war against the Adilshahi Sultanate and therefore, in effect, set aside his father’s authority over him as well as the *mukasas* in the Pune region. This state of affairs was formally recognized by all concerned when, in 1658, Shahji declined all responsibility for his son’s actions and the Adilshah too agreed not to hold him responsible for them.<sup>2449</sup> Not a single Muslim officer has been known to be in Shivaji’s *civil* service thereafter. From contemporaneous documents, we know the names of around 200 officers — *havaldars*, *subadars*, *sarsubadars* and ministers — in Shivaji’s civil service; not one of them is Muslim.<sup>2450</sup>

There were a few Muslim officers in Shivaji’s armed forces. In a Marathi document dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657, Noor Beg, a Muslim, is mentioned as the *Sarnaubat* of the infantry and so far as we know he was the first officer to hold that post in Shivaji’s army.<sup>2451</sup> He is not mentioned in any other source. He was most probably one of the officers appointed by Shahji. In any event, he was soon succeeded by a Maratha named Yesaji Kank.<sup>2452</sup> We find only one Muslim officer, Shama Khan, in the list of 29 cavalry commanders, but none in the 36 infantry

commanders and 31 district *Subadars* given by Sabhasad.<sup>2453</sup> The same chronicler also tells us of Ibrahim Khan, an officer of *Hazari* rank (it is not mentioned whether he belonged to the infantry or cavalry), who distinguished himself in the siege of Phonda in 1675.<sup>2454</sup> One Siddi Ibrahim is mentioned in the *Shivabharat* as one of Shivaji's ten bodyguards when he went to meet Afzal Khan.<sup>2455</sup> Perhaps this Siddi Ibrahim might be the same officer who is called Ibrahim Khan in the Sabhasad Chronicle. Siddi Hilal, an Abyssinian as the term 'Siddi' implies, was a renowned Muslim officer of the Maratha army.<sup>2456</sup> Bhimsen tells us that while accompanying Daud Khan's army marching, belatedly, to the relief of Salher in 1670, he lagged behind and came up against a party of Maratha horsemen under a Muslim officer named Noor Khan. Fortunately for Bhimsen, he knew this Noor Khan as he was previously employed in Mughal service; joblessness had driven him to defect to Shivaji. Noor Khan therefore escorted Bhimsen in safety to the Mughal camp.<sup>2457</sup> Qazi Haidar, a Muslim, was one of the Persian scribes in Shivaji's service.<sup>2458</sup> The story of Madari Mehtar is, as already shown, unreliable.

The presence of these Muslims in Shivaji's military or civil service in no way contradicts, as we shall presently see, his avowed aim of the establishment of a Hindu Kingdom.

As for the Navy, it would not be surprising at all even if we find in it Muslim officers and sailors in large numbers because the Marathas were quite inexperienced in this arm. Actually, of the three admirals of Shivaji's navy, namely, Daryasarang, Daulat Khan and Maynak Bhandari, whom we know from English correspondence, the first two were Muslim; Daryasarang along with his son was imprisoned in 1678 and is never heard of again.<sup>2459</sup> Sabhasad gives the names of the admirals as Daryasarang, May Naik Bhandari and Ibrahim Khan.<sup>2460</sup> We do not come against the last name in any

contemporary document and perhaps it is a mistake for Daulat Khan.

Europeans were also employed in Shivaji's service mainly for technical work such as the construction of ships and the preparation of mines. It would be remembered that he had employed a large number of Portuguese for the construction of ships in 1659. It has also been mentioned that in 1665 Jai Singh had complained about Portuguese nationals employed in Shivaji's service and that the viceroy had expressed his inability to stop Portuguese renegades from serving in the Mughal, Bijapur or Shivaji's armies. During the Karnatak expedition, Shivaji had written a letter to the English President at Madras whose contemporaneous English translation runs as follows:[2461](#)

"Translate of a letter from Shivaji Raja from Vancambado to Sir Wm. Longhorne. 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1677.

"Since my arrival into the Karnatak country I have conquered several forts and castles, and do also intend to build new works in several forts and castles. You may likely have with you such men as know how to make great carriages for guns and how to contrive mines. We have need of such men at present, especially those that know how to make mines and to blow up stone walls. I had such men with me who came from towards Goa and Vengurla and are all kept employed in several of my forts and castles; and when I enquired of them for more such men, they told me they were all gone for Chinapatam[2462](#) and Pulicat, wherefore I now write to your worship about them that you may please to enquire if there be any such men with you that know how to make mines. You would be pleased to send some 20 or 25 or a[t] least 10

or 5 such men, for I shall pay them very well and shall entertain them in several of my forts and castles, wherewith I shall also acknowledge your worship's kindness towards us, so you would by all means enquire about the said men and send them hither as many as you can get."

The response of the English, however, was cool. The minutes of their "Consultation at Fort St. George (at Madras)", dated 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1677, reads:[2463](#)

"Shivaji Raja having sent the Agent letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> September last by two of his spies [messengers], desiring us to supply him with engineers to which was returned a civil excuse, it being wholly unfit for us to meddle in it, there being many dangers consequent there on, as well of increasing his power as of rendering both Golconda and the Mughal enemies, all these parts being spread with his spies and himself and army now come nearer this way within two days march of this place."

#### NATURE OF SHIVAJI'S KINGDOM

It is true that, given the conditions of those days, Shivaji's kingdom was favourable to the Hindus. It is also true that there is reason to believe that in one or two cases he restored temples which had been demolished or forcibly converted into mosques by previous Muslim regimes. However, this must not be taken to mean that he made it a daily practice. In the progress of our inquiry about the nature of his kingdom, we should bear in mind his religious tolerance before giving undue importance to such stray acts of demolition or blaming him for them. He was not a religious fanatic and his kingdom, though it cherished Hinduism, was not a theocracy. We may cite a later day incident that illustrates how scrupulously he kept religion separate from

governance. When the Deo of Chinchvad, a saintly person whom Shivaji held in great reverence, intervened in a civil suit, beat up one of the contestants and caused him to be imprisoned in the Kondhana Fort (Sinhgad), Shivaji sarcastically wrote to the holy man: "Do you take the insignia of my office and give up yours to me!" And to the commandant of the fort he wrote: "Whose servant are you? The Deo's or mine? Release the prisoner at once."<sup>2464</sup>

Before attempting to understand the nature of Shivaji's kingdom, it would be in order to 'let the sources speak', so to say, for an unbiased overall picture. These sources have been listed below with a comment or two where necessary.

The collective body of evidence could be classified into the following:

- a) Shivaji's own words and deeds
- b) How he appeared to his close contemporaries who were sympathetic to his cause
- c) How he was viewed by his enemies
- d) The impressions of neutral contemporaries and
- e) How Shivaji's political successors viewed the sovereign state he had established.

Nevertheless, we must consider at the outset, and always bear in mind, what Dr.Surendra Nath Sen says as a fitting preamble to our present inquiry: "In India religious intolerance has been very rare and Shivaji's conception of a Hindu Empire was in no way identified with religious persecution."<sup>2465</sup> Needless to state, as the history of the last millennium bears out, the 'India' implied by Dr.Sen is 'Hindu' India.<sup>2466</sup> If any aspect of Shivaji's policy at all bordered on "religious persecution", it was only to the extent that in his kingdom Muslims were not at liberty to enforce their presumed doctrinal

duty to break images of Hindu gods, demolish Hindu temples and convert non-Muslims to their faiths.

*Shivaji's deeds* tell us of how he regarded his own role as a sovereign king *vis-à-vis* religion. Two essential facets of the issue must be considered. First, while Shivaji continued existing grants to Mosques,<sup>2467</sup> he is not seen to have made new ones. It is, nevertheless, claimed that Shivaji made grants to mosques just as he did to temples. However, this belief is not borne out by available evidence. It is of course true that he confirmed old grants to some mosques, but not a single piece of evidence has come to light so far to indicate that he also made *new* grants either to Muslim institutions like mosques or individuals like, say, a *hafiz* (a Muslim scholar who knows the Quran by heart). On the other hand, several *new* grants were bestowed in his kingdom on Hindu temples, *mutts*, Vedic scholars and holy men.<sup>2468</sup> There is a qualitative difference between continuing an old grant and making a new one. It may also be noted that Shivaji in his letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1672 to Dattajipant Vaknis specifically ordered him to look after proper management of the annual congregation at the temple of Lord Rama at Chaphal and ensure that pilgrims were not harassed by the soldiery or Muslims.<sup>2469</sup> Also, ample arrangements were made by his government for the expenses of the congregation, including supply of grain for feeding the pilgrims.<sup>2470</sup>

Secondly, an element of pragmatism, in what *prima facie* appears as tolerance, must not be overlooked. Consider this: Aurangzeb issued a *farman* (28<sup>th</sup> February 1659), soon after ascending the throne, ordering that neither should Hindus be permitted to build new temples nor should existing ones be demolished.<sup>2471</sup> The obvious motive behind this order was averting resentment among, and possible alienation of, the Rajputs. Yet, he reneged from this seeming tolerance when his authority became well established. Thus, when even one as unremittingly bigoted as Aurangzeb needed to occasionally

curb his fanaticism for the sake of expediency, it should surprise none that a ruler like Shivaji, despite supreme esteem for his own religion but tolerance for other faiths, also found it necessary to adopt the practical approach.

Much is made of the few Muslims who were in Shivaji's service. We often find that personal loyalty or hope of advantage can transcend loyalty to nation, religion, caste or other such grouping. Witness Rajput or other Hindus like Jai Singh, Jaswant Singh together with innumerable other 'Singhs', as also several Maratha Hindus like Nagoji Mane and Suryaji Pisal in Aurangzeb's service, or Murar Jagdeo and Baji Ghorapade in Muhammad Adilshah's service. The names of about 200 civil servants employed during Shivaji's reign are known; none of them is Muslim. One of the avowed aims of Shivaji's kingdom was the welfare of its subjects, which depended on how closely the civil servant interacted with the populace and succeeded in winning their trust. It is not unlikely that memories of official persecution by the Islamic State were too fresh in the minds of the people to make this possible for a Muslim official to achieve. Some Muslim officials find mention in the period before 1657-58 when Shahji still had a say in the administration of his *jagirs* in the Pune region. Yet, as already noted, it is remarkable that no Muslim official can be traced in Shivaji's civil administration after 1660.

The name of a certain Muslim mendicant called Baba Yaqut of Kelshi is usually included among some saintly persons with whom Shivaji is supposed to have come in contact. But the reference is only found in some later date chronicles.<sup>2472</sup> Not a single document of Shivaji's times about his connection with Yaqut Baba has come to light so far, though it is not impossible that Shivaji might have continued some already-existing grants to him. There is abundant contemporaneous evidence about Shivaji's association with Hindu holy men such as Ramdas, Mauni Bava and Deo of Chinchvad, but

no contemporaneous evidence is extant about a similar connection between Shivaji and Yaqt Baba.[2473](#)

As we discussed in the previous section, the Marathi language had been suffering incessant incursion by Arabic or Persian words and their usage was gradually becoming a matter of common public acceptance. It might be the opinion of some, then as now, that such 'confluence' only enriches the language. Isn't Urdu, it might be argued, a rich offspring of the Hindi and Persian tongues? Yet, the very fact that Shivaji ordered creation of a lexicon to replace Persian terms by Sanskrit ones in official correspondence indicates that he was unwilling to reconcile or resign with meek acceptance of intrusive alien influence.

The following extract from the treatise *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, which was commissioned by Shivaji himself, says:

"Shivaji, having decimated the Muslims who had spread all over the country, appointed as his *Amatya* (finance minister), to act as a sentinel, the very same Raghunath Narayan Hanmante whose diplomacy in dealing with chieftains in the Karnataka and the Qutbshah of Bhaganagar [Hyderabad] had facilitated the gradual conquest of the entire East. Entrusting administration of those territories to him, Shivaji returned to Rajgad after which he [i.e. Raghunathpant Hanmante], who was pious, fostered the Brahmins by giving them grants for subsistence. He re-consecrated, with due religious observances, the shrine of Shonachalapati, which had for long been in a state of destruction by the Muslims,[2474](#) and recommenced rites and rituals for worship of Shrimushna, Vridhhagiri and Rukmasabhadhip[2475](#) so that his deeds would be remembered by posterity. After the *yavanas* were completely subdued in the land, Shivaji commissioned [Raghunath] Pandit to

render a lexicon of administration, usage of which had become despoiled by the Muslim tongue, so that its propagation in cultured language [Sanskrit] may be facilitated. Thus, by bowing to Shivaji's command, this *Raja-vyavahara-kosha* is being created by this great *Amatya*, who is known as Raghunath."<sup>2476</sup>

It is not likely that Raghunathpant Hanmante, on his own and without Shivaji's orders or at least consent, could have conducted repairs and re-dedicated the temples vandalized by Muslims. Shivaji had visited the Vridhhachalam temple during his Karnataka Campaign.<sup>2477</sup> It is possible that he might have issued orders to Raghunathpant for the re-dedication during that very visit.

A certain Narayan Pillai, at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, wrote in Tamil a history of various regimes of the Karnataka basing his research on a number of old sources. Some part of Pillai's history was translated into French by M.Gnanou Diagou and published as *Histoire Détailée des Rois du Carnatic*. The original Tamil is known as *Karnatak Rajakkal Savistar Charitram*. The preface (p.2) to the French translation states that the history was written by orders of the Commissioner of Arcot, William McLeod, after consulting several Hindu and Muslim sources, and that it is free from the usual exaggeration that marks works by old Hindu chroniclers.

This French translation says that the Shiva temple at Tiruvannamalai (i.e. the Shonachalapati Temple) and the Samottir Perumal (Vishnu) Temple were destroyed and converted into mosques by Muslims, and that Shivaji demolished both mosques to re-establish the Shiva Temple.<sup>2478</sup>

We thus first have evidence of the *Raja-vyavahara-kosha* that the Shonachalapati Temple had been destroyed by Muslims, and of both this source as well as Pillai that Shivaji re-

dedicated the temple to Shiva. In addition, Pillai states that this and another temple at Tiruvannamalai, which had also been converted into mosques by Muslims, were restored by Shivaji after ordering demolition of the Islamic structures. History is replete with instances of temple demolition and their replacement by or conversion into mosques. Therefore, it is possible that the Shonachalapati Temple had indeed been commandeered for use as a mosque. A reference appearing in a contemporaneous Jesuit letter about Shivaji's Karnatak expedition says, "Shivaji desecrated their mosques."<sup>2479</sup> It is quite likely that this Jesuit is referring to the same Tiruvannamalai incident mentioned by Narayan Pillai where Shivaji demolished the mosque and restored the temple. We have already seen that Shivaji had reconstructed the temple of Saptakoteshvara which had been destroyed by the Portuguese.

Dr. John Fryer, an employee of the East India Company, was ordered by President Aungier to visit the Chief Mughal Officer at Junnar, who had requested the visit. He left Mumbai on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1675, along with an entourage of about 30 men which included an interpreter, palanquin bearers and porters, and went via Kalyan, which was in Shivaji's dominions. The Maratha *havaldar* there allotted a large mosque for Fryer's overnight stay and requested him to look at some of his friends who were ill, which the doctor did. He obtained from the *havaldar* the necessary permit to travel through Shivaji's territory. Fryer notes that there were several mosques in Kalyan and the *mullahs* formerly received fat pensions; that Shivaji, being Hindu, would otherwise have certainly demolished them but, deliberately brushing aside the intention of the original donors and builders, he converted them into granaries, especially those within the town.<sup>2480</sup> These recorded incidents must not lead us to conclude that Shivaji regularly demolished mosques. His policy was characterized by moderation.

We have seen that Shivaji's *sarnaubat* Netoji Palkar had defected to the Mughals and, after Shivaji's escape from Agra,

was converted to Islam under duress. Later, as we shall see, he came back to Shivaji in 1676, renounced Islam and was brought back into the Hindu fold.

A single thread runs through these three acts: the commissioning and implementation of a Sanskrit lexicon in the administration to replace the Persian terms that had been forced upon the Marathi language by an alien rule, restoration of temples that had been demolished or converted into mosques by Muslims, and the re-conversion to Hinduism of Netoji Palkar who had been forcibly converted to Islam. That thread is Shivaji's concern for rejuvenation of indigenous Hindu religion, tradition and culture. This concern is also manifested by his coronation in 1674 with full Vedic rites. And for that he had to wage war mainly, though not solely, against monarchies following an alien persuasion - Islam. In a letter to his stepbrother Ekoji he wrote: "You should have thought [to yourself]: 'He [Shivaji] is blessed by Shri Mahadeo [Shiva] and Goddess Bhavani. He kills the wicked Turks [Muslims].[2481](#) How could I win when my army also has Turks? How would the Turks hope to escape with their lives?"[2482](#)

Let us now examine *how Shivaji's associates saw him*.

When Sambhaji was yet a prince, he composed a work on polity in Sanskrit called the *Budhabhushanam*. He states in the preamble how his father, by vanquishing the enemies of the Gods, had "set up Brahmins and other castes on a firm foundation in their respective walks of life with the intention of reviving and protecting the caste organization (*varnashramadharma*),[2483](#) which had violently been disturbed by the *mlechhas*."[2484](#)

In a deed of grant issued by Sambhaji after he succeeded as the *Chhatrapati* (sovereign), he provides brief information

about his predecessors, as was the custom in those times, and describes his father as one ‘who had vowed, at the very first blossoming of his youth, to reduce the *mlechhas*.<sup>2485</sup>

Paramanand, author of the *Shivabharat*, was Shivaji’s contemporary. He had been to Agra with him and had closely associated with him. He states that Shivaji himself ordered him to compose the Sanskrit epic, for which reason it may be regarded as an official biography of Shivaji. The following appears in the epic as part of an address that it claims was delivered by Ali Adilshah just before dispatching Afzal Khan against Shivaji: “The Muslim Faith is being destroyed by that Shivaji who has pride in his own religion”<sup>2486</sup> and that “he [Shivaji] has been insulting the *yavanas* (Muslims) since his youth.”<sup>2487</sup> There is no doubt whatsoever that the Adilshah could actually have expressed these sentiments, as we shall soon see.

The same source says that Afzal Khan, after reaching Wai, sent a letter to Shivaji in which he wrote, “You conquered Kalyan and Bhiwandi and demolished the mosques there”<sup>2488</sup> and that “Taking no cognizance of your own strength, you have imprisoned Muslim priests and dared audaciously to block the path of Islam.”<sup>2489</sup>

Even if we concede that Paramanand imagined what he attributes to Adilshah and Afzal Khan, it needs to be remembered that they are thoughts of a contemporary of Shivaji who must have known his views and aspirations intimately.

The sentiment that runs through the *Shivabharat* is that Lord Vishnu incarnated Himself as Shivaji of His desire to liberate mankind from the *mlechhas*, re-establish *dharma*

(righteousness), uproot the *yavanas* (Muslims), bring succour to the Gods, and cherish the Cows and the Brahmins.[2490](#)

The author of the *Parnal-parvata-grahakhyanam*, Jayaram Pindye, another contemporary who spent three years with Shivaji, says in a preamble to his description of various valorous deeds performed by Shivaji, “I shall now describe what the scriptures themselves state about how the unblemished Kalki will destroy the *turushkas* [i.e. the Muslims].”[2491](#)

The same Pindye, in another work, the *Radhamadhavavilas*, uses for Shivaji epithets like ‘destroyer of *yavanas* who are powerful in the *kaliyuga* (traditional Hindu division of time into four eras, of which *kali* is the last).’[2492](#)

Bhooshan, author of the *Shivarajbhooshan* in Braj verse, was also a contemporary of Shivaji and had met him at Raigad. He, too, describes Shivaji every so often as a destroyer of Muslims and protector of Hindus.[2493](#)

Here are some examples:[2494](#)

Verse 12 – ‘The advent of Shivaji instilled exultation among Gods and Brahmins, the *kaliyuga* vanished and the *mlecchas* were shorn of their arrogance.’

Verse 73 – ‘Shivaji has become a wall of protection for Hindus and a nemesis of *Turks* [Muslims].’

Verse 275 – ‘Shivaji desires promotion of Hinduism and uprooting of *mlecchas* from the world.’

Verse 295 – ‘Shivaji rids the earth of *mlecchas*.’

Verse 326 – ‘Shivaji is eager to uplift the Hindus and destroy the Turks.’

Verse 348 – ‘Raja Shivaji! Your very incarnation is for destroying *mlecchas*.’

Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad, a contemporary and the first Marathi biographer of Shivaji, believed he was an incarnation of god<sup>2495</sup> He relates the following story at the beginning of his chronicle:

Severe scarcity of water was experienced at the temple of Shambhu Mahadeo<sup>2496</sup> and Shivaji's grandfather Maloji, to relieve the suffering of the people, spent a considerable sum of money to construct a large water tank at the place. Pleased by this pious act, Shambhu Mahadeo [Shiva] appeared to him in a dream and said: "I will be incarnate in your family, the gods and the Brahmins will I protect and destroy the *mlecchas*."<sup>2497</sup>

So Shivaji, according to the chronicler, was this incarnation of god whose mission was to protect the gods and the Brahmins, and destroy the Muslims.

Ramchandrapant Amatya's treatise on polity (or statecraft) was written in 1716. Yet it may be regarded as a contemporaneous source because he was a contemporary of Shivaji and had even served as his finance minister (*amatya*). He writes in that work: (a) "He [Shivaji] rescued the Dharma, established Gods and Brahmins in their due places."<sup>2498</sup> (b) "After achieving so much success by favour of God he [Rajaram] divulged his inmost object of conquering the country occupied by the *Yavanas*, of destroying the *Yavana* confederacy and of beating down the *Yavana* predominance which had taken root in the East, West and South by sending large armies."<sup>2499</sup> (c) "While, by favour of God, within a short time he [Rajaram] will defeat the chief enemy, subdue all the territories and forts about Delhi, Agra, Lahore, Dacca, Bengal, Thatta [in Sindh], and maritime and other places, and go to Banaras and establish the idol of Kashi Vishveshvara."<sup>2500</sup>

Shivaji held Saint Ramdas in great reverence. In a well known poem addressed to Shivaji, he says that the Lord inspired him to protect the gods, religion, cows and Brahmins and that the Maharashtra Dharma (i.e. the Hindu religion) has survived because of him. [2501](#)

To sum up, it may be said that persons closely associated with Shivaji, like heir-apparent Sambhaji, Paramanand, Pindye, Bhooshan, Ramchandrapant Amatya, Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad, Ramdas and Raghunathpant Hanmanté, held a firm conviction that it was his life's work to protect Hindus or Hinduism from Muslims, for which purpose it was necessary to destroy them.

*His enemies' views* also exist in fair quantity.

*Tarikh-i Ali*, the official chronicle of Ali Adilshah's reign, in connection with Afzal Khan's appointment to deal with Shivaji, says:

"The banished infidel (*Kafir*), Shivaji Bhosale,... was extending the hand of repression and injustice like a greedy and hungry dog, that does not feel satisfied with the bone it gets and wants more, and was oppressing the faithful [Muslims] who were engrossed in prayers to God.

After the King [Ali Adilshah] received this news — because he thought that [the tree of] the observance of Muhammadi faith [Islam] would not bloom without the water of his bloodthirsty sword and the thorny bushes of infidelity and polytheism [i.e. Hinduism] would not burn without the fire of the enemy-consuming sword — appointed Afzal Khan with 10,000 horsemen with orders to fan the flames of anger and melt the balance of Shivaji's life in the

crucible of destruction and to trample the harvest of his life under the hooves of horses.”[2502](#)

Ignoring the allegorical expression in this extract, it bears comparison with what the *Shivabharat* says about Ali Adilshah’s address to Afzal Khan and the Khan’s letter to Shivaji.

In his *farman* dated 16<sup>th</sup> June 1659 to Kanhoji Jedhe, Ali Adilshah writes:

“Shivaji out of thoughtlessness and evil propensities has started troubling the followers of Islam residing in the Province of the Nizamshahi Konkan. He has also plundered them. He has captured many forts in the royal territories...Therefore, we have appointed Afzal Khan Muhammadshahi as the *subadar* of that province and have sent him with a formidable army.”[2503](#)

It will be observed that this, too, compares well with what the *Shivabharat* says on the subject.

Shivaji’s *neutral contemporaries* have left us some ‘impressions’ that help in acquiring an idea about his religious policies.

Henry Revington’s letter to Shivaji written from Rajapur on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1660 is the first letter any Englishman wrote to Shivaji. It begins: “Sevagy, General of the Hendoo [i.e. Hindu] Forces.”[2504](#)

While there are several errors in Cosme da Guarda’s account of the Afzal Khan incident, it tells us a great deal of how Shivaji was regarded by neutral observers. He calls Afzal Khan ‘Belulghan’ when, from the description he provides, it is clear that he actually intends to mean the former. He writes how this

Belulghan, while marching into Shivaji's territory, destroyed "several temples of idols" and how Shivaji surprised him in his camp and took him prisoner. Then, says Guarda:

"Come here', he [i.e. Shivaji] said, 'what share had these idols in the offences thou say'st I committed! A brave exploit was it indeed to destroy stone buildings and to break mute images that could not offer thee any resistance. Dost thou know that if thou hadst not committed these barbarities, I would never resolve to seek thee. But knowing what thou didst in hatred of me, I at once decided to show thee thy lack of sense....' This said he ordered his head to be cut off and swearing that henceforth he would do the same thing in the mosques he found, and in many places he committed the same (insults) and more."<sup>2505</sup>

This is not to say that Guarda's information is factual. Yet, it indicates a Portuguese contemporary's *impressions* about Shivaji, which is of greater import to our present inquiry, errors of detail in his account notwithstanding.

Niccolao Manucci, the Italian who had virtually settled in India, writes in his *Storia do Mogor*: "To make a mock of Shivaji, the Mahomedans had killed cows in temples, in retaliation he, too, ordered the throats of pigs to be cut in the mosques of the Mahomedans."<sup>2506</sup> While the credibility of Manucci's information is doubtful, it is an indication of what a neutral contemporary of Shivaji thought about him.

How Shivaji's *political successors* viewed the kingdom founded by Shivaji is also pertinent to this inquiry. Here are a few examples.

In a stone inscription (22<sup>nd</sup> March 1688) at Phonda, Dharmaji Nagnath, who was the *Deshadikari* (chief administrative officer) during Sambhaji's reign, says that 'the

regime, which was formerly Muslim, has now become a Hindu state.<sup>[2507](#)</sup>

The assertion that the Maratha State was a ‘regime of Gods and Brahmins’ appears frequently in letters of Chhatrapati Rajaram.<sup>[2508](#)</sup>

Balaji Bajirao alias Nana Saheb Peshwa says in a letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1752 to Pilaji Jadhavrao “we are disciples of Shivaji.”<sup>[2509](#)</sup> Nana Saheb was born almost 40 years after Shivaji’s death, so when he says he is Shivaji’s disciple he intends to convey the meaning that he is a follower of the traditions established by Shivaji. He is known to have acted in respect of at least two Hindu religious sites thus: The Sundar Narayan Temple at Nasik was in existence at least till 1625, sometime after which Muslims demolished it to construct mosques and graves. In later times, on an appeal made by a certain Govindbhat Dharmadhikari belonging to the family that originally held the hereditary priesthood of the shrine, Nana Saheb ordered the demolition of the new structures put up by Muslims. The structures were accordingly razed and another temple to house the Sundar Narayan deity was constructed around 1756 by Gangadhar Chandrachud.<sup>[2510](#)</sup> Likewise, the Tryambakeshwar Temple (about 40 km from Nasik) had been destroyed by Muslim rulers and replaced by a mosque. Nana Saheb Peshwa demolished the mosque and rebuilt the temple in 1754.<sup>[2511](#)</sup> It is not surprising that such examples of demolition of mosques which had been constructed by destroying or converting temples are certainly very few; what is indeed astonishing is that such incidents occurred in a state ruled by Hindus who are renowned for their tolerance — as a matter of conviction, not policy — throughout their history.

It is well known that when the Marathas became ascendant at Delhi, becoming *de facto* rulers of the Mughal

Empire, the Maratha war lord in North India, Mahadji Shinde, procured in 1789 a *farman* from the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam, prohibiting cow slaughter throughout the Mughal Empire.<sup>[2512](#)</sup>

The perception that the kingdom founded by Shivaji was for the protection of Hindus prevailed right up to its dissolution in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century. As we have seen, the Chitnis Chronicle clearly states that Shivaji, from his very childhood, evinced deep aversion for Muslims and entertained a desire of one day reducing them and establishing a Hindu state.<sup>[2513](#)</sup>

Thus, Shivaji's own words and deeds, the records left by his contemporaries — admirers, enemies and neutral observers — and the views of his political successors conclusively show that the primary aim of the kingdom he founded was protection and promotion of Hinduism. This by itself was sufficient guarantee that there would be no persecution of the followers of other religions, unless curtailment of those who regarded destroying images of Hindu gods, demolishing Hindu temples, and converting non-Muslims by force or inducement as a duty enjoined upon them by their religion was viewed as persecution.

## *Chapter 12*

# Offensive Against The Mughals

## REVOLT OF THE JATS (1669)

We have seen how the tyranny of the Mughal government often led to peasants' revolts. To this was added religious persecution. Soon after his enthronement, Aurangzeb, as we have seen, had decreed in a *farman* dated 28<sup>th</sup> February 1659 that though the construction of new temples should not be permitted, existing temples should also not be demolished.<sup>2514</sup> But this 'restraint', shown as a matter of policy, was now forgotten and the Emperor's Islamic zeal reared its ugly head again. The *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* records under the 12<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb:

"The Lord Cherisher of the Faith [i.e. Aurangzeb] learnt that in the province of Thatta, Multan and especially at Banaras the Brahman misbelievers used to teach their false books in their established schools, and their admirers and students, both Hindu and Muslim, used to come from great distances to these misguided men in order to acquire their vile learning. His Majesty, eager to establish Islam, issued orders to the governors of all the provinces to demolish the schools and temples of the infidels and with the utmost urgency put down the teaching and the public practice of the religion of these misbelievers."<sup>2515</sup>

Soon after this order was promulgated, the Jat peasantry in the environs of the village of Tilpat rose in revolt under the leadership of a chieftain called Gokla.<sup>2516</sup> Its causes are not known. It might have been the result of oppression by revenue officials, and it is not impossible that the intensification of religious persecution, too, might have been a reason. On 12<sup>th</sup> May 1669, the Emperor learnt that Abdun Nabi Khan, the

*faujdar* of Mathura and also of Akbarabad [i.e. Agra], who had marched against the rebels, was killed by a musket shot during the encounter. The next day he appointed Rad-andaz Khan to deal with the rebels. But the Khan was unable to fulfill the task assigned to him and the revolt spread over a wider area. At last, on 28<sup>th</sup> November 1669, the Emperor himself set out towards Agra to crush the rebellion. He sent Hasan Ali Khan on 4<sup>th</sup> December to attack the rebels, who were routed after a bitter fight; 300 of them were killed, and 250 men and women were taken captive. Gokla himself was taken prisoner during the following month and was sent to the Emperor who had arrived at Agra on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1670. The fate that befell the Jat leader was terrible. By the Emperor's orders, his limbs were hacked off one by one on a platform at the prefect's headquarters. His son and daughter were converted to Islam, evidently under duress, and the daughter was married off to a Muslim servant of the Emperor. Hasan Ali Khan was appointed *faujdar* of Mathura and a strong garrison was left under his command.

Meanwhile, the destruction of temples was continuing in accordance with the Emperor's orders. In September 1669, it was reported to the Emperor that, as per his orders, the temple of Vishwanath (Shiva) at Kashi was demolished by Imperial officers.<sup>2517</sup> Then, records the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, under the events of the 13<sup>th</sup> year of Aurangzeb's reign:<sup>2518</sup>

“During this month of Ramazan [13<sup>th</sup> January to 11<sup>th</sup> February, 1670]... the Emperor as the promoter of justice...and the reviver of the faith of the Prophet, issued orders for the demolition of the temple situated in Mathura, famous as the Dehra of Kesho Rai. In a short time by the great exertions of his officers, the destruction of this strong foundation of infidelity was accomplished, and on its site a lofty mosque was built at the expenditure of a large sum. This temple of folly was built by that gross idiot

Birsingh Deo Bundela. Before his accession to the throne, the Emperor Jahangir was displeased with Shaikh Abul Fazl. This infidel [i.e. Birsingh Deo Bundela] became a royal favourite by slaying him [i.e. Abul Fazl], and after Jahangir's accession was rewarded for this service with the permission to build this temple, which he did at the expense of 33 lakhs of rupees.

"Praised be the august God of the faith of Islam, that in the auspicious reign of this destroyer of infidelity and turbulence, such a wonderful and seemingly impossible work [of destruction] was successfully accomplished. On seeing this instance of this strength of the Emperor's faith and the grandeur of his devotion to God, the proud Rajas were stifled, and in amazement they stood like images facing the wall. The idols, large and small, set with costly jewels, which had been set up in the temple, were brought to Agra, and buried under the steps of the mosque of Begum Sahib, in order to be continually trodden upon. The name of Mathura was changed to Islamabad."

#### **SHIVAJI RECOVERS CEDED FORTRESSES (FEBRUARY - JUNE 1670)**

While these events were taking place, Shivaji suddenly opened an offensive against the Mughals. According to the Sabhasad Chronicle, Aurangzeb, suspecting collusion between the Prince Muazzam and Shivaji, wrote ordering the Prince to arrest Prataprao and Niraji Raoji. But the Prince's agent at the Imperial Court intimated him of this order beforehand, whereupon he told Niraji to leave at once with the Maratha contingent. So they set out at night and went to Shivaji. The Emperor's letter reached Aurangabad eight days later to which the Prince replied that the Marathas had already fled. So this, according to Sabhasad, was the cause of the breach of peace between Shivaji and Aurangzeb that had lasted for about two

and a half years.<sup>2519</sup> According to the *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, certain portions of Sambhaji's *jagir* were confiscated against the repayment of Rs.100,000 that had been advanced to Shivaji for expenses when he went to Agra and was the reason why Shivaji recalled Prataprao.<sup>2520</sup> But the rationale advanced by both these sources does not seem very plausible. It seems possible, however, that Shivaji might have judged the unrest around Agra caused by Aurangzeb's persecution of Hindus as an opportune moment to break the peace. Henry Gary, in his letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1670 from Mumbai, wrote:

“The arch rebel Shivaji is again engaged in arms against Orangsha [i.e. Aurangsha, Aurangzeb], who, out of a blind zeal for reformation, has demolished many of the Gentues' [Hindu's] temples and forced many to turn Mussulmans. He [Aurangzeb] has taken several of Shivaji's castles and intends to pursue him to extremity. No preparations are wanting on his [Shivaji's] side to regain his castles, and Deccan is likely to be the seat of war.”<sup>2521</sup>

Since the treaty with Shivaji in 1665, the Mughal army of the Deccan was being gradually depleted, probably to reinforce the northwestern frontier and also to cut down expenditure.<sup>2522</sup> What it needed, in fact, was an increase in its size because the proper garrisoning of the 23 fortresses, ceded to the Empire by the treaty of Purandar, demanded some 10,000 additional troops. The result was that the Mughal Army of the Deccan was not only reduced in size but was spread over a wide area and consisted mostly of garrison troops. Further still, fortresses in the west were separated from the rest of the province by the Sahyadri Range and could be easily isolated. The territory acquired by the treaty of Purandar was thus proving a liability rather than an asset to the Empire for the time being.

The storm broke in December 1669. The newsletter of the Mughal Court records that on 11<sup>th</sup> December 1669, the Emperor learnt from the dispatch of the Bakhshi of the Deccan of the desertion of four *mansabdars* of Shivaji's clan, each holding the rank of 1000 *dhat*/500 *sawar*.<sup>2523</sup> The newsletter does not mention where they had gone but it is almost certain that they had deserted to Shivaji. The Maratha contingent in Varhad returned to its homeland plundering the countryside on its way.<sup>2524</sup>

A number of fortresses ceded to the Mughals by the treaty of Purandar were invested or isolated by Maratha roving bands. At the same time, the Maratha light cavalry invaded and pillaged Mughal territory at several points. A newsletter of the Mughal Court dated 9<sup>th</sup> May 1670 records:

“Salih Khan has petitioned that ‘Till yesterday Shivaji has plundered and devastated 51 places near Ahmednagar, Junnar and Paranda.’ Having heard this, the Emperor kept silent.”<sup>2525</sup>

While these raids were being carried out, the Marathas were also busy in recapturing the fortresses lost by the treaty of Purandar. Sinhgad was taken by escalade on 4<sup>th</sup> February 1670 and that episode would be related here in some detail so as to give the reader some idea of the Maratha methods of capturing fortresses.

Sinhgad is situated about 20 km southwest of Pune on one of the highest points in the Pune range, 1320 m above sea level and about 700 m above the surrounding plain. The northern and southern sides of the mountain have very steep ascents which culminate into a great wall of black rock over 12 m high, which in itself constitutes sufficient defence. Strong walls, with bastions at intervals, are built where the rise is less steep. The

fort is shaped somewhat like the blade of an axe and is over three kilometers in circumference. The approach to the fort is by two steep, tortuous paths which in many places consist of flights of steps carved out in the face of the rock. Each of these, one in the northeast and the other in the southeast, is defended by fortified gateways. Those in the northeast are known as the Pune gates and those in the southeast as the Kalyan gates. The only weak point in the fortress is a gorge on the west side of the hill which drains rainwater falling on the summit. The sides of this gorge are less steep and offer a comparatively easy approach to the top. A strong fortified wall, evidently a later construction, is built across the mouth of the gorge. The fortress was manned by some 1200 Rajputs under command of Udaybhan Rathod.[2526](#)

On the night of 4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> February 1670 a select party of 500 Mavala infantry under command of Tanaji Malusare arrived secretly near the fortress and lodged itself undiscovered at the foot of the rock.[2527](#) Two Mavala rock climbers ascended the hillside and let down a rope ladder by which the rest of the party began to climb.[2528](#) When some 300 Mavalas had entered the fort their presence was discovered and an alarm was given. Tanaji immediately pushed forward in the hope of still surprising the enemy. Though prematurely discovered and opposed by superior numbers, the assailants had the advantage of surprise. In the ensuing fight, Tanaji and Udaybhan came face to face, engaged in single combat and were killed at each others' hands. Suryaji, Tanaji's brother, rallied the disheartened Mavalas and captured the fort. Then, thatched stables in the fort were set alight as a prearranged signal of victory to Shivaji who was on nearby Rajgad waiting it.[2529](#)

In the same month, or the next, an attempt to storm the fort of Mahuli, 80 km northeast of Mumbai, was repulsed with heavy losses and the enterprise was abandoned for the time

being.<sup>2530</sup> Soon afterwards, but certainly before the end of March 1670, Shivaji's forces captured Kalyan and Bhivandi.<sup>2531</sup> Mir Zahid, the Mughal *Bakhshi* and *Waqai-nawis* of Kalyan, was taken prisoner but released on payment of Rs.1,500.<sup>2532</sup> Purandar was captured by Nilopant, the *Muzumdar*, on 8<sup>th</sup> March 1670 and the fort commandant Raziu-d Din was taken prisoner.<sup>2533</sup>

Alarmed by this fresh blaze-up, the Emperor took immediate steps to strengthen his forces in the Deccan. A number of contingents in north India were ordered to march thither.<sup>2534</sup> However, before these reinforcements could arrive, it lay naked without any sizeable field force to check the Maratha offensive, and relieve the isolated fortresses in the Konkan and the Sahyadri Range. The only force available at hand was that under Daud Khan Quraishi, the Arab Governor of Khandesh. He arrived at Ahmednagar on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1670.<sup>2535</sup> Two days later, he set out at the head of 7000 cavalry and descended by way of Junnar into the Konkan, probably through the Nane pass, to throw provisions in Mahuli and the surrounding fortresses. On his way he learnt that the Marathas were fortifying a hill about 10 *kos* from Mahuli. So he dispatched his son Hamid and Lodi Khan, who drove them away. Mahuli was critically short of gunpowder and rations; the Commandant, Manohardas, in despair of getting enough supplies to defend the fortress, resigned from his post. So Daud Khan appointed Alawardi Beg in his place and reinforced him with 200 soldiers. This was all Daud Khan could have done. With the Maratha light cavalry hovering around him, he could not have stayed there for want of supplies. So having completed his task for the time being he returned to Junnar by the end of April.

As soon as his back was turned, the Marathas resumed their attacks on the fortresses in the Konkan and the Sahyadris. These had remained isolated, except for the relief of Mahuli, for the last five months and the approaching rainy season, which would make the passes impassable for a sizeable army, meant that they could not hope to be relieved for at least another four months. The Marathas made full use of this opportunity. Lohgad was captured on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1670 and many other forts soon afterwards.<sup>2536</sup> An English letter dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1670 from Mumbai to Surat reports:

"Part of his army are now besieging Karnala, a castle on the top of a hill in our sight, they are approached near the wall by throwing up breast works of earth and boards, which for their defence they carry on before them; it is thought that they will carry it before long."<sup>2537</sup>

Another dated 11<sup>th</sup> June 1670 from Mumbai to Surat says:

"Shivaji is not so slothful as the Mughal's forces, for he not only makes hay while the sun shines, but then when it is obscured by violent rains also, for since they have withdrawn forces up the hill [i.e. the Sahyadri] for a quiet wintering, his have not been idle, but have recovered for him Lohagad,, Kohoj and about

8 days since Khed-durg,<sup>2538</sup> and very lately made an assault again upon Mahuli and had about 200 men knocked on the head by stones thrown down from the walls. He now encourages his men to make another attempt upon Mahuli and then he will expose them to no further service these rains. He has 5,000 men that he keeps in Bhiwandi and at the foot of Mahuli for a second assault."<sup>2539</sup>

Hindola,<sup>2540</sup> Mahuli, Karnala and Rohida were captured on 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, and 24<sup>th</sup> June, 1670 respectively.<sup>2541</sup> Details of how these fortresses were taken are not extant but evidently the Marathas, as was their practice, relied on surprise night attacks rather than on prolonged sieges. At Karnala, however, they seemed to have followed the conventional method instead of their usual practice of a surprise night attack.

Though we do not have the dates of the capture of other fortresses that were ceded to the Mughals, evidently they also were reduced before the rainy season was over. Sabhasad's statement that 27 forts were recovered within four months, though not accurate, is not altogether fanciful.<sup>2542</sup> An English letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> June 1670 from Mumbai to Surat states:

“By a bazar *pattamar* [courier] the deputy Governor wrote a few lines to the President the 25<sup>th</sup> current, giving the news that Shivaji had taken Mahuli from the Mughal and that he had recovered all his castles and strongholds upon the hills, excepting one named Karnala, which, upon the report of his taking Mahuli, it is thought will be surrendered and some of his forces have been all that time against Danda Rajpuri, which will be in danger to be lost if he joins his forces together against it in person. It is probable, so soon as boats may venture to sea, the Siddi of Danda may send to us (as he did last year to Captain Young) for protection and security of his family and estate or for provisions which will be one of his greatest wants, or should he make overtures of another nature, we desire to have your orders timely that we may be provided with an answer.”<sup>2543</sup>

And again on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1670 the Englishmen at Mumbai wrote to Surat:

“We have seriously considered of your sale of the whole parcel of broadcloth, cloth rashes and fine cloth that we expect in our shipping from England, and do approve thereof, and that it is done seasonably, for now that Shivaji has taken Mahuli and regained all his other castles from the Mughal we do think that the trade in Surat will not be so current this year as the last, for if the people were then so affrighted by Shivaji their expectations of him will now be greater and money very scarce in Surat.”[2544](#)

About this time, in 1670, Shivaji moved his capital from Rajgad to the fort of Rairi and renamed it Raigad.[2545](#)

Shivaji's operations against Danda Rajpuri, evidently from landside, had continued and the Council of Mumbai, as their following letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> August 1670 to Surat shows, was careful not to offend him by furnishing any supplies to that castle:

“Mr. Ball, Mr. Simons, Mr. Hill and other freemen were intended to furnish Danda Rajpuri with rice they have bought for that purpose, and some of them to have gone in person, which we having little notice of, forewarned their so doing, in regard it did not consist with our safety and the interest of this island to aid or assist any of those our neighbours, who were engaged in wars one against another, which they might well understand, knowing how much this island must be beholding to the opposite Main, which Shivaji possessed at this time, who has his spies here in all places and can tell from what place his enemies are supplied. They promised to forbear sending it to that place, and we assured them that if they did and the Company received any damage therefrom their estates should be liable to make satisfaction; what

they determine since we know not. The Karwar *qasids* [couriers] told us that Shivaji did not besiege it [Danda Rajpuri], but we understand from the Siddi's men that Shivaji has 5,000 men against it and that he sent him [Siddi] word that he had now taken Mahuli and all the castles on the Hill [Sahyadri] from the Mughal, and did he now think to withstand him, and promised that if he would deliver him the castle he would make him General of his army; but he [Siddi] scorns him and knows Shivaji cannot take it so long as he can be relieved with provisions by sea and land, his men usually in the night skirmishing with the enemy and diverse of late have been slain.”<sup>2546</sup>

While the fortresses in the Konkan and the Sahyadris, any one of which would have been the prize of a campaign, were falling like ninepins, a ludicrous drama was being enacted at the provincial headquarters.<sup>2547</sup> We have been acquainted with Diler Khan during the siege of Purandar. This very loyal but obstinate Pathan had been appointed to lead an expedition to extort tribute from the Chiefs of Chanda and Deogarh and, after fulfilling that mission, was staying at Nagpur which had been annexed to the Mughal Empire. After Shivaji launched his offensive against the Mughals, the Emperor had ordered the Khan to join Prince Muazzam, the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan. He set out from Nagpur on 29<sup>th</sup> March 1670 and, after pursuing some enemy raiders, reached Pathri, 140 km southeast of Aurangabad. Here he received the order to wait on Prince Muazzam at Aurangabad. This Diler Khan was reluctant to do, for he did not see eye to eye with the Prince's confidant Maharaja Jaswant Singh. Anxious about his own safety now, he did not comply with the Prince's order. The Prince in his turn accused him of rebellion. So the Emperor sent Iftikhar Khan, the *Khan-i Saman*, to enquire into the matter but who, due to his policy of not antagonizing either of them, played the “jack on both sides, and told the prince Diler Khan was his enemy,

and went to Diler Khan and told him the Prince would seize on him if he came to Aurangabad.”<sup>2548</sup> This further aggravated the quarrel and the Prince began to assemble what forces he could to punish Diler Khan who immediately decided to go to Delhi in person, and set out in August 1670. To avoid the forces that the Prince was assembling around Aurangabad, he had to march by a roundabout route. By the time the Prince, who had marched northward to intercept Diler Khan, arrived on the south bank of the Tapi on the Burhanpur-Aurangabad route, Diler Khan had also reached that river some 60 *kos* further east. Here, the Prince received and complied with the Emperor's express orders to return to Aurangabad at once. Jaswant Singh, the adviser of the Prince, was transferred to Burhanpur and Diler Khan to Gujarat. Meanwhile the Deccan was filled with wild rumours of a civil war among the Imperialists and it was even thought that “Sultan Muazzam the Mughal's son who resides at Aurangabad being assisted with Shivaji and other princes has raised a vast army and is intended against his Father.”<sup>2549</sup> The Emperor was displeased with Iftikhar Khan and deprived both him and his brother of their *mansabs* and titles.

#### SECOND SACK OF SURAT (OCTOBER 1670)

In March and April 1670 there were repeated alarms at Surat of Shivaji's impending attack on the city.<sup>2550</sup> The Surat Council therefore resolved, on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1670, to call from Mumbai 35 to 40 Portuguese soldiers in the Company's service along with 6 or 7 English file leaders<sup>2551</sup> for the protection of their factory.<sup>2552</sup> Though the Mumbai Council acceded to this, they observed in their letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> March 1670 to Surat that they “could ill spare so many men having Shivaji so near a neighbour” to them.<sup>2553</sup> About the middle of April, 39 Portuguese with a sergeant and four other English soldiers sent from Mumbai had arrived at Surat.<sup>2554</sup> Soon afterwards, however, the alarm at Surat considerably subsided as Bahadur

Khan, the *subadar* of Gujarat, arrived in the city with 5,000 horsemen. As a result, the Surat Council resolved on 25<sup>th</sup> April to send back their soldiers to Mumbai.<sup>2555</sup> Fresh alarms of Shivaji's attack on the city began in September. In their meeting held on 12<sup>th</sup> September 1670, the Surat Council passed the following resolution:

“...being advised from Bombay that Shivaji is raising a great army at Kalyan and the adjacent country to fall on this province of Gujarat, when this town will be the first place he will take. We have resolved ... to send down [to Swally] all the goods with all possible speed both by the hoy and the sloop and likewise by country boats, by which means we shall prevent any unhappy dispute as also the danger they will run if Shivaji (as it is reported he intends) should take the town. And this we think necessary and convenient though somewhat chargeable.”<sup>2556</sup>

And in their meeting held on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1670, they noted:

“The continual fear the merchants of this town are subjected unto caused by the frequent, and now fresh, alarm of Shivaji's great preparations (who is credibly reported, is intended against this province), has wrought on them a willingness to part with their gross goods at easier rates than otherwise they would have done, being desirous to convert all into money, which is easier to be conveyed away on occasion.”<sup>2557</sup>

On 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1670, Shivaji, marching through the forests of Jawhar and Ramnagar, indeed appeared at the gates of Surat at the head of 15,000 horse and foot.<sup>2558</sup>

Then, on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1670 the English Council of Surat, which had gone to Swally for the lading of Europe ships, received "sudden and certain news of Shivaji's approach within 20 miles of Surat."<sup>2559</sup> At that time there were three English ships, the *Berkeley Castle*, the *Experiment* and the *Hannibal*, at Swally which had arrived in September; one more, the *Loyal Subject*, arrived there on 2<sup>nd</sup> October. Besides, there were two ships which could have been useful to the Englishmen. One of these, the *Blessing*, belonged to the King of Bantam. Its captain was an Englishman named Anderson and it was manned by English and Javanese sailors. The other, the *Loyal Oxenden*, was privately owned the President, Gerald Aungier,<sup>2560</sup> himself.<sup>2561</sup> It would be remembered that he had commanded the party that had sallied out of the English house at Surat during Shivaji's first sack of Surat in 1664.

When the news of Shivaji's arrival within 20 miles of Surat was received, Aungier wanted to go to Surat in person with a party of seamen taken from the English ships at Swally for the defence of the English factory. But the members of his Council dissuaded him from the idea by advancing various arguments such as the impropriety to hazard the person of the President when all the merchants of the town and the officers themselves had deserted it, and the need to protect the goods at Swally itself where the enemy might send some detachments. Instead it was decided to send 40 men taken out of the Company's ships with Streynsham Master.<sup>2562</sup> He was told to keep his men close to the Company's house in Surat and not to discharge a gun or fight with the enemy unless they were first attacked. So in the night of 2<sup>nd</sup> October, Master marched to Surat with about 30 men; the rest, about 10 men, were sent upon the hoy which was to lie in the river to secure the retreat of those at Surat in case they were forced to leave the house.

On 3<sup>rd</sup> October, Shivaji's army approached the walls of the city and "after a slight assault" the defendants fled to the

shelter of the castle leaving the city to Shivaji's mercy.<sup>2563</sup> All the great houses in the city were broken open where the Marathas found a vast treasure and set fire to many, "destroying near half the town to the ground." The Marathas also approached the castle threatening to storm it but did not venture very near. Only the English, Dutch and French houses, and the two Serais — the New one occupied by Turkish merchants and the Old one by the Tartar King of Kashghar who, driven out by his son, had gone on a pilgrimage to Mecca and had arrived at Surat two months previously<sup>2564</sup> — stood on their defence. The Marathas attacked the English house and the Old Serai on the first day. But, as Gerald Aungier reported to the Company, "the enemy found such hot service from our house, having lost several men, that they left us and fell on the Tartar quarter [Old Serai] fiercely, which lay between the French house and ours." The Tartars offered stout resistance at first, but the French allowed the Marathas to possess some avenues next to their house and, it was accused, even supplied them with powder and shot. This made the Serai untenable. So, during the night, the Tartars took their King to the castle, leaving the Serai a prey to the Marathas where they killed those who remained and, according to Gerald Aungier's report, found "a vast treasure in gold, silver, rich plate, a gold belt and other rich furniture." Once the Old Serai fell to the Marathas, they could easily bring the English house under fire. But seeing that the Englishmen were determined, the Marathas held fire and one of their officers asked for parley with the commander of the English house. So Streynsham Master spoke to him from the wall and reminded the Maratha officer of the good relations the Englishmen at Mumbai had with Shivaji. The Maratha, on the other hand, told Master that Shivaji was much enraged as the Englishmen had killed many of his men and was bent on revenge. Master pointed out that the Marathas had attacked and wounded several of his men before they opened fire. He also told the Maratha officer that "if his men did not assault the English, they would not offend him, but if they offered violence

they were resolved to defend the house to the last man and would sell their lives dear." The Maratha officer then agreed to keep his men off and send a man to discourse with Master. The New Serai occupied by the Turkish merchants was also attacked, probably on the second day. But the attacks were beaten off. On the third day the Maratha officer sent a man<sup>2565</sup> to the English house who advised Master to send some person to Shivaji with a small present, as "the Raja was much offended for the loss of his men." So Master, with the concurrence of his colleagues, sent a present, comprising some scarlet cloth, sword blades and knives with two of his men. They were taken to Shivaji's tent outside the town. He sent for them, treated them kindly and then "putting his hand into their hands he told them that he would do the English no wrong."

Anderson, the captain of the King of Bantam's ship, the *Blessing*, had come forward to the assistance of his compatriots. He himself, with 20 men from his ship, Englishmen and Javanese, had participated in the defence of the English Company's house.<sup>2566</sup> In the first day's engagement, one of these Englishmen received a gunshot and later died of his wound. Anderson himself lost about Rs.8,000 in pepper and other goods in the great fire.

There were continuous alarms of the Marathas coming to Swally, especially because the *shah-bandar* (customs officer, literally harbour master), the *Qazi*, and most of the eminent merchants of the city had fled there. Aungier observed in his dispatch to the Company that Shivaji would indeed have sent part of his army there if he had not been prevented from fording the river due to spring tides and had all the boats not been taken by the merchants to move their goods to Swally. So the Englishmen took all possible precaution for their defence at Swally as well. With the help of the ships' carpenters, they built a small platform at one end of the main yard and mounted eight guns on it. It was said that one of Shivaji's spies that were at

Swally, reported these preparations to him. The Englishmen also kept a constant watch against the threat of fire. They moved the Company's treasure and the goods that had arrived from Europe, on board the *Oxinden* and the *Blessing*. They continued lading as fast as possible goods that were to be sent to Europe on board the *Berkeley Castle* which was the first ship that was to depart for England that year. They also transported the goods stored in their two great warehouses at Umra and Rander<sup>[2567](#)</sup> because they feared that the Marathas or the country people might plunder or set fire to them.

The Dutch had only 35 men in their house.<sup>[2568](#)</sup> Before Shivaji's appearance at Surat, they had embarked the Company's property on a galiot and sent it to Swally. But they were not attacked.<sup>[2569](#)</sup> A messenger came to them from Shivaji to assure them that they would not be harmed if they remained quiet, and also told them to send a representative to his master. When the Dutch representative was taken to the presence of Shivaji, the Raja asked him "as to the best plan to despoil the principal merchants" and required to bring an answer the next day. But when the Dutch representatives were ready to leave the Dutch house the next day, the news spread that Shivaji and his troops had gone. Two of Shivaji's men who had come as escort to the Dutch representative were thus left behind. The Dutch could not send them on their own for they would certainly have been killed. They could not keep them in their house for the governor would have demanded their custody and the Dutch would have been accused of harbouring the enemy. So they conducted the Marathas out of the city at night after which they safely reached Shivaji's camp.

The French, according to the Dutch letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1670 from Surat, had 150 Europeans, about a dozen cannon of fair caliber and a large quantity of ammunition in their factory.<sup>[2570](#)</sup> Yet they offered no opposition to Shivaji

though, according to the English letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> November 1670 from Surat, “they vapoured [boasted] as if they would have fought the whole army themselves.”<sup>2571</sup> In fact, they made their peace with Shivaji by giving him valuable presents according to a Dutch letter, and were even said, according to one English letter, to have furnished the Marathas with powder and shot.<sup>2572</sup> Even then, when some of the men in the French house appeared on the terrace with arms, the Marathas shot three of them dead and yet the French did not retaliate.<sup>2573</sup>

The gallant resistance offered by the English, Persian and Turkish merchants deserves all praise. But they were spared not because of their gallantry alone but also, as Carrè remarks, because “Shivaji wanted to plunder at ease and he came to Surat to take booty and not to fight.”<sup>2574</sup>

The Marathas suddenly left the city on 6th October.<sup>2575</sup> According to the Surat Council’s letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> November 1670 to the Company, “before he [Shivaji] marched away he sent a letter to the officers and chief merchants, the substance whereof was that if they did not pay him twelve lakh of rupees yearly tribute he would return the next year and burn down the remaining parts of the town.”<sup>2576</sup> As soon as the Marathas left, the poor people of the city started plundering what was left and all the houses, except those which stood on their guard, were ransacked.<sup>2577</sup>

The seamen sent for the defence of the English house were, after the Marathas left the city, “very prompt to offer violence to the estates of the natives.” When Streynsham Master reported this to the Surat Council, which was then at Swally, they ordered him to promise the seamen a gratuity if they behaved decently and soberly. Accordingly, they decided, in their meeting of 17<sup>th</sup> October 1670, to pay Rs.20 to each officer and

10 to each seaman, this amount to be paid to those who were at Swally Marine to defend the warehouses as well as to those who were at Surat.<sup>2578</sup> Later, the directors of the Company sent for Aungier, by the ships leaving England in March 1672, a gold medal struck in commemoration of his defence of the Surat factory.<sup>2579</sup> Streynsham Master, who had actually defended the factory, was also given a gold medal which he received personally in England in December 1673.<sup>2580</sup>

The spoil taken was immense; according to an official report from Surat quoted in the newsletter of the Imperial Court dated 17<sup>th</sup> January 1671, it was worth Rs.6.6 million.<sup>2581</sup> But the real loss suffered by Surat could not be measured by this booty alone. The damage to the prosperity of the city was heavy and permanent. For a long time afterwards, rumours of Shivaji's approach threw Surat into consternation and stopped all trading activities.<sup>2582</sup> Here are some extracts from the letters and consultations of the Surat Council:

“A sudden news came that Shivaji was near with an army of 15,000 men, which put the city in a great fright.”<sup>2583</sup> (3<sup>rd</sup> February 1672.)

“We have been continually alarmed by Shivaji’s forces the whole year, excepting the months of August and September; the town gates and all passages stopped up for several months. Those of greatest quality who could prevail with the Governor for money, got permission to send their families out and secure them in other parts far distant.”<sup>2584</sup> (22 October 1672.)

“The town is strongly alarmed by Shivaji’s forces near Ramnagar. The people of Valsad, Chikhli and Gandevi are fled and the Baniyas here are packing

away what they can do privately.”<sup>2585</sup> (22<sup>nd</sup> October 1674.)

“This town begins already to be alarmed by Shivaji, which is no mean obstruction to our trade, but we trust God will preserve your estate from all danger.”<sup>2586</sup> (26<sup>th</sup> October 1675.)

“The President and Council considered of sending down the soldiers that have been kept here all this month for the security of the Company’s estate, but in regard the town is jealous [i.e. fearful] of Shivaji’s visiting them this year, wherefore that the Company might not be in want of assistance to defend their estates and their servants’ lives should he again burn and plunder the city.”

“Resolved that that the soldiers be detained here, and not sent to Bombay.”<sup>2587</sup> (12<sup>th</sup> April 1677.)

“This city of Surat and the countries adjacent have for these four years been under continual fear of being surprised by Shivaji’ army...and it is confidently affirmed that Shivaji’s army increases daily more and more and that many of his soldiers are lodged privately [i.e. secretly] in the very town of Surat upon some design.<sup>2588</sup> (26<sup>th</sup> May 1677.)

“The city of Surat is often times alarmed with the approaches of Shivaji’s for[ces] and is verily believed if not otherwise diverted [he] will certainly this year attempt once more to surprise it...so that the inhabitants of Surat do now more dread him than ever, it being assured that he has declared its utter ruin upon his next coming with fire and sword.<sup>2589</sup> (24<sup>th</sup> September 1678.)

“We have lately been hotly alarmed with Shivaji’s approaches to this city, but, it pleased God, it proved only a party of his men who have burnt and robbed a village or two about two days’ journey from hence and are retired.”<sup>2590</sup> (5<sup>th</sup> April 1679.)

But the bane of Surat proved a boon for Mumbai. Merchants in Surat contemplated shifting to Mumbai, which offered them security, freedom of religion, kind usage and small customs.<sup>2591</sup> In due course, Surat lost its position as the greatest emporium of India.

#### BATTLE OF VANI DINDORI (17<sup>TH</sup> OCTOBER 1670)<sup>2592</sup>

Prince Muazzam, the *subadar* of the Deccan, had received intelligence that Shivaji had gone to plunder Surat. So he ordered Daud Khan, who was at Burhanpur, to intercept the Marathas. Marching by way of Aurangabad and Vaijapur he arrived at Chandwad in the evening of 16<sup>th</sup> October 1670. The route from Surat to Nasik crosses the Chandwad range through the Kanchan- Manchan pass, 15 km west of Chandwad. At midnight, Daud Khan's scouts brought him the news that Shivaji had crossed the pass and was marching to Nasik while a part of his army had halted at the pass to collect stragglers. So he immediately set out in the night to catch up with the Marathas. On the following morning, the Mughal van under Ikhlas Khan<sup>2593</sup> ascended a hill near the pass and saw the Maratha cavalry drawn for battle in the plain below.

Though the ground here is broken by a number of rivulets which carry off rainwater falling on the southern face of the hills but are dry for the rest of the year, and is dotted by a few undulating hills, it is generally level and admirably suited for light cavalry.<sup>2594</sup> Here it could maneuver, skirmish, condense or

expand its squadrons or conveniently lie in wait in some suitable fold of ground for attacking a charging enemy in his rear. It was equally unsuitable, however, for a set-piece battle which the Mughals were used to fight. This was the spot Shivaji, with 10000 cavalry, had chosen to accept battle to cover the withdrawal of his plunder that he had sent ahead. The battle that was fought here is known after the joint names of the district Vani-Dindori.

Instead of halting his division, so that the rear might catch up with the van, Ikhlas Khan decided to attack immediately. Bhimsen tells us that this recklessness was a result of "the excitement of his youth" but — and this is a mere conjecture — he might as well have been lured by the Marathas, as was their practice, by a simulated flight. While his troopers were preparing for battle with arms brought with them on camels, he himself led a small body of horsemen in a reckless charge on the Marathas and was wounded and unhorsed. Meanwhile, Daud Khan arrived on the scene and sent forward a strong detachment under Rai Makarand Khatri to reinforce the van while he himself was leaving his baggage with a small guard in a ruined village on a height surrounded by brooks. By the time Daud Khan joined the fray, this detachment had become involved in the battle and had suffered heavy losses. The Mughal cavalry thus came into action piecemeal instead of in a concentrated body and gave the Marathas a chance to defeat them in detail. After Daud Khan's arrival, the Marathas were pushed back and Ikhlas Khan was rescued; though they kept hovering around, the Mughal artillery and matchlocks kept them at a distance. The battle raged for many hours in a series of cavalry actions. The ground was broken and Mir Abdul Mabood, commander of divisional artillery,<sup>2595</sup> was separated from the rest of the army. He was attacked by the Marathas and one of his sons was killed while he himself was severely wounded. The Mughals had suffered heavy losses in the initial actions and by evening their position was critical. Bhimsen tells us, "At that time Daud Khan did not have more than 1,000

soldiers." The detachment that was left in the rear to protect the baggage was then called up. When night descended upon the battlefield, the Marathas, with a captured elephant, withdrew under cover of darkness and the Mughals bivouacked in their entrenched camp.

The next day, Daud Khan marched with his battered army to Nasik from where he sent back his wounded to Aurangabad. The Marathas descended into the Konkan by way of Kunjargad.<sup>2596</sup> Daud Khan stayed at Nasik for one month to guard the Mughal territory against further Maratha incursions and then marched to Ahmednagar, evidently in conformity with Maratha movements.

#### CONQUEST OF BAGLAN AND SACK OF KARANJA

The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1592 that the fort of Trimbak was captured by Moropant in the dark fortnight of the month of Kartik (19<sup>th</sup> October to 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1670).<sup>2597</sup>

In November 1670 the Maratha fleet assembled at Nagaon. The English factors at Mumbai made discreet inquiries about its destination and were informed by the Maratha admiral, Darya Sarang, that Shivaji would march on Surat with 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry where 3,000 soldiers and a large number of pioneers would join him by sea and that after taking the castle of Surat he would march on Bharuch.<sup>2598</sup> A spy, which the English had sent to Nagaon, counted 160 vessels anchored there.<sup>2599</sup> On 24<sup>th</sup> November the Maratha fleet actually set out from Nagaon and sailed as far as Daman. On the 27<sup>th</sup>, the English saw two fast frigates sailing northward and thought that they were going to recall the fleet.<sup>2600</sup> Actually, on 17<sup>th</sup> December, the English Council at Mumbai received certain intelligence that it had returned to Dabhol.<sup>2601</sup> The purpose of

this cruise is not known. It does not seem to have been part of any deception plan because, if anything, it would have drawn the Mughal field army northward and thus in a suitable position to meet the impending Maratha stroke. Perhaps it was what we would call a training exercise and the English might have been duped by the Maratha admiral who was aware of their anxiety about the security of their factories at Surat and Bharuch. The Marathas, it would seem, deliberately spread such rumours to confuse their enemies. In fact, one of Shivaji's servants, who had gone to the Mumbai Island on 16<sup>th</sup> November 1670, had told his friends of seven or eight places, Mumbai being one, which, he thought, Shivaji was aiming at.<sup>2602</sup> Be that as it may, the cruise was not entirely uneventful. In spite of the Portuguese-Maratha treaty of 1669, relations between them had remained strained. The Maratha fleet entered into a fight with the Portuguese at Daman, captured a Portuguese vessel and carried it back to Dabhol. Soon afterwards the Portuguese, in retaliation, impeded a Maratha flotilla near Vasai and captured 12 small vessels.<sup>2603</sup>

Meanwhile, the army, instead of marching on Surat as the English thought it would, crossed the Sahyadris and invaded Baglan. This hilly district, "famous for its temperate climate, its numerous streams and the abundance of its trees and fruits," consisted of about 1,000 villages and was guarded by nine hill forts, the strongest among which were those of Salher and Mulher, the others being smaller hill outposts.<sup>2604</sup> While a force under Moropant Pingle reduced the forts of Ahiwant, Markanda and Raval-Javala in November 1670, Shivaji himself swept eastward into Khandesh and Varhad and swooped down upon the rich and prosperous town of Karanja<sup>2605</sup> late in November 1670.<sup>2606</sup> The strength of this force is not known but it was probably between ten and fifteen thousand cavalry. In those days, Karanja was the chief market town of Varhad and years of peace which that rich province had enjoyed had resulted in

accumulation of a fabulous wealth in it. According to an English report, the booty taken was worth Rs.10 million and was laden on 4,000 bullocks and donkeys.<sup>2607</sup> In addition, all the rich men of the place were carried off for ransom.<sup>2608</sup> Many other towns in Varhad yielded vast sums of money.<sup>2609</sup> Bahadurpura, a suburb of Burhanpur, was also plundered.<sup>2610</sup> A notable feature of the campaign was that the Marathas took written undertakings from towns and villages to pay them one fourth of the revenue in future.<sup>2611</sup> This was what we might call a psychological attack to undermine the prestige of the Mughal government.

The storm passed as quickly as it had come and the Maratha horsemen retired towards Baglan. Then, in December 1670, Maratha forces, totaling some 20000 horse and foot, joined hands near Salher and stormed it by escalade.<sup>2612</sup>

The account of the storm of Salher is reported in the newsletter dated 19<sup>th</sup> January 1671 of the Imperial Court. It states:<sup>2613</sup>

The petition of Neknam Khan [the *faujdar* of Baglan] was received. He had requested thus:

“First, 20,000 horse and foot of Shivaji had laid siege to the fort Sultangad [Salher].<sup>2614</sup> Seizing an opportunity they fastened rope ladders to the fort and scaled it. When Fathullah Khan, the commandant of the fort, came out they killed him. Then his wife’s brother parleyed with the enemy and handed over the fort to them. But if orders are issued to his [petitioner’s] relative Qutb-ud Din Khan the fort will be recaptured from the enemy after his arrival.’ Having heard this, the Emperor ordered Asad

Khan<sup>2615</sup> to write to Neknam Khan that orders had been issued to Daud Khan and he would come and take the necessary action there.

“Secondly, there is no guarantee about Aurang-gad [Mulher], Javalagad and Ravalagad.<sup>2616</sup> Having heard this, the Emperor ordered to write to Neknam Khan that Daud Khan would take necessary action about them as well.

“Thirdly, the supplies of grain are not reaching this place. The officials of Khandesh should be ordered to provide supplies of grain. The Emperor ordered to write to the officials of Khandesh to keep on providing supplies of grain to Neknam Khan and to write to Muhammad Ashraf, the *diwan* of Khandesh, to send Rs.50,000 to Neknam Khan, the *faujdar* of Baglan, and give with him the contingent of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. They should supply lead and powder and make provision for repairing the fort.”

About this time the Marathas also captured the forts of Achalgad in Baglan and the forts Jivadhan, Chavand, Harishchandragad and Hadsar in the Harishchandragad Range.<sup>2617</sup>

Meanwhile what of Daud Khan? We have seen that by the end of November, or about the time when Karanja was being despoiled of its wealth, Daud Khan had reached Ahmednagar. From here, having learnt of the Maratha inroads into Baglan, he again marched northward. When he had reached Ankai-Tankai, he received urgent messages from his son that the Marathas were plundering around Burhanpur. So he turned eastward and crossed the Ajantha range by the Fardapur pass where, to his chagrin, he learnt that the Marathas had returned to Baglan. So

he again turned westward to catch up with them. Daud Khan learnt of the fall of Salher on his way, only a short distance away, and established himself at Kanchan-Manchan to check further Maratha depredations in his province.[2618](#)

In this career of conquest the Marathas met with failure at three forts: Chakan, Shivneri and Dhodap. Their failure at Chakan becomes known through a petition, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1671, submitted by a *mansabdar* named Naroji, son of Raghoji. He submitted therein that his endeavours in defence of the fort during the siege laid by the enemy had not been acknowledged, that his *jagir* had been laid waste by the enemy, and that, therefore, he be transferred to the field army or the Imperial retinue and be given financial assistance.[2619](#) The failure at Shivneri has been recorded by Dr. John Fryer who had visited the fort in May 1675 to treat some relations of the commandant of the fort. About the Maratha attempt on the fort, he writes:

“He [commandant of the fort] gave me... the liberty to take a round about the castle, never before granted any not listed in his service....

The first object busied me, was a place Shivaji’s men had attempted to scale, by me esteemed a desperate deign, and very improbable; yet two men got up, and a stone casually tumbling, deterred their accomplices, leaving them [the two men who had come up] a sacrifice to the governor [commandant of the fort] and women, who being left alone to the defence of the castle (all the men deserting on the approach of a vast army of Shivaji’s) hurled them down the mountain for their rash adventure.”[2620](#)

The Maratha failure at Dhodap is reported in the following newsletter of the Court dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1671:[2621](#)

“A report was received from Muhammad Zaman, the commandant of fort Dhodap. He had written: ‘Shivaji’s army had laid siege to the fort, but there was a good supply of guns and ammunition due to the Emperor’s good fortune. Therefore the enemy was unable to consolidate. Having heard this, the Emperor ordered Asad Khan to write to Muhammad Zaman: ‘Your services have been acknowledged. Be hopeful for promotion. Daud Khan has been ordered to go to reinforce you. He will come to reinforce you. Bahadur Khan has been ordered from this side. He will come to support you.’

Shaikh Sulaiman submitted that the *Firangis* had petitioned that if the Emperor would give them some assistance they would embark in ships and harass Shivaji. The Emperor ordered to write a *farman* to Saifullah Khan, the officer in charge at Surat, to the following effect: ‘Enquire and report what this *Firangi* was saying. Identify the Persons who can wage war against Shivaji and submit a report. Five or six ships capable of accommodating 500 men are lying there [at Surat] in a state of disrepair. Get those repaired.’”

The capture of Salher was an event of great strategic importance. In the first place, it furnished Shivaji with an admirable base of operations against the rich provinces of Gujarat and Khandesh. It is only 125 km east-southeast of Surat, 50 km south-southwest of Nandurbar, 100 km west-southwest of Amalner, 250 km west-southwest of Burhanpur and 175 km northwest of Aurangabad. All these places, the last two being the capitals of Khandesh and the Deccan respectively, now lay within easy striking range of Maratha cavalry. Also a 150 km stretch of the Surat-Burhanpur route lay within 80 km of Salher. Secondly, with their northward extension, the chain of Maratha strongholds along the Sahyadris flanked two important Mughal routes in the Deccan and threatened to

interrupt all traffic on them. The first, the Surat-Nasik-Junnar route lay under their very nose. The second, the Surat-Shrigonda route, passing through Ankai-Tankai and Ahmednagar, lay, almost throughout its length, within 100 km of them. Thirdly, the northward extension of the front in general, and the seizure of Salher in particular, enabled the Marathas to menace at once several alternative and divergent objectives, which the enemy may desire to cover, and thus imposed on him the longest possible passive defence. Behind the secure defensive shield of the Sahyadris, Shivaji could now concentrate his army and conceal till the very last moment the precise line of attack which he intended to take, thus impaling the Mughals on the horns of a dilemma. If they concentrated their forces to cover an objective he could pounce upon any of the remaining unguarded ones. If they dispersed their forces to cover all possible objectives they would be exposed to destruction in detail. The loss of Salher had made the front too wide, for their available forces, to impose any effective check on Maratha inroads and, unlike the Marathas, they did not have the advantage of a natural obstacle to defend it. The advantages of mobility, the width of the front and a natural cover to conceal their movements, which the Marathas thus enjoyed, were further accentuated by the topography. The Mughal forces trying to intercept the Maratha raiders would have to negotiate the mountain ranges and rivers emanating from the Sahyadris. On the other hand, the mobility of the Marathas would be further enhanced by the scarcity of natural obstacles across their direction of attack. Of course, they also would have to move across a number of tributaries that emanate from the branches of the main range and join the principal rivers but these could be crossed almost at any point throughout their length and formed no real obstacles as such.

The pattern of military operations which followed the capture of Salher consisted therefore of a concerted series of strokes at different points and, unless we keep in mind the advantages which the extension of the front had conferred

upon the Marathas, their success, in spite of their superior mobility, becomes militarily unintelligible. It should also be noticed how the operations in these two theatres — the one along and to the west of the Sahyadris and the other in the plains east of them — reacted on each other. The plundering raids to the east of the Sahyadris diverted their enemy's attention and prepared the way for an almost unopposed northward expansion which in turn gave impetus to these raids by developing the threat over a wider space. Though the chroniclers speak only of a few selected long range raids, the few cotemporaneous documents that have survived suggest that continuous blows were being struck on all along the front. Here are a few examples.

Newsletter of the Imperial Court, 14<sup>th</sup> January 1671

“The petition of Muhammad Ashraf, the *diwan* of Khandesh, was received. He had written: ‘Shivaji’s army is plundering the region of Varhad. His majesty knows that copper coins worth 20 million [rupees] of the Imperial treasury are in the *Khalisa parganas*.’ Having heard this, the Emperor ordered Asad Khan to write to Khan Zaman: ‘Why did you go to Islamgad alias Devgad if you had heard that the enemy’s army was coming to Varhad? Now take those coins worth two million to Burhanpur. If the enemy takes that money away you will have to answer for it. Therefore be alert.’[2622](#)

“The petition of Barkhurdar Khan,[2623](#) the commandant of fort Ausa, was received. He had written: ‘Shivaji’s army of 20,000 horse and foot was plundering this region and was exacting contributions. Recently they were encamped at a distance of two *kos* from this fort and wanted to attack this place. Having heard this news I got the fort

of Ausa, which had broken at various places, repaired, placed the artillery on the fort, and got ready. Then they dropped the plan of coming here and went away. But they have exacted contributions from my *jagir*, and have plundered and laid it waste. Therefore I have received nothing. My position is difficult and I hope for some favour from the Emperor.' Having heard this, the Emperor said: 'He deserves our favour. But there are many such persons. If all of them submit such requests how can we grant them? Therefore we cannot grant his request.' "[2624](#)

A Memorandum dated 21<sup>st</sup> January 1671 contains a summary of submissions made by Suhrab Khan,[2625](#) the commandant of the Udgir Fort, and the remarks on each passed by a higher authority, perhaps the *subadar* of the Deccan or his representative.[2626](#)

[1] As the Udgir Pargana has been laid waste by the Imperial army and the enemy, all the cultivators have fled far away. Since two years nothing has been received [by way of revenue]. It has not been possible even to procure loan. [Remark–] *Not approved.*

[2] At the end of the night on 24<sup>th</sup> December 1670 six to seven thousand horsemen and a few thousand foot soldiers appeared near the fort. Because I was alert we opened fire whereupon they turned back and went towards [fort] Nilanga. Spies brought the news that the wicked Shivaji was at that place. [Remark–] *Acknowledged.*

[3] The wicked one [Shivaji] sent a message to send him fourth part of the revenue or else he would lay waste the territory. He carried away the property

of the merchants who had taken refuge in Nilanga.  
[Remark–] *Army will be sent.*

[4] Fathjang Khan<sup>2627</sup> who had been appointed for the protection of this territory has not arrived till 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1671. He has arrived at Nanded. [Remark–] *He will reach there.*

[5] A letter was written to Shafi Khan, the *diwan* [of the Deccan] about making arrangement for provisions etc. and lists of necessary things was sent to him. The Khan wrote about this to the Court once and was ordered to provide whatever was necessary for buildings etc. Nothing has been provided yet. [Remark–] *Make arrangements.*

[6] Soldiers are near death because of hunger and would soon go away. They have not been paid for six months or rather for a longer period. [Remark–] *Make payment.*

[7] What little the *diwan* has agreed to pay for provisions has not been received yet. For the protection of the town and the fort I have kept 200 horsemen and 400 musketeers more than are required by regulations. I am distressed that as the *jagirs* are laid waste how long can I continue like this. [Remark–] *Acknowledged.*

[8] The list of necessary things and repairs of buildings has been sent now. It is necessary to make proper arrangements. Four hundred musketeers should be approved as reinforcement till Shivaji's rebellion is quelled. [Remark–] *Make repairs.*"

Newsletter of the Imperial Court, 15<sup>th</sup> March 1671:

“The newsletter of Aurangabad was received. It was written therein: ‘Shivaji attacked and sacked the town of Chandwad. He captured one elephant, 12 horses and 40000 rupees of the government and plundered the entire town. The commandant of the fort, Baqi Khan, is shut up in the fort. Lodi Khan, the *faujdar* of Konkan, fought with Shivaji’s army but fled after having been defeated and wounded. When Fathjang Khan, the *faujdar* of Nanded, heard these incidents he left Nanded and came here.’

“Having heard this, the Emperor ordered to write to Fathjang Khan that his title of Jang has been revoked.”[2628](#)

These documents clearly show that a strong Maratha force, possibly numbering 10,000 horse, was operating around Udgir from January to March 1671, either in a single expedition or in a series of raids. There is no possibility of the Maratha force that sacked Karanja in November 1670 having turned southward towards Udgir because, in the first place, there is sufficient evidence indicating its return towards Salher and secondly, laden with the spoils of Karanja it could not have moved towards Udgir, which is about 250 km south of Karanja and about 350 km east of Pune, and then stayed there for such an extended period. Therefore, this must have been another Maratha division which struck eastwards as soon as Daud Khan was drawn northwards by the Maratha forces operating in Baglan, Khandesh and Varhad.

The Emperor had already begun considering marching in person to the Deccan to direct operations against Shivaji. It is recorded in the newsletter dated 15<sup>th</sup> January 1671 of the Court that he had ordered Diyanat Khan to ask astrologers to find an auspicious time in the month of Shawwal (1<sup>st</sup> February to 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1671) for setting out towards the Deccan.[2629](#) But he gave up the idea, evidently because of his other preoccupations.

## STRUGGLE FOR SALHER

On 29<sup>th</sup> November 1670, Mahabat Khan<sup>2630</sup> was appointed to the command of the Mughal Army of the Deccan.<sup>2631</sup> He arrived with large reinforcements — according to an English letter, with 40000 horse — at Aurangabad on 10<sup>th</sup> January 1671.<sup>2632</sup> The figure of reinforcements given in the English letter might be exaggerated, but they could have brought the strength of the Mughal Army of the Deccan to probably forty to fifty thousand cavalry. From Aurangabad, Mahabat Khan immediately set out for Chandwad which he might have reached by the end of the month.<sup>2633</sup> From there, he advanced into Baglan and besieged the fortresses recently captured by the Marathas. An English letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> February 1671 from Mumbai, tells us of the arrival of Daud Khan at Junnar with 12000 cavalry, evidently to guard the Mughal territory against Maratha inroads from that direction.<sup>2634</sup> The hill strongholds of Ahiwant, Achalagiri, Markanda and Javala capitulated in May 1671.<sup>2635</sup> These, however, were small forts, no more than outposts of Salher. But as the rainy season was approaching, Mahabat Khan left Baglan and marched to Ahmednagar and thence to Parner, about 35 km west-southwest of Ahmednagar, to encamp for the monsoons.<sup>2636</sup>

Baglan, however, was not allowed to rest in peace. Another Mughal corps under Bahadur Khan, the *subadar* of Gujarat, with Diler Khan as his second-in-command, was ordered to march to the Deccan.<sup>2637</sup> Bahadur Khan was foster brother of the Emperor, had distinguished himself during the Mughal war of succession and now held the rank of 6000 *dhat*/ 5000 *sawar*/ 5000 *du aspa sih aspa*.<sup>2638</sup> According to an English letter, he

arrived at Surat in May 1671 and was there on 1<sup>st</sup> June.<sup>2639</sup> Soon thereafter he marched south and besieged Salher in June, at the height of the rainy season.<sup>2640</sup>

The revolt in Afghanistan led to the recall of Mahabat Khan, in September 1671, to take charge of that province and Bahadur Khan was appointed in his place.<sup>2641</sup> He left Ikhlas Khan Miyana to continue the siege — possibly with about 20,000 men — and himself marched to Ahmednagar.<sup>2642</sup> From there, detachments of the Mughal army raided Pune and Chakan.<sup>2643</sup> An English letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> January 1672 from Mumbai, tells us that Prataprao Gujar, the Maratha cavalry general, was killed during one of these raids.<sup>2644</sup> Though this information was incorrect, it suggests that Prataprao Gujar with his light cavalry was active around Pune at this time for the defence of Maratha territory.

An English letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> February 1672 from Mumbai speaks of "Shivaji having his hands full here."<sup>2645</sup> On the contrary, however, the dispersion of his enemy's army had offered Shivaji a grand opportunity to inflict a crushing blow upon them. In January 1672, as the English letters from Mumbai inform us, he was assembling a strong force around Mahad by draining his forts even as far as Kudal and Vengurle.<sup>2646</sup> Soon afterwards, on Shivaji's orders, Moropant Pingle, with an infantry force, secretly marched northward behind the screening heights of the Sahyadris, while Prataprao Gujar slipped past the Mughal army and raced northward with a cavalry force to join him. The two forces then linked up and fell on the besiegers of Salher sometime in the second half of January or the first half February 1672. According to Sabhasad, a part of the Maratha army held them in front while the other fell on their flank and rear. Taken completely by surprise, the Mughals were routed. Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat was killed

and Ikhlas Khan himself was taken prisoner with several officers of his division such as Amar Singh's son Muhakkam Singh and Darkoji Bhosale.<sup>2647</sup> The booty included 11 elephants and 1,700 horses. The prisoners were released on payment of ransom.<sup>2648</sup>

The victory of Salher was followed up by the capture of Mulher.<sup>2649</sup>

#### CHHATRASAL'S VISIT TO SHIVAJI<sup>2650</sup>

Though the exact date is not known, it was sometime in 1670/71 that Shivaji received a visit from Chhatrasal Bundela. His father, Champatrai Bundela, was the Chief of Mahoba in eastern Bundelkhand<sup>2651</sup> and, according to some sources, it was he who had guided Aurangzeb to the unfrequented and therefore unguarded ford over the Chambal which had enabled that prince to turn the flank of Dara's entrenched position during the Mughal war of succession.<sup>2652</sup> Later on, however, taking advantage of the confusion during the war, Champatrai set himself up as an independent chief and made extensive raids in the surrounding territory. As soon as Aurangzeb's hands were free from the War of Succession, he dispatched an army in February 1659 under Shubhkaran Bundela against the refractory chieftain. Most of the Bundela chiefs joined the Imperial army in the hunt. At last, left with a handful of followers and exhausted with fever and hunger Champatrai sought refuge, in October 1661, with a Rajput chief in Sarangpur district of Malwa. Here, suspecting betrayal by his host, he and his wife stabbed themselves to death.<sup>2653</sup>

Champatrai left five sons behind him. Of these, the fourth, Chhatrasal, was then a boy of just eleven. In those days, the only occupation to which a man of *Kshatriya* (Warrior) class could

resort was military service. So Chhatrasal and his elder brother Angad entered Mirza Raja Jai Singh's contingent. They distinguished themselves at the siege of Purandar and in September 1665 obtained, on Jai Singh's recommendations, ranks of 1000 *dhat/500 sawar* and 300 *dhat/150 sawar* respectively.<sup>2654</sup> Thereafter, Chhatrasal was posted under Diler Khan and distinguished himself in the operations against the Chief of Devgad.

Chhatrasal, however, was ill at ease in Mughal service. He was enthralled by stories of Shivaji's exploits and decided to seek service under him. He left the Mughal camp one day on the pretext of hunting and went to see his illustrious hero. Shivaji treated him with honour, heard his story and extolled his manly spirit but sent him back with the following advice: "Recover and rule your native land. You and I are as one. Do not be afraid of the Turks. Goddess Bhavani helps me. So I am not afraid of the Turks and have drawn my sword against them. Go to your native land, collect a force and wage war against the Turks. Protect the cows, the Vedas and the Brahmins. If you die fighting you will gain salvation; if you win you will rule the earth. You are a brave man. If I keep you here I shall get all the credit of success. So go to your native land and destroy the Mughals." Then Shivaji called for a sword, girded it at Chhatrasal's waist and bade him farewell.<sup>2655</sup>

Chhatrasal went back and met Shubhkaran Bundela who was serving in the Deccan and tried to win him over to his plan of a revolt against the Mughals. Shubhkaran, who had seen Champatrai's plight, thought the idea madness. He tried to dissuade Chhatrasal from such an undertaking and even promised to get him a promotion. Undaunted, Chhatrasal went to Bundelkhand and embarked, at the age of 21, on the desperate plan he had in mind with a following of only five horsemen and 25 foot-soldiers. The time however was opportune. Aurangzeb's policy of temple destruction in 1670

proved to be a blessing in disguise. The Bundelas looked upon Chhatrasal as the champion of the Hindu faith and flocked to his banner. Even Bundela officers in the Mughal army secretly rejoiced at the successes of their rebel brethren. Initially, Chhatrasal's raids were directed against the districts of Sironj in the west and Dhamoni in the southwest. He followed the Maratha practice of sparing places which paid a contribution of one fourth of the revenue and plundering those that failed to pay up.[2656](#)

Chhatrasal's later life is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that he carved out an independent principality in Bundelkhand and died at the ripe age of 81 in 1731.

#### RUSTUM-I ZAMAN'S REBELLION AND DEATH (1671)

That Rustum-i Zaman was in secret collusion with Shivaji was a belief that was both widespread and old.[2657](#) It would be remembered that in their letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1666, the English factors at Hubli had reported to Surat that Rustum-i Zaman had surreptitiously delivered the fort of Rangna to Shivaji's officer Raoji Pandit and had then gone to Bijapur to plead for himself.[2658](#) Our next piece of information comes from a letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> September 1671, which the English factors at Karwar wrote to Surat. It reads:

“There has broke out a rebellion some few days since never thought of before; Rustum-i Zaman who formerly was Lord of these towns hereabout, being dispossessed of them by the King [Adilshah] for his treacherous compliance with Shivaji in delivering up one of the King's castles unto him, presuming upon his favour and the great alliance he has among the nobility of this country, has taken up arms, hoping to effect by force , which hitherto he could not do by the

intercession of all his friends that is, to be restored to his former estate; he has so well played his time that being assisted underhand by Shivaji's forces, he has already seized on as much country as amounts to upwards of three hundred thousand pagodas yearly rent; he has likewise plundered Raybag and burnt part of it, so that it is thought, what with that it has suffered formerly by Shivaji and this now, it is utterly ruined and will not for long time be able to hold up its head again. The merchants of Athani and other towns are all led to remoter places and they of Hubli convey away their goods as fast as they can, fearing the contagion will spread as far as them, so that in those parts all things are in great confusion. The King has sent an army against him, but his friends are so powerful that it advances but slowly; in the meantime they are making his peace with the King and it is thought will at length frighten him to a compliance and restoration of what country he formerly enjoyed or its value; and the poor merchants that have been robbed and undone by this Court cheat must expect no manner of satisfaction but endure it patiently, anything of that nature being contrary either to their religion or at least their practice.”<sup>2659</sup>

That Shivaji had rendered assistance to Rustum-i Zaman and the latter had plundered Raibag and exacted money from other towns, was also reported in a Dutch letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> September 1671 from Vengurle.<sup>2660</sup>

But it was not long before Rustum-i Zaman's rebellion came to an end. The Karwar factors wrote to Surat on 31<sup>st</sup> October 1671 that the King's forces had fought a battle with the rebels and utterly routed and dispersed them.<sup>2661</sup> Dutch letters dated 15<sup>th</sup> October

and 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1671 from Vengurle reported that Rustum-i Zaman had been taken prisoner by the army sent by the King of Bijapur.<sup>2662</sup> Then, it seems, Rustum-i Zaman was either taken prisoner or lured to the Court on some false assurance, for Carré, who had halted at Hukeri on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1673 during his journey to Bijapur and had dined with Rustum-i Zaman's son, records in his journal that the King of Bijapur, having come to know of Rustum-i Zaman's collusion with Shivaji, summoned him to the Court "on some affairs of state and beheaded him" and that as he knew that the nobleman's son was not mixed up in his father's treachery, he gave him the governorship of Hukeri but took away most of the *jagirs* and privileges which his father enjoyed.<sup>2663</sup> Rustum-i Zaman's son, Abu Khan, too was known by his father's title, Rustum-i Zaman.<sup>2664</sup>

#### SHIVAJI AND THE SIDDIS

Shivaji' operations against the Siddi's coastal fort of Danda Rajpuri were continued or resumed and, by 1671, the Siddi was reduced to such dire straits that a report was received at Goa from the Portuguese fleet of the North that Shivaji had laid siege to Danda Rajpuri by land and sea, continuously bombarding it, and that there was a great danger that the fort would pass into his hands. The Portuguese governors and the State Council deliberated on the report in their meeting held on 15<sup>th</sup> March 1671. They thought that the passing of the fort into Shivaji's hands would be prejudicial to the security of [Portuguese] Chaul and, therefore, resolved that, though their recent treaty with Shivaji required them to remain neutral in the war between Shivaji and the Siddi,<sup>2665</sup> they should secretly provide the Siddi with ammunition.<sup>2666</sup> According to the

instructions received from Goa the Portuguese captain of Chaul started providing succour to the Siddi as best he could and still the Siddi's position continued to deteriorate. He had no money to pay his soldiers. So, at his request, the Portuguese factor at Vasai loaned back to him the money which he had deposited as tribute while acknowledging Portuguese overlordship. The Siddi had also sought a loan of Rs.2,000 against the horses which he had kept at Chaul for security. However, the factor was unable to grant it for lack of money. The Portuguese Viceroy, Count of Lavradio,<sup>2667</sup> and the State Council deliberated on this situation in their meeting of 29<sup>th</sup> May 1671 and resolved to pay him Rs. 2,000 against the horses and also to provide him ammunition secretly and with all due precaution.<sup>2668</sup>

But despite all this support which the Portuguese were secretly giving him, the Siddi, it would seem, was finding it difficult to hold out against Shivaji. Therefore, in 1672, he acknowledged the Mughal Emperor as his overlord. Then a fleet was quickly formed and its command was given to one Siddi Sambul.<sup>2669</sup> In his letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> September 1672 to Surat, Thomas Roach, an English gunner in Mughal service, mentions the Siddi as "His Majesty's servant, the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri."<sup>2670</sup> The minutes of the Mumbai Council's meeting held on 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1672 mention "Siddi Sambul of Danda Rajpuri, General of the Mughal's fleet against Shivaji."<sup>2671</sup> But the Siddi's allegiance to the Mughal Emperor was little more than nominal. It was a marriage of convenience.<sup>2672</sup> The Emperor had no naval force and the Siddi needed support to defend himself against Shivaji.

Every year, since he became a *mansabdar* of the Mughal Empire, the Siddi used to request shelter at Mumbai for his fleet. Perhaps, he considered it too dangerous to keep his fleet at

Danda Rajpuri, which was completely surrounded by Shivaji's territory, and there was no anchorage for a fleet at the island fort of Janjira. His usual mode of operations was to keep the fleet at Mumbai and make occasional forays into Shivaji's coastal possessions to plunder and burn. Shivaji, of course, took severe objection with the English for allowing the Siddi's fleet to anchor at Mumbai. That island was dependent on Shivaji's dominions for the supply of provisions and firewood as well as trade of its inhabitants with the main land. Besides, the Siddi's men used to make a nuisance of themselves in the island by their disorderly and rowdy behaviour. So the Mumbai Council, too, was reluctant to give shelter to the Siddi's fleet. But their commercial interests in the Mughal Empire being more vital to the Company, they had to succumb to the pressure brought to bear upon them by the Mughal officer in charge at Surat and allow the Siddi to anchor his fleet at Mumbai. This became the main cause of the tension in Shivaji's relations with the English, resulting in the Khanderi campaign, which shall be related in a later chapter.

In October 1672, Siddi Sambul came from Surat to Mumbai with his fleet of 30 to 40 ships and, since the Mumbai Council did not allow him ingress, anchored outside the harbour. Soon afterwards, this fleet began making depredations on Shivaji's coast.

In their letter dated 21<sup>st</sup> December 1672, the Mumbai Council gave an account of these to the Company thus:

“This year's campaign between the Mughal and him [Shivaji] ... is like to produce notable action, King Aurangzeb having sent a fleet of 30 sail of small frigates from Surat to assist the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri against him by sea, which fleet has done him much mischief, burning and plundering all his seaport towns, destroying also 50 of his vessels, and by land a vast army is reported coming down under

the command of the King's son Sultan Muhammad, who is lately restored out of prison,<sup>2673</sup> so that we have a hard and ticklish game to play, for the King being highly enraged against Shivaji, should he understand that we are in peace, or hold any strict correspondence with him, it might probably cause him to order some disturbance to be given to your general affairs, not only in these parts but in Bengal also. On the other side we are also forced to keep fair with Shivaji also, because from his country we are supplied with provisions, timber and firewood, and likewise your inhabitants of Bombay drive a good trade into the main [land] which would be a great prejudice to your island if it were obstructed."<sup>2674</sup>

This is corroborated by the letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> January 1673 written by the Portuguese captain of Chaul to the Portuguese Viceroy. What he reported therein was briefly as follows: The Siddi's fleet which had arrived from Surat, without attempting to relieve the fort of Danda Rajpuri besieged by Shivaji, carried fire and sword almost all along Shivaji's coast. It plundered and burnt Dabhol and, at Kelshi, set fire to eight of Shivaji's large craft. Frightened by these acts, the inhabitants of Chaul and other places sought refuge at Portuguese Chaul. Shivaji, his secretary and the *subadar* of Konkan wrote letters to the Captain of Chaul thanking him for the good treatment given to their people. Later, one of Shivaji's officers, accompanied by Shivaji's chief private physician, arrived at Chaul and asked for some men and gunners to man Shivaji's navy as he had no personnel with knowledge of the sea. To this the Portuguese Captain replied that they should approach the Viceroy because he alone could take any decision in such matters.<sup>2675</sup>

Abbé Carré, who had travelled on his way from Surat to Goa through the coastal strip of Shivaji's dominion in December 1672, was an eyewitness to the results of the Siddi's

depredations. He had seen how some villages and towns were almost deserted as the inhabitants had fled to hills and forests out of fear of the Siddi, whose ships were penetrating as far as they could through rivers and creeks, and had also seen Shivaji's soldiers assembled in a village for defence against the marauder.[2676](#)

The Siddi's strength on land was insignificant compared to Shivaji's and yet he could play such havoc on Shivaji's coastal strip because as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) wrote, "He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much, and as little, of the war as he will." He could land his force anywhere he wanted and as quickly withdraw them. To put sufficient garrisons all along the coast would have been impossible for Shivaji, especially when he was engaged in war against the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate. He could have placed detachments at a few important places but most of the coast would have been left defenceless against sudden raids. The only permanent way to put a stop to such depredations was to create a strong fleet to destroy, or at least neutralize, the Siddi's naval power, which Shivaji was striving to do since 1659. But as he needed to maintain a disproportionately large army to defend and expand his dominion, he could not immediately devote enough resources to create a sufficiently large fleet. Besides, he did not yet have enough men, especially leaders, with experience and skill in sea warfare. These inadequacies could not be overcome in a short time. Meanwhile, all that he could do to defend his coast from the Siddi's depredations was to place mobile striking forces at a few points in an attempt to catch and destroy the Siddi's marauding parties.

#### SHIVAJI'S FIRST ATTEMPT TO FORTIFY KHANDERI (1672)

Khanderi is a small island 17 km south of Mumbai harbour and 4 km from the mainland. Two kilometers to its east by north lies its sister island, known as Underi, opposite Thal on the mainland.[2677](#) Khanderi is two and a half kilometers from

north to south and slightly less than a kilometer from east to west. There are two hillocks on the island with a wide opening between them. The anchorage is to the northeast of the island. About 450 m to its northeast is a reef, which becomes exposed at half tide. The space between this reef and Underi is foul ground, impassable to boats of any size. Underi, about a kilometer from the mainland, is much smaller and lower than Khanderi. It is surrounded by rocks except for a small cove in the northeast where small boats could be anchored.

Shivaji commenced building a fort on Khanderi in 1672. This attempt is mentioned in three English letters of the period.

Surat to Mumbai

22<sup>nd</sup> April 1672

“There is a report here that Shivaji intends to build a castle on Henry Kenry [i.e. Khanderi], which the [Mughal] Governor makes one of his arguments for his not letting the President go, pretending he will help Shivaji, which [report] if true, it concerns [us] more than the port [of] Surat to hinder it, and therefore advise us if you hear of any such thing.”[2678](#)

Mumbai to Surat

1<sup>st</sup> May 1672

“We cannot hear that Shivaji does intend to build a fort on Henery Kenery; if he makes any attempt so to do we shall quickly put a stop to it.”[2679](#)

Although the Mumbai Council had not heard of the attempt, the Mughal Court knew about it as is evident from the following extract from a letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> September 1672 written from Delhi by Thomas Roach, the English gunner in Mughal service, to the Surat Council:

“Another passage amongst these papers (a journal of the *Darbar* [i.e. Court] affairs for two months time past<sup>2680</sup>) was that *Nakhuda Omed* [Ahmad]<sup>2681</sup> of Surat had sent an *Ardast* [petition] to the King to this effect, that if the King would but disburse 120,000 rupees then he would undertake to hinder Shivaji from finishing that castle which he has so long been building off upon Henry Kennary, to which the King gave answer that they should take security from him for the money and let him proceed so that when I had considered of this, I thought it good to clap this passage into your *Ardast*; that that was one of the main desires you had to go to Bombay for, to assist His Majesty’s servant, the Siddi of Danda Rajapur, in hindering Shivaji from finishing the aforesaid castle; and yet notwithstanding all this the said Governor of Surat would not let you go.”<sup>2682</sup>

No more information is extant about this attempt made by Shivaji to fortify Khanderi. We do know that he resumed the task in 1679. So it is evident that he abandoned it this time, probably due to shortage of water.<sup>2683</sup>

#### THE SATNAMI REVOLT (1672)<sup>2684</sup>

The Satnamis were a Hindu religious sect in North India, with its stronghold in the *pargana* of Narnol, 120 km southwest of Delhi. Though its followers dressed as mendicants they earned their livelihood as cultivators or traders with small capital. Most of them belonged to what were then considered as lower castes of Hindu society. As they shaved their heads they were called *Mundiyas* (shavelings). Though their revolt seems to have been sparked off by a temporal incident, Aurangzeb’s persecution of the Hindus was certainly the underlying cause which turned it into a religious uprising.

One day, a quarrel broke out between a Satnami cultivator and a foot soldier near Narnol. The soldier hit the cultivator with a stick which broke his head, whereupon a body of Satnamis beat the assailant to death. When the news reached the local government administrator, he sent a party of footmen to arrest those men. By then a large number of Satnamis had gathered at the scene. They attacked the footmen, put them to flight and seized their arms. The number of rebels was increasing by the hour. The *faujdar* of Narnol sent a large body of horsemen and foot soldiers to punish the rebels. But they too were routed by the Satnamis. The movement now spread like wild fire and the number of rebels rose to some five thousand. The Satnamis defeated the *faujdar* of Narnol, captured the town, demolished a number of mosques and tombs and established their own administration. A belief spread among them that they were immortal and that if one of them was slain, seventy others would spring up in his place!

At last, on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1672, the Emperor sent a force of 10,000 horsemen, supported by artillery, under command of Rad-andaz Khan to crush the revolt. A great battle was fought, both sides suffered a large number of casualties and at last the Satnamis were routed. According to the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* "they acted the battle, described in old Hindu books, called in the Hindu tongue the *Mahabharat*." The Emperor promoted Rad-andaz Khan to the rank of 3500 *dhat*/2000 *sawar* and conferred upon him the title of Shujaat Khan.

#### **REVOLT IN AFGHANISTAN (1672-1677)[2685](#)**

Before we continue with our narrative it would be as well to describe events in Afghanistan which had a profound influence upon the military situation in the Deccan.

The Afghans rose in revolt early in 1672. Their chief, Aimal Khan, declared himself king, assumed the title of Aimal Shah,

struck coins in his own name and proclaimed war against the Mughal Empire. The Khyber Pass was closed and the province of Afghanistan was cut off from the rest of the Empire. Muhammad Amin Khan, the *subadar* of Kabul, who at that time was at Peshawar, immediately set out for the provincial capital. On his way, on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1672, his army was surrounded and destroyed by the Afghan forces in the Khyber Pass. Thousands of Mughal troops perished, and as many men and women were taken prisoner to be sent to Central Asia for sale as slaves. Muhammad Amin Khan himself, with only a handful of officers, escaped to Peshawar. Soon afterwards, the Emperor demoted him from the rank of 6000 *dhat*/6000 *sawar* to 5000 *dhat*/5000 *sawar*, appointed him *subadar* of Gujarat and ordered him to take charge of his new office without being granted audience, evidently as a mark of displeasure.

It was probably due to this disaster that Prince Muhammad Muazzam, *subadar* of the Deccan, was summoned to the Court.

On 24<sup>th</sup> July 1672 he had audience with the Emperor.<sup>2686</sup> Mahabat Khan, who was at that time campaigning in the Deccan, had served as the *subadar* of Afghanistan on three occasions in the past and had intimate knowledge of local conditions. He too was summoned to the Court and sent off with a large army to take charge of the turbulent province. In spite of the Emperor's prodding, however, he remained inactive and failed to bring the situation under control. The Emperor therefore dispatched an independent force on 17<sup>th</sup> November 1673 under command of Shujaat Khan (formerly, Rad-andaz Khan), who had successfully quelled the Satnami uprising, to punish the Afghans. This force, on 14<sup>th</sup> February 1674, in its attempt to push on to Kabul through the Karapa Pass, was surrounded and annihilated by the Afghans and Shujaat Khan himself was slain.

Matters having come to this pass, the Emperor himself left Delhi on 8<sup>th</sup> April 1674 and marched to Hasan Abdal, between Rawalpindi and Peshawar, to direct operations. He arrived there on 27<sup>th</sup> June 1674 and stayed on for the next year and a half.

Reinforcements now poured to Afghanistan from all over the Mughal Empire including the province of the Deccan. On 28<sup>th</sup> September 1674 Fidai Khan was appointed to replace Mahabat Khan as *subadar* of Kabul. Despite all these efforts, the situation did not improve immediately and in 1675 a division under Mukarram Khan was surrounded and annihilated at Khapash, the Khan himself escaping with a few followers. Gradually however, the situation was brought under control, largely through diplomacy rather than force of arms. Many clans were won over by grant of *mansabs* in the Mughal army. Desultory fighting continued but, by the end of 1675, the situation was stabilized. The Emperor turned back from Hasan Abdal on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1675 and arrived at Delhi on 27<sup>th</sup> March 1676.

On 15<sup>th</sup> October 1676 Prince Muhammad Muazzam was appointed to command the army in Afghanistan and was given the title of Shah Alam Bahadur. On his recommendation, Amir Khan was appointed *subadar* of Kabul on 19<sup>th</sup> March 1677. The Prince returned from Afghanistan and reached Delhi in January 1678. Amir Khan, after a show of strength, won the hearts of the Afghans by his conciliatory policy, sowed dissensions in the rebel camp, and managed the affairs with such astuteness that during his governorship for the next 21 years, till his death in 1698, no serious uprising broke out in that frontier province.

#### **DEATH OF ABDULLA QUTB SHAH**

Abdulla Qutbshah died on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1672. He had no male heir and was succeeded by his youngest son-in-law, Abul Hasan.<sup>2687</sup> It would be remembered that in 1655 Aurangzeb had exacted a written commitment from Abdulla Qutbshah of making Muhammad Sultan, Aurangzeb's eldest son to whom his eldest daughter was married, his heir.<sup>2688</sup> Abul Hasan's throne, therefore, was no bed of roses and that sensuous and foolish man trembled at the thought of an impending Mughal invasion. Shivaji, who was quick to take advantage of Abul

Hasan's dread of a Mughal aggression, sent his envoy Niraji Raoji to Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) in May 1672 and concluded a pact with the Qutbshah, by the terms of which the latter was to pay him a (yearly) subsidy of 100,000 Hons (i.e. about Rs.375,000) of which 66,000 were paid immediately.[2689](#)

Muhammad Muzaffar, a Persian nobleman, was the prime minister of the Qutbshahi Sultanate and it was largely through his machinations that Abul Hasan was made the Sultan of Golconda. Tired of Muhammad Muzaffar's autocratic rule, Abul Hasan now intrigued with his shrewd Hindu secretary Madanna and one day, removed Muhammad Muzaffar from prime ministership without much ado and replaced him by Madanna.[2690](#) His first act, after becoming prime minister of Golconda, was the payment of tribute to the Mughal Emperor which was agreed upon by the treaty of 1656. It was accompanied by a petition from Abul Hasan informing the Emperor of his accession.[2691](#) With his hands full in Afghanistan and the western Deccan, the Emperor approved this succession by a *farman*, which mentioned the agreement concluded with Abdulla Qutbshah in 1656 but recognized Abul Hasan as the ruler of Golconda, provided he remained loyal and faithful, assist the Mughal noblemen to extirpate Shivaji and paid the tribute regularly. In his reply dated 4<sup>th</sup> May 1675, Abul Hasan promised to abide by these conditions and specifically stated he would consider Shivaji as his enemy and would not receive his envoys.[2692](#) Of course, as future events will show, Abul Hasan did not intend to keep that promise.

#### SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH (OCTOBER 1670 TO MAY 1672)

In October 1670 the Mumbai Council sent some boats as usual to fetch firewood from the mainland to burn their lime. But Shivaji's men forbade them and said that this was their master's absolute order. In their dispatch of 14<sup>th</sup> October 1670

the Mumbai Council reported the matter to Surat and asked them whether they should cut down the wood on Mumbai Island or take it by force from some adjacent islands belonging to Shivaji. The latter course, of course, they wrote, was quite feasible for these islands were uninhabited and lay scattered up and down the coast at some distance from the mainland.<sup>2693</sup> The Surat Council replied on 29<sup>th</sup> October 1670 that force should not be resorted to and that the Mumbai Council should complain to the governor of Kalyan and ask him to inform Shivaji that the English were willing to establish their factories in his ports provided he would order Anaji or some eminent person to treat with them regarding the Rajapur reparations.<sup>2694</sup> The outcome of this complaint is not known.

In his dispatch of 12<sup>th</sup> July 1671 the Mumbai Council informed Surat that the Deputy Governor had sent a letter to Shivaji.<sup>2695</sup> Shivaji's reply was received some time afterwards and the Mumbai Council enclosed its Portuguese translation with their dispatch dated 12<sup>th</sup> August 1671 to Surat to show how Shivaji slighted the friendship of the English.<sup>2696</sup> But their hopes of an accommodation were again raised by the arrival of an envoy of Shivaji to Mumbai. The discourse with him is reported in the Mumbai dispatch of 9<sup>th</sup> September 1671.<sup>2697</sup> He was told of the English demand of 32,000 Hons to make satisfaction for the losses which they had sustained at Rajapur. The envoy replied that though this was a great sum his master would disburse it if anything of future benefit might ensue and also promised all assistance to the English to build a fort at any place in Shivaji's dominions opposite Mumbai so as to secure the trade between the island and the mainland. But the real purpose of his visit was to ask the assistance of the English against Danda Rajpuri in the shape of an engineer, a mortar piece, one or two heavy guns and grenades. He also assured that Shivaji would contrive to manage the deal secretly so that the Mughal Emperor would have no occasion to take affront against the

English. He then pressed the English to send Ram Shenavi with him explaining that otherwise when Shivaji would hear their demands without any hope of their assistance he would break off negotiations.

In their reply of 30<sup>th</sup> September 1671 the Surat Council instructed Mumbai to send Stephen Ustick and Ram Shenavi<sup>2698</sup> to continue the negotiations with Shivaji. As for Shivaji's demand of assistance against Danda Rajpuri they wrote:<sup>2699</sup>

“We would not positively have them promise him those granadoes, mortar pieces and ammunition he desires, nor absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it is convenient to help him against Danda Rajpuri which place, if it were in his possession, would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay; and on the other side, our denial is not consistent at present with our interest, in respect we believe the keeping in suspense will bring him to a speedier conclusion of the treaty, hoping thereby to be furnished with these things he desires.”

They also instructed the Mumbai Council to send a convenient present for Shivaji and that Ustick should be sent in “a handsome equipage befitting the Company’s honour.

Meanwhile, the Surat Council had also drawn up their instructions which Ustick was to observe during his negotiations with Shivaji.<sup>2700</sup> First, they exhorted him to be careful for he was to treat with Shivaji, “one of the most politick princes of these eastern parts.” He was to tell Shivaji that that the amount of their losses was 32,000 Hons and show the particulars if he desired. The Council anticipated that “he will scruple against many of them [i.e. the particulars] and will be hardly persuaded to pay so great a sum” and instructed Ustick to point out that he had already given full satisfaction to all

others who suffered at the same time with the English. Ustick was also to describe the great advantages brought by the English settlements to various ports like Surat, Karwar, Calicut and Baliapattam as well as to the inland cities, and the great loss Shivaji's ports were suffering for want thereof. Then he was to emphasize that despite the fact that the Company had many opportunities and power to seize the ships and subjects of Shivaji to revenge themselves of the injuries they had sustained, they had borne such course out of hopes that Shivaji would at length consider his own advantage and propose terms of peace. Since he had done so now, the Governor and the Council were willing to defer the orders they had received to make good their losses till they understand what course he would take to give them satisfaction. Till this was done, the English would never settle at Rajapur. If Ustick found that Shivaji was not ready to pay so large an amount, he was to tell Ram Shenavi to inquire privately how much Shivaji was willing to allow and in what manner it would be paid — whether all in cash or partly in cash and partly by remittance from customs.

If Shivaji brought up the subject of the assistance against Danda Rajpuri, Ustick was to say that the English being merchants such assistance could not be expected from them but he might give assurance that "when a firm peace is concluded with him, he need not want anything that England affords." He was to be careful, however, not to make any positive commitment or denial but was to promise him in general terms the same advantages which the Mughal Emperor and other rulers enjoyed from the English.

The Maratha envoy again came to Mumbai in November 1671. Shivaji's main purpose in sending him was, as the Mumbai Council wrote to Surat, to make peace with the English "in hopes of an underhand assistance against Danda Rajpuri and till something as to that is granted he will not pay a penny." The envoy assured the English that if they would spare three or four heavy guns, Shivaji would find some Portuguese to buy

these from them as if for their own use, so that their name would not be brought into question. To hasten this business he was very eager to go to Surat as "a private man or Fakir." But the Mumbai Council persuaded him to stay till the return of Ram Shenavi whom they immediately sent to Surat.[2701](#)

In their letter dispatched with Ram Shenavi, the Mumbai Council related this discourse with the Maratha envoy. Besides that, they made two remarks in the letter. First, their servant Giridhar had informed them that the place on the opposite main offered by Shivaji would be of great profit to the Company. Secondly, "Shivaji is so sensible of our want of wood that he fears not the seizure of salt vessels or breaking with him as some of his officers have hinted by way of discourse to the Deputy Governor."[2702](#)

To this, the Surat Council replied on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1671:[2703](#)

" Ram Sinay [Shenavi] brought us your letter of the 8<sup>th</sup> current and has in private discoursed with us what Shivaji, by the messenger last sent, proposes to us by way of accommodation and what he demands from us in order to the supply of his wars against Danda Rajpuri, in both which we find so great subtlety, self [?selfish] policy and unsecure inconstancy on his part, and so great difficulties and apparent hazard on the Company's to deal with him on these terms that we begin to despair of bringing the business to any issue in the way it is now carried, and it was put to the question whether we should proceed on a further treaty with him or no. But that it might not be laid to our charge that we have failed on our side we think good to continue our order for Mr. Ustick to proceed with Ram Sinay, and do confirm our former resolution, that till the matter of satisfaction

for the Company and nations former losses be first determined, we cannot with honour or safety concede to anything which he proposes, for that is the ground work on which we must build our future correspondence with him....

“We observe you are under a mistake in two things, first in overweening and putting too great a value on the proffer which he makes of a place on the main, where he flatters you with a permission to build a castle for the security of our trade. It appears to us a politick cheat, to defeat us totally of all hopes of further satisfaction for our past losses. You seem to us (building on Giridhar’s opinion) to be fond of this place as to what may tend to Company’s future profit. We, so far as we yet can apprehend thereof are of a contrary opinion, judging that it may rather eclipse than advantage the growth of the Island Bombay for us to settle on any place on the Main so near it, for the trade will certainly be all carried thither, whereas otherwise it will brought to the Island. Besides we can in no way admit of putting to the charge of building a fort or house there, for the constant expense thereof will be unsupportable and render all gods that shall be very dear. However, though the advantages thereof may appear in time, yet it is not prudence in us at this conjuncture to let him know we have occasion of any of his ports, but rather, as we have done hitherto so many years that we shall, by God’s great providence, continue still.

“The second mistake that you are in appears in your undervaluing our own conditions as to wood, Shivaji’s officers have, it seems in notable policy, given the Deputy Governor to understand our great want thereof, but the Deputy Governor might have answered that wood grows in other places adjacent as

well as in his country, from whence the Island may be supplied, though with a little more charge, and that Shivaji's vessels would serve very well to bring it to us. In fine, as we before mentioned you have to deal with the most politick people of all these parts who make a notable observation of the least things which may accidentally pass from you in discourse which may turn to their advantage and therefore you must be very wary of what passes in talk from you that may tend to the weakening of our cause or lessening our reputation; and this caution we do more especially recommend to Mr. Ustick, who will be often engaged in discourse with Shivaji and his people touching these and other matters, and therefore we advise him to apply such answers as may most preserve our credit and not give Shivaji occasions to undervalue us."

Soon afterwards, the Mumbai Council wrote to Shivaji informing him of their intention to send an envoy to treat with him.<sup>2704</sup> But Ustick's departure was delayed for some time because Shivaji was otherwise engaged.<sup>2705</sup> Then, in February 1672, Shivaji sent a message to Mumbai to send their envoy to treat with him about the Rajapur reparations.<sup>2706</sup> Ustick set out from Mumbai on 10<sup>th</sup> March 1672 and returned on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1672.<sup>2707</sup> The outcome of his mission is reported in letters dated 14<sup>th</sup> May and 21<sup>st</sup> December 1672, sent from Mumbai to Surat and the Company respectively. After a "long and tedious attendance" Ustick had half an hour's discourse with Shivaji and his Brahmin officers to little effect. Shivaji received Ustick very kindly and invited the English to open their factory at Rajapur. Then he ordered one of his ministers to treat with the Englishman. He offered 5,000 Hons towards the losses of the English at Rajapur. While these negotiations were going on, "Shivaji was engaged in a great design against the Koli country

whereupon the Minister appointed to treat [with Ustick] being called away"<sup>2708</sup> Ustick returned to Mumbai.<sup>2709</sup> Later Shivaji sent one Sundarji (Prabhu) to Mumbai for further negotiations, but the offer made by him was regarded by the Mumbai Council "so slight" that they sent him back to Shivaji with their demand for restitution.<sup>2710</sup>

#### CONQUEST OF JAWHAR AND RAMNAGAR (1672)

Shivaji's recent conquests had left a very narrow salient in the north up to Salher. To impart to it the depth for defence, it was obvious that sooner or later he would have had to gain control over the territories in its rear towards the west, viz. the principalities of Jawhar and Ramnagar.

The principality of Jawhar lay to the north of Shivaji's acquisitions in the Konkan. Its headquarters was at Jawhar, some 70 km north of Kalyan and 65 km west of Nasik. Further north, lay the principality of Ramnagar. Its headquarters was at Ramnagar,<sup>2711</sup> some 25 km southeast of Daman and 40 km southwest of Dharampur. Besides these two, there were a number of petty chieftains in this territory. Ramnagar, the larger of the two principalities, was ruled by a Rajput Raja and Jawhar by a chief of the Koli tribe. Both these principalities were extremely hilly, covered in thick forests and cut up by a number of streams flowing from the Sahyadris to the Arabian sea. To the west they bordered on the Portuguese colony of Daman which was a narrow strip – about 30 km wide – extending from Karanje in the south to the Par river in the north, about 10 km north of Daman.

In 1672, Shivaji's army under command of Moropant invaded the principality of Jawhar and captured its capital on the 5<sup>th</sup> June. Vikramshah, the Chief of Jawhar, took refuge at

Nasik in Mughal territory.<sup>2712</sup> Moropant followed this up and captured Ramnagar in the same month. The Chief of that principality, Somshah, sought asylum at Daman.<sup>2713</sup>

No comprehensive and contemporary account of this campaign is extant. But Abbé Carré's description would give readers some idea of the difficulties of the campaign and how Moropant overcame these. Carré writes: <sup>2714</sup>

"Shivaji formed a second corps of army under the command of one of his oldest generals, a man who, besides the military qualities which he possessed to a high degree, had great judgement and genius for business [i.e. for administration]. He was sent into the country in the neighborhood of the Malabari coast from Chaul to a day's journey from Surat, with orders to attack the numerous petty sovereigns, who, considering themselves safe on account of the situation of these places, believed that they were guarded against all attacks and did not recognize any one superior to themselves.

"In short neither the Mughal nor any other power had till then attempted to subject them on account of the difficulty of the road and their ignorance of the country which was entirely covered with forests. I have more than once passed through this region; and seeing all these Princes, whose states are divided into woods or rivulets, whose soldiers, moreover, are only either foreigners or men picked up in the mountains, it seemed to me that there was a great resemblance between this country and Italy, such as it is to-day, divided between so many different states and princes.

"This general of the army...had to fight in a country where it was so inconvenient to maneuver

troops that it was necessary to overcome nature before fighting men. There were only fortified castles everywhere in the midst of the forests, where hills of immense thickness served for defence: at every step they came across rivers or torrents that arrested man and horse, without the commander's having any knowledge of these places. He did not lose courage in spite of all these difficulties, and in these campaigns he subjected to Shivaji all the petty sovereigns who, in a country, hardly a hundred leagues (in extent) had recognized none superior to themselves.

"The fortune of his master attended him in all the battles he fought: but completely subdued as they were, they did not cease to annoy and harass Shivaji's general. Three or four of the bravest among them and those who could bear the burden of war better on account of their wealth, were surprised to find themselves subjugated with their neighbours in a country which seemed inaccessible, and that by a (mere) platoon of enemies; they then formed the design of fighting for their liberty which they had just lost with so little resistance: they began by putting in safety what they have been able to preserve and forming a league among themselves, they took the field, supported by many thousands of men. Their plan was not to fight [a pitched battle] but to draw the enemy general into the defiles where they doubted not that they would make a bargain out of it.

"This ruse succeeded at first, and this general, a great warrior, has since declared that he never fought with so much risk. However, he formed his army into several detachments, to proceed through lonely paths to attack the enemy, cutting down woods and levelling the roads; all this was executed with so much diligence and courage that nothing could arrest

the course of his conquest. Governors were posted in the places conquered, where excellent garrisons were stationed and the victorious army returned to Shivaji, prepared for new victories."

Thus ended this remarkable campaign which demonstrated the ability of the Marathas to outwit not only the sluggish armies of the Adilshahi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire but also a cunning and nimble foe who was as adept as themselves in surprisals and ambushes, in his own country.

SHIVAJI'S DOMINION

JULY 1672

 600 meters & above.



Shivaji having conquered the territory of Ramnagar now sent his envoy to Daman to demand the *Chauth* which the Portuguese used to pay to the chief of that principality. Carré, who arrived at Daman shortly afterwards, describes the scene in his journal thus:[2715](#)

“There were then at Daman two young kings of the country — one of Javare [Jawhar] and the other of the Cosles [Kolis].[2716](#) They had taken refuge for the past two months with the Portuguese, to escape the triumphant armies of Prince Shivaji, before whom everyone trembled. He had taken the country of these two small kings, who had their castles near Daman. They drew from the Portuguese a subsidy of 60,000 Mahmudis, for which they were to prevent incursions into Portuguese territory by thieves and bandits inhabiting their dependencies of Coles and Chotia,[2717](#) for the purpose of pillaging villages, gardens and country houses as they used to do. Prince Shivaji after conquering the territory of these two kinglets, sought to seize the revenues and privileges so he sent an ambassador to Daman to treat with the Portuguese about the annual rent of 60,000 Mahmudis to be paid on the conditions accorded to the fugitive kings; and to make his embassy more important, he also sent 4,000 horsemen as his envoy’s escort to the gates of Daman.

“The Portuguese had not the least idea of such an embassy, and had learnt from their spies and runners, whom on the report of Shivaji’s conquests they had placed all over the country, that his troops were advancing quickly toward Daman. They at once feared he was going to besiege the place and all the more as they imagined this was because he wanted to

seize the persons of the two kings, who were hiding in the town. They were seriously alarmed; all Christians from outside, capable of bearing arms, were ordered into the town and the Governor assembled all the inhabitants and gave each a charge and duties according to his rank and capacity. Everyone placed himself at his post. The walls and bastions were inspected; and the artillery was put into order; arms were distributed where necessary, and in short all preparations were made for the defence of the place. The news came that Shivaji's troops were below the tower and belfry of the town, and that the neighbouring country swarmed with the enemy. The Governor immediately sent to the managers at the arsenal of war-munitions to tell them they should open the magazines as quickly as possible for bullets, powder, balls, and other such things; but the Paulist Fathers in charge of such magazines and munitions from which they draw large revenues and rents were not alarmed at the universal commotion occasioned

by panic.<sup>2718</sup> They sent a cold reply to the Governor that they would not give any munitions before receiving the money for them. The Governor lost his temper and the captains and officers of the town protested and made a great outcry at being kept waiting, but all this was of no avail. The Fathers in charge wanted money, otherwise they would give no munitions. The town was, therefore, obliged to await the attack of Shivaji's troops, and there is no doubt that, had they come with ill intent against the town it could have been captured without resistance, in the same way that the town of Diu, some years previously, had been taken and pillaged by Arabs.<sup>2719</sup> It is quite certain that, if the inhabitants of such a big town had had good leaders, and those leaders the proper means of defence, not a single Arab would

have returned to Muscat; for they would have prevented the Arabs from scaling the walls as they actually did, without meeting any resistance.

"However Shivaji's envoys did not come to Daman to make war. They stopped at the outskirts of the town, waiting for someone from inside with whom to parley. They were amazed at not finding anyone in the suburbs to whom they could notify the object of their visit. Shivaji's ambassador was, therefore, obliged to send one of his men to the gates of the town; and as soon as his wishes were learnt he was allowed to enter the place. His peaceful mission caused as much joy and calm as their arrival had occasioned trouble and alarm. So the Portuguese on learning that Shivaji, far from wishing to make war had sent these visitors only in order to come to some arrangements with them about his new conquests, received his envoy with every sort of courtesy, and gave him great hopes of obtaining favourable replies from the viceroy at Goa, on the subject which he had come to negotiate.[2720](#) Consequently the ambassador and Shivaji's troops went back to their camp without having committed the least injury or insult in the Portuguese territory through which they had passed.

"This was the state of affairs when I arrived at Daman. A Portuguese grandee whom I visited there, gave me an account of this event,[2721](#) expressing his astonishment and saying that it was very fortunate no one had got angry with the Paulist Fathers, for if any one had offended them in the slightest degree, they would not have hesitated to obtain satisfaction for it by certainly ruining the former."[2722](#)

The Portuguese however never paid the Chauth to Shivaji on the pretext that he was not the absolute master of the principality of Ramnagar.<sup>2723</sup> On the contrary they continued to pay the Chief of Ramnagar, who had taken refuge with them, a part of the *chauth* to enable him to continue his struggle against Shivaji.<sup>2724</sup> However they did pay to Shivaji the tax called *Gaokhandi* which they used to pay to the Chief of Jawhar.<sup>2725</sup>

With Jawhar and Ramnagar passing into the hands of the Marathas, Surat throbbed with panic. The minutes of the meeting of the Surat Council held on 21<sup>st</sup> June 1672 record:

“This town of Surat having for some days been alarmed by the late success of Shivaji’s forces under Mono [Moro] Pundit by his taking of Jawhar from the Raja of the Coolys [Kolis], and thereby having made his approaches within 40 cours [kos], and none of this King’s forces to impede his march hither, [the people] are much more affrighted this day by his yet nearer approach to Ramnagar, the Raja of which place is fled to Chikhli, within 4 course [kos] of Gandevi, with all his family, and all the people fled out off Gandevi, the Baniyas endeavouring to do the like here, but that the town gates were shut to keep them in. But what adds to their fear is, some letters brought to this Governor and to Mirza Muazzam<sup>2726</sup> the principal merchant, from Shivaji and his General Mono [Moro] Pundit, once more demanding the Chouty [chauth] or 1/4 part of the king’s revenue under this Government, which amounts to 400,000 Rupees, threatening if they did not speedily send him the money he would set down here ere long with his army.”<sup>2727</sup>

And on 25th June 1672, the English factors at Surat wrote to their colleagues at Mumbai:

“The same day [i.e. on 21<sup>st</sup> June ] also were brought letters from Shivaji to the Governor and Mirza Muazzam demanding the third time (which he wrote should be the last) the Couty [chauth] or 1/4 part of the king's revenue under this Government, declaring that, as their king had forced him to keep an army for defence of his people and country, so that army must be paid and if they sent him not the money speedily, he bid them make ready a large house for him, for he would come and sit down here, and receive the rents and customs, for there was none to stop his passage.”[2728](#)

## *Chapter 13*

# **Offensive Against The Adilshahi Sultanate**

Ali Adilshah II died on 24<sup>th</sup> November 1672 to be succeeded by his four year old son, Sikandar, and the administration of the Sultanate devolved upon Khawas Khan.<sup>2729</sup> As he refused to share it with other leading noblemen, the Sultanate was torn by internal discord.<sup>2730</sup> Soon afterwards, Shivaji broke the peace that had existed between the two states since 1667 and recalled his ambassador at Bijapur, Babaji Punde.<sup>2731</sup> For the next few years, he remained on the defensive on the Mughal front and continued to expand his dominions at the expense of the Adilshahi Sultanate. But a couple of months were to pass before he actually opened his offensive against the Adilshahi Sultanate.

### **THREAT OF A JOINT ATTACK ON MUMBAI (FEBRUARY 1673)**

War broke out in Europe between England and Holland in March 1672.<sup>2732</sup> Ships from Europe brought this news to India in September 1672.<sup>2733</sup> Then, in December, it was learnt at Mumbai that a Dutch fleet of 22 ships, on its way up the west coast, was intent upon attacking the island.<sup>2734</sup>

The construction of the Mumbai Fort had begun in 1669 and was in a reasonable state of defence with an armament of about 50 guns by the end of 1672.<sup>2735</sup> The garrison of the fort and the island comprised two regular companies, totaling 300.<sup>2736</sup> They included 180 Englishmen, some Europeans, mostly Portuguese, and a few half-cast Portuguese. Besides these, there were three companies of militia consisting of about 400 native Christians armed with spears and three companies of Bhandaris,<sup>2737</sup> totalling about 100 men, armed with clubs

and bill-hooks. An English troop with a sanctioned strength of 50 troopers had also been formed. Thus, the strength of the entire garrison was about 780 men. In addition, it was decided to raise a temporary force of 500 Muslims and Rajputs whose recruitment began about 24<sup>th</sup> February and was complete by 7<sup>th</sup> March 1673.

The naval force of the island had just two frigates – the Revenge and the Hunter.<sup>2738</sup> Besides these there was a Dutch prize, the Mayboom, captured off Karwar in October 1672, and a few other vessels. Four French ships had arrived at Mumbai on 12<sup>th</sup> February 1673 and were hauled up alongside the frigates under command of the seaward guns of the fort.

Definite intelligence of the near approach of the Dutch fleet was received on 10<sup>th</sup> February 1673 and, on the 20<sup>th</sup> of the same month, seven Dutch vessels were discovered to be at anchor not far from the mouth of the Bay but outside the range of the fort's guns.<sup>2739</sup> They came closer still during the night and, early next morning, stood in as close to the shore as possible. But observing that an attempt of landing would be resisted, they stood out once more. They arrived off Kolaba Point towards noon and then cruised up and down in the Back Bay till about 3 o'clock, when they came to anchor. Thereupon, the president moved one of the two regular companies and a considerable number of Bhandaris to the island of Kolaba and Back Bay, and two companies of militia, a party of Bhandaris and some horsemen to Mahim to resist any attempted landing. Strong guards were also appointed on Malabar Hill, Warali and other places to secure them.

It appeared that a clash was inevitable, for some Dutch boats had often been sounding the bay and point of Kolaba. About sunrise on 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1673 they weighed anchor and stood to northward, arrived off Malabar Hill and anchored as close to the shore as possible. Soon afterwards they weighed

and stood out again intending for Surat and, the next day, were out of sight.

But the danger was not deemed to have passed yet for, according to the information received at Mumbai, the remainder of the Dutch fleet was still at Vengurle and their admiral Rickloff Van Goens had made an agreement with Shivaji for a joint attack on Mumbai. In their dispatch of 28<sup>th</sup> March 1673 the Mumbai council reported to the Company:

“We had certain intelligence that Rickloff [Van Goens], taking advantage of our difference with Shivaji, had made an agreement with him to assist them [i.e. the Dutch] with 3000 men for the taking Bombay, they, [i.e. the Dutch] engaging to assist him with their whole fleet for retaking Danda Rajpuri from the Siddi. This gave your President matter of great consideration, whereupon he dispatched letters immediately to Shivaji for diverting him from such a design, proposing with all advantageous offers of peace with him and the Siddi and how dangerous a neighbour the Dutch would be to them. Shivaji, though passionately desirous of taking Danda Rajpuri, against which he has spent vast treasure and [had suffered a] loss of near 15,000 men, yet, we presume, not daring to trust the Dutch did not yield to their demand which we suppose was one chief argument joined with others that the remaining part of the [Dutch] fleet never came to disturb us, but whether they are gone or continue yet at Vengurle we have no certain advice.”<sup>2740</sup>

The main body of the Dutch fleet never came up the coast.<sup>2741</sup> The Dutch ships that had gone to Surat returned and passed Mumbai at the end of March causing an alarm for one night. In March 1673, the Dutch fleet on the west coast

dispersed and the part that remained under Van Goens was mainly occupied in blockading the French ships at St. Thome for the rest of the year.

We cannot say how far the “certain intelligence” received by the English, regarding negotiations between Shivaji and the Dutch for a joint attack on Mumbai, was correct. There are no Marathi records on this point and no Dutch documents have been discovered yet to throw some light on it. Be that as it may, Sir Charles Fawcett rightly remarks: “The history of Bombay might have been very different had a joint attack of this kind been made.”[2742](#)

#### CAPTURE OF PANHALA AND PARALI (6<sup>TH</sup> MARCH AND 1<sup>ST</sup> APRIL 1673)

Shivaji dispatched a detachment on 6<sup>th</sup> January 1673 under Anajipant and, three days later, another select band under Kondaji Farzand to capture Panhala.[2743](#) Before Kondaji set out for this desperate mission, Shivaji conferred with him on the plan and bestowed upon him a palanquin, garments of various kinds and two large bracelets of gold. His colleagues Ganaji and Motyaji Ravalekar were also presented with suitable ornaments. Anaji went to Rajapur and thence advanced three stages. Kondaji joined him there while he was deliberating on the detailed reports brought by the chief spy. The fort was already reconnoitered.

Then one night, they set out and arrived near the fort with necessary equipment of escalade such as rope ladders and pitons. While Anaji with the main body remained concealed in a thick forest, Kondaji and his desperate band went ahead and, after an arduous march, arrived at the steep precipice of the fort in the pitch-dark night of 6<sup>th</sup>/7<sup>th</sup> March. Giving each other a helping hand and using their specialized equipment they silently escalated the precipice.

Then suddenly the stillness of the night was pierced by the shrill sound of the trumpet. The sentries, slumbering with their eyes half-closed, threw off their sheets, jumped to their arms and poured out. With sword in hand, the commandant of the garrison himself rushed out with his men from the guard-room. Hand to hand fighting ensued in which the commandant was slain. Sporadic scuffles continued for a while at different places on the fort but in a short time all resistance ended and the Marathas secured complete possession of the fort. Every building was thoroughly searched and guards were appointed on the ramparts and at every gate.

Word was immediately sent to Shivaji. Shortly afterwards Anaji also arrived on the fort. Shivaji received the dispatch two days later and, jubilant at this success, rewarded the courier with a hundred Hons, fed him sugar by his own hand and gave orders to beat drums and fire guns to proclaim news of the victory. He set out from Raigad with his ministers and commanders the very next day (9<sup>th</sup> March 1673), and, marching by easy stages via Mahad, Poladpur and Pratapgad, arrived at Panhala.<sup>2744</sup> Dattajipant, the Vaknis, had also reached there by that time to receive his master.

Shivaji carefully inspected the fort after his arrival at Panhala. Heads of different departments made their reports. Depots of corn and other provisions and magazines full with fire arms, ammunition and various other weapons were shown to him. He also went round the ramparts. Then he rewarded his men and stayed at the fort for a month.

Parali, according to the Jedhe Chronology, was captured soon afterwards, on 1<sup>st</sup> April 1673.<sup>2745</sup> However, no details of the event are available.

**BATTLE OF UMRANI (MARCH-APRIL 1673)<sup>2746</sup>**

The loss of Panhala took Bijapur by alarm. Internal quarrels subsided for a while and Abdul Karim Bahlul Khan, a Pathan, was sent to check the Maratha offensive. Sabhasad says Bahlul Khan had twelve thousand cavalry under his command, which is plausible. Other sources are silent on the point. The Khan set out from Bijapur and, marching by way of Tikota, arrived at Umarani, some 45 km west of Bijapur, and drew up his army into a laager, formed of gun-carriages, and awaited reinforcements.

Shivaji, who was at Panhala, learnt of Bahlul Khan's advance and ordered Commander-in-Chief Prataprao to attack the enemy before he was reinforced. Marching by night with great secrecy and speed, Prataprao arrived at Umrani within two days, cut off the enemy from their water supply and encircled their laager. According to the *Basatin-us Salatin*, the Maratha army which encircled Bahlul Khan numbered ten to fifteen thousand cavalry. Other sources are silent on the point. The source from which the Adilshahi army was drawing its water supply is not known.

The battle which followed was confined for some time to shooting of arrows and firearms. But Bahlul Khan, cut off from water, was fighting at great disadvantage, and thirst and the sweltering heat of April began to show their effect. Towards sunset, he made a determined effort to break out. This resulted in hand to hand fighting during which the Marathas captured an elephant and killed an Adilshahi officer, Muhammad Barqi.

There is no unanimity between different accounts of the battle thereafter. The Jedhe and the Deshpande Chronologies contain the following entry: "In the same month [i.e. March-April] a battle was fought between Bahlul Khan [on one side] and Prataprao and Anandrao [on the other]. Victory was attained near Bijapur. One elephant was captured."

*Parnal* says Bahlul Khan retreated by a route allowed by Prataprao and thereafter his army, evidently their baggage, was

plundered.

Sabhasad states that Bahlul Khan made a determined attack, reached the water and had a drink. Thereafter, says the chronicler, he asked for terms and promised that he would never make war against Shivaji, whereupon Prataprao allowed him to retire. Having learnt this, says the chronicler, Shivaji censured his Commander-in-Chief for having made peace with the enemy.

According to the *Tarikh-i Iskandari*, Bahlul Khan reached the water whereupon the Maratha army retired.

The *Basatin-us Salatin* has quite a different story to tell, which is not unusual. It says that the Maratha army fled after sunset whereupon Bahlul Khan, whose army had suffered great casualties, retired to Tikota. Here he received reinforcements, marched against the Marathas and defeated them.

Of these various accounts, that of the *Basatin* is completely false. It is clear from internal evidence that its narrative of this battle is based upon *Tarikh-i Iskandari* and the falsehoods which the chronicler adds from his own imagination can be easily identified. *Parnal* is silent about the outcome of Bahlul Khan's effort to reach the water. But the statement in the *Tarikh-i Iskandari* that he did succeed in this attempt is perhaps true because it is corroborated by Sabhasad and contradicted by none.

#### SACK OF HUBLI (16<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 1673)

From Umrani, Prataprao turned southward, invaded Canara and plundered several towns including Hubli, the chief mart of the English trading station at Karwar.<sup>2747</sup> The account in English letters from Karwar of 14<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> June 1673 is as follows:<sup>2748</sup>

When the Marathas entered Hubli on 16<sup>th</sup> April, the company's house was the first one to be plundered. The cloth stored in it was brought out into the market place and shown to Prataprao; the house was dug up to 'a man's depth' in search of concealed wealth. A great search was made for the company's broker or his man because the Marathas thought they could discover where the money was hidden if they could get him "for", remarks the Karwar dispatch, "these people always imagine [that we] are never without great sums of ready money in our house." While the Marathas were rummaging in the warehouses of the company, some powder was accidentally set afire and blew up a warehouse. Some 20 Marathas were killed in the explosion.

The loss to the company, which included various goods like copper plates, lead, pepper, cloth, soap, alum and paper as well as some cash, amounted to 7,894 'Sungre' Hons and 32 juttals.<sup>2749</sup> Some baskets of coral beads were saved by the diligence of the broker who conveyed them out of one door while the Marathas were about to enter by the other. Besides this, the English factors and the company's brokers suffered an individual loss of about Rs.5,200.

While the plunder was in progress, the Marathas learnt that Muzaffar Khan was advancing to the succour of the town with four or five thousand cavalry and they departed with what they had already packed up, leaving behind several goods in the streets which they had not the time to carry away. Muzaffar Khan missed them by a day's march.

### CAPTURE OF SATARA AND PANDAVGAD (JULY AND OCTOBER 1673)

The Marathas continued their offensive even in the rainy season of 1673. The Jedhe Chronology records: "27<sup>th</sup> July 1673: Satara was taken."<sup>2750</sup> A little more information is provided by

the minutes of the meeting of the Mumbai Council held on 15<sup>th</sup> September 1673:

"Shivaji ... despises and bears up himself manfully against all his enemies and lately has taken a very considerable castle called Satara in the heart of the Bijapur country, from whence a number of oxen are lately come to Rairi laden with rich spoil."<sup>2751</sup>

This information is repeated in the Mumbai letter of 4<sup>th</sup> October 1673.<sup>2752</sup> The Mumbai letter of 25<sup>th</sup> October 1674 also says Shivaji had captured the fort of Satara in the previous year, i.e. in 1673.<sup>2753</sup> Shivaji visited the fort on 13<sup>th</sup> October 1673.<sup>2754</sup>

The Shivapur Chronology, our only source of information about Pandavgad, states: "17<sup>th</sup> October 1673: Mavalas on Pandavgad."<sup>2755</sup>

How these forts were taken is not known but it may be surmised that they were taken by the usual Maratha method of surprise night escalade.

### **SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH (DECEMBER 1672-OCTOBER 1673)**

Towards the end of 1672, a Maratha envoy named Pilaji arrived at Mumbai.<sup>2756</sup> In their dispatch dated 6<sup>th</sup> January 1973 to the Company, the Mumbai Council wrote that, on the one hand, the President was being courted by the commander of the Mughal fleet, which was then anchored at Mumbai, to join him in a war against Shivaji and, on the other, by the Maratha envoy for assistance against the Mughals, both promising great rewards. They added that the President was keeping fair with

both and hoped to procure ‘reputation and advantage’ to the island from them both.<sup>2757</sup>

The Maratha envoy had an interview with the President on 10<sup>th</sup> February 1673 and delivered a letter from Shivaji.<sup>2758</sup> But as the President was busy towing to the alarm of an imminent threat of the approaching Dutch fleet, the envoy was dismissed immediately. He continued to press for an answer to the letter and was given a second interview on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1673, in the course of which he proposed 7,000 Hons to be paid either in cash or defrayed out of the customs to make satisfaction for the losses of the English. The Mumbai council suspected this to be more to take advantage of them in their time of trouble. So they decided on the same day (i.e. on 13<sup>th</sup> February) to suspend negotiations till the “noise of the Dutch fleet was over.”

The Surat dispatch of 18<sup>th</sup> April 1673 informed Mumbai of the Siddi’s intention to winter at the island.<sup>2759</sup> In their reply dated 26<sup>th</sup> April 1673, the Mumbai Council asked them to tell the Siddi, if he had not already left , that the Mumbai Government positively prohibited it.<sup>2760</sup> This was of no avail, and on 8<sup>th</sup> May 1673 Siddi Sambul arrived at Mumbai with a flotilla of about 30 vessels.<sup>2761</sup> He had brought with him letters from the Governor of Surat, along with a dress of honour for the President that he pretended was sent by the Mughal Emperor, recommending grant of permission to winter at the island.<sup>2762</sup> The President refused to oblige but allowed five of their frigates to be hauled ashore at Mazagon.<sup>2763</sup> Leaving Mirza Muhammad Hasan to look after these, the Siddi left Mumbai with the rest of the flotilla sometime between 17<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> May 1673, and went to Danda Rajpuri.<sup>2764</sup>

The Mumbai Council, apparently ignorant of what had occurred at Hubli, decided on 10<sup>th</sup> May 1673 to send their

broker Vagjee to resume negotiations with Shivaji.<sup>2765</sup> Shortly after the decision was taken, they learnt from the Karwar letters that the company's estate at Hubli was "In all probability plundered and taken away by Shivaji", i.e. by his army.<sup>2766</sup> On 14<sup>th</sup> May 1673, a ship belonging to a merchant from Rajapur arrived from Muscat and was driven into the Mumbai harbour by stress of weather. The Mumbai Council confiscated it, together with its goods, on the same day to put pressure on Shivaji to make restitution for their former losses as well as for those that they might have suffered at Hubli.<sup>2767</sup> In their meeting of 16<sup>th</sup> May 1673, the Mumbai Council reconsidered their former decision to send Vagjee to continue negotiations with Shivaji and, as they thought that a Hindu would not dare to declare their minds to Shivaji as freely and effectively as an Englishman could, they resolved to send Thomas Nicolls instead.<sup>2768</sup>

The Mumbai council sent Thomas Nicolls along with a Hindu broker, evidently as an interpreter, to Raigad on 19<sup>th</sup> May 1673, charging him with the following tasks:<sup>2769</sup>

- 1) To explain the cause of attachment of the Rajapur ship.
- 2) To demand restitution for their losses at Hubli.
- 3) Continue negotiations regarding the Rajapur reparations.
- 4) To press for the payment for salt supplied from Mumbai. The Mumbai merchants had supplied this salt to Shivaji's dominions on condition that half the price would be paid at Mumbai before the departure of the vessels laden with salt and the remaining half when it would be

delivered at Shivaji's ports. But when the salt was unladen, the officers at Shivaji's ports had refused to make payment.

5) To seek exemption from customs on firewood brought to Mumbai from Shivaji's dominions. The Mumbai merchants were often troubled by demands of customs for these goods. Nicolls was to point out that the English were not charging customs for such petty things supplied to Shivaji's dominions from Mumbai and to tell him that if they were forced to pay customs for such trifles, he must expect similar treatment from them.

6) To enquire what customs Shivaji would charge for the passage of goods through his country to Mughal or Adilshahi territories and to procure his order for the lowest possible rate. (To understand the purpose of this inquiry it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the relations between the English and the Portuguese. Mumbai's natural line of communications with the mainland passed through Portuguese dominions at Sashti and other places. But the Portuguese, jealous of the rapid development of Mumbai, tried to obstruct its trade with the mainland by levying extortionate customs at Vasai, Thane and Karanje on goods in transit through their territory, and by prohibiting the supply of timber and provisions from their territory. Only a few months earlier, this policy had compelled Mumbai to obtain its wood and timber requirements from Surat. The problem could have been solved by resorting to Shivaji's dominions for trade with the interior as well as to obtain provisions for Mumbai. The Mumbai council was for some time trying to open a passage to Aurangabad by way of Nagothane through Shivaji's territory. A correct understanding with Shivaji was a prerequisite to the establishment of such a route.)

7) To explain, as occasion demanded, that the English had not allowed the Siddi to winter at Mumbai and were not giving him any assistance save that which is required out of "pure necessity and friendship to the Mughal [Emperor]" nor shall they give him any further assistance unless Shivaji would provoke them to the contrary.

Nicolls went to Raigad charged with these tasks and was granted audience with Shivaji on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1673, during which the latter disowned all responsibility for the losses of the English at Hubli and said that he must await his officers' reports and details of the alleged losses before he could give any answer to their demand.<sup>2770</sup> But he passed orders for the removal of two minor complaints relating to salt and firewood. To Niccoll's inquiry about the customs that Shivaji would charge for the passage of goods through his territory, Shivaji answered that he would consider that proposal. Niccols was expecting that Shivaji himself would bring up the questions of the Siddi's wintering at Mumbai and the attachment of the Rajapur ship, but he did not say anything on these subjects though, according to Niccols, he had received a letter from the merchants of the ship on the very day of this interview. Niccols records in his diary that when Shivaji rose "he was urged to speak to me about it; but he did not, but told the fellow [i.e. he Hindu broker accompanying Niccols]...that if the English would part with [i.e. restore] the goods [in the ship], they might [do so], but he could not force them and I do believe he would be glad if we would satisfy ourselves [for our losses] in any such way to excuse him for it."

Niccols was informed after the interview that Shivaji would shortly send his answer, evidently about the Rajapur reparations, to the President with his envoy Bhimaji.

More details about Shivaji's refusal to accept responsibility for the losses of the English at Hubli are provided by the Surat letter to Karwar dated 21<sup>st</sup> June 1673. It runs:

“ This is only to advise that Mr. Thomas Nicolls is returned from Shivaji who will not own that any of his men have done the least mischief to the English, and therefore he demanded the particulars of what we lost at Hubli and the name of the person that plundered us, for he declared to be ignorant of any such thing, nor did he give any such order and he further declared that he prosecuted a just war in his enemies country, if his army in plundering any of the enemy's towns does, unknown to him, meddle with and seize any English goods he cannot help it, for in that hurry and confusion which either his soldiers plundered for themselves or the country people seized on, he is no ways liable to answer. This is what he alleges on his part withal, further, as a friend, [he] advises us that we trade so little as we can into Deccan because he is determined to make a sharp war there so soon as the rains are over.”<sup>2771</sup>

Even as Nicolls was engaged in this interview with Shivaji, the Marathas were planning to make a raid and burn the Siddi's frigates that were hauled ashore at Mazgaon [Mumbai]. Having received several reports about these intentions, which were confirmed by Mirza Muhammad Hasan (whom the Siddi had left at Mumbai), the Mumbai council ordered on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1673, the very day on which Nicolls had an interview with Shivaji, that the Revenge frigate be stationed at the mouth of the harbour of Mazgaon to secure the Company's and the Mughal Emperor's vessels and that some small boats be kept afloat so as to be ready on all occasions to protect them.<sup>2772</sup>

Soon afterwards, the President received intelligence that Shivaji had sent some spies to discover the fords at “Sion and Mochimbo”, which were the only places to cross over to the island,<sup>2773</sup> and it was evident that Shivaji was planning to make

an attempt on Mumbai.<sup>2774</sup> These reports were placed before the Mumbai Council on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1673, whereupon they passed the following orders.<sup>2775</sup>

- i) That the ferry boats at "Sion and Mochimbo" be wholly taken away and a proclamation be issued forbidding all people to pass by way of either of these two places between Mumbai and Sashti.
- ii) That all persons who desire to come to or depart from the island must make use of the ferry boats of Mumbai and Mahim and of none else.
- iii) That two officers be appointed, one at Mumbai and the other at Mahim, for registering the names of all persons that would come to or depart from the island, the purpose of their journey and other necessary details.

Meanwhile Nicolls had returned to Mumbai on 17<sup>th</sup> June and was followed 2 or 3 days afterwards by Shivaji's envoy, Bhimaji, who had two interviews with the President between 23<sup>rd</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> June 1673.<sup>2776</sup> The proceedings of their talks, as submitted to the Mumbai council on 25<sup>th</sup> June, were as follows.<sup>2777</sup>

Bhimaji declared that Shivaji desired to reach an agreement on the Rajapur affair and offered 10,000 Hons as full satisfaction for the losses of the English at Rajapur so that they might settle again in his dominions. But he argued that as Shivaji was short of cash this sum would be defrayed from the customs at Rajapur when the English would settle there. As to the business of Hubli, Bhimaji asserted that Shivaji had no knowledge of it nor had he given any order to his army to disturb the English there. In fact, the town was plundered not by Shivaji's army but by the Adilshahi soldiers and the Governor of Hubli and therefore Shivaji was not liable to answer for it.

The envoy then complained about the Company's giving shelter to the ships of Shivaji's enemy and demanded restitution for the Rajapur vessel. He also asked to be supplied with two or three heavy guns for his master. The President then gave his explanation regarding the wintering of the Mughal fleet at Mumbai. He further told the envoy that the sum of 10,000 Hons, being in no way proportionate to the losses suffered by the English nation at the hands of Shivaji, was unacceptable. He also tried to convince the envoy that it was more to the advantage of Shivaji than of the Company to make satisfaction and end the difference. The envoy then asked the president to send a trustworthy person with him to treat further with his master for a more speedy determination of the controversy.

The Mumbai Council heard these proceedings on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1673 and decided to send Narayan Shenvi with Bhimaji to settle terms.<sup>2778</sup> He was instructed to induce Shivaji to allow 12,000 or at least 8,000 Hons to be paid in cash or goods and five years' or at least three years' exemption from customs at Rajapur. He was not to accept anything less without further orders. If Shivaji should raise the question of the Rajapur vessel he was to be told that all vessels driven by storms into the dominions of the Portuguese or Shivaji were confiscated and the same practice had been followed in confiscating the Rajapur vessel. If Shivaji should deny responsibility for the losses of the English at Hubli he was to be retold that he would be acquainted with the details thereof as soon as the Mumbai Council received advises from their factors in those parts. As for the two guns which he had asked on behalf of Shivaji, he was to be reassured that after the Rajapur affair was settled and peace made he should have not only two but as many as he would desire.

With these instructions, Narayan Shenvi departed with Bhimaji for Raigad in June 1673 and did not return till the end of September 1673.<sup>2779</sup>

Meanwhile news had been received at Mumbai that a party of rebels, who had risen against the Adilshah, had laid siege to their trading station at Karwar.<sup>2780</sup> This, it was foreseen, might prevent the supply of cloth and pepper from that town. Rajapur could be an alternative source for the supply of these goods but the restoration of the attached vessel would be a prerequisite to the settlement of an English trading station at that town. Moreover the war with the Dutch had not ended yet and confiscation of the Rajapur vessel might provoke Shivaji to join them in a combined attack on Mumbai.<sup>2781</sup> On the other hand, the vessel was not worth no more than Rs.8-10,000, goods and all, and its owner had brought letters from Shivaji, his son and most of his principal officers interceding for its restoration and promising to come to a fair understanding with the English.<sup>2782</sup> These considerations led the Mumbai council to decide, on 21<sup>st</sup> August 1673, to restore the vessel to its owner subject to the consent of their colleagues at Surat.<sup>2783</sup>

Meanwhile the Surat council, having learnt of the amount of losses at Hubli and failure of Niccoll's mission, had passed the following resolution on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1673:<sup>2784</sup>

“Seeing there is no probability of security from such a heathen, who while we are in treaty with him for satisfaction for our losses at Rajapur, gives orders for the robbing our factory at Hubli, we can think of no better way to recover the Honorable Company and Nation's right than by taking what vessels belong to his ports; and hearing [that] there are some expected to return from Mocha to Rajapur the latter end of the next month, the Council thought it requisite to advise their President that he give commission to the commanders of the frigates he shall send down to Karwar to look out and make prize of them.”

They stuck to their decision and communicated their disapproval, in their letter of 30<sup>th</sup> August, of the Mumbai council's resolution to return the ship.<sup>2785</sup> They were of the opinion that Shivaji was "in a sad perplexed condition by means of Bahlul Khan coming on the one side and the Mughal Army on the other" and therefore concluded that there was no need of dissembling and keeping fair with him. They also thought that Rajapur would be of little importance to the Company's trade and that they themselves could manage to provide 2,000 tons of goods from Surat in case of need.

The Mumbai Council took up the Surat dispatch for consideration on 15<sup>th</sup> September 1673.<sup>2786</sup> They felt that their colleagues at Surat

"are mistaken in their intelligence, for Shivaji is not in so ill a condition as they wrote him to be, he rather despises and bears up himself manfully against all his enemies and lately has taken a very considerable castle called Satara in the heart of the Bijapur country... and though it is probable [that] the Mughal army may fall into his country this year and Bahlul Khan on the other side, yet neither of them can stay long for want of provisions, and his flying army will continually keep them in alarm... And should we rashly provoke Shivaji at this time when we are in war with so potent an enemy as the Dutch, we may justly bring upon ourselves more trouble and danger than we are aware of, for the Dutch offered Shivaji the last year a considerable advantage if he would assist them with 3,000 men to help take Bombay, for he himself has owned it [that such an offer was made], and upon the wintering of the Siddi's fleet here did in his passion publicly threaten, if the Dutch came again, what he would do. The Gentlemen of Surat say that he is a rogue and keeps faith with no man; we say so too,

but that is no argument for us to break with him at this time, and we think his own interest will persuade him to keep fair with us if we do not first break with him and though we will endeavour to procure ... satisfaction from him for the Company's losses as well as [of] particular men... yet we declare it as our opinions in this juncture of affairs [that] it is to no ways prudent to enter into open acts of hostility with him, except [i.e. unless] we resolved to endure the misery of famine on the one side [by the stoppage of provisions from Shivaji's dominions], or to make proof [i.e. certain] of an attack by the Dutch and his united forces on the other."

As for Rajapur, the Mumbai Council was confident that a trading station there would "prove in time of as great advantage to their concerns as that of Karwar and exceedingly beneficial to their island Bombay." It further argued that though Surat might provide, as the Surat council had asserted, 2,000 tons of goods, money would be saved by procuring certain kind of cloth at Rajapur, for their prices at that town were at least twenty percent less than those at Surat.

Upon these considerations, the Mumbai Council unanimously resolved to restore the Rajapur vessel and its goods to its owner.<sup>2787</sup>

Meanwhile, a letter that had been received from Narayan Shenvi who had gone to Raigad was also put before the Mumbai Council in their meeting of 15<sup>th</sup> September 1673.<sup>2788</sup> Narayan had written that after much delay and when he was about to return without answer, Shivaji had sent for him and after much discourse had declared that he was willing to compose the differences with the English and offered 7,000 Hons to be defrayed, as he had no cash due to the war, from the customs of Rajapur when the English would settle there. He had also

promised to allow something to other Englishmen, in lieu of their individual losses, after the English settled at Rajapur.

About the end of September 1673, Narayan Shenvi returned with Shivaji's envoy Bhimaji.<sup>2789</sup> In his interview with the president, the envoy raised some objections about the demands of the English.<sup>2790</sup> So, on 29<sup>th</sup> September 1673, the Mumbai council appointed two of its members, Child and Ustick, and its secretary Francis Day, to examine and compare the accounts with him.<sup>2791</sup> The first meeting between the Maratha envoy and the English delegates was held on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1673.<sup>2792</sup> The envoy was first shown the papers of particulars of the Company's demands amounting to 39,957 Hons and 36 jettals with the interest thereof and these accounts were interpreted to him. He seemed much startled at this demand and replied that it being so disproportionate to what his master received into his treasury when he plundered Rajapur, he feared little would come out of such a claim. However, he desired that the particulars presented by the English be compared with his accounts. The objections which he raised were as follows:

1) Heavy and combustible goods – Brimstone, Granado Shells, brass pots and such other heavy and combustible goods were never received by Shivaji. The granado shells alone would have required 2,000 men or thereabouts to carry them away and Shivaji at that time, hotly pursued of the Adilshahi forces, had to leave Rajapur. The town was in Adilshahi possession for three months after it was plundered and when Shivaji returned to it he found no such things there and therefore was not responsible for them.

2) Debts due from Rajapur merchants to the Company – Shivaji was not liable to make satisfaction for these nor for those which the English might have to forego in future by

reason of the despoliation of their debtors during a sack because it would not be possible at such time to inquire who the debtors of the English were. The English can expect no more than security to their trading station and goods. (What he meant was that the English could expect security to their trading station but not to their debtors. So, if their debtors suffered financial loss in a Maratha raid and, as a result, were unable to pay their debts to the English, the Marathas would not be responsible.)

3) Debts due to the English from the Adilshah and Rustum-i Zaman – Shivaji was not liable for these either, for the same reasons as given above.

4) Losses suffered by the brokers of the English – As they were native merchants and were not living in the English trading station, Shivaji is wholly unconcerned to make good their losses.

5) Individual losses of Englishmen – The English figures were surprisingly large. Shivaji had received no more than the following particulars from the English trading station during the sack – One mortar piece; two small brass guns; 63 Tipkee Hons and 22 Dabhol laris<sup>2793</sup> (totalling 1.75 ser and 1.75 tolas of gold); one silver bridle, one plated saddle and other horse furniture (totalling 6.5 maunds and 5.5 tolas of silver); three horses; five rings (two studded with diamonds, two with rubies and one with sapphire); a remnant of scarlet cloth; one half piece and a remnant of coarse cloth; eight mirrors. These items would not amount to more than 4,000 Hons including 1,500 Reals belonging to Revington. Shivaji himself had shown to Narayan Shenvi an old book wherein these particulars were entered.

The English delegates replied to these objections that even if all this was granted to be true, Shivaji ought to make full satisfaction, for, had he not plundered Rajapur, the Company would have never sustained that loss. On this Bhimaji pointed

out that Shivaji had despoiled several kings, princes and merchants but had never made any satisfaction. What he was offering to the English was purely out of a desire of friendship with them as is shown by his friendly gesture in permitting the island of Mumbai to be daily furnished from his territories with several sorts of provisions. On the other hand it could be easily perceived that Shivaji was not dependant on what assistance the English could afford him for, notwithstanding his old difference with them, he had been continually at war with the Mughal Emperor and had increased his dominions. Furthermore, Bhimaji pointed out, Shivaji was not at all concerned at what damage the English could do him for all that they could do was to capture a few of the merchant vessels which belonged to his ports. However he would be willing to pay 5,000 Hons to end all dispute concerning Rajapur.

To this the English delegates replied that there was so much difference between this offer and their demand that they could only conclude that the Maratha envoy had no order to end the dispute and had only come, as others formerly did, to discourse in a formal manner rather than to compose the difference. Shivaji, they admitted, had sufficient reason, because of their long patience and forbearance, to pretend that he had little need of their friendship and to have little esteem of their ability to right themselves of those wrongs he had done them. But, they pointed out, Shivaji might remember that they could stop, to his no small detriment, the supply of salt to his dominions from Mumbai and if they would start seizing his merchant vessels as well as those of his subjects, they might soon requite their loss. And they might be forced to resort to such course, sooner than Shivaji expected, as their endeavours to obtain satisfaction by fair means had been fruitless. Therefore if the envoy had no better terms to offer he had no need to give himself any further trouble for they could not submit his answer to their President. But they wished that he would consider his master's interest and suggest some better

terms of accommodation, and showed their readiness for a second meeting whenever he liked.

The second meeting was held on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1673.<sup>2794</sup> After the whole day was spent in fending, Bhimaji raised his offer to 7,000 Hons, and when the English delegates refused to accept it he desired an interview with the President.

On 4<sup>th</sup> October 1673, the envoy had an interview with the President and after many hours of grueling arguments and objections, offered 9,000 Hons to be paid in seven years' time in goods and by remittance of customs when the English would settle at Rajapur.<sup>2795</sup> As the President was not willing to accept this, he raised the amount to 10,025 Hons<sup>2796</sup> and said that he dared not offer more having already gone beyond his orders. This amount was to be paid as follows:

2,500 Hons to be defrayed from Rajapur customs on goods imported or exported by the Company

2,500 Hons to be paid in goods immediately on the establishment of an English Trading station at Rajapur.

2,500 Hons to be paid in goods twelve months after the above payment.

2,500 Hons to be paid in goods in "the next ensuing year."

10,000 Hons Total.

Besides this, Shivaji was to use his utmost endeavours to recover the amounts due to the English from Ali Adilshah and Rustum-i Zaman as well as from the merchants of Rajapur.

The Mumbai council approved these proposals and decided to send Narayan Shenvi to get them confirmed by Shivaji.<sup>2797</sup>

No agreement was made about the losses suffered by the English at Hubli. In their letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1673, the Mumbai Council informed Surat: "The new controversy

touching Hubli we have reserved for another time having fair promises for satisfaction in that particular also.”<sup>2798</sup> But the Mumbai Council hoped, as they wrote in their letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> December 1673 to the Company, “in time to bring him to some composition and allowance for that also, for he is much a friend to our nation, if to any, and exceedingly desires our trade again in his ports....moreover Shivaji promises himself to settle a warehouse of his merchants in Bombay for the putting of great quantities of goods which he has lying by him, which will increase the trade of your port and your revenue in customs of said goods.”<sup>2799</sup> Narayan Shenavi’s departure was delayed because Shivaji was not at Raigad. <sup>2800</sup>

### SIDDI’S DEPREDATIONS (OCTOBER 1673)

The Siddi’s fleet left Mumbai for Danda Rajpuri about the end of August 1673 and returned a month afterwards.<sup>2801</sup> The Mumbai Government expected that the Siddi would make no depredations on the opposite mainland on which the island was dependant for its supply of provisions, firewood and timber and the Siddi had promised the President on oath accordingly.<sup>2802</sup> But despite this promise and the fact that the English had obliged him with supply of powder shot, men and provisions, the Siddi took his fleet to the opposite main about 10<sup>th</sup> October 1673 and burnt and plundered several towns such as Pen and Nagothane and took some prisoners to be sold as slaves.<sup>2803</sup> He then blocked up the rivers on the mainland which were the avenues of supply to the island and prevented provisions coming to it. The President also learnt that he intended to stay in the Nagothane River for most of the year and to build a fort on a small island near Karanje. The stoppage resulted in a scarcity and dearness of provisions in the island.<sup>2804</sup> In retaliation, the Mumbai Government prohibited for some time the entry of his ships into the harbour and their supply from

the island.<sup>2805</sup> They even contemplated the use of force against him.<sup>2806</sup> This, however, they could not do without endangering their colleagues at Surat and their trade in the Mughal Empire. Besides, the Dutch, with whom they were at war, would not have missed the opportunity to provide naval assistance to the Mughals to take the island. These considerations compelled the Mumbai Government to hold their hand.<sup>2807</sup>

The tension was relieved shortly afterwards as the Siddi received a check from Maratha forces. Contemporaneous English documents tell the story.

#### Mumbai Occurrences <sup>2808</sup>

31<sup>st</sup> October 1673

“Some of Shivaji's soldiers surprised a parcel of the Siddi's men as they were on shore cutting the standing rice in his country, and destroyed about a 100 of them, carrying away the heads of some of the chiefs unto Shivaji.”

#### Mumbai to Surat <sup>2809</sup>

31<sup>st</sup> October 1673

“Siddi Sambul has gained little honour or advantage by assaulting that part of the Main over against us, and blocking up Nagothan river, for he has lost a great many men, and has been cheated of his hopes for he had thought to bring that part of the country to contribution but Shivaji sent a considerable strength of about 3,000 men to defend his country against him so that now with shame he thinks of leaving the place... The king [i.e. the Mughal Emperor] is most grossly abused and fed with lies of great victories [by the Siddi] whereas he has done little or no mischief to Shivaji hitherto nor is he

capable of doing any but only plundering a few open villages to seaward and burning a few Cajan houses, and taking some Kunbis as slaves, which is the worst he can do and what Shivaji not at all values.”[2810](#)

Mumbai to Thomas Roach at [Agra](#)[2811](#)

7<sup>th</sup> November 1673

“Siddi Sambul has an evil design in writing those lies and aspersions against us, for having received a great deal of money from the King [i.e. the Mughal Emperor] and put him to a vast charge and done no service at all against Shivaji he [the Siddi] must invent a great many lies to keep up his credit with the King and Bahadur Khan to whom, I understand that, he has wrote that he has taken several castles and burnt several towns and killed a great many of Shivaji's men. All those are mere forgeries and falsities for he has not done Shivaji any mischief in the least, rather he has been beaten and lost a great many of his men, and the most he can brag of [is that] he has burnt a few Cajan houses belonging to coolies[2812](#) and *kunbis* and fishermen that lived near the waterside: some whereof he has taken prisoners and sold for slaves and this is all he has done or is ever likely to do against Shivaji, for Shivaji is a subtle and politic warrior and fights close and warily, never daring to meet in the field, but uses all stratagems and advantages that he can, whereby he has often surprised and cut off many of Siddi's men so that they dare not attempt the shore in any place where Shivaji has any forces to oppose them.”

In the meantime, Shivaji was also making preparations to augment his fleet. On 6<sup>th</sup> November 1673, the Surat council informed Mumbai that the French had sent a pink (a kind of

vessel) down to Rajapur with 2,000 maunds of lead and 88 iron guns.<sup>2813</sup> The Mumbai Government confirmed their report in their dispatch of 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1673 and added that the French themselves acknowledged it saying that they were forced thereunto.<sup>2814</sup> The Mumbai Government thought that with these guns “Shivaji will be able to arm out a notable fleet against the Siddi, for he only wanted guns.”<sup>2815</sup>

### MARATHA INCURSIONS INTO CANARA (OCTOBER 1673-MARCH 1674)

In September 1673, as we have seen, Narayan Shenvi, the envoy sent by the Mumbai council, had an interview with Shivaji at Raigad. Soon afterwards Shivaji in person took the field. The Jedhe Chronology records: “On the auspicious day of *Vijaya Dashami* [i.e. 10<sup>th</sup> October 1673] His Highness [Shivaji] went and plundered Bankapur.”<sup>2816</sup>

Under the same year, the Shivapur Chronology records:

“13<sup>th</sup> October 1673: The Raja arrived at Satara.”<sup>2817</sup>

It is clear from these entries that Shivaji set out from Raigad on 10<sup>th</sup> October, arrived at Satara on 13<sup>th</sup> October, and from there went to Bankapur and plundered it.

Some more details are provided by English dispatches from the Mumbai Council. The first, dated 16<sup>th</sup> October 1673, cautioned their colleagues at Surat that there had been a report of Shivaji’s intention of plundering some part of the Mughal territory for which he had a considerable army ready with 20,000 “wallets” to convey the booty.<sup>2818</sup>

About that date, the Mumbai council sent their ketch, the *Phoenix*, with twelve soldiers to Surat because they suspected,

wrongly as it turned out, that that metropolis might be Shivaji's objective.<sup>2819</sup> In their next dispatch dated 31<sup>st</sup> October 1673, the Mumbai council relayed to Surat the certain intelligence that Shivaji had gone in person with 15,000 men to take the castle of Sonde from the Adilshah and conquer the Karnataka country which was embroiled in a civil war.<sup>2820</sup> Then, in their dispatch of 15<sup>th</sup> December, the Mumbai council informed the company:<sup>2821</sup>

“We have advised Your Honours in our letters of the 23<sup>rd</sup> October of our treaty and conclusion of peace of Shivaji which though fully agreed on between the envoy and us, is not yet signed and confirmed by Shivaji himself being gone with an army of 25,000 men into the King of Bijapur's country where he has robbed and plundered many rich towns, and it is said he is fallen into the country of Cavack [?] or Canara to get more plunder in those rich towns to bear the charge of his army.”

Shivaji was near Karwar early in December 1673. An English dispatch of 8<sup>th</sup> December 1673 from Karwar mentions the receipt of a flying report that Shivaji in person had arrived within one and a half days' journey from the town.<sup>2822</sup> The next dated 17<sup>th</sup> December 1673, from Karwar to Surat is more elaborate. It runs:<sup>2823</sup>

“The 8<sup>th</sup> instant we wrote Your Honours by four *pattamars* [i.e. couriers] wherein we acquainted you of Shivaji's coming to Kadra which proved very true; his forces, by report 4000 foot and 2000 horse, and himself in person. He stayed not above four days. Most of his forces were up the hill [i.e. in the uplands east of the Sahyadri range] hard by Hubli, which cause the merchants to forsake the town.... We hear likewise that Shivaji's forces have had two great

overthrows by Bahlul Khan and Sharza Khan, one at Bankapur and the other at Chandgad, which is thought was the occasion of his retiring so soon from these parts.”

The fact that Shivaji had arrived at Kadra with only a part of the army while the rest remained in the uplands, suggests that the Maratha army was not operating in a solid mass but in independent detachments, a deployment suitable for plundering a large area. There might have been occasional skirmishes of these detachments with Bijapuri forces. The following entry in the Jedhe Chronology probably refers to one such:

“November 1673: A battle was fought between Sharza Khan and Vithoji Shinde. Vithoji perished.”<sup>2824</sup>

It was not long before Vithoji’s death was avenged. The Deshpande Chronology records under Shaka 1595: “In the month of Margashirsha [29<sup>th</sup> November to 27<sup>th</sup> December 1673] Mahimaji Shinde killed Sayyid Habib Sharza Khan<sup>2825</sup> near Panhala. Two elephants and 300 horses were captured.”<sup>2826</sup>

By 6<sup>th</sup> March 1674 the Mumbai council had received advice that Shivaji had returned to Raigad.<sup>2827</sup> He must have arrived there some days earlier, perhaps in February 1674.

#### DEFEAT OF MUGHAL ATTEMPT TO DESCEND INTO THE KONKAN (C. JANUARY 1674)

About the beginning of 1674 the Marathas foiled a Mughal attempt, led by Bahadur Khan and Diler Khan, to descend into the Konkan. Perhaps, the attempt was made to take advantage of Shivaji’s absence in Canara. Its earliest reference is found in an English letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> February 1674 from Surat to Mumbai. It says: “Diler Khan has lately received a rout by Shivaji

and lost 1,000 of his Pathans and Shivaji about 4 or 500 of his men.”[2828](#)

The following extract from the letter of Narayan Shenvi, who had arrived at Raigad in March 1674 to obtain Shivaji’s confirmation of the agreement that had been reached about the Rajapur reparations, evidently alludes to the same incident:

Narayan Shenvi to Mumbai  
Raigad  
4<sup>th</sup> April 1674

“By other conveyances Your Honour will have received news of the proceedings of Shivaji’s army. Nevertheless I cannot be excused without giving you some account. Bahadur Khan did desire to descend into Konkan, but understanding that the Raja Shivaji had stopped the passages by breaking the ways and advances twixt the hills and keeping a constant guard there where the passages were most difficult, he returned from whence he came.”[2829](#)

#### **PLUNDER OF BAHADUR KHAN’S CAMP (FIRST HALF OF 1674)**

After his appointment as *subadar* of the Deccan, Bahadur Khan — in fact now Khan Jahan Bahadur — built an entrenched camp, and later a fort, at the village of Pedgaon on the left bank of the Bhima River, 60km south of Ahmednagar. He named the fort Bahadurgarh after himself and stayed there with the army of the Deccan.[2830](#)

The Surat dispatch of 1<sup>st</sup> August 1674 gives a very interesting account of the plunder of the Khan’s camp by the Maratha army. It does not give us the date of the event but, allowing for the time taken for news to reach Aurangabad and thence Surat, it might be placed a couple of months before 1<sup>st</sup>

August 1674 or earlier. Its account in the Surat dispatch runs as follows:

“It is wrote hither from Aurangabad that Shivaji had spoiled and destroyed Bahadur Khan’s camp, and besides 200 brave [fine] horses collected for the king [i.e. the Mughal Emperor] hath carried away a crore [10 million] of rupees and burnt all his tents. It is said he decoyed Bahadur Khan and his army with 2,000 horse who drew him 20 or 30 course [kos] from his camp while Shivaji sent 7,000 horse another way that did the feat; but that we cannot confirm until we have further advises.”[2831](#)

Cosme de Guarda gives a similar account but inserts it, erroneously, in his account of Shayista Khan’s campaign against Shivaji. The Surat dispatch shows that it should be placed in the first half of 1674. The substance of Guarda’s account is as follows:

Netoji divided the cavalry into two divisions. The smaller one of 2,000 remained concealed in the woods on both sides of the road. As the Mughal army arrived and began to pitch their camp, the other division of 8,000 attacked them and then, splitting into four groups, fled in different directions, pursued by the Mughals. Meanwhile the division of 2,000, which had remained concealed, fell upon and plundered the baggage of the Mughal army. By the time the tired Mughal army returned to the site of their camp the Marathas had vanished.[2832](#)

None of these accounts mentions the site of this incident but it appears from Guarda’s account that it occurred while the Mughal army was on the march which is probable because a permanent camp such as that at Pedgaon would be heavily fortified. It may also be surmised that it had occurred not against the entire Mughal army in the Deccan but against a

division detached on some expedition or as an escort for the treasury. The amount of the booty mentioned in the Surat dispatch is certainly exaggerated. The annual revenue of the Mughal Empire was less than Rs.220 million. So it is unlikely that an army on the march would carry as much as one crore (10 million) rupees with it. We might add that the Mumbai Council did not give credence to the news in the Surat dispatch.

They wrote to Surat on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1674.<sup>2833</sup>

“We have no certain advice of his (Shivaji’s) attempting Bahadur Khan’s camp, nor do I give credit to any such thing, for they seem too great friends to quarrel with one another, and too wise and politic enemies to trust one another or be surprised.”

This is an allusion to the belief that Shivaji had seduced Bahadur Khan with bribes. But the fact that the incident is reported not only in the Surat dispatch but also in the latter date account of Guarda suggests that there must have been some truth in it.

#### **PRATAPRAO’S DEATH AND MARATHA INCURSION INTO CANARA (FEBRUARY-MARCH 1674)**

As related earlier, Bahlul Khan had recouped his strength since his defeat at Umrani and had resisted the Marathas during their invasion of Canara towards the end of 1673. Soon afterwards he marched towards Panhala. Whereupon Shivaji, according to the Sabhasad Chronicle, sent a message to Prataprao: “Bahlul Khan is coming; you are to go with the army, encounter and rout him, and win a victory. Otherwise do not show your face [to me again].”<sup>2834</sup> Whereupon, the chronicler tells us, Prataprao encountered Bahlul Khan at Nesari and was killed in the ensuing battle.<sup>2835</sup> The Jedhe and the Shivapur Chronologies give 24<sup>th</sup> February 1674 as the date of this incident and the former states, in addition, that it occurred at

Nesari.<sup>2836</sup> It is also narrated in a letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> April 1674 by Narayan Shenvi, who had arrived at Raigad in March 1674 to obtain Shivaji's confirmation of the agreement about the Rajapur reparations. The letter runs:<sup>2837</sup>

"The Raja Shivaji intended to proceed for Kudal to give new orders to his army and to create a new general of his horse in the room of Prataprao who fell in the encounter of Shivaji's army with Bahlul Khan in a narrow passage betwixt two hills who with six horsemen more were slain, being not succoured by the rest of the army, so that Bahlul Khan remained victorious, but Anandrao, [his] lieutenant, sent Shivaji word that he should not resent his General's death, he [Anandrao] remaining in his stead, on which Shivaji ordered Anandrao to succeed him in quality and pay, and not to return alive without being victorious against his enemies. And Anandrao being a valiant person, on his master's order moved with the whole body of his horse far into the enemy's country in search of Bahlul Khan. But it happened that Diler Khan understanding of Prataprao's death, fell in with his army to succour Bahlul Khan making great haste to fight with Anandrao, but he [Anandrao] seeing two such valiant enemies before him durst not fight them, and thereupon took his way towards Canara, journeying 15 leagues per diem, he before and the two nobles [Diler Khan and Bahlul Khan] following him; but after many days march, not daring to effect anything but only to march after him, they both returned. Diler Khan went under Panhala to besiege it, and stayed there but five days and returned to his former station, and Bahlul Khan went to Kolhapur. Anandrao passing much inland, robbed a city called Pench, eight leagues from Bankapur, which city belongs to Bahlul Khan's *jagir*, from whence he

returned well laden with 3,000 oxen laden with goods, which Bahlul Khan and Khizr Khan understanding, they intended to intercept him with their whole army, encountering near Bankapur, where happened a desperate battle; but Anandrao got the victory. In said battle fell a brother of Khizr Khan, cousin of Bahlul Khan, and Anandrao robbed the whole army and brought 500 horse and two elephants and other things, Bahlul Khan and Khizr Khan flying away. Anandrao on his return leaving his booty with Shivaji is gone again to Balaghat [i.e. the uplands] to rob more towns."

Some historians have asserted that Prataprao, out of remorse he felt at Shivaji's censure, attacked Bahlul Khan's army with only six horsemen and all of them were cut down.<sup>2838</sup> There is not a shred of evidence to support this romantic tale. In those days, commanders very often literally led their armies and it is probable that Prataprao while riding ahead, perhaps to reconnoiter the ground with a small escort, was surprised by an enemy patrol and fell in the encounter. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that Prataprao lost his head and charged upon the Adilshahi army with only six troopers. Pench in Narayan Shenavi's letter is probably Hospet mentioned in a contemporaneous Dutch letter as having been plundered by Shivaji.<sup>2839</sup>

The account of Anandrao's raid into Canara is corroborated by the Jedhe Chronology. It states:

"Anandrao while returning after plundering the market of Sampgaon fought a battle with Khizr Khan and captured two elephants."<sup>2840</sup>

On 8<sup>th</sup> April 1674 Shivaji inspected his army at Chiplun and appointed Hansaji Mohite in place of Prataprao as the

commander-in-chief, conferring upon him the title of 'Hambirrao'.<sup>2841</sup>

Then, on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1674, the Marathas captured the fort of Kelanja.<sup>2842</sup>

### **NAVAL BATTLE OF SATAVLI (MARCH 1674)**

As related earlier, Narayan Shenvi had gone to Raigad in March 1674 on behalf of the Mumbai Council. His report to the Deputy Governor of Mumbai, written at Raigad on 4<sup>th</sup> April, contains the following:

"I shall give Your Honour what news I have heard of Siddi Sambul in a few words. He engaged with Daulat Khan's navy in Satavli river, where there was slain above one hundred men of the Siddi's and 44 of Daulat Khan's who gains the victory but is wounded with an arrow, and it is reported that Siddi Sambul is likewise wounded and his hands burnt. He not meeting with good success in the aforesaid river is gone to Harihareshwar near Vessing [?].<sup>2843</sup> This news Shivaji told me himself."<sup>2844</sup>

We do not have any more information about this battle.

### **SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH (MARCH – JUNE 1674)**

Having received advice of Shivaji's return to Raigad, the Mumbai Council decided, on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1674, to send Narayan Shenvi there.<sup>2845</sup> In the meantime, the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri had proposed that the English president should mediate a peace between him and Shivaji and Narayan was instructed to sound whether Shivaji was inclined to a peace with the Siddi.<sup>2846</sup> After having received advices from Narayan Shenvi, Oxenden<sup>2847</sup> was

to proceed to Raigad to finalize the Rajapur business and endeavour to bring about a peace between Shivaji and the Siddi.<sup>2848</sup>

Narayan Shenvi was granted audience with Shivaji on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1674.<sup>2849</sup> During this interview, Shivaji instructed his officers to pass orders regarding the Rajapur reparations. He also warned Narayan that great differences would occur between himself and the English if the latter gave shelter to the Siddi in their port. Later, Narayan communicated to Niraji Pandit<sup>2850</sup> the proposal of peace from Siddi Fath, but was told that Shivaji had no inclination thereunto and never brought up the subject again. On 4<sup>th</sup> April, Narayan reported to Mumbai the outcome of his mission. He also informed the Deputy Governor that Shivaji was making preparations for his coronation in June 1674 and urged that Oxenden be sent up at once with a handsome present of jewels that might be worth Shivaji's wearing at his coronation.

On 9<sup>th</sup> April 1674 the Mumbai Council wrote to the Surat Council asking them to send ornaments worth three or four thousand rupees for presenting to Shivaji.<sup>2851</sup> In the same letter, they also wrote of their anxiety caused by the Siddi. Shivaji, they wrote, was greatly affronted by their favouring the Siddi and had sent a message to the President that if the English assisted him, or allowed his vessels to winter at Mumbai they must not expect peace with him. The Mumbai Council was therefore determined not to allow the Siddi to winter at Mumbai and had communicated their resolve to the Surat Council so as to prepare them beforehand to answer the demands of the Mughal governor of Surat.

Then, with their dispatch of 18<sup>th</sup> April 1674, the Mumbai Council enclosed a letter in Persian addressed to the governor of Surat which their colleagues at Surat were to hand over to

him.<sup>2852</sup> In that communication, the President had described the difficulties which the Mumbai Council had been facing due to the wintering of the Siddi's fleet at Mumbai and had suggested that the Mughal fleet should winter at Surat or Danda Rajpuri.

But all these efforts of the Mumbai Council to dissuade the Siddi from coming to Mumbai proved in vain. On 24<sup>th</sup> April, Siddi Sambul with his fleet, comprising two men-of-war, five frigates and some fifteen *gurabs* appeared at the mouth of the Mumbai harbour. The Mumbai council resolved that they should not be allowed to enter and gave orders to the commanders of the English frigates accordingly. But the weather intervened on the side of the Siddi and a violent storm on 25<sup>th</sup> April drove his fleet into the harbour.<sup>2853</sup> Exasperated by this, the President again wrote a letter to Surat on 25<sup>th</sup> April 1674 repeating his former arguments for his inability to allow the Siddi to winter at Mumbai.<sup>2854</sup>

He also added that Khawas Modi,<sup>2855</sup> who had been lately at Kalyan and Nagothane, was told by Dattaji Pandit, the Maratha *subadar* of those places, that he had orders from his master to hinder all provisions from going to Mumbai and also to make war upon the English if they allowed the Siddi to winter at Mumbai. With this letter the President enclosed another that he had received from Narayan Shenvi and asked the Surat Council to show it to the governor of Surat so as to bring to his notice what danger the island would face if Shivaji declared war against the English. Finally he asked the Surat Council to tell the governor of Surat plainly and boldly that the English were willing to leave the port and trade of Surat rather than be subject of these great inconveniences caused by the Siddi.

On 27<sup>th</sup> April 1674, Siddi Sambul sent one of his captains to the President to ask for permission to winter his five frigates there.<sup>2856</sup> The Mumbai council confirmed their former refusal and resolved that Oxenden's departure for Raigad should be suspended until the Siddi's departure from Mumbai.<sup>2857</sup> By 30<sup>th</sup> April, the storm had abated but the Siddi showed no inclination to go. So the Mumbai Council sent Captain Shaxton — the Deputy Governor — and three other members of the Council aboard the Siddi's a ship to ask him to leave and to warn him, if he refused, that they would not supply him with any victuals and water after three days. This resulted in a very rude answer from the Siddi that his ships must winter there whether the English allowed it or not.<sup>2858</sup> On the same day, some of his men landed from three or four boats at Shivadi, Sion and one other place at Mumbai and robbed the inhabitants.<sup>2859</sup> At the beginning of May, some 500 of the Siddi's men with arms and ammunition arrived in boats and tried to land on the island. The guards at the custom house resisted the attempt and fired three or four shots which struck some of the boats and made them desist.<sup>2860</sup> Despite such incidents, the President continued furnishing the Siddi with water and provisions. On 8<sup>th</sup> May, the Siddi sent his representative to the President with a request to allow him to stay.<sup>2861</sup> By then it was too late to sail to Surat and, recognizing the need to make some concession, the President agreed to allow him to winter at Mumbai on condition that the Siddi's stay would be peaceful and that he would not make any depredations on the mainland opposite Mumbai. The Siddi signed these conditions on 15<sup>th</sup> May and was granted permission to winter with his fleet at Mazagon.<sup>2862</sup> Meanwhile, the President had received a letter from Narayan Shenvi pressing him to send Oxenden to Raigad as Shivaji's coronation day was approaching.<sup>2863</sup> It was also necessary to explain to Shivaji why the English were allowing the Siddi to winter at

Mumbai.<sup>2864</sup> Narayan had also sent a *kaulnama* (i.e. a letter of assurance) issued by Shivaji which was translated into English and entered into the minutes of the Mumbai Council, dated 8<sup>th</sup> May 1674.<sup>2865</sup> In it, Shivaji had agreed to pay the English 10,000 Hons as reparations for their losses at Rajapur. Of this amount 7,500 Hons were to be paid in three annual installments by discounting 2,500 Hons from the payment for goods worth 5,000 Hons which the English were to buy from Shivaji; the remaining amount, 2,500 Hons, was to be defrayed out of the customs payable by the English after they reopened the factory at Rajapur.<sup>2866</sup>

On 13<sup>th</sup> May, the Mumbai Council decided to send Oxenden, accompanied by George Robinson and Thomas Mitchell, to Raigad.<sup>2867</sup> The three set out from Mumbai and reached the foot of Raigad fort on 19<sup>th</sup> May.<sup>2868</sup> Shivaji was so busy with preparations for his coronation that it was not until 26<sup>th</sup> May 1674 that Oxenden was granted audience.<sup>2869</sup> When Oxenden spoke of the articles of peace which he had brought with him, Shivaji referred him to Moropant, the Peshwa. On 11<sup>th</sup> June 1674, Niraji Pandit sent word to Oxenden that Shivaji had granted and signed<sup>2870</sup> all the articles presented by the English, except the one regarding their coins passing current in Shivaji's dominions, which was thought needless.<sup>2871</sup> The ministers of state also signed the articles the next day which were then delivered to Oxenden by Niraji. Having thus concluded their business, Oxenden and his colleagues departed from Raigad on 13<sup>th</sup> June and arrived at Mumbai on the 16<sup>th</sup> June 1674.

## *Chapter 14*

# Coronation

### RATIONALE FOR THE CORONATION

Shivaji, from very early in his career, conducted himself as *de facto* sovereign. This is reflected in his seal; the earliest document which bears it is dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1646 when he was just sixteen years old. The *Shivabharat* says when Afzal Khan learnt that Shivaji was in Jawali fully prepared for war he wrote a letter to him.<sup>2872</sup> An excerpt from that letter, as given in the epic, is as follows:

“You audaciously brandish the trappings of an Emperor, sit without authority upon a golden throne, bestow rewards or mete out punishments to people; you have willfully stopped paying obeisance to those deserving respect after you have become independent. You have grown incorrigible and are not afraid of lesser persons [compared to me, i.e. Afzal Khan]. Therefore, the triumphant Adilshah has sent me [against you].”<sup>2873</sup>

It is possible that the actual letter was not exactly as stated by the *Shivabharat*; at least some portion of it might have been the poet’s interpolation. However, the statement that Shivaji regarded himself as a sovereign ruler is rooted in reality whether it was mentioned in the letter or not. It is not without significance that, when Shivaji capitulated to Jai Singh in 1665, he did not accept a *mansab* for himself.<sup>2874</sup> Perhaps he might have considered it as a blemish on his independent career.

Be that as it may, the demand of stability and prevalence of the rule of law in the eyes of the common populace necessitated formal and legal recognition to the State through a coronation

according to hoary, time honoured custom. Perhaps, one of the important reasons for the survival of the Maratha state, even when Aurangzeb had executed Sambhaji and Rajaram was besieged within the fort of Gingee for several years, could be that Shivaji had imparted to it legitimacy by formally ascending the throne.

### **GAGABHATT**

According to the Sabhasad Chronicle, Gagabhatt, hearing Shivaji's fame, came from Banaras to meet him and voiced his ardent feeling that 'the Maratha Raja ought to become the *Chhatrapati* [Lord of the Royal Umbrella, a sovereign king].'  
Shivaji, and all the principal men, approved of the prospect.<sup>2875</sup>

No contemporaneous source is available to corroborate the information given in the Sabhasad Chronicle. It is possible that the idea might have occurred to Shivaji himself. Nevertheless, even if it is presumed that it occurred to somebody else, the credit for carrying it out must undoubtedly go to Shivaji alone.

It might incorrectly be inferred from Sabhasad's statement (viz. that 'Gagabhatt, hearing Shivaji's fame, came from Banaras to meet him') is that Gagabhatt had not previously met Shivaji. This is not true. A decree in Sanskrit awarded before April 1664 by an assembly of Pandits, convened at Rajapur to consider a socio-religious question at the behest of Shivaji, is extant.<sup>2876</sup> That document opens with a list of names of the 15 Pandits who were present. The first of these is that of Gagabhatt, showing that Shivaji knew Gagabhatt since before April 1664 as a scholar in Hindu *Dharmashastra* (code of laws). Moreover, from information given in a Eulogy to Shivaji, called the *Shivaprashasti* that is appended to the decree, it seems that Gagabhatt, too, was aware of Shivaji's lofty accomplishments before April 1664.

Although Gagabhatt's family originally hailed from Maharashtra, they had for some generations settled in Banaras and were renowned for their learning. Gagabhatt's great grandfather, Narayanbhatt, who lived during Akbar's reign, had restored the Kashi Vishveshwar temple that had been demolished by the Muslims in earlier times and had also authored several scholarly treatises. His grandson and Gagabhatt's father, Dinkar, too, was a prolific writer. Fondly nicknamed 'Gaga' by Dinkar, Vishveshwar (his given name) continued even in later life to be known as Gagabhatt. He is himself credited with several literary commentaries on scripture, especially on the *Dharmashastra*.<sup>2877</sup>

#### **ENGLISH LETTERS REGARDING THE CORONATION CEREMONY**

A letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> April 1674 written from Raigad by Narayan Shenavi (representative of the English East India Company) to the Deputy Governor of Bombay mentions the imminent coronation of Shivaji. This is the earliest available reference to Shivaji's coronation.

The English were negotiating with Shivaji about compensation for the Maratha loot of their factory at Rajapur in 1660 and Narayan Shenvi was sent to Raigad as their representative for that purpose. He reached the foot of the Raigad Fort on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1674, met Niraji Raoji's son, Pralhad Niraji, at Pachad and was asked to stay there until Shivaji permitted him to ascend to the fort. Narayan Shenavi then sent one of his servants to intimate Shivaji of his arrival. The servant returned the same day with a message that Shivaji would see him after the formal period of mourning for a recently deceased wife of the Raja had concluded, and that Shenavi should stay at the foot of Raigad till then.<sup>2878</sup> Niraji Raoji came to Pachad on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1674, which was the Hindu New Year Day, and escorted him to the fort the next day. Narayan Shenavi stayed on the fort for five days and was granted an audience on 3<sup>rd</sup>

April. Shivaji instructed his clerks to issue an order in conformity with the negotiations about compensation to the English that had been held previously. This account has been given in the letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> April 1674 written by Narayan Shenavi to the Deputy Governor of Bombay.

Later in the letter, he writes about the general state of affairs at Raigad:

“Sevagee is making a throne very magnificent, on which he spends much gold and jewels, intending to be crowned in June next, being the beginning of the New Year [?]. To this coronation he has invited many learned Brahmins, and will liberally bestow on them many elephants, horses and money, but it is not known whether he will be crowned in person or some other Prince, for it is reported he has a Prince of the Nizamshahi race in his custody.”<sup>2879</sup>

It is somewhat not clear what Shenavi meant by writing that June 1674 was the beginning of the New Year. The deeds of grant Shivaji issued after his coronation mention the coronation year, which was instituted as an Era from the date when Shivaji was crowned on Raigad. It might have been decided before the coronation ceremony that the new Era would commence from the day of the coronation, which might have been reflected in Shenavi’s letter.

The same letter mentions that it was not known whether Shivaji himself would be crowned or some Prince of the Nizamshahi dynasty whom, Shenavi seems to have believed, Shivaji held in his custody. It may be recalled that, after the Mughals had captured Daulatabad in 1633 and taken Husain Nizamshah into their custody, Shahji had placed Murtaza, a ten year old kin to the deposed king, on the throne as the successor Nizamshah at the Pemgiri fort and commenced acting as his

Regent. It appears from Shenavi's letter that a rumour was afloat at the time that Shivaji might repeat something similar.

Before concluding the letter, Shenvi writes:

"Now I desire Your Honour to send Mr. Henry Oxenden immediately with a good present...Your Honour has already wrote [sic.] to Niraji Pandit that you would send an Englishman of your council [for concluding the treaty] which he hath made known to the Rajah, wherefore it is convenient that Mr. H. O. [i.e. Henry Oxenden] comes with a considerable present in conformity to his quality, which may be about 1,000 or 1,200 rupees. It is also reasonable that you present the Rajah with something at the time of his coronation, but this present you now send will serve for all [i.e. for Shivaji and his ministers]."[2880](#)

After deliberation upon Narayan Shenavi's letter, the Mumbai Council resolved to send Henry Oxenden (to Raigad) to sign the treaty with Shivaji, and to ask for "what things are necessary for the present" from Surat.[2881](#) As per this resolution, the Bombay Council wrote a letter on 9<sup>th</sup> April 1674 to the Surat Council asking for jewels costing around 3,000 to 4,000 rupees as a present for Shivaji at the time of the coronation.[2882](#)

(It may be noted that the Company's representatives were not invited to attend the coronation. The Bombay Council had decided on their own to send their representatives with a present to attend that occasion.)

As per the Bombay Council's letter, the Surat Council made ready the present to be offered to Shivaji and sent it along with a letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> April 1674.

The list given in the letter is as follows:[2883](#)

The particulars which we send you are as follows:

[Number]	[Item]	Rupees
2	Pearl weighing rutt. [ruttee, a measure of weight] 10 1/10 cost...	500
4	Ditto weighing rutt. 18 9/10 cost...	750
1	Diamond ring, a rose cut, cost...	450
1	Ditto cost...	325
1	Ditto, a table, cost	130
1	Head jewel like a feather cost...	680
2	Bracelets cost...	450
		3285
	Insurance at 13/16 per cent	29 1/4
		3314 1/4

[2884](#)

“All which particulars we have delivered to Mohan Drunidas and Vallabh Lakshmidas, Shroffs, to send you, which they do by a *cosset* [i.e. *Qasid*, courier] that accompanies your cooly, the bearer hereof.”

The following order was passed in the meeting of the Bombay Council held on 4<sup>th</sup> May 1674:

“Ordered that Mr. Oxenden prepare himself with all speed to go to Rairi with the present, and that Mr. John [Child], Mr. Oxenden and Mr. Ustick do meet this afternoon and put the present in order, and to consider how it must be disposed, and to bring an account thereof to the President next Council day.

“Ordered also that Mr. George Robinson, and Mr. Thomas Mitchell do accompany Mr. Oxenden for his assistance in this affair.”<sup>2885</sup>

How the presents were arranged is recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Bombay Council held on 11<sup>th</sup> May 1674 thus:<sup>2886</sup>

“Mr. Child, Mr. Oxenden and Mr. Ustick having put the present for Shivaji and shared them out as they are to be presented the President and Council having perused the same, approved thereof, the contents of the present as follows (viz.)

*To Shivaji Rajah (viz.)*

One head jewel set with diamonds etc. cost Rs. 690  
Two bracelets set with diamonds etc. cost Rs. 450  
Two pearls poised rutts 10 1/10 Rs. 510

-----

Rs. 1650

*To Sambhaji Rajah, Shivaji Rajah's son*

Two bracelets set with small rubies Rs. 125  
One breast jewel of 8 diamonds Rs. 250

-----

Rs. 375

*To Moro Pundit, Shivaji's greatest favourite*

Two large pearls valued at... Rs. 400

*To Anaji Pundit, a great favourite*

Two gold chains poised Tolas 7 Rs. 125

*To Niraji Pundit, another favourite*

Two Pamarins Rs. 70

*To Raoji Somnath, Shivaji's secretary*

Two Pamarins Rs. 70

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*Total Rs. 2690*

“Besides several other small presents to which are left to Mr. Oxenden to dispose of to under officers as he shall see occasion and for the Company's interest.”

Henry Oxenden accompanied by George Robinson and Thomas Mitchell left Bombay on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1674 in a *shibad* (a small ship) and, halting at Chaul, reached Pachad on 19<sup>th</sup> May 1674. They reached Raigad on 22<sup>nd</sup> May and, after signing the treaty, started back on 13<sup>th</sup> June and reached Bombay on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1674.<sup>2887</sup> The diary maintained by Henry Oxenden, narrating the account of this entire journey, is extant.

Some of the entries in Henry Oxenden's narrative are as follows:

19<sup>th</sup> May 1674

“Set forward for Rairi, and about nine of the clock came to Pachad, a town at the foot of the Rairi hill,

where we understood that Shivaji was departed thence to Pratapgarh to visit the Shrine of Bhavani, a pagoda [i.e. a temple or image of the Deity] of great esteem with him, and celebrate some ceremonies there in order to his coronation, having carried with him several presents, and amongst the rest a sombrero of pure gold weighing about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  maunds<sup>2888</sup> which he had dedicated to the said Pagoda's use. Understanding here that we could not be admitted to the castle until Shivaji's return, pitched our tents in the plain.”<sup>2889</sup>

21<sup>st</sup> May 1674

“This day we continued in the same place [i.e. Pachad] under the tent, and found it excessive hot and incommodious; but this evening to our joy we understood that the Rajah was returned from Pratapgarh, when I solicited Niraji Pandit [i.e. Niraji Raoji] to procure us leave to pass up the hill into Rairi castle.<sup>2890</sup>

22<sup>nd</sup> May 1674

“We received orders to ascend up the hill into the castle, the Rajah having enordered us a house there, which we did, leaving Pachad about 3 of the clock in the afternoon, we arrived at the top of that strong mountain about sunset, which is fortified by nature more than art, being of very difficult access, and but one advance to it, which is guarded by two narrow gates, and fortified with a strong high wall, and bastions thereto. All the other parts of the mountain is [sic.] a direct precipice, so that it is impregnable except the treachery of some in it betrays it. On the mountain are many strong buildings, as the Rajah's Court, and houses for other ministers of state, to the

number of about 300. It is in length about 2½ miles and breadth ½ a mile, but no pleasant trees nor any sort of grain grows thereon. Our house was about a mile from the Rajah's palace, into which we retired with no little content.”<sup>2891</sup>

26<sup>th</sup> May 1674

“The Rajah, by the solicitation of Niraji Pundit gave us audience, though busily employed with other great affairs, as his coronation, marriage etc. I presented him and his son Sambhaji Rajah with those particulars appointed for them by the President and Council which they seemed to take very kindly.”<sup>2892</sup>

The above extract mentions Shivaji's marriage. However, Shivaji did not contract any new alliance on the occasion. His *maunjibandhanam* [thread ceremony] was performed on 29<sup>th</sup> May 1674 after which, as is clear from the *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru*, Shivaji was wedded a second time to his queens.<sup>2893</sup> These marriages are referred to as ‘*Samantrik Vivah*’ and ‘*Mantra-Vivah*’ (marriage with Vedic rites) respectively in the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies.<sup>2894</sup> This clarifies why Shivaji was re-married to his wives. His original marriages, all of which were performed before his *maunjibandhanam*, were not conducted according to Vedic rites, because only one who has undergone the *maunjibandhanam* has a right to the Vedas. Therefore it was now necessary for the previous marriages to be re-solemnized with Vedic rites.

In a letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> May 1674 from Raigad to Bombay, Oxenden writes that “the Rajah

was, and is still so busy about his coronation marriage with two other women.”<sup>2895</sup> In the same letter Oxenden states that, “after his coronation he intends to set up a mint.”

## THE CORONATION CEREMONY

The ceremonies began on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1674 and concluded on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1674. Gagabhatt specially wrote an entire treatise setting out how the various rituals ought to be performed. The treatise is called the *Rajabhishekapravayoga*, a copy of which is preserved in the Bikaner Archives. Henry Oxenden's account is the only available eye witness record of the coronation written down by one attending the ceremony on Raigad. However, since the various rituals were essentially of religious import, he, a non-Hindu, could not witness them. He only attended the ceremonial Court after the coronation on 6<sup>th</sup> June. Nischalpuri, a *Tantrik*,<sup>2896</sup> was also on Raigad at the time of the coronation ceremony. His account is found in *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru*. However, this small book is not written by Nischalpuri personally but by his disciple, Govind Narayan Barve.

To obtain a brief overview of how the several rituals of coronation were performed, we will rely on the following sources:<sup>2897</sup>

1. *Rajabhishekapravayoga*
2. Jedhe Chronology
3. Shivapur Chronology
4. Oxenden's Narrative
5. *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru*
6. A letter dated 13<sup>th</sup> October 1674 sent from Vengurla by Abraham Le Feber, a servant of the Dutch East India Company, to the Governor General and Council, Dutch East India Company.

Abraham Le Feber does not seem to have been at Raigad at the time of Shivaji's coronation.<sup>2898</sup> There is no way of knowing how he gained the information that he gives in his letter. The Marathi chronicles also describe Shivaji's coronation; however

they are written in the post-Shivaji period and a large part of them is imaginary.


## 29<sup>th</sup> May

As stated above, the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronicles say that Shivaji's *maunjibandhanam* was performed on this day. Abraham Le Feber also mentions it.<sup>2899</sup> Shivaji's *Tula* with gold was also performed on the same day. Though the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronicles do not mention this, Oxenden's narrative, Le Feber's letter and the *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru* mention the fact. According to the Dutch letter, Shivaji was weighed against gold, silver, copper, iron, cloth, spices, butter, sugar, fruits and many other commodities.<sup>2900</sup> The *maunjibandhanam* and the *Tula* were performed as preludes to the actual coronation ceremonies, perhaps a reason why the *Rajabhishekapravayoga* does not mention them.

## SHIVAJI'S KINGDOM

JUNE 1674

600 meters & above.



### **30<sup>th</sup> May**

According to the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies and the *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru*, Shivaji re-married his queens according to Vedic rites. As stated in the *Rajabhishekapravayoga*, rituals like *Ganesh Pujan* and *Punyahavachan*<sup>2901</sup> were also performed on this day.

### **31<sup>st</sup> May**

As stated in *Rajabhishekapravayoga*, rituals like *Aindrishantividhi* and *Aishanyag* were performed on this day.

### **1<sup>st</sup> June**

Also according to the *Rajabhishekapravayoga*, rituals like *Grahayajna* and *Nakshatrahoma* were performed.

### **2<sup>nd</sup> June**

This was a Tuesday and *Jyeshtha Shudhha Navami* (or, ninth day of the bright half of the month of *Jyeshtha*) according to the Hindu calendar. As, according to the *Rajabhishekapravayoga*, rites connected with the coronation were prohibited to be performed on a Navami or a Tuesday, no rite or ceremony was performed that day.

### **3<sup>rd</sup> June**

The rite of *Nakshatrayajna* was performed according to the *Rajabhishekapravayoga*.

### **4<sup>th</sup> June**

On this day *Nivrittiyag* was performed as prescribed in the *Rajabhishekapravayoga*.

## **5<sup>th</sup> June / 6<sup>th</sup> June**

The auspicious time determined for Shivaji to *formally* and *actually* ascend the throne was, according to the Jedhe Chronology, three *Ghatikas* (72 minutes) before sunrise (i.e. a few minutes before 5 a.m.) on *Jyeshta Shuddha Trayodashi* (the thirteenth day of the bright lunar fortnight) Shaka 1596. The date of the previous day, i.e. *Dwadashi* (the twelfth day of the bright lunar fortnight) extended up to 21 *Ghatikas* and 34 *Palas* (i.e. between the hours of 2 and 3 a.m.). So, the actual enthronement was carried out *after* the lunar date by the Hindu calendar had changed to *Trayodashi*, but *before* the day of week changed to Saturday (at sunrise).<sup>2902</sup> It may be noted, however, that by western reckoning it was 6<sup>th</sup> June 1674, because the date in that system changes at midnight. The enthronement was followed by a chariot ride (*Ratharohan*) and visit to a temple riding an elephant. The grand event of a Hindu ascending the throne according to Hindu custom was without precedent in then recent history.

The story that the Brahmin community opposed Shivaji's coronation is not supported by any contemporaneous or reliable evidence. In fact, Shivaji's enthronement was generally welcomed by the Hindu populace, Brahmins included.

### **HENRY OXENDEN'S NARRATIVE:**

#### **5<sup>th</sup> June**

"Niraji Pundit sent me word that on the morrow about seven or eight in the morning the Rajah Shivaji intended to ascend the throne, and he would take it kindly if I came to congratulate him therein, that it was necessary to present him with some small thing, it being not the custom of these eastern parts to appear before a Prince empty handed. I sent him

answer I would, according to his advice, wait on the Rajah at the prescribed time.”<sup>2903</sup>

**6<sup>th</sup> June**

“About 7 or 8 of the clock, went to Court and found the Rajah seated in a magnificent throne and all the nobles waiting on him [in] very rich attire, his son Sambhaji Rajah, Peshwa Moro Pundit and a Brahmin of great eminence seated on an ascent under the throne, the rest, as well officers of the army as others, standing with great respect. I made my obeisance at a distance and Narayan Shenavi held up the diamond ring, which was to be presented him. He presently took notice of us and enordered our coming nearer, even to the foot of the throne, where being vested, we were desired to retire, which we did, but not so soon but that I took notice on each side of the throne there being (according to the Moor’s manner) on heads of gilded lances many emblems of Government and dominion, as on the right hand were two great fishes heads of gold with very large teeth, on the left hand several horses’ tails, a pair of gold scales on a very rich lance head poised equally, an emblem of justice, and as we returned at the palace gate there were standing two small elephants on each side and two fair horses with gold bridles and rich furniture, which made us admire which way they brought them up the hill, the passage being so difficult and hazardous.”<sup>2904</sup>

Shivaji started a new Era commencing from the date of his coronation or from *Jyeshtha Shuddha 13, Shaka 1596* (i.e. from 6<sup>th</sup> June 1674). The grants he gave thereafter have the new Era mentioned in them. However, he continued to use the Shuhur calendar in routine correspondence. In documents issued by him with his Era mentioned in them, he is addressed as

*'Kshatriya- Kulawatansa Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati'*,<sup>2905</sup> while in those which do not contain the new Era, he is addressed as '*Rajashree Shivaji Raje*' according to previous custom. Thus, '*Raja Shivachhatrapati*' is the formal title Shivaji had assumed after his coronation. Shivaji's gold and copper coins have the legend '*Raja Shivachhatrapati*' inscribed on them. It seems, therefore, that these coins were struck after his coronation. (That he intended to set up a mint after his coronation is mentioned in Oxenden's letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> May 1674 to Bombay)

According to Abraham Le Feber, Shivaji spent 150,000 Pagodas (i.e. Hons) on the coronation ceremony and alms.<sup>2906</sup> Sabhasad states that the expenditure on the coronation ceremony was 14,200,000 Hons.<sup>2907</sup> Of these two figures, the former seems to be an understatement and the latter is evidently gross exaggeration. The exact amount of money spent on Shivaji's coronation ceremony cannot be determined as no reliable source is available to shed light on that aspect. However, there is no doubt that a very large sum was spent. Hence, a tax called *Sinhasan patti* or *Miras patti* was levied on *watandars* after the coronation.<sup>2908</sup>

Shivaji's mother Jijabai passed away, shortly after the coronation, on 17<sup>th</sup> June 1674 at Pachad.<sup>2909</sup> Le Feber writes: "Shivaji's mother having come to be present at her son's coronation, although about 80 years old,<sup>2910</sup> died 12 days after, leaving to her son about 25 lakhs of pagodas, some say more."

## SHIVAJI'S SECOND CORONATION

Nischalpuri, who was present at Raigad for Shivaji's (first) coronation, performed Shivaji's second coronation on

*Lalitapanchami* or *Ashwin Shudhha 5, Shake 1596* (24<sup>th</sup> September 1674). Nischalpuri narrated that event to his disciple Govind Narayan Barve who reduced it to writing in the *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru*. Its brief summary is as follows:[2911](#)

The coronation ceremony and some rituals related to it were not, according to *Tantrik* principles, properly executed. Hence, some unfortunate events occurred a few days before the coronation. Shivaji's Commander-in-Chief Prataprao (Gujar) was killed (in battle) no sooner than Shivaji had agreed to the coronation, his queen Kashibai passed away and on the day before his thread ceremony, a shooting star was sighted. Gagabhatt insulted the Brahmins Nischalpuri had sent and asked Shivaji not to pay obeisance to him. Hence, there occurred some ill portents like a piece of wood falling on Gagabhatt's nose, or a decorative wooden lotus coming loose from the column on which it was fitted and falling on Shivaji's family priest Balambhatt's head. Moreover, Gagabhatt had committed some ritualistic errors. He had selected an inauspicious hour, had neither offered sacrifice to the Mountain, to Vetal (the King of the Nether World according to traditional belief) and to sundry spirits nor had he offered worship to (the Goddess) Shirkai. For these reasons, when Nischalpuri took Shivaji's leave from Raigad after the first coronation, he felt obliged to caution him of impending misfortune. Alarmed by this, Shivaji requested Nischalpuri to arrange for a second coronation according to *Tantrik* rites. Nischalpuri decided to perform the ceremony on *Lalitapanchami* and proceeded on a pilgrimage. Nevertheless, Nischalpuri's prophesy turned out to be true. A few days after the first coronation, Jijabai passed away; lightening struck the Pratapgad fort causing the stables to catch fire. Later, on Lalitapanchami[2912](#) (i.e. on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1674), Nischalpuri conducted the second coronation according to *Tantrik* rites.

The Shivapur Chronicle has the following entry under Shaka 1596: "Ashwin Shuddha 5: enthronement again."[2913](#)

Although the Shivapur Chronicle does not mention Nischalpuri's name, it is evident that the entry refers to the second coronation presided over by Nischalpuri. Mention in that work of Shivaji's marriages or events like the death of Prataprao, Kashibai and Jijabai, are corroborated by other contemporaneous sources. However, it cannot be said that other details appearing therein, which are not corroborated elsewhere, are necessarily factual. So all that can be said with certainty is that Shivaji was enthroned a second time according to *Tantrik* rites, on the advice of Nischalpuri, on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1674.

Persian sources make no mention of Shivaji's coronation. However, the Sabhasad Chronicle describes how the Mughal Emperor, the Adilshah and other Muslim rulers received the news. Sabhasad writes:

"In this manner was the Raja installed on the throne. In this age the *Mleccha* [Muslim] sovereigns [rule] all over the world. Only this Maratha King has become Lord of the Umbrella (*Chhatrapati*). This affair, that has come to pass, is not one of little importance.

Bahadur Khan Kokan[2914](#) . . . wrote this news of the coronation to the Emperor at Delhi. As he learnt this, the Emperor descended from the throne and retired to the harem. He struck both his hands on the earth and lamented much, repeating the name of his god. He did not take food and water for two days and exclaimed, "God has taken away the Muslims'

kingdom, destroyed [our] throne, and conferred it on the Maratha. Things have reached the climax now." In this strain he lamented much and grieved much. Then the principal ministers consoled him in various manners, and by various promises made him sit on the throne. Similarly, when the Sultans of Bijapur and Bhaganagar [Hyderabad] and all others learnt this, they became sad. The Sultans of Constantinople (Rum), Syria (Sham), Persia (Iran), and Turkestan (Turan) and of the Seas began to lament in their minds, and became distressed when they learnt this news. Events of this nature took place."[2915](#)

This description given in the Sabhasad Chronicle is perhaps exaggerated or even imaginary. However, the sense must be true. The Mughal Emperor and the Adilshah must have been crestfallen when they heard the news. For, we may remind ourselves of Sabhasad's simple but meaningful phrase: 'It was an event of no ordinary importance that the Maratha Ruler became Chhatrapati'!

## *Chapter 15*

# All-Out Offensive

**SHIVAJI, THE SIDDI AND THE ENGLISH (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1674)**

As related earlier, the Siddi's fleet had arrived at Mumbai in April 1673 and had wintered there for the rainy season.<sup>2916</sup> The Mumbai Council passed the following resolution in their meeting of 26<sup>th</sup> August 1674 in connection with this:<sup>2917</sup>

“The President having received advice from Shivaji that if we admit the Siddi's fleet to tarry any longer in our port he will, notwithstanding the peace betwixt him and us, fall upon his enemy in our harbour and declare war against us, inserting [sic. informing] that we show more favour to the Siddi than to him, which being seriously considered, [it was]

“Ordered that the secretary and Captain Thomas Nicolls be immediately sent to the Siddi to give him notice of the message Shivaji sent to the President, and to declare unto him that himself and [his] fleet must leave this port, they having received provisions and accommodation all the rains, which being now over they may with safety go to sea.”

This, however, appears to have made no effect on the Siddi. The minutes of the meeting of the Mumbai Council held on 4<sup>th</sup> September 1674 record:<sup>2918</sup>

“The Governor and Council having noticed that the Siddi had listed a considerable number of Portuguese and Topazes, inhabitants of this island, in his service in the war against Shivaji in a private and secret way without giving the least notice thereof to the Governor, which being a thing not to be permitted and may justly give Shivaji offence and cause him to resent it ill, whereupon it was agreed on and

“Ordered that a general order be made and published strictly forbidding any person whatsoever to pass off from the Island without leave from the Governor, and that the chief of the *Pove*<sup>2919</sup> be sent for and acquainted that if any person inhabitant of this island shall entertain himself to the Siddi’s service [he] shall be severely punished and all his estate confiscated to the Honourable Company.”

At long last, towards the end of September 1674, the Mumbai Council succeeded in persuading the Siddi to leave Mumbai.

Mumbai to Surat<sup>2920</sup>

25<sup>th</sup> September 1674

“We have had some piques with Siddi to get him out of Mazgaon bay and with much ado have persuaded him to get his vessels out, and in 4 days more he has promised to leave this place. We expect frequent troubles from him, but we must bear it so well as we can for your sakes.”<sup>2921</sup>


Shivaji had finished the construction of a fort on an islet, called Kansa, at the mouth of the Danda Rajpuri Creek, about three kilometers northwest of Janjira and one and a half kilometers from the mainland, before the beginning of

1675.<sup>2922</sup> The fort, which he named Padmadurg, was meant as a check on Danda Rajpuri, as he himself mentioned in a letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> January 1675.<sup>2923</sup> But it did not seem to have effectively served that purpose, particularly because the Siddi continued to get shelter for his fleet in Mumbai.

#### MARATHA INCURSION INTO KHANDESH (DECEMBER 1674-JANUARY 1675)

In December 1674, Maratha forces struck deep into Khandesh and plundered and burned the country as far as Burhanpur. The following account is based on English letters from Mumbai and Surat which are our only source for that campaign.

Early in October 1674, a great Maratha army had assembled at Kalyan. On 5<sup>th</sup> October 1674 the Mumbai Council received a letter from "an intelligent and credible person" at Kalyan that Shivaji in person had arrived there with a great army and that the design where he was bound was kept very secret.<sup>2924</sup> By 10<sup>th</sup> October they heard that Shivaji himself had departed for Pali leaving behind the army which then ascended the Sahyadri range overlooking Bahadur Khan's army about the fort of Junnar.<sup>2925</sup> They also learnt that this army was provided with a great quantity of pickaxes, mattocks, crows of iron and such other instruments needed for plunder.<sup>2926</sup> By 22<sup>nd</sup> October, it had moved northward and had arrived near Ramnagar which strongly alarmed Surat, causing a stampede at Valsad, Chikhli and Gandevi.<sup>2927</sup> Soon afterwards, rumours were rampant that the Marathas had burnt Gandevi. But these subsided after a while when it was learnt that the Marathas had come only to put fresh provisions and men in their forts and had now retired.<sup>2928</sup>



When the Mumbai Council heard of these rumours, they wrote to their colleagues at Surat on 8<sup>th</sup> November 1674 that the greater part of the Maratha army, commanded by Shivaji himself, had ascended the Sahyadris and had given Bahadur Khan's army a hot alarm. But the Council could not tell "whether he intends to assault his [i.e. Bahadur Khan's] camp or else make bravado and so pass to Surat or some other place and where he designs to plunder."<sup>2929</sup> On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1675, a body of 12,000 Maratha cavalry swooped down upon and plundered Dharangaon, about 125 km north of Aurangabad.<sup>2930</sup> The English trading station at the town was run by two Englishmen — Samuel Austen, the Chief, and his colleague, Thomas Haggerston. On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1675, the Marathas burnt down the English warehouse together with the goods therein on the order of their commander despite the pleading of the Englishmen that the English were at peace with Shivaji and had established a trading station at Rajapur. Cloth worth Rs.3,554 perished in the conflagration and weavers fled with Rs.5,681 advanced to them. The two Englishmen were carried off over 30 to 40 *kos* and were despoiled of everything they had before being released. The unfortunate Haggerston was whipped because he had no more. The loss to the Company including the warehouse, the houses of the weavers and money advanced to them, was estimated at about Rs. 10,000.

The Mumbai dispatch of 24<sup>th</sup> March 1675 reports that during this raid, Shivaji's army had plundered and burnt territory to the very walls of Burhanpur.<sup>2931</sup>

Austen and Haggerston returned to Surat in the same month and narrated their plight, whereupon the Surat Council asked their colleagues at Mumbai to demand satisfaction from Shivaji and procure pledges of security from him for the brokers and English servants of the Company.<sup>2932</sup> About 20<sup>th</sup> February the Mumbai Council wrote a letter to Shivaji together with copies of attestations of Austen and Haggerston to demand satisfaction.<sup>2933</sup> In their dispatch of 24<sup>th</sup> March 1675, they

informed the Company that they were sending Austen to Shivaji to demand satisfaction and pledges of security for their trading stations and were confident that these would be granted. But, they recognized, "it is ill trusting a plundering army who has no regard to friend or foe. Shivaji in his own country gives us [as] great encouragement to your trade as we can reasonably desire."<sup>2934</sup>

#### AUSTEN'S VISIT TO SHIVAJI

President Aungier sent Austen to interview Shivaji at Raigad in August 1675. Austen and Robert Harbin set out from Mumbai on 24<sup>th</sup> August 1675 with presents worth Rs.740 for Shivaji and some of his ministers <sup>2935</sup> and reached Raigad on 6<sup>th</sup> September. In his narrative, Austen wrote:

"September the 6<sup>th</sup>. On the 6<sup>th</sup> September we gained the high and difficult top of Rairi hill... and fortunately had audience the next day of Shivaji and Sambhaji Raja etc. principal officers, who being burdened with shame at my complaints, a politick slumber encircled his brow, and seemingly hung thereon until I had finished, and then he pleaded ignorance to the fact and totally denied the reception of any effect whatsoever, and so desired time for his most serious considerations."<sup>2936</sup>

It was 15<sup>th</sup> September before Austen could obtain another audience with Shivaji through the intercession of Pralhad Pandit.<sup>2937</sup> Shivaji spoke briefly, saying he had no account given him by his General of anything taken from the Englishmen except some plate (which belonged to Samuel Austen), that the demands of the Englishmen were unreasonable, and that as their factory was not well fortified he had no reason to satisfy them for acts of some vagabonds without the order or

knowledge of his General. To this Austen rejoined that the act was certainly committed with the knowledge of the General, otherwise he would not have carried Austen as a prisoner so far, and challenged that the General might deny this before him. But Shivaji took no notice of this and asserted that Austen would not get any compensation.<sup>2938</sup> Shivaji demurred to Austen's request for pledges of security to all the factories of the Company; he was not willing to give such pledges to any except Surat and other sea ports. But after much haggling he agreed to give his pledge of security to all and ordered his secretary, in Austen's presence, to dispatch these. Austen adds in his narrative that these had since been received by the President.

But this report does not narrate in full what Shivaji said on this occasion. The gap is filled by the Surat dispatch of 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1676 which says:

“Satisfaction could not be procured, Shivaji declaring that he was not liable to make good any losses we sustained in his enemy's country, against whom he procured a just war; he blamed the General of his army much for the violence done us, and to the end we should not be subject to such injuries hereafter he gave his *coles*<sup>2939</sup> or passports for that place [Dharangaon], as also for many other factories, but we know not how far they may be trusted unto, and therefore we shall adventure no more than the necessity of your affairs force us unto for the better procuring of goods for England.”<sup>2940</sup>

#### REDUCTION OF PHONDA AND CONQUEST OF CANARA

*Shivaji's Overtures for a Treaty with the Mughal Emperor (January-July 1675)*

Shivaji opened negotiations early in 1675 for a treaty with the Mughal Emperor. Bhimsen's account of how this came about is, in brief, as follows:

Bahadur Khan, the Mughal *subadar* of the Deccan, had censured Jadhavrao and Siddi Hilal, *thanadars* of Gulshanabad [Nasik] and Dindori respectively for their failure to check Maratha inroads. Whereupon, they had defected to Shivaji.<sup>2941</sup> Now Shivaji sent them back explaining to them that he had a mind to conclude a treaty with Bahadur Khan and their presence with him would hamper the process. So they left him, confessed their crime through the mediation of Shubhkaran Bundela and met Bahadur Khan. Apparently, though Bhimsen does not specifically say so, they were again enrolled in the Mughal army. Then Shivaji sent his envoy to Bahadur Khan that he wanted to come to an agreement, and sought his help to obtain the Emperor's pardon. He further conveyed the assurance that he would send his elder son to serve in the Imperial army as soon as the Emperor's consent was obtained. Bahadur Khan forwarded this petition to the Emperor. The Mughal officer, Ali Quli, who carried it from Bahadurgarh (Pedgaon), reached the Emperor's camp at Hasan Abdal in 13 days. The Emperor sounded a note of caution: "You should be very careful about the tricks of Shivaji. You should send Malik Barkhurdar<sup>2942</sup> with some reliable persons who know the temperament of Shivaji and the Hindus and a regular document should be drawn up." Having thus obtained the Emperor's approval, Bahadur Khan chose Muhammad Sayyid and Gangaram Gujarati<sup>2943</sup> to accompany Malik Barkhurdar to meet Shivaji.<sup>2944</sup>

Meanwhile, conflicting rumours about the treaty were in circulation. Their first indication is found in the Mumbai Council's letter of 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1675 which states "Shivaji is entering into a treaty of peace with the Mughal and some think

[it] will take effect."<sup>2945</sup> A more definite report was conveyed in the Surat Council's dispatch of 13<sup>th</sup> February 1675. It said:

"Here has of late been current report that the King [Emperor Aurangzeb] has made peace with Shivaji on certain conditions of delivering up some castles to the King and sending his son into the King's service, who was to give him the command of 5 or 6000 horse,<sup>2946</sup> and that the King had granted Shivaji all the country on this side of the river Bhinvara [Bhima] for his confines, which runs near Aurangabad. But we hear further that Shivaji demurs and will not send his son to the King's General until he has better security."<sup>2947</sup>

The Mumbai Council, however, were doubtful about the truth of this report, for, they wrote in their letter of 27<sup>th</sup> February 1675, 'the Mughal army had lately fallen down upon Kalyan and burnt Kalyan-Bhvandi'.<sup>2948</sup> Since then, they added, it had retired and Shivaji's men had returned to Kalyan. The Surat Council was equally skeptical and expressed their suspicion in their letter of 25<sup>th</sup> March 1675 that the treaty was but another of Shivaji's tricks to gain time to provision his forts with corn and also to procure a subsidy from the Adilshah to carry on the war against the Mughals by threatening him that otherwise he would make peace with them and continue the war against the Adilshahi Sultanate.<sup>2949</sup> But, then, the Surat Council received more reliable information. On 15<sup>th</sup> June 1675 they informed their colleagues at Mumbai that the other day they had visited Sayyid Mahmud<sup>2950</sup> and were told by him that the Mughal Emperor had signed the articles of peace with Shivaji.<sup>2951</sup> Even then the Surat Council remained skeptical for they added, "Pray enquire into this business of his ministers and advise us what they say."

The *Basatin-us Salatin* and English letters of the time give the terms of the treaty as follows:

(1) Shivaji was to deliver all the forts and country ceded according to the treaty of 1665 and those which he had recently captured.<sup>2952</sup>

(2) He was to send his son to serve in the imperial army.<sup>2953</sup>

(3) He was to be granted the *deshmukhi* of the Deccan.<sup>2954</sup>  
The *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* records:

"As Khan Jahan Bahadur [Bahadur Khan] had defeated the infernal Shivaji by repeated attacks and many forced marches and greatly exerted himself in chastising the other rebels of the Deccan, and had exacted tribute from the rulers of the Deccan, Bijapur and Hyderabad, on 7<sup>th</sup> July 1675 the Emperor rewarded him by giving him the title of Khan Jahan Bahadur Zafar Jang Kokaltash, promoted him to 7000 *dhat*/7000 *sawar* by an increment of 1000 *dhat*, and presented him with 10 million of *dam* [Rs. 250,000]. His servant Muhammad Salih, who had brought cash, horses and elephants of the tribute, got a robe and his companions a reward of 1,000 rupees. Splendid robes, high promotions, titles, and a *farman* of praise were sent to Zafar Jang and his sons with Muhammad Mirak, mace bearer. At Zafar Jang's request Sambhaji, the son of Shivaji, was granted the rank of 6,000 *dhat*/6000 *sawar*, 80 lakhs of *dam* [Rs. 200,000] as present, kettle drums and banner, and a robe and a *farman* were sent for him with the said mace bearer."<sup>2955</sup>

*Shivaji's March to Phonda (March-April 1675)*

While this treaty was being negotiated, Maratha forces were active in the south. In their dispatch of 6<sup>th</sup> February 1675 the Rajapur factors reported the news that Dattaji with some 3,000 horse had been to Kolhapur which redeemed itself from their fury by paying a contribution of 1,500 Hons.<sup>2956</sup> Then, the letter continues, they went to Songaon which gave them 500 Hons and from there went on roving. But more important developments were taking place at Rajapur for, the letter added, Anaji left Rajapur in the night of 6<sup>th</sup>/7<sup>th</sup> February and “went his way for Phonda as is gave out.”

According to the Jedhe Chronology, Shivaji set out on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1675, presumably from Raigad, and laid siege to Phonda on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1676.<sup>2957</sup> On 20<sup>th</sup> March 1676 the *subadar* of Rajapur sent word to the English factors at Rajapur that Shivaji would arrive the next day at the village of Vilavade,<sup>2958</sup> 4 course (*kos*) from Rajapur and he and other officers went there to receive the King. The Englishmen — John Child and his colleagues — immediately prepared their petition, got it translated into the vernacular and arrived at the village in the night of 20<sup>th</sup>/21<sup>st</sup> March. Shivaji did not arrive there the next day, as was expected, “but the 22<sup>nd</sup> about midday accompanied by abundance of horse and foot and about 150 palanquins.” The Englishmen had pitched a tent near the route by which the Maratha King was to pass to the place fixed for his reception.<sup>2959</sup> What followed may best be described in the words of the Englishmen.

“So soon as we heard of his near approach, we went out of our tent, and very near met him. He ordered his palanquin to stand still, called us very near him, seemed very glad to see us and much pleased we came to meet him, and said the sun being hot he would not keep us now, but in the evening he would send for us.”<sup>2960</sup>

Then, after meeting Anaji, the Englishmen retired to their tent and later were told some time by a messenger from him that they might meet the Raja at Rajapur.[2961](#)

“In the morning early we set forward for Rajapur and coming to a pleasant spring of water, we sat down under a tree, resolving to stay there once more to meet the Rajah, where we had not been long, but Pralhad Pundit, Niraji Pundit’s son, passing by, came out of his palanquin to us where we were, seemed very glad to see us, and desirous to know wherein he might be serviceable to us, being very sensible of what had passed between us and Anaji. We showed him the request [petition] we intended to make to the Rajah and desired his advice. He gave us hopes to expect that all would be granted....

“The Rajah being near at hand, he took leave of us and bid us be confident of his readiness to serve us. Immediately after he was gone, came the Rajah. He stopped his palanquin and called us to him. When we were pretty near him, we made a stop, but he beckoned with his hand till I [John Child] was up close with him. He diverted himself a little by taking in his hand the locks of my periwig[2962](#) and asked us several questions; at length asked us how we liked Rajapur and said that he was informed we were not well pleased there, but bid us not to be in the least dissatisfied for what passed. He would order things for the future to our full satisfaction and that we might be sure he would not fail to send for us when at Rajapur and that no reasonable request we should make to him would he deny us.”[2963](#)

The Englishmen then waited for a while to meet Anaji, but learnt that he had gone by a different route and so returned to

Rajapur. Shivaji stayed in Rajapur till 25<sup>th</sup> March. The Englishmen went to see him in the morning of that day.

“And when we came near to the house where the Rajah was, adjoining to our old house, a messenger was sent to desire us to stay under a tree, where after we had been a small time, we were admitted to his presence. I was placed so near him on his right hand that I could touch him. With him we continued about two hours, which was most part spent in answering many of his questions. At length we presented him our paper of desires, which after been read to him, with a little pause, seriously looking on us, said that it was all granted us. He would give us a *farman* for all. We then sent for a present that we had made ready for him, amounting to about 200 pagodas, with what we gave privately to Pralhad Pundit & ca., that much assisted us, which money we count very well bestowed and doubt not but that you will highly approve thereof.

“The same evening the Rajah went hence and we dispatched Mohandas to wait upon him and get the *farman* sealed. For him we waited this many days, hourly expecting him, but being lately informed that the Rajah has set watches suffering none to pass to the northward of the place where he is, but are searched and what papers found about them taken away, shall not keep these [letters of ours] any longer, but copy of *farman* shall send hereafter.”<sup>2964</sup>

It may be noted that as Shivaji was marching south he was setting up ‘stops’ in his rear so as to prevent the flow of traffic and information northward and thus keep his whereabouts and intentions secret as long as possible.

*Siege of Phonda*

As stated earlier, Shivaji commenced the siege of Phonda on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1675.[2965](#) Its story may best be unfolded through the English letters from Rajapur and Karwar.

### Rajapur to Mumbai

1<sup>st</sup> April 1675

“The Rajah had been here [and] used us with all expressions of kindness. He is now gone to a place of his own called Kudal within a day's journey of Phonda. Before he went hence, he ordered about 40 small vessels to be got ready, the biggest not above 4 guns, which are to go to Vengurle, with all speed, there to wait his orders. He has an army with him of 15,000 horse, 14,000 foot and 10,000 mesures [*mazurs*, labourers], with pickaxes, crows, hatchets &ca. His designs are not known. Some are of the opinion he designs against Phonda, others that he intends to plunder Goa, others that he is going against Surrup Magues [Sarup Nayak's?] country,[2966](#) and others that he designs against Bijapur. He has taken Kolhapur, and report speaks he will soon have Raibag. When he was here, we found it necessary to present him some desires in our masters' behalf. All our requests he readily gratified, one was about a house, which we are in hopes to get without disbursing a penny; with him we sent Mohandas, one of our brokers, to get his *farman* sealed for what we desired, which we hourly expect. When he arrives, we shall send an express with ample advices.”[2967](#)

### Karwar to Mumbai

14<sup>th</sup> April 1675

“Shivaji has laid siege to Phonda Castle with about 2,000 horse and 7,000 foot these six days, and it is thought by all that he will carry it, for he is providing against the rains and designs to stay to starve them

out, for we hear that Muhammad Khan has not above 4 months provision in the castle, and he has no great expectations from Bijapur; the Portuguese at his coming saluted him very roughly, but do begin now to be a little calmer, so that we think the Portuguese will not molest Shivaji nor assist Muhammad Khan”<sup>2968</sup>

Rajapur to Mumbai

20<sup>th</sup> April 1675

“Shivaji Rajah with all his forces is set down against Phonda. He has lost already a great many men, but is now in likelihood to carry it. He undermined it four times, but was countermined by the defendants. He has hove up a bank against it that his soldiers lie under, which is within 12 feet of the castle wall, and it is said he will not rise therehence till he carries it. The Portuguese are in great fear of him at Goa. They do not stick here to say that when he has Phonda, Goa he counts as his own. He will, by all reports, when master of this castle, soon be possessed of all the King of Bijapur’s dominions. He has some forces near Raibag, but we have no news certain that it is taken. He has his ambassador with the Viceroy of Goa,<sup>2969</sup> who has promised to stand neuter, but privately the Portuguese assist Phonda what they can; and indeed it concerns them so to do, for they will undoubtedly, if Shivaji takes it, find him a bad neighbour. The Portuguese sent for its relief 10 *shibads* laden with provisions of all sorts, and some men, but it fell all into Shivaji’s hands, who sent to the Viceroy about it, but he denied to have knowledge of it and excused himself so well as he could, but it is reported [it] was done by his orders.”<sup>2970</sup>

Karwar to Mumbai

22<sup>nd</sup> April 1675

“We hear news that Rustam-i Zaman,<sup>2971</sup> Lord of this country, is upon his way with about 1,500 horse and some foot, this force is coming to the succour of Phonda....

“As to Shivaji, he sets all wheels at work, for while he is prosecuting his design at Phonda, his forces that went aloft have plundered three great cities, one belonging to this kingdom named Etgerree [? Yadgir], the other two hard by Bhaganagar which is in the limits of the King of Golconda’s dominions. They have brought away a great deal of riches besides a many of rich persons which they have carried to Shivaji at Phonda. His forces have robbed Cuncolim and Veroda in the Portuguese territories and it is thought by all that he will win Phonda Castle, for he makes preparations to take up his winter quarters there. Fame declares his army to consist of 30,000 men. We expect some of them every day here, for the people begin to come from Simisee [?Shiveshvar or Sirsi] already, which is not above two leagues of us.”<sup>2972</sup>

That the Marathas had plundered Portuguese territory is confirmed by the minutes of the meeting of the Portuguese State Council held on 30<sup>th</sup> April 1675. It is stated therein that at midday on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1675 Shivaji’s men entered the village of Chandar in pursuit of some *desais*, plundered two or three houses and killed a servant of the church there. On the same day, Shivaji with over 200 horsemen entered the village of Cuncolim in pursuit of Ranmast Khan (“Ranne Mostacana”), despoiled several persons who were fleeing and took away the ornaments in the church. After deliberating on these reports the Council unanimously resolved that an investigation should be made whether Shivaji’s men had deliberately entered

Portuguese territory or they had done so by mistake and meanwhile to take Shivaji's envoy into custody.<sup>2973</sup>

On 1<sup>st</sup> May 1675 a wall of the fort was blown up by a mine and the fort was captured.<sup>2974</sup> But the news had not reached Rajapur by 3<sup>rd</sup> May.

Rajapur to Mumbai

3<sup>rd</sup> May 1675

"Phonda has been closely besieged by the Rajah. News here was that he had possession of two outworks and had filled up the ditch, made 500 ladders and 500 shackles of gold of 1/2 ser weight each shackle, which was to give those as would adventure to ascend the ladders to scale the walls. He has lost abundance of men, and we hourly expected to hear he has raised his siege and is marching away, Bahlul Khan being come down against him with 8,000 horse and 7,000 foot, besides many forces joined to him since he is come down."<sup>2975</sup>

But Shivaji had detached a strong force to intercept any Adilshahi army that might arrive to relieve Phonda.

Karwar to Mumbai

8<sup>th</sup> May 1675

"Shivaji has forces upon the Ghat [Sahyadri range] to impede any Succors coming to these parts....

"Shivaji has taken Phonda Castle and has put Muhammad Khan in irons; with forcing him, he has writ to adjacent castles to surrender to Shivaji, but none of them will adhere to him. In Shiveshvar there is about 3,000 horse besides foot, which have laid

siege to the castle for this 15 days; 12 days ago one of Shivaji's generals visited Karwar to burn it, which he did effectually, for he has not left an house standing. He pitched his tent at Karwar where the *desai* formerly dwelt.”[2976](#)

Rajapur to Mumbai

21<sup>st</sup> May 1675

“Phonda was taken by the Rajah some days since. He put all he found in it to the sword except the governor Mahmud Khan who saved his own life and four or five more by promising into the Rajah's subjection all these parts belonging to the King [Adilshah]. Ankola and Shiveshvar castles are likewise taken; Kadra only stands out, but the daily expected news will come of its being likewise taken. He is now master of Karwar.”[2977](#)

Karwar to Mumbai

25<sup>th</sup> May 1675

“We are come now to acquaint your Honours of the great success Shivaji has had in these parts, for he is master of all as far as Ankola, which he did not get by his valour but for his money (except Phonda).[2978](#) Robert Jones and Edward Austin went and met him after he was in possession of Karwar.”[2979](#)

Rajapur to Mumbai

31<sup>st</sup> May 1675

“Shivaji has now taken all belonging to the King of Bijapur in Konkan. He was very kind to our friends at Karwar [Robert Jones and Edward Austin]. Bahlul

Khan continues at Miraj; his strength is reported to be 8,000 horse and 7,000 foot. He endeavoured to come down to relieve Phonda, but the Rajah had filled up the passages with trees cut down for the purpose and lined them with men, so that he could not pass without certain expectation of great loss, and great fear of being wholly overthrown. This is the news we have here, but from Karwar they write us that the Rajah stopped his [Bahlul Khan's] intentions to relieve Phonda with a very large present."[2980](#)

Rajapur to Mumbai

3<sup>rd</sup> June 1675

"Bahlul Khan has left the greatest part of his forces in and about Miraj and he is gone to winter at Bijapur. Shivaji Rajah, the last news we had of him, he was at Ankola, but was designed to winter in a castle near the Raja of Sonda's country. Anaji Pundit is left in Phonda to see that repaired and made in a defensible condition."[2981](#)

Rajapur to Mumbai

14<sup>th</sup> June 1675

"Within these three days the Rajah [Shivaji] passed by this place bound to Rairi. It is reported for a certain truth that Bahlul Khan was bribed by him. It is now thought that he will make peace with the young King of Bijapur and next summer go against Carnatte, being Sarup Nayak's country."[2982](#)

### *Results of the Campaign*

Thus in this short campaign of less than four months Shivaji pushed the southern boundary of his kingdom as far as

the Gangavali river. Beyond it lay the kingdom of Ikkeri.

John Fryer who visited Karwar towards the end of 1675 writes:

“Karwar, what remains of it, is under the new conquest of Shivaji, being lately, with Ankola, Phonda, Kadra and Shiveshvar brought under (though all of them very strong places).”[2983](#)

Fryer visited Gokarna in January 1676, about which he writes:

“Shivaji spared not this town when he took the castle, so that it is almost down or deserted; the soldiers by that means disfurnishing themselves of all necessaries, but what they seize by violence abroad; the castle is a fine place and of good force; bearing fifty brass guns, the Moors had got out of a Portuguese shipwreck; it commands as far as the River Gangavali the utmost extent of Shivaji’s dominions.”[2984](#)

Describing the condition of the Kingdom of Bijapur he writes:

“Shivaji is reckoned also as a diseased limb of Deccan impostumated [abscessed] and swollen too big for the body; in some respects benefiting, in others discommoding it; beneficial, by opposing the Mughal’s entry into the Kingdom; but prejudicial in being his own paymaster rewarding himself most unconscionably; all Konkan being little enough for him, extending in length along the sea coasts, 259 Leagues, that is, from Valsad hills to the river Gangavali; where neither is he limited in his extravagant desires, expecting only opportunity to

gain further. Inland he has not much, the Ghat seeming to be a natural line of circumvallation to the up-country, where it is Campaign [flat terrain], though below hilly; so that you ascend to it by mountains piled on one another, over which Shivaji has total dominion, the Deccanis not striving to retake anything, for all he has blocked up their ports, which may prejudice them for the future; an irreparable damage (Arab steeds being the life of their cavalry); they having only Porto Novo beyond Tuticorin left them free.”[2985](#)

### *Disillusionment of the Mughals*

On 17<sup>th</sup> July 1675 the Surat Council had informed their colleagues at Mumbai of the news then current of a peace between Shivaji and the Mughal Emperor.[2986](#) But only five days later they again wrote:

“The governor [of Surat] now declares there is no peace between Shivaji and the King [Emperor Aurangzeb] though the Articles were signed by the King and sent an elephant to Bahadur Khan, and raised his *mansab* for the good service he had done in making the conditions; but Shivaji has baffled him, will stand to no such Articles [and had] contrived the deceit only to prosecute his conquest in the Bijapur territories.”[2987](#)

What happened is narrated in *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*. It tells us that Malik Barkhurdar, Muhammad Sayyid and Gangaram Gujarati were granted an audience with Shivaji. Then

“He did not overlook the minutest possible ceremony in treating them well. On the first day, he showed a great sense of courtesy but on the second

day, his attitude was absolutely different when he arrogantly asked them as to what power they had that they were asking him to sign a pact of friendship. He added that they should leave the place otherwise he would insult them. Those helpless fellows returned without achieving any goal and they conveyed to Bahadur Khan all that happened.”<sup>2988</sup>

At this time the Rajapur factors — John Child and Thomas Mitchell — were on a tour of upcountry to procure goods and had reached Raibag on 31<sup>st</sup> July. In their letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> August 1675 from that town they wrote:

“The 30<sup>th</sup> ditto [July 1675] news was brought us early in the morning that Shivaji’s party in Kolhapur had seized the Governor there for the king. Many of the inhabitants are leaving the town but Shivaji’s soldiers kept all in with promise of fair usage, so that the town’s people are preserved in quiet and some security, Shivaji having to guard it, report speaks, about 2,000 men, and the Moor [Muslim] governor that was in it is carried to Panhala castle, where he as yet remains a prisoner. Soon after we had this news we set forward for this place, our journey very troublesome and uncomfortable. In the highway we passed by many dead bodies of men and women that died for want of food. The ways in many places very deep so that our horses in some places ready to stick fast. Such towns as we passed much broken and decayed, a few or no people in them, where one house had a dweller ten were empty, the people being run away for want and fear Shivaji and oppression of their governor. The 31<sup>st</sup> July we arrived in this place...

The news of these parts are altogether uncertain and vary daily. The most credibly believed and reported [news] is, viz., that Aurangzeb, the King of India, has taken great displeasure against Shivaji

Rajah, who had offered him 17 castles to make peace, which after the King had agreed to and signed the Articles, the Rajah refused to deliver the castles, upon which the King of India has wrote to the King of Bijapur and the Nabob Bahlul Khan offering to let go a usual tribute that this King uses to pay him annually, provided he will with all his forces go against the Rajah on this side, and he intends against him on the other side, with resolutions, if possible, to utterly destroy Shivaji. This offer is accepted by the King's ministers and the Nabob has ordered baskets to be made to pass his men over the rivers (caused by the great rains that have fallen) intending against Panhala. So soon as the Moon changes, it is given out, he will set forward but the rivers and deep ways will certainly hinder his putting his resolutions so suddenly in practice, but against Panhala it is undoubtedly reported he will, which if he doth, will not or cannot be before Diwali<sup>2989</sup> so that till that time Kolhapur and all there about will be in quiet and our business by then will be near done."<sup>2990</sup>

#### SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH AT RAJAPUR (OCTOBER 1674 TO 1677)

In October 1674 Charles Ward and George Robinson arrived at Rajapur with some goods and money to restart the Company's factory at Rajapur.<sup>2991</sup> On their arrival they found that the trade at the town was practically at a standstill owing to the long absence of the English and also because the French had ceased to trade for want of stock and shipping.<sup>2992</sup> Formerly, the factory was accommodated in a house of their own and the adjoining one which they had taken on rent. Now the former was used to hear public grievances and keep registers while the *subadar* of the district himself lived in the

latter.<sup>2993</sup> Ward tried to obtain their old house but the *subadar* refused to vacate it. However he asked the Englishmen to send for the Articles of Peace concluded between Shivaji and the Company and assured that if it was stipulated therein he would not stay in the house one hour.<sup>2994</sup>

John Child, who was appointed to be the Chief of the Rajapur factory, was detained at Mumbai for some time.<sup>2995</sup> He arrived at Rajapur on 28<sup>th</sup> January 1675. He was accompanied by Thomas Mitchell, a writer, and six soldier-clerks.<sup>2996</sup> On 2<sup>nd</sup> February the English party came ashore. Most of the merchants of Rajapur had come to receive the English about six miles short of the town. While they were waiting there the *subadar*, Jivaji Pandit, and commander of Shivaji's sea forces, Daulat Khan, also arrived there. After being entertained with music and dance according to the local custom the party, comprising about 500 men now, set off for Rajapur. By the time they reached the town, their number had swelled to some 3,000 men. The English party was then conducted to a house which was appointed for them. It was the best in town except that of Anaji's, the *subadar*'s, and the French company's, but was situated at a distance from the river. Here the *subadar* and the admiral took their leave.<sup>2997</sup>

The English paid a visit to Anaji on 5<sup>th</sup> February and spent five hours with him. Anaji refused to let them have their former accommodation but proposed four other places instead, which were shown to them. The English were unwilling to take any of them because they were situated at some distance from the river. Anaji then told them that they could choose any place above his house and promised that a house would be built there to their liking within two months. He also agreed that the cost of the new house would be deducted out of the customs. Then the English brought up the subject of the payment of 2,500 Hons as per the agreement. Anaji demanded to be shown Shivaji's order concerning this which, when done, he said that

the *subadar* would give them goods worth 5,000 Hons for which they should pay only 2,500, the rest being deducted in lieu of the payment to be made to them.<sup>2998</sup>

In their letter of 20<sup>th</sup> April 1675, the Rajapur factors informed the Mumbai Council that Anaji had offered them coconuts and beetle nuts at very dear rates — the former at 5 laris per *khandi* and the latter at 100 laris per *khandi* whereas they were really worth 2.5 laris per *khandi* and 80 laris per *khandi* respectively.<sup>2999</sup> In March 1675 the Englishmen, as related earlier, obtained an audience with Shivaji when he was on his way to Phonda. Shivaji granted John Child's request that the money to be paid to the Company should be paid in commodities at the market price and that the Company should not be required to make any payment against them as stipulated in the agreement.<sup>3000</sup> Before the Maratha King departed from Rajapur, he left a man behind whose sole job was to look after the building of a house for the English which he was to finish with all speed. By 20<sup>th</sup> April, when the Rajapur factors reported these matters to Mumbai, the foundation was dug and lime and stone were gathered.<sup>3001</sup> The house, it would seem, was built to the satisfaction of the Englishmen. But they did not obtain any payment during the year which they were to get according to their agreement with the Maratha King.<sup>3002</sup> In February 1676, the Mumbai Council sent five *gurabs* to bring up a large quantity of coconuts as part payment at the rate mentioned in a contract Child had made with the *subadar*. The *gurabs* were detained at Rajapur for nearly two months without getting any coconuts. Four of these managed to get other freight but one had to return empty. The Company had to suffer a loss as a result.<sup>3003</sup> In 1677, they received some coconuts and beetle nuts in lieu of payment, but they were so decayed that they scarcely bore the expense of transportation to Surat.<sup>3004</sup>

#### SHIVAJI AND THE SIDDI (FEBRUARY 1675 TO NOVEMBER 1675)

Siddi Sambul again came to Mumbai in February 1675, but as he had lost many men, evidently in his encounters with Shivaji, and was in financial straits as well, he was contemplating returning to Surat. Meanwhile Shivaji had laid siege to Danda Rajpuri and the Englishmen at Mumbai thought that Shivaji would take it before the beginning of the rainy season.<sup>3005</sup> By the middle of April, the Siddi returned to Surat thus sparing the island from his unwelcome presence in the rainy season of 1675.<sup>3006</sup> Shivaji by that time was engaged in the siege of Phonda.

In the height of the rainy season of 1675, the Marathas were busy building new war ships. On 17<sup>th</sup> August 1675, the Englishmen on board the *Mayboom*<sup>3007</sup> wrote from Jaitapur:

“We are now almost and had been altogether ready to haul the *Mayboom* off the ground but that men are difficult to be procured and more hard to be kept by reason a fleet of men of war that is here fitting out for Shivaji whose servants press all the carpenters, sawyers and smiths that they can find to our great hindrance.”<sup>3008</sup>

And on the same day, the English factors at Rajapur wrote:

“As to fitting the *Maytree* [sic. *Mayboon*] we have had much trouble to get carpenters & ca. to work upon her and after we had to keep them, the Rajah [Shivaji] sending express order for the speedy building several new gurabs to be in readiness to accompany him with his army against Danda Rajpuri.”<sup>3009</sup>

These preparations, it seems, continued throughout the rainy season. On 7<sup>th</sup> September 1675, the Mumbai Council wrote to Surat:

“All the news we have is that Shivaji makes preparation to take the castle of Danda Rajpuri to which end, besides his land army, he is providing an armada by sea; but some wiser men say that he has other deeper designs for his armada, to wit, to invade some of the King’s [Emperor Aurangzeb’s] coast to the northward while his armada is employed this way. But his designs are so well laid and secretly carried on that no judgement can be made of them till they are executed.”<sup>3010</sup>

In August 1675, Siddi Sambul sent word to Surat that unless relief was sent, Danda Rajpuri could not hold out for long.<sup>3011</sup> But it appears that the governor refused to extend the necessary cooperation whereupon the Siddi sought the intervention of the Emperor himself. This is shown by the Surat dispatch of 4<sup>th</sup> September 1675 which states that, on the previous day, the governor had received an order from the Emperor to follow Bahadur Khan’s orders for the supply of the Siddi’s fleet on all occasions “which formerly he refused to do without the King’s immediate orders.”<sup>3012</sup> In October 1675, a Mughal fleet comprising two large men of war, several frigates and 2,000 fresh men, under command of Siddi Sambul’s brother Siddi Qasim, sailed for Danda Rajpuri.<sup>3013</sup> In his letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> September 1675 from Surat the President had instructed Philip Giffard, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai, to provide the Siddi’s fleet with water, provisions and other necessaries “for their money” but to warn that they must not rob any vessel within the bay from Khanderi Underi and Chaul northwards, or land any men to plunder any part in the bay, and that if they failed to comply with this they must not expect any assistance

from the English.<sup>3014</sup> The Surat dispatch of 8<sup>th</sup> October 1675 intimated the Mumbai Council of the Siddi's departure from Surat and instructed them to give his fleet "all fair assistance and civil deportment" because it would be appreciated by the governor of Surat and reported to the Mughal Emperor.<sup>3015</sup>

The Siddi put in the Mumbai harbour about 14<sup>th</sup> October. In a dispatch of that date, the Mumbai Council informed Surat that they had received a letter from the Siddi on the previous day. This letter was evidently a rude one, for the Mumbai Council enclosed a copy of it and of their answer to it, and asked the opinion of their colleagues. They also remarked that they should find him a "very troublesome neighbour" unless their colleagues at Surat procured an order from Ghiyas-ud Din Khan, the governor of Surat, prohibiting the Siddi from hostilities in the Bay waters from Chaul and Khanderi Underi upwards.<sup>3016</sup>

The Siddi did not stay at Mumbai for long. After putting some men ashore<sup>3017</sup> he sailed down the coast to seek out Shivaji's fleet and burn it in port. When this design was frustrated by the vigilance of the Marathas, he descended upon and plundered and burnt Vengurle on 2<sup>nd</sup> November besides several other towns, whereupon the Maratha fleet, comprising 57 well-manned small frigates, put to sea.<sup>3018</sup> An English ship, the *East India Merchant*, which arrived at Mumbai on 25<sup>th</sup> November 1675 had met both the fleets in her voyage up the west coast. Mentioning it in their dispatch, the Mumbai Council remarked: "We wish they may meet and box it out stoutly, for they are both equally troublesome to us and much hinder the trade of our port."<sup>3019</sup>

#### CIVIL WAR IN THE ADILSHAHI SULTANATE

Exasperated by his failure to check Maratha inroads, Khawas Khan decided to conclude an alliance with the Mughals

so as to launch a combined offensive against Shivaji. He opened negotiations with Bahadur Khan and, on 19<sup>th</sup> October 1675, himself met the Mughal viceroy at Pandharpur on the banks of the Bhima. The terms of the treaty that was then concluded were as follows:<sup>3020</sup>

(i) The Adilshah was to be exempted from the payment of the annual tribute to the Mughal emperor.

(ii) Sikandar Adilshah was to be granted the title of Shah. (The Mughals considered the Adilshah and the Qutbshah as their vassals and, as the term 'Shah' signified sovereignty, referred to them as Adil Khan and Qutb Khan respectively.)

(iii) Khawas Khan was to launch a vigorous offensive against Shivaji.

(iv) Princess Shahr Banu Begam, the elder sister of Sikandar Adilshah, was to be given in marriage to one of the sons of the Mughal Emperor.

In addition, a personal agreement to marry the daughter of Khawas Khan to the son of Bahadur Khan was also made.

But this plan was upset by a sudden revolution in Bijapur. The Sultanate had inherited from its predecessor, the Bahamani Sultanate, the blood-feud between the Pathans, who served in large number in the Adilshahi army, and the Deccani Muslims who were native converts. The Abyssinians, known as the Siddis sided with the latter faction. Khawas Khan was the leader of the southern party and his opponent Bahlul Khan was that of the Pathans.

On 11<sup>th</sup> November 1675, Bahlul Khan treacherously imprisoned Khawas Khan, seized the fort of Bijapur and assumed the regentship.<sup>3021</sup> The revolt had not yet taken the

form of a factional fight. But Bahlul Khan did not trust the Muslims from the Deccan and transferred Shaikh Minhaj, a Deccani Muslim who was in charge of the capital, to the Maratha frontier. Minhaj resented his transfer and began to intrigue with his friends for the overthrow of the Pathans. Having learnt this, Bahlul Khan decided to eliminate him. Accordingly, Khizr Khan Panni, a Pathan nobleman and right hand man of Bahlul Khan, invited Minhaj to a feast; but the latter got wind of the plan, turned the tables on Khizr Khan and stabbed him to death on 12<sup>th</sup> January 1676. Enraged by the act, Bahlul Khan executed Khawas Khan on 19<sup>th</sup> January.<sup>3022</sup>

#### MARATHA RAID TOWARDS AURANGABAD (C. JANUARY 1676)

Sometime after the conclusion of the Mughal-Adilshahi treaty, at the close of 1675 or in early 1676, the Maratha cavalry struck deep inside Mughal territory and plundered it as far as Aurangabad. Bahadur Khan set out from his camp at Pedgaon with light equipment and caught up with them near Lasur, 45 km west-southwest of Aurangabad. According to Bhimsen, the Marathas were defeated in the ensuing battle and Bahadur Khan pursued them up to Junnar.<sup>3023</sup> This statement, however, must be seen in the light of Maratha strategy which was to avoid battle, unless it could be brought about under the most favourable conditions, and by a series of threats and raids produce distraction, disturbance and demoralization among the enemy. The English factors had understood this when they wrote: "He is, and ever was for a running banquet, and to plunder and burn those towns that have neither defence nor guard."<sup>3024</sup> Therefore the Marathas, when they came up against the defenders in such raids, broke off the action at the earliest opportunity. The Mughals, physically and morally tired of these fruitless pursuits, consoled themselves by depicting the disappearance of the Marathas, albeit with the plunder, as their own victory.

#### **MARATHA RAID TOWARDS BIJAPUR (c. FEBRUARY-MARCH 1676)**

Sometime before 13<sup>th</sup> March 1676, a detachment of the Maratha army under Bakaji Farzand plundered Athani, 55 km west by south of Bijapur. On 11<sup>th</sup> January 1676 the English factors at Rajapur had reported to the Surat Council that Shivaji was assembling his army below Panhala.<sup>3025</sup> In their next letter, dated 13<sup>th</sup> March 1676, they wrote: "Shivaji Rajah is very well at Panhala,<sup>3026</sup> has robbed Athani, [and] the merchants losses is valued at 300,000 pagodas (i.e. Hons.)."<sup>3027</sup> The exact date of this raid is not known but it was evidently carried out a few weeks before 13<sup>th</sup> March. The Dagh register, too, records that Shivaji had plundered the famous commercial town of Athani, carrying away booty of 500,000 Hons.<sup>3028</sup>

The trading station of the English did not escape unscathed. According to the letter dated 1<sup>st</sup> May 1676 from Surat to Fort St. George (Chennai), their losses amounted to sixteen Hons in broadcloth and other goods.<sup>3029</sup> The English made a complaint to Shivaji, who, according to the English letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> January 1677 from Surat to Mumbai, expressed regret for the trouble caused and agreed to pay full compensation.<sup>3030</sup> But a letter from Surat to Rajapur dated 5<sup>th</sup> April 1678, shows that they had received nothing till then.<sup>3031</sup> In this letter, reference has been made to what was plundered from them at Athani and Songaon.

There are two interesting Marathi documents which throw some light on the modus operandi of the Marathas in their plundering raids. The first is a letter of assurance, dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1676, given by Dattajipant Vaknis to some merchants of Athani who were taken prisoners by the Marathas. In substance, it is as follows: "The cavalry went to Athani, captured you and kept you at Panhala. You agreed to pay a ransom of 7000 Hons.

Pay it within two months and carry on your business happily.”<sup>3032</sup>

The second document is a promissory note dated 17<sup>th</sup> March 1676, given by 14 merchants of Athani to their creditor, from whom they had borrowed the amount required for their release. The gist is as follows: “Bakaji Farzand’s raid came to Athani. At that time we were carried off and were subjected to a ransom of 7000 Hons. We made you our creditor and you got us released. We shall give your money at any place you demand within one month.”<sup>3033</sup>

Only three days had passed between these two documents and therefore it appears that these merchants had borrowed the amount from someone residing nearby, perhaps in Shivaji’s dominion, with whom they had been doing frequent business.

#### MUGHAL INTERVENTION IN THE ADILSHAHI CIVIL WAR

##### *Bahlul Khan’s Victory over the Deccani Party*

Bahadur Khan learnt of the execution of Khawas Khan after his return to Pedgaon from the fruitless pursuit of the Marathas. He informed the matter to the Emperor and awaited his orders.<sup>3034</sup>

In the meantime, the leaders of the Deccani party like Shaikh Minhaj, Siddi Masud, and Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan had assembled with their forces at Adoni, about 215 kilometers southeast of Bijapur. Bahlul Khan marched thither and routed them on 21<sup>st</sup> March 1676, whereupon they fled to the Qutbshahi territory and appealed to Bahadur Khan for help.<sup>3035</sup>

##### *Bahlul Khan’s Victory over Bahadur Khan*

By this time, Bahadur Khan had received the Emperor's orders to launch an expedition against Bijapur.<sup>3036</sup> But he lacked adequate forces to undertake this operation and to simultaneously defend his province against Maratha raids. Nor could he hope for large scale reinforcement as the resources of the Empire were required on its sensitive northwest frontier. Despite these difficulties, he prepared for the invasion of Bijapur in accordance with the Emperor's orders. While doing so, he must have left a part of his forces on the Maratha frontier.

After completing his preparations, Bahadur Khan crossed the Bhima south of Solapur and marched on the Adilshahi capital. He was also joined on the way by the Deccani nobles who had fled to Qutbshahi territory. Meanwhile, Bahlul Khan had arrived at Indi, 45 km northeast of Bijapur. Bahadur Khan marched upon him, was defeated near Indi on June 1<sup>st</sup> 1676 and fell back north of the Bhima.<sup>3037</sup> Here he was joined by Dilir Khan whom the Emperor had sent to reinforce him.<sup>3038</sup>

Bahadur Khan then laid siege to the nearby fort of Naldurg, 45 km east-northeast of Solapur. The Bhima was in spate as it was the rainy season, which Bahadur Khan could have thought would prevent Adilshahi forces from coming to the relief of the fort. But they succeeded in crossing the river in strength and approached Naldurg, whereupon Bahadur Khan raised the siege and turned back to face them. After an indecisive encounter, the Pathans retreated south of the Bhima. Bahadur Khan followed them up to Halasangi and stayed there for some time.<sup>3039</sup>

#### COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE JAWHAR AND RAMNAGAR DISTRICTS

The conquest of Jawhar and Ramnagar has already been narrated in the last chapter. However, these two principalities had not been completely subdued. The Rajas of Jawhar and Ramnagar had taken refuge in Mughal and Portuguese

territories respectively and continued from there a guerrilla war against Shivaji's forces.<sup>3040</sup>

From around April 1676, the Maratha forces were being assembled at Kalyan so as to march into these turbulent districts and stamp out the flames of guerrilla resistance. An English letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> April 1676 from Bombay informed Surat of the arrival of 10,000 Maratha cavalry at Kalyan.<sup>3041</sup>

The letters of the English factors at Surat throw some light on the counter-guerrilla operations that were then carried out by Maratha forces under command of Moropant. On 25<sup>th</sup> May 1676 they wrote to Fort St. George (Chennai):

“We have lately been twice alarmed by Shivaji’s forces and the town [Surat] continues yet jealous of his approach, in regard that a body of his [i.e. Shivaji’s] men keep hovering about Ramnagar, the Rajah of which place he has beaten, and made his excursions into the koli’s [i.e. Jawhar’s] country, settled a party of men and fortified Pindval, a strong hill in the said country, which place is not a day’s march from Surat.”<sup>3042</sup>

They informed Mumbai on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1676 that “Moro Pundit ...having beaten the Rajah of Ramnagar out of his country and taken Pindval and Painech<sup>3043</sup> is now within 3 days journey from us.”<sup>3044</sup>

As usual, the presence of the Maratha army in its vicinity threw Surat into consternation.<sup>3045</sup> But, after having stationed strong garrisons in the districts of Jawhar and Ramnagar, the Maratha army went back to encamp for the rainy season.<sup>3046</sup>

The news of their return is first given in an English letter dated 1<sup>st</sup> June 1676 from Surat.<sup>3047</sup>

It would be of interest to note that Shivaji had a resident agent at Surat since before 28<sup>th</sup> April 1676. An English letter from Mumbai of that date informs Surat that “The bearer of this, is one Sundarji Prabhu, a person that is sent to Surat by Moro Pandit to succeed Keso Ram, Shivaji’s *Vakeel* [agent, ambassador] there, who for the neglect of his duty is turned out.”<sup>3048</sup>

About two or three months must have passed between the appointment of Keso Ram as the Maratha ambassador at Surat and Moropant’s decision, after having been informed of his neglect of duties, to replace him by Sundarji Prabhu. Therefore it appears that Keso Ram must have been appointed to that post not later than January-February 1676. Does this suggest the conclusion of a Mughal-Maratha treaty before that date? It may not be the case. Had it been so, the English factors would have certainly mentioned it. The first mention of such a treaty is found on 5<sup>th</sup> December 1676 in their correspondence. Hence the date of the treaty cannot be placed much before that date unless we have some positive evidence to do so.

The English Council at Surat wrote on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1676 to their colleagues at Mumbai:

“Sundarji Prabhu is arrived but we have not thought good to show him any outward countenance nor receive his visit as yet till we hear how he is received by the Governor of the town, for we think, it is not good to give him any occasions of jealousy.”<sup>3049</sup>

And on 9<sup>th</sup> June 1676 they wrote:

“This day and at the same time that Siddi Qasim came to take his leave of the President, Sundarji Prabhu, Shivaji's Envoy, came to visit the President and deliver Moro Pundit's letter which was full of kindness, but as to the affairs which Sundarji treats about, we judge it most prudent to keep ourselves as unconcerned as wee can.”<sup>3050</sup>

Again on 4<sup>th</sup> July 1676:

“Sundarji Prabhu finds but a cold reception here, which makes him threaten hard and foretell the miseries of plunder and desolation to this city.”<sup>3051</sup>

#### NETOJI'S RETURN TO HINDUISM

It has been related earlier how Netozi was compelled to embrace Islam and was renamed Muhammad Quli Khan. He was given the rank of 3000 *dhat*/2000 *sawar* and was posted on the northwest frontier where he served for about eight years. According to Manucci, he made one unsuccessful attempt to escape.<sup>3052</sup> His opportunity came in 1676 when he was sent to the Deccan. This time he succeeded in the attempt and came to Shivaji. He was taken back into the Hindu fold on 19<sup>th</sup> June 1676 after performing the prescribed rites of atonement.<sup>3053</sup> In their letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> July 1676 the English factors at Rajapur wrote to Surat “Shivaji has lately returned to him a subtle fellow by name Netozi, who has been 10 years in the Mughal's court, turned Moorman [Muslim], but now remade a Hindu.”<sup>3054</sup>

#### SHIVAJI, THE SIDDI AND THE ENGLISH (JUNE 1676 TO JULY 1678)

In 1676, Siddi Qasim was appointed as “Governor of Danda Rajpuri and Captain General of the King's [Mughal Emperor's] Armada against Shivaji” in place of Siddi Sambul.<sup>3055</sup> The Mughal governor of Surat, Ghiyas-ud Din Khan, importuned

with the Surat Council to allow the Siddi to winter at Mumbai during the rainy season and, in view of their trading interests in the Mughal Empire, the Council decided to gratify him and wrote to that effect to their colleagues in Mumbai.<sup>3056</sup> The Siddi arrived at Mumbai with his fleet on 26<sup>th</sup> June 1676 and, with the permission of the Mumbai Council, anchored at Mazgaon.<sup>3057</sup>

Moropant Peshwa laid siege to Danda Rajpuri at the height of the rainy season of that year,. In their letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> August 1676, the Mumbai Council reported to Surat:

“Moro Pundit is come against Danda Rajpuri with 10,000 men and has promised not to see Shivaji’s face till he has taken it; he makes great preparations to assault, having cut down all the timber round about, intending to make certain great barricades upon boats, under cover of which to storm it. Siddi Qasim intends speedily thither with 4 or 500 men with him for its defence.”<sup>3058</sup>

But Danda Rajpuri remained as defiant as ever and this attempt fared no better than the previous ones. And then, in November 1676, the Siddi attacked and burnt Jaitapur.<sup>3059</sup>

Siddi Sambul again arrived at Mumbai in March 1677. The Mumbai Council was not willing to allow him to stay there. But he deluded them by day-to-day promises to leave till the season was so advanced that he was unable to stir. In their dispatch dated 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1677, the Mumbai Council reported all this to their colleagues at Surat.<sup>3060</sup> Before it reached Surat, the Surat Council had received a letter from the Siddi entreating them to let him winter at Mumbai with his fleet. Whereupon the Council, in their letter of 30<sup>th</sup> April 1677 blamed their colleagues at Mumbai for allowing him to stay there so long and ordered them to ask the Siddi to leave immediately and, if he

persisted in staying there, to prohibit the inhabitants of the Island, by a public proclamation, to sell any provisions to the Siddi's people.<sup>3061</sup> But this stern stand came to nought at the 'request' of the governor of Surat, and the Surat Council agreed to allow the Siddi to winter at Mumbai under certain restrictions on the movements of his people on the Island.<sup>3062</sup>

It was not long before the Siddi abetted the kidnapping of four Brahmins, who were principal men of the place, from Shivaji's territory, though he or his men did not participate in the act. The deed was done by inhabitants of the Island and the captives were then kept hidden in the Siddi's ships. Soon afterwards, the *subadar* of Chaul complained to the Mumbai Council for having suffered to be done this "unneighbourly abuse" by the inhabitants of the Island, demanded release of the prisoners, and, failing which, threatened to stop the supply of provisions and firewood from the mainland. The Mumbai Council immediately took up the matter with the Siddi and, though he pleaded ignorance, got all the captives freed. The eleven kidnappers, all inhabitants of the Island, were condemned to be hanged, but only three of them were executed and the other eight were sent to St. Helena as the Company's slaves.<sup>3063</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the command of the Mughal fleet had been assigned to Siddi Qasim, but Siddi Sambul was procrastinating in handing over charge to him. Impatient at this, Siddi Qasim, early in October 1677, marched with his men to Mazgaon where Siddi Sambul was staying. Having learnt this, the Mumbai Council at once sent Captain Keigwin with some horsemen to keep the peace. But before he arrived, the Siddis had already started fighting. Keigwin parted them with difficulty. In the process three horses of the Company received bullet wounds and one of them died; none of the horsemen were hurt. Some eight or ten men of the trouble makers were killed. After this the Deputy Governor, John Petit, summoned

Siddi Qasim and expostulated with him for the affront he had put on the Mumbai Government. Except the Siddi himself and two or three others, all his men were disarmed and were ordered to leave the island within four or five days; Siddi Sambul, too, was given a similar order.<sup>3064</sup> The fleet appears to have left Mumbai under Siddi Qasim at the beginning of November 1677.<sup>3065</sup> Shivaji's coastline does not seem to have suffered from the Siddi's depredations that year, evidently because of their internecine quarrels, for there is no mention of such attacks in available records.

Siddi Qasim came with the fleet to Mumbai in March 1678, and because of the pressure brought to bear upon them by the governor of Surat, the Surat Council instructed their colleagues at Mumbai to allow the Siddi to winter there with his fleet during the rainy season.<sup>3066</sup> Shivaji was naturally indignant at this and the Mumbai Council had to keep a strict watch at Mazgaon to protect the ships of the Company as well as those of the Siddi from the probable attack by the Maratha King.<sup>3067</sup> The following minutes of the meeting of the Mumbai Council held on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1678 show how seriously they regarded the threat:<sup>3068</sup>

“Having received certain information of Shivaji Rajah’s preparations and intention to send a strong party of soldiers under the command of Daulat Khan to attempt the burning and destroying the Siddi’s fleet that is haled on shore at Mazgaon. Which intelligence being confirmed unto us by several hands, both from Narayan Shenavi, who was sent by the Deputy Governor to reside at Chaul to advise of the Rajah’s actions and motion, as also by the spies Siddi Qasim sent on the same account. Which being taken into consideration, it was not thought consistent with prudence that we should esteem ourselves so secure

as not to make any further preparations, but more consistent with our honour and security to be vigilant and not suffer those whom we have taken under our protection to be destroyed. In order whereunto it was thought expedient that all the out guards, being now but weak, should be reinforced with infantry under the command of commission officers.

\* \* \*

“That the remaining part of the garrison be divided into two companies and to mount the guard [at the fort] every other day [by turn].

“That the commanders of the English ships that are haled on shore at Mazgaon be ordered to get all their guns placed with cannon baskets where they may best secure the fleet and annoy the enemy if they attempt to land at that place, and that Siddi Qasim be ordered to hale of his vessels that are on shore as soon as possible.”

In accordance with this resolution Captain Adderton was given a written order on 20<sup>th</sup> July to take eight files of soldiers [i.e. 48 men] with him and join those who were already at Mazgaon, keep a strict watch and, if any boats appeared, not to allow any person from them to land there. Similar orders were given to Captain Richard Keigwin, Ensign Daniel and Lieutenant Thorpe.<sup>3069</sup> The troop of horse under command of Captain Richard Keigwin was dispatched to Mahim with orders to send scouts daily to Sion and Mochumbo [Matunga?] so that in case of the enemy's approach he could rush there to impede their landing. Two *manchuas*<sup>3070</sup> with guns in their prows and manned by soldiers were ordered to patrol between Mahim and Mazgaon. The Mumbai Council reported all these security measures to Surat in their letter of 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1678 and remarked:<sup>3071</sup>

“The impending storm that seem to threaten us proceeding not out of any disgust that Shivaji Rajah has taken against any of our proceedings nor the nation in general but against the Siddi, who this year has much provoked him by making slaves of the people and Brahmins he took in his [Shivaji's] incursions into his territories, we thought good to send the *Coffery*<sup>3072</sup> word that he haul his fleet off and ride in the Bay, which would certainly divert the designs of the Rajah, and be a security to the Siddi and the King's fleet for they are not able to deal with him at sea....He is now resolved to float the fleet, which we hope may prevent our coming to blows with Shivaji's army, which would certainly cause a breach of peace, and then this Island would be in a miserable condition for want of all sorts of provisions.

“Thus you see what we formerly conjectured is come to pass, and what troubles and charges we are like to be brought in for assisting and harbouring this fleet, which does the King [Emperor Aurangzeb] neither service nor honour. These things duly represented to the governor of Surat or Grandees by men that are able to discourse it without fear and pusillanimity (and not Baniyas...) we doubt not but would prevail with him to order their fleet yearly to Surat, and not involve the nation in a war to protect a parcel of thieves, for the Siddi is no better. And this we leave to your performance, which, if not effected, be assured sooner or later we shall find the dire effects of war and famine.”

Soon afterwards, the Mumbai Council received a report that Daulat Khan had gone with his army to Kalyan-Bhiwandi, had asked for a passage through Portuguese territory, that the Portuguese had denied it posting watches, at Thana and other places, and 40 armed *manchuas* in the rivers.<sup>3073</sup> At last in July


1678 the Siddi launched his ships into the water and kept them anchored near the fort of Mumbai.[3074](#)

As the Siddi was thus being harboured at Mumbai, relations between Shivaji and the English continued deteriorating and culminated in the Khanderi Campaign as we shall see in a later chapter.

## SHIVAJI'S KINGDOM

SEPTEMBER 1676

  600 meters & above.



#### THE MUGHAL-MARATHA TREATY

His defeat at Indi and failure at Naldurg must have emphasized upon Bahadur Khan's mind the need to make peace with Shivaji so as to withdraw his forces from the Maratha frontier and concentrate his strength against Bijapur. And, at this juncture, came Niraji Raoji, the Maratha Chief Justice, as an envoy with an offer of peace.<sup>3075</sup> The date of the treaty that was then concluded is not known. Its first mention is found in an English letter from Mumbai to Surat, dated 5<sup>th</sup> December 1676. It runs:<sup>3076</sup>

"It is not only reported from all hands, but we have now received letters from the *Subadar* of Chaul that there is a peace concluded on between the Mughal and Shivaji, in which the Siddi is excluded, and the King [i.e. the Mughal Emperor] not to help or assist him....

"Narayan Shenavi is gone with Moro Pandit to Chaul...

"Narayan Shenavi informs us that Shivaji is to pay the Mughal 400,000 Pagodas yearly, to assist him with 5,000 horses and that the said Moro Pandit send to Rairi [Raigad] for 4 lack of Pagodas to send away immediately for the first year's payment: and that the 5,000 horse are gone under the command of Niraji pundit."

As usual, conflicting rumours continued to be circulated hereafter. On 20<sup>th</sup> December 1676, the Bombay factors wrote to Surat that "The peace between the Mughal and Shivaji, we hear, is broken again; some say because he refused to send his son Sambhaji Rajah as hostage; others say it was only a peace of Bahadur Khans making with [which] the Mughal would not

stand to.”<sup>3077</sup> But on 19<sup>th</sup> March 1677 the Bombay factors again wrote to Surat:

“We have some credible reports that there is a peace concluded between Shivaji and the Mughal, though dare not absolutely affirm it, though some of our servants that are now come from up the hill say that there is free egress and regress out of Shivaji’s unto the Mughals dominions, without the least manner of hostility.”<sup>3078</sup>

The fact that Shivaji set out on the Karnataka expedition with a large army on 6<sup>th</sup> October 1676 suggests that the Mughal-Maratha treaty was concluded sometime before that date and the news contained in the Bombay letter of 5<sup>th</sup> December of its conclusion was correct. Thus, the date of the treaty may be placed sometime around September 1676.

As for the terms of the treaty, the information contained in the Bombay letter of 5<sup>th</sup> December 1676 appears fairly correct. That a Maratha contingent was sent to serve with the Mughal army of the Deccan is corroborated by Bhimsen who records that “Bahadur Khan came to friendly terms with Shivaji who dispatched 4,000 horsemen for the help of the Mughals.”<sup>3079</sup> The war with the Siddi also continued unabated even after the conclusion of the treaty.

According to Sabhasad, some presents and gem-studded ornaments were sent to Bahadur Khan.<sup>3080</sup> He does not specifically say that this was a bribe. Part of the money might have been sent as a tribute to the Mughal Emperor. But there is an implied meaning that this was but a bribe to please Bahadur Khan. An English letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> January 1678 from Mumbai also says that Bahadur Khan was corrupted by Shivaji.<sup>3081</sup> However, Bahadur Khan’s decision to make peace

with Shivaji could not have been influenced entirely by bribe. The Emperor had ordered him to invade the Adilshahi Sultanate. How could he do so without first securing his western frontier? He could, therefore, justify his decision to make peace with Shivaji. The costly presents which Bahadur Khan received from Shivaji could not by themselves have produced the Mughal-Maratha peace. But they could have certainly eased the process.

## *Chapter 16*

# The Karnataka Campaign

### **SHIVAJI'S MOTIVES FOR HIS KARNATAKA EXPEDITION<sup>3082</sup>**

Peace between the Mughals and the Marathas, which was concluded around September 1676, would have enabled Bahadur Khan to withdraw garrisons that were stationed on his western frontier for defence against Maratha depredations and thus assemble a formidable army for the war against Bijapur. This is borne out by Bhimsen, who writes: "Bahadur Khan came to friendly terms with Shivaji who dispatched four thousand horsemen for the help of the Mughals. The Khan collected many royal servants mainly from the category of *faujdars*. And thus the Mughals formed such a formidable army that a single puff from them could have finished the existence of Bijapur."<sup>3083</sup> *Faujdars* were Mughal officers in command of district garrisons.

Once this direct Mughal threat, magnified by the Mughal-Maratha peace, occupied the attention of the Adilshahi army, Shivaji was free to put into execution his plan to carry his army to the east coast and conquer the province of Adilshahi Karnataka.

The motives behind this remarkable choice were probably as follows:

Karnataka was long famous for its riches. The revenue from its fertile soil was further augmented by sea ports on the eastern seaboard.<sup>3084</sup> Bijapur had increased immensely in power through acquisition of this region. Particularly since its loss of territory to the Mughals and Shivaji, it was the wealth from the Karnataka which supplied the sinews of war to, and formed the economic foundations of, the Adilshahi army. Its conquest therefore would cut the source of supply not merely of the

opposing army but of the opposing state as a whole. Further, since Shivaji had occupied its western seaboard, the Adilshahi Sultanate could receive its vital supply of horses only through the ports on the Coromandel Coast. Horses suited for military purposes were not bred in India. Each year, the Mughal Empire imported thousands of Central Asian horses across its land frontier.<sup>3085</sup> For their supply of horses, the Deccan Sultanates were solely dependent upon the sea-route. For them, thus, it was practically a matter of life and death. By occupying the Coromandel Coast, Shivaji could not only have deprived the Adilshahi Sultanate of this vital supply and thus seriously weakened its fighting power, but also gained it for himself. The conquest of Karnataka would thus be an indirect approach to the enemy's economic and strategic rear.

Dr. Fryer, the English traveller, had fully understood the importance of Karnataka to the Adilshahi Sultanate when he wrote: "He (Shivaji) has blocked up their (western) ports, which may prejudice them for the future; an irreparable damage (Arab steeds being the life of their cavalry); they having only Porto Novo beyond Tuticorin left them free."<sup>3086</sup>

Secondly, a direct threat to or approach towards Bijapur would have invited a strong reaction. An attack by a Hindu enemy on the heart of the Sultanate might have united all the contending Adilshahi factions in a common cause and would have also roused the envy and suspicion of Shivaji's Mughal ally. On the other hand, an attack on the distant province of Karnataka would not have attracted serious attention for some time, particularly when the Adilshahi army would be facing a closer and more direct threat from the Mughals, enhanced by the peace Shivaji had made with them.

Thirdly, the Adilshahi Karnataka was ill-defended. The Adilshahi Sultanate had conquered that province at the beginning of Shivaji's career. In fact, it was its preoccupation in

that theatre which had facilitated Shivaji's rise. Thereafter, the Adilshahi army was involved more and more in the north and west in its war against Shivaji and the Mughals. Consequently, the defence of Karnataka was neglected. And now Shivaji was the chosen man of destiny to conquer the very province the annexation of which by the Adilshahi Sultanate had facilitated his rise some twenty years ago.

The one drawback in the plan was the distance that would have separated the new acquisitions from his dominions on the west coast. But, as we shall see, he definitely intended to join the two parts by annexing the intervening territory as soon as possible. In fact, its exposure to attacks from both sides would only aid in its conquest. And Shivaji did have that remarkable ability to turn into an asset what would seem a liability to a lesser man.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acquaint the reader with the political situation in the Adilshahi Karnataka.

The coastal plains of the province were divided into two administrative districts. The northern district up to Pondicherry was governed from Gingee by Nasir Muhammad, a brother of Khawas Khan, and the southern, from Valikandapuram by Sher Khan, a Pathan noble and confidant of Bahlul Khan. Further to the west, the uplands, with their headquarters at Bangalore, constituted the *jagir* of Ekoji which he had inherited from his father, Shahji.

Sher Khan had invaded the northern district after the civil war broke out and, by the end of September 1676, had shut up Nasir Muhammad in the fort of Gingee.<sup>3087</sup> Martin, the French Chief of Pondicherry, records in his diary of May 1677:

“The Duke of Gingee [i.e. Nasir Mohammad] perceived well that he could not resist Sher Khan and that the latter would sooner or later make himself master of this capital [i.e. Gingee], urged all the more

by the hatred that always existed between the Pathans and the Deccanis, he [the Duke] resolved to negotiate with the King of Golconda for handing over to him Gingee and other territories he had. For this he dispatched some envoys who communicated with the [Qutbshahi] minister Madanna about this affair.”<sup>3088</sup>

English factors of Fort St. George (Chennai) too, on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1676, informed Mumbai :

“Gingee, it is said, treats with this King [i.e. the Qutbshah], but we hardly think him in a condition to undertake it, being wholly intent upon fleecing his country, as well soldiery as common people, and that spoils all.”<sup>3089</sup>

While this internecine war was being fought, Ekoji was presented with an opportunity to carve out an independent principality for himself. Chokkanatha, the Nayak of Madurai, invaded the principality of Tanjore in 1673. In the ensuing war, Vijay Raghava, the Nayak of Tanjore, perished with his entire family. Chokkanatha appointed his foster brother Alagiri as the governor of Tanjore. Soon afterwards, however, Alagiri broke off from his master and assumed independence. In the meantime, some officers of the old dynasty found a boy from the house of Vijay Raghava who was saved from the carnage and sought the help of the Adilshah to establish him on the throne of Tanjore. The Adilshah ordered Ekoji to restore the throne of Tanjore to the old dynasty. Alagiri, who had already lost the protection of Chokkanatha, was defeated and fled to the Kingdom of Mysore. Ekoji then established the boy on the throne of Tanjore and went back. But the boy king soon displeased the officers to whom he owed his throne. On their invitation, Ekoji again invaded the principality in early 1675 and put the boy to flight. For some time thereafter he might have held the principality in the name of Adilshah but, when the Sultanate was embroiled in

civil war, he seized the opportunity to assume an independent status with his seat at Tanjore.<sup>3090</sup>

#### GENESIS OF THE KARNATAKA CAMPAIGN

Shivaji was well informed about the political situation in the Karnataka under Adilshahi rule and expected his step-brother to play a more prominent role there, similar and complementary to the one he himself was playing on the west coast. In fact, he had already set afoot the necessary arrangements for carrying his own army to the Coromandel Coast. In a letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> December 1675 from Surat, "Baron tells De La Haye<sup>3091</sup> that he met Anajipant, one of the principal ministers of Shivaji, near Rajapur and, while discussing the conquest of the Karnataka, Anaji frankly admitted to Baron that if the Mughal Emperor continued his war on the side of Lahore and if the Pathans kept him engaged, Shivaji would carry his army to that [i.e. the east] coast; and to minimize the difficulties of the enterprise he had already sent an embassy to the court of Golconda to explain his plans to the King [i.e. the Qutbshah] and obtain some money from him."<sup>3092</sup>

Sometime during this period, Shivaji acquired in the person of Raghunathpant Hanmante a most valuable source of local knowledge of the Karnataka. The exact date of Raghunathpant's arrival at Shivaji's court is not known. But a Marathi document dated 1<sup>st</sup> February 1676, recording a judgment given in a civil suit and bearing the seals of Shivaji himself and his ministers, contains the name of Raghunathpant immediately after those of Shivaji and his son-in-law Harji Mahadik.<sup>3093</sup> Therefore, Raghunathpant must have joined service under Shivaji sometime before this date.

Raghunath and Janardan were sons of Naro Dikshit, one of Shahji's trusted officers, and became principal officers and

advisers to Ekoji after Shahji's death. Sabhasad says they left him on account of their differences (possibly regarding his easygoing disposition) and came to Shivaji.<sup>3094</sup> The Chitnis Chronicle states that Raghunath was dissatisfied with Ekoji's indolence and lack of enterprise.<sup>3095</sup> But Ekoji was certainly not as indolent as Chitnis makes him out to be. André Freire, a Jesuit missionary, writes: "Thus becoming absolute master of the Kingdom [of Tanjore], he seeks to make himself loved by the inhabitants, and has already succeeded in it. The justice and wisdom of his government begin to heal the wounds of the preceding reign and develop the natural resources of this country, one of the most remarkable in all India by the fertility of its lands and the wealth of its productions. By repairing the canals and tanks, he has fertilised extensive fields, uncultivated for many years, and the last harvest has surpassed all that one has ever seen."<sup>3096</sup>

But if Ekoji was a good administrator he certainly did not come up to the expectations of Raghunathpant, if that minister wanted his master to emulate his illustrious brother. So Raghunathpant could have been attracted by Shivaji's aim and fame, as well as a perceived hope of better prospects there for his own career and advancement. It is difficult to say anything with certainty about Raghunathpant's role in the formulation of the Karnataka plan. The A. K. Chronicle and the Chitnis Chronicle state that the idea of the conquest of Karnataka was suggested to Shivaji by Raghunath.<sup>3097</sup> But as chroniclers, who depict him as the father of that plan, often give free rein to their fancy, it is best not to rely on them till their story is substantiated by more dependable sources. However, that Shivaji held him in very high esteem is proved beyond doubt by the document, mentioned above, which bears the name of Raghunathpant along with those of Shivaji and his ministers. As we shall see, Shivaji also handsomely rewarded him for his

services after the expected success of the campaign was achieved.

Shivaji was faced by two obstacles in the successful execution of his design. First, the direct one, viz., the opposition of the Adilshahi army; the second, the indirect one, viz., the threat from the Mughal army to his own dominions on the west coast. With his diplomatic masterstroke he had removed both these obstacles without any cost in manpower to himself. What was now required to be done was to take a sizeable army to the Adilshahi Karnataka and occupy that defenceless province. But he needed a siege train to reduce the formidable fortresses of Gingee and Vellore, for which he counted upon his new ally — the Qutbshah of Golconda.

#### MARCH TO HYDERABAD<sup>3098</sup>

##### *Date of Shivaji's Departure from Raigad*

A Marathi document dated 1<sup>st</sup> June 1747 says Shivaji set out on the Karnataka expedition on the day of Dasara.<sup>3099</sup> This is a Hindu festival which follows the harvesting season and, in the days of yore, Hindu armies usually set out on campaigns on that day. It is probable therefore that Shivaji himself might have left Raigad on the day of Dasara which in 1676 coincided with 6<sup>th</sup> October.

Here a word of explanation is necessary for the reader unfamiliar with military history. It is not possible for a great army to march in a single body when it sets out on an expedition due to supply problems. It marches in different divisions, with a suitable distance between them, till they reach within striking distance of the objective.

It appears that some units of Shivaji's army had already started leaving before 6<sup>th</sup> October 1676. An English letter dated

2<sup>nd</sup> October 1676 from Bombay reads: "Just as Mr. Mauleverer was coming away, he [Shivaji] took his journey with a great army towards the Canara country, intending as was given out, to take Basrur and Honavar and the rest of that country lying upon the sea."<sup>3100</sup> Mauleverer had left Bombay on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1676 and returned sometime between 26<sup>th</sup> September and 2<sup>nd</sup> October.<sup>3101</sup> As the journey from Bombay to Raigad took about four days, he might have left Raigad sometime between 23<sup>rd</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>3102</sup>

While Mauleverer was about to leave Raigad, a great army might have been assembled there and some of its units might have already started leaving. Shivaji himself might have left the fort on 6<sup>th</sup> October 1676.

But, while this army was leaving Raigad, some Maratha forces were already operating in the Belgaum district. The Mumbai letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> October 1676 reads: "Shivaji is not gone down the coast, but gone up the hill [i.e. into the uplands], and has besieged two castles in Balaghat [the uplands], one called Belgaum near Bankapur the other called Vayem Rayim<sup>3103</sup> about 5 days journey on this side of it."<sup>3104</sup>

In those days, particularly in European correspondence, any Maratha force was often referred to as being led by Shivaji himself. If Shivaji himself had left Raigad on 6<sup>th</sup> October, or even a little before that, it is inconceivable that he could have besieged Belgaum, leave alone the matter of the English having received that news at Bombay, on the same day. So when they say Shivaji had besieged Belgaum, it merely means that a Maratha force had invested that fort.

The picture now becomes much clearer. A great Maratha army was assembled near Raigad and some of its units had already started leaving by the last week of September 1676.

Shivaji himself left the fort on 6<sup>th</sup> October 1676. While this army was leaving Raigad, another Maratha force was operating in the Belgaum district.

### *Shivaji's Route to Hyderabad*

The Marathi document cited above mentions that Shivaji set out on the Karnataka expedition on the day of Dasara and halted at Poladpur. A Marathi record of administrations over the Wai Pargana records that Shivaji captured the stronghold of Wai on 16<sup>th</sup> October 1676. It was no more than a small fortified enclosure and would have been captured in a day, either by Shivaji himself or by an advance guard of his army.<sup>3105</sup> Another Marathi document dated the month of Shawwal, Shuhur year 1120 (5<sup>th</sup> August to 3<sup>rd</sup> September, 1719) says that, while on his way for the Gingee expedition, Shivaji had sent a force from Umbraj under command of Sakhaji Gayakawad to attack Khatav.<sup>3106</sup> Another Marathi document written sometime after 13<sup>th</sup> September 1686, states that Shivaji invaded the district of Khatav, drove out the Adilshahi troops, demolished the fort on 20<sup>th</sup> October 1676, and established his own garrison there.<sup>3107</sup> A fifth Marathi document, whose first page that might have borne the date is untraceable, tells us that during Shivaji's march on the Gingee expedition, he had halted at Nimsod-Mayani.<sup>3108</sup> Nimsod and Mayani are two villages in the modern Satara district. Nimsod is about 30 km east by north of Umbraj and Mayani is about 10 km east of Nimsod. One more link in the chain is provided by an English letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> January 1677 from Surat to Mumbai. It was written by a person who had just arrived in Surat from Rajapur. We know of a certain John Child who was the chief of the English trading station at Rajapur and who left for Surat sometime in December 1676.<sup>3109</sup> It is almost certain that this letter was written by him. It runs: "About 100 ox lading of goods coming down of ours met with Shivaji's army going against a place called Belgaum; after he understood that

they were ours he did not only order that no hindrance should be given, but ordered some of his own men to see them past Kolhapur.”<sup>3110</sup> As Child had left Rajapur in December 1676 and the letter has been written from Surat on 10<sup>th</sup> January 1676, this incident must have occurred before 31<sup>st</sup> December 1676. And, as the oxen were going down, i.e. towards Rajapur, and as Shivaji provided them with an escort up to Kolhapur, he must have been at some place a few kilometers east or south of Kolhapur.

Thus we can now fix five points on Shivaji’s route, viz., Poladpur, Wai, Umbraj, Nimsod-Mayani and a place a few kilometers east or south of Kolhapur. He had two alternative routes from Poladpur — ascend the Ambenali pass and then turn south towards Satara and Umbraj, or march south towards Khed, ascend the pass and push east towards Satara. From Satara he marched south towards Umbraj and then turned east towards Nimsod Mayani. From there he marched in the general direction of Miraj and arrived at a place a few kilometers east of Kolhapur. His route hereafter is not known, but it appears that he continued his march due south, crossed the Ghataprabha River and arrived in the Belgaum district where a Maratha force had already arrived before 6<sup>th</sup> October 1676.

The Dagh Register entry of 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1677, says: “The well-known roving robber Shivaji suddenly appeared in Golconda, from the uplands of Vengurle, in the month of March [1677]. With 12,000 cavalry and on the 14<sup>th</sup> of the month personally met the King [Qutbshah].”<sup>3111</sup> From around Belgaum, the most obvious course for the Maratha army would have been to march northeast towards Bhaganagar through the fertile tract between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra rivers. The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1598 that in the month of Pausha (25<sup>th</sup> December 1676 to 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1677), Husain Khan Miyana was taken prisoner by Hambirrao near Yalgedala in the Gadag district and that the booty included 2,000 horses and some elephants.<sup>3112</sup> We have seen that Shivaji

had reached Hyderabad by 4<sup>th</sup> March 1677 and we know that Hambirrao had accompanied Shivaji into the Karnataka.<sup>3113</sup> This implies that this battle must have been fought while Hambirrao was on his way to Hyderabad. Or, had the Maratha army been moving in two or three divisions marching abreast of each other for obtaining a larger supply area but all in the general direction of Hyderabad, Hambirrao might have been commanding its right wing division.

Thus, the Maratha army was moving over an immense arc — from Raigad to around Belgaum and thence to Hyderabad, a distance of well over 1,000 km. This was traversed in about five months, probably with frequent and long halts. Both the Mughals and the Bijapuris must have been perplexed about his object throughout this journey. When he was marching south towards Belgaum, they probably thought that, while the Mughals were attacking the Adilshahi Sultanate from the north, he would attack it from the west and try to annex districts in the uplands like Belgaum, Hubli and Bankapur. When, from around Hubli, he turned towards the northeast, they might have been expecting him to attack Bijapur from the south. But he did not do that; he continued his march and arrived at Hyderabad. Here he was well placed to attack either the Mughals or the Bijapuris *from the east* if they attempted to menace his Kingdom in the west. He had a secure base at Hyderabad and here he had allies, viz. the Qutbshahi army and the forces of the Deccani faction of the Adilshahi Sultanate. Both the Mughals and the Bijapuris must have been kept wondering what he proposed to do next. Surprise, a very important element in the art of war, is produced by either speed or secrecy, or by both. If one moves fast he can catch the enemy before the latter becomes aware of the danger. Secrecy is usually attained by concealment, taking advantage of geographic factors. But there is a subtler form of secrecy, i.e. secrecy of intent. Shivaji's march to Hyderabad was not executed with speed; in fact, it was rather slow. It was not concealed; everyone

knew where he was. Secrecy lay in his object, which kept his enemy guessing, not knowing what to defend.

### *The Strength of the Maratha Army of Karnataka*

The strength of the Maratha army which Shivaji carried to the Coromandel Coast is variously given in contemporaneous sources. In the minutes of the meeting of the English council at Fort St. George (Chennai) held on 9<sup>th</sup> May 1677, it is estimated at 20,000 horse and 40,000 foot.<sup>3114</sup> In a letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1677 from Fort St. George, it is given as 16 to 20 thousand horse and several thousand foot.<sup>3115</sup> The Dagh Register entry dated 26<sup>th</sup> July 1677 records a report that Shivaji's army that advanced on Gingee comprised 15,000 foot and 16,000 horse.<sup>3116</sup> According to Sabhasad, the strength of the Maratha army which went to the Karnataka was 25,000 select cavalry.<sup>3117</sup> He seems to have forgotten to give the strength of the infantry. An unknown Dutchman, who was at Hyderabad when Shivaji arrived there, states that Shivaji was encamped near the town with 12,000 foot and 24,000 horse.<sup>3118</sup> But his account was written after 1686, or more than ten years after the event, and his estimate about the strength of the army might not have been very accurate. Moreover, he could have underestimated the strength of the infantry because a part of it might not have reached Hyderabad till the time he was there. Of these various estimates, the most reliable is that of Fort St. George because it was made at a time when the Maratha army was passing within a few kilometers of that fort. Anyway, broadly speaking, these various estimates do not differ much from each other, except the very low figure for the strength of the infantry given in the Dagh Register and the account of the unknown Dutchman. So we would not be far off the mark if we accept the fort St. George estimate, viz., about 20,000 horse and 40,000 foot.

### *March through Qutbshahi Territory*

Sabhasad tells us that on entering Qutbshahi territory, strict orders were issued to the army that the inhabitants were not to be molested, and provisions purchased from them peacefully and with their consent. A few miscreants, he tells us, were beheaded, which ensured perfect discipline.<sup>3119</sup>

The arrival of the Maratha army at the gates of Hyderabad threw the city into consternation. Our unknown Dutchman, who was staying in the capital at this time, writes: <sup>3120</sup>

“I had the honour several times of speaking with the great ruler who governs Golconda, for instance, in 1676 when the notable brigand, Shivaji, with 12,000 foot and 24,000 horse, was encamped three leagues from the town, threatening to reduce it to ashes if the King [i.e. the Qutbshah] refused to grant him a large sum of money. This threat caused general consternation. We trembled for our own safety and for our [i.e. Dutch East India Company’s] factory lest the precious goods it contained should become the prey of this redoubtable brigand. To avoid such a catastrophe Jan Van Nyendaal, acting for Heer Hartsink, went to the rebel’s camp to conciliate him, and offered (as formerly did Abigail to King David) a present of almonds, dates, grapes and pistachio nuts, the whole worth about 1000 florins. He received the gift very graciously in his tent which had been erected for the occasion. The messengers were refreshed with coffee,<sup>3121</sup> garlanded with flowers, presented with robes of honour and granted safe conduct guaranteeing their persons and the effects of the Company against the danger which threatened them.

“These savages intended to attack the palace of the King as well as that of his principal nobles


knowing that great treasures were there concealed. The whole town in consequence was in a state of alarm and confusion. However, the Governor Madanna realised that the only means of closing the mouths of these infuriated dogs of war was to shower money on them. Every day was poured out to them 1000 to 2000 ducats and finally Shivaji retired in a litter, embellished on every side with sheets of massive gold accompanied by 8 outriders and 30 chaise-bearers.”

But it was certainly not the intention of the Marathas to plunder the Qutbshahi capital as the citizens feared. In fact, their good behaviour had pleased the Qutbshah greatly and, according to Sabhasad, he wanted to come forward to some distance to receive Shivaji. But the Maratha King sent a courteous message: “You should not come. You are [my] elder brother, I am [your] younger brother. You should not come forward [to receive me].” Then, says the chronicler, Madanna, the prime minister of the Qutbshahi Sultanate, and his brother Akkanna, came forward to receive and conduct him into the city.<sup>3122</sup>

The rustic Maratha King had furnished his army with rich gold-embroidered accoutrements for the occasion.<sup>3123</sup> By now the fears of the citizens of Bhaganagar seemed to have been allayed. Shivaji’s exploits had won him great renown throughout India and the Marathas, according to Sabhasad, received a grand welcome from the citizens of the capital who were eager to see them and their illustrious hero.<sup>3124</sup>

# SHIVAJI'S MARCH TO GINGEE

October 1676 – May 1677



#### **SHIVAJI-QUTBSHAH TREATY**

Shivaji, as we have seen, met the Qutbshah on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1677. When he reached the palace, he sent the message: "Do not come downstairs. I am coming [to you] in person."<sup>3125</sup> The meeting has been graphically described by our unknown Dutchman. He writes:<sup>3126</sup>

"Prince Shivaji entered by one door and those who were permitted to attend the audience entered by another. This fierce destroyer [i.e. Shivaji] then having been admitted to the King's [i.e. the Qutbshah's] presence came in by a door pointed out to him and the King came in by another. Both then sat down at seats prepared for them and entered into conversation. While they were thus talking, the palace was surrounded by 6,000 [Maratha] cavalry, who approached so silently, that the buzzing of a fly could have been heard. I do not speak from hearsay, for I was an eyewitness of the affair, having seen it all from a window. It was thus that the brigand made known to the world that like a second Massaniello<sup>3127</sup> he was as much beloved as respected by his subjects."

The exact terms of the treaty between Shivaji and the Qutbshah are not known. But some of these, revealed by various contemporaneous sources, were as follows:

(i) According to Fort St. George letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1677, a contingent of the Qutbshahi army, comprising 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry under Mirza Muhammad Amin, accompanied the Maratha army to the Adilshahi Karnataka.<sup>3128</sup> This is supported by the Jedhe Chronology which states that after meeting the Qutbshah, Shivaji took with him a Qutbshahi

contingent and went to the Karnataka.<sup>3129</sup> Martin, the French Chief of Pondicherry, tells us that orders were issued from the Qutbshahi Sultanate to its officers and chieftains that Shivaji was to be given every assistance he would ask for, including troops, supplies, artillery and munitions.<sup>3130</sup> Of these, it appears, it was the artillery and munitions which Shivaji needed most.

(ii) The Qutbshah, according to the Fort St. George letter cited above, was to give Shivaji a subsidy of 3,000 Hons a day during the expedition.<sup>3131</sup> Sabhasad also says that Shivaji set out from Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) on the Karnataka expedition “with the treasures and provisions of that place.”<sup>3132</sup>

Besides these two terms, the Qutbshah, according to contemporaneous European sources, was to get all, or at least a part, of the conquered territory. But Shivaji, they say, cheated the Qutbshah and did not part with any portion of the Adilshahi Karnataka when it was conquered. An English letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1677 from Fort St. George says that the Qutbshah stopped the payment of the subsidy of 3,000 Hons a day to Shivaji because the latter usurped all the conquered territory including Gingee.<sup>3133</sup> Martin, the Chief of the French settlement at Pondicherry, writes in his journal under July 1677 that a man, whom he had sent to Madras (Chennai) to report about the goods he had sent there, informed him that “the English governor of that place had received a letter from the King of Golconda ordering him not to give any assistance to Shivaji but to be on his guard and to defy him.”<sup>3134</sup> Whether the man had heard this from the English governor himself or whether he was merely repeating rumours he picked up in Madras, we do not know. But it is hardly likely that the English governor could have told this unnamed, and most probably Indian, messenger about the letter he might have received from

the Qutbshah. And, had the English governor really received such a letter, he would have certainly mentioned it in his correspondence with the Company or his colleagues at other trading stations. That he had not done so suggests that the story of the man, whom Martin had sent to Madras, was based on rumour. Martin further says: "This prince [the Qutbshah] had since recognized that he had been cheated with respect to the promise that Shivaji made him of restoring Gingee to him. Yet the Brahmin Madanna who was the author of this expedition suffered nothing and was still at the head of affairs."<sup>3135</sup>

Nellore Ramanna, a Hindu envoy of the English who was present in Shivaji's camp, wrote a letter to Fort St. George on 16<sup>th</sup> July 1677 in which he mentions the presence in Shivaji's camp of Mirza Muhammad Amin, the commander of the Qutbshahi contingent that was accompanying the Maratha army.<sup>3136</sup>

Another letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> July 1677, which Nellore Ramanna sent to Fort St. George, proves that the story about the English governor having received a letter from the Qutbshah ordering him not to give any assistance to Shivaji but to be on his guard and to defy him, was a product of somebody's fancy. Ramanna, in his letter, informs his masters that a Qutbshahi officer, Madanna Pantalu, sent for him and asked him, as the English were merchants belonging to the Golconda territory, what business had he (Ramanna) to remain there since Shivaji had already sent the English governor a dress of honour for the presents the governor had sent him. Madanna Pantalu, Nellore Ramanna further writes, told him that he had informed Golconda of the presence of messengers of various people and had received orders that he was not to allow too many messengers to remain there.<sup>3137</sup> Nellore Ramanna seems to have tarried with the Maratha army for some time, but had to go back ultimately. In their letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1677 to the Qutbshah and his prime minister Madanna, the English

Council at Fort St. George complained that their experience of Shivaji's proceedings on the west coast had induced them to keep some of their men to watch his movements but they were compelled to come back because the Qutbshahi officer Madanna Pantalu threatened to put them in prison.<sup>3138</sup> And in their letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> September 1677 to Vir Raghavayya, who was their Hindu envoy residing at Golconda, they wrote: "We do now write both to his Highness [i.e. the Qutbshah] and Madanna [the prime minister] concerning the ill behaviour of one of the Divan's [i.e. the government's] Brahmins named Madanna Pantalu, who remains at present with Shivaji Raja."<sup>3139</sup> These letters show that till September 1677, a responsible representative of the Qutbshah was accompanying Shivaji and, what is more, was taking the necessary security precautions. Further, in his letter, written after 16<sup>th</sup> November 1677, Shivaji offered his step-brother Ekoji to put in a request on his behalf to the Qutbshah and secure for him a *jagir* worth 300,000 Hons (a year) in Qutbshahi territory.<sup>3140</sup> Even if we assume that Shivaji was not sincere in this promise, he must have been careful enough to make it seem true. He would not have made such promise unless he had been on good terms with the Qutbshah because, had there been a breach between himself and the Qutbshah, Ekoji would certainly have known about it. Thus, throughout the campaign which was to follow, and even thereafter, relations between Shivaji and the Qutbshah seem to have remained quite cordial, which would have been impossible if Shivaji had cheated the Qutbshah.

What then, it may be asked, were the Qutbshah's motives in assisting Shivaji in his Karnataka expedition?

Madanna was one of four sons of a humble Brahmin clerk named Bhanaji Pant living in a village in the Qutbshahi district of Warangal.<sup>3141</sup> Bhanaji Pant taught his sons secretarial work, accounting and the Persian, Hindustani and some other Indian languages. When grown up, Madanna came to Bhaganagar

together with his brother Akkanna to seek employment, and found a job as a clerk in the service of a Qutbshahi nobleman. By 1672 we find him serving as the personal assistant of Sayyid Muzaffar, a leading nobleman in the Qutbshahi Sultanate. His opportunity for advancement came in 1672. Abdullah Qutbshah died on 21<sup>st</sup> April that year, leaving behind him three daughters but no son. The eldest was married to Muhammad Sultan, the eldest son of Aurangzeb; the second to Mirza Nizamuddin Ahmad, an Arab nobleman, and the youngest to Abul Hasan, a distant relative of the Qutbshah.<sup>3142</sup> It would be remembered that at the time of his son's marriage to the Qutbshahi princess, Aurangzeb had exacted a promise from the Qutbshah that Muhammad Sultan would be made heir to the throne of Golconda. But Muhammad Sultan broke away from his father during the Mughal war of succession and sided with his uncle Shuja. Soon afterwards, he was induced to come back and was imprisoned at Gwalior. He was brought back to the Court in 1672 and given a *mansab* a couple of years later. He died in 1676.<sup>3143</sup> At the time of Abdullah Qutbshah's death, Aurangzeb, being too preoccupied with the sensitive northwestern frontier and the war with Shivaji, was in no position to assert his son's claim to the Golconda throne. Abdullah Qutbshah's second son-in-law, Nizamuddin Ahmad, was playing an active part in the affairs of the state but his haughty and rude demeanour had alienated him from the Qutbshahi nobility. Abul Hasan, the third son-in-law of Abdullah Qutbshah, was, therefore, installed in the throne of Golconda. Sayyid Muzaffar and his personal assistant Madanna played a prominent part in winning over the chief Qutbshahi nobles to the plot.<sup>3144</sup> After Abul Hasan's accession to the throne, Sayyid Muzaffar became the prime-minister and Musa Khan the commander-in-chief of the Qutbshahi Sultanate. It appears that Madanna was also rewarded at this time by taking him into state service as chief accountant. After his appointment as Prime Minister, Sayyid Muzaffar began concentrating more and more power in his own hands and the

Qutbshah, tiring of his increasing domination, decided to remove him. He took Madanna into confidence and, in a bloodless coup, removed Sayyid Muzaffar from prime ministership and appointed Madanna to that high office.<sup>3145</sup> By his efficient administration, Madanna soon won the confidence of the Qutbshah who left the Sultanate entirely to his management and spent time in pursuit of pleasure.<sup>3146</sup> Gradually, Madanna tightened his hold on the administration by investing his kinsmen with important offices in state service. He appointed his brother, Akkanna, as the Minister in charge of the army, his nephew Podili Linganna as the governor of the Poonamallee District, another nephew Gopanna alias Ramdas as the revenue collector of the Bhadrachalam District and still another, Yanganna, to high command in the army, with the title 'Rustumrao'.<sup>3147</sup> Among Muslims, he generally favoured local 'Deccanis' and was inclined to dispense with services of their alien brothers-in-faith. But it appears that he was also careful to maintain a balance between different factions at the court, for he appointed Muhammad Ibrahim, a Persian, as the commander-in-chief of the army.<sup>3148</sup>

Madanna was a devout Hindu. He built a number of temples at places of Hindu pilgrimage. He also awarded several grants to Hindu religious institutions.<sup>3149</sup> But his vision was not limited merely to awarding religious donations. As we shall presently see from what Martin writes, he also appears to have cherished the prospect of restoring the Karnataka — of which Fate and personal enterprise had made him an arbiter — to indigenous Hindu predomination.

And this man, who had succeeded in his silent revolution, was at the helm of affairs in the Qutbshahi Sultanate when Shivaji arrived in Hyderabad. It is very likely, therefore, that he found in the Maratha king one who seemed in tune with his own cultural outlook and, at that particular juncture, most

capable of realizing his subtle design of indigenization. Perhaps, it was owing to this view Madanna took of Shivaji that the latter succeeded in obtaining such advantageous terms from the Qutbshah.

Martin, the Chief of the French settlement at Pondicherry, records in his journal under May 1677:

"At last at the beginning of the month of May the movements made at Golconda for carrying on the war in these quarters were known. The Duke of Gingee [Nasir Muhammad] perceived well that he could not resist Sher Khan and that the latter would sooner or later render himself master of this capital [i.e. Gingee], urged all the more by the hatred that always existed between the Pathans and the Deccanis, he [the Duke] resolved to negotiate with the King of Golconda for handing over to him Gingee and other territories he had. For this he dispatched some envoys who communicated with the minister Madanna about this affair; this Brahmin wanted to render some service to his religion on this occasion, as he had control over the King of Golconda and knew how to win him over to his views, Madanna proposed to the King the conquest of the state of Gingee which would consequently involve the countries of Tanjore, Madurai and thereby render him the master of the whole of Karnataka. As he had his secret designs, he thereafter represented that it would not be proper to send there an army in usual form for fear of exciting the jealousy of the Mughal and also because it was necessary that he should keep his best troops near him, and that Shivaji Raja, who was not far from Golconda with an army, must be induced to undertake this conquest and with the cavalry that was ordinarily [stationed] in that part of Karnataka which was dependent on this kingdom and by the

orders that would be issued to the governors of different places and to the Poligars to join Shivaji, it [i.e. Shivaji's army] would suffice for this enterprise, and that before embarking on it that Chief [Shivaji] should engage on an oath, to deliver to the King of Golconda all the fortresses he would capture, the good prince[Qutbshah] was deceived by the proposal. He wrote to Shivaji, inviting him to advance. The minister Madanna, who knew that Chief [Shivaji], knew it well that nothing would be obtained from his promises, and apparently he was in agreement with him, his object was to put a part of Karnataka under Hindu domination and to make himself a powerful protector of Shivaji by virtue of the facilities that he gave him [Shivaji] to make himself the master of it, and perhaps they had still more far-reaching designs.”<sup>3150</sup>

Thus it was Martin's perception too that, according to the treaty, Shivaji was to hand over the fortresses in the new acquisitions to the Qutbshah. That it was not correct is shown by the extracts from English letters quoted above. Even after Shivaji's conquest of these territories relations between Shivaji and the Qutbshah remained friendly and after Shivaji's death also the Qutbshah remained an ally of Shivaji's son Sambhaji.<sup>3151</sup> There is no doubt whatsoever that the treaty was completely favourable to Shivaji and the Qutbshah was not to get anything out of it except goodwill. That such a treaty was concluded was solely due to Shivaji's relations with Madanna and the latter's vision of Shivaji as the saviour of the Hindus. And it was made possible because of Madanna's hold over the Qutbshah.

The letter which Shivaji wrote to Maloji Ghorpade, an Adilshahi nobleman, to induce him to join Qutbshahi service bears testimony to the vital role Madanna played in the

conclusion of the treaty and his complete accord with the Maratha King. It runs:<sup>3152</sup>

“Formerly our father the late Maharajah [Shahji] came here [i.e. in the Adilshahi Sultanate] during the reign of Ibrahim Adilshah. Ibrahim Adilshah entrusted to the Maharajah the responsibility of the *Badshahi* business.<sup>3153</sup> The Maharajah then thought that: ‘Now that the *Badshahi* responsibility had fallen into our hands our Maratha Kinsmen, who earned a livelihood by military service as *sardars*, should be raised to the rank of Badshahi *wazirs*.<sup>3154</sup> That should be done which, by getting the *Badshahi* work done from them, would attain them reputation and great respect.’ Then he brought your father, Baji Ghorpade, who was serving as a *sardar*, introduced him to the *Badshah* and raised him to the rank of a *wazir*. Since then [important] *Badshahi* works were performed by your father and yourself. Thus three generations of the *Badshah* and a couple of yours passed away. But when Mustafa Khan caused the Maharajah to be arrested your father, Baji Ghorpade, forgot all the good that the Maharajah had done to him, stood surety [for the Maharajah’s safety], [treacherously] seized the Maharajah and handed him over into the custody of Mustafa Khan. Since then the quarrel between our family and yours went on intensifying. In several fights you killed our people and we killed yours. Our people slew your father Baji Ghorpade in battle. This the conflict between us was going on.

“Now I will explain the present political situation. There were three *Badshahs* in the Deccan; Nizamshah, Adilshah and Qutbshah. Of them the Nizamshahi Sultanate perished. At that time the chief Nizamshahi nobles submitted to the Adilshah and gained

livelihood for themselves [in Adilshahi service]. At present the Adilshahi has been usurped by Bahlul Khan Pathan. The Badshah is but a child, he reigns only in name. He is imprisoned and the Pathans have captured the throne, the royal umbrella and the fort of Bijapur. That the Pathans have seized the Badshahi of the Deccan is not good. If the Pathans gain power they will destroy the families of the Deccanis one by one. They will not let anyone live. Considering this we from the first have kept good relations with the Qutbshah. Now, therefore, the Qutbshah, showing his favour has sent us a letter of invitation in his own hand with his palm impression. Thereupon we came and met the Qutbshah. It is the court etiquette to make prostration and salutations at such time but the Qutbshah acknowledged that we have held an umbrella over our head [that is to say have declared ourselves king] and exempted us from prostration and salutations. The *Badshah* came from one side and we from the other [that is to say the meeting took place on an equal footing, both parties coming halfway to meet each other]. The *Badshah* was gracious and embraced us closely. He took us by the hand and seated us by his side. He showed various marks of favour. We established good relations between ourselves and the Qutbshah. Thereafter the Qutbshah showed complete concurrence with ourselves and Madannapant and decided that he would agree to the terms made by us [viz. Shivaji and Madanna]. All the plan and responsibility is entrusted to us so as to expand our *Badshahi* as far as possible, destroy that of the Pathans and do that which would retain the *Badshahi* of the Deccan in the hands of us Deccanis.

“When the plan was entrusted to us we thought: ‘Our Maratha kinsmen should be taken into confidence and introduced to the Qutbshah. *Jagirs*

should be given to them. The dignity of the Badshahi should be maintained by getting the Badshahi work done from them. That should be done which would maintain your estates and families. It is proper for us to promote the interests of our Maratha kinsmen.' Having thought thus we relinquished from our mind the enmity that has been growing since the time of your and our fathers and, bearing in mind that the interest of you Marathas should be promoted, requested the Qutbshah and have sent you a *farman* of assurance of the Qutbshah. You are born of a high family. Rely on us. As soon as you get this letter get away from the Pathans by all means and come to us at Bhaganagar [Hyderabad]. Undoubtedly you will come, but also send your envoy beforehand, so that he would reach us a few days before you, to explain your opinion, definite intention and sincerity so that we would request the Qutbshah, settle the *Jagir* and immediately send you a *farman* of assurance, with palm impression, and a dress of honour. Accept these and come and see the Qutbshah through us. At that time we shall settle your *jagir* so well that you and your sons and grandsons will remember that a great deal of good is done to you. This is a time when your wealth will be enhanced and the work of the Qutbshah would be done by you.

"Perhaps you might think: 'Being a high-ranking officer of the Adilshah for two generations, how could we desert from Bijapur to the Qutbshahi on the advice of the Raja [Shivaji]?' But the *Badshahi* [of Bijapur] had ceased to exist when Khawas Khan was imprisoned, the fort of Bijapur was captured by the Pathans and the *Badshah* of Bijapur, who is but a child, was kept in confinement. Bijapur has fallen into the hands of the Pathans. What of the Adilshahi now? And you have tied yourself there in vain thinking that the Adilshahi

is yours. Even if you propose to serve the Pathans, they will not give you any great estate. And the Qutbshah, ourselves and all the Deccanis are joining hands and destroying the Pathans. You Marathas are ours. We have written to you frankly so that you should prosper. We shall secure for you from the Qutbshah double of what the Pathans give you and if possible more. Your interests shall be promoted by all means. We swear in the name of god that we shall not fail to do this and that we have relinquished from our mind every rancour of the former enmity. You should come without suspicion. Send your envoy beforehand. Send with him a letter with an oath in the name of your family deity that you will keep good relations with us and that you have relinquished every grudge of the former enmity. We shall not fail to promote your interests by all means. What more may be written?"

#### CONQUEST OF THE ADILSHAHI KARNATAKA

#### *The Climatic Factor*

Shivaji remained in Hyderabad for about a month and then, on 1<sup>st</sup> April 1677, set out for the Adilshahi Karnataka.[3155](#) Here lay the supreme artistry of his plan. It has been mentioned earlier that military operations in India were suspended during the southwest monsoons, or from June to September.[3156](#) But the Coromandel Coast receives a good deal less rainfall during those months; it receives the greater part of its rainfall from the northeast monsoons, i.e. from October to December. So military operations there can be prosecuted during the period of the southwest monsoons; in fact, the moderate rainfall received in this area during those months actually facilitates military operations. It seems Shivaji purposefully took advantage of this

climatic factor. He had already ensured the security of his dominions on the west coast by letting loose Mughal dogs of war on the Adilshahi Sultanate. But he desired, it appears, to take this additional precaution in view of the rapidly shifting political conditions. Now with his realms on the west coast protected by the pouring sheets of rain he could safely embark upon an expedition into the Adilshahi Karnataka.

### *Seizure of Gingee and the Siege of Vellore*

Marching by way of Srisailam, Shivaji with his army debouched into the coastal plains of the Karnataka.<sup>3157</sup> Passing through Kalahasti, they were at a place a little to the west of Fort St. George (Chennai) on 9<sup>th</sup> May 1677 and, soon afterwards, stood near Kanchipuram on the northern bank of the Palar.<sup>3158</sup> Before them lay the rich but defenceless province of the Adilshahi Karnataka.

The Maratha vanguard had reached Gingee by the middle of May.<sup>3159</sup> After the execution of his brother, Khawas Khan, and the seizure of the regency by the Pathans, Nasir Muhammad had little hopes of retaining control of that fort.<sup>3160</sup> Therefore, he handed it over to the Marathas in return, according to Martin, of some cash and the promise of an assignment, to be given in Qutbshahi territory, of 50,000 écus a year.<sup>3161</sup> The Jedhe Chronology merely records that Shivaji took Gingee in the month of Chaitra, Shaka 1599 (24<sup>th</sup> March to 21<sup>st</sup> April, 1677).<sup>3162</sup> Sabhasad, too, is silent on the point of any such promise having been made to Nasir Muhammad. The latter source merely says that Nasir Khan and his brother Rauf Khan were given assurance of safety and induced to come out.<sup>3163</sup>

This quick and bloodless triumph astonished contemporary observers. André Freire, a Jesuit missionary,

writes:

“Then [in the beginning of 1677] news reached us that Shivaji, elder brother of Ekoji, and Captain, though faithless, of the Mughal [Emperor], many of whose territories the former had captured, was coming from the north at the head of a powerful army in order to conquer the kingdom of Gingee. It seemed generally impossible that Shivaji would come here from his own territory, which is far away more than two months' journey crossing the territories of Adil Khan and the King of Golconda, who are powerful Musalmans. Nevertheless when they saw him possessed of the main fortress of Gingee they could not doubt any more that what they had foretold as impossible was true. As a matter of fact it was very advantageous to him that the Musalmans were then divided between themselves, and some other Musalmans, who were Abyssinians, had joined him.”<sup>3164</sup>

Meanwhile, the main body of the Maratha army had reached Vellore about 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1677.<sup>3165</sup> Vellore was one of the strongest forts in South India and had a resolute Siddi (Abyssinian) commander named Abdulla Khan. He refused to surrender the fort despite implorations of Nasir Muhammad.<sup>3166</sup> It was immediately invested.

By this time, petty chieftains in the province had started sending their envoys to make their submission to the Maratha King. Martin records in his memoirs of May 1677 that “Not being in a position to defend themselves the petty princes of these parts decided immediately to send [their messengers] to Shivaji.”<sup>3167</sup> This is borne out by the Hindu envoy of the French who met Shivaji at the siege of Vellore in the first fortnight of

June 1677 and informed his masters that the ambassadors of the Nayaks of Madura and Mysore as well as the envoys of the Chiefs of Vellore and Ulundurpettai<sup>3168</sup> had arrived at Shivaji's camp.<sup>3169</sup>

This Hindu envoy had brought a letter from Martin for Shivaji. He paid three visits to Shivaji and returned to Pondicherry on 19<sup>th</sup> June 1677 (N.S.).<sup>3170</sup> In the first interview, Shivaji expressed his displeasure at the French because they had usurped St. Thome and attacked the Qutbshahi army that had gone there to take possession of that place, had seized a Qutbshahi ship in the port of Machilipatnam and had captured Valudavur.<sup>3171</sup> In 1672, the French had captured St. Thome (Meliapur) from the Dutch. But they failed to retain it for long and in 1674 the place was besieged and captured by the Dutch with the assistance of the Qutbshah.<sup>3172</sup> In March 1676 a French ship sent by Martin for piracy had captured a Qutbshahi ship in the port of Machilipatnam.<sup>3173</sup> Then, during the war between Sher Khan and Nasir Mohammad, a French detachment under Martin left Pondicherry on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1676 and captured for Sher Khan the fort of Valudavur the next day.<sup>3174</sup> Shivaji's censure referred to these incidents. In the second interview, Shivaji demanded that as the French had captured Valudavur from Nasir Khan on behalf of Sher Khan, they should now retake and return the fort to its owner and also asked for some Frenchmen to reduce Vellore. At this the envoy excused himself by replying that they could not venture out of Pondicherry.<sup>3175</sup> Shivaji was even more curt in the third interview. Martin recorded in his journal:

“At the third [audience], Shivaji assured our envoy that we might stay in complete security at Pondicherry without taking the side of either party; that if we offered the least insult to his people there

would be no quarter for us or for those of our people who were in the factory of Rajapur, that he would send an *havaldar* in a few days to govern Pondicherry and that we might have to live with him in the same manner as we had done with the officers of Sher Khan; the Chief [Shivaji] dismissed the Brahmin [the envoy of the French], he entrusted him with a letter for me in the form of a *farman*; his minister also wrote me in the same terms.”<sup>3176</sup>

On 14<sup>th</sup> May 1677, the English factors of Fort St. George received a letter from Shivaji requesting them to send him some cordial stones<sup>3177</sup> and antidotes for poisons. These, together with some presents, were promptly sent.<sup>3178</sup> Then, on 25<sup>th</sup> May, Shivaji again sent a letter from the siege of Vellore to Sir William Langhorne, the governor of Fort St. George, requesting him to procure for him some more Maldive coconuts, Bezoar stones,<sup>3179</sup> cordial stones and some other antidotes and state the price of these things without hesitation.<sup>3180</sup> The English sent these too, as presents, together with a letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1677.<sup>3181</sup>

As the garrison of Vellore continued to hold out, Shivaji kept a part of his army to continue the investment and himself marched south, by way of Gingee, around the middle of June 1677.<sup>3182</sup>

### *Rout of Sher Khan*

Sher Khan had received information about the impending storm at the beginning of May 1677.<sup>3183</sup> Martin had paid a visit to Sher Khan at Thiruvadi (or Tiruvadi) on 29<sup>th</sup> June 1677 and records what Sher Khan told him of his plan of defence against

Shivaji. He writes: "As for his decision [Sher Khan said] if Shivaji sent only four to five thousand horse against him he would hazard a battle, but if he [i.e. Shivaji] came with all his forces, he [i.e. Sher Khan] would have to retire under the guns of one of his fortresses, that what caused him the greatest trouble was the lack of funds."<sup>3184</sup> Martin also states his advice to Sher Khan: "I then added that ..... we were touched to see him in so little state [i.e. ill-equipped] to resist Shivaji whose army consisted of twelve thousand horse and many thousand infantry, that in my opinion he should furnish his principal fortresses with good garrisons and supply them with victuals and munitions of war and retire with a body of cavalry near the woods of Ariyalur, that he knew well that Shivaji could not remain more than two months longer in these parts on account of the necessity of going to preserve his estates in the Deccan and on the [west] coast of India, and that after his departure he [i.e. Sher Khan] would have the liberty of re-establishing himself, as his lands would not disappear and would exist for ever."<sup>3185</sup> Sher Khan's uncle had also given him similar advice, but Sher Khan rejected it.<sup>3186</sup> Martin's plan sounded good but there were many difficulties in carrying it out. Where could Sher Khan find the troops to garrison his forts and the munitions to equip them? Martin writes: "This matter was again dilated on after which the principal Brahmin [in Sher Khan's service] was called in to see whether there would be room for admitting some provisions into the places that had been named to him; this man ... foresaw the ruin of Sher Khan and answering in a sufficiently cold tone raised many difficulties, and it is true that he (i.e. Sher Khan) ought to have thought of this earlier."<sup>3187</sup>

Thus the fortresses were not ready to stand a siege and the army was in no better condition. Of Sher Khan's army Martin writes: "His army was composed of three thousand horse and three or four thousand infantry but the mere name of Shivaji made them tremble. Sher Khan was by nature one of the

capable men in India for governing, but was little qualified for war.”<sup>3188</sup>

In the meantime, the Marathas had captured two small places named Panamalai and Tiruvannainallur.<sup>3189</sup> The Maratha vanguard comprising 6,000 troopers reached the vicinity of Thiruvadi on 26<sup>th</sup> June. Sher Khan advanced to meet them but as soon as they came within sight he realized his mistake and hastily turned back with the Maratha cavalry close on his heels.<sup>3190</sup> Sher Khan’s motley crowd was scattered in all directions. Some of the fugitives reached Pondicherry on 28<sup>th</sup> June.<sup>3191</sup> Martin records: “Many cavaliers, some dismounted and stripped of everything, passed through Pondicherry and retired towards the north.... The entire country was covered by these fugitives. There were not [even] ten cavaliers together.”<sup>3192</sup>

Then Sher Khan entered the forest of Akal Nayak. Here, a rearguard of some 500 troopers checked the Maratha pursuers for two hours in the night while Sher Khan, with only a hundred horses, continued his flight southwards.<sup>3193</sup> According to Vardhappa, the Hindu envoy of the English who was in the Maratha camp, the pursuers had acquired by 27<sup>th</sup> June booty of some 500 horses, two elephants, twenty camels, several bullocks and tents, great drums and other material.<sup>3194</sup> Shivaji with the main body of the army encamped a little south of Devenapatam.<sup>3195</sup>

The booty increased further. Sieur Germain, the French envoy who was proceeding south for an audience with Shivaji saw three hundred horses and four elephants that were captured from Sher Khan being led by a body of Maratha horsemen.<sup>3196</sup> The Jedhe Chronology says ten elephants were captured. It is silent about the number of horses.<sup>3197</sup>

While the Marathas were chasing Sher Khan, his father-in-law clung to the small fort of Thiruvadi where Shivaji left a detachment of the Maratha army comprising, according to Vardhappa, Baba Sahib, some horse, "Savarumwar"<sup>3198</sup> and some of Nasir Muhammad Khan's horse.<sup>3199</sup> Sher Khan himself fled towards Bhuvanagiri situated on the north bank of the Velar. According to Martin, he intended to retire into the forest of Ariyalur but he was so closely pursued that he could not make it. On 27<sup>th</sup> June he reached Bhuvanagiri and was promptly besieged there.<sup>3200</sup> The garrisons of Valudavur, Devanampattinam and many other forts fled a couple of days later; these places were immediately occupied by the Marathas.<sup>3201</sup> In his memoir of July 1677 Martin observes: "It could be said that so sudden a revolution had never been witnessed if we had not since instances of greater revolutions in Europe."<sup>3202</sup> Sher Khan surrendered on 5<sup>th</sup> July and agreed to give up all his territory and pay a ransom of 20,000 Hons till the payment of which his son Ibrahim Khan was to be kept hostage.<sup>3203</sup> On 8<sup>th</sup> July Martin received a letter from his envoy, who was in the Maratha camp, informing him that Shivaji had inspected the fort and ordered it to be demolished.<sup>3204</sup>

It would be convenient here to complete the story of Sher Khan as recorded by Martin.<sup>3205</sup> After his surrender, Sher Khan, with only 20 troopers, went to the forest of Ariyalur. He was allowed to do so by the Marathas on condition that he would leave Ariyalur after the release of his son and go to Madura or Mysore. Sher Khan could not raise the amount required to procure his son's release and having pity upon him some local chieftains collected it for him. But Martin says: "It is, however, credited that he had some effects under the private charge of his principal wife who took possession of precious stones and jewels which are supposed to be worth nearly hundred

thousand écus.”<sup>3206</sup> Be that as it may, Sher Khan’s son was released about February 1678. From there he went to Tiruchirapalli, the capital of the principality of Madurai, whence he again returned to Ariyalur. But having received a warning from Shivaji’s officers, the Nayak of Ariyalur sent him away. Sher Khan then took refuge with the Nayak of the Maravar tribe (also called the Setupati of Ramnad). Very little is known about him thereafter.

Martin’s account throws some light on the security precautions that were being taken by the Marathas. The French had sent a letter with a Hindu envoy who reached Bhuvanagiri on 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> July and was granted audience by Shivaji. The Maratha king expressed his surprise that the French had not cared to send a Frenchman instead.<sup>3207</sup> Having been informed of this by the envoy’s letter, which was received on 5<sup>th</sup> July, the French sent a Frenchman named Sieur Germain with a Portuguese interpreter the next day. By that time Shivaji had proceeded southwards. The French envoy was detained by the Maratha governor of Palayamkottai who demanded a copy of Shivaji’s letter, evidently the one which Shivaji had given them at the siege of Vellore. Martin sent it from Pondicherry and only then was the French envoy allowed to proceed further and even then, under escort.<sup>3208</sup> In his diary of July 1677 Martin writes: “No one could pass through the country without a pass from Shivaji’s officers.”<sup>3209</sup> And again in August: “Some days expired without getting any news from outside as orders had been issued not to let the letters pass through the country.”<sup>3210</sup>

Simultaneously with these security precautions, Maratha administration was also being quickly set up in the conquered country. In his memoirs of July 1677, Martin states: “Two Brahmins sent by Shivaji arrived at Pondicherry for governing this colony.”<sup>3211</sup> And again: “Shivaji sent some Brahmins to all

the villages in the country for governing them, the numbers of these scamp who followed Shivaji for trying to get some employment is something amazing, they counted more than twenty thousand.”<sup>3212</sup> Brahmins formed the backbone of civil administration in those days. Martin’s information about the number of Brahmins which followed the Maratha army may be exaggerated but it shows that legions of civil servants were following the army to set up civil administration.

### *Shivaji's Camp on the Coleroon*

The Maratha army was encamped at Tirumalvadi (Thirumalapadi) on the north bank of the Coleroon (Kollidam), the northern distributary of the Kaveri, by the middle of July

1677.<sup>3213</sup> Nellore Ramanna, the Hindu envoy of the English who was at the camp, informed his masters in his letter dated 16th July 1677 of the arrival of an envoy of the Nayak of Madura. Shivaji, he wrote, demanded a tribute of ten million (Hons) to which the envoy replied that as Ekoji and the Nayak of Mysore had seized some territory of his master’s principality his master would be unable to pay anything at the time, but he would give seven hundred thousand (Hons) if Shivaji would restore to him his lost territory.<sup>3214</sup> In his next letter, dated 27<sup>th</sup> July, written when the Maratha army had commenced retiring northward and was at Valikandapuram, Nellore Ramanna informed his masters that Shivaji had sent Raghunathpant (Hanmante) to Madura with the envoy and that an agreement had been concluded with the Nayak according to which he was to pay 600,000 “pardoas”<sup>3215</sup> to Shivaji and that 150,000 of these were paid immediately.<sup>3216</sup>

In the meantime, after his arrival on the Coleroon, Shivaji had sent a letter to Ekoji asking him to send some of his trusted servants. When they arrived at his camp Shivaji put before

them his demand for half the share of his father's estates and, when they returned, he sent some of his trusted courtiers with them to persuade Ekoji for an amicable settlement.<sup>3217</sup> Ekoji himself then arrived at Shivaji's camp at Tirumalvadi.<sup>3218</sup> According to Nellore Ramanna's letter cited above, Ekoji was accompanied by an escort of 2,000 horse and Shivaji went forward some distance to receive him.<sup>3219</sup> Shivaji repeated his demand for his share of the patrimony, but Ekoji refused to part with any portion of it.<sup>3220</sup> The Jedhe Chronology, Martin, Sabhasad and Bhimsen say Ekoji, suspecting then that Shivaji intended to imprison him, fled from his camp and reached Tanjore.<sup>3221</sup> According to André Freire, Ekoji was actually imprisoned but escaped.<sup>3222</sup> But this is contradicted by Shivaji's letter to Ekoji in which he wrote: "It was not befitting my position and reputation that I should seize you and demand my share from you when you, being a younger brother, had of yourself come to see me. So I gave you leave to go to Tanjore."<sup>3223</sup> This is supported by Nellore Ramanna, the Hindu envoy of the English who was at Shivaji's camp throughout this period. On 27<sup>th</sup> July 1677 he wrote to his masters from Valikandapuram that after Ekoji's refusal to part with any portion of his father's estates "Shivaji waxed very angry and had him begone"<sup>3224</sup> Sabhasad, as we know, had written his chronicle several years after the event. Bhimsen was far away from the scene of this incident and his account is based on hearsay. It is true that Martin and André Freire were comparatively close to the scene of this incident and that the Jedhe Chronology has proved itself to be a reliable source, but none of these can supersede the testimony, if not of Shivaji himself then at least of Nellore Ramanna who was a neutral observer in Shivaji's camp. After Ekoji's departure Shivaji, according to Nellore Ramanna, detained his courtiers Jagannathapant, Shivajipant and Konheripant, and a merchant

called Niloba Naik, who had accompanied him. They, however, were released soon afterwards.<sup>3225</sup>

The incident led to an open breach between the brothers and thereafter Shivaji, as the Jedhe Chronology records, annexed Ekoji's districts, including Jagadevgad, Chidambararam and Vriddhachalam, and besieged the fort of Kolar.<sup>3226</sup> Nellore Ramanna, too, wrote in his letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1677 sent from Tundumgurty (Thondankurichi) that Shivaji had given an order "to take possession of all his brother's country."<sup>3227</sup> And Martin, too, records in his journal that after Ekoji's flight, Shivaji took possession of a part of the lands of Gingee which belonged to Ekoji.<sup>3228</sup>

Germain, the French envoy who had been detained at Palayamkottai eventually reached the Maratha camp on the Koleroon and stayed there for three days. Shivaji gave him a letter of assurance for the security of the French settlement of Pondicherry.<sup>3229</sup> Germain, encountered the Dutch delegation going to Shivaji, led by the Chief of their factory at Devanampattinam, on his way to, and back from, Shivaji's camp.<sup>3230</sup> Vyankataji, a Brahmin envoy sent by the Chief of the Dutch settlement at Devanampattinam, Albert van Weede, had already met Shivaji to seek Shivaji's permission to continue the Dutch Company's trade as before. Shivaji had sent with him a letter of assurance which was received on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1677.<sup>3231</sup> Then Weede sent Herbert de Jager and Nicolaes Clement with various presents to Shivaji. They left Devanampattinam on 27<sup>th</sup> July and arrived at Shivaji's camp on 6<sup>th</sup> August 1677 (N.S.) and obtained the Maratha King' audience the same day. They waited in the tent for half an hour after which the King came there accompanied by Raghunathpant and Janardan. The Dutchmen stood up when the King entered the tent. The King sat down with Raghunathpant beside him and Janardan in front. The

Dutchmen, too, sat down at a distance of about 1.5 meters from him. After listening to their requests and accepting the presents brought by them, the King reassured them of his favour and gave them leave to depart with a present for their chief.<sup>3232</sup> It seems that the Dutch envoys had more than one audience with Shivaji. Before they left the Maratha camp, the King learnt that the Dutch were harbouring some persons and goods belonging to Sher Khan. As a result, Shivaji reminded them when they left that they would get a letter of assurance from his minister only after all these persons and goods were handed over to his men.<sup>3233</sup>

In his memoirs of August 1677 Martin provides a description, evidently based on Germain's report, of the Maratha camp on the Coleroon. It runs: "The camp of Shivaji was without pomp, without women; there were no baggages, only two tents, but of simple cloth and very scanty, one for him, the other for his prime minister."<sup>3234</sup>

### *Shivaji's March to Vanikamvadi (Vanakkampadi)*

Shivaji broke camp at the end of July 1677 and marched north by way of Valikandapuram, where he was on 27<sup>th</sup> July, and Tundumgarti.<sup>3235</sup> The Maratha army proceeded thence northwards to Elavanasur while Shivaji himself, with some of his courtiers, went on a pilgrimage to the temple at Vridhhachalam.<sup>3236</sup> In his letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1677, Nellore Ramanna informed Fort St. George that Shivaji's army was yet at Elavanasur and that Shivaji had not yet returned from Vridhhachalam.<sup>3237</sup> It appears that the fort of Elavanasur was held by Ekoji's men. Jagannathapant, who was formerly in Ekoji's service, arranged for its surrender to the Maratha army. In the letter cited above, Nellore Ramanna wrote: "The said Raja has given order to take possession of all his brother's country,

and this day Shivaji Raja's people have taken possession of Elavanasur Fort, Jagannathapant having agreed and turned away them that was in the said Fort. Shivaji Raja brings Jagannathapant Shivajipant [a namesake of Shivaji] and Niloji Naik along with him." From Elavanasur the Maratha army marched to Vanikamvadi. By then Shivaji had rejoined the army and from Vanikamvadi, he wrote a letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> September to William Langhorne, the governor of fort St. George (Chennai). The original letter is not extant but a contemporaneous English translation has survived. It reads:

Translation of a letter from Shivaji Raja from Vanikamvadi to Sir William Langhorne:

"Since my arrival into the Karnataka country I have conquered several Forts and Castles and do also intend to build new works in several forts and castles. You may likely have with you such men who know how to make great carriages for guns and how to contrive mines. We have need of such men at present, especially those that know how to make mines and to blow up stone walls. I had such men with me, who came from towards Goa and Vengurle and are all kept employed in several of my Forts and Castles; and when I enquired of them for more such men, they told me they were all gone for Chinapatam and Pulicat, wherefore I now write to your Worship about them that you may please to enquire if there be any such men with you that know how to make mines, you would be pleased to send some 20 or 25, or a(t) least 10 or 5 such men, for I shall pay them very well and shall entertain them in several of my forts and castles, wherewith I shall also acknowledge your Worship's kindness towards us, so you would by all means enquire about the said men and to send them hither as many as you can get."<sup>3238</sup>

To this the English returned a civil excuse, "it being," according to the minutes dated 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1677 of their council of Fort St. George, "wholly unfit for us to meddle in it, there being many dangers consequent thereon, as well of increasing his power, as of rendering both Golconda and the Mughal our enemies."<sup>3239</sup>

In their letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> August 1677, the English factors at Bombay informed Surat: "Shivaji is at present in the upper Karnataka, where he has taken the strong castles of Gingee, Tanjore, Penukonda, and several others and shamefully routed the Moors and it is believed has robbed Srirangapattana and carried away great riches from thence."<sup>3240</sup> The Surat factors repeated the rumour, of Shivaji's having taken Tanjore and plundered Srirangapattana, in their letter dated 31<sup>st</sup> October 1677 to the Company.<sup>3241</sup> These reports, however, were not true.

#### SHIVAJI'S ADMINISTRATION IN THE KARNATAKA

##### *Strengthening the Defences of the Karnataka*


Even before the conquest of Karnataka was complete, Shivaji began to remodel its defenses. In his memoir of July 1677 Martin writes: "Several small places serving only to cause the expense of maintaining the garrison, the artillery and munition were destroyed, what were within were transported to Gingee."<sup>3242</sup> And again in November 1677 : "At the time of Shivaji's departure that chief gave orders to destroy many small places situated in the plain country and to construct some fortresses on the mountains and heights he had noticed."<sup>3243</sup>

Particular attention was paid to the strengthening of Gingee. In his memoir of August 1677 Martin writes: "Shivaji

after having examined the site of Gingee, which offered a very great protection, gave orders to cut off a part, to demolish the colonies outside and to make new fortifications.”<sup>3244</sup> And, in the memoir of February 1678: “They were vigorously labouring of Gingee for demolishing a portion of the wall of that place and to fortify the (area) enclosed by it.”<sup>3245</sup>

André Freire corroborates Martin. In his letter (1678), he writes:

“After the capture of the kingdom of Gingee by the tyrant Shivaji, as related in the latest annual letter...and after the surrender of the main fortress of Vellore, the siege of which lasted for a year, Shivaji, as a sagacious and experienced man who knew the great strength of Musalmans in India, whom he had banished from this kingdom and treated with great dishonour and desecrated their mosques — though he was not in fear of them at present — nevertheless started to fortify himself for the future in order to resist the whole of their power. To attain this he strongly fortified the main fort of Gingee, though its situation is naturally impregnable. He pulled down great parts of its walls and built them again with new bastions so tactically constructed that it looks a fortress built rather by Europeans than by Indians. Thus he fortified himself in the rest of this kingdom, by destroying some forts which he considered of no use, and by building new ones both in the plains and on the hills and highest mountains against all enemies. Following European methods, he broke up tremendous boulders, built tanks, constructed edifices and all other requirements of warfare. For building all these fortifications he spent a great deal of money, which he acquired more by oppressing his subjects than by justice.”<sup>3246</sup>



*Prohibition of Slave Trafficking*

In the letter of assurance dated 26<sup>th</sup> August 1677, which Shivaji granted to the Dutch Company, traffic in slaves was specifically prohibited. The relevant passage states:

“In the days of the Moorish [Muslim] government it was allowed for you to buy male slaves and female slaves here [the Karnatak], and to transport the same, without anyone preventing that. But now you may not, as long as I am master of these lands, buy male or female slaves, nor transport them. And in case you were to do the same, and would want to bring [slaves] aboard, my men will oppose that and prevent it in all ways, and also not allow that they may be brought back in your house; this you must observe and comply with.”[3247](#)

In this letter Shivaji had granted the Dutch Company all the privileges they had enjoyed during Sher Khan’s rule except the right to buy and transport slaves, “since”, comment Jager and Clement in their letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> August 1677 from Trinamal to Devanampattinam:

“[Shivaji] has established [as] a fundamental rule of his government, that none of his subjects may be made into slaves, let alone be sold or transported, in order not to lack any inhabitants, with which these new conquests are sparsely enough provided, even though this tyrannical rule has already made many of the best inhabitants leave.”[3248](#)

This, be it remembered, is the interpretation Jager and Clement had put on Shivaji’s order. The fact remains that Shivaji had prohibited slave trafficking in his new acquisitions.[3249](#)

*Temples*

We have already seen that some temples in the Karnatak vandalized by previous rulers were rededicated to gods and certain rites and rituals for their worship were recommenced during Shivaji's administration.<sup>3250</sup> De Jager's remark, in his report dated 15<sup>th</sup> October 1677, that 'though Shivaji devoutly visited the renowned temples in every place that he passed through in Karnatak, the donations he made to them were far below his stature', is noteworthy in this respect.<sup>3251</sup>

#### CHARGES OF INJUSTICE AND OPPRESSION

His European contemporaries in Karnataka had written much about the injustice and oppression in Shivaji's administration. We shall first see what they have to say.

In their letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1677, the English factors of Fort St. George wrote: "Meanwhile the moneyed men all about the country shift out of the way as fast as they can, he having taken a minute account of all such as he passed by within 2 leagues and 2½ of this place."<sup>3252</sup>

In his memoir of August 1677 Martin wrote: "During the whole of the rest of the month there was a continual hunt for people believed to be able to give money. The Dutch were practically invested in their lodge at Devanampattinam, and were forced to give present in order to have free entry and exit, letters written to Shivaji served no purpose, his answers were in truth courteous and full of friendly assurances but his Brahmins had his word for not complying in them."<sup>3253</sup>

And in that of November 1677 he wrote: "Nearly the whole of the month of November passed in rain which is usual during the northern monsoon that often commences at the end of October or at the beginning of November. This wind, however,

did not moderate the ardour of Shivaji's officers for exacting money by all possible means."<sup>3254</sup>

It should be noted at the outset that all these accounts were written at a time when the conquest of the coastal plains of Karnataka was yet to be completed. Shivaji's soldiers, after all, were not angels and some of them might have resorted to plunder, taking advantage of the unsettled conditions of the country. Such things are the curse of every war. But it would not be fair to assume that they were continued even after the conquest of the Karnataka was complete. Shivaji's European contemporaries always complain about his plundering raids in the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate. But none of them charge Shivaji with misadministration in his own dominions. There is no reason why he would have adopted a different policy in what were now *his own* dominions on the east coast.

Martin's bitterness about the Maratha administration and particularly about Brahmins is understandable. Sher Khan had not only given him a site for the French factory but had also allowed him to build a fort there.<sup>3255</sup> His dream of expanding the foothold which the French had thus gained was shattered with Shivaji's conquest of the Karnataka. He had a habit of dabbling in local politics. It was he who had stormed the fort of Valudavur for Sher Khan, and, as we have seen, was censured by Shivaji for that act. Yet, he had not changed his old ways. But Shivaji's Brahmin administrators outwitted him every time he tried to interfere in local affairs. Thus in July 1677 he had unlawfully kept under arrest two men who were to pay 300 *Écus* on Sher Khan's account. Shivaji's Brahmins learnt of it and forced him to hand over these men to them.<sup>3256</sup> During the same month, the garrison of Valudavur abandoned the place. Among them was a man who sent his horse to Sher Khan for

him to keep. But the Brahmins came to know of this, too, and compelled him to deliver the horse to them.<sup>3257</sup>

The hollowness of Martin's complaints about Shivaji's officers is apparent from the following account which he included in his memoir for May 1678:

"Shivaji's officers continued their outrages on the inhabitants [of this part]. There were some ancient grants made by princes of the country to diverse private people. These were resumed [by Shivaji's government], even those of the Hindu *pandarams*<sup>3258</sup>... There was one of these *pandarams* in a small village, north of Pondicherry, who derived a large revenue from lands granted even by some Muslim princes though they were of hostile religion. This man, who passed for a saint among the Hindus, gave food to all the travellers generally without distinction of religion or race... The *pandaram* was not spared; the best part of his revenue was exacted from him."<sup>3259</sup>

We have already dealt with Shivaji's policy about *watans* and special privileges as well as the motives that necessitated it.<sup>3260</sup> Martin's account does not prove the charge of misadministration. It merely shows that the same policy was also adopted in the Karnataka.

In his account of November 1678, Martin says Raghunathpant complained to his envoy that the French made no commerce at Pondicherry, brought no profit to the state and were the cause of the Dutch (who were at war with the French) wanting to leave Devanapattinam where they made a considerable trade. Therefore, Raghunathpant said, he could not suffer the French to continue thus any longer. But he would

wait a year or two more on condition that the French would lend him 10,000 pagodas which he needed for the maintenance of his troops. Upon this Martin remarks "It is true that the Governor General lacked money for paying the troops, but that proceeded from two causes, the first (was) that the Brahmins from the highest officer to the lowest, robbed with impunity; the second reason (was) the ill treatment accorded to the people, which drove many to leave and pass on to the territories of the neighbouring princes, so that the provinces did not yield two-thirds of its ordinary revenue. It must, however, be admitted that the Brahmins were more careful in making the lands profitable than those under the government of the Muslims had appeared (to us) to be. A number of places around Pondicherry covered with brambles and brushwood only, of which nobody thought (anything), was reclaimed and these have produced well since, but the best part of these improvements went to the profit of the Brahmins."<sup>3261</sup>

The land which the French had obtained at Pondicherry was not given in charity. It was expected that they would attract trade and bring profits to the state in the shape of customs duty. As they were not doing so, there was nothing wrong in Raghunathpant's demand of a loan on behalf of the government. And if they were unwilling to do so, they were given the option of quitting the settlement. His charges against Brahmins of having accorded ill treatment to the people have been belied by his own admission that they had done much to improve the lands. And this improvement was made, be it remembered, within a year and a half of their arrival in the province.

#### THE MUGHAL-BIJAPUR WAR

While Shivaji was thus overrunning the Adilshahi Karnataka, the Mughals were squandering away their time in the face of the Adilshahi army. Unfortunately, details of this campaign are

not known. The Mughal army was set free for its war against Bijapur from October 1676 but all they had accomplished in doing, in the ten months till August 1677, was to seize, through craft and deceit, the frontier fortresses of Gulbarga and Naldurg.<sup>3262</sup> The commandant of the former was imprisoned after its capture, suggesting that the betrayal was made not by him but by someone else in the garrison.<sup>3263</sup> A *jagir* was conferred upon the commandant of the latter and therefore the betrayal must have been effected by him.<sup>3264</sup> The exact dates of the capture of these two forts are not known. According to the *Basatin-us Salatin*, Ahasanabad (i.e.Gulbarga) was captured by the Mughals on 7<sup>th</sup> July 1677.<sup>3265</sup> This appears correct because the Jedhe Chronology has an entry to the effect that Gulbarga was captured by Bahadur Khan in the month of Ashadha, Shaka 1599 (21<sup>st</sup> June to 19<sup>th</sup> July 1677).<sup>3266</sup> As for Naldurg, the dates given in the *Maasir-i Alamgiri* and *Basatin-us Salatin* do not correspond with one another. According to the former, it was captured on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1677 and, according to the latter, on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1677.<sup>3267</sup> The date given by the Jedhe Chronology is the month of Shravan, Shaka 1599 (20<sup>th</sup> July to 18<sup>th</sup> August 1677), which supports the latter.<sup>3268</sup> Be that as it may, it is certain that the Mughals gained just these two forts – Naldurg and Gulbarga – in their war against Bijapur. Compared to Shivaji's sweeping conquests in the Adilshahi Karnataka, this was a measly achievement.

Bahadur Khan must have felt cheated when he learnt of Shivaji's gains in the Karnataka. Peace was then made with Bahlul Khan largely, it appears, through the efforts of Dilir Khan, who also was a Pathan.<sup>3269</sup> The Emperor summoned Bahadur Khan to the Court in August 1677 and ordered Dilir Khan to assume charge of the *suba* till the arrival of a new *subadar*.<sup>3270</sup> By now the Mughals and the Adilshahi armies had

wasted their strength in an inconclusive struggle which appears to have left them far too exhausted even to dream of a successful campaign in the highly fortified Sahyadris. Past experience had shown that neither of them was strong enough, single-handed, to launch an offensive campaign in the mountains. Moreover, Bahlul Khan would not have agreed to undertake there a combined offensive which would have exposed his rear to the Qutbshah, who had concluded a defensive-offensive treaty with Shivaji and had already massed his army on the Adilshahi frontier. They could not go against Shivaji's forces in the Adilshahi Karnataka either because that, too, would have exposed their rear; in any case, an offensive campaign there was impracticable with the monsoons approaching fast on the Coromandel Coast. So they decided to give vent to their rage by invading the Qutbshahi Sultanate! The Qutbshahi army, supported by the Deccani forces of Bijapur, was well prepared for such an eventuality.<sup>3271</sup> After an indecisive battle at Malkhed, fought in September 1677, the joint armies of the Mughals and Bijapur withdrew to Naldurg.<sup>3272</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S RETURN TO THE WEST COAST

##### *Shivaji's Departure from Karnataka*

By now, Shivaji was away from his dominions on the west coast for about a year. The conquest of the coastal plains of the Adilshahi Karnataka was almost complete and the shifting political conditions in the Deccan required his presence at the capital. So he appointed Raghunathpant as the Governor of these new conquests as well as *Amatya* of the whole Kingdom and gave him a reward of 100,000 Hons.<sup>3273</sup> Hambirrao Mohite, the Commander-in-Chief of the Maratha army, was also left, along with most of the army, to complete and consolidate the conquest.<sup>3274</sup> Santaji, a natural son of Shahji, who had been

living with Ekoji, had joined Shivaji after his arrival in the Adilshahi Karnataka. He, too, was left there.<sup>3275</sup> Shivaji set out on his return march, having thus settled the administrative arrangement.

The minutes of a meeting of the English Council of Fort St. George, held on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1677, record that Shivaji with his army was “within two days march of this place.”<sup>3276</sup> Shivaji set out on his return journey soon thereafter. Perhaps he might have already done so by the time these minutes were written.

The strength of the detachment which Shivaji took with him is not definitely known. But in their letter dated 20<sup>th</sup>/29<sup>th</sup> November 1677, the English factors at Fort St. George informed Surat: “We hear that Shivaji is gone with 4,000 horse towards Bijapur or his own country, leaving the rest of his forces in his new conquests.”<sup>3277</sup> The Jesuit letter also says Shivaji left the largest part of his army in the Karnataka.<sup>3278</sup>

Shivaji’s departure from his new conquests remained secret for some time. Martin says in his memoir of September 1677: “This prince was so incommunicative about his plans that long after he had left, many people were persuaded that he was still in the province. His name alone struck his enemies with terror.”<sup>3279</sup> That was why the English factors at Fort St. George wrote to Machilipatnam on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1677: “Shivaji is yet in his new conquests.”<sup>3280</sup>

### *War with Ekoji*

Having learnt of Shivaji’s departure, Ekoji began to conspire with petty local chieftains, for eviction of Shivaji’s forces from the Karnataka.<sup>3281</sup> Though they did not respond to this plan, he assembled his own force, comprising 4,000 cavalry

and 10,000 infantry, crossed the Coleroon and, on 16<sup>th</sup> November 1677, attacked the Maratha army under Santaji and Hambirrao which numbered about 6,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.<sup>3282</sup> In a letter, which he later sent Ekoji, Shivaji himself says that the battle was fought near Valikandapuram.<sup>3283</sup> The Jedhe Chronology calls the place Ahiri.<sup>3284</sup> According to the Fort St. George letter of 20<sup>th</sup>/29<sup>th</sup> November 1677, Santoji was initially forced to withdraw but he turned back during the night, surprised Ekoji's camp and scattered his army. The booty, according to this letter, included 1000 horses, tents and all the baggage.<sup>3285</sup> According to the Jedhe Chronology, 3000 horses and some elephants were captured. Besides this, the Fort St. George letter tells us that three principal officers were taken prisoner. Shivaji's letter to Ekoji also mentions their names. They were Pratapji Raja, Bhivaji Raja and Shivaji Dabir. The first two were natural sons of Shahji and the last was a minister of Ekoji.<sup>3286</sup> Ekoji himself, with his remaining army, fled across the Coleroon.<sup>3287</sup>

André Freire's account of this battle resembles that in the Fort St. George letter cited above. But he adds something which requires examination. He says that though the Muslims in Ekoji's army were inferior in numbers "they were decided either to win or to die in the fight; these were specially stimulated to do so by the injuries and outrages committed by Shivaji against their wives and children shortly before: some of them had been barbarously murdered by him in order to obtain money." He further tells us that though Ekoji was initially victorious he fell into an ambush prepared by his enemies and was routed.<sup>3288</sup>

The charge which the Jesuit missionary makes is baseless. Shivaji's men had not crossed swords with Ekoji's army at any time before this incident, so how and where could they have committed these barbarous acts against the latter's men? One

version, the defective one, of the letter says that these acts were committed during the sack of Gingee.<sup>3289</sup> But Ekoji's men were not at Gingee; moreover, we have no evidence to say that such acts were committed there. Some of the men whom Martin had sent to Gingee were present when Nasir Muhammad surrendered the fort to the Marathas.<sup>3290</sup> Had the Marathas dishonoured any women or massacred any children at Gingee, Martin, who is always critical of the alleged oppression by the Maratha administration, would have certainly mentioned it in his account. But he makes no such accusation. Native envoys of the English were always loitering around the Maratha army. They, too, mention no such incident. The Maratha detachment which besieged Tiruvadi, while their main body was pursuing Sher Khan, included, according to Vardhappa, who was present in Shivaji's camp, "Baba Sahib, some horse, Savarumwar and some of Nasir Muhammad Khan's horse."<sup>3291</sup> This shows that after Gingee was surrendered, at least some of Nasir Muhammad's troops were taken into Shivaji's service. Would they have joined his service had any of their or their fellow soldiers' women been dishonoured and children massacred by Shivaji's troops? And would Shivaji have accepted the service of men who had such serious grievance against him and who could therefore not be relied upon?

Shivaji learnt about Ekoji's defeat when he was in the Torgal district, whence he wrote the following letter to his brother:

"As we have much work to do in Raigad province we kept Santaji Raja, Raghunathpant and Hambirrao in that [i.e. the Gingee] province and arrived in the district of Torgal. There we learnt that misguided by the Turks [Muslims] you assembled and sent your army against our men. They arrived at Valikandapuram. When your men advanced [against our men] a great battle was fought between your men

and our men. Your men were defeated. Pratapji Raja, Bhivaji Raja and Shivaji Dabir; these three were captured and many were killed. Many fled in rout. This we have learnt. Having heard this we wondered how in spite of your being a son of the Maharaja [Shahji] you do not reflect and do not discriminate between sin and righteousness. Then there is no wonder that you will be brought to distress. You would ask what you should think. [We would answer] you should have thought that 'we have enjoyed the entire *jagir* for thirteen years. Now we should give him half the share which he [i.e. Shivaji] is demanding and should be happy.' You should also have thought that 'He is blessed by Shri Mahadeo [Shiva] and Goddess Bhavani. He kills the wicked Turks [Muslims]. How could I win [against him] when my army also has Turks? And how would the Turks hope to escape with their lives?' You should have thought thus and should not have brought upon open hostilities. But you cherished [wicked] intentions like Duryodhan and caused unnecessary loss of life. Now let bygones be bygones. Do not be adamant hereafter. You have enjoyed the entire *jagir* for thirteen years. Now we have taken what is ours. Now give up to my men the places like the forts of Arni, Bangalore, Kolar, Hoskote, Shiralkot [? Shire], other minor places and Tanjore which have remained in your hands. Also give up half the share of cash, ornaments, elephants and horses and make peace with us with an open mind. We shall give you an estate of three hundred thousand hons in the province of Panhala on this side of the Tungabhadra. Or, if you do not want an estate from us, we shall request the Qutbshah and shall secure for you an estate [with an annual income] of three hundred thousand [Hons] from him. Both the alternatives have been written to you. Choose any one of these two. Do not be adamant. There is no need to

quarrel among ourselves and become disheartened. At least hereafter, aim at maintaining peace between you and us and settle the matter of division and be happy. Family feud is not good. As an elder, we have told you [these things] till today and now we again tell you that it is well and good if you would listen [to this advice]; you will remain happy. If you would not listen [to this advice] you will fall into distress. What can we do [then]?”<sup>3292</sup>

Whether or not this letter had any effect on Ekoji, we do not know but it is certain that his defeat did. The Jedhe Chronology records that Ekoji concluded a treaty by giving up the fort of Kolar.<sup>3293</sup> According to Sabhasad he had to give a large amount of money.<sup>3294</sup> The following entry in the Fort St George Diary under 9<sup>th</sup> April 1678 provides more details:

Intelligence of Shivaji's and Ekoji's composing their differences:

“By intelligence from the parts of the Gingee we understand that by Shivaji's order to his General, his brother Santaji, and to his Brahmins and chief officers, they have concluded a firm peace with Ekoji, his brother, and delivered back to Ekoji a good part of the country worth 2 lakhs of Pardoes per annum; which Shivaji had taken from him, and Ekoji in lieu thereof had paid 3 lakhs of Pardoes in ready money, and upon the confirmation of this agreement Santaji had been feasted and nobly presented by Ekoji in his castle of Tanjore and after his having the third quarter of 6 lakh of Pardoes which the Madurai Nayak promised to pay Shivaji of which there now remains but 1½ behind to be paid, Santaji with this army returned to Gingee castle, great part of which is very strongly rebuilt since Shivaji took it, and there is great

store of grain and all things necessary for a long siege already laid in, and he has a good stock of money also beforehand besides the rent of the country he has taken daily coming.”<sup>3295</sup>

This is corroborated by the Dagh Register dated 28<sup>th</sup> August 1678, which records that, according to the two letters of 11<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> May from Negapattinam, Ekoji was allowed to retain the country of Tanjore on payment of 300,000 pardaix to Shivaji.<sup>3296</sup>

After this treaty, Hambirrao, together with most of the army, left that province and returned to the west coast. Martin states in his memoir of January 1678 that being aware of the disunity among the local chieftains, Shivaji’s officers did not think it necessary to keep all the cavalry and so they kept only three to four thousand of it with them and sent the rest to Shivaji who saw the prospect of having to face both the Deccanis and the Pathans by the agreement concluded between them.<sup>3297</sup> Of course, only three or four thousand cavalry would not have been sufficient for the defence of the Gingee Province. Sabhassad tells us that after the treaty, Raghunathpant sent back Hambirrao with the army and raised a force of 10,000 cavalry in the Karnataka.<sup>3298</sup>

### *End of the Adilshahi Civil War*

It has already been related that, after their abortive invasion of the Qutbshahi Sultanate, the joint armies of the Mughals and Bijapur withdrew to Naldurg in September-October 1677. Soon thereafter, Siddi Masud appealed to the Qutbshah to intercede for ending the internecine war in the Adilshahi Sultanate. The Adilshahi civil war came to an end through his efforts and it was agreed upon between the warring factions that the prime ministership of the Sultanate would go

to the Deccanis and the command of the army to the Pathans.<sup>3299</sup> But, before this agreement came into effect, Bahlul Khan died at the fort of Gulbarga on 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1677.<sup>3300</sup> His lieutenant, Jamshed Khan, thought it impossible to hold his own against the Deccanis and surrendered the fort of Bijapur to their leader Siddi Masud.<sup>3301</sup> The first mention in English correspondence of Bijapur having fallen into the hands of the Deccani party is in the Karwar letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> January 1678 and is confirmed again on 23<sup>rd</sup> of the same month.<sup>3302</sup>

In their letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1678, the Rajapur factors relate an interesting story about the seizure of Bijapur by the Deccani party. It is as follows: After the death of his master, Jamshed Khan intended to deliver the fort of Bijapur to Shivaji in return for six hundred thousand Hons. Siddi Masud got wind of this plan, feigned first weakness and then death and caused a litter to be sent away publicly with a part of the army to Adoni (evidently to create the impression that Masud's body was being carried in it for a funeral at Adoni). The remaining 4,000 troops went to Jamshed Khan pretending that since their leader was dead they would serve him if he would enlist them. Jamshed Khan did so (perhaps because he was short of troops) and received them into the fort. Thereafter within two days they seized his person, opened the gates and received Masud –alive. As the story goes, Shivaji, who had already set out towards Bijapur, learnt this on the way and went back.<sup>3303</sup>

This story, however, cannot be relied upon because it is not borne out by any other source and, despite this alleged attempt at treason, Jamshed Khan continued to serve as a high-ranking officer in the Adilshahi army.<sup>3304</sup>

The internecine squabbles in the Adilshahi Sultanate did not come to an end completely. Rivalry between Siddi Masud and Sharza Khan continued.<sup>3305</sup> Ambar Khan had assembled

two or three thousand troopers and was raising trouble around Sindhanur, about 160 km southeast of Bijapur.<sup>3306</sup> But the more immediate problem which Masud had to face was that of the Pathan soldiery.<sup>3307</sup> Their salaries had fallen in arrears and the amount due to them was, according to the *Basatin-us Salatin*, 160,000 hons. Therefore the Pathans assembled outside the walls of Bijapur with their headquarters in Bahlul Khan's house and began to plunder the surrounding territory. To suppress their lawlessness, Masud sent out a detachment which attacked Bahlul Khan's house, which the Pathans had prepared for defence, on 14<sup>th</sup>/15<sup>th</sup> April 1678. The house was surrounded by the Adilshahi army and the Pathans agreed to make a settlement at 40 per cent of the arrears. But Masud's envoy bluntly told them that they would not get more than five per cent and that if they were not content with it they would be dismissed. The *Basatin-us Salatin* does not tell us what settlement was finally made. But the story is narrated here in some detail only to portray the conditions of anarchy that then prevailed in the Adilshahi Sultanate.

### *Campaign in the Gadag District*

Shivaji was within two days' march of Fort St. George on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1677.<sup>3308</sup> Soon thereafter he set out on his return journey, evidently through the tract between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna. The Jedhe Chronology says he arrived in the Gadag district in the month of Kartik of Shaka 1599 (17<sup>th</sup> October to 14<sup>th</sup> November 1677) and invested Belavadi.<sup>3309</sup>

While Shivaji was marching towards the Gadag district, another Maratha force under Dattaji, a minister as well as Governor of the Panhala province, struck southeast towards Hubli, about 50 km west of Gadag. According to Rajapur and Karwar letters, dated 8<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> December 1677 respectively, Dattaji with 4,000 cavalry was roaming around Hubli

demanding tribute from the Adilshahi commandant of that place.<sup>3310</sup>

In their letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> October 1677 to Surat, the English factors of Mumbai speak of "Shivaji's forces having besieged Bankapur and robbed Gadag and Lakshmeshvar."<sup>3311</sup> Bankapur is about 550 km as the crow flies from Madras, while the distance between them by road must have been more—say over 650 km. If Shivaji had marched at the rate of about 30 km a day he would not have reached Bankapur till around 25<sup>th</sup> October. The Jedhe Chronology records, as we have seen, that he arrived in the Gadag district sometime between 17<sup>th</sup> October and 14<sup>th</sup> November 1677. So there is little possibility of English factors of Mumbai having known of his arrival at Bankapur by 29th October 1677. Therefore the force that they say had "besieged Bankapur and robbed Gadag and Lakshmeshvar" appears to have been the one under Dattaji which, according to the Rajapur and Karwar letters of 8<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> December respectively, was roaming around Hubli. Thus, to sum up, Dattaji was plundering the towns in the district of Gadag in October 1677. Was he awaiting Shivaji's arrival there? It appears so.

The Mumbai letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> January 1678 says "He [i.e. Shivaji] is at present before Banca Pore, two other very strong ghurrs [gads i.e. forts] or rocks"<sup>3312</sup> The belief of the English factors of Mumbai that Banka and Pur were two separate places was incorrect. A portion of their information about Shivaji's presence before it is correct. Shivaji and Dattaji seem to have joined forces somewhere near that place around November 1677.

The siege of Bankapur is not mentioned by any other source. Probably it was not a regular siege operation but merely shutting up of the garrison by bands of Maratha troopers roving about it. Be that as it may, Bankapur did not fall into the hands

of the Marathas at the time.<sup>3313</sup> One can reconstruct the campaign in the Gadag district as follows: From October 1677, a Maratha force under Dattaji was plundering the towns in that district. Shivaji seems to have joined hands with it in October-November 1677. The Marathas occupied the countryside in the Hubli-Gadag-Bankapur triangle, but the Adilshahi forts of Bankapur and Hubli held firm.<sup>3314</sup>

Leaving a part of his army in occupation of the Gadag district, Shivaji himself left for Panhala and it was on his way there that he besieged Belavadi. This village, about 20 km southeast of Sampgaon, boasted a *gadhi* — a small mud fort — held by the widow of the local Desai. It was besieged because the lady had plundered the transport bullocks of Shivaji's army.<sup>3315</sup> The name of this 'amazon' was, Mallawwa.<sup>3316</sup> She defended her *gadhi* for an unexpectedly long period — according to Chitnis, 27 days. It was then stormed and she was taken prisoner. Sabhasad says that she was punished, whereas according to Chitnis she was released and given a small estate.<sup>3317</sup>

It is interesting to note that the English factors at Rajapur learnt of this comparatively insignificant episode. On 28<sup>th</sup> February 1678, they wrote to Surat:

"He [i.e. Shivaji] is at present besieging a fort where, by relation of their own people come from him, he has suffered more disgrace than ever he did from all power of the Mughal or Deccanis, and he who has conquered so many kingdoms is not able to reduce this women Desai."<sup>3318</sup>

Shivaji's chivalrous conduct towards this lady is indicated by a stone sculpture found in the village of Yadvad, about 10 km

north of Dharwad.<sup>3319</sup> It is carved in a 3'x2.5' stone slate. A bearded man is shown sitting with a child in his lap and a glass in his hand. It is said that Mallawwa caused such sculptures to be put up in many villages in her jurisdiction, of which Yadvad was one, to commemorate Shivaji's chivalry. But this is the only one that has been discovered so far. It appears that the idea meant to be conveyed by this sculpture is that Shivaji is giving a glass of milk to Mallawwa's child as a token of his assurance of safety to her.

In their letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1678, the Rajapur factors informed Surat that Shivaji was expected at Panhala shortly.<sup>3320</sup> He arrived at the fort sometime before 5<sup>th</sup> May 1678. The Karwar letter of that date later confirms his being at Panhala "in person."<sup>3321</sup> From there, he went to Raigad. The Jedhe Chronology says that after capturing the province of Gadag, Shivaji arrived at Raigad in the month of Jyeshtha of Shaka 1600 (11<sup>th</sup> May to 9<sup>th</sup> June 1678).<sup>3322</sup> The English factors of Karwar wrote to Surat on 14<sup>th</sup> June 1678 that Shivaji had lately departed from Rajapur, after a visit to their colleagues there, and intended to go to Panhala.<sup>3323</sup> But, it seems, their information that he intended to go to Panhala was incorrect. Be that as it may, he had reached Raigad on or before 9<sup>th</sup> June 1678.

The political scenario in the Deccan was extremely complex during the first half of 1678. There were conflicting rumours about different sets of alliances — that between Bijapur and the Mughals against Shivaji, between Bijapur, Golconda and Shivaji against the Mughals, or Bijapur and Golconda against Shivaji.<sup>3324</sup> In reality, Golconda did not take active part in any theatre and the Mughals restricted themselves to the defence of their own territory. The main struggle continued between the Marathas and Bijapur and the main theatre had shifted to the west and northwest of Bijapur, from Athani in the north to Bankapur in the south.

## RAIDS IN MUGHAL TERRITORY

Even before Shivaji's return to Raigad, the Marathas launched a series of strikes at widely separated points in Mughal territory which knocked the breath out of the Mughal army of the Deccan in fruitless pursuit.

It would be remembered that the Chief of Jawhar had taken refuge in Mughal territory and from there continued to stir up guerrilla resistance against Shivaji's rule. The Jedhe Chronology states that in the month of Margashirsha, Shaka 1599 (15<sup>th</sup> November to 14<sup>th</sup> December 1677) Moropant swooped down upon and plundered Nasik. The most important gain in this raid was that Vikramshah, the Chief of Jawhar, was taken prisoner together with Siddi Fakir, the Mughal *faujdar* of the district.<sup>3325</sup> On 16<sup>th</sup> January 1678, the Mumbai Council wrote to the Company: "Moropant, one of his [Shivaji's] generals, has also of late plundered Trimbak Nasik and other considerable places within the Mughal's territories which has added much to his [Shivaji's] treasure."<sup>3326</sup> And on 21<sup>st</sup> February 1678 they wrote to Surat: "The news current in these parts is that Dilir Khan, the Mughal's General against Deccan is come to Nasik-Trimbak which place Shivaji's army plundered not long since, but his army is so broke by a fight with the Deccani Wazirs, that Shivaji values him little."<sup>3327</sup>

Dilir Khan appears to have returned from Nasik to his camp at Parner but had to leave it soon afterwards to deal with a Maratha force that had struck deep inside Mughal territory and was plundering the countryside around Bidar, some 345 km east-southeast of Parner. Bhimsen writes that, as Dilir Khan received the news that the Marathas were creating trouble in the vicinity of Jafarabad alias Bidar, he set out from Parner and, leaving a part of his army at Paranda under Shubhkaran

Bundela, rushed towards the troubled area.<sup>3328</sup> Bhimsen, who also had accompanied the army then, describes his stay at Paranda but does not tell us anything about the outcome of Dilir Khan's march towards Bidar. As usual, the Marathas had probably vanished by the time he reached there. Bhimsen further says: "The letter of Dilir Khan came to Shubhkaran telling him that he should bring his forces to Solapur. He reached there. . . Dilir Khan joined the forces and stayed sometime in Indapur [about 30 km west by south of Paranda]. The small fort there had been damaged and needed repair, which was done."<sup>3329</sup>

It was while Dilir Khan was thus drawn southwards that the Marathas appear to have swooped down upon and plundered Paithan. We have no information about this raid except the statement in the *Maasir-i Alamgiri* that on 8<sup>th</sup> May the Emperor learnt of Shivaji's attack on Mungi Paithan.<sup>3330</sup>

From Indapur, Dilir Khan marched to Bahadurgad and stayed there during the rains.<sup>3331</sup>

#### FALL OF VELLORE

Vellore fell on 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1678 after a siege of fourteen months.<sup>3332</sup> Martin records in his memoir of August 1678:

"After a vigorous defence on the part of the garrison, the Governor [commander of the fort] was at last compelled by a kind of contagious disease, which had broken out in the place and which carried away every day about eight to ten persons, to surrender the fortress of Vellore which was besieged since the arrival of Shivaji in the province. The capitulation made, he got out with one hundred infantry and

thirty horsemen. This fortress is important, the troops of Shivaji had pushed their conquest further in other provinces in such a way that we were assured that there was only a distance of about thirty leagues by road between his estates on the [west] coast of India and his conquests in these parts.”<sup>3333</sup>

The Adilshahi army had made a belated attempt to save the fortress. An English letter of August 1678 from Fort St. George reads:

“Yesterday there came intelligence from Kanchipuram (which is the Chief City of these parts, and about 40 miles distance) that there was 1000 or 1500 of Shivaji's Horse under the command of Santaji, his brother, which appeared before that place, whereupon the inhabitants were put into great fears, thinking the town would be taken and plundered, and they reported also that those Horse with other forces were intended to proceed further into the King of Golconda's Country, and to take Poonamallee castle about 10 miles inland from us but this day came other persons from Kanchipuram, who reported that those Horse of Shivaji's, about 1000, came there in pursuit of some Bijapur foot that were intended to relieve and succor Vellore castle (in Arcot), which has been besieged by Shivaji's forces these 14 months, and those foot (after a skirmish wherein about 100 of them were killed, and about 40 or 50 of Shivaji's Horse) being routed, the said Horse pursued them so far, and upon Podili Linganna's sending them word (that the) foot were not in that Towne but were gone into the woods, they were upon their return to Vellore.<sup>3334</sup> The said castle of Vellore is now surrendered to Shivaji's forces, Abdulla Khan, the Captain, that held it out all this time having behaved

himself very resolutely therein but his men from 1,800 foot and 500 horse, being by the extremity of the siege and sickness reduced to 200 foot and 100 horse and no supplies sent him from Bijapur or Golconda he could not hold it longer, and therefore delivered it upon conditions to have 30,000 pagodas in money , a small fort and country worth 30,000 pagodas per annum: in which if he does receive possession of it, he says he intends to leave his family, and go himself on a pilgrimage of Mecca.” [3335](#)

According to a Fort St. George Diary entries of 30<sup>th</sup> September and 16<sup>th</sup> October 1678, Abdulla Khan received only 15,000 pagodas upon his surrender and, as he found that the Marathas were eluding the payment of the rest of the amount, he came to Madras (Chennai) with his family on 29<sup>th</sup> September, awaited for some time an invitation to some suitable employment in Golconda or Bijapur and then went away on 16<sup>th</sup> October.[3336](#) The *Basatin-us Salatin* tells us that Abdulla was bought up by Shivaji for 50,000 Hons. He then went back to Bijapur and though Siddi Masud wanted to confiscate the amount, he could not do so because Abdulla was a protégé of his rival, Sharza Khan.[3337](#) The veracity of these stories is doubtful because, in the conditions in which the fort was surrendered, it is unlikely that the Marathas would have paid him such a large amount, though they might have paid something in appreciation of his gallantry.

#### RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The fall of Vellore completed the conquest of the coastal plains of the Adilshahi Karnataka.

In their letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> January 1678 to the Company headquarters in England, the Mumbai Council wrote of this

campaign:

“Shivaji Raja, carried on by an ambitious desire to be famed a mighty conqueror, left Rairi, his strongest hold in the kingdom of Konkan at the latter end of the last fair Monsoon, and marched with his army, consisting of 20000 horse and 40000 foot into Karnataka, where the Telingas have two of the strongest holds in these parts called Gingee, Tanjore, where many merchants are considerable inhabitants, and with a success as happy as Caesar’s in Spain, he came, saw and overcame, and reported so vast a treasure in gold, diamonds, emeralds, rubies and wrought coral that have strengthened his armies with very able sinews to prosecute his further victorious designs.”<sup>3338</sup>

The results of the campaign were commensurate with the brilliance of its conception and execution. A letter dated August 1678 from Fort St. George reads:

“And now Shivaji by his Deputies has a full and quiet possession of all these countries about those two strong castles or holds of Gingee and Vellore, which are worth 22 lack of pagodas or 550 thousand pounds sterling per annum; at 5 shillings the pardoe,<sup>3339</sup> in which he has a considerable force of men and horse, 72 strong hills, [i.e. hill-forts] and 14 forts [castles in the plains], being 60 leagues long and 40 broad, so that it will not be easily taken from him.”<sup>3340</sup>

The new conquests, according to Sabhasad, were worth two million hons (per year).<sup>3341</sup> He also states that, including the old forts as well as the new ones built by him, Shivaji

garrisoned 100 forts in that province.<sup>3342</sup> But this statement appears exaggerated and contradicts the list of forts in Karnataka which the chronicler has given, wherein only 79 forts are listed as those in the Karnataka.<sup>3343</sup>

Soon after the conquest of the Coromandel Coast, the Maratha merchant navy began to ply as far as Malacca. An entry dated 15<sup>th</sup> November 1680 in the Dagh Register says that, according to the news received from Pulicat in October, the trade was running well at Porto Novo and that a small *galiot* of Raghunathpant was to go from Porto Novo to Malacca and he had asked the Dutch for exemption from customs duties.<sup>3344</sup> And another entry dated 21<sup>st</sup> December 1680 says that a small ship belonging to Raghunath Pandit reached Malacca on 17<sup>th</sup> October with 219 bales of carpets.<sup>3345</sup>

But the most important benefit of this campaign was reaped after Shivaji's death. Manucci says: "By these victories he increased his strength, and subsequently was able to resist the armies of Aurangzeb."<sup>3346</sup> Shivaji was aware that, sooner or later, he would have to cross swords with the entire might of the Mughal Empire. He wanted to offer a defence in depth which would force their armies to spread out, over-stretch their lines of communication and thus expose them to Maratha counter attacks. His plan of defence was based on space, hill fortresses and superior mobility of his light cavalry. This strategy was not fortuitous. It was intentional and the stage was set for its adoption by careful preparations.

These preparations were put to test when the impending Mughal invasion came at last after Shivaji's death. But the strategy which he had laid down was already in place to guide the Marathas. Gingee stood a siege, with a short interruption, of nine years — the longest in modern history. It capitulated at last but, by that time, the Maratha light cavalry operating against

the over stretched Mughal lines of communication had broken the back of the Imperial armies, from which disaster they never recovered.

The conquest of Karnataka, completed almost without bloodshed, was a triumph of Shivaji's grand strategy. Not only did it save the Maratha kingdom from complete extinction by the mighty waves of the Mughal invasion that rolled in from the north, but it also completely shattered them and laid the foundations of the Maratha Empire. It thus decided the fate of India in the next century.

## *Chapter 17*

# The Khanderi Campaign (August 1679 - January 1680)

BEGINNING OF SHIVAJI'S SECOND ATTEMPT TO FORTIFY KHANDERI (AUGUST 1679)<sup>3347</sup>

Shivaji's abortive attempt to fortify the islands of Khanderi in 1672 has already been related.<sup>3348</sup> He renewed the venture in 1679 when the Siddi's fleet had wintered at Surat instead of Mumbai. The time chosen was the height of the rainy season, evidently to attract as little attention as possible and avoid interference by the English, the Siddi or the Portuguese. In their letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> November 1679 to the Company, the Surat Council recalled:

“In August last Shivaji ordered some hundreds of men with diverse materials for the fortifying thereof, and was so nimble and secret in his design that before notice was taken of it [he] had run up breast-works in several places to defend his men and mounted some small guns.”<sup>3349</sup>

But about 27<sup>th</sup> August 1679, the English at Mumbai had received intelligence from their Portuguese and Hindu informants that Shivaji had been making preparations to fortify Khanderi and had collected men and material at Chaul for the purpose.<sup>3350</sup> They informed Surat in their express letter of that date:

“This serves chiefly to inform [you] that we have received certain intelligence, both from [the] Portuguese and Hindu correspondents, that Shivaji Rajah intends to fortify the island of Hendry Kendry [that is Khanderi and Underil], lying at the mouth of this bay, and always *supposed* to belong to us. We

humblly perceive it little policy to suffer so potent and voracious a prince to possess himself of so considerable a post without disputing his title thereunto. His designs herein cannot be otherwise than to have a check on the whole trade of this island and adjacent parts, by keeping there always a fleet of small brigantines to cruise up and down. This we thought not fitting to omit advisal of, that you might be pleased to strengthen us by your advice and orders how to proceed, for both men and materials are come to Chaul for said design. If he is suffered to build it will be hard disputing with him hereafter, but at present we suppose standing on our terms and *owing it as ours*, *with a seeming resolution to obstruct him*, may make him desist.”<sup>3351</sup>

By the end of August 1679, Maynak Bhandari, a Maratha naval officer, had landed on the island with 150 men and four small guns, whereupon the Deputy Governor of Mumbai wrote him to leave the island which he refused to do without orders from his master.<sup>3352</sup> The Deputy Governor also sent his interpreter, Narayan Shenavi, to the *Subadar* of Chaul to inform him that the English could not allow him to prosecute his design without acquainting their superiors at Surat and receiving their orders which they were awaiting.<sup>3353</sup> In the night of 4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> September the *Havaldar* of Chaul sent up to Raigad to inform Shivaji of the English intervention.<sup>3354</sup>

#### DECISION OF THE ENGLISH TO INTERVENE (SEPTEMBER 1679)

The Mumbai council was fully aware of the importance of Khanderi.<sup>3355</sup> On 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1679 they passed the following resolution:

“Shivaji Rajah’s ministers on the main [land] send over from Thal to Khanderi a considerable number of men and materials, with an intention to fortify and

settle on the said island, which will be a very great prejudice and inconvenience to this port.... They having at present but one or two small boats for that purpose ... a small strength will hinder them, and for that intent it was

“Ordered that three *shibads* should be with all speed fitted up, and that Ensign Hughes, with six files of soldiers should be drawn out to go on board said *shibads* and cruise between that [island] and the main [land] and hinder all boats whatsoever (employed for) the transportation of men and materials to the said island.”<sup>3356</sup>

In accordance with this resolution the Deputy Governor of Mumbai dispatched, on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1679, a squadron of three *shibads*, with six files of soldiers in all, under command of Ensign Daniel Hughes.<sup>3357</sup> His orders were to turn back the boats that may come to supply the island telling them that the island belonged to the King of England and that they must not build or settle therein. He however was not to resort to force unless the enemy did so first.<sup>3358</sup>

Meanwhile, also on 3<sup>rd</sup> September, the Surat council received the Mumbai dispatch of 27<sup>th</sup> August which informed them of “Shivaji Rajah’s intentions to fortify the island Khanderi.”<sup>3359</sup> In their meeting held the next day they resolved to send the following orders to Mumbai.

“That they [the Mumbai Council] immediately erect an English flag on the highest part of the island (and if it may be done without any danger from the Malabaris) that a file of soldiers be kept there to guard it. And the *Hunter* frigate be ordered to attend upon them, plying up and down near the said island, giving the commander orders, to acquaint in a friendly way those that are appointed by Shivaji for the

management of that design, when they offer to erect their fort, that the island belongs to His Majesty of Great Britain, and that none can attempt anything upon the place without an open breach of friendship; and ... that if a breach happens the whole world may be sensible the cause first and only proceed from them. Likewise that they sent advice to the same effect to the chief ministers at Chaul, or who else they shall find most proper to prevent any further proceeding therein; and if the Deputy Governor etc. (as being upon the place) shall find any other method more effectual we leave it to them to make choice of such fit means as they shall see most secure and behoofful [useful] to the island, requiring them to advise us of all accidents and occurrences therein as opportunities shall offer themselves.”<sup>3360</sup>

Orders in accordance with this resolution were dispatched to Mumbai on 5<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>3361</sup> Meanwhile, the Mumbai Council, in their letter of 6<sup>th</sup> September, informed Surat of the Maratha occupation of Khanderi and the dispatch of three English *shibads* to blockade the same, asking for approval of these measures. They wrote:

“If we have done well herein you will approve thereof, if not our small siege is soon withdrawn. This affair will require your most serious consideration, and if you will please to take our opinions in the case, we give it in brief, that it will be both dishonourable to the nation and very prejudicial to the island [of Mumbai] ... to suffer Shivaji or any other prince whatsoever to fortify or possess [the] said island [of Khanderi]. Your orders herein we desire may be plain and punctual, that we may nor err in the putting them in execution, nor hereafter be left to answer for others' defaults, nor be deceived with the ambiguous term of the Delphic Oracle *ibis et redibis & ca;*<sup>3362</sup> not doubting

but your prudence will give such directions as the exigence requires.”<sup>3363</sup>

This letter was taken up for consideration in the Surat Council’s meeting of 15<sup>th</sup> September and the following resolution was passed:

“Therefore we do determine to give our orders to the Deputy Governor and Council [of Mumbai] that if they find that no fair means will take place with them [i.e. the Marathas], but that they rather persist in their obstinacy, and that Daulat Khan shall appear there with the Rajah’s fleet to protect and countenance their proceedings and will not be prevailed with amicably to be gone and recall those settled on the island, that then they [i.e. the Mumbai Council] fit out the *Revenge* and *Hunter* frigates to join with what vessels they have, and can conveniently man, and repel them with force as an open and public enemy.”<sup>3364</sup>

In the same meeting, the Surat Council resolved to dissolve their factory at Karwar. They had also received a letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> August from Rajapur advising them that the factors there had received ‘Barratts’ (varats or bills of exchange) from the *subadar* to the amount of 292 *khandis* (a measure of weight) of beetle nuts and half a million coconuts which they (i.e. the factors) hoped to get in by the end of September and requesting them (the Surat Council) to order the Mumbai Council to send down vessels to bring the goods up.<sup>3365</sup> The Surat Council decided to leave the matter “to the care of Mr. John Child and the Council of Bombay, as also to consider and put in execution the most effectual means for dissolving that factory and bringing the factors from thence.”<sup>3366</sup> Orders according to these resolutions were dispatched to Mumbai on 20<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>3367</sup> But the orders about Karwar and Rajapur could not be put into effect by the Mumbai Council because of the hostilities.<sup>3368</sup>

#### THE PORTUGUESE POLICY (SEPTEMBER 1679)

On 16<sup>th</sup> September 1679 the Governor of Portuguese India, Antonio Pais de Sande, convened a meeting of the State Advisory Council in the fort of Goa and informed them that he had received a letter from the Captain of Chaul, Francisco de Saldhana. In substance, it was as follows:

Two thousand men of Shivaji Raja had arrived at Upper Chaul and were to be employed for the fortification of Khanderi Island, situated just opposite Chaul. Further, there was a report that he would send 3,000 more for the purpose. Having realized that that the fortification of that island would be prejudicial to him, the Siddi had planned to send twelve galiots to oppose them.

Having informed them of the contents of the letter, the Governor sought the Council's advice. The members of the Council expressed their view that the fortification of the said island would be prejudicial to their neighbourhood as well as to their maritime traffic. They therefore advised the Governor that two frigates and two galiots, which were detailed to patrol the coast between Mumbai and Vasai, be ordered to go to Khanderi. The Governor agreed with this view and assured the council that the necessary action would be taken immediately.<sup>3369</sup>

But this resolution was not put into effect when the Governor learnt that the English had sent their naval force to oppose the fortification of Khanderi. The Governor then ordered the General of the Northern forts, Joao de Melo de Sampaio, to remain neutral and tell the English that they [i.e. the Portuguese] could not enter the war as they had made a treaty with Shivaji. He also instructed the General to supply all provisions to the English but, at the same time, not to disfavour or embarrass Shivaji's plans, because their neighborhood would be more troublesome to the Portuguese than that of Shivaji.<sup>3370</sup>

#### THE BLOCKADE (4<sup>TH</sup> SEPT. TO 6<sup>TH</sup> OCT. 1679)

(A continuous correspondence between Mumbai and the blockading squadron was maintained by means of small boats called 'advice boats'.<sup>3371</sup> The squadron was supplied with water and other necessities such as wood from Mumbai by means of a 'water boat' or 'tank-boat' which also carried dispatches.<sup>3372</sup>)

The English squadron reached off Khanderi on the morning of 4<sup>th</sup> September 1679. By then the Marathas, as Ensign Hughes informed Mumbai in his dispatch, had landed about 400 or more men — mostly workers — on the island, erected small sheds, thrown up about three feet high breastworks of earth and stone at probable landing places and mounted four to six guns guarded with similar works.<sup>3373</sup> Two hours after the arrival of the English squadron, two boats, full of men, came from the mainland but were turned back by the English.<sup>3374</sup> The Marathas then stopped the supply of Khanderi for about ten days.<sup>3375</sup> But the work of fortifying the island went ahead and by 9<sup>th</sup> September, as Hughes informed Mumbai, the Marathas had also constructed some gun-carriages on the island.<sup>3376</sup>

On 13<sup>th</sup> September 1679, the *Revenge*,<sup>3377</sup> with two files of soldiers, commanded by Captain William Minchin, left Mumbai at 6 p.m. and arrived off Khanderi at 9 p.m.<sup>3378</sup> The next morning, the squadron of *shibads* left for Mumbai due to foul weather.<sup>3379</sup>

On 15<sup>th</sup> September 1679, Maratha small craft resumed the supply of Khanderi. As captain Minchin reported to Mumbai, two boats went from the mainland to the island on that day and six more on the next.<sup>3380</sup> Since then, Maratha small craft continued to run the blockade and carry reinforcements and supplies to Khanderi, mostly at night, without serious interference.<sup>3381</sup> These lightly built ships, as captain Minchin and later Captain Keigwin complained, were faster and could easily outrun the heavily built English ships.<sup>3382</sup>

The squadron of *shibads*, this time under command of Lieutenant Francis Thorpe (as Hughes was sick), joined the *Revenge* on the 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>3383</sup> On 19<sup>th</sup> September, Lt. Thorpe made an attempt to land on the island. Captain Minchin described it in his dispatch to Mumbai thus:<sup>3384</sup>

On the morning of 19<sup>th</sup> September Minchin went on board Thorpe's *shibad*, found him drunk and was told by him that he intended to land his men on the island in the night of 18<sup>th</sup>/19<sup>th</sup> September but was kept off as their approach was discovered by a light match (evidently lit by the garrison). Minchin advised him to desist from any rash attempt and to stick to the orders of the Deputy Governor and the Council of Mumbai, and then returned to his ship. Soon afterwards, he heard the sound of gun-fire from the *shibads* and immediately realized that Thorpe was making an attempt to land on the island. The Garrison was alert and returned the fire. Captain Minchin sent his boat, with all the Englishmen he had, to support Lt. Thorpe but before they reached the scene two of the *shibads* turned back. Sergeant Nash<sup>3385</sup> then came on board the *Revenge* and informed Minchin of the loss of the third *shibad* and the death of Lt. Thrope, John Bradbury, and Henry Welch. Several other men were taken prisoner.<sup>3386</sup> Many others were wounded and sent back to Mumbai in one of the *shibads*.<sup>3387</sup>

The garrison hauled the captured *shibad* ashore and took out her mast.<sup>3388</sup> In their report dated 18<sup>th</sup> November 1679 (i.e. two months after the event) to the Company, the President and Council of Surat had distorted the story a little. This distortion, whether intentional or otherwise, reads:

“But this rash and inconsiderate man [i.e. Lt. Thorpe], contrary to his instructions, when he comes to the island, goes himself ashore alone, and in his disputes with Shivaji’s men falls out with them, upon which they shot him and some other in the *shibad*

lying so near the shore that she ran aground and so was possessed by Shivaji's men.”<sup>3389</sup>

Captain Minchin's dispatch, written on the very day of the action, is far more reliable and it does not refer to Thorpe's having gone ashore alone. On the contrary, it specifically mentions Thorpe's intention of landing his men on the island which was not put into effect on the night of 18<sup>th</sup> /19<sup>th</sup> September only because they were discovered in time by the light matches evidently lit by the garrison.<sup>3390</sup>

After sending back the wounded in one *shibad* the blockade was continued by the *Revenge* and the remaining *shibad*.<sup>3391</sup> On the very day of this action, i.e. on 19<sup>th</sup> September, Captain Minchin sent the *shibad* to lie close in with the island but it came under heavy fire from the garrison and had to withdraw out of the range of their guns.<sup>3392</sup> Anyway, Captain Minchin had little hope of subduing the garrison by bombardment. In his dispatch of 22<sup>nd</sup> September he wrote:

“As for what damage we can do them ashore it will be but little to their men, for as [soon as] ever we approach, the people all hide themselves in the rocks [so] that there is not a man to be seen. We may batter some of their breastworks down but except we could have the blood of some of their men in revenge of the blood of our countrymen we may receive more damage than we can do harm....However, if your Worship do approve of it, after the new moon is over, I will place myself in the same place where I rode before, which is on the southeast side of the island, abreast of their main breastwork.”<sup>3393</sup>

In the meantime, the garrison was working hard to fortify the island. Captain Minchin added in his dispatch of 22<sup>nd</sup> September: “They have been very hard employed in their works night and day ever since”

The *shibad* that was sent to Mumbai rejoined the *Revenge* and the other *shibad* sometime on 22<sup>nd</sup> September.<sup>3394</sup> On or before 26<sup>th</sup> September Minchin moved closer to the island. In his dispatch of that date he wrote:

“Sir, our ship now lies so near that we can hear them [i.e. the garrison] call out to their sentinels to have a care; and further we are daily in expectation of seeing Shivaji’s fleet, and in case I hale into the bay, which is the only place if I do execution to beat down some of their battery, and if Shivaji’s fleet come in upon me, then I shall be embayed and may be glad to know which way to get out again for no wind but a southerly wind will carry me clear again; which is your Worship’s general orders to have a care of embaying myself [so] that Shivaji’s fleet comes not upon me unawares.”<sup>3395</sup>

Soon afterwards, the Mumbai Council received definite intelligence about the impending arrival of the Maratha flotilla from Rajapur under command of Daulat Khan.<sup>3396</sup> Therefore, on 29<sup>th</sup> September, they ordered the blockading force to come back for refitting on 1<sup>st</sup> October.<sup>3397</sup> While it was refitting, a small *manchua* with two files of soldiers, was to cruise between the island and the mainland during daytime, retire into the bay (i.e. the waters between the island of Mumbai and the mainland) in the evening so as to be secure and sail out again in the morning to continue its vigil.<sup>3398</sup>

On 7<sup>th</sup> October 1679, the English squadron, now consisting of the *Revenge*, two *gurabs*, three *shibads* and two *manchuas* — totalling 188 soldiers on board excluding officers and men — resumed the blockade under command of Captain Richard Keigwin in the *Revenge* who had experience of naval warfare in England.<sup>3399</sup> The squadron was “manned with such Christians as could be safely be spared from Mumbai.”<sup>3400</sup> The armament of the

Revenge comprised 16 guns.<sup>3401</sup> One of the *gurabs* was armed with six guns and the other probably with an equal number.<sup>3402</sup> The *gurabs* were hired from two residents of Mumbai and were manned and fitted out with guns.<sup>3403</sup> The owners of the *gurabs* — a certain Englishman called Gape and a local resident called “Popgee Naique” — were promised compensation in case of damage.<sup>3404</sup>

Keigwin's orders were not to allow any boats to come from the mainland to the island and to do his utmost to capture those who would attempt it. “But”, ran the orders issued by the Deputy Governor and Council of Mumbai,

“the main reason and occasion that induces us to fit out so considerable a fleet is the certain intelligence we have that the Rajah's [i.e. Shivaji's] armada, consisting of about twenty sail of *gurabs* under the command of Daulat Khan, is now afitting and ordered to make all speed possible to come up to the succor of this island Khanderi-Underi. . . . When you see it [i.e. the armada] appear and it draws near to the island, you are to send a small boat to Daulat Khan, the Rajah's admiral, and acquaint him in a friendly way with such circumstances of our right to the place as may be most fit and agreeable to the present occasion in difference, which if you shall find to have no influence upon him to withdraw, then you are with courage [to] assault him as an open and public enemy.”<sup>3405</sup>

The council gave further instructions that if Daulat Khan was not inclined to engage in battle but stood to the northward or “anyway into this Bay” (i.e. the waters between the Mumbai Island and the mainland) with his fleet, then Keigwin was to follow and prevent him if he tried to land on Mumbai Island.<sup>3406</sup>

The Mumbai Council considered the strength of the blockading squadron adequate. While Keigwin with his

squadron stood off Khanderi, they wrote to him on 17<sup>th</sup> October:

“The multitude of the enemy’s vessels we concern ourselves not for, because we are sensible your strength is greater, they being but poorly manned and ill fitted for a fight; but yet let not this make you so far slight them as to be careless, but be very watchful and if you can get one or two of the vessels coming or going out from Khanderi it will be a greater satisfaction to the fleet to see what sorry people they have to deal withal.”<sup>3407</sup>

In their dispatch of 6<sup>th</sup> October 1679, they informed Surat that their squadron would leave Mumbai on the next day for the blockade of Khanderi and asserted: “If they [i.e. the garrison of Khanderi] are strictly blocked up, we are assured that the want of water will cause them to surrender, it being already very scarce with them.”<sup>3408</sup>

The squadron anchored off Khanderi on 8<sup>th</sup> October 1679 and on 10<sup>th</sup> October, Keigwin learnt that Daulat Khan was ready to sail.<sup>3409</sup>

#### THREAT TO MUMBAI (OCTOBER 1679)

The manning of the blockading squadron left Mumbai with only “fifty garrison soldiers besides the troop” and therefore it was decided to recruit fifty Topazes.<sup>3410</sup> In the meantime, the Marathas were assembling a force on the mainland opposite Mumbai and had even asked the Portuguese for passage through their territory. This the Portuguese refused to grant. As the easiest way to descend upon Mumbai passed through Portuguese territory, this Portuguese refusal considerably reduced the threat of any Maratha attack in strength on the island. But the Mumbai Council feared that they might use small boats to transport their troops from across the mainland. Therefore, on 13<sup>th</sup> October, they hired two more *shibads* for the defence of Mumbai because

none of the Company's were in the port at that time. Further, they also prepared themselves to oppose any attempt on the part of the Marathas to force their way through Portuguese territory.<sup>3411</sup>

While the Mumbai Council was taking these steps for the defence of the island, a man named Sundarji Prabhu sneaked into Mumbai on 11<sup>th</sup> October and was caught immediately afterwards. It was well known that this man was in Shivaji's service for several years and he had been to Mumbai as a representative of his master in several cases. His arrival at such time "in so mean an equipage as in a manner disguised" could not be esteemed otherwise than his being a spy. During an inquiry held on 16<sup>th</sup> October, Sundarji failed to give a satisfactory account of his arrival. This, together with the fallacies and equivocations that he used to clear himself, confirmed the suspicions of the Mumbai Council and they unanimously decided to put him in prison.<sup>3412</sup> It was also decided in this meeting, held on 16<sup>th</sup> October, to employ three or four poor inhabitants of Mumbai on a small pay and send them to the mainland to watch Shivaji's forces and bring back the intelligence every three or four days.<sup>3413</sup>

On 13<sup>th</sup> October, John Child took charge as Deputy Governor of Mumbai from Henry Oxenden.<sup>3414</sup>

#### THE BLOCKADE (6<sup>TH</sup> TO 21<sup>ST</sup> OCTOBER 1679)

The Maratha flotilla, comprising 35 galiots and *gurabs*, under command of Daulat Khan came in sight of the English squadron about 3 p.m on 15<sup>th</sup> October 1679. The English squadron immediately weighed anchor and put themselves in a fighting posture. But the Maratha ships tucked and stood into the shore and anchored in shallow water near the land where they could not be followed.<sup>3415</sup> On 16<sup>th</sup> October, most of the Maratha flotilla entered the Nagaon creek and the next day they had all gone there.<sup>3416</sup> The English squadron then took their station

within shot of the shore and were occasionally fired at but without any damage.<sup>3417</sup>

The presence of the Maratha flotilla compelled the English blockading ships to remain close together lest they were fallen upon and defeated in detail.<sup>3418</sup> This need to keep the blockading squadron concentrated weakened the blockade. The Maratha galiots were much nimbler than the heavier English ships; they remained active and continued to go to the island of Khanderi at night.<sup>3419</sup>

In the morning of 18<sup>th</sup> October, the Maratha flotilla comprising about 40-50 *gurabs* and *galiots*, came out of the Nagaon River and keeping close to the shore rowed towards the English squadron.<sup>3420</sup> The English ships were anchored at this time in a line near Khanderi between that island and the mainland and with their bows towards the latter. There was an easterly breeze and the tide of flood was coming on. When the Maratha flotilla rowed as far as Thal abreast of the English, they suddenly changed course and, with their guns firing, bore down upon the English with wind and oars, scarcely giving them any time to prepare for battle. In accordance with the orders he had received from the Mumbai Council, Captain Keigwin, as he wrote in his dispatch, was going to send to the Maratha flotilla to inform them that the Island belonged to the English, but the Marathas came upon him so fast that he had no time to do so. As their bows were pointing in the direction from which the attack came the English ships could not bring their guns to bear upon the enemy. There was no time to weigh anchor and the English were forced to cut their cables, loose sails and flee southward in a disorderly fashion with the *Revenge* and a *gurab* called the *Dove* — hired from Gape — the sternmost.

The Maratha ships closed upon the Dove in a crescent formation. Being narrow, the *gurab* had no guns in her stern and no room for more than four men to fire their small arms towards the rear. She fired four or five gun-shots and as many musket-

shots. Two of the men that were firing out of the stern were killed. This frightened the lascars so much that they jumped overboard. The *Revenge* was the nearest ship to the *Dove* and Sergeant Francis Mauleverer, in command of the *gurab*, called to her for help. But there was little room to manoeuvre between the island and the mainland and the *Revenge*, as Captain Keigwin later wrote in his disptach, "could shorten no more sail for fear of being on shore", evidently by the rising tide. Therefore she answered that Mauleverer should keep the enemy off with his small arms till she were clear of the island and then she would lay by for his help. By this time the blockading squadron was on the run with sail and oars, and two *manchuas* under command of sergeants Fuller and Duckett fled past the *gurab* with sails and oars but offered her no assistance. About one half mile before the Marathas were up with her the *Dove* struck her ensign and lowered her top-sail. Before the Marathas boarded her, about fifteen minutes later, sergeant Mauleverer also ordered his men to lay down their arms and go down into the hold because John Naylors, the pilot of the *gurab*, advised him that if they did not do so all of them would be cut down when the enemy would come on board. The *Revenge* was now left alone and her sails were also haled up. The Marathas took this as a sign of surrender and, according to captain Keigwin's dispatch, twenty-four Maratha *gurabs* and a number of *galiots* closed upon her. But Captain Keigwin — the commander of the blockading squadron — and Captain Minchin in command of the *Revenge* encouraged their men "admonishing them what disgrace it would be to Christians to be prisoners to heathens" and ordered them to hold their fire till the word of command. Finding her guns silent the Marathas thrust forward their boats to board the *Revenge*. But as they came within pistol-shot the *Revenge* opened fire with her stern chase — firing round shot and partridge — and blunderbusses. This turned the tables on the Marathas. According to Captain Keigwin, he saw some of the enemy ships sinking while others fled towards Nagaon. The *Revenge* chased them till they reached the shallow water of the Nagaon River and then returned to her

station off Khanderi where she was joined by other English vessels, some of which had endeavoured to run as far as Chaul.

While the battle was being fought, the Marathas carried off the *Dove* to Khanderi.<sup>3421</sup> Thus she was lost with 6 files of soldiers, besides officers and sailors, including in all 20 Europeans.<sup>3422</sup>

On 22<sup>nd</sup> October, the Mumbai council informed Surat that, according to the reports which they had received, three Maratha *gurabs* were sunk, many others were damaged and were fitting up at Nagaon, not less than three hundred Marathas were killed and about one hundred were wounded and sent to Chaul for treatment.<sup>3423</sup> On 25<sup>th</sup> October, they wrote to Keigwin:

“According to the news we have from our spies, we have no reason to believe (that) the enemy’s fleet will ever come against ours, for they were soundly banged, lost about 600 men and now are using their endeavours to get men on board their vessels to fly for Rajapur for their security.”<sup>3424</sup>

At Khanderi the Marathas dismounted the guns of the *Dove* for the defence of that island as is shown by the Mumbai Council’s letter dated 17<sup>th</sup> November to Surat in which they lamented, “now her [i.e. the *Dove*’s] guns are turned against us, planted at Khanderi, where she lies hauled up.”<sup>3425</sup>

The prisoners taken by the Marathas were treated well as is evident from the fact that they were allowed to correspond with Mumbai.<sup>3426</sup> Mauliverer and other English prisoners made a petition to the Deputy Governor and Council of Mumbai that they were in great want of provisions and other necessaries and therefore should be given some allowance. The Mumbai Council asked for instructions from Surat in this regard. In their meeting held on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1679, the Surat Council decided that the prisoners taken by the enemy should be dismissed from service

for their cowardice during the engagement but they might be given some small allowance, if it can be securely sent to them, only for victuals as the Deputy Governor and Council of Mumbai would see fit.<sup>3427</sup>

As for the conduct of other men in the blockading squadron, the Mumbai Council wrote on 19<sup>th</sup> October to Captains Keigwin and Minchin:

“We cannot but be heartily sorry and ashamed that our countrymen in those vessels that we esteemed of most use to you should behave themselves so basely, of whom be well assured that we shall take particular notice as we see occasion. . . . Let us require you to stand to those principles you have already shown, and let them under your command know from us that if they fear to fight at sea they must and shall suffer on shore in that nature, as the law has provided for such persons in such a case and let them be well assured of the extremity if they behave themselves so unworthily in the future.”<sup>3428</sup>

The engagement fought on 18<sup>th</sup> October was seen and heard from Mumbai.<sup>3429</sup> In a meting held on the same day, after the engagement but before they knew of its outcome, the Mumbai Council decided to reinforce the blockading squadron with a small ship (named the *Fortune*) and two of the Company’s *shibads* and to enlist 10 files of Topazes, at five xeraphins per month, to replace the men drawn from the garrison company to man the vessels.<sup>3430</sup>

The 20 Europeans lost with the *Dove* were a serious loss. In their letter to Surat of 19<sup>th</sup> October, the Mumbai Council wrote of their “great want of Englishmen” and in another of 17<sup>th</sup> November, they wrote that they were unable to replace the twenty Europeans lost with the *Dove*.<sup>3431</sup> In their meeting of 20<sup>th</sup> October they passed the following resolution:

“There being a very great want of English to send to sea and there being but few else but what are in the troop, it was Ordered that those Englishmen in the troop be reduced into the garrison company out of which may be drawn in proportion as many English as is wanting to send to sea.”<sup>3432</sup>

The Mumbai Council was naturally anxious about the threat to Mumbai posed by Maratha forces on the mainland. On or before 20<sup>th</sup> October, a boat laden with rice came to the custom house and was seized, together with a small *galiot*, on suspicion that they belonged to Shivaji’s subjects on the mainland.<sup>3433</sup> But it was found that it belonged to a Muslim merchant in Mumbai and the *galiot* to a padre and, therefore, the Mumbai Council ordered on 25<sup>th</sup> October that these vessels be restored to their owners.<sup>3434</sup>

In the night of 19<sup>th</sup>/20<sup>th</sup> October, the Maratha flotilla again rowed up along the shore up to Thal and, at the break of day when there was “not a breath of wind stirring”, rowed towards the English squadron. The *shibads* and *manchuas* in the blockading squadron were near the mainland. As the Marathas approached them they weighed and came back to the *Revenge* which was anchored within musket-shot of the island. Fearing that if their cables broke or were cut by the Marathas they would be heaved ashore on the island with the tide, the English weighed anchor. The *Revenge* did not have enough room to manoeuvre between the island and the mainland and the small craft — i.e. the *shibads* and the *manchuas* — did not have enough strength to engage the Maratha flotilla on their own. So the English squadron stood to sea with the *Revenge* taken in tow by the *manchuas* (because without their help, as there was no wind, she would have been heaved ashore on the island) and came to anchor about a mile and half from the island. In the meantime, the garrison on the island opened fire upon them. While they were thus engaged, the Maratha flotilla came within shot of the

English and then suddenly turned away and rowed towards the island to relieve it.<sup>3435</sup>

On 21<sup>st</sup> October, the blockading squadron was reinforced by the *Fortune* and two *shibads*. The *Fortune*, a small three mast vessel hired by the Company, was armed with eight guns and four chamberpieces,<sup>3436</sup> and manned by fourteen Englishmen, five files of Topazes and thirty lascars. The *shibads* belonged to the Company. They had been out on freight and had just arrived from Goa. Each of them was armed with two guns and manned by three Englishmen and three files of soldiers besides the sailors. With this reinforcement, the strength of the English squadron came to the *Revenge*, the *Fortune*, one *gurab*, five *shibads* and two *manchuas*, totalling ten vessels.<sup>3437</sup>

The Mumbai Council considered that these reinforcements would enable Keigwin to deal with the Maratha flotilla with security and also enforce the blockade of Khanderi, which they hoped would surrender in a short time for want of water.<sup>3438</sup>

#### THREAT TO MUMBAI (OCTOBER 1679)

In their dispatch dated 22<sup>nd</sup> October, the Mumbai Council informed Surat of the threat posed to Mumbai by the Maratha forces assembled on the mainland opposite them.<sup>3439</sup> They had learnt that Shivaji had assembled about 4,000 men at Kalyan-Bhiwandi with the intention of descending upon Mumbai by way of Thane, and had sent four messengers to the Portuguese captain general of Vasai asking for a passage through his territory. The Portuguese refused to grant it whereupon the Marathas threatened to force a passage. But actually they marched to Panvel in their own territory opposite Turbhe (Trombay). The Mumbai Council feared that their intention was to embark in seven large *gurabs* that they had in readiness and descend upon Mumbai. In their letter to Keigwin of 22<sup>nd</sup> October, the Mumbai Council also spoke of the Marathas having moved a party of them to Shahabad.<sup>3440</sup> In the meantime, the Mumbai

Council, in their meeting held on 20<sup>th</sup> October, had already decided, in view of this threat, to station three small boats in the bay at night — one each at Karanje, Turbhe and Sion. They were to return towards the island of Mumbai and give alarm by firing a musket several times as soon as they found any boats approaching Mumbai.<sup>3441</sup> The Mumbai garrison was reduced to man the ships in the blockading squadron. Therefore the Mumbai Council in their letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> October instructed Keigwin to send back two *shibads* if he could do so without danger and in any case retire with the entire blockading squadron for the defence of Mumbai as soon as he heard or saw the guns of Mumbai firing.<sup>3442</sup>

#### THE BLOCKADE (23<sup>RD</sup> OCTOBER TO 1<sup>ST</sup> NOVEMBER 1679)

As it was, Keigwin could ill afford to spare two *shibads* from his small force. In his dispatch of 23<sup>rd</sup> October he informed Mumbai that the previous day, or the very day the Mumbai Council asked him whether he could spare two *shibads*, the Maratha flotilla at Nagaon was reinforced by 37 galiots which came from the south. So he wrote them of his inability to do so and informed them that he needed some smaller craft to impose the blockade.<sup>3443</sup> Because, as he wrote in his dispatch of 24<sup>th</sup> October, he had to keep his squadron concentrated lest the Marathas fell upon and defeated his ships in detail.<sup>3444</sup>

The Marathas were quick to take advantage of this. In the night of 22<sup>nd</sup>/23<sup>rd</sup> October, twelve galiots went to the island and, in the night of 25<sup>th</sup>/26<sup>th</sup> October, seven small boats sneaked into the island under cover of darkness.<sup>3445</sup> The Maratha boats, wrote Keigwin in his dispatch of 26<sup>th</sup> October, were too nimble and swift with their oars and therefore he decided to ambush them.<sup>3446</sup> In the night of 26<sup>th</sup>/27<sup>th</sup> October, he anchored his *shibads* and *manchuas* at the mouth of the Nagaon River in the hope of catching the Maratha boats going to or returning from the island.<sup>3447</sup> However, although he had blocked the Nagaon River, the Marathas could continue to supply the beleaguered

garrison from other places on the coast. In his dispatch of 27<sup>th</sup> October, Keigwin wrote in disappointment: “The boats which were at the island [of Khanderi] went out in the night, but we think they went to the northward [instead of coming to Nagaon].”<sup>3448</sup> And to add to his worries, nineteen small boats came from the south and entered the Nagaon River on 27<sup>th</sup> October.<sup>3449</sup>

Irritated by these repeated reports of the ineffectiveness of the blockade, the Mumbai Council wrote to Keigwin on the same day (i.e. on 27<sup>th</sup> October): “It is a very great trouble to us to read the daily relief that the enemy gives to the island; we had thoughts and great hopes that the additional strength sent you would have prevented it.”<sup>3450</sup> But Keigwin had no suitable craft to strangle the supply of Khanderi. In his dispatch of 28<sup>th</sup> October he wrote:

“There are 16 or 17 galiots gone into the island this night though endeavoured their prevention with all the care we could. Those small boats go in by the lights of the island undiscovered of us, which we leave to your consideration. The gurab indeed is of no use to us for the prevention or hindrance of those boats that pass in and out to the island.”<sup>3451</sup>

On 31<sup>st</sup> October, Keigwin sent back the *gurab* (called the *Hector*), as ordered by the Mumbai Council, it being “a very improper vessel for that occasion”, thus reducing the strength of the blockading squadron to nine vessels.<sup>3452</sup> But the Mumbai Council appears to have promised to reinforce him with *some* galiots because in his dispatch of 31<sup>st</sup> October (in which he reported that he was sending back the *Hector*) he adds: “We like very well of your galiots to be sent here, and well manned with soldiers; it is certainly your readiest way to prevent relief to Khanderi.”<sup>3453</sup>

The galiots that had gone to the island were still there on 31<sup>st</sup> October.<sup>3454</sup> To intercept them, Keigwin again laid an ambush in the night of 31<sup>st</sup> October/1<sup>st</sup> November at the mouth of the Nagaon River.<sup>3455</sup> But his luck was no better. In his dispatch of 1<sup>st</sup> November, he wrote:

“By our last we wrote you our intent of planting our boats at Nagaon River’s mouth. They could not remove from Khanderi until the moon went down lest they should be discovered from the main [land]. The enemy’s galiots took the same time to go from the island and, being quicker in rowing, were arrived at Nagaon before our vessels and got in. There were some *gurabs* at the rivers mouth that fired at our boats several guns, but did not hurt. Our people finding their design frustrated retreated to us again in the morning, which troubles us extremely to be thus disappointed. ... Sir, be assured we are not idle in endeavouring their hindrances, and were it in our power they should find it so, but these little creeping boats deceive us to admiration; when we have nimble boats of the like nature we hope they shall not escape us so.”<sup>3456</sup>

#### DECISION OF THE ENGLISH TO SEEK TREATY (OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1679)

While Keigwin was thus trying in vain to strangle the supply of Khanderi, the Mumbai Council began thinking of a new strategy. Instead of getting themselves tied down before Khanderi, trying to stop the elusive Maratha small craft from supplying that island, would it not be better to assume the offensive, set fire to the enemy vessels in the Nagaon River and make depredations on the enemy coast? On 22<sup>nd</sup> October they wrote to Surat:

“We humbly beg you will now take into your serious considerations whether you shall not give us leave to use our utmost endeavours against Shivaji in

destroying his country and doing him all the injury we can, for if we are only tied up to keep him from the island of Khanderi and fight only such vessels as may come to relieve the island, the enemy will have great advantage, may retire to Nagaon, and when well fitted out and [sic? will] fight again. Whereas, if we improve our time, [we] may burn his vessels in the river and destroy his country, to his great detriment, of which please to consider. Its certain Shivaji will not lay down his design of fortifying Khanderi-Underi by fair words or dealings. If could be spared us a Europe ship to batter the island but one, two or three days, it would in all likelihood put an end to all and ease the great charge we are at in a short time, and that may be done by our ship(s) without damage to them, for the guns on the island are but small and cannot reach them, whilst their guns may do great execution.”<sup>3457</sup>

In their next dispatch, dated 27<sup>th</sup> October 1679, the Mumbai Council repeated their request for one or more Europe ships to batter the island. Mumbai to Surat:

“We are now come to the unpleasant business of Khanderi-Underi ....It is seated so that if we suffer any to fortify there we must expect no further trade on this island than they shall permit without (i.e. unless) we be at continual charge to keep a greater fleet at sea than they can bring against us. We cannot but be sensible this affair must much disturb your Honour and it is a sufficient grief to us not only that we are necessitated to be at a greater charge on that expedition, but to find we have not that success we did reasonably expect. Do all we can, we cannot hinder wholly relief being given to the island, but nightly their small galiots, 10 or 20, pass to and from the Maine to the island, in the dark unseen by our vessels. What they can carry, we are sensible, cannot be more than enough to supply the

absolute needs of our enemy's men; bat here lyes the evil; if we do not beat them from it this summer we shall be at a great charge to no purpose, for in May we must call in our fleet and there in the rains the enemy will take all opportunities of fair weather to transport lime [etc. so](#) that by September next it may be expected he will have a strong fort and large tanks prepared to keep water; so that it will be a hard matter to get him off it, whereas now if you please to order a Europe ship or ships to batter the island together with our small vessels, with God's blessing 3 or 4 days at furthest will put an end to that business and ease the Ho'nble. Company of great charge; which we have formerly advised and now again humbly beg you will take into your serious considerations.”[3458](#)

But while the Mumbai Council was urging an offensive strategy, the Surat Council had begun to have second thoughts about the matter.

Surat to Mumbai  
18<sup>th</sup> October 1679

“It does not a little take up our thoughts what that unhappy business of Khanderi may come to with such a restless disturber of all peace and commerce as Shivaji, and who, we are sufficiently sensible, will highly resent his being obstructed by us in fortifying that hitherto too much unregarded island until, we fear it hath proved too late, especially the Hon'ble [Company] being so unwilling and disliking to be brought to a due expense for the asserting and defending their affairs and interest in these parts of the world. Therefore could heartily have wished you had given us a more perfect account where it lies, what distance from the main [land] and from whence our *pretence* of title duly arises, that we may know the

better how to govern ourselves and direct you in so weighty an affair.”<sup>3459</sup>

In their next letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> October to Mumbai, the Surat Council expressed concern about the expenditure incurred in maintaining the soldiers and asked the opinion of the Mumbai Council about the possible outcome of the hostilities over the next month or two, the time that may be required to blockade the island “to bring things to a good effect” and the monthly expenditures in excess of the amount the company had sanctioned.<sup>3460</sup> Then, in the night of 24<sup>th</sup>/25<sup>th</sup> October, they received the Mumbai letter of 19<sup>th</sup> October which informed them of the battle that had been fought the previous day, the loss of one of their ships together with the men aboard, fitting up of the *Fortune* and two *shibads* to reinforce the blockading squadron and enlistment of ten files of soldiers for the defence of Mumbai.<sup>3461</sup> The next morning, i.e. on 25<sup>th</sup> October, the Surat Council met to consider the effects of these events. The loss of one ship, fitting out of three more and enlistment of soldiers meant additional expenditure. Further, there was also the danger of an enemy descent on Mumbai Island itself. They could not hope to replace the men which had been lost and therefore would not be able to oppose Shivaji for long. And all this would prove in vain when, at the onset of the rainy season, they would have to withdraw their ships and give the enemy an opportunity to fortify and supply the island. In view of these gloomy prospects, the Surat Council decided to await more detailed orders and reinforcements from the Company and adopt the following policy in the meantime: First, the Deputy Governor and Council of Mumbai were to try, through the mediation of some proper person, for an honorable and timely withdrawal from the affair “but which”, the Surat council resolved, “must appear as an act of kindness and friendship to us both, and not any desire of ours.” If this could not be effected, the Mumbai Council were to try to obtain the aid of the captain general of Vasai, pointing out to him that he was equally concerned in this affair for his own security. If they received a cold response from him, they were to make the

best use of the Siddi's fleet which was to sail from Surat after a few days and, once he got engaged with the Marathas, gradually withdraw themselves — "not by treaty but by design." The Surat Council also decided to send the *Hunter* frigate, which had arrived at Surat in the night of 24<sup>th</sup>/25<sup>th</sup> October, together with the soldiers they had there, to strengthen the hands of the Mumbai Council. These decisions were conveyed to Mumbai in the Surat letter of 28<sup>th</sup> October.<sup>3462</sup>

Soon afterwards, the Surat Council received a courteous letter from Shivaji which showed him as being "inclinable to peace". The original letter or its contemporaneous translation is not extant. It is not mentioned in the Surat letter of 23<sup>rd</sup> October but was taken into consideration in the meeting of the Surat council of 31<sup>st</sup> October.<sup>3463</sup> Therefore, it appears to have been received by the President at Surat sometime between these two dates. On 31<sup>st</sup> October, the Surat Council received the Mumbai letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> October in which the Mumbai Council had informed them of the threat to Mumbai posed by the enemy force assembled at Panvel.<sup>3464</sup> In the same letter, the Mumbai Council had asked permission to adopt a more offensive strategy.

The Surat Council took into consideration both these letters — Shivaji's and the Mumbai Council's — in their meeting of 31<sup>st</sup> October and decided to return a civil answer to Shivaji. Their resolution reads:

"We cannot judge it prudence to omit so happy an overture and therefore do conclude to return him a civil answer, demonstrating our trouble for the occasion his people have given the English at Mumbai to quarrel with him about his fortifying so insignificant a rock as Khanderi-Underi, which is not in the least becoming a Prince of his eminence and qualifications, and though we have a right to that place, yet to show the candour of our proceedings, we

are willing to forget what is past, and therefore have given instructions to the Deputy Governor of Mumbai to treat with such persons as he [ i.e. Shivaji] shall appoint about the present differences ... which, we are very much persuaded, will produce some good effect.”<sup>3465</sup>

As for the Mumbai letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> October, the Surat Council decided to instruct them to send a special emissary to Shivaji or to proceed through the *Subadar* of Chaul as the Deputy Governor may think convenient.<sup>3466</sup> A Europe ship, the *New London*, had arrived at Surat and the Surat Council was willing, in principle, to send it. But they decided not to do so: first, because it could not be fitted in time to be of benefit to Mumbai and, secondly, due to the frequent alarms caused at Surat by parties of Shivaji's men and the general distractions in those parts where they had no guards left, having sent them with the *Hunter*, to defend themselves and the Company's goods and treasure. Instead, they decided to send orders to Captain Cooke and Captain Goldsborough to remain at Mumbai until 7<sup>th</sup> December and to assist the Mumbai Council with their ships, men and boats as necessity would require.<sup>3467</sup>

Orders in accordance with these decisions were sent to Mumbai in the Surat letter of 3<sup>rd</sup> November. Therein they wrote:

“Upon a due discussion of all circumstances of our great inability to carry on a war with so potent and situated an enemy for a *place not unquestionable*, whether we have a real right to it or not, we have concluded [that] it more fitly and safely concerns us to come to some speedy composure of this difference with him especially considering the Honble Company's extreme averseness to all disputes (how necessary soever) with the natives of these countries, and the strict injunctions laid upon us for a general

reducement of their whole charges under their Presidency.”<sup>3468</sup>

The Deputy Governor was also advised “to avoid all expressions that may either be laid hold on to strengthen his [i.e. Shivaji’s] claim or countenance his possession for fortifying of it [i.e. Khanderi]” in his correspondence with Shivaji. A copy of Shivaji’s letter to the President and that of the President’s reply to him were also sent to Mumbai along with this letter.<sup>3469</sup>

As for the Siddi, they wrote that though he and the Portuguese are as much concerned to prevent the fortification of Khanderi as themselves, he “like the Portuguese” is “designing politically to leave us singly to the dispute of Khanderi” and therefore it would “behoove” to make a speedy agreement with Shivaji.

They also wrote of their inability to send the *New London* due to the reasons given in the consultation. However, though not mentioned in their letter to the Mumbai Council, they drew a commission to Captains John Goldsborough and James Cook on the same date on which this letter was written, i.e. on 3<sup>rd</sup> November. It ordered them that at their putting in at Mumbai in their voyage up the coast of India, they were “to remain for a security and countenance to the island until the 7<sup>th</sup> December if the Deputy Governor and Council [of Mumbai] shall desire it, but no longer, and to afford them such fit assistance with your ships, boats and men as may not be to the hazard of their loss.”<sup>3470</sup> The Surat Council again reiterated this policy in their letter of 7<sup>th</sup> November; and added:

“... for what you propose, to batter it [i.e. Khanderi] with the Europe ships, you will find what we are able to do with those commanders by what [ we have ] wrote them and sent you; besides we ought to be very cautious how we try our utmost ability of strength at this time, lest we should fail of success and so Shivaji

encouraged therefrom to slight our overtures, and not unlikely emboldened, or at least exasperated, to invade Bombay itself, and wherein in such case we desire your opinions whether you are well able to defend yourselves.”<sup>3471</sup>

The Mumbai Council remained dissatisfied with this policy and, in their letters of 17<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> November, urged Surat to reconsider their decision.<sup>3472</sup> But in their meetings of 3<sup>rd</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> December the Surat council reiterated their former decision and conveyed it to Mumbai in their letters of 4<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> December respectively.<sup>3473</sup>

In the meantime, however, they informed the Company, in their letter of 18<sup>th</sup> November, of the Khanderi affair and the loss of one *shibad* and one *gurab*, their inability to strangle the supply of Khanderi and lack of force to attempt a landing.<sup>3474</sup> The Europe ships — the *Bengal*, the *New London* and the *Ann* — had arrived on the coast of India. If these could be employed to bombard the island with their great guns they could reduce it in four or five days without any danger to themselves. But, the Council regretted in their letter, as they had no instructions from the Company how to deal with such situations and the commanders of the ships had no instructions to follow the Council’s orders, they could do nothing therein. The Council also wrote of the rising expenditure and the threat to Mumbai posed by Shivaji’s forces assembled on the mainland, and asked: “Give us speedy and positive directions therein how to proceed for the future, otherwise all will be lost.”

#### THE BLOCKADE (3<sup>RD</sup> TO 10<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 1679)

On 3<sup>rd</sup> November Keigwin reported to have seized a canoe with three men who professed to have come from Mumbai. He sent them to Mumbai for inquiry. Some of his men were claiming that it had come from the island but some said otherwise.<sup>3475</sup> In the night of 3<sup>rd</sup>/4<sup>th</sup> November, Maratha *gurabs* and galiots came

up along the shore. Then their galiots crept to the northward of the island and their *gurabs* to the southward, evidently to screen the galiots from the English squadron. The *Revenge* and the *Fortune* tried to cut off the *gurabs* from Nagaon but they escaped as there was no wind. Other English vessels chased the galiots "within musket-shot of the island" but failed to capture any of them.<sup>3476</sup>

Meanwhile, the *Hunter*, under command of Captain William Norgrave, arrived at Mumbai and on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1679 the Mumbai Council sent her to reinforce the blockading squadron.<sup>3477</sup>

Mumbai to Keigwin  
4<sup>th</sup> November 1679

"Your advices are no way pleasing, and the charge of our fleet to no purpose. We cannot longer wait in hopes of better, since every days experience shows us worse and worse. We do now therefore send out the *Hunter* frigate."<sup>3478</sup>

This brought its strength to two frigates, the *Fortune*, five *shibads* and two *manchuas* — a total of ten ships.<sup>3479</sup> But this accession of strength was of no use to catch the nimble Maratha small craft and Keigwin's disappointments continued as before. On 5<sup>th</sup> November the Maratha *gurabs* again came out of the Nagaon river and crept along the shore to take the galiots back. There was an easterly wind and the *shibads* and the *manchuas* in the blockading squadron went towards and engaged the Maratha *gurabs*. As the Marathas bore upon them with their prows, they fell back towards the heavier ships in the blockading squadron. But these heavy ships could not stir due to an adverse wind and tide, and, before they came within gunshot of the English, the Maratha ships turned about and made down to the Nagaon River.<sup>3480</sup> This was what Keigwin reported to Mumbai in his dispatch of 5<sup>th</sup> November and from it the engagement does not

appear to have been a sharp one. But in their dispatch of 17<sup>th</sup> November, the Mumbai Council informed Surat that on 5<sup>th</sup> November there was a “smart engagement” between their small vessels and the enemy flotilla.<sup>3481</sup> Their losses, they wrote, were only five men wounded — “all Topazes and coolies” including one man who lost his hand — whereas, according to the news they had from Chaul, the enemy lost over 100 men and brought over 100 men wounded on shore.

In the evening of 6<sup>th</sup> November, Keigwin with his entire squadron took station at the mouth of the Nagaon River to block up the Maratha vessels that were bringing supply to Khanderi.<sup>3482</sup> However, he needed more ships, particularly small craft to block up Thal. It would be remembered that the Mumbai council was contemplating sending some galiots to join the blockading squadron. These were not sent yet. In his dispatch of 7<sup>th</sup> November, Keigwin informed the Mumbai Council that he had taken station at the mouth of the Nagaon River and reminded them that the galiots, of which they had formerly written and which he needed to block up Thal, were not sent yet.<sup>3483</sup> But instead of sending him the galiots, the Council sent express orders, dated 10<sup>th</sup> November, to return to his former station off Khanderi.<sup>3484</sup> The reasons for these orders was that the Siddi’s fleet was sighted from Mumbai on that day and the Mumbai Council feared that if he took possession of the disputed island he might prove a troublesome neighbour.<sup>3485</sup> According to the Council’s orders, Keigwin unwillingly brought back his squadron to its station off Khanderi by 13<sup>th</sup> November.<sup>3486</sup>

In their dispatch of 17<sup>th</sup> November the Mumbai Council reported to Surat the progress made in winning over Portuguese support.<sup>3487</sup> Several letters were exchanged between the Deputy Governor of Mumbai and the Captain General of the North, the governor of Vasai and other Portuguese authorities, and they had promised all assistance. They had already refused to grant the Marathas a passage through their territory. Now “truely sensible of their own dangers” they patrolled the waters to resist any

Maratha attempt to force a passage. Their garrisons were put in a state of readiness and the Captain General of the North visited Karanje, Shahabad and other places. They also provided information to the English and supplied them with plenty of provisions “as ever it had from Shivaji’s country and at as cheap rates.”

#### THE SIDDI’S ARRIVAL (NOVEMBER 1679)

About 10<sup>th</sup> November 1679, the Siddi’s flotilla reached Mumbai.<sup>3488</sup> His strength at this time is not known, but the Mumbai letter of 31<sup>st</sup> January 1680 states that he “has 2 great ships, 5 three-mast frigates, one ketch and 26 galiots, in them about 700 men.”<sup>3489</sup>

Upon his arrival at Mumbai, the Council sent Henry Gary and John Hornigold to talk with him and find out his intentions. The Siddi told them that he would soon take Khanderi if the English would block Shivaji’s flotilla in the Nagaon river for some time, but received no response from the English emissaries.<sup>3490</sup> The Mumbai Council had instructed Keigwin to treat the Siddi, when he would arrive off Khanderi, with all respect and kindness.<sup>3491</sup> But they did not trust him at all and considered him a very unfit neighbour. The Siddi intended to make depredations on the coast within their bay, something from which they endeavoured to divert him. They suspected that the Siddi desired to seize the island of Khanderi for himself. In that case, they feared, they would find themselves in a worse predicament. They would not get any compensation they were demanding from Shivaji (for Rajapur, Athani etc.), their men taken prisoners by Shivaji’s forces would not be released and all the expenditure on the campaign would prove in vain.<sup>3492</sup> They distrusted him so much that they instructed Keigwin that not more than one officer was to be sent to the Siddi’s flotilla at a time even if he invited them.<sup>3493</sup>

The Siddi arrived off Khanderi shortly after his call at Mumbai.<sup>3494</sup> On 16<sup>th</sup> November, he went about the island to reconnoiter its fortifications. He then met Keigwin and told him that the strength of the island was not great, and the garrison included 300 soldiers and 200 workers.<sup>3495</sup> He also spoke of his intention to attack the island.

#### THE BLOCKADE

Since the Siddi's arrival, a prolonged artillery duel ensued between his flotilla and the island. There are several references to this in English records.<sup>3496</sup> However, it did little damage to either of them.<sup>3497</sup> In his dispatch of 18<sup>th</sup> November, Keigwin remarked: "We think they spend their powder to little purpose except the noise does hurt them."<sup>3498</sup> There was no firing between the English and the Marathas, though the English were "at an anchor nearer the island than any of them [i.e. the Siddi's ships]."<sup>3499</sup>

The blockade was strengthened by the Siddi's arrival and the Mumbai letter of 17<sup>th</sup> November informed Surat that for eight days not a single boat had passed from the mainland to the island.<sup>3500</sup> This led the Mumbai Council to hope that the island would not hold out for long and that the garrison would surrender themselves to the English rather than to the Siddi. So they dispatched to Keigwin a letter addressed by the Deputy Governor of Mumbai to the garrison commander of Khanderi and instructed him to deliver it if the Maratha commander parleyed.<sup>3501</sup> They also sent, in their letter of 17<sup>th</sup> November, specific instructions as to how Keigwin should take possession of the Island if the Marathas surrendered it. First, he was to take on board 50 or 60 principal men in the garrison as a pledge, then he was to send 12 files of soldiers to occupy the island and finally he was to take the rest of the Maratha garrison on board without arms.<sup>3502</sup> In reply, Keigwin wrote on 18<sup>th</sup> November:

“We are birthed as near the island as conveniently we can, and keep to your orders, and shall be vigilant in laying hold of such opportunities in case signals shall be given from the enemy for any parley of surrender, but you may be assured the Siddi is as watchful to lay hold of the like occasions as we are and will endeavour to share with us perforce. Therefore, in such a case, we desire to know how we may act in the defence of it, whether to oppose the Siddi by force of arms and not suffer them [i.e. the Siddi’s men] to come on shore [of Khanderi]. This we entreat by the next general.”<sup>3503</sup>

To this the Mumbai Council replied on 20<sup>th</sup> November that Keigwin was to take possession of the island secretly at night. But in case of any hostile acts on the part of the Siddi — such as firing against their vessels or on the island after they had taken possession of it — and if he could not be persuaded to desist from such acts by fair means, Keigwin was instructed to defend himself.<sup>3504</sup>

In the morning of 21<sup>st</sup> November, the Marathas raised a white flag in a tree upon the hill. Whereupon, the English sent a *manchua* near the island but it received no response. Later on they learnt that the Siddi had also sent a boat near the island. But the Marathas refused to have any discourse with his men and threatened and abused them. The English then again sent a boat with sergeant Cully, a Dutchman that formerly served them,<sup>3505</sup> and a Portuguese. This time the Marathas had a civil discourse with them and assured them that they would come to no harm. The party asked them what the white flag was up for. They replied: “a sign to the shore.” The English asked them if they would surrender and told them that if they did they would be treated kindly and would receive the protection of the English. The Marathas answered that they would not deliver up the island even if the English would stay there for twelve months. The English then told them of the letter of the Deputy Governor of Mumbai addressed to the *Subadar*, Maynak Bhandari. The

Marathas showed eagerness to have it but said that they would have come off to them but had no boat. They also told the English that Maynak Bhandari, too, intended to write to the Deputy Governor, and promised free passage to any messengers. The English party then returned without delivering the Deputy Governor's letter.<sup>3506</sup>

On 26<sup>th</sup> November, the Siddi informed Keigwin that he had with him a soldier who formerly served Daulat Khan and had fled to Chaul. In his dispatch of the same date Keigwin wrote to Mumbai of the information which this deserter had given.<sup>3507</sup> As for the reason of his desertion the deserter said his fault was to say "Khanderi was to be easily taken by a few Potanners [Pathans?]" for which, he said, he would have received severe punishment if he had not escaped. As for the condition of the garrison, the deserter said they had six *khandis* of powder and 1000 balls, besides those found in the *gurab* and the *shibad* taken from the English, twelve great guns and 500 men including 300 swordsmen and 200 musketeers.<sup>3508</sup> They had four wells but when he left the island there was little water in any of them and the men in the garrison had to scoop the water in their hands to fill up their jars. The deserter further reported that the soldiers on this island were willing to surrender, but Maynak Bhandari, his son and a Muslim did not consent to it, for Shivaji had sent them the word that he would cut off their heads as well as of their wives and children, which he had in his custody, if they would quit the island. They also had many sick men. It appeared from this information that the garrison would not hold out for long. The Siddi desired that the English would back him up with their *shibads* when he landed his men on the island, something Keigwin believed he would attempt but was only awaiting some men from Surat. After having communicated this to the Mumbai Council in his dispatch of 26<sup>th</sup> November, Keigwin requested them to lose no time in arriving at an agreement with Shivaji lest the Siddi should forestall them in taking possession of the island.

But whatever may have been the plight of the garrison, the work on the fortification of the island went on as before.<sup>3509</sup>

#### ATTEMPT OF THE ENGLISH AND THE MARATHAS TO MAKE PEACE (NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1679)

On 17<sup>th</sup> November, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai received a letter from the *Peshwa* and sent a reply on the same day. In it he informed the *Peshwa* of the continuous bombardment of the island by the Siddi's fleet and of the likelihood that the Siddi would soon carry it. In that case, he wrote, the misery that would befall their country must be great which the *Peshwa* could not but be aware of. Therefore he advised the *Peshwa* to send orders to the garrison of Khanderi to deliver the island to the English and assured him that if this was found to be against Shivaji's wishes the English would withdraw their men after the Siddi was gone and then it might remain uninhabited as before.<sup>3510</sup> On 23<sup>rd</sup> November the *Bengal Merchant* arrived at Mumbai and was detained by the Mumbai Council "in the hopes of such an answer as that her countenance would have stood us in great stead."<sup>3511</sup> But on 27<sup>th</sup> November they received a reply from the *Peshwa* which was contrary to their expectation.<sup>3512</sup> The *Peshwa* had written his determination not to be persuaded out of the island.<sup>3513</sup> On 28<sup>th</sup> November the Deputy Governor again wrote letters to Shivaji and the *Peshwa*.<sup>3514</sup>

In their letter of 29<sup>th</sup> November, the Mumbai Council informed Surat of this correspondence and the need for money if the fleet was kept out longer. The extra charge, over that of the routine expenditure, they estimated to be about 5000 sherafins per month. Then, again urging for an offensive strategy, they wrote: "This brings us to humbly beg you will speedily please to consider whether we shall call in the fleet or act something, that our charge be not wholly thrown away in lying still and suffering our enemies to laugh at us, to our great discredit." They also asked for directions as to their behaviour towards the Siddi in case of any hostile acts on his part.<sup>3515</sup>

The Surat Council considered the developments narrated in this letter in their meeting held on 12<sup>th</sup> December and reiterated their former decision to seek an agreement with Shivaji. Their resolution reads:

“The Deputy Governor still earnestly pressing for orders to allow him to make incursions into Shivaji’s country and attempt his fleet in harbour as opportunity should offer, or else to call in our own fleet and ease the Honourable Company of so great a charge, we have again taken the matter into our serious considerations and the better to confirm our own judgement we sent for Captain John Goldsborough and Captain John Daniel and desired their opinions in this affair; who after we had declared upon them the *great restriction we are under from the Honourable Company*, [and] the great want of Englishmen upon the island [of Mumbai] and thoroughly acquainted them with such orders as formerly passed, they did concur with us that *it would not be prudence too far to exceed the orders the Honourable Company have given us nor yet to hazard our men in such dangerous designs when we have scarcely sufficient to defend Bombay itself*; and as for withdrawing our fleet, we shall further consider of that upon their advising us their success in their treating with Shivaji, and that they find all their endeavours fruitless in obstructing him from relieving Khanderi, which we do now conclude to require their speedy answer into.”<sup>3516</sup>

This decision was conveyed to Mumbai in their letter of 13<sup>th</sup> December.<sup>3517</sup> But therein they also brought to the notice of the Council the folly in a sudden withdrawal of the blockading squadron. They wrote:

“What you offer as to the calling in of the fleet now we have proceeded thus far, it will not be prudence all

of sudden withdraw, especially now you are in treaty with Shivaji, which if [it] takes not a good effect and that you find your endeavours in reducing Khanderi fruitless, by obstructing relief from it, which is our only business, upon your advice thereof we shall then take it into our serious considerations what fittest to be done in this unhappy affair."

As for the Siddi, they advised the Mumbai Council to avoid any open breach with them "since it may produce such ill consequences to the Hon'ble Company's affairs here." "Therefore", they wrote,

"... if you cannot find Shivaji will be brought to any acceptable terms of composition then, we have concluded, it would be better to let it fall into this King's [i.e. the Mughal 'Emperor's] hands than to remain in Shivaji's." If they could not reach an agreement with Shivaji, they were to withdraw from the war and leave him and the Siddi to dispute the island. A convenient pretext for their withdrawal would be provided, "from the Siddi's attempting within the limits of the Bay to burn and destroy that part of Shivaji's country which hitherto has and ought to be protected by us."

Meanwhile, the Marathas were also sending out feelers to reach some agreement with the English. On 6<sup>th</sup> December, the Rajapur factors reported to Surat their interview with Anaji who had come to that town on 28<sup>th</sup> November to visit a temple nearby. Anaji had sent for them and had inquired why they were not doing trade as before. They replied that the *Subadar* had put a stop to all their business and they had thought that this was done by Anaji's orders. Anaji told then that he had forbidden it once but after reconsideration had ordered the *Subadar* not to molest the English but as for the "Buckshis" he had no authority to grant it because the Raja had already given an order to the

contrary. He however assured them that he would write to the Raja on their behalf and was confident that the Raja would grant them the necessary permission. He further told them that he had once written to the Deputy Governor greatly desiring their friendship and had asked him to send Narayan Shenavi for that purpose but, as Narayan had not arrived, he would send his ambassador to treat with the Deputy Governor. He expected that the Rajapur factors would send a man with his ambassador and would inform their superiors "how desirous the Rajah was to continue in friendship." The Rajapur factors tried to excuse themselves by saying that they were mere servants and their writing would signify nothing. But this did not satisfy Anaji and therefore they were obliged to send their servant, Shaikh Mahmud, along with him.<sup>3518</sup>

#### THE BLOCKADE (DECEMBER 1679 - JANUARY 1680)

The blockade in the meantime had continued as before. In his dispatch dated 3<sup>rd</sup> December to the Mumbai Council, Keigwin related the following interesting incident:

"Two boats made their escape from the island, coming up with the Siddi's galiots which hailed them; the Shivaji boats said they belonged to such a ship, naming the ship's name, captain and pilots, by which stratagem they got leave to pass."<sup>3519</sup>

On 3<sup>rd</sup> December, Keigwin went on board the Siddi's ship. The latter asked him whether he was willing for a joint landing. Keigwin gave no response to this proposal. Hereupon the Siddi pressed him again for a joint landing, told him that the eyes of all peoples were upon them — those of the French, the Dutch and the Portuguese upon the English and those of the Muslims upon him — and asked him to convey the proposal to the Deputy Governor of Mumbai. He also told Keigwin that he had 700 men ready for landing and that he would ask Keigwin's advice before such a venture. During this visit, Keigwin saw

some slaves on the ship and asked the Siddi's people where they had taken them. The Siddi told him that they had been taken from the Nagaon River.<sup>3520</sup>

On the same day i.e. on 3<sup>rd</sup> December, the Mumbai Council learnt of these acts of the Siddi from another quarter. On that day they received a letter from Shivaji forwarded by Daulat Khan together with his own letter. Shivaji's letter was full of courteous expressions but he made it absolutely clear that he would go ahead with the fortification of Khanderi. Daulat Khan's letter complained of the Siddi's burning of his master's towns, and carrying the inhabitants away and blamed the English for consenting to these acts.<sup>3521</sup> As it was, the English had never allowed the Siddi to make depredations on the Maratha coastline within their bay, "for", as they had explained in a letter, "that would certainly exasperate Shivaji mightily and make him conclude us wholly afraid of him, which would encourage his adventuring on us here." <sup>3522</sup> On 4<sup>th</sup> December the Mumbai Council informed Surat of these acts.

"The Siddi's galiots have been ashore on the main [land] in Shivaji's country opposite to us, have burnt four towns and taken many prisoners. We wrote to him yesterday about it but received no answer yet."

As for the letters of Shivaji and Daulat Khan they wrote in the same dispatch:

"We shall today give an answer to his [i.e. Daulat Khan's] and the Rajah's letters, resolving to take all opportunity by fair means to put an end to our difference with Shivaji with as much speed as may be, according to your orders."<sup>3523</sup>

The Siddi replied to the Mumbai letter soon afterwards and the Mumbai Council conveyed its gist to Surat in their letter of 8<sup>th</sup> December. The Siddi had explained that it was for the interests of

the English that he had resorted to those acts so as to make Shivaji sensible that it was for the sake of the English that he (i.e. the Siddi) had spared those parts so long. The Siddi's courier who brought this letter to Mumbai also conveyed the Siddi's message that he had no design to keep Khanderi, that all he desired was that it might be out of Shivaji's hands and that, if the English would join him in an assault on it, he would, after it was taken, give it up to them.<sup>3524</sup>

Meanwhile, the Mumbai Council had received certain information from Nagaon that Daulat Khan was fitting out his flotilla to put to sea. According to a report they had received, his intention was to stand out to sea for two or three days and, when the nights were dark, land his forces at Mahim or some other place on the Mumbai island.<sup>3525</sup> So the Mumbai Council instructed Keigwin, in their letter of 10<sup>th</sup> December, to send, if he could do so with security, the *Hunter* and one of the *manchuas* to lie at the mouth of the Nagaon River during the nights whence, after making sure that Daulat Khan's flotilla was in the river, they were to retire every morning to the blockading squadron off Khanderi. If the enemy tried to come out, these ships were to discharge some guns to alert the entire squadron which were then to make their utmost to destroy the enemy. And if Daulat Khan succeeded in escaping from the river, Keigwin was to send one of the two frigates and three small craft to lie off Mahim every night. If Daulat Khan succeeded even then to steal into Mahim, the *Hunter* and three small craft were to signal the entire squadron whereupon the *Fortune* was to join them to destroy the enemy while the *Revenge* and the remaining four small craft were to go to Mazgaon to prevent the enemy's escape. The council also instructed Keigwin to inform the Siddi of Daulat Khan's intentions to put to sea. Further the letter brought to Keigwin's notice that despite all the watches kept by him and the Siddi, a small canoe, rowed by two men, was carrying letters from Khanderi to Thal once in two or three days and instructed him to pass on this information to the Siddi.<sup>3526</sup>

In his reply, dated 12<sup>th</sup> December, Keigwin expressed doubt about Daulat Khan's supposed intentions to put to sea but reported that he would send the *Hunter* and the *manchua* to keep watch at the mouth of the Nagaon River.<sup>3527</sup> He also informed the Siddi about Daulat Khan's intentions but the Siddi sent him word that "he did not like his *gurabs* riding off Nagaon river's mouth."<sup>3528</sup>

Repeating the disbelief of Daulat Khan's supposed intentions, Keigwin suggested, in his dispatch of 13<sup>th</sup> December, that he and the Siddi could block up the Maratha flotilla in the Nagaon River and simultaneously prevent relief to the island. This, he added, he would not mention to the Siddi until he had received the Mumbai Council's directions. As for the canoe of which the Mumbai Council had written, Keigwin reported that they had caught one but found no letters with the men in it; only some hens. They pretended that they were sent to the Siddi from Karanje but were found to be lying; so Keigwin sent them to the Siddi who also believed them to be "rogues".<sup>3529</sup> We do not hear anything about the fate of these men hereafter.

On 17<sup>th</sup> December Captain Adderton replaced Captain Keigwin as the commander of the blockading squadron and Keigwin went back to Mumbai.<sup>3530</sup>

The monotonous bombardment between the island and the Siddi's flotilla had continued as before.<sup>3531</sup> This, however, had not prevented the garrison to press on with the fortification. In his dispatch of 17<sup>th</sup> December, Captain Adderton wrote:

"About two O'clock yesterday Captain Keigwin did send a note on board me, which did specify [that] the Siddi did desire our *manchuas* might go down to Nagaon River's mouth along with his vessels, being Shivaji had about 16 galiots at the river's mouth going out. We sent our *manchuas*, but before the Siddi and we got half way to Nagaon, Shivaji's galiots did return into

Nagaon River again. Seeing that our *manchuas* and Siddi's vessels did return to Khanderi again.

"Here has been several great guns fired from the island Khanderi-Underi and Siddi yesterday and this morning, but to as much purpose as formerly. At Khanderi there is about 200 men at work in the bay upon the wall that goes cross the bay."<sup>3532</sup>

And again on 19<sup>th</sup> December:

"Several guns have been fired from the isle and Siddi, but to no purpose. Our enemy's walls at Khanderi-Underi are a great height and they do work very very hard on them."<sup>3533</sup>

In their letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> December, the Mumbai Council wrote to Surat:

"We have so often and largely discoursed the business of Khanderi that we account it needless to trouble you any further with our opinion thereof, but shall duly observe your orders in our proceeding to make an honourable, advantageous and as speedy a peace as we can with Shivaji, for Khanderi holds out to admiration and now in a few days the northerly monsoon will blow hard, that our small vessels will not ride abroad with security, so that our large expenses on that affair is like to be to little purpose. We could heartily wish you had been pleased to have given us leave to have done our utmost against Khanderi-Underi; but in all things we humbly submit your better judgment"<sup>3534</sup>

As for the precautions they were taking against the threat of a Maratha attack on Mumbai, they wrote: "We have people at

every passage to the island that examine all comers and goers.”<sup>3535</sup>

## Mumbai to Surat

1<sup>st</sup> January 1680

“... but for Khanderi we fear it will continue Shivaji’s for it holds out to admiration, and now in a few days the Northerly Monsoon will be so fresh here, as no riding at Khanderi for small vessels.”<sup>3536</sup>

As the Mumbai Council had feared, the northerly winds soon began to make it difficult for their small craft to remain at sea. On 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1680, Captain Minchin reported to Mumbai that for two days the northerly wind was “blowing somewhat” and their small craft had been forced to take shelter at the island of Underi.<sup>3537</sup> He also informed them that Shivaji’s men had brought several guns at Thal and on 3<sup>rd</sup> January had fired several times at the English small craft at Underi.

In the afternoon of 9<sup>th</sup> January, the Siddi with three or four galiots suddenly landed some of his men on Underi and started fortifying it.<sup>3538</sup>

On 11<sup>th</sup> January Captain Adderton informed Mumbai that the garrison at Khanderi had built a wall in mortar and about six to eight feet in height on the hill. Then, he says:

“The day that the Siddi went on the shore at Underi he planted a great gun on Underi against Thal, which has been fired on them several times, but we understand not of any execution it hath done to Thal people.”<sup>3539</sup>

Adderton’s letter of 11<sup>th</sup> January also mentions that the small craft in the English squadron were forced to go and lie

under Underi due to bad weather. In the night of 12<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> January the Maratha flotilla made an attack on Underi. It has been described by Captain Adderton's dispatch of 13<sup>th</sup> January thus:

In the night of 12<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> January the Maratha flotilla sailed out from the Nagaon River and at about one o'clock arrived at Underi. The Siddi himself was on the island. A great many guns were fired from both sides whereupon the English squadron weighed and their small craft moved towards Underi. But they met one of the Siddi's galiots on the way which told them that the enemy had gone back. The English saw the Maratha flotilla going towards the Nagaon River but could not follow them as they were far ahead and in shallow water. The Siddi suffered no damage in the engagement. The losses suffered by the Marathas were not known.<sup>3540</sup>

In the night of 13<sup>th</sup>/14<sup>th</sup> January, the English squadron received a message from the Siddi that the enemy fleet would come again to attack Underi and they should be ready to send their small craft to support him. In his dispatch of 14<sup>th</sup> January, Captain Adams informed Mumbai of this message and also wrote that the Siddi himself was still at Underi and was working very hard to fortify that island.<sup>3541</sup> In the night of 18<sup>th</sup>/19<sup>th</sup> January, two Maratha galiots again tricked the English. The incident, related by Captain Adderton in his dispatch of 19<sup>th</sup> January is as follows:

About 12 o'clock in the night of 18<sup>th</sup>/19<sup>th</sup> January the English sighted two galiots and challenged them. They answered: "Oupna" (*apana*, our own). But the English squadron had an order among themselves that after the watch gun was fired none of their vessels was to leave its place without some special occasion. As all the small craft in their squadron as well as those in the Siddi's flotilla were at their berths, they saw through the trick and "fired several guns, but it was to little purpose, for they flew like lightning."<sup>3542</sup>

The bombardment between Khanderi and the Siddi's flotilla had continued as before.<sup>3543</sup> But the Siddi remained at Underi and was now giving more attention to the fortification of that island.<sup>3544</sup> In the evening of 21<sup>st</sup> January, he stationed a ketch as a guard vessel between Underi and the mainland.<sup>3545</sup> The artillery duel between Khanderi and the Siddi's flotilla was gradually dying down and a fresh one had erupted between Underi and the mainland. In his dispatch of 24<sup>th</sup> January, Captain Adderton wrote:

“Here [is] but little firing from the isle Khanderi and Siddi here of late, but several guns [are] fired from Underi and Thal. The Thal people ... have made a little work up and there their guns are planted against [their] enemy, but we understood not of any execution done on either side.”<sup>3546</sup>

At dawn on 26<sup>th</sup> January, the Marathas made another attempt on Underi, which captain Adderton described in his dispatch of the next day and the Mumbai Council in their letter to Surat of 31<sup>st</sup> January.<sup>3547</sup>

The Siddi had installed a garrison of 3000 men and 10 great guns at Underi. Daulat Khan issued out of the Nagaon River with over 30 *gurabs* and galiots and, just as the morning star was rising, assaulted Underi at three places to land 3000 men. A great number of guns were fired from both sides and the attack was beaten back. Daulat Khan seems to have suffered heavy losses. At the next tide of flood the English squadron saw “abundance of pieces of vessels” and eight bodies floating past them. According to the Mumbai letter, Daulat Khan lost several vessels, 200 men killed and 100 wounded. The Siddi's losses, it says, were slight, only four men killed and seven wounded.<sup>3548</sup> The English tried to send their small craft to support the Siddi but they could not stir as the wind blew right in their teeth and the tide was ebbing. Just at dawn, Daulat Khan's flotilla made for Nagaon. The ships of the

English and the Siddi weighed but could not catch up with the Marathas, because by then the wind had shifted to the east by south and afterwards to southeast. According to the Mumbai letter, “Siddis watchfulness and good Intelligence from Chaul has frustrated his [i.e. Daulat Khan’s] design.”

#### CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE MARATHAS

Meanwhile the negotiations between the English and the Marathas had progressed. In their letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> December, the Mumbai Council informed Surat that two days previously, i.e. on the 19<sup>th</sup> or 20<sup>th</sup> December, they had received a letter from Shivaji and another from the *Subadar* of Chaul, who was empowered to treat with the English, and that they had replied to the *Subadar*’s letter on 21<sup>st</sup> December asking him to send a person to treat with them.<sup>3549</sup> In their next letter, dated 1<sup>st</sup> January 1680, the Mumbai Council informed Surat of their having received a letter from Shivaji three days previously which was forwarded by the *Subadar* of Chaul together with his own letter. Shivaji’s letter, they wrote, was on the same lines as the former. He had acknowledged the two communications he had received from the Mumbai Council but had taken no notice of the President’s. The *Subadar* in his letter had expressed his desire for peace, had promised to do his utmost to obtain all reasonable satisfaction for the English and had requested them to send a boat to Chaul for the passage of his emissary because he could not send his own due to the Siddi’s galiots patrolling in the bay.<sup>3550</sup> Accordingly the Mumbai Council, as they wrote in their letter of 1<sup>st</sup> January, sent one balloon with Ram Shenavi and a file of musketeers.

It is not known what transpired between Ram Shenavi and the *Subadar* of Chaul. But evidently he had come back from Chaul with the *Subadar*’s message that the English should put forward their proposals for peace. In their meeting, held on 8<sup>th</sup> January 1680, the Mumbai Council resolved to send their

proposals as desired by the *Subadar*.<sup>3551</sup> The proposals were then drafted, translated into Marathi and sent with Ram Shenavi to Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul on the same day.<sup>3552</sup> In brief they were as follows:

(1) Shivaji was to pay immediately what was due from him to the Company and the inhabitants in their dominions.

(2) The *gurabs*, the *shibad* and other equipment and men captured by the Marathas were to be returned.

(3) Vessels coming into or going out of Mumbai were not to be hindered and if any such vessels were damaged or ran aground due to storm they were to be returned together with the goods.

(4) Shivaji was to pay the charge borne by the English in the war.

(5) The English were to be allowed to trade freely in Shivaji's dominions.

(6) The former treaty between Shivaji and the English was to be observed.

Ram Shenavi returned to Mumbai along with a Maratha emissary who brought with him the replies of Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul to the articles proposed by the English.<sup>3553</sup> They had agreed with all proposals except the fourth by which the English had demanded a war-indemnity from Shivaji.<sup>3554</sup> No reference was made to this proposal in their reply. Regarding this, the Mumbai Council reported to Surat on 31<sup>st</sup> January:

“Our last demand [actually the 4<sup>th</sup> article in their proposals] see no answer given unto, but Anaji Pandit in his letter took notice of it and has promised to use

his utmost endeavour with the Rajah [i.e. Shivaji] on our behalf.”<sup>3555</sup>

In the covering letter, Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul assured that the proposals as agreed by them would be duly confirmed under Shivaji’s seal.<sup>3556</sup> On their part, Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul had made the following proposals:<sup>3557</sup>

(1) The English were to withdraw their fleet and command Siddi Qasim who had come with their support to withdraw his.

(2) If the English were unable to make the Siddi withdraw due to his pretensions of being a servant of the Mughal Emperor, they were not to provide him with any assistance, ammunition or boats. To ensure the observance of this condition the Marathas would keep one responsible person with ten men at Mumbai as long as the Siddi’s fleet remained at Khanderi.

(3) Debtors absconding from Shivaji’s dominions to those of the English were to be delivered to the Marathas. If the English were unable to do that on account of their custom, all the debts and other charges due from such persons were to be taken by their ministers of justice.

(4) Enemies of the Marathas were not to be allowed to enter the Nagothane or Pen rivers as was agreed between the Marathas and the English in their first treaty. They must see to it that the prisoners taken by the Siddi by coming thither during the hostilities between the English and the Marathas were delivered.

(5) The subjects of Shivaji were to be free to trade in the dominions of the English.

(6) Daud Khan, “who assisted in Mumbai in the Siddi’s service” had done much harm in Shivaji’s country. He was to be turned out of Mumbai.

The Mumbai Council drafted their reply to these proposals, got it translated into Marathi and sent it to Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul with Ram Shenavi and the Maratha emissary.<sup>3558</sup> In brief their reply was as follows:<sup>3559</sup>

(1) The Siddi shall not be supplied with guns and ammunition. But as the English had friendship with the Marathas and trading stations ('factories') in their territory they also had friendship with the Mughal Emperor and trading stations in his dominions. Therefore, as there was no hindrance for water and provisions to the Marathas there shall be none to the Siddi in their port.

(2) If any inhabitants in Shivaji's dominions absconded to Mumbai, the English, having been acquainted of this by the Marathas, would present them before their court of justice. If any such person was not able to pay he would be put into prison until he gave satisfaction.

(3) The English would do everything possible to hinder the enemies of Marathas from entering the Nagothane and the Pen rivers. (No reference was made to the Maratha demand regarding prisoners taken by the Siddi.)

(4) Shivaji's subjects shall be free to trade in Mumbai.

(5) Anyone who assisted in doing injury to Maratha territory would be severely punished and turned out of Mumbai. (The Marathas had specifically demanded the expulsion of Daud Khan. No reference was made to him in the reply.)

Ram Shenavi returned with a promise from Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul that the prisoners taken by the Marathas shall be restored to the English as soon as possible and an order for 100 *khandis* of beetle nut to be made good at Chaul in lieu of the *gurab* etc. taken from the English on condition that they would withdraw their fleet from Khanderi.<sup>3560</sup>

In their meeting held on 27<sup>th</sup> January 1680 to consider this, the Mumbai Council passed a resolution to order Captain Adderton and others to withdraw their fleet to Mumbai “being too sensible of the extraordinary charge that the Hon’ble Company are at in keeping out a fleet that is not so offensive to our enemy as to bring them to better terms than we have already done.”<sup>3561</sup> This order was dispatched on 28<sup>th</sup> January and the English squadron came to anchor at Mumbai on the 30<sup>th</sup> January.<sup>3562</sup>

Informing Surat of these developments, the Mumbai Council wrote in their letter of 31<sup>st</sup> January: “We could heartily wish Khanderi business had never been.”<sup>3563</sup> They also mentioned their intention to discharge the “Cools and Lascarrs” in their small craft but to entertain the musketeers till the muster day which was to be on 26<sup>th</sup> February by which time, “We shall have your answer to these, be settled somewhat here and better know how to govern ourselves, and the charge will not be much.”

Before the Surat Council came to know of this, they wrote a letter to the Company on 24<sup>th</sup> January reporting that the advice first given them, that want of fresh water would, in a few days, force the garrison to surrender the island, had proved wrong and in view of the great charge and the uncertainty of success they had ordered the Mumbai council “to take all opportunities of a fair agreement with him [i.e. Shivaji].”<sup>3564</sup> They continued:

“Since he [Shivaji] is resolved not to be withdrawn from his design of fortifying that place, but by force, which we are so unable to do for want of men and other fit materials requisite thereunto, that until we can receive such, with your orders how further to direct us therein, we have thought it prudence, to palliate things with him until then and which we are now in hourly expectation to hear some result of; so

that if you shall find your island of Mumbai may be so considerable to you as to deserve the removal of so ill and near a neighbour, and who, by the situation of the place, just in the mouth of your port, will wholly disturb and discourage all trade to your island ( if not a prologue to its sudden loss as captain Goldsborough and the other two commanders can well inform you), you must send us out ships and men with a fit person to manage in person such a design, otherwise little will come of it.”

In their letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> February to Mumbai, the Surat Council expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of the treaty.<sup>3565</sup>

Before 27<sup>th</sup> February, Shivaji had ratified the treaty as was promised by Anaji and the *Subadar* of Chaul. This is shown by the order of that date which the Mumbai Council gave to Gape charging him with the responsibility to close down the Rajapur factory and bring back the coconuts and beetle nuts received from the *Subadar* as part of the *bucksis*.<sup>3566</sup> Their letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> March to Surat also reports: “He has confirmed all as per a paper enclosed translated into English for your better understanding.”<sup>3567</sup>

On 25<sup>th</sup> February, the Mumbai council passed an order to send a *shibad* to Chaul to collect one hundred *khandis* of beetle nut for which Anaji and the Subhedar of Chaul had sent them an order on the *Havaldar* of Chaul in lieu of the satisfaction for their *gurab*, *shibad* etc. taken by the Marathas.<sup>3568</sup> In their letter of 9<sup>th</sup> March, the Mumbai Council informed Surat of the arrival of the *shibad* with the 100 *khandis* of beetle nut which they had dispatched to Surat the previous day.<sup>3569</sup>

The prisoners taken by the Marathas were also restored to the English in or before March 1680 as is evidenced by a petition of that month by Francis Mauleverer, Isaac Clarke, John Naylor and others — “English that were prisoners in Shivaji’s country”

— for their salaries during the period of their imprisonment.<sup>3570</sup> This is also shown by the declarations taken by the Mumbai Council in March 1630 from Francis Mauleverer, Isaac Clarke, Returne Roper and three other of the crew of the *Dove*.<sup>3571</sup>

The troubles of the Mumbai Council did not end with the treaty. They could trust neither Shivaji nor the Siddi, both powerful enough to make them anxious about the security of Mumbai and had animated both — Shivaji, because they had killed so many of his men and hindered his fortification of Khanderi which, had they not meddled, would have been made secure long before; the Siddi, because they had made a separate peace with Shivaji and left him alone, and would not comply with his demands for fear of an open breach with Shivaji, which in fact the Siddi was striving at.<sup>3572</sup> And in this he was supported by the Governor of Surat who, too, was disgusted with the English at Mumbai.<sup>3573</sup>

While these hostilities off the Khanderi Island certainly exposed several shortcomings and limitations in Shivaji's fledgling naval enterprise, they also demonstrated equally convincingly that he evinced sufficient confidence in both the fine fettle of his fleet as well as the tenacity and grit of his men to throw an open challenge, virtually under their very noses *and at sea*, to one of the mightiest maritime powers of the time like England. No Indian power in then recent history had even contemplated doing the unthinkable before Shivaji!

#### **WAR BETWEEN THE SIDDI AND THE MARATHAS AND THE DILEMMA OF THE ENGLISH**

The war between the Marathas and the Siddi continued unabated. On 31<sup>st</sup> January, the Mumbai Council informed Surat that guns were continually exchanged between them and that Shivaji's men had brought a gun at Thal which reached Underi.<sup>3574</sup> This, however, they added, had not done any harm to the Siddi while his guns that reached the mainland had killed several.

The Portuguese had, in the meanwhile, taken strong action against the Siddi's depredations. It is described in the Mumbai letter of 2<sup>nd</sup> February thus:

"He robbed lately a town of the Rajah's near Chaul, upon which the Portuguese seized one of his *gurabs* and two galiots, took his men out of them and put them in prison, keeping all till the Siddi had brought back from Danda Rajpuri what men &ca. he had carried out of the said town and delivered up to them"<sup>3575</sup>

On 31<sup>st</sup> January a great battle was fought between the Siddi and Daulat Khan, which, the Mumbai Council wrote on 2<sup>nd</sup> February, lasted four hours. The Siddi, they wrote, captured four *gurabs*, two *shibads* and two galiots, and killed about 500 men, taking 160 prisoner. His losses comprised only eight killed and twenty wounded. On 1<sup>st</sup> February 1680, the Siddi's galiots towed into Mumbai three of the captured *gurabs*. The English sent for his *Nakhuda* (captain), told him of the unreasonableness of this action and tried to persuade him not to keep the vessels there, but to send them away to the Siddi. But all that he did was to remove them to Sandy Bay where they lay till 2<sup>nd</sup> February. In their letter of that date, the Mumbai Council informed Surat of this incident and expressed concern about their relations with Shivaji.<sup>3576</sup> The letter frankly admitted that their port was a great cause of all the troubles which Shivaji was receiving from the Siddi because, without their assistance, he could not remain long in those parts for the Portuguese would not furnish him with anything except a little water and that too not often. Therefore, they added, it would be reasonable on Shivaji's part to expect that the English would take similar action as the Portuguese had for the Siddi's depredations within their bay. They also complained about the Siddi's demands for mortars, lead, gunpowder, grenades, gunners and 50 or 60 musketeers, as well as for his resolve to winter at Mumbai. They put him off till the 26<sup>th</sup>

January but at last lent him 4000 xeraphins. They enclosed his bill, drawn by him on the governor of Surat, for the amount borrowed, and requested the Surat Council to demand this money from the latter. He came to Mumbai with five or six galiots and one or two hundred armed men at a time and would not be denied by fair means and persuasions. This involved additional expenditure for the Mumbai Council which they were forced to bear, on the one hand, for the security of the island from the Siddi and, on the other, for the security of his fleet from any attempt by Shivaji. They therefore asked the Surat Council to use their influence with the governor of Surat and strengthen their hands by specific orders as to how they should behave towards the Siddi.

In their letter of 9<sup>th</sup> February, they again complained to Surat.<sup>3577</sup> The *gurabs* captured from the Marathas still lay at Mumbai, and the Siddi could not be persuaded to take them away. Further still, he had now started to entice the men in the company's service by offers of greater pay.<sup>3578</sup>

The balloon<sup>3579</sup> which they had sent to Chaul in December to bring back the prisoners had not returned, nor had they received any news from them.<sup>3580</sup> They had just (9<sup>th</sup> February) received a report that these prisoners were sent down towards the coast by Anaji's orders but were stopped on the way upon the aggravation of the war against the Siddi.<sup>3581</sup>

After the conclusion of the treaty, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai had proclaimed that all merchants of the island might trade freely in Shivaji's dominions. Accordingly the Mumbai merchants sent several boats to the mainland. Whereupon the *Nakhuda* of the Siddi's flotilla came to the customs house and publicly declared that any vessel which would go to trade in Shivaji's country without their leave, would be forfeited.<sup>3582</sup> On 8<sup>th</sup> March, the Siddi sent 13 galiots into the Pen River where they intercepted, attacked and robbed a boat belonging to the Mumbai Island, wounded a man and carried off a sailor. On that date, he

also plundered four towns in the Pen River, burnt many houses and carried away several prisoners. In retaliation, Shivaji's minister seized the boats belonging to the Mumbai island.<sup>3583</sup> Informing Surat of these incidents, the Mumbai letter of 9<sup>th</sup> March asked them to persuade the governor of Surat to order the Siddi to desist from such acts within their bay. They suggested that the Surat Council might plead that as their provisions were supplied from Pen, Nagothane and other places on the mainland within their bay, they would not be able to supply the Emperor's fleet and would themselves be in want if the Siddi continued to rob these places. The Portuguese also would not supply them anything for they, too, were disgusted with the Siddi. They feared that Shivaji's ministers would demand and expect from them the same action against the Siddi which the captain of Chaul had taken. Otherwise, the letter concluded, they must not expect peace with Shivaji, and asked for plain and positive orders.<sup>3584</sup>

Meanwhile, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai received a haughty reply to a letter which he had sent to the Siddi in this regard. The Siddi maintained that the English President and Bhimaji Parekh had urged him and the governor of Surat to bring his flotilla there to help the English. Even then, he wrote, the English broke the agreement that was reached after his arrival and made a separate peace with the enemy. His fleet was there to destroy the enemy lands and that was the order he had. He had abided so far with the agreement made at the time of Siddi Sambul that no harm was to be done to the coast from "Saral Baty" [Bhatti, Chaul?] to Pen, Nagothane. But the situation had changed now since the enemy's occupation of Khanderi and he would observe the first agreement only if the enemy would vacate that island. Then they shall have no occasion to keep the fleet there.<sup>3585</sup>

Again, on 25<sup>th</sup> March, the Mumbai Council reported to Surat that a *manchua* sent to Chaul was fired upon, seized and carried away to Underi by the Siddi's flotilla although it was flying the

English flag, and the men in the *manchua* were told that the Siddi shall treat all boats coming out from Mumbai in the same way to ensure that their enemy was not supplied with ammunition by the English.<sup>3586</sup>

The Surat Council replied to these Mumbai letters of 9<sup>th</sup> February and 9<sup>th</sup> March on 24<sup>th</sup> March. They were so much taken up by the removing of their goods from their warehouses in Surat to Swally that they had had no suitable opportunity to see the governor of Surat, who, they wrote, was much disgusted at their having made peace with Shivaji. Even then they authorized the Mumbai Council as follows:

“Therefore give the Siddi plain and public notice, if he continues these abuses to us, [that] you have orders to furnish him with no more money nor provisions, and likewise further to use him in such a manner as he will find the evil of it in the end, by causing such a breach betwixt us as may prove harder to reconcile than the war with Shivaji.”<sup>3587</sup>

But this policy was not implemented. In fact, in their letter of 8<sup>th</sup> December 1680, the Surat Council advised Mumbai to avoid “an absolute difference with the Siddi” and “endeavour to delay and temper things” and to try to make the Siddi sensible “in that manner not to endanger the company’s affairs here.”<sup>3588</sup> Therefore, troubles continued as before also during Sambhaji’s reign.<sup>3589</sup>

In their dispatch dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 1680 to the company, the Surat Council had reported of the conclusion of the treaty with Shivaji.<sup>3590</sup> They also wrote of the Siddi’s menace and remarked:

“It will highly concern your Honours speedily to take sane effectual course for redress of these growing evils (with diverse others in yours affairs here, too many now to be repeated), otherwise you will

suddenly lose your island [of Mumbai] and all your northern trade.”

And in another, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1682, they observed:

“If you resolve to continue the possession of your island Mumbai and that its revenue should any ways answer its charge, you must not only unrest Sevagy from Kendry and the King ( i.e. the Mughal Emperor) from Hendry; but bring the Portuguese to some better terms and friendly behaviour towards us, otherwise that most unhappy (but) incomparable place will prove nothing but a constant trouble and damage to you.”<sup>3591</sup>

#### ENGLISH FACTORS AT RAJAPUR AND KARWAR DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Readers are already aware of an account of Anaji’s talks with the Rajapur factors, as communicated in their dispatch of 6<sup>th</sup> December. The next letter from Rajapur that has been traced in the English records is dated 30<sup>th</sup> December. It contains news about Shivaji’s wars in the uplands but gives no information about their own affairs.<sup>3592</sup> For that we have to turn to their next dispatch, dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1680. The information contained therein is as follows:<sup>3593</sup>

The Rajapur factors had planned to sneak away one night during the period of hostilities. But the *Havaldar* got wind of the plan the previous day, allegedly through a servant in the English factory named “Everage”. The English then learnt from one of the French (“frenched”) peons that the *Havaldar* had sent some soldiers down the river to watch for them, and therefore cancelled the plan. Then, on 15<sup>th</sup> January, this Everage obtained leave to go to Kharepatan, pretending some business there, but the English learnt that he actually went to Goa where he hired a vessel to transport him to Mumbai. Since then the *Subadar* sent to the English for the key of their warehouse and asked them to return the beetle nuts which they had received on account of

“Bucksis”. This the English refused to do though they knew well that if he was determined to take them “he might do what he pleased.” But the *Subadar* only took an account of the beetle nuts in the warehouse and “sealed up the door with the Rajah’s seal.” The letter makes no mention of the treaty and it therefore appears that they were not aware of it.

We may infer from these Rajapur letters dispatched during the period of hostilities that they were treated well.<sup>3594</sup> After having learnt of the treaty, the Surat Council, in their letter of 20<sup>th</sup> February 1680, instructed Mumbai to send a frigate to Rajapur to bring away the factors with such part of the “bucksis” that would be ready.<sup>3595</sup> But before they received this letter, the Mumbai Council, in accordance with the Surat orders of 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1680 which they had not been able to put into effect so far, had already dispatched Gape aboard the *Hunter* about 27<sup>th</sup> February.<sup>3596</sup> Gape was charged with the responsibility to close down the Rajapur factory and bring the coconuts and beetlenuts received from the *Subadar* of Rajapur as part of the “Bucksis”. To convince Shivaji’s officers at Rajapur, who they thought might be unaware of the treaty, they gave with Gape “a red paper that is our Articles of Peace signed by the Rajah and a white paper that is a letter from Anaji Pundit to the Deputy Governor” and instructed him to be careful about these documents and return those to them.<sup>3597</sup>

The *Hunter* anchored near Rajapur on 1<sup>st</sup> March. The English factors in the town, Thomas Mitchell and Robert Reade, met John Gape and Charles Alley on board and informed them of the “Civility of Shivaji’s ministers”. On the following day, Gape and his colleagues went in the town, paid a visit to the *Subadar* and informed him of the treaty. Having expressed satisfaction at this, the *Subadar* told them that he had received no advice of it from Shivaji or Anaji yet. Then the English gave him “the letter” and with this he was satisfied. Till 10<sup>th</sup> April, the English were still at Rajapur awaiting the order from Shivaji or Anaji for the delivery of the goods to them.<sup>3598</sup>

The matter of “*bucksis*” was delayed due to Shivaji’s sudden death.<sup>3599</sup> Then Sambhaji refused to give them the “*bucksis*” because his enemy, the Siddi, was not only being harboured but also furnished with ammunition and provisions in their port contrary to the articles of the treaty with Shivaji.<sup>3600</sup> He however promised them that he would order the payment of the “*bucksis*” as well as the satisfaction for their losses at Athani if they would turn the Siddi out of their port, would not allow him to winter there and would not furnish him with ammunition and provisions. Otherwise, he threatened, he would be very severe and would demand back that part of the *bucksis* which was already paid.<sup>3601</sup>

The English trading station at Karwar had not been molested during the hostilities. The Karwar factors wrote to Surat on 24<sup>th</sup> November: “We are very sorry of the difference with Shivaji, as yet we are not molested nor hindered in any of our affairs, but if it proceeds to a height we desire to have a file of Topazes (for our more security) [which] may be ordered from Bombay.”<sup>3602</sup>

It would be remembered that the Surat Council had decided on 15<sup>th</sup> September 1679 to close down the Karwar factory. But this decision was cancelled thereafter. In their dispatch dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 1680 to the company the Surat Council reported that the *Hunter* was sent to dissolve the Rajapur factory but they had decided to continue the Karwar factory for some time because to close down both immediately after the treaty would give an affront to Shivaji and would hinder the performance of the treaty, and secondly they had no vessel except the *Revenge* to send to Karwar and to send her there would leave the island of Mumbai defenceless. Therefore they would ask the Karwar factors to be in readiness and, after the arrival of the Europe ships, “shall not fail to bring them away and totally dissolve that factory.”<sup>3603</sup>

## *Chapter 18*

# **Last Triumph and Death**

### **TROUBLES OF BIJAPUR (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1678)**

Masud Khan's position as the regent of Bijapur was far from enviable.<sup>3604</sup> In 1678, internecine squabbles of the unruly nobles had reached such a stage that Bijapur appeared to be on the brink of dissolution. The *Basatin-us Salatin* narrates the situation as follows:<sup>3605</sup>

The Pathan soldiery continued to be unruly. Sharza Khan remained hostile to Masud Khan and the latter tried to conciliate him by giving him in *jagir* the territory he desired. A conspiracy to assassinate Masud Khan and his confidant Vyankatadri was discovered just in time. Siddi Nusrat Mulk Sundar was escorting Masud Khan's family and treasure from Adoni to Bijapur. Aka Khusrav, the commandant of fort Raichur, attacked the party on the way, killed Nusrat Mulk, seized the treasure and imprisoned Masud Khan's family in the fort. It was with great difficulty that Masud Khan obtained their release through the intercession of the Princess Padshah Bibi and the Qutbshah.

To these internal squabbles were added Maratha inroads in Adilshahi dominions. Exasperated by this situation, Masud Khan decided to revoke the treaty with the Mughals and seek Shivaji's friendship. Having learnt this, Dilir Khan wrote him a letter to dissuade him from the idea. He promised full military support to suppress the internal troubles in the Adilshahi Sultanate and recapture Adilshahi territory seized by Shivaji. Malik Barkhurdar, the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur, also tried to placate him. All this was of no avail. Masud Khan had made up his mind and wrote to Shivaji entreating his alliance to

suppress the enemies of the Sultanate. Shivaji at once responded favourably to these overtures.

Meanwhile, Dilir Khan, having learnt of these developments, prepared to march against Bijapur. Malik Barkhurdar, the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur, sent a report to the Emperor about the state of utter confusion in Bijapur and suggested that the disbanded Adilshahi soldiery be enlisted to chastise Shivaji. The Emperor gave his approval to the scheme whereupon Malik Barkhurdar began recruiting the disbanded Adilshahi soldiers, gave them money and sent them to Dilir Khan.

When Masud Khan learnt of Mughal preparations against the Adilshahi Sultanate he appealed to Shivaji for aid, whereupon the latter sent six or seven thousand cavalry for the defence of Bijapur. Masud Khan told the officers of this Maratha contingent to post it at Ittangihal. Instead of doing so, they came near the capital, pitched their camp in the suburbs of Bijapur, called Khanapura and Khusravpura, and asked Masud Khan to entrust one of the gates and one of the bastions of the walled city to them. When the Khan refused to do so they moved to Zuhrapura, another suburb of the capital. This increased the Khan's suspicions. One day, so it was said, Shivaji's men were bringing in provisions laden on oxen into Bijapur for sale. Swords were concealed in the sacks laden on oxen and each animal was accompanied by a soldier. While the convoy was entering the city, the guards at the gate suspected that something was afoot and thrust iron rods into the sacks. Those in which the rods were obstructed were broken open and the swords hidden inside were found. These were confiscated and the men accompanying the oxen were beaten up and driven out. Shivaji's men then plundered the suburbs of the capital and took some rich merchants as captives. The garrison of Bijapur retaliated by firing cannons upon the Maratha soldiers. The commander of the Maratha contingent was killed and the troops fled.

The discovery of this plot changed Masud Khan's mind. He made overtures of friendship to Dilir Khan, sought his help against Shivaji and proposed to reiterate the former treaty. Dilir Khan accepted the proposal and sent a detachment to assist Masud Khan. The latter sent Vyankatadri and some Adilshahi nobles together with the Mughal detachment against Shivaji. When the joint forces reached Tikota, spies brought the news that Shivaji had arrived at Sangola with seven or eight thousand horsemen and was intending to make a surprise night attack. Having learnt this, Masud Khan ordered Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan to reinforce the joint forces immediately. But the latter tarried on the pretext that he had no money to pay his troops and complained that he had received nothing out of the money which Masud Khan had taken from Dilir Khan for the expenses of the army. So Masud Khan recalled Vyankatadri alone to tell him to conciliate Sharza Khan. But another trouble arose at this time. Abdulla Khan, the commandant of Vellore, had surrendered the fort to Shivaji on payment of 50,000 Hons and was residing with his family at Zuhrapura outside the capital. Masud Khan had asked Abdulla Khan to come inside the city when Shivaji's men plundered the environs of the capital. Once inside, he demanded the money which Abdulla Khan had received from Shivaji, whereupon the Khan went to Sharza Khan, paid him 10,000 Hons and obtained his support. This aggravated the enmity between Masud Khan and Sharza Khan.

This is what has been narrated in the *Basatin-us Salatin*. It does not tell us what occurred of the joint forces that had advanced to Tikota. Presumably the expedition was abandoned and both the Adilshahi and the Mughal forces retired to their respective bases.

#### SAMBHAJI'S DEFECTION TO THE MUGHALS (13<sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER 1678)

Shivaji's eldest son Sambhaji was born on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1657 to Shivaji's eldest wife Saibai.<sup>3606</sup> His mother died on 5<sup>th</sup> September 1659.<sup>3607</sup> Not much is known about his childhood. After Shivaji's

capitulation and first visit to Jai Singh, he had sent Sambhaji, with the Raja's Rajput servant Ugrasen Kachhwah, to the Raja's camp on 17<sup>th</sup> June 1665 where the seven-year old boy had lived for several days, evidently as a hostage.<sup>3608</sup> He had then gone to Agra with his father in 1666. He was with his father when the latter walked out from the Emperor's Court in anger. Though Shivaji himself never attended the Court again, he sent Sambhaji there along with Ram Singh. Then the boy escaped with his father, crouching in a basket of fruit and sweetmeats. To avoid attracting attention, Shivaji left him at Mathura in the care of three Brahmin brothers and the boy was brought home a few months later.<sup>3609</sup> After the renewal of Shivaji's treaty with Aurangzeb, Sambhaji was given a *mansab*, was sent by his father to Aurangabad to pay his respects to the Mughal Prince Muhammad Muazzam and, as he was a minor, was permitted to return home after an audience with the Prince.<sup>3610</sup> Thus, Sambhaji had gone through many adventures and had brushed shoulders with the high and mighty from his very boyhood. The Shivapur Chronology tells us that he was given administrative responsibility since 26<sup>th</sup> January 1671.<sup>3611</sup> He was just fourteen at the time. But it was not unusual in those days to have responsibility entrusted to one at that age. Unfortunately, we do not know the nature of the responsibility he was given. When Thomas Nicolls, the representative of the Mumbai Council, visited Raigad in May 1673, he had held a conversation with Sambhaji about the business for which he had come and, though the young prince was not in a position to give any decision, he had heard what the Englishman had to say, evidently through an interpreter.<sup>3612</sup> It would seem that Shivaji was gradually grooming him in affairs of state.<sup>3613</sup> Sambhaji was present when Henry Oxenden had audience with Shivaji on 26<sup>th</sup> May 1674.<sup>3614</sup> When the Englishman attended the Court of the newly crowned Maratha King in the morning of 6<sup>th</sup> June 1674 Sambhaji, the Peshwa Moropant and "a Brahmin of great eminence" (presumably Gagabhatt) were "seated on an ascent under the throne" while all others were standing with great respect.<sup>3615</sup> Sambhaji was present with the principal officers

when Samuel Austen had audience with the Maratha King on 7<sup>th</sup> September 1675.<sup>3616</sup> An English letter from Surat to Mumbai written on 10<sup>th</sup> January 1677 states: "As for Shivaji Rajah how firm his *farmans* have proved Your Honour is sensible of, but that he will ever rob us in his own country there appears no fear or suspicion for it, for he is prosperous and grows greater and greater, and he, should he die, I see no great fear of danger, for *his son [Sambhaji] is already crowned, and of sufficient understanding he appears.*"<sup>3617</sup> So, it would seem, Sambhaji was declared crown prince before Shivaji set out on the Karnatak expedition. Shivaji had also sent him to Rajapur to deal with the complaints of the English factors there as is shown by the following extract from the Surat dispatch of 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1677: "These considerations together with several robberies committed by Shivaji's army on your estate at the plunder of Raibag, Athani, and other violences and breach of contracts sustained from his ministers, and the unsettled condition of the Deccan country, by the means of the present war there, hath caused us for the present to dissolve that factory and call your servants away so soon as we can, to the end that we might the better bring Shivaji and his officers to a more just and punctual compliance with us hereafter; and our design has so far succeeded that Shivaji, on the news of our leaving his country, has sent his son Sambhaji to see justice done us in all our demands and to persuade us to continue at Rajapur, promising us all fair and punctual compliance hereafter."<sup>3618</sup>

Then suddenly, on 13<sup>th</sup> December 1678, a great calamity befell Shivaji. The Jedhe Chronology records the incident as follows: "13<sup>th</sup> December 1678: Sambhaji Raja became alienated, fled from Parali fort and went to Dilir Khan in the Mughal dominion. He [i.e. the Khan] honoured him [and] gave him the rank of 7000 [*dhat*]."<sup>3619</sup>

François Martin, Chief of the French settlement at Pondicherry, wrote in his memoirs under February 1679: "The officers of Shivaji had information that his eldest son Sambhaji

had gone to the Mughal side on account of some grievances he had against his father.”<sup>3620</sup>

The Surat Council’s letter of 17<sup>th</sup> February 1679 is equally vague. It merely states that Shivaji’s “eldest son has left him in a high discontent and is fled to own Dilir Khan, a great Umbraw<sup>3621</sup> of this King’s [Aurandzeb’s] lying near his country, and as fame gives out resolves to turn Moor [Muslim].”<sup>3622</sup> The rumour that Sambhaji was resolved to become a Muslim was, of course, false. Sabhasad tells us that “Sambhaji Raja, the Raja’s [i.e. Shivaji’s] eldest son, took offence with him, went over to the Mughal dominions and met Dilir Khan there.”<sup>3623</sup> According to *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* Sambhaji, due to some improper behaviour, had become disgusted with his father, was confined to the fort of Parnal and fled from there.<sup>3624</sup>

None of these sources tells us the exact cause of the estrangement between father and son. The *Basatin-us Salatin* says that Sambhaji’s infatuation for a woman was the cause of the estrangement.<sup>3625</sup> But we have no definite evidence about this; all that we can say is that the generation gap is not a new invention. This would be especially pronounced when the father is as able and exacting as Shivaji.

As regards Sambhaji’s flight, details provided by *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* and *Basatin* are as follows:<sup>3626</sup>

Sambhaji fled with a few followers and sent a message to Dilir Khan that he had arrived near and sought the Khan’s help as he was pursued by Shivaji’s men. Dilir Khan sent Ikhlas Khan with three or four thousand troopers and himself followed him. First Ikhlas Khan and then Dilir Khan met Sambhaji on the way. Dilir Khan immediately conveyed this news to the Emperor whereupon Sambhaji was awarded the title of Raja, the rank of 7000 [*dhat*] and various presents. The Khan also threw some feasts to celebrate the occasion. Mahadji, son of Bajaji Nimbalkar and son-in-law of Shivaji, did not appear to have

taken Sambhaji's defection kindly for he asked the latter why he had come there. Sambhaji passed on this discourse to Dilir Khan whereupon the latter kept Mahadaji under arrest for some days.

The news of Sambhaji's defection spread far and wide and is reported in English letters of the time. The earliest mention is found in the Surat dispatch of 17<sup>th</sup> February 1679 cited above.

#### CAPTURE OF KOPPAL AND DODDABALLAPUR (MARCH 1679)

Shivaji's recent acquisitions on the east coast were separated from his dominions on the west coast. It was obvious that Shivaji would soon try to seize the intervening Adilshahi territory to join these two parts of his Kingdom. The capture of Koppal and Doddaballapur was a step in that direction. It would be remembered that late in 1676 or early in 1677, an Adilshahi nobleman, Husain Khan Miyana, was taken prisoner in a battle fought during Shivaji's march to Hyderabad. His brother Qasim Khan was in possession of the fort at Koppal. Janardan Narayan, brother of Raghunathpant Hanmante, defeated Qasim Khan in battle and took him and two sons of Husain Khan prisoner.<sup>3627</sup> With these hostages in hand, the fort of Koppal was taken by the Marathas without bloodshed on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1679 and Husain Khan was taken into Shivaji's service.<sup>3628</sup> This was followed by the capture of the Bahadurbinda fort, 3 km south of Koppal, on 18<sup>th</sup> March 1679.<sup>3629</sup> Meanwhile, on 10<sup>th</sup> March 1679, Anandrao had captured Doddaballapur.<sup>3630</sup>

#### THE BHUPALGAD CAMPAIGN (MARCH-APRIL 1679)

With the Maratha prince in his pocket, Dilir Khan hoped to make an easy conquest of Maratha territories. The account of his campaign against Bhupalgad as given in the *Basatin-us Salatin* and the *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* is briefly as follows:

Taking Sambhaji with him, Dilir Khan advanced to Bhupalgad, 15 km southeast of Kolhapur. It was a strong hill-

fort newly built by Shivaji and was well-provisioned and garrisoned. Cannons were dragged on top of the hill during the night. The next day, one of the towers was demolished in an hour and the fort was captured. Large stocks of grain fell into the hands of the Mughals and were distributed among the soldiers. Seven hundred men were taken prisoner and were set free after mutilating one arm of each.<sup>3631</sup>

The Jedhe Chronology records that that Bhupalgad was captured by Dilir Khan on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1679.<sup>3632</sup>

It is surprising that the hill-fort was reduced in such a short time and neither the *Basatin-us Salatin* nor the *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* gives any explanation. For that we have to turn to the Chitnis Chronicle. It states that the garrison was perplexed on seeing the son of their King, did not open fire for fear of hurting him and fled during the night. Then, says the chronicler, Shivaji ordered all of his other garrisons not to evacuate the forts and to open fire without hesitation.<sup>3633</sup>

The *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* and *Basatin-us Salatin* are our chief authorities for the second act of the campaign which began on the same day. The account they give is as follows:<sup>3634</sup>

On the very day Bhupalgad fell, 16,000 Maratha cavalry arrived near the fort to succour the garrison. But by that time, the fort was already in Mughal control. When Dilir Khan learnt of their approach, he dispatched Ikhlas Khan, Raja Jaswant Singh Bundela and Rashid Khan alias Illahmulla Khan — altogether about 1,500 cavalry — against them. The Mughal detachment encountered the Maratha force at a distance of six *kos* from the fort and finding themselves outnumbered took refuge in a walled village. They were being attacked from all sides but managed to keep the enemy at bay for six hours with the help of their artillery. Meanwhile, Dilir Khan sent Sar-afraz Khan and Latif Shah with a strong force to support the beleaguered detachment and himself followed them with the

whole army. The Marathas melted away on the arrival of this strong force. Dilir Khan returned to Bhupalgad after pursuing them for two *kos*, completely dismantled its fortifications and burnt down what could not be carried away.

Meanwhile having learnt that Iraj Khan and Bajaji [Nimbalkar] were bringing in a convoy of provisions from Paranda to Dilir Khan, the same Maratha force turned eastward and fell in with their quarry near the Bhima at a distance of about 15 *kos* from Paranda. The Mughal escort took refuge in a small fort in the district and left the convoy to be plundered by Marathas.

The campaign is of interest for two points. First, it shows that Shivaji was determined to resist the Mughals despite the defection of his son to them. He was not ready to forego the state even for the safety of his son. Secondly, it provides one of the several illustrations of Maratha strategy and grand-tactics. They attacked Ikhlas Khan because they had a great numerical superiority against him. But as soon as a strong force arrived on the scene they melted away instead of accepting battle and attacked the enemy's line of supply far in his rear.

Dilir Khan's movements hereafter, described by *Basatin-us Salatin* alone, were as follows:

After demolishing the fort of Bhupalgad, Dilir Khan marched towards Bijapur and sent a message to Masud Khan that he had perceived the latter's intention of deceiving him by maintaining a covert alliance with Shivaji. Shortly afterwards, Dilir Khan arrived at Halsangi. Frightened by his arrival so near the capital, Masud Khan sent him a conciliatory message that he had every intention to comply with the agreement and that it had not been effected so far only on account the arrogance of Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan. Padshah Bibi, he assured, would shortly be sent as per the treaty. He also requested Dilir Khan to go back to the Bhima River as the arrival of the Mughals was

causing harm to the country. Dilir Khan then left Halsangi, crossed the Bhima at Dhulkhed and reached Takli.<sup>3635</sup>

#### SHIVAJI AND THE PORTUGUESE (JANUARY–MAY 1679)

We have already seen how the *chauth* was one of the causes of friction between Shivaji and the Portuguese.<sup>3636</sup> The system of *cartazes* about navigation which the Portuguese imposed upon Asian powers was another. Shivaji's officers continued trying to disregard it and the Portuguese continued to enforce it.<sup>3637</sup> Minor border 'incidents' were a third cause of friction, or these might have been a result of other already existing causes.<sup>3638</sup> Besides these, two incidents which occurred in 1679 further worsened relations between Shivaji and the Portuguese.

Towards the end of 1678, some Arab warships of Muscat intercepted the Portuguese Northern Fleet escorting a convoy of merchant ships carrying provisions for Goa. During the engagement, some of the merchant ships took refuge in the river of Sangameshwar. The Maratha *subadar* there refused to release them without Shivaji's permission. On the other hand, five Arab ships were awaiting them at the mouth of the river in case they tried to break out into the open sea. The question was taken up for consideration in a meeting of the Portuguese State Advisory Council held at Goa on 11<sup>th</sup> January 1679. It was resolved in the meeting to send the fleet to attack and burn the Arab ships in the river.<sup>3639</sup> But this was easier said than done for, when the Portuguese admiral Joseph de Melo de Castro sailed there, he found that the Arabs had entrenched themselves with guns on both banks of the river under the protection given by Shivaji's men and that the channel had been blocked with two galiots.<sup>3640</sup> It was evident that any attempt by the Portuguese against the Arab ships would have led to war with Shivaji. As the Portuguese were unwilling to risk it, the Council resolved in its meeting of 8<sup>th</sup> March 1679 merely to continue the blockade of the Arab ships.<sup>3641</sup> In his letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> March 1679, the Portuguese Governor complained to Shivaji himself about the refuge given in the river of Sangmeshwar to the Arab ships.<sup>3642</sup>

The outcome of this incident is not known. This and other such incidents were a result of Portuguese highhandedness at sea. No other Asian power except Shivaji challenged it. By 1721, affairs had changed so much that Portuguese merchant ships were compelled to buy permits (called *dastaks*) from the Marathas to sail in the coastal waters of India.<sup>3643</sup> Unfortunately, Shivaji did not live long enough to see this signal achievement of the Navy founded by him.

The other incident was a fort that the Marathas had started building on the left bank of the Sal River, which formed the boundary between the Portuguese Colony at Goa and Shivaji's Kingdom. When the Captain of the Portuguese outpost at Raitur (called Rachol by the Portuguese) reported this to the Portuguese Governor Antonio Pais de Sande, the latter ordered him to write a letter to the Maratha *Havaldar* of Balli asking him to stop the work immediately as it was contrary to the treaty between the Portuguese and Shivaji.<sup>3644</sup> The *Havaldar* replied that the fort was being built at the behest of his master, Shivaji Raja, that it would not cause any inconvenience to the Portuguese and that the Marathas were free to do as they pleased in their dominion. The Captain of Raitur then wrote a letter to the *Subadar* of Phonda. No reply had been received to that letter by the time the Portuguese Governor put the matter before the State Advisory Council in its meeting of 15<sup>th</sup> May 1679. It was feared that if the fort was allowed to be built, it would be a threat to the security of the district of Sashti and the traffic in the Sal River. It was resolved therefore that if the Marathas did not stop the work, the Captain of Raitur should be instructed to demolish it, but without letting anyone become wise that it was done with the consent of the Portuguese Government!<sup>3645</sup> Again, we know nothing about the outcome of this incident.

DILIR KHAN'S INTRIGUES AGAINST THE ADILSHAHI SULTANATE (MAY-AUGUST 1678)<sup>3646</sup>

Masud's relations with Sharza Khan were getting worse and as he did not have enough strength to chastise the latter by force, he sought Dilir Khan's assistance against Sharza Khan. Dilir Khan welcomed this opportunity to intervene in the affairs of the Adilshahi Sultanate and sent Ikhtisas Khan, alias Abd-ur Raihan, Abdul Ghafur, Shaikh Muhammad Junaidi and Wazir Beg — altogether two or three thousand horsemen and some artillery — to Masud's help. As they arrived and encamped outside the castle of Bijapur, Vyankatadri, the confidant of Masud Khan, prepared to attack Sharza Khan who was also encamped outside the capital. But Sharza Khan stood to arms and, while Vyankatadri hesitated, made overtures to Malik Barkhurdar, the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur. He offered to assign his son to Imperial service and himself go to Dilir Khan who, he requested, should mediate a peace between himself and Masud Khan. Malik at once assented and Sharza Khan, instead of being attacked by the Mughal detachment, went with them to Dilir Khan's camp where he was received with great ceremony. His son Sayyid Ahmad alias Ghalib Khan was given the rank of 6000 [*dhat*] and the *jagir* of Balapur district. Sharza Khan was paid Rs.50,000 on his arrival and Rs.1,000 rupees per day thereafter for the maintenance of his contingent. Besides, Dilir Khan frequently gave him gifts. But despite this favoured treatment, his family was sent to Aurangabad to be kept there as hostages. Among Adilshahi noblemen who defected to the Mughals about this time was one Hakim Shamsuddin (usually called Hakim Shamsa).

Perceiving that the Adilshahi Sultanate was on the brink of dissolution, Masud Khan decided to conciliate Dilir Khan by sending over the promised contingent. Accordingly, he sent his son Siddi Darwesh with Vyankatadri, Abdul Saif, Siddi Jauhar,<sup>3647</sup> Siddi Yaqut, Hasan Khan Rohila and Miyan Khan Turan — altogether 5,000 horsemen.

They remained encamped at Dhulkhed on the southern bank of the Bhima. Dilir Khan treated them with great respect

and often sent them confectionary and other delicacies. He particularly worked upon Vyankatadri, who paid frequent visits to the Khan's headquarters, and lent him money wherever he learnt that the Adilshahi nobleman was in financial difficulties. Altogether the Khan gave about Rs.100,000 to Vyankatadri.

Meanwhile, Dilir Khan had kept in touch with the three or four thousand men which was the only force remaining in the Adilshahi capital and was making secret agreements with them. The fulfillment of his plan of annexing the Adilshahi Sultanate without resorting to war did not seem far away.

One of the clauses in the treaty between the Mughal and Adilshahi states was that the Adilshahi princess was to be given in marriage to one of the Mughal princes. This was not effected so far and, on the Emperor's orders, Dilir Khan began to press for its fulfillment. Princess Shahr Banu Begam, known as Padshah Bibi, the elder sister of Sikandar Adilshah, was about 15 or 16 years old. She was intelligent, involved herself in the administration of the State and was respected by government servants. Masud Khan had no objection in giving her in marriage to a Mughal prince but his difficulty was that the princess was not willing to go. So he won over the chief maid of the princess and other servants of her household and asked them to persuade the princess that the existence of her brother's throne depended entirely on her agreeing to marry the Mughal prince. She soon grew tired by their constant harrying and agreed to go. Masud Khan then borrowed some money on loan from Dilir Khan on the pretext that he had no funds to send the princess with due ceremony and baggage. In July 1679, the princess was sent to Dilir Khan's camp at Takli and from there to Aurangabad *en route* Delhi.<sup>3648</sup>

Meanwhile Dilir Khan was weaving schemes to annex the Adilshahi. He had promised Hakim Shamsuddin the regency of Bijapur and had won over Vyankatadri, the Adilshahi representative. But the Mughal Prince, Shah Alam Bahadur, the

*subadar* of the Deccan, was hostile to him and had ordered the commandants of various forts such as Bidar, Paranda and Solapur that no money, artillery and other war-material was to be sent to Dilir Khan without his express sanction. So Dilir Khan wrote a letter to the Prince that there was an opportunity to fulfill their desire to annex Bijapur for which he should be assisted with finance, army and war-material. Whereupon the prince sent 60,000 Muhars to Solapur with his trusted servants and instructed them that these should be disbursed to Dilir Khan only when it was certain that Bijapur would be seized if the money was spent. He also instructed the Khan to complete the task with this amount and not to demand more.

Soon after the arrival of the Adilshahi princess at his camp, Dilir Khan made an agreement with Vyankatadri on 28<sup>th</sup> July 1679 by which Masud Khan was to hand over the regency to Hakim Shamsuddin and a Mughal contingent was to be stationed at Bijapur. This would be virtual annexation of the Adilshahi Sultanate to the Mughal Empire. When Vyankatadri sent a dispatch about this to Masud Khan, the latter conferred with his confidants — Siddi Yaqut, Qazi Said, Siddi Yaqut Khairiyatkhan and Sidhorav — and decided to reject the proposal. Meanwhile Vyankatadri arrived at Bijapur to persuade Masud Khan. The Khan spent two or three days contemplating his next move. Then, in the night of 12<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> August 1678, he arrested Vyankatadri and his confederates and confiscated their properties. On a post-haste message from him, his son, Siddi Darwesh, who was encamped at Dhulkhed, also arrived in Bijapur with the Adilshahi contingent.

#### DILIR KHAN'S ADVANCE TOWARDS BIJAPUR (AUGUST-OCTOBER 1679)

Diler Khan's advance towards Bijapur is narrated in the *Basatin-us Salatin* as follows:<sup>3649</sup>

When Dilir Khan learnt that his plan to annex the Adilshahi Sultanate without bloodshed had misfired, he crossed

the Bhima at Dhulkhed, 60 km north-northeast of Bijapur, on 18<sup>th</sup> August 1679. But, although he was trying to make haste to catch Bijapur unprepared, he could not stir because his treasury was exhausted and he had no money to pay his soldiers. When the officers of the Prince learnt that Masud Khan had imprisoned Vyankatadri and recalled Siddi Darwesh to Bijapur, they too refused to give money to Dilir Khan. While Dilir Khan wrote a letter to the Prince and ultimately obtained the money, vital time had been lost and Masud Khan put it to good use. He strengthened the castle of Bijapur, stocked it with provisions, and brought Pam Naik's troops as well as soldiers from Torgal, Adoni and Karnul to reinforce the garrison. He also sent Sidhorao with a letter for Shivaji. Its substance, according to the *Basatin-us Salatin*, was as follows:

“It is not that you do not know the situation in this capital. It is well-known. Army, treasure, territory, materials for the defence of the castle — nothing of these has been left. The enemy is very powerful and hard and thinks night and day of attacking Bijapur. You are an old servant of the dynasty and have attained greatness in this capital. Therefore you alone would be anxious for the well being of this state. Others would have no grief about it. This time of danger is such that such a powerful enemy has reached the very head and is lying in wait to seize the opportunity. Now the capital and the castle would not be defended unless you take an interest in it. Remember your [former] master, come hither and suggest what you consider proper and it will be done.”

Shivaji decided to give his full support for the defence of Bijapur when he received this letter. He detailed a force of 10,000 troopers to reinforce Masud Khan, sent 2,000 oxen – laden with provisions from various forts to Bijapur and bid his subjects to send grain and other supplies thither for sale. He also sent a letter to Masud Khan, the import of which according to the *Basatin* was as follows: “I am responsible for this service. You strengthen the castle and be assured [of my help]. I shall

come in person, worst and plunder Dilir Khan's army and shall punish him."


Masud Khan took heart at this message. A few days later, Shivaji's envoy Visaji Nilkanthrao came to Bijapur with dresses of honour for the Adilshah and Masud Khan. He informed them that 5,000 troopers had arrived at Ainapur and 5,000 more at Bhupalgad awaiting their orders and that Shivaji in person would arrive shortly afterwards. While these developments were taking place, Khairiyat Khan and Miyan Khan, who were sent ahead by Dilir Khan, attacked the fort of Mangalvedhe. The Adilshahi commandant of the place Said Khan Tarin fled from the fort and Mangalvedhe fell into the hands of the Mughals.[3650](#)

Another Mughal commander, Bajaji (Nimbalkar), attacked Akluj. Having learnt this, Bahadur Khan (Adilshahi) who was at Sangole, 50 km south-southeast of Akluj, marched there. In the ensuing battle, Bajaji's force was defeated and put to flight, and his son was killed.

News was received at Bijapur that the Mughal cavalry had captured and sacked Salotagi and Kasegaon and were plundering the surrounding country. This was followed by another piece of news that the horsemen of Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan had reached Almel, whereupon Masud Khan sent Sayyid Sharif, Farid Khan Panni, and Mithi Khan Panni towards Almel and Sabaji Ghatare, with troops from Torgal, towards Indi. Sabaji encountered Sambhaji[3651](#) who was foraging thereabout. About 10 or 15 men fell on each side and Sabaji was wounded by an arrow. But he captured 50 horses, four camels and 50 oxen.

Meanwhile, Anandrao arrived with two or three thousand Maratha troopers near Bijapur. Masud Khan went forward to Nauraspur to receive him, and stationed him at the same place.

After receiving money (released by the order of the Prince), Dilir Khan built a mud fort at Dhulkhed and established an outpost there to keep open his line of supply. He set off thence on 15<sup>th</sup> September 1679 and arrived at Halsangi on 20<sup>th</sup> September. He repaired the mud fort at that place and established an outpost there to guard his line of supply. On 6<sup>th</sup> October 1679, he made a foray as far as Baratgi, fell back to Bommanahalli on 7<sup>th</sup> October and began building a strong enclosure there.



Masud Khan was still trying to make peace with the Mughals. When Dilir Khan made a raid as far as Baratgi, Masud Khan sent trays of fruit and confectionary to him. On 12<sup>th</sup> October 1679 Sayyid Alam and Yadgar Ali came from Masud Khan, met and talked with Dilir Khan through Ikhlas Khan and returned after promising Dilir to bring about a treaty with Masud.

On 31<sup>st</sup> October 1679, Shivaji arrived near Bijapur with 10,000 cavalry and was joined by his contingent that was at Bijapur the next day.[3652](#)

The *Basatin's* account is corroborated by Shivaji's letter to Ekoji. It runs:

"Seeing that the Sultanate of Bijapur was weak Dilir Khan marched on Bijapur with the intention of capturing it. He crossed the Bhima River and closed near the city. Masud Khan wrote this news to us that 'The enemy has become very aggressive; you should come and help us.' Thereupon we took to horse on the same instant and stage by stage came to Panhala. We assembled the entire army and went in person with the cavalry near Bijapur."[3653](#)

The events which followed are described by the *Basatin* thus:[3654](#)

After his arrival near Bijapur, Shivaji asked Masud Khan's permission to enter the city with 5,000 troopers and pay a visit to Sikandar Adilshah. Masud Khan gave him permission to come with 500 men. But Shivaji's Prime Minister Moropant refused to give his consent on suspicion that Masud Khan would commit treachery against his master by concluding an alliance with Dilir Khan. According to his advice, Shivaji cancelled his plan to go into the castle of Bijapur. He told Masud

Khan's envoy that he would be pleased to meet the Adilshah but first he would drive away Dilir Khan.

Meanwhile, the Prince wrote a letter to the Emperor after seeing that all plans of Dilir Khan and Malik Barkhurdar had misfired, the castle of Bijapur was put in a posture of defence, and Shivaji had arrived near Bijapur. He complained that Dilir Khan had spent a large amount of money without attaining anything so far and expressed his fear that it would be very difficult to take Bijapur and that Dilir Khan's enmity might drive Masud Khan to hand over the Adilshahi state to Shivaji. Khan Jahan Bahadur Kokaltash (i.e. Bahadur Khan) and other grandees of the Mughal Court also intrigued to prejudice the Emperor against Dilir Khan. On his part, Dilir Khan wrote to the Emperor that the Prince and others were not telling the truth and that Bijapur was ill-prepared for war. Malik Barkhurdar and Hakim Shamsuddin also wrote similar letters. All this was of no avail and the Emperor summoned Hakim Shamsuddin and Malik Barkhurdar to Court. Accordingly, Dilir Khan dispatched the former on 7<sup>th</sup> October and the latter on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1679.

#### DEVASTATION OF THE MUGHAL TERRITORY BY MARATHA FORCES (NOVEMBER 1679 - FEBRUARY 1680)

Thus, Dilir Khan lay encamped at Bommanahalli and Shivaji to the west of Bijapur. What Shivaji did thereafter is narrated in the *Basatin-us Salatin* as follows:

On 5<sup>th</sup> November 1679<sup>3655</sup> Shivaji split his army into two divisions and entered Mughal territory. He himself with eight or nine thousand cavalry marched by way of Almel, and Anandrao with ten thousand cavalry, by way of Sangole. As Shivaji's devastation of Mughal dominions was an annual evil, Dilir Khan ignored this and decided to press on towards Bijapur believing that once Bijapur was taken he could easily drive out Shivaji.<sup>3656</sup>

In his letter to Ekoji, Shivaji himself describes how he laid Mughal territory waste. It might be best to tell the story in his

own words.

“We assembled the entire army and went in person with the army near Bijapur. Considering that the enemy was strong — and particularly the Pathan tribe is obstinate — [we thought that] such tactics should be adopted that he would become disappointed and defeated. Therefore, we decided upon imposing a pull [upon the enemy] by spreading the army in his territory. Accordingly we left Dilir Khan at a distance of three gaos, crossed the Bhima River and went on devastating the country right up to Jalnapur.<sup>3657</sup> We went to Jalnapur, made a halt for four days and plundered the market. A large wealth fell into [our] hands. Jalnapur is [at a distance of] four gaos from Aurangabad. Disregarding that the Prince was at that place [Aurangabad] [we] sacked the market. An immense wealth, besides gold, silver, elephants and horses was found [there]. While we were marching on horseback towards fort Pattagad with that [wealth] Ranmast Khan and Asaf Khan and Zabit Khan and five or seven such officers with eight or ten thousand troopers came in the way.<sup>3658</sup> We chastised them, captured horses and elephants and arrived at [fort] Patta. Then [we] sent the army again to wreak havoc in the [enemy] territory and sent Moropant, the prime minister, to capture the 27 forts of the Mughals that are in the province of Baglan and Khandesh and to capture territory and we [in person] halted at [fort] Patta.”<sup>3659</sup>

This is confirmed by the following entry in the Jedhe Chronology under Shaka 1601:

“In the month of Kartik [25<sup>th</sup> October to 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1679], a treaty was concluded between the Adilshah and Shivaji Raja. In the same month the Raja

went to and plundered Jalnapur. There a battle was fought with Ranmast Khan. Sidoji Nimbalkar was struck and killed by a musket-ball. The Rajah returned from Patta and came to Raigad.”<sup>3660</sup>

Khafi Khan mentions the sack of Jalna. The substance of his narrative is as follows:<sup>3661</sup> Jalna was a prosperous town full of valuable commodities belonging to the merchants of Balaghat.<sup>3662</sup> A Sufi ascetic, Sayyid Jan Muhammad, had his monastery there. Whenever the enemy turned towards this town the inhabitants took refuge in the monastery with their belongings and thus remained safe from the infidels. This time too several rich merchants sought refuge there with cash and goods. But Shivaji's men, coming to know this, paid no heed to the dignity of the ascetic, plundered the men in the monastery, took many of them captive and threatened Sayyid Jan Muhammad and his followers with hands and tongues.<sup>3663</sup> Because of his curse Shivaji died in the same year.

In his letter to Ekoji Shivaji gave an account of Moropant's campaign in Baglan and Khandesh. It runs:

“Moropant was sent in that province. He captured fort Ahiwant. [The fort of] Ahiwant is just like Panhala, equal to it. Another strong fort, Nahawa [Ratangad], which is in the country towards Baglan, was also captured. Both these forts, old renowned places, were captured. Great wealth was found on these forts also. Besides [he i.e. Moropant] sent the army that was with him in the country, wrecked havoc and captured a large tract.”<sup>3664</sup>

The *Basatin-us Salatin*, Khafi Khan's *Muntakhab-ul Lubab* and contemporaneous English letters corroborate and supplement this account. The *Basatin* states: When Shivaji entered the Mughal territory he had 30,000 cavalry with him. They plundered and burnt the Mughal territory from the Bhima

to Daulatabad. Then they devastated Varhad, Khandesh and Baglan. It was said that the booty obtained included 12,000 horses and *crores* of rupees.<sup>3665</sup>

Khafi Khan briefly mentions the plunder of Dharangaon and Chopda.<sup>3666</sup> However, English sources are more elaborate. They run as follows:

Surat Consultation  
8<sup>th</sup> December 1679

“Certain intelligence being brought to this city the last night of Shivaji’s burning and plundering Dharangaon, Chopda, and many other considerable towns adjacent, has struck a general consternation into all the inhabitants here that he has also an eye towards this city....which he may the more facilie [i.e. easily] perform now [that] all these parts remain destitute of any considerable force to oppose him; so that we do now conceive it our duty to take some seasonable [timely] care for the preservation of the Hon’ble Company’s estate and our own persons from an enemy exasperated against us for our disputing with him before Hendry Kendry [i.e. Khanderi].”<sup>3667</sup>

Dharangaon to Surat

Dated Chopda, 12<sup>th</sup> December 1679

“Our last was of 25<sup>th</sup> passed per express which gave your Honour &ca. the news of Shivaji’s forces approaching into these parts, as also the care taking in getting all our *Caphila*<sup>3668</sup> ready to depart , which God be thanked was effected, and [it is] a miracle that it escaped their hands, for the next day S. A. [i.e. Samuel Austen] with the *Caphila* set out from Dharangaon and went a day’s journey so far as Gandhali almost

into the very jaws of the enemy, for we had no sooner arrived there but there was news of the [Maratha] forces being very near; upon which news at half night the *Caphila* set out again and was ordered not to go their usual journey so far as Betawad but to proceed further, which God be thanked they did, otherwise they had been taken, for by three of the clock in the afternoon the town was all of a flame. S. A. returned from Gandhali to Chopda, where he was no sooner arrived but the news was that Dharangaon was all of a fire likewise, what goods and estate was there of the Company's, God be thanked, set out two hours before, which arrived safe unto us; the next day the [Maratha] army from several places made towards Chopda, which made us, together with the towns people, betake ourselves to the hills, where God be thanked we arrived safe, together with the Company's goods and what we had of our own, so much as we could get carts for; what remained was stolen, the house only remaining, which was good fortune considering the most part of the town besides was burnt to the very ground, amongst which a warehouse full of goods of S. A. was consumed likewise. The [Maratha] army, which consisted of 12,000 horse, kept their rendezvous here two days and then set forward towards Burhanpur, but never went so far, but turned of more to the right hand towards Malkapur, where Shivaji himself with 20,000 horse more are to meet. Here are various reports concerning the Prince, who is said to be all one with Shivaji, and through his assistance doth intend to put for the crown; now, therefore, at present the country is in a most miserable condition, and to tell your Honour &ca. the truth we are likewise so too, for what comfort we had before was in the strength of the *faujdar*, who is now sent far away with all the rest of the *faujdars* that belong to these parts; and we are once more forced to

the hills, being freshly alarmed with another army consisting of 12,000 horse which is come very near us, who intends for Burhanpur and supposed to join with the Prince's forces. Just now here is fresh news that the city of Aurangabad is plundered and burnt, and that the Prince doth now declare for Delhi, he having wrote to the chief of Burhanpur, Ckaune Gamma [Khan Zaman],<sup>3669</sup> to deliver the city and merchants unto him.”<sup>3670</sup>

The rumour relayed in the above letter that Aurangabad was plundered and burnt was not correct nor was there any more truth in the other rumour that the prince was in alliance with Shivaji and had declared for Delhi.

Chopda to Surat  
24<sup>th</sup> February 1680

“The news of these parts are so various and dubious, every day contradicting, that there is no inserting thereof, so many stories concerning the prince that there is little credit to be given thereto, therefore forbear writing the same. As to Shivaji's forces, they have plundered and burnt most of these parts excepting the towns which pay him  $\frac{1}{4}$  part [of the revenue]; those he meddles not with. His armies under Moro Pundit continue still upon these borders, endeavouring to take what castles they can. They have a great itching towards Mulher Castle and showed themselves before it two or three times; but it proves too strong for them, therefore will scarce come into their possession except betrayed unto them. They have already taken [a fort], namely Hurmunt Ghurr [Ahiwantgad]. What their future designs are at present nobody can tell. The reports of their joining with the Prince, there is little credit to be given thereto. Whither their next march will be a few days

will show. Some speak as if they intend for Surat; others say Burhanpur. God only knows where their intentions are bound next. What loss the Hon'ble Company has sustained by Shivaji's armies, a particular account is here enclosed sent your Honours &ca.”<sup>3671</sup>

While the Marathas were thus causing havoc in Mughal territory, various rumours were speedily circulated around the country. For instance, the English factors at Mumbai had learnt and repeated in the following dispatch that Shivaji and his Prime Minister Moropant were defeated in two separate engagements by Dilir Khan and Ranmast Khan respectively.

Mumbai to Surat  
29<sup>th</sup> November 1679

“Shivaji Rajah is now at a place called Pattagad, about five days journey from hence, to which place he fled with 500 horse to secure himself, having left the greatest part of his army near Bijapur, where Dilir Khan engaged him, wholly routed him, and took 2000 horse, besides prisoners, & Ca....

“The Peshwa is gone to him, and we have news that Anaji Pandit will be there too, who wrote us some days ago, and whose letter we have likewise answered. The Peshwa was intended for Surat, but the overthrow he received by one Ranmast Khan, a Pathan, who killed him 2000 men and took 400 horse, which diverted him.”<sup>3672</sup>

The information of the English factors of Bombay of the defeats of Shivaji and the Peshwa was incorrect. The Surat Council knew the truth.

Surat to Mumbai

13<sup>th</sup> December 1679

"The advice you give us of Shivaji's and his Peshwa's being routed by this King's [Aurangzeb's] armies in two several encounters is here quite contrary reported, and which we have more reason to credit from his ravaging this country, having lately burnt and sacked Chopda and Dharangaon, and is said to be gone with a design to surprise Burhanpur, which has put such a damp on all trade and struck such a consternation on the spirits of these people as is hardly credible, all the ways being stopped and diverse *Caphilas* robbed, amongst which the Company's from Ahmedabad; and here we are in hourly fear of an alarm from him, it being certainly advised to private persons in Surat that he intends suddenly to fall upon this city, which would be a thing rather to be wondered at than believed, did we not see what he has done and still doth in one place or another."<sup>3673</sup>

#### SAMBHAJI'S ESCAPE (DECEMBER 1679)

What occurred after Dilir Khan's return to Bommanahalli is related in the *Basatin-us Salatin* as follows:<sup>3674</sup>

On 13<sup>th</sup> November 1679, Khwaja Abd-ur Razzaq and Sayyid Alam arrived from Masud Khan with an entreaty for peace. Dilir Khan told them: 'Masud Khan should send his son to our army (evidently as a hostage), should repay our loan and forsake Shivaji's alliance. Then only would I be able to speak to the Emperor on your behalf.' Abd-ur Razzaq undertook the responsibility for this and sent back Sayyid Alam with instructions to persuade Masud Khan to send his son and army and return immediately. But Sayyid Alam went to Masud Khan and advised him that: 'Abd-ur Razzaq has joined Dilir Khan. The Khan is an alien and is not trustworthy. What is his reliability

that we should send (your son) Siddi Darwesh to him?' Having heard this Masud Khan dropped the idea of an alliance with the Mughals and did not even send a reply to Dilir Khan's letter.

Dilir Khan awaited Masud Khan's reply for two days and as none came, he decided to plunder Adilshahi territory. Leaving his big guns and impedimenta at Bommanahalli, he set out on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1679 and arrived at Makhnapur. On 17<sup>th</sup> November he reached Jalgeri, but he could not attack Bijapur for fear of Shivaji. Sambhaji had earlier bragged that he would capture several forts and territory for the Mughals. Moreover the Nayak and people at Murtazabad alias Miraj were in covert alliance with the Mughals through Abdul Faiyaz. Relying on Sambhaji and these people, Dilir Khan decided to march towards Miraj and Panhala. This move, he hoped, would force Shivaji to turn back from Mughal territory and come there. Therefore on 17<sup>th</sup> November, he set out from Jalgeri and arrived at Tikota. When Ikhlas Khan, who led his vanguard, reached Tikota his troops started plundering the town. Whereupon Hindu and Muslim women plunged into wells with their children and drowned. About 3,000 Hindus and Muslims were taken captive. The town was thoroughly plundered. When Khwaja Abdul Razzaq learnt this, he took mercy upon the captives, obtained the release of 500 of them and kept them in his custody. On 19<sup>th</sup> November, Dilir Khan set out from Tikota and, plundering and devastating on the way and taking captives from various villages, arrived at Athani via Honwad and Telsang. On 22<sup>nd</sup> November, he had left Athani and was marching to Ainapur. On the way he learnt that Sambhaji had fled from his army and gone to Bijapur. Dilir Khan turned back from the very spot he heard this news and marched towards Bijapur.

Shivaji had sent his trustworthy people to conciliate and bring back Sambhaji.<sup>3675</sup> He seized an opportunity and fled from Dilir Khan's army with his wife, disguised in male attire, and five horsemen. He reached Bijapur on 23<sup>rd</sup> November. Masud

Khan sent him clothes, bedding and other necessities. When Dilir Khan learnt this, he became very angry with Masud Khan. Whereupon Abd-ur Razzaq requested the Khan to give him leave so that he would go to Masud Khan and manage the business of Sambhaji. He accordingly took leave and on 29<sup>th</sup> November arrived at Bijapur. Having perceived the cause of Abd-ur Razzak's arrival, Sambhaji set out on horseback in the night of 1<sup>st</sup> December 1679 and went to Panhala.

In his letter to Ekoji, Shivaji wrote about the safe return of his son thus:

“Sambhaji Raja had gone to the Mughals. We employed various means to bring him back. He too realized that in the [Mughal] Empire or in the *Badshahis* of Bijapur or Bhaganagar [Hyderabad] things will not be done to his liking. So, in response to our letter he came and met us. I conciliated him as is proper in family affairs.”<sup>3676</sup>

Apart from Shivaji's efforts, what was it that might have brought Sambhaji to his senses?

Perhaps the following passage in a letter from Mumbai written on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1680 provides the answer:

“Dilir Khan, with Sharza Khan and Sambhaji Raja, has robbed Athani, after which burnt it to the ground, and took abundance of prisoners, about which the two latter were dissatisfied being for releasing the prisoners, but Dilir Khan would not hear of it, so they both left him and went to Bijapur, and since Sambhaji Raja is come to Panhala, into which castle he was received with 300 horse and 1,000 foot, and the Rajah is gone thither to meet his son: this is the news in these parts.”<sup>3677</sup>

That Sambhaji stole away from Dilir Khan, evidently being disgusted with the Khan's cruelty, is correct. But the news in the English letter that Sharza Khan, too, had left Dilir Khan, was not correct.

The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1601: "In the month of Margshirsha [24<sup>th</sup> November to 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1679] Sambhaji Raja fled from the Mughal dominions and arrived at Panhala. On Pausha Vadya 7 [13<sup>th</sup> January 1680] he and the Raja [Shivaji] met each other."<sup>3678</sup>

#### SIEGE OF BIJAPUR (DECEMBER 1679 – JANUARY 1680)

Having learnt that Sambhaji had deserted him, Dilir Khan, who was marching from Athani to Ainapur, turned back. Devastating the countryside and taking what men and women he could as captives, he arrived at Aliyabad on 5<sup>th</sup> December 1679 by way of Kakhandaki and Ukkali and pitched his camp there.<sup>3679</sup> There is no reliable information about the strength of Dilir Khan's army. The *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* tells us that the Khan had 20,000 horsemen with him.<sup>3680</sup> In any event, Dilir Khan certainly did not have sufficient force to capture the walled city of Bijapur by a regular siege. And he had already lost the chance to capture it by a *coup de main*.

Bijapur was defended at this time by a very weak garrison. But the position of supplies was good. A steady supply of grain and other provisions was coming in from Shivaji's dominions and also from other quarters and was available cheaply. On the other hand, the Mughal army was not receiving any supplies and therefore the prices of grain and other provisions had escalated sharply in the Mughal camp.<sup>3681</sup>

From Aliyabad, Dilir Khan moved his artillery to Rasulpur and Murari Bag, and opened fire on the castle. The garrison returned the fire. On 11<sup>th</sup> December 1679, the Khan moved to the reservoir called Begam Hauz and pitched his tents there.

The artillery duel continued as before. Dilir Khan shifted his position on 18<sup>th</sup> December 1679 and pitched his tents near Afzal Khan's mansion. On 23<sup>rd</sup> December, a great battle was fought before the Alapur gate in which Ikhlas Khan and Abdul Faiyaz fought on the Mughal side and Maloji Ghorpade, Yaqut Khan Khairiyat Khani and Hasan Khan Rohila on the Adilshahi side. Dilir Khan moved back on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1680 to Begam Hauz and the fighting continued as before.[3682](#)

While Dilir Khan was thus engaged in the siege of Bijapur, Maratha forces were wreaking havoc on his communications. In his letter to Ekoji, Shivaji describes these activities thus:

“Just as we halted at the fort of Patta a letter came from the noble Khan [i.e. Masud Khan] [in which he had written]: ‘you launched an expedition into the enemy territory, devastated it, [and thus] imposed a pull [upon the enemy]. But the enemy is not being dislodged from this place and has closed near the castle in great strength. You should come at this time and help and save the Badshahi.’ Therefore we again took to horse and came stage by stage to Panhala.

“Formerly we had rendered much aid [to Bijapur] with money and army and afterwards also sent ample money and recalled the army that had spread out in the enemy territory and sent it against Dilir Khan. They intercepted the [enemy's] supplies, captured all material and imposed a pull upon him. Ranmast Khan and other lords were coming to his assistance from Aurangabad with seven or eight thousand troopers. Attacking and beating them up [our army] chased them as far as Aurangabad. Plundering several towns and devastating the country they returned and surrounded the enemy.”

Then, after briefly narrating Moropant's operations in Baglan and Khandesh, the letter continues:

"This news and the former news that we had launched an expedition, plundered Jalnapur and humbled Ranmast Khan repeatedly reached the Emperor. So the Emperor became perplexed and *ahadi* after *ahadi* came to Dilir Khan [to convey the Emperor's order to turn back].<sup>3683</sup> In this way we imposed a pull (upon the enemy) by devastating the country, and capturing forts, castles and territory, and harried the enemy by constantly interrupting the supplies."<sup>3684</sup>

The *Basatin-us Salatin* gives a more detailed account of what was happening on the Mughal side. In brief, it is as follows:<sup>3685</sup>

Meanwhile, the breach between the Prince and Dilir Khan was widening. Dilir Khan received no financial assistance from the Prince nor did he obtain anything from his *jagir* as the country was laid waste by the Marathas. The Prince repeatedly wrote him that as the Marathas had entered Mughal territory he should drive them out. But Dilir Khan demurred from complying with the Prince's orders on one or the other pretext. His sole desire was to make an honourable withdrawal and to that end he was endeavouring to patch up a peace through Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan. But Masud Khan was aware of the breach between Dilir Khan and the Prince and was receiving letters of exhortation from Shivaji. According to the *Basatin*, even the Prince had covertly opened talks with Masud Khan and had agreed to call back Dilir Khan in return for a promise to pay 25,000 Hons to the Prince. The Emperor was also receiving repeated letters from the Prince about Dilir Khan's stupidity and complaints from various places because all *jagirdars* in the province of the Deccan were utterly ruined, and about the devastation wrought by Shivaji in the country. Khan Jahan

Bahadur Kokaltash and other eminent nobles at the Court did not miss the opportunity to impress upon the Emperor how that stupid Pathan [i.e. Dilir Khan] had squandered Imperial treasury in the vain hope of taking Bijapur. The Emperor wrote a very curt letter to Dilir Khan. In it he blamed the Khan for marching against Bijapur without making prior arrangements for the defence of his charge, ordered him to turn back at once to protect Imperial territory and warned him that he would have to answer for wasteful expenditure and devastation of the country.

The Prince too had become very impatient; he instructed the Diwan and the treasurer that no heed ought to be paid to Dilir Khan, nor money from the treasury be given to him, warning them that whatever they disbursed to him would be realized from them. He also ordered Dilir Khan that he would personally handle the matter of making peace with Masud Khan and that Dilir Khan should not meddle in it. He even went so far as to instruct officers in Dilir Khan's army that they should not fight against Bijapur on Dilir Khan's orders.

Things having reached this stage, Dilir Khan decided to move from Bijapur. But he had no intention of withdrawing. Instead, he thrust still deeper into the Adilshahi territory!

In his letter to Ekoji, Shivaji wrote:

"Dilir Khan also realized that we would destroy the entire state if he stayed there. Fully convinced thus he left Bijapur and marched by stages of a *kos* or two a day. Thus was the enemy harried, disappointed and dislodged. The noble Khan [i.e. Masud Khan] too made great exertions and defended the castle. Thus we assisted Bijapur with money and army, dislodged the enemy by employing all the means that were required and saved Bijapur."<sup>3686</sup>

On 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1680, Dilir Khan sent Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan and then Husain Khan ahead with artillery and impedimenta. On 28<sup>th</sup> January he sent his envoy Muhammad Munif with Masud Khan's envoy to Bijapur. On 29<sup>th</sup> January Dilir Khan himself set out from Begam Hauz. Leaving a swath of destruction in his wake — burning, plundering and slaughtering — he arrived at Shahpur (120 km east by south of Bijapur) on 21<sup>st</sup> February 1680 by way of Kakhandaki, Nalatwad, Kodekal and Gugi. This was the country of the Berads, a hardy and warlike tribe. Their chief Pam Naik, who had his headquarters at Sagar alias Nusratabad (10 km south-southwest of Shahpur), had offered 10,000 Hons for Dilir Khan's departure from his district. Dilir Khan demanded 300,000. To avoid destruction of his territory Pam Naik agreed to pay 30,000. But Dilir Khan insisted on his former demand and as Pam Naik would not pay, plundered Shahpur. Meanwhile Pam Naik's soldiers opened fire from the fort and the surrounding hills and inflicted heavy casualties on the Mughals. Pam Naik himself was in the fort of Nusratabad. Dilir Khan sent an embassy to him for parley. Of the 11 men in the embassy, Pam Naik executed nine by impaling them on stakes, imprisoning the remaining two. Towards noon, Dilir Khan turned back from Shahapur. Having learnt this, his son, Fath Mamur, who was engaged in plundering, also turned back. He was attacked from the surrounding hills by Pam Naik's infantry, but extricated himself from the mêlée with great difficulty and joined his father. Many Mughal soldiers who were engaged in plundering were left behind. Of these some 200 were killed and many wounded by Pam Naik's infantry. Those who were saved joined Dilir Khan. The Mughal losses amounted to 1,700 killed or wounded. Dilir Khan reached Gugi, overtaken by grief and worry. The *Basatin* states: "Dilir Khan wept with acute shame and remorse. 'Today', he thought, 'I was humiliated as never before! I was disgraced many a time in the past, but the ignominy of this day was just too much!'"

Meanwhile, the special couriers of the Emperor were growing impatient at Dilir Khan's non-compliance with Imperial orders. They rebuked him and even cut the ropes of his tent, thus forcing him to move on. They kept spurring him at every stage and did not allow him to linger. They were particularly rude at Shahapur, pressing the *Bakhshi* and other officers of the army not to comply with Dilir Khan's orders. Officers in his army began to blame Dilir Khan. The army's treasury was also exhausted. Dilir Khan told the *Bakhshi* that he would give 30,000 Hons from his own sources for the army's expenditure and implored him that they should stay there for three days and punish the Berads.

All this was of no avail and Dilir Khan was forced to set off from Gogi at daybreak. He arrived at the fort of Almel, laying waste and burning the towns and villages on the way. He bombarded the fort of Almel and took many captives. The *desai* of Almel met Dilir Khan and agreed to pay 8,000 Hons of which he paid 2,000 immediately and redeemed all the captives. Dilir Khan halted at the place for a day, marching to Sindgi which he devastated and torched. He then arrived at another village which suffered the same fate. The Khan stayed there for two or three days and demolished the mud forts which he had established during his advance. Then he dispatched Dilir Himmat and Ikhlas Khan to demolish the mud fort at Bommanahalli and bring back the artillery and baggage that was left there; he himself marched to Nimbali. Dilir Himmat and Ikhlas Khan fulfilled the task entrusted to them and joined Dilir Khan with artillery and baggage.

While Dilir Khan was thus running riot through Adilshahi territory the Maratha cavalry was hounding him at every step.<sup>3688</sup>

Soon after his arrival at Nimbali, Dilir Khan retired to his camp at Pedgaon and a treaty was concluded between the

Mughals and the Adilshahi Sultanate.<sup>3689</sup> A reconciliation was also brought about between Masud Khan and Sharza Khan.<sup>3690</sup> On 1<sup>st</sup> March 1680, the Emperor appointed Khan Jahan Bahadur Zafar Jang Kokaltash (Bahadur Khan) as *subadar* of the Deccan in place of Prince Shah Alam Bahadur.<sup>3691</sup> He arrived at Aurangabad and took charge of office in May 1680.<sup>3692</sup>

#### SHIVAJI'S LETTER TO EKOJI

Shivaji wrote to Ekoji, seemingly sometime after his return from the Karnataka expedition. The letter, which is undated, illustrates the force of Shivaji's personality. Grant Duff says: "Ekoji, impatient of control, appears to have been so mortified that he resigned himself to melancholy, neglected his affairs, omitted even the usual care of his person, and the observances enjoined by his religion; he became careless and abstracted from all worldly affairs and assumed the conduct rather of a devotee than of an active chief, such as he had hitherto shown himself. On this occasion Shivaji addressed a letter to him, full of energy and good sense. This letter was amongst the last that Shivaji ever dictated."<sup>3693</sup>

Shivaji writes:<sup>3694</sup>

"Many days have passed without any communication from you, which makes us [i.e. Shivaji] uneasy of mind. Raghunathpant wrote to us at length that you are melancholy and dejected; that you are not taking due care of your health; that you have stopped celebrating festivals and performing religious rites; you have a large army but it is idle because you are in no mood to send it out on expeditions; and generally that, entertaining thoughts of renunciation, you are talking of retiring to some place of pilgrimage, there to while away your time.


“You are aware how our late father unceasingly strove against adversity and, while serving under the Muslims, achieved so much renown through individual effort, merit and ability... You know also, and are witnessing, the manner in which we have faced every difficult situation to establish our independent rule. We are therefore at a loss to comprehend what circumstance could have caused you to believe you have fulfilled your life's work at such early juncture, and has instilled in you untoward reclusive thoughts so that you have turned away from the path of enterprise, are squandering your wealth by letting your men earn without doing any work and are also neglecting your person. What kind of wisdom or policy is this? What can ail you when you have in our person an elder who will always care for you?

“So live your life henceforth by removing from your mind every thought of dejection and asceticism. Take part in every festival and religious ceremony as before and take proper care of your person. Put your soldiery to good use by assigning them to expeditions and thereby earn fortune and renown. If you exert your best efforts and attain fortune and happiness in those parts, we will only be contented and full of pride that our younger brother has accomplished much.

“Raghunathpant, who is in that province, is no outsider; he is our very own man. He respects you as much as he respects us. He is skilled and knows only too well how you ought to conduct yourself. We have placed our trust in him. So should you and, through mutual understanding and co-operation in matters of state, employ his finest abilities to attain fame and fortune.

“Do not sit idle and squander time by allowing your men to be paid for doing no work. This is the time for action; you have enough time in your old age to become an ascetic. We, too, would like to see your abilities and achievements. What more may be written? You are wise.”

# INDIA 1680



## Shivaji's Kingdom

### **SHIVAJI'S DEATH (3<sup>RD</sup> APRIL 1680)**

Shivaji returned to Raigad soon after Diler Khan's discomfiture and suddenly died at noon on Saturday, 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1680. The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1602: "At noon on Saturday, 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1680 Raja Shivaji passed away at Raigad."<sup>3695</sup> The date and place of his death are corroborated by several other sources.<sup>3696</sup>

Even while narrating his death, Muhammad Saqi Mustaidd Khan, author of the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, and Khafi Khan, author of the *Mutakhab-ul Lubab*, poured vituperation on the Maratha King. Muhammad Saqi Mustaidd Khan states: "It was reported from the newsletter of the Deccan that on 24<sup>th</sup> Rabi-ul Akhir, [Aurangzeb's Regnal] year 23 [14<sup>th</sup> May 1680] the villainous Shivaji, after returning from a journey, twice vomited blood in the excess of heat, and sank down into the pit of hell."<sup>3697</sup> Here 24th Rabi-ul Akhir is evidently a mistake for Rabi-ul Awwal; 14<sup>th</sup> Rabi-ul Awwal of Aurangzeb's Regnal year 23 corresponds with 4<sup>th</sup> April 1680. Even after this correction the date would be incorrect by one day. Khafi Khan states: "The author has found the chronogram of his [Shivaji's] death in the words *Kafir ba-Jahannam raft*."<sup>3698</sup> The literal meaning of this chronogram is: 'The infidel went to hell.' Its numerical value comes to 1081 A. H.<sup>3699</sup>

Even Cosme da Guarda, who was a great admirer of Shivaji, believed that, being a pagan, Shivaji would surely go to hell. He writes: "...His [Shivaji's] soul ...very shortly left for the eternal torments of hell where the unfortunate Shivaji learnt, but very late, the ridiculous imposition [here Hinduism] in which he believed."<sup>3700</sup> And the devout Catholic that he was, it is interesting to note how he ends his biography of the Maratha King: "In this manner died Shivaji after so many tricks and wiles with which he made himself a great lord, and though they availed him much in this world even to the extent of saving his

head while in the power of the Great Mughal, he cannot find any device to save himself from the sad destiny more potent and powerful than the greatest monarch, for it excuses none.”<sup>3701</sup>

As for the cause of his death, the Bombay Council’s letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> April 1680 says: “We have certain news that Shivaji Rajah is dead. It is now 23 days since he deceased, it is said of a bloody flux, being sick 12 days.”<sup>3702</sup> A contemporaneous Portuguese document states that Shivaji died of anthrax.<sup>3703</sup> However, none of these sources provides sufficient details to draw a definite conclusion. The Sabhasad Chronicle states that the King died of fever, while some versions of the A.K. Chronicle state that he died of “navjvar” (possibly typhoid).<sup>3704</sup>

Such was the dread Shivaji’s name evoked, that doubts were expressed for some time after his death whether the news was an artifice on his part to cover some design. Rumours of his death had twice been heard during his lifetime. When he really died, it was perhaps quite natural for some people to disbelieve the report. These doubts are repeated in some contemporary English letters.

Surat to Bombay

7<sup>th</sup> May 1680

“Shivaji’s death is confirmed from all places, yet some are still under a doubt of the truth, such reports having been used to run of him before some considerable attempt, wherefore [we] shall not be too confident until well assured.”<sup>3705</sup>

Surat to Fort St. George

20<sup>th</sup> May 1680

“Shivaji has for some time been credibly reported for dead, but now it is contradicted as only a design to

catch his eldest son Sambhaji Rajah, who has highly offended him.”<sup>3706</sup>

### Hugli to Mumbai


December 13, 1680

“Shivaji has died so often that some begin to think him immortal. It is certain [that] little belief can be given to any report of his death till experience shows it per the waning of his hitherto prosperous affairs, since when he dies indeed it is thought he has none to leave behind him to carry on things at the rate and fortune he has all along done.”<sup>3707</sup>

Though Shivaji died suddenly, the kingdom he established did not perish with him. He had raised the ambitions of the Marathas and taught them how to defeat the Mughals. Soon after his death, Aurangzeb personally descended into the Deccan and, in a few years, annexed the Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda. But he failed miserably in extinguishing Maratha resistance and died a frustrated man in 1707. By about 1760, Shivaji’s political heirs virtually succeeded in completely realizing his aims so that the Maratha cavalry, having subdued the once-mighty Mughals, could water their steeds in the distant Indus.

The empire he founded, which had to give way to a world power that had humbled all other powers in Europe, finally became the immediate predecessor to British rule. But the India of today is literally shaped — geographically, politically and culturally — by the Maratha Empire. Thanks to Shivaji’s intervention, India has not fallen prey, *yet*, to an intolerant, barbaric imposition. If, in the comity of nations, India is a peaceable, tolerant country, it is because its majority has, largely through Shivaji’s inspiration and deeds, remained Hindu, which in itself is a guarantee that the polity continues to espouse cultured tolerance more as a matter of principle than policy.

**INDIA**  
**HIGH TIDE OF**  
**THE MARATHA EMPIRE**  
**JULY 1759**



## Maratha Empire ( including tributary states )



# **Statesmanship and Generalship of Shivaji**

## **SHIVAJI AS A STATESMAN**

War being an instrument of policy, statesmanship and generalship are closely related. The former draws the premises in which the latter has to work. In modern times, these two functions are divided between the government and the general staffs of its armed forces but, in the seventeenth century, they were unified. So Shivaji combined in his person complete political and military authority, and his statesmanship enabled his generalship to accomplish what it did.

### *His Policy of Religious Tolerance*

Shivaji's political aim was the liberation of India from Muslim rule<sup>3708</sup>and the establishment of a Hindu kingdom. Yet, to him, this did not mean the persecution of other religions. Hindus by nature and indoctrination are a tolerant people and do not regard their religion as the only way to salvation, nor indeed that of others as a threat to their own. Shivaji was no exception, a fact which has led some historians to confound this innate tolerance with their modern notions of 'secularism'. Even if we choose to ignore for a moment the plethora of evidence saying Shivaji aspired to establish a Hindu kingdom, it is highly improbable, considering the times in which he lived, that his political aim could have been the creation of a secular state; and if at all we are to believe such a contention, it must be attested by positive evidence, which it is not. In conformity with his times, his was a 'non-secular' state and the mere fact that it was refreshingly free from religious bigotry would not make it secular by any stretch of the imagination. By this logic, religious persecution would be a binding condition for every

theocratic state. Also, that he employed Muslims in his army and navy does not make his state secular; and if it should, all Muslim kingdoms in India, including the Mughal Empire, would rank higher than his as secular states.

Though Shivaji's motives were thus both political and religious, the ostentation of the latter would have provoked a strong Muslim reaction providing his enemies with a common grievance which, were they only willing to lay aside their traditional enmity, could be developed into a common cause. The proclamation of a *jihad* against him being the last thing he desired, he based the war on a nationalist motive — by substituting the idea of a war of national liberation for that of a religious one. His religious tolerance, actuated either by benevolence or deliberate policy, or both, deprived his Muslim enemies of their most potent weapon, namely, a cause with the halo of a religious war.

It may be asked if we, after three hundred years, could discern his real intention, how is it to be believed that his enemies failed to do so. Well, they did not. What Shivaji did was to avoid exciting their religious fanaticism to an extent which would force them into each other's arms. His principal enemies, namely the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate, were natural foes of one another as the aim of the former was to annex the latter. However, once the Adilshahi Sultanate realized the futility of its efforts to subdue Shivaji, it began to look upon him as its bulwark against the expansionist policy of the Empire. This equilibrium would have been broken had Shivaji, too, been a religious fanatic; then, its inherent hatred of the Hindus would have dominated the Sultanate's policy and driven it into Aurangzeb's arms. Shivaji by his tolerance kept the 'temperature' sufficiently low so as to prevent such an eventuality.

*Undermining of the enemy's inner front and consolidation of his own*

Shivaji appreciated that in war, military force is but one of the instruments of grand strategy, and he at once set force aside should he consider that he could attain his political aim better and more cheaply in other ways. As Carrè remarked, "If Shivaji possessed military qualities to such a high degree he was no less a capable man knowing more than one way of reaching his goal." [3709](#)

The contribution of these means to his success cannot be overestimated because without them it would have been impossible for him, with the slender resources at his disposal, to overcome the military might of his enemies.

Just as there is an outer (or military) front in war (or border in peace) there is an inner (or political/psychological) front in both war and peace.[3710](#) The inner front is the province of the statesman, the outer front that of the general. Should this inner front collapse, the outer one will also be imperilled. Shivaji exploited his enemy's weakness on the inner front and subverted him from within. Very often, there exist some inherent cracks in this inner front in the shape of religious, racial and linguistic differences, corruption and lack of motivation. Though some of these can never be completely filled up, a judicious administration would do much to mitigate their evil effects. A wise statesman, by his judicious administration, would deny the enemy an opportunity to drive a wedge in such a crack. On the other hand, he would do his utmost to convert the cracks within the enemy state into widening chasms and thus destroy it from within. His success in doing so would depend upon the political posture he adopted. An incorrect posture would drive the divergent groups in the enemy state towards each other and would consolidate instead of loosening the enemy's resistance. On the other hand, a correct posture would loosen the enemy's resistance by exploiting the existing cracks. This is applicable to cracks

existing between two or more enemy states as well as to those within an enemy state.

He took advantage of the self seeking, ambitions and factional discords among his enemies, fomented dissensions among them and enticed rebellions in their rear. Thus he impaired his enemy's capacity for war by causing a distraction to or at least a subtraction from their powers. In 1670-71 he enticed Chhatrasal to rebel against the Mughal Emperor. In 1671 he stimulated Rustum-i Zaman's rebellion against the Sultanate of Bijapur.

In comparison with the Mughal Empire, Shivaji's military power lacked the credibility necessary to back up his policy of seducing discontented elements in the enemy's camp. These elements would not have lent themselves to his seditions unless they felt confident of the success of such treason with his support. Shivaji at this stage lacked the power necessary to attract them. Therefore he resorted to the simpler method of seduction by money instead of the subtler and for more effective method of seduction by an idea. This choice was imposed upon him by force of circumstances.

The means he adopted to achieve his purpose, till about 1672, appear somewhat direct, blunt and devoid of subtlety. Seduction by an idea is cheaper, and far more extensive and effective than that by money. The former, once injected, is self-generating and raises a large section of the population, tied together by the bond of a common idea, against the government. The latter is obviously limited in its extent. Till 1672, Shivaji mainly resorted to the latter method. The cause would appear to be that he was till then considered a petty rebel and lacked enough military power to support his diplomacy. This also explains why he was not too successful in exploiting the inner front in the Mughal Empire.

As his power and prestige increased, he employed more subtle and indirect means. The antagonism of the vast majority

of 'Deccani' Muslims to the Pathans had created an immense inner front in the Sultanate of Bijapur. Shivaji took advantage of this factional discord, entered into alliance with the Deccani Muslims, detached them from their government and thus undermined the foundations of his enemy's military power. The native Muslims thus became his willing but unwitting agents. It should be noted that had he been a Hindu fanatic, he would have enabled the Muslims to sink their internal grievances and achieve political consolidation.

A direct attack at this stage might have rallied the contending factions of Bijapur against him. His abstention from attack enabled the factious poison to spread throughout the Sultanate. The civil war in the Sultanate of Bijapur, which he had thus accentuated, presented him with a propitious opportunity to further his political aim — the conquest of the Karnataka. Its attainment depended on the solution of two problems: how to protect his own kingdom against the Mughal army of the Deccan once his own army was committed to the Karnataka, and how to move the Adilshahi army out of his way. He solved both these problems, indirectly, by a stroke of genius. He concluded a treaty with the Mughals and thus induced them, indirectly, to invade the Sultanate. Thus the Adilashahi army was pinned down at no expense of manpower to him. Having locked both his adversaries in a bloody struggle, he then marched at the head of a formidable army to the Karnataka. Its conquest was a mere formality — the culmination of his statesmanship.

It may be asked, could Shivaji not have exploited the inner front by instigating the Hindus to rise against their tyrannical rulers? The answer is 'No'; because, in the first place, the Hindus, even though they professed a common religion, were not blended into a nation. Secondly, centuries of foreign rule had extinguished every sentiment of patriotism in their breasts. They had accepted their fate with a tame and shameless resignation. It was a conglomeration of slaves who,

acquiescent in their state of bondage, were always prepared to commend the clemency of their masters whose fanatic zeal had not proceeded, in their opinion, to the last extreme of injustice and oppression. Thirdly, the Hindus felt an abundance of awe for established power and would not have stirred against it until they felt completely confident about the successful outcome of a revolt.

While he thus undermined the enemy's inner front, he was careful to consolidate his own. The means he used to secure his base were political as well as military. In the first place he was one of those great men who give aspirations to a race. He gave the Marathas a sense of moral unity such as they had never yet known. Secondly, the administrative reforms which he introduced went far to curtail rebellion. He reorganized the administration of the country on very different lines from the ones that were hitherto adopted in India. He realized the inherent disadvantages of the *jagirdari* and *watandari* systems. He abolished the first and replaced it by a regular service. He curtailed the other by reducing the powers and privileges of the *watandars*, depriving them of control over finance, taxation and military command, and also forbade them to build fortifications. He appreciated that it was unsafe to entrust the civil and military authority to the care of one man and separated military command from civil government. He knew that good government and the goodwill of the civil population are the moral foundations of military power. As soon as a district was occupied, an organized administration was set up, peaceful conditions were restored, and agriculture and trade were encouraged. Thus he won and retained the loyalty of his subjects and secured his kingdom against internal revolt.

Cosme da Guarda says of him:

"Moreover, such was the good treatment he accorded to people and such was the honesty with which he observed the capitulations that none looked

upon him without a feeling of love and confidence. By his people he was exceedingly loved, both in matters of reward and punishment he was so impartial that while he lived he made no exception for any person; no merit was left unrewarded, no offence went unpunished; and this he did with so much care and attention that he specially charged his Governors to inform him in writing of the conduct of his soldiers, mentioning in particular those who had distinguished themselves, and he would at once order their promotion either in rank or in pay, according to their merit. He was naturally loved by all men of valour and good conduct.”<sup>3711</sup>

“In a short time he reached such a state that it was then regarded as a great wonder. It was reasonably regarded as a marvel that more soldiers entered than left his service while he was alive, for besides being so numerous and of such diverse castes, they were the subjects of other kings and were not themselves naturally very firm (in their adherence). But what surprises one most is that so many moral virtues should shine in a Gentio (Hindu) rebel and a reputed robber. He used to invigilate the soldiers’ barracks at night, and learn, from what he overheard, the proceedings of his ministers whom he gave high salaries that they might have no excuse for excesses. But they knew that he kept himself informed in every manner.”<sup>3712</sup>

“He gave frequent audiences even to the most wretched of his subjects and to all he administered equal and impartial justice. He ardently wished that there should be peace and order among his people and he did his best to ensure that they might all live in abundance. He did not enact many laws but his orders were strictly obeyed, and if anybody violated any of

his orders the offenders lived only so long as he did not learn of it, for he was not less prompt in (inflicting) punishment than in awarding rewards. He never permitted any feud and strife, and least of all robbery and for any (of these offences) (the culprit) paid with his life.... If in any of his stations or provinces any native wanted to molest a traveller and if the latter invoked (the name) of Shivaji all (his troubles) came to end, such was the respect (he enjoyed) and such was the fear his subjects had (for him). At last such a condition was reached that all avoided, like a pest, to give the least displeasure to their master, for he was equally feared and loved.<sup>"3713</sup>

Carré writes:

"He advanced into the kingdom of Bijapur and took possession of many big undefended places which were in the heart of the kingdom. He posted governors there, and disposed of everything according to his liking with such clemency and generosity in the newly conquered country that the very men, whom he had to conquer by force of arms, willingly submitted to him."<sup>"3714</sup>

### *Opportunism*

Shivaji was an astute opportunist who preserved a distinct and unbroken view of a scene which was incessantly shifting, and never missed a chance to take advantage of his enemy's weakness to further his political aim. In 1657-58 he took advantage of the factional discord within the Adilshahi Sultanate and overran North Konkan. In 1661-62 he extended his power over South Konkan when the Adilshahi army was distracted by Siddi Jauhar's rebellion. He opened his offensive against the Mughals in 1670 when Aurangzeb's policy of religious persecution led to unrest and occupied the resources

of the Empire. From 1672 onwards he exploited internecine discords within the Sultanate to further his political aim.

### *Foresight*

Shivaji realized that sooner or later a trial of strength with the full power of the Mughal Empire would have to be made. As his strategy was essentially one of exhaustion, he decided to extend his conquests southwards, i.e. away from the Mughal Empire to make as sure as he could of a long war. This was essential in order to obtain depth of defence so as to be able to barter space for time and, by forcing the enemy to over-extend his strength, create opportunities for counter attack. His strategy of exhaustion was thus woven on space, hill fortresses and superior mobility of his light cavalry. This policy led to the conquest of the Karnataka. His wisdom was proved twenty-seven years later when the Mughal armies, with their overstretched communications and harassed by the Maratha light cavalry, miserably failed in the conquest of the South, which ultimately led to their utter ruin.

### *Appreciation of the Value of Sea-power*

The wide genius of Shivaji is well shown in his appreciation of the value of sea-power and the efforts, hampered by many difficulties, he made to establish a fleet. He was the 'Father of the Maratha Navy' and the first, nay, the only Indian ruler of his times who realized the importance of sea-power. And what is still more remarkable is that he laid the keel of his first ship when he was barely twenty-nine.

### *Relations with Europeans*

Europeans provided Shivaji with a window on the outside world. The revenue accruing from their trade in his territory was a welcome addition to the meager resources of his state and it was from them that he tried to obtain artillery supplies as

well as engineering and naval expertise. As such, he was eager to cultivate friendship with them as long as they maintained a reciprocal friendly, or at least peaceful, attitude towards him.

### *The Portuguese*

The Portuguese attitude towards Shivaji was dictated by their policy of rendering assistance against the strongest power in South India which in future might threaten their existence. In accordance with this policy, their relations with Shivaji could be divided into two phases.

i) Till the end of 1664 they maintained cordial relations and even rendered him some covert assistance against the Mughals.

ii) Shivaji's victory over Khawas Khan in November 1664, which extended his territory as far south as Goa, made the Portuguese apprehensive of his growing strength and they tried to impede his progress as far as it was in their power to do so. This gave rise to intermittent clashes, both on land and sea, between the two. The main issues involved were as follows:

1) The sanctuary afforded in Portuguese territory to the Sawant of Wadi.

2) The covert and overt assistance rendered to the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri.

3) The Portuguese refusal to pay the *chauth* to Shivaji, which formerly they were paying to the Raja of Ramnagar whose territory Shivaji had annexed.

Though the Portuguese assistance to the Siddi caused considerable nuisance to Shivaji, none of these issues was of vital importance for the existence of Shivaji's kingdom. So he showed remarkable and wise restraint in dealing with them. The measures he took to counter these Portuguese actions were as follows:

- 1) Impeding the trade between the Portuguese territories and the Desh uplands.
- 2) Ravaging Portuguese territory, only once on a serious scale.
- 3) Threat of an alliance with the Imam of Muscat against the Portuguese.

By skillful application of these means he soon managed to induce the Portuguese to desist from any act of active hostility against him. By the treaty of December 1667, the Portuguese undertook to warn Lakhram Sawant and others to desist from any act of hostility against Shivaji and expel them from Portuguese territory in the event of their failure to abide by the warning. By another treaty, concluded in 1670, the Portuguese undertook that they would not assist the Siddi. By the time of his death only one last issue, namely, the payment of *chauth*, remained unresolved and even that was well on the way of settlement.

It would have been natural had Shivaji resented the religious persecution of the Hindus by the Portuguese. On 26<sup>th</sup> November 1675, the Mumbai Council wrote to the Company: "Shivaji and they [the Portuguese] daily quarrel, the chiefest cause of his hatred to them being for forcing orphans of his caste [religion] to turn Roman Catholic."<sup>3715</sup> Despite this, Shivaji did not make it a major issue in his relations with the Portuguese, evidently because he did not want them to perceive such intervention as a threat to their presumed doctrinal 'right' to proselytize, and thus induce them to seek alliance with Muslim powers against him'

### *The English*

The first conflict between Shivaji and the English arose out of Revington's wanton act of rendering active assistance to the Adilshahi army at the siege of Panhala and the subsequent plunder of their trading station of Rajapur. The English

President and his Council at Surat were aware that the fault lay with Revington, but to uphold their national prestige they made persistent efforts to obtain compensation for their losses at Rajapur. Shivaji tried to use this incident, and the consequent negotiations, as a lever to obtain their assistance to reduce Danda Rajpuri. The English were not willing to provide it, presumably for the following reasons (a) Their desire to obtain Danda Rajpuri for themselves. (b) Their trade in the territories of the Siddi's masters — first the Adilshah and later, the Mughal Emperor. (c) Their fear of Shivaji's growing power which in future might threaten their island base of Mumbai. As a result, the English secured little compensation for their losses at Rajapur. In exasperation, they even contemplated for some time of attacking Shivaji's maritime trade. Since 1672, the English were compelled, because of their trade in the Mughal Empire, to allow the Mughal fleet to use Mumbai as its naval base. Shivaji's attempt to bring pressure upon them by fortifying Khanderi led to a clash with them.

### *The French*

Till 1676, the French had no possessions bordering on Shivaji's territory and therefore there was no cause of friction between the two. The French opened a trading station at Rajapur in 1664 and Shivaji obtained considerable artillery supplies from them. Shivaji did not accept it, possibly because he did not then wish to antagonize the English.

### *The Dutch*

Shivaji's attitude towards the Dutch was one of amicable neutrality. The Dutch offer of an alliance against the English and the Siddi has already been dealt with in a previous chapter.

### *Relations with the Imam of Muscat*

That Shivaji had some relations with the Imam is certain but details regarding their nature and extent are as yet not available. The use Shivaji made of these relations to bring pressure upon the Portuguese is already mentioned.

#### SHIVAJI AS A STRATEGIST

The following dictums from *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu, now a well known Chinese general and military thinker, are the best commentary on Shivaji's strategy.<sup>3716</sup>

"To triumph in battle and be universally acclaimed 'Expert' is not the acme of skill."

"For he wins his victories without erring — 'without erring' means that whatever he does insures his victory, he conquers an enemy already defeated."

"Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle."

"For, to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

"Thus what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy's strategy."

"Thus those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battles."

Strategy, as defined by the British military thinker, Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, is "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."<sup>3717</sup> It "forms the plan of war" and "maps out the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war."<sup>3718</sup> The fact that it is not always possible or necessary to destroy the enemy's armed forces in

battle gives rise to two forms of strategy—the strategy of annihilation and the strategy of exhaustion or attrition. The aim of the former is to annihilate the enemy; that of the latter, to exhaust and thus impose one's will upon him. The choice between these two forms of strategy depends upon the goal set by policy and the availability of means. And whichever form of strategy is resorted to, its aim is to diminish the possibility of resistance and to bring about the battle, when and where necessary, under the most advantageous circumstances. Shivaji was fully aware that the destruction of the enemy's army in battle is only one of the means to the end of strategy and not an end in itself. And, as he lacked sufficient means to do so, he avoided pitched battles and resorted to the Fabian grand strategy of gradually draining the enemy's endurance. His strategy was thus one of attrition, not of annihilation. Its aim was not to destroy the enemy but to exhaust him. The means he employed to carry out his strategy were mobility and the strong resisting power then possessed by fortresses.

Strategically, his career could be divided into an alternating series of offensive and defensive phases.

In the offensive phase he aimed at capturing as many fortresses as he could before the enemy's field army could arrive to their relief. The offensive was opened when the enemy's attention was drawn elsewhere and in an area which lacked a field army capable of intervening. It comprised

- 1) Surprise attacks, often by night, helped by a calculated choice of objectives, on fortresses which lacked adequate garrisons and supplies.
- 2) Roving detachments to isolate these fortresses.
- 3) Deep raids in enemy territory to distract the enemy's attention and also to gain the much needed finance to sustain his own army.

In the defensive phase, he resorted to an elastic defensive-offensive based on a combination of hill fortresses and highly mobile cavalry detachments.

The most significant feature of his career as a soldier is that he fought so few battles in so long a series of campaigns. And whenever he fought one, he did so only when he had obtained some decisive physical or moral advantage prior to the battle. In many of his battles, his strategy not only prepared the way for a victory but actually produced it.

In the battles of Javali and Umbarkhind he lured his enemies into ambuscades where their cavalry could be of little or no use. In 1661 he first marched past Shringarpur and thus lulled Suryarao Surve into a false sense of security. Then he doubled back with such speed that the decision was produced without a battle. In his 1664 campaign against the Adilshahi army, he took advantage of the enemy's lack of concentration and defeated them in detail. The speed with which he acted caught Baji Ghorpade's division completely off balance and easily scattered it. Then he doubled back and fell upon Khawas Khan.

We shall now reverse the course of our inquiry and examine his military career in the light what are called the principles of war.[3719](#)

## I. Selection and Maintenance of Aim

As war is only a part of political intercourse, it follows that the strategic aim should be subordinated to political aim. On the other hand, if war is to be an effective instrument of policy, the political aim should be modified in accordance with the means available at hand. An objective may be desirable politically, but that which is politically desirable must be militarily possible.

The first point to note in Shivaji's career is that he had a realistic grasp of the limitations of his means and the wisdom to adjust his ends accordingly. Thus, he modified his ultimate aim of the liberation of India to the more immediate aim of the establishment of his authority in the Konkan, the narrow strip of land between the natural rampart of the Sahyadris and the sea. The establishment of his authority in this easily defensible area, additionally strengthened by extensive fortifications, would then provide him a firm base for further expansion.

The plains east of the Sahyadris were easy to conquer but difficult to hold, particularly in view of his weakness in heavy cavalry and artillery. There were times, such as after the destruction of Afzal Khan's army, when he could have overrun these plains, but he showed remarkable restraint in not venturing in such a premature expansion in an area where his forces would have been at a disadvantage. The liberation of the Konkan was his immediate goal and he kept to it unswervingly. Never did he waver from his purpose. Never did he bite off more than he could chew.

The positions he held east of the Sahyadris were no more than outposts or forward defended localities in the main strategic line of defence. In defensive, they threatened his enemy's communications and thus acted as a brake on any would be invader. In offensive, they formed springboards for his mobile striking forces. The objects of his frequent cavalry raids in the plains was not conquest but attrition of the enemy's forces and attainment of the much needed finance to sustain his army.

Up to 1675, he continued his expansion by pushing his frontier northwards and southwards in the coastal strip and along the Sahyadri range.<sup>3720</sup> Only after this base was firmly established did he turn his attention to the Karnataka.

## II. Mobility

The strength of the Mughal army lay in their heavy cavalry and artillery. However their artillery was very cumbersome and hampered strategic mobility. Shivaji, himself handicapped by lack of artillery, turned this very drawback to his advantage by the skillful employment of his light cavalry.

The Maratha army was lightly equipped and was free from the encumbrance of an elaborate supply system. It lived off the country and could subsist on the scantiest of food. It was their greater hardihood and superior discipline which had endowed Shivaji's army with such remarkable mobility.

An English letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> June 1664 says about him,

“Shivaji is so famously infamous for his notorious thefts that report has made him an airy body, and added wings or else it were impossible he could be at so many places as he said to be at, all at one time.

“Sometimes he is certainly believed to be in one, and in a day or two in another place, and so in half dozen remote one from another, and there burns plunders all without control, so that they ascribe to him to perform more than a Herculean labour that is become the talk of all conditions of people.”<sup>3721</sup>

And again,

“...It is none of his business to lay siege to any place that is fortified against him, for it will not turn him to account. He is, and ever was for a running banquet, and to plunder and burn those towns that have neither defence or guard.”<sup>3722</sup>

To add to the effectiveness of his cavalry arm, he repaired and built a wonderful network of fortresses which served as

supply depots and places of refuge for his army.

With his superior mobility, he could always decline battle or force it on his own terms. His mobility disarmed all resistance because it enabled him to seek out weak spots and strike with decisive effect. By his speed, he outstripped rumour and often arrived before his enemy was aware that he was near. His enemies were thus bewildered by his swift and unpredictable movements. As a result, their armies became exhausted in fruitless pursuit exposing thereby some other weak points in their line of defence. His cavalry raids deep inside enemy territory conclusively proved how the Mughal armies were helpless and their territory defenceless before Maratha striking forces.

Shivaji was also aware of the mobility that sea power conferred upon him, as is evident from his raid on Basrur in 1665.

### **III. Surprise**

The purpose of strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance by upsetting the enemy's physical and mental balance. This purpose is fulfilled by exploiting the elements of mobility and surprise. Mobility produces surprise which in its turn enhances mobility by diminishing the possibility of resistance. Shivaji's career as a soldier abounds in surprisals. In the 1648 campaign against Fath Khan's army, he surprised the enemy by attacking him at an unexpected place. In the Jawali campaign, he fixed the Chandrarao's attention towards the Radtondi pass and then fell upon his rear unexpectedly by a skillful turning movement. In 1659, he surprised Afzal Khan's army in the forest of Javali. In 1661, he threw Suryarao of Shringarpur off guard by a ruse. He crossed the forests south of Surat by unfrequented tracks and surprised and sacked it twice. In 1664, the speed with which he acted surprised and paralyzed his enemies. First, he swooped down on upon Baji Ghorpade's

camp unexpectedly, then turned back and fell upon Khawas Khan's division. Since the reduction of Mughal fortresses in Baglan in 1672, the number of alternative objectives which he threatened kept his enemy guessing as to the point of danger and enabled him to pounce upon unguarded objectives. He was a master of stratagems and made free use of them. The new technique which he developed for the capture of hill fortresses was also based on surprise.

#### **IV Concentration**

The essence of the principle of concentration is distraction. If we merely concentrate our forces the enemy would also do the same and we shall not gain advantage over him only out of our concentration. What is important is to induce the enemy to disperse his forces so as to achieve a decisive concentration at the selected time and place. This requires distraction of enemy forces by a series of threats. The principle of concentration means concentration of strength against weakness. This is the essence of sun Tzu's sayings quoted below.

“To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect.”

“Therefore, against those skilled in attack an enemy does not know where to defend.”

“He whose advance is irresistible plunges into his enemy's weak positions.”

“If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. Thus I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike a few of the selected points, those I deal with will be in dire straits.”

“The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few.”

“And when he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere.”

“Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.”

As Shivaji's strategical aim was not to bring the enemy to battle but to wear him out by military pinpricks, his army generally operated in small but highly mobile light cavalry detachments. However, he had fully grasped the true meaning of concentration — not mere quantitative concentration, but concentration of strength against weakness, which is achieved by distracting enemy forces so as to obtain a superiority of force at the decisive place and time. The distraction — both physical and psychological — of enemy forces caused by his plundering raids paved the way for his almost unopposed expansion along the coastal strip. By threatening several points at once he hypnotized them into inaction and thus deprived them of their freedom of action. Cosme de Guarda writes:

“Shivaji after sent expeditions to different places at the same time and in all of them he was convoked and he was in command. The question is still unsolved whether he substituted others for himself or (whether) he was a magician or the devil acted in his place. Much has been said about it in India and there is much divergence of opinion as usual. If I had to give my opinion, I would say that as he sent expeditions to two, three and four places at the same time and as with every regiment went a Captain whom all obeyed and called Shivaji Raja (name that he had assumed

after his rebellion), this mistake was caused by some people who came every day [i.e. fresh recruits] and did not know him well as yet. Hence arose the belief that he used to be in different places (at the same time.) It was confirmed when people robbed at different places met and all affirmed that Shivaji in person sacked these places on such a day or such a night at such an hour. And as among Indians much less suffices to confirm much more, there grew the firm belief that Shivaji was everywhere.”<sup>3723</sup>

The northward expansion of the Maratha state increased the scope for raiding by increasing the width of the front. On the other hand, the increased raiding activities kept the Mughal forces tied down in defending their territory and consequently increased the scope for an unopposed northward expansion.

Under cover of these cavalry raids, his infantry overran the coastal strip and in turn acquired new bases for further raids. Maratha raids in the first half of 1670 pinned down Mughal forces east of the Sahyadris and enabled him to obtain a decisive superiority of force in the Konkan. The distraction caused to Daud Khan’s army by his Karanja raid in November 1670 enabled Moropant to reduce the fortresses in Baglan without interference.

And though the destruction of the enemy’s army was not his strategical aim, Shivaji was quick to seize the chance afforded by his enemy’s dispersion and struck like a thunderbolt, as he did at Shirwal (1648) and Salher (1672).

## V. Security

Shivaji’s protective system was based on a formidable network of fortresses. The artillery in those days could not compete with the strength of fortifications. The best means of taking a fort were still mining, starvation and treachery. Shivaji

was a great fort-builder. The intensive fortification of his kingdom tended to slow down invaders, hampered their movements, absorbed their manpower and created opportunities for a counterstroke. For his own army, these fortress pivots formed protected supply depots and places of refuge, enabling it to manoeuvre freely. He was quick in consolidating his new conquests by fortifying strategic points.

The security of his field forces was ensured by a combination of secrecy, surprise, mobility and last, but not least, intelligence. It is remarkable that throughout his life he was never once surprised by an enemy force.

## VI. Offensive Action

Shivaji well understood the principle that attack is the best defence. He avoided pitched battles and made the utmost use of fortresses to wear down the enemy strength in besieging them. But his defence was by no means static for he usually took the tactical offensive using fortresses as pivots of manoeuvre and exploiting the superior mobility of his light cavalry. Now and again we see him attacking weak points in the enemy's dispositions. He thus developed his own plans and dislocated those of the enemy by compelling them to dance to his tune. These offensive strokes also boosted the morale of his troops even when he was strategically on the defensive.

### SHIVAJI AS A TACTICIAN

"In the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated."

"Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice of courage; apparent weakness of strength."

"Thus those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him

with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await him in strength."

"Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him." – Sun Tzu

Tactics is the art of disposition, manoeuvring, and employment of forces in actual combat. As related earlier, Shivaji's strategical aim was not to strike at the enemy's army but to wear it out by military pin-pricks. Shaped in accordance with this strategy, his grand tactics were to base his forces on fortresses and carry out a defensive-offensive campaign. Thus he avoided battle with the main enemy army, harassed them on the march while keeping himself out of reach, cut off their supplies with hovering bands of light cavalry, drew them into ambuscades by feigned retreats and attacked isolated parties with superior forces.

Elphinstone's description of Maratha tactics, though particularly meant for Rajaram's period, may with equal propriety be applied to that of Shivaji.

"An assemblage of such troops never stood the heavy charge of a body of Moguls, but dispersed at once, and scampered off singly to the nearest hills or broken ground. If the enemy left their ranks to pursue them, they cut off single horsemen, or rapidly assembled behind a ravine, or in some other situation where it was not safe for small parties to attack them; and when the disheartened pursuers turned back with their horses exhausted, the Marathas were upon them in a moment, charged in on them, if there was an opening or confusion, but generally, hung loosely on their flanks and rear, sometimes dashing up singly to fire their matchlocks into the mass, or even to dispatch a straggler with their long spears. Their chief excellence, as well as their delight was in the plunder

of a convoy. The favour of the country people gave them full information, while it kept the Moguls in darkness, till they were suddenly assailed on the line of march, and saw the camels and cattle, carrying the grain and stores they were escorting, swept off in a moment. They would then form a compact body to protect those which were carrying treasure; but with such a prize before them, the Marathas were irresistible; the party was generally obliged to take post; the Marathas cut off the communications, and perhaps even the water, and at the end of a day or two, the Moguls were obliged to surrender, the men were stripped of their horses and their valuables, and the chiefs detained for a ransom.”<sup>3724</sup>

“A defeat to the Marathas was like a blow given to water, which offers no resistance to the stroke and retains no impression of its effect: their army dispersed at the moment to unite again on the same day or the next.”<sup>3725</sup>

Little is known of Shivaji’s battlefield tactics. Contemporaneous accounts of his battles are obscure. The only battle of note from which, with some imagination, we can form a general notion of his tactics is that of Vani-Dindori. And in it, the tactics employed were as follows:

The offensive strength of the Mughal army lay in their heavy cavalry. To avoid having to withstand its shock and also to disorganize enemy ranks, the Marathas harassed and exhausted the enemy by means of clouds of encircling, elusive horsemen, but made no attempt to close. Adopting loose formations they kept at a distance from the enemy and hovered around him like mosquitoes which could be beaten off only momentarily. When any of these bands became particularly irritating, the Mughals detached a body of their cavalry to drive them off. The Marathas lured it away by a feigned flight. When

it was disorganized in pursuit, other bands of Maratha horsemen, lying in wait, closed on the charging Mughal cavalry and struck it in flank and rear. While one or more such actions were thus taking place, other Maratha bands fixed the attention of the main body. Thus again and again the Mughal heavy cavalry was galled into blind charges which soon disjointed their formation. The conflict thus took the form of a mobile battle, like that of modern armoured forces, constituting several independent actions being fought over a wide area, instead of a set-piece battle which the Mughals wanted to fight.

The Shivadigvijay Chronicle describes these tactics as follows:

“In wolf-tactics the army should be divided in four or five divisions. (They) should march in concert without letting the enemy know (their movements). The enemy army vigorously attacks this apparently inferior force (of one of the divisions). It should take to flight and the pursuers, who would (think) that it is defeated, should then be surrounded from all sides by other divisions. In this way the large enemy army does not know (our) strength and is defeated by a small army. That is why wolf-tactics are endowed with victory. This is the way of attaining success by a small army against a large army.”<sup>3726</sup>

#### THE INDIRECT APPROACH

All of Shivaji's actions—strategical and tactical — could be explained as examples of what Sir Basil Liddell Hart calls the Indirect Approach. Briefly, Liddell Hart's theme is that a direct approach to one's object tends to stiffen resistance and that the dislocation of opposition, by an indirect approach, should precede the attempt to overcome it.<sup>3727</sup>

Shivaji's policy of tolerance and his call 'south for southerners' are examples of the indirect approach to his goal. The former prevented a consolidation of his enemy's resistance and the latter actually loosened it. The aim of his strategy of elastic defence against Shayista Khan's army was not merely to avoid battle or gain time but to wear out its morale by convincing it that it could not force a decision. It was thus aimed not directly at the enemy's army but indirectly at its moral rear. His approach to Shringarpur in 1661 was also indirect. By marching away from it he lulled Suryarao Surve into a false sense of security and then suddenly doubled back to catch him off balance. His strategy of threatening alternative objectives was an indirect approach to his real target because it compelled the opposing army either to divide itself in trying to cover divergent points, or else abandon them in order to keep itself in concentration. His plundering raids in Varhad were an indirect approach to the enemy's economic and moral rear. Instead of a direct approach to Bijapur he attacked it indirectly by severing the economic roots of its military power in the Karnataka. In another sense, the conquest of Karnataka was an indirect approach also against the Mughal army. It laid the foundation of the plan which Shivaji envisaged against the impending and inevitable Mughal invasion with the full power of the Empire and which his successors carried out. Its aim was to weaken the Mughal army not by a direct attack but indirectly by lengthening its communications and thus exposing it to counter-attacks. His tactics also had the essential characteristic of an indirect approach. Instead of directly attacking the opponent, the Maratha light cavalry first got him off balance by teasing him into ill-timed charges and when he was in confusion, attacked him in turn.

Shivaji has often been compared by his European contemporaries with other Great Captains of the past. The Portuguese viceroy in India wrote in a letter to the King of Portugal on 20<sup>th</sup> September 1667: "In cunningness, valour, activity and military prudence he [Shivaji] could be compared

with Caesar and Alexander.”<sup>3728</sup> Carrè calls him ‘one of the greatest men the East has ever seen’ and adds further, “In his courage, the rapidity of his conquests and his great qualities he does not ill resemble that great king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus.”<sup>3729</sup> An English letter of 16<sup>th</sup> January 1678 says of him, “Shivaji Raja...marched with his army...into Karnataka... and with a success as happy as Caesar’s in Spain, he came, saw and overcame” and adds that he is no less dexterous in capturing fortresses than Alexander the Great was.<sup>3730</sup> Another English letter dated 14<sup>th</sup> February 1678 remarks, “But it is too well known that Shivaji is a second Sertorius and comes not short of Hannibal for stratagems.”<sup>3731</sup>

Shivaji did not fight a single battle comparable in magnitude to those fought by these Great Captains. But has not Sun Tzu wisely said, “To triumph in battle and be universally acclaimed ‘expert’ is not the acme of skill.”? The form of strategy which he had adopted had no place for such a battle. This no doubt makes it difficult for a superficial observer to fathom his great qualities as a general, but patient reflection would show that his military career could be used to illustrate practically every known principle of war. And be it remembered as well that while most of the Great Captains of the world had the power and prestige of an organized state behind them, Shivaji enjoyed no such advantage. He is among those great men of the world who conceived, carried out and consolidated a revolution.

#### **WAS SHIVAJI A GUERRILLA LEADER?**

Guerrilla warfare is the form employed by a nation inferior in arms and military equipment against established rulers or aggressors. Evidently, the strategy to which guerrillas resort, in the early phases, is one of exhaustion. They wage a “war of detachment”,<sup>3732</sup> interrupt the enemy’s lines of communication, ambush enemy detachments and attack enemy outposts. Gradually the enemy, impelled to detach large bodies of troops

to protect his lines of communication, evacuates certain areas, which the guerrillas then declare as 'liberated' areas. In course of time, guerrilla bands grow into larger units, expand liberated areas and acquire the characteristics of a regular army.

The main strength of guerrilla warfare lies in its very lack of military formality. Regular armies in the field are supplied in two ways; in the first place, from magazines fed from the home base, or by purchase of local products on cash payment, or by requisition; secondly, by pillage. Guerrilla forces cannot rely on any of these methods. The first would enable their enemy to starve them out by cutting off supplies. Nor can they resort to the second method, namely, pillage, which would dissociate them from the people and expose them to their enemy. Guerrillas are supported by a sizeable section of the population from whom they directly obtain their supplies and recruits. The guerrilla lives and operates amongst the people 'like a fish lives in a pond'. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla forces. This does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. But such base areas are flexible and do not resemble the rear installations of a regular army.

Generally, the government forms a link between the army and the support provided by the people. This support is mainly in the form of taxes which are used to procure provisions and war material required to sustain the army. These materials and provisions are stored in supply depots and are forwarded to the army along lines of communication. The supply depots may be likened to huge water reservoirs and the lines of communication to canals or pipelines. If the supply depots are captured or the lines of communication cut by the enemy, the army dependent upon these would be paralyzed. A threat to either of these would therefore compel it to accept battle. On the other hand, guerrilla forces operate in small bodies and receive the necessary support directly from the people without

any intermediate agency like the government. Therefore there are no huge supply depots or lines of communication by threatening which the guerrillas could be compelled to fight. The supply system of guerrillas is highly decentralized.

The key problem in anti-guerrilla warfare is therefore not how to destroy guerrillas but how to seek them out and maintain contact with them. As they operate in small elusive bands, they do not provide suitable targets. Nor is it possible to pin them down by attacking an objective which is of such importance that they must protect it, because no such objectives exist. They have no lines of communication which could be cut and no magazines which could be captured or destroyed.

It is not the strategy and tactics which distinguish the guerrilla forces from the regular ones. The term 'guerrilla tactics' is misleading. There is no such separate set of guerrilla tactics. The tactics they employ are an important but not a distinguishing characteristic of guerrilla warfare. Basically they are a part of normal infantry tactics. Guerrillas are distinguished from regular forces by the method of recruitment and supplies or, in other words, by the nature of people's participation. A guerrilla force can operate successfully only in an area in which the civilian population is not merely passively in sympathy with them but in which there is a fair proportion who will give them active and willing assistance, directly and not through any intermediate agencies like the government. We could call this 'short-circuit' supply. There are no big reservoirs and pipelines. Instead, there are innumerable capillaries.

The form of warfare to which Shivaji resorted did not have any of these distinguishing characteristics. From the very beginning of his military career he relied on a regular system of government and taxation and a regular army which, in his kingdom, was fed from regular magazines established in hill fortresses. In enemy-held territory, his army lived off the land

as was usual in those days. His strength lay in the superior mobility of his light cavalry and the network of fortresses on which it was based. The former the Mughals could not compete with, and the latter they could not take without a long siege which exposed them to sallies from neighbouring fortresses. It was not the absence of targets, but their inability to take them which baffled the Mughal army.

Similarities (with Guerrilla Warfare) which have given rise to the myth that Shivaji used guerrilla warfare are, it seems, as follows –

- (1) Strategy of exhaustion
- (2) His grand tactics of operating in small cavalry detachments
- (3) The terrain in which he operated.

None of these however are exclusive characteristics of guerrilla warfare.

The only period of his career in which his method of waging war resembled guerrilla warfare is from 1661 to 1663 – during his campaigns against the Mughals. And even then, it was not guerrilla warfare but ‘guerrilla-type’ warfare, which is not one and the same thing.

#### **WAS SHIVAJI A MERE PLUNDERER?**

Shivaji has often been wrongfully, but naturally as he was fighting against established governments, called a mere plunderer by his contemporaries. He had to maintain a large army to defend his tiny kingdom against such mighty foes as the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate. His supreme difficulty throughout his career was always the payment of his army. The resources of his state were too meager to sustain a large army and the only alternative that remained was plunder. His policy is clearly revealed in a contemporaneous English

letter. When he arrived before Surat in June 1672 he wrote letters to the governor of the town "demanding the third time (which he wrote should be the last) the *couty (chauth)* or  $\frac{1}{4}$  part of the King's revenues under this Government, declaring that as their King had forced him to keep an army for defence of his people and country, so that army must be paid."<sup>3733</sup>

And though he was ruthless in attaining his object he never indulged in wanton cruelty. It seems, from two or three instances, that when he arrived before a town he generally called upon the wealthy and leading merchants to make a reasonable contribution and only when such willing compliance was refused, did he resort to force.

His plundering raids had some definite objects, namely,

- (1) To acquire the means to sustain his army,
- (2) To destroy the economic foundations of the enemy's might,
- (3) To compel the enemy to divide his forces, and
- (4) To force the enemy to go on the defensive.

The first two objects were economic hence grand strategic,<sup>3734</sup> the last two were strategic.

The Allies, in the Second World War, resorted to strategic bombing as a means of destroying the enemy's sinews of war. What Shivaji did was not only destroy them but also to appropriate them. And while doing so, he was far more careful than the Allies in the Second World War to avoid unnecessary and wanton collateral destruction.

#### AS A LEADER OF MEN

Shivaji was short in stature, fair complexioned, distinguished by an aquiline nose and quick and piercing eyes.<sup>3735</sup> He kept a beard.<sup>3736</sup> In his life style he was markedly

simple and cared little for any physical pleasures.<sup>3737</sup> Thevenot tells us that he ate but once a day.<sup>3738</sup>

A statesman of outstanding ability, he was energetic, enterprising, far sighted and secretive.<sup>3739</sup> His lively imagination was tempered with a profound common sense. He possessed the skill to fashion an instrument of war which fitted his own genius. He was a staunch disciplinarian, a marvelous organizer, a great administrator and an able soldier.<sup>3740</sup> Throughout his life he never lost sight of his aim. Foreseeing and optimistic, he possessed an indomitable spirit which could neither be quelled by adversity nor satiated by success.

As a leader of men, he was not only the brain but the soul of his army. He magnetized all who came into contact with him and knew how to stir their hearts.<sup>3741</sup> The well being of his soldiers was his constant concern. He had won their trust and devotion, not only by his heroism, but also by his daily concern in their welfare and happiness.<sup>3742</sup> As Carlyle wrote of Napoleon "There was an eye to see in this man, a soul to dare and do. He rose naturally to be the King. All men saw that he was such."<sup>3743</sup>

His highest moral virtue was his outlook upon women. He had extraordinary respect for womanhood. He abhorred rape and violence, and punished severely those who were guilty of such crimes.<sup>3744</sup>

Even Khafi Khan, a hostile critic, says of him:

"Shivaji had always striven to maintain the honour of the people in his territories. He persevered in a cause of rebellion, in plundering caravans and troubling mankind; but he entirely abstained from other disgraceful acts, and was careful to maintain the honour of the women and children of Muslims when they fell into his hands. His injunctions upon

this point were very strict, and anyone who disobeyed them received punishment.”<sup>3745</sup>

About this extraordinary man, Acworth says:

“But his mere acquisitions constitute an altogether imperfect measure of the power he exercised and evoked. No man perhaps then living had a keener and juster appreciation of his own strength and the weak points of his opponents. He alone among his countrymen thoroughly gauged the sources and the direction of both. He saw that the time had come when the Maratha nation might be made anew, and he made it. He saw that, with all its swelling pretentiousness, its enormous wealth, the vast numbers of its subjects, nothing but the shell of its old energy and power was left to the Mahomedan dominion, that the vices and jealousies of autocratic rule had eaten away the heart of it. From the first day of his negotiation with the *killedar* [castellan, commander of a fort] of Torana<sup>3746</sup> he kept his eye steadily fixed on the vast project of Hindu reconquest, and both as a captain and a statesman, in each of which capacities he was pre-eminently great, his conduct shows an unwavering adherence, not to the exigencies of the passing moment nor to the projects of personal ambition, but to certain leading principles of action and administration which he had prescribed to himself as the adequate and necessary means to his great end. His claim to greatness is, of course, not to be criticized by the ethics of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Grant Duff says, ‘superstition, cruelty, and treachery are not only justly alleged against him, but he always preferred deceit to open force when both were in his power.’<sup>3747</sup> The charge of superstition may be passed by, but as regards that of cruelty it is noticeable that Elphinstone — certainly a more

discriminating judge — says that ‘during his whole career Shivaji, though he inflicted death and torture to force confessions of concealed treasure, was never personally guilty of any useless cruelty,’<sup>3748</sup> and this statement is assuredly correct. Elphinstone also says of him that ‘though a predatory war, such as he conducted, must necessarily inflict extensive misery, his enemies bear witness to his anxiety to mitigate the evils of it of humane regulations, which were strictly enforced.’<sup>3749</sup> The truth seems to be that, though Shivaji was ruthless in attaining his object, he was completely free from the detestable passion for gratuitous cruelty, as well as from any disposition to indulge in it as a gratification of temper, and there are few other oriental conquerors, if any, of whom both these things can be said. To contest the accusations of deceit and treachery would be childish, the best that can be said is that every one of Shivaji’s enemies was just as treacherous as he was, only not so acute, and that the era and the people were unacquainted with the principle of either public or private veracity. The idea that deceit to a foe was morally wrong probably never occurred to a single man or either side. The whole career of Shivaji was one of struggle and of stress. In his earlier days the resources of the kingdom of Bijapur were such as it might well have appeared madness to contend against, and the whole power of the Mughal emperor was brought to bear on him as soon as he became conspicuous. It was essential to him to push his projects as secretly, as unostentatiously, and in such a way as to attract as little notice as possible; and though no doubt he was utterly unscrupulous in his choice of means, his circumstances were such as would have furnished much excuse even in an age of higher morality. But he ought not, I think, to be condemned for not being in these particulars better than his age, and that he was

no worse, a study of Aurangzeb's history sufficiently establishes. But if it may fairly be said of these two princes that either was ready to adopt any means which were the best adopted in his opinion for the attainment of his end, it must added that in all other respects the character of Shivaji far transcends that of his mighty foe. Religion was a dominant feature in both, but in Aurangzib it was degraded into the pettiest, narrowest, and most malignant bigotry. His revival of the jizya, or hateful poll-tax on Hindus, contributed, more perhaps than any single act, to the downfall of the empire, by accentuating the distinction between the ruling race and the vast majority of their subjects. There was no error in policy which he was not ready to commit if to his mean and distorted mental vision a text in the Koran or a falsely revered tradition seemed to justify or demand it, as there was no precept or homily in the same sacred volume which ever held him back from treachery or crime. The gaoler of his father, the assassin of his brothers, the suspicious and dreaded tyrant of his sons, too conscious of faithlessness in himself to have faith in others or to inspire it, his statesmanship mere cunning, his energy the peddling industry of a clerk, opposed to such a national and religious upheaval as is without parallel in the history of India, and which was guided by an intellect as far-reaching and profound as his own was limited and shallow, he was born to be the architect of ruin; if Shivaji, as his admirers contend, was an incarnation of divinity specially created for Hindu conquest and dominion, Aurangzeb seems equally to have been sent into the world for the express purpose of disintegrating the Mahomedan empire.”<sup>3750</sup>

The decisive Battle of Tours has already been mentioned in the first chapter. Of the significance of this famous battle,

Gibbon writes:

“A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.”<sup>3751</sup>

The Battle of Tours, so also the repulse of Muslim arms from Constantinople, saved Europe from such a calamity.

Shivaji's achievements are described in much the same vein. Bhooshan says:<sup>3752</sup>

“The glamour of Kashi has departed,  
Into a *masjid* has Mathura been converted,  
Had Shivaji not been  
Circumcised might all have been.”

The Pratihara Empire held back the tide of Muslim invasion for some three hundred years; the Vijayanagar Empire played a similar role in south India for some two hundred years. None of these powers, however, succeeded in destroying the spectre that threatened them. And by the middle of the seventeenth century it seemed that all they had done would, alas, be in vain. It was the genius of Shivaji which saved India from such a calamity, and thus changed her fate.

Describing the plight of Hindus, Bernier wrote: “The tenth incarnation, say the Gentiles (Hindus), will have for its object

the emancipation of mankind from the tyranny of the Mahomedans."<sup>3753</sup> No wonder then that the Hindus considered Shivaji an incarnation of God.<sup>3754</sup>

This popular sentiment, which was evidently prevalent all over India even in Shivaji's time, is reflected in the writings of Lt. Col. Mark Wilks who, after narrating Randaula Khan's conquests in the south from 1636, says:

"Such was the state of times when a Hindu author, concluding a succinct chronological account of ancient kings, conveyed under the disguise of a prophesy,<sup>3755</sup> thus denounces the evils which were to ensue: 'Omens and Prodigies shall appear. The goddess Kali shall descend on earth, in all her wrathful forms; the proprietors, occupiers, nobles, and all the children of the south shall perish: mankind shall be engaged in incessant wars; the demons everywhere exciting the strife, and arms, in every town and every street: the nobles shall be compelled to obey the command of the Turks<sup>3756</sup> and be led like sheep to the slaughter.' The prophesy concludes with the animating prediction of a deliverer and conqueror, who should relieve the Hindus from these horrible oppressions: 'Then the divine Veera Vasunta<sup>3757</sup> shall appear; the skies shall shower down flowers, &c.' Such a deliverer in the person of the celebrated Sevagee was shortly afterwards supposed to have appeared; and there is abundant evidence that both he and his adherents directly countenanced the idea of his being under the immediate protection of a deity, by whose inspiration he professed himself to be directed. We shall not permit ourselves to be seduced by the adventures of this extraordinary man far beyond the limits which connect them with the direct object of our work."<sup>3758</sup>

Sir Jadunath Sarkar sums up his accomplishment in these words:

“He has proved by his example that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a state, defeat enemies; they can conduct their own defence; they can protect and promote literature and art, commerce and industry; they can maintain navies and ocean-trading fleets of their own, and conduct naval battles on equal terms with foreigners. He taught the modern Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth.

“...The Emperor Jahangir cut the *Akshay Bat* tree of Allahabad down to its roots and hammered a red-hot iron cauldron on to its stump. He flattered himself that he had killed it. But Lo! within a year the tree began to grow again and pushed the heavy obstruction to its growth aside!

“Shivaji has shown that the tree of Hinduism is not really dead, that it can rise from beneath the seemingly crushing load of centuries of political bondage, exclusion from administration, and legal repression; it can put forth new leaves and branches; it can again lift its head to the skies.”<sup>3759</sup>

## **Appendix I - Sources on the Life of Shivaji Contemporaneous Public Documents**

The term ‘public document’ is here employed to designate those documents which were created, not with the primary intention of disseminating knowledge or history of the period to posterity but in the course of routine administration of the state. Public documents include state papers such as orders to and dispatches from governors, generals and ambassadors, court diaries, correspondence with other states as well as various kinds of other correspondence, reports and minutes of meetings, the workings of the courts, tax related and other financial documents, charters (*sanads*) for grants and awards, letters for their renewal (*khurd khats*), letters of arbitration, and the like.

### ***Persian***

There were four prominent Muslim states in 17<sup>th</sup> Century India — the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi, Qutbshahi and Nizamshahi Sultanates. Persian was the court language of all four. One can easily imagine how in the normal course of their reign, these states must have generated hundreds of thousands of Persian documents; unfortunately their state archives did not outlast their demise. Delhi, the Mughal capital, was sacked at least thrice in the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries and Imperial archives were in all probability destroyed. Their provincial records, too, must have shared a similar fate.

*State Archives, Andhra Pradesh:* This collection contains some 150,000 official Mughal documents from the period of Shah Jahan's and Aurangzeb's reigns. It was discovered in 1916 within the fort at Aurangabad, which was the main Mughal station in the Deccan at one time. The collection is now

preserved as the ‘State Archives, Andhra Pradesh’ at Hyderabad. Very few of these documents are directly useful for our purpose; yet, some of them do indeed possess some pertinent information. Other documents in this collection are mainly useful for our understanding of the working of the Mughal Court — information which is valuable for the backdrop of a biography of Shivaji.

*Central Records Office, Bikaner:* Archives of principalities in Rajputana have been here preserved. The collection contains contemporaneous extracts of *akhbars* (newsletters), which is a record on a day by day basis of what transpired at the Imperial Mughal Court; the Emperor would inspect them for accuracy at the end of the day and order necessary changes. Liaison officers of high ranking *mansabdars* would copy extracts from these for the information of their masters. The original *akhbars* have not survived, but the Jaipur State Archives had 6,463 extracts in its collection, of which 3,304 are now with the Royal Asiatic Society in London. (A microfilm of these is preserved at the *Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal* at Pune.) The remaining 3,159 extracts are at the Central Records Office, Bikaner. Aurangzeb’s rule lasted 17,747 days, but the available extracts of *akhbars* do not match this number. Copies of *akhbars* are also available at the National Library, Kolkata. About 75 of these extracts are useful as a source for Shivaji’s biography.

*Private Archives:* The private archives of former noblemen or grant and fief holding families contain old documents in Persian. Although these often pertain to grants and awards, they yet tell us a good deal about those times. Some such private archives are now preserved in various governmental and non-governmental institutions such like the ‘State Archives, Andhra Pradesh’, the ‘Pune Puralekhagar’ (Pune Archives) of the Government of Maharashtra, the ‘Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal’, Pune, and the ‘Rajwade Sanshodhan Mandal’, Dhule.

Some notable compilations of such Persian documents are:

*Aitihasik Farsi Sahitya* (Historical Persian Papers), 6 Volumes. Persian text and Marathi translation.

*Selected Documents of Shah Jahan's Reign.* (Persian text with English summaries.)

*Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign.* (Persian text with English summaries.)

*Selected Waqai of the Deccan, 1660 -1671 A.D.* (Persian text with English summaries.)

*Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans.* (Persian text with English summaries.)

*House of Shivaji.* (Some chapters contain English translations of some Persian documents.)

*Select Articles* (Some chapters contain English translations of some Persian documents.)

*Persian Documents* (Photocopies of some Persian documents found in a private collection, with English and Kannada translations.)

*Mughal Archives: A Descriptive Catalogue of Documents Pertaining to the Reign of Shah Jahan (1628 – 1658)*, Vol. I.

*Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I (1658-1663), Parts 1 and 2.

*Collections of Letters:* Royal letters were drafted by Imperial *munshis* (scribes). These scribes often made copies and compiled them not as a record of history, but as models of correct official letter writing for future generations of scribes to

emulate. Some such compilations which are useful for the life of Shivaji are listed below.

1. *Adab-i Alamgiri*: This is a collection of drafts of letters dictated by Aurangzeb, and letters written on his orders by his *munshi* Abul Fath alias Qabil Khan. Sadiq, who was a scribe to Aurangzeb's son Muhammad Akbar, found and incorporated them in a collection of letters compiled by the scribe in 1115 A. H. (1703-04). It contains some 535 of Aurangzeb's letters, 8 of his son Muhammad Sultan's and about 132 of Muhammad Akbar's, these last having been drafted by Sadiq. Most of these letters, as copied in this compilation, do not bear dates. But it could be surmised from internal evidence that Muhammad Akbar's were written between 1678 and 1681 and those Aurangzeb's and others', between 1649 and 1659. However two of Aurangzeb's letters in this collection belong to later dates, one to 1670 and the other to the beginning of 1671. Drafts of these two letters could not have been written by Qabil Khan who had died in the 5<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb (1662-63).

Aurangzeb's letters in this collection are a useful source for information on Mughal campaigns against the Qutbshahi and Adilshahi Sultanates, as also on Shivaji's attempts to gain Mughal support against the Adilshahi Sultanate in 1656-57 and his incursions into Mughal territory in 1657.

Several manuscript copies of *Adab-i Alamgiri* are extant. I have used the version published in 1971.

2. *Insha-i Haft Anjuman* (Seven collections of Letters): This compilation was prepared by Himayat Yar in 1698-99. His father, Udairaj alias Talayar Khan, worked as a scribe first for Rustam Khan and, after his death, for Mirza Raja Jai Singh. The letters drafted by Udairaj are divided into seven parts in this compilation. Hence its name, *Insha-i Haft Anjuman*. These seven parts are as follows:[3760](#)

1. Rustam Khan's letters to Shah Jahan.
2. Jai Singh's letters to Aurangzeb written during the Mughal War of Succession.
3. Jai Singh's letters to Aurangzeb written during the former's expeditions against Shivaji and the Adilshahi Sultanate (1665-66)
4. Rustam Khan's letters to Shah Jahan's sons and Jai Singh's letters to Aurangzeb's sons.
5. Rustam Khan's letters to other Mughal *mansabdars* and Jai Singh's letters to other Mughal *mansabdars*, to noblemen belonging to the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates and other states in the Deccan wanting to defect to the Mughals, and those to Mughal envoys in the Deccan.
6. Letters sent by Udairaj on behalf of Rustam Khan and Jai Singh.
7. Letters drafted by Udairaj for others. (These include two letters drafted for Shivaji and sent to Aurangzeb.)

The letters in the compilation are an important source of information about Jai Singh's campaigns against Shivaji and the Adilshahi Sultanate. I have used English translations of these letters made by Sir Jadunath Sarkar and published in *House of Shivaji*, those made by Jagadish Narayan Sarkar and published in *The Military Dispatches of a Seventeenth Century Indian General*, and Marathi translations made by Setu Madhavrao Pagadi in *Mogal-Maratha Sangharsh*.

3. *Durj-ul Gawahir* (A casket of Jewels): It contains drafts of 212 letters compiled by Govind Prabhu, son of Neel Prabhu who was employed as a scribe to both Shivaji and Sambhaji. Only two letters from this compilation are directly useful for the purpose of the present work. One is a letter written by

Shivaji to Mughal officers after his raid on Shayista Khan and the other, written by Shivaji's Commander in Chief Prataprao Gujar to the officials and inhabitants of Surat. Both are also included in another compilation, called the *Khutut-i Shivaji*, noticed below. Photocopies of all the pages in *Durj-ul Gawahir*, along with full English translations of these two letters, and English summaries of others, made by Professor B. D. Verma have been published in *Tarabai Papers: A Collection of Persian Letters*.

4. *Khutut-i Shivaji* (Shivaji's letters): The name of this collection is misleading; only two out of the thirty-two letters in it are supposed to have been written in the name of Shivaji. Including these two, seven letters in this collection may be useful for the life of Shivaji. These are: (1) and (2) Included in *Durj-ul Gawahir* and noticed above. (3) and (4) Dilir Khan's letters to Shivaji (c. 1665 and c.1675). (5) Prataprao's letter to the officials of Surat (c.1672). (6) Their reply (c.1672). (7) A letter to Aurangzeb protesting against the imposition of the *jizya* (capitation tax against non-Muslims). The authorship of this letter has been erroneously attributed to Shivaji.<sup>3761</sup> Only two copies of this collection are known: one in the Royal Asiatic Society in London and the other in the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Recently a friend of mine tried hard to trace the latter copy only to find that it has curiously gone missing! I have used a photocopy of the manuscript in London procured by Dr. Vijay Bedekar (Thane) and Dr. Madhukar Ambekar (London).

### ***Marathi***

Although Persian was the official language in Muslim states of the Deccan, Marathi was used at lower echelons of the administration. Even some *farmans* of the Adilshahs and Qutbshahs used to be bilingual — the Persian text followed by its Marathi version. Shivaji made Marathi the official state language, but the archives of his kingdom did not survive too

long after his death on account of the Mughal invasion which followed. Most of the documents which were found later came from private collections.

Of the published texts of Marathi papers, about 425 documents have a bearing on the life of Shivaji and about 85 are useful for Shahji's biographers.

Some of the more important published compilations of Marathi state papers are:

1. *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vols. 8, 15 to 18, 20.
2. *Shiv-charitra-sahitya*, 14 Volumes
3. *Sanads and Letters* (Marathi title – *Sanadapatratil Mahiti*.)
4. *Decisions from the Shahu and Peshwa Daftar*. (Marathi title – *Vatanpatre, Niwadapatre Vagaire*.)
5. *Shri Sampradayachi Kagadpatre*, 2 Volumes
6. *Shri Ramdasichi Aitihasik Kagadpatre*, 2 parts
7. *Marathi Daftar*, Vol. III
8. *Purandare Daftar*, Vol. III
9. *Selections from the Peshwa Daftar* (Marathi title – *Peshave Daftaratun Nivadlele Kagad*.) Vol. XXXI.
10. *Records of the Shivaji Period* (Marathi title – *Shivakalin Kagadpatre*.)
11. *Aitihasik Sadhane*

## 12. *Shiv-chhatrapatinchya Patranche Prati-rup-darshan*

### Hindi

Correspondence between Mirza Raja Jai Singh's officers with him, those at Amber — the headquarters of his *jagir* — and his representatives at the Imperial Mughal Court has been preserved in the Central Records Office at Bikaner in Rajasthan. Texts and condensed English translations of 68 letters from this collection have been published in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*. These letters are related to Jai Singh's campaigns against Shivaji and the Adilshahi Sultanate, as well as Shivaji's visit to Agra.

### Portuguese

The official language of administration of the Portuguese colonies in India was of course Portuguese. Shivaji became a neighbour of Portuguese dominions from the year 1658. Many documents in Portuguese, therefore, contain references to Shivaji. The Portuguese also communicated directly with Shivaji and his officers.

Of the various Portuguese collections which mention Shivaji, a few important ones are listed below.

1. *Livros das Monções do Reino* (Monsoon Books of the Kingdom): All official correspondence sent from Portugal to Goa was copied and compiled in these volumes. These letters usually reached Goa during the monsoon, hence the name. The compilation does not consist of letters sent to Lisbon from Goa. However, many of the letters sent from Portugal to Goa often quote some paragraphs from them.

The collection has a total of 456 volumes, covering the period from 1560 to 1914. Of these, 62 pertaining to the period

between 1605 and 1651, are preserved in the National Archives at Lisbon. Others are kept in the Goa Archives.

At least twelve volumes in this collection are useful for Shivaji's biography, and all of them are kept at the Goa archives.

2. *Livros dos Reis Visinhos* (Letters of the Neighbouring Kings): This collection at the Goa archives contains copies of all the letters sent to neighboring states by the Portuguese administration in India during the period 1619-1842.

The collection consists of 22 volumes. The first volume includes letters from 1619 to 1620. The second commences from 1662. Letters in the intervening period are missing. The second and third volumes contain letters which are useful for Shivaji's biography.

3. *Livros das Pazes e Tratados da India*. (Books of the Treaties and Agreements of Portuguese India): All five volumes of this collection are kept in the Goa archives. They include various treaties into which the Portuguese administration of the colonies in India entered with various neighboring states from time to time. The first four volumes are manuscripts while the fifth is printed.

Cunha Rivara first published these drafts in *Boletim do Governo do Estado da India* (Bulletin of the Portuguese State in India) during 1873-1875.

Thereafter, they were again reproduced in *Collecção dos Tratados e Concertos (de Pazes)* edited by Biker. This is a collection in 14 volumes published during the period 1881-1887. The fourth volume of this collection has documents useful for Shivaji's biography.

4. *Assentos do Conselho do Estado* (Minutes of the Meetings of the State Council): This is a nine-volume collection of

manuscripts preserved at the Goa archives. It includes minutes of meetings of the State Advisory Council held during the period 1618-1750. These are printed in the five-volume collection called *Assentos do Conselho do Estado* edited by Dr. Panduranga S. S. Pissurlencar. The second and third volumes of this collection contain information about Shahji and the fourth, that about Shivaji.

5. *Documentos Avulsos relativos á India* (Loose documents relating to India): This collection is preserved at *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino* at Lisbon. Box Nos. 25 and 27 are especially useful for Shivaji's biography.

Of these, I have only used the published volumes of *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*. Besides, I have used the following books which give translations of Portuguese documents useful for Shivaji's biography, or provide information extracted from Portuguese documents.

1. *The Portuguese and the Marathas*: Dr. P. S. Pissurlencar wrote *Portugueses e Maratas* (6 parts) about the relations between the Portuguese and the Marathas. These were translated from Portuguese into English and published in one volume entitled *The Portuguese and the Marathas*.

2. *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane – Portuguese Daftars*: Volume II of this source includes Marathi translations of original Portuguese sources done by Dr. Pissurlencar. They include *Portuguese e Maratas*: Part 1 – Shivaji, Part 2 – Sambhaji, Part 3 – Rajaram, a part of the book *Antigualhas* and a portion relevant to Maratha history from *Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India* (The Portuguese Diplomats in India). Volume III contains Marathi translations of about 500 documents relevant to Maratha history out of about 1,500 printed in the *Arquivo Português Oriental*, Tomo I, Vol. III edited by A. B. de Bragança Pereira. About 25 of these are useful for the life of Shivaji, the rest are of a later period.

3. *Sivashahi Portuguese Kagadpatre* (Portuguese Documents of the Shivaji period): Contains Marathi translations and English summaries of 120 Portuguese documents, from 1658 to 1695, made by S. S. Desai. Of these, 70 documents relate to the life of Shivaji.

In all, about 225 Portuguese documents having a bearing on the life of Shivaji have come to light so far.

### ***English***

Correspondence between officers of the East India Company was mainly related to mercantile affairs but, as commerce was affected by political and military events, it also contained reference to such occurrences in the region. Most of these papers are preserved at the India Office<sup>3762</sup> (London), Bombay Archives (Mumbai), Public Record Office and the British Museum (both, London), and the Bodleian Library (Oxford). The following books on the East India Company are relevant to our purpose:

1. *The English Factories in India*, 17 volumes: The English East India Company's transactions and trade in India between 1618 and 1684 are narrated by quoting or abstracting passages from original documents.<sup>3763</sup> The first nine volumes pertain to the period between 1618 and 1654, and are not relevant for a biography of Shivaji. However, they provide details about India of Shivaji's time. The next volume deals with the period 1660-1666 and includes a letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> December 1659 which has Shivaji's earliest mention in English records. Volumes that follow also have much to say about Shivaji.

2. *English Records on Shivaji*, 2 Volumes: These contain a total of about 1,000 extracts from the Company's papers which refer or are related to Shivaji.

## **Dutch**

Dr. Bal Krishna's *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Parts I and II, and Vol. II, Part I contain English translations, and *Shivakalin-patrasar-sangraha*, Vols. I and II contain Marathi translations, of about 175 Dutch documents throwing light on the life of Shivaji. I have used these translations for the present work. Various collections in which these Dutch documents have been found are, in brief, as follows:

1. Koloniaal Archief (Colonial Archives): This series contains hundreds of manuscript volumes, preserved at *Algemeen Rijksarchief* (General State Archives) at The Hague. These include documents such as correspondence between Batavia and the Dutch East India Company's headquarters in the Netherlands, correspondence between Batavia and various Dutch settlements in Asia, and minutes of the meetings of the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies and his Council. Volumes 1123-24, 1132-33, 1136-37, 1142-46, 1152, 1156 and 1159-60 and Batavia Letter Books from 1660 to 1681 contain documents useful for a biography of Shivaji.

2. *Dagh Register*: These are hand written volumes of the diaries of the Batavia headquarters of the Dutch East India Company and are now preserved at The Hague. These diaries also contain substance of the letters received from various settlements and factories. Diaries for the years 1624 to 1682 have been published in 23 volumes. At least twelve of these are useful for our purpose.

3. Dutch Records: This is a collection preserved in the India Office, London. One of its sections called *Transcripts from the Hague* contains the following: (a) Copies of letters sent from the Dutch settlements in Asia to the Netherlands -there are 57 volumes of these with letters from 1600. English translations of the first 29 volumes covering the period from 1600 to 1700 are

also preserved in the India Office. (b) Copies of letters sent from the Company's headquarters in the Netherlands to its settlements in Asia – there are four handwritten volumes with letters from 1614 to 1670. English translations of each of these volumes have also been preserved in India Office. (c) Copies of letters sent by the Governor of the Dutch East Indies to various settlements – there are nine handwritten volumes of these covering the period from 1617 to 1699. Translations of the first three of these volumes are also preserved in the India Office. Seven volumes in sub-section (a) of these Dutch Records are useful for the life of Shivaji.

### ***French***

The French East India Company was set up in 1664. Its first factory in Shivaji's dominions was opened at Rajapur in 1668. Contemporaneous French accounts refer to correspondence between Shivaji and the Company's officials. But this material has not been explored to the extent it deserves. Dr. Surendra Nath Sen, in his *Foreign Biographies of Shivaji*, has made a brief reference to two French letters throwing light on the life of Shivaji.

### ***Miscellaneous***

The Jesuit Mission of Madura used to send annual reports to their headquarters in Rome. These contain, apart from the work of the mission, accounts of the political and military events in the region. The reports were written in Italian, Portuguese and Latin. They are useful for the history of South India and, as far as the life of Shivaji is concerned, for his Karnataka expedition. A French translation of these, made by J. Bertrand, was published in his *La Mission du Madure*. An English translation of some extracts from Bertrand's French version is published in *History of the Nayaks of Madura* (pp. 263-95). However Bertrand's translation is replete with various

defects.<sup>3764</sup> I have used the English translation of extracts from original letters related to the life of Shivaji made by H. Heras and published by Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Pune, in a small book entitled *Historical Miscellany*.

### *Contemporaneous Court Histories*

#### *Persian*

*Ain-i Akbari* (Akbar's administration): This account of Akbar's administration written by Abul Fazl (1551-1602) is of course of no use for the life of Shivaji, but is useful for the information it gives about the Mughal military organization. I have used the English translation made by H. Blochmann under the title *The Ain-i Akbari*.

*Tuzuk-i Jahangiri* (Jahangir's administration): This is Emperor Jahangir's autobiography and covers the period between 1606 and 1624. It is of no direct use for the life of Shivaji, but gives some information on Shahji's career. I have used the English translation made by Alexander Rogers.

*Badshahnama*: Authored by Abdul Hamid Lahori under the Emperor's orders, it is an account of the first 20 years of Shah Jahan's reign (1628 – 1647). Advancing age prevented Lahori from writing in 1648 when Shah Jahan permitted him to retire. Though of no direct use for the life of Shivaji, it serves as an important source for Shahji's biography and also contains details of Mughal administration. I have used the text published by The Asiatic Society of Bengal.

*Padshahnama*: This account of the last ten years of Shah Jahan's reign (1647–1657) was written by Mohammad Waris, who was Lahori's understudy. It is of no direct use for the life of Shivaji, but provides useful background information, especially about Aurangzeb's invasion of the Qutbshahi Sultanate when he was a prince. I have used a manuscript copy of this work

preserved in Shree Natnagar Shodh Sansthan (Sitamau, Madhya Pradesh, India).)

*Alamgirnama*: Written by Mirza Muhammad Kazim, it provides a history of first ten years of Aurangzeb's reign and was prepared upon his instructions. The author was allowed access to official documents. However, Aurangzeb asked him to cease writing after he had completed narration of the first ten years "as the Emperor preferred laying the foundation of innate qualities to the manifestation of superficial vanity." The latest event mentioned in the *Alamgirnama* is dated 16<sup>th</sup> December 1668. The work contains fairly accurate information but, being an official history, some events unpleasing to the Emperor have either been omitted altogether or have been only cursorily mentioned. For example, Shivaji's raid on Shayista Khan (1663) is mentioned in one sentence and his first sack of Surat (1664) is not mentioned at all.

No English translation of the *Alamgirnama* has been published yet. I have used the Persian text published by The Asiatic Society of Bengal.

*Maasir-i Alamgiri* (Memorable Deeds of Alamgir): This is a history of Aurangzeb's reign written by Saqi Mustaidd Khan who had been an employee in the Mughal administration. After Aurangzeb's death, the *wazir*, Inayatullah Khan asked the author to complete the history of the deceased Emperor's reign. The work was completed in 1122 A. H. (1710-11). The author relies upon the *Alamgirnama* for the first ten years of Aurangzeb's reign and on contemporaneous official documents for the rest. The work is fairly accurate, but compared to other Mughal court histories it is quite brief. Also, it does not mention unflattering events in Mughal history. For example, it does not mention Shivaji's sack of Jalnapur.

I have used the English translation of the work done by Sir Jadunath Sarkar and published by The Royal Asiatic Society of

Bengal and, where necessary, the Persian text published by the same institute, then called The Asiatic Society of Bengal.

*Muhammadnama*: This history of the reign of Muhammad Adilshah was written by Mulla Zahur ibn Zahuri who says that the Sultan himself ordered him to write it. The latest date mentioned in the work is 5<sup>th</sup> May 1649, but it also includes events which are known to have occurred in 1654. So the work must have been written in that year or soon thereafter. At least three copies of this work are extant. A copy, made in 1920, is preserved in the Bijapur Museum, a photocopy of which I have used.<sup>3765</sup> A condensed English translation of the *Muhammad Nama* done by Professor B. D. Verma is published in the English section of *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part II.

*Tarikh-i Ali Adilshahi*: This is a history of the reign of Ali Adilshah II, written upon his orders by one Nurullah who was a high ranking official in the Bijapur Court. The author has not given any name to this work. In the colophons of its various copies, it is called by different names such as *Tarikh-i Ali Adilshahi*, *Tarikh-i Adilshahi* and *Kitab-i Ali Adilshahi*. The work gives an account of Ali Adilshah's reign till 1666. It is verbose, gives very few dates and very little information of only a few important events. I have used the text published from Hyderabad in 1964.

### *Urdu*<sup>3766</sup>

*Alinama*: This is an epic poem written in the Deccani Urdu dialect on Ali Adilshah's reign up to 1666. The author, Mohammad Nusrati, says the Sultan ordered him to compose it. Several old copies of the poem have survived. I have used the photocopy in the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Pune, of the manuscript preserved in India Office, London.

### *Sanskrit*

*Anupuran or Shivabharat*: Paramanand, the author of this biography of Shivaji in Sanskrit verse says that it was composed at the behest of the Maratha King himself. The Author does not indicate when he wrote it. The latest event mentioned in it is the death of Siddi Jauhar, reiterating the rumour that Ali Adilshah had Jauhar poisoned. No date is given, but a contemporaneous English letter says Jauhar died sometime between 17<sup>th</sup> August and 30<sup>th</sup> September 1661. It could therefore be assumed that the *Shivabharat* was composed sometime after September 1661.

Paramanand had been awarded the title *Kavindra* (king of poets). Some Rajasthani letters written by Mirza Raja Jai Singh's officers show that Paramanand was in Shivaji's retinue during the latter's visit to Agra in 1666. The '*Parnal-parvat-grahanakhyanam*' tells us that Shivaji had called on Paramanand and sought his blessings when he was passing through Poladpur on his way to the Panhala fort, which the Marathas had recaptured in 1673.

The *Shivabharat* consists of 2,262 verses spread over thirty-two chapters. The last chapter is incomplete. It is not known whether the poet ever wrote anything beyond the existing portion of the epic.

Insofar as the author states it was composed at Shivaji's behest, the *Shivabharat* could be considered an official biography. Moreover, its reliability has been proven time and again. However, the work is imperfect to the extent that it suffers from the effects of a lackadaisical approach to history writing prevalent in seventeenth century Hindu society. Any history must have dates in profusion to enable a correlation between the various events it describes. But the *Shivabharat* gives only two: Shivaji's birth and Afzal Khan's death. The author uses the narrative style, in that he portrays himself as the narrator of the account of the life of Shivaji to an audience

(real or imagined) of Sanskrit scholars in Banaras. Also, the verse form imposes some restrictions on the composer. Despite these limitations, the *Shivabharat* is a very reliable source as other sources often corroborate its version of events.

Four manuscripts of the *Shivabharat* are preserved in the Saraswati Mahal Library at Tanjore. I have used the text and its Marathi translation published in 1927 under the title *Shrishivabharat*.

### ***Kannada***

*Kanthirav-narasraj-vijayam*: Govind Vaidya wrote this biography of Kanthirava Narasaraja, King of Mysore, in Kannada verse upon the orders of his general, Nanjarajendra. It was completed in 1648. It is of no direct use for the life of Shivaji, but it provides details of Adilshahi campaigns against Mysore, which is useful for the political background. If we ignore the poetic hyperbole found in such works, it has been found to be a generally reliable source.

The Kannada text of the work has been published in 1926 in the Kannada series of the Mysore Oriental Library. I have used the condensed Marathi translation of the portion relevant to Maratha history (c. 11 to 17) published in *Shiva-charitra-vritta-sangraha*, Vol. I.

### ***Other Contemporaneous Histories***

#### ***Persian***

*Futuhat-i Adilshahi* (Triumphs of the Adilshahi): This is a history of the Adilshahi from the time it was founded to the reign of Muhammad Adilshah. But it mainly focuses on the

regimes of Ibrahim II and his son Muhammad. The author, Fuzuni Astarabadi, hailed from Iran.

The work is obviously incomplete because the narrative breaks off abruptly and the customary *khatima* (epilogue) is missing. Internal evidence shows that it was written between 1640 and 1644. The writer had spent some time in the Adilshahi Court and his accounts are fairly reliable. Though it is of no direct use for the life of Shivaji it provides some useful background information. It is our only source of some information about Adilshahi campaigns in southern India that began in 1637. I have used the photocopy of an old manuscript of the work preserved in the British Museum in London.<sup>3767</sup>

*Amal-i Salih* (Salih's composition): This is a history of Shah Jahan's reign and the Mughal civil war which broke out at its end. The author, Mohammad Salih Kambu, states in the foreword that he completed the work in 1070 A.H. (1659-60), but the narrative also includes the deposing and imprisoning of Shah Jahan as well as his death in 1666. So this portion must have been included in it later.

The account of the first 30 years of Shah Jahan's reign in this work is taken from the *Badshahnama* of Qazwini, the *Badshahnama* of Lahori, and the *Padshahnama* of Waris. The narrative thereafter is given independently by the author. It is an important source for the account of the Mughal invasion of the Adilshahi Sultanate (1657) and Shivaji's incursion into Mughal territory at that time. I have used the Persian text published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

*Futuhat-i Alamgiri* (Triumphs of Alamgir): The author Ishwardas, a Nagar Brahmin, hailed from Pattan in Gujarat. He initially worked under Chief Judicial Officer Shaikh-ul Islam and was later employed in the Mughal administration at Ahmedabad. His narrative covers the period between 1657 and 1698.

Ishwardas' writing is full of errors. It is of little value as a historical source. As far as Shivaji's career is concerned, the *Futuhat* mentions the raid on Shayista Khan, campaigns of Jaswant Singh and Jai Singh against Shivaji, first sack of Surat, one of Shivaji's campaigns against Janjira, Shivaji's visit to Agra, Prataprao's raid of Mungi-Paithan, and the battle of Salher (1672). Some details given in these narratives are correct, but quite a few are palpably wrong. The author has not given a single date pertaining to the life of Shivaji.

I have used the English translation of this work published under the title *Ishwardas Nagar's Futuhat-i Alamgiri*. But, as it is not of much use for the life of Shivaji and as it contains glaring errors, it has been used only at one or two places.

*Tarikh-i Dilkusha* (Enchanting History): It is a memoir of Bhimsen Saxena, a Hindu Kayastha, who spent most of his life in the Deccan in Mughal service. The work spans the period from 1658 to 1709.

Bhimsen was born in Burhanpur around 1648-49. His father, who was employed as a supervisor in the Mughal artillery, later appointed Bhimsen as his deputy. Bhimsen lost his job after his father's retirement and joined the service of the Mughal *mansabdar*, Daud Khan. Shivaji, on his way back from the raid on Surat, fought a rearguard action against Daud Khan's army on 17<sup>th</sup> October 1670 which battle (called the Battle of Vani Dindori) Bhimsen witnessed. He was with Daud Khan's force during various expeditions against Shivaji thereafter. Bhimsen joined imperial service in the department of branding of horses soon after Bahadur Khan's arrival in the Deccan in 1671. He was witness to various campaigns that the Khan undertook against Shivaji and the Adilshahi Sultanate. We are not concerned with his later career. Suffice it to say that he began writing his memoirs in 1700.

Bhimsen gives very few precise dates and often has them — as well as chronological sequence — wrong, evidently because he wrote his memoirs entirely from memory and not from written records kept from time to time. But several details in his narrative are corroborated by other sources and he had been an eye witness to many of the events he describes. I have used the English translation of the work published by the Department of Archives, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay (Mumbai) in 1972.

### ***Urdu***

*Tarikh-i Iskandari* (The History of Sikandar): This composition in verse written by Nusrati (the author of the *Alinama*) centers on the battle between Adilshahi General Bahlul Khan and Commander-in-Chief of Shivaji's cavalry, Prataprao. The battle, known as the Battle of Umarani, was fought sometime during March-April 1673 and Nusrati is known to have died in 1025 A.H. (1674-75). So the poem must have been written soon after the battle it describes.

The only known manuscript copy of the work was in the possession of Dr. Abdul Haq who migrated to Pakistan at the time of India's partition. All attempts to trace the manuscript have failed since.<sup>3768</sup> The complete text of the work has not been published. But Dr. Haq in his Urdu biography of the poet, entitled *Nusrati*, has stated that *Tarikh-i Iskandari* contains 554 couplets, has quoted 226 of those and one line each of two more, and has also given a summary of the remaining portion. Dr. Devising Chauhan has given a Devnagari transliteration with a Marathi translation of these lines in his book *Tarikhe Iskandari*. I have used *Tarikhe Iskandari*, and where necessary the *Nusrati*, to glean the information contained in the Urdu poem.

### ***Sanskrit***

*Shivakavya*: Sankarshan Sakalakale, the author of this Sanskrit poem on Shivaji, seems to have been Shivaji's contemporary; some of the accounts in the poem are satisfactorily corroborated by other reliable resources, suggesting that the writer lived in the same period.

The extant portion of the work begins with the second canto and ends with the seventeenth, altogether comprising 1160 verses. It spans the period of Shivaji's career between the Javali campaign (1656) and the raid on Shayista Khan (1663). If further chapters were written, they are yet to be discovered. It contains some details about Shivaji's expedition against Chandrarao More and his North Konkan campaign in 1657-58 which are not found in any other source. However, no dates are given. A substantial portion of the work, such as description of gardens and precious stones, has nothing to do with the life of Shivaji.

The only known copy of the work is preserved in the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Pune. Selected passages, relevant to the life of Shivaji, comprising about 400 verses with Marathi summary, have been published in a small book entitled *Sankarshan Sakalakale-krit Shivakavya*. It is the one which I have used.

*Parnal-parvat-grahanakhyanam*: Jayram, the author of this small Sanskrit work in verse, tells us little about himself in the poem except for the mention, "I write poetry in twelve languages". Jairam Pindye, the author of *Radha-Madhav-Vilas*, too, says at one place in that work that he knows twelve languages. It is evident that Jayram, the author of the *Parnal-parvat-grahanakhyanam* and Jairam Pindye, the author of the *Radha-Madhav-Vilas* are one and the same person.

The *Parnal* contains five cantos comprising 354 verses. It narrates two events in Shivaji's life: the capture of Panhala in

1673 and the battle between Bahlul Khan and Prataprao that followed. No dates are mentioned. The poem presupposes that the author is narrating events to Ekoji, Shivaji's step-brother. Internal evidence shows that it was written sometime in 1673-74. Many details appearing in the work find corroboration in other sources.

I have used the Sanskrit text and its Marathi translation published under the title *Parnal-parvat-grahanakhyanam* in 1923.

*Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru*: Shivaji was enthroned in June 1674. A Tantrik cleric called Nischalpuri found some flaws in the rituals performed at that ceremony; therefore a second coronation was conducted in September, which is the subject of this small composition in Sanskrit verse. Govind Barve, the author, was Nischalpuri's disciple. Internal evidence shows that it was written during Rajaram's reign (1689-1700). The Sanskrit text has been published in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 1 (pp.29-40).

### ***Marathi***

*Sabhasad Chronicle*: Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad wrote this Chronicle in 1697 at Ginjee at the behest of Rajaram. The writer was a high ranking officer in Rajaram's administration.

The chronological sequence in the work is often confused and the writer evidently lacked official documents for reference at the time of writing. But barring these two shortcomings, it is a reliable work of history, generally free from hyperbole and fiction. It gives dates of only two events: Shivaji's coronation and death. Among the Marathi Chronicles, Sabhasad's work is the most important because he was a contemporary of Shivaji.

I have used the Marathi text of the chronicle published under the title *Chhatrapati Shri-Shivajiraje yanchi Bakhar* and

also its English translation made by Surendra Nath Sen and incorporated in his *Siva Chhatrapati*.

### ***Portuguese***

*Vida e Acçeoens do Famoso e Felicissimo Sevagy* (Life and Actions of the Famous and Successful Shivaji) This biography of the Maratha King, published in Lisbon in 1730, was written in 1695 by Cosme da Guarda, a resident of Murmugao (Murgaon). Some events in Shivaji's career — the campaigns of Afzal Khan, Shayista Khan and Jai Singh, the Agra visit, the sack of Surat, Shivaji's death — feature in the book. The work contains several errors and the author draws a great deal on hearsay and gossip. Hence, while it is not a reliable source, it is significant to the extent that it reflects a contemporaneous foreign writer's impression of Shivaji.

I have used the English translation of the book made by Surendra Nath Sen and included in his *Foreign Biographies of Shivaji*.

### ***Contemporaneous Marathi Ballads***

The Afzal Khan episode is the subject of two old Marathi ballads: one written by Adnyandas and the other by Fatanji. The first of these has two versions; the shorter one is published in *Thor Purushanche aani Striyanche Powade* edited by S.T. Shaligram and the longer one in *Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, edited by Y. N. Kelkar. The longer one has, of course, interpolations. Fatanji's ballad is published in *Aitihasik Sankirna Nibandh*, Vol. VIII. Fatanji's ballad and the shorter version of Adnyandas' ballad seem to have been written during Shivaji's time or soon after his death.

### ***Contemporaneous European Accounts***

European accounts of 17<sup>th</sup> Century India are in various forms: travelogues, diaries, and memoirs. Most of their authors were in the service of the English, French, or the Dutch East India Companies, some had come as tourists out of curiosity, some were private merchants and some, proselytizers. A few like Manucci had lived in India for several years and had travelled widely in the country; the experience of some, like Martin, though they too had lived in India for several years, was limited to a particular province. Some, like Mandelslo, had lived in India for barely a few months. Some like Thevenot knew one or more languages prevalent in India while some like Tavernier were entirely dependent on interpreters.

Most of these Europeans have truthfully recorded what they saw or heard as they understood it. It is true that some of them had made grossly inaccurate statements about the history and geography of India, and the customs of Indians, where they had no direct knowledge of the subject. A remarkable feature of their accounts is that they have recorded information on a variety of topics — description of towns, routes, customs, rates of exchange of various currencies, and weights and measures — which, being of routine daily knowledge, had not been deemed significant by the native population or alien Muslim rulers, and therefore are seldom noticed in their records.

The Europeans whose accounts have been used in the present work are:

Englishmen: John Jourdain, Edward Terry, William Methwold, Peter Mundy, Streynsham Master, John Marshall, Dr. John Fryer.

Frenchmen: François Pyrard, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, François Bernier, Jean de Thevenot, Barthélemy Carré, François Martin.

Dutchmen: Francisco Pelsaert.

Italians: Pietro Della Valle, Niccolao Manucci, Giovanni Francesco Gemelli Careri.

Portuguese: Antonio Monseratte

Spanish: Sebastien Manrique.

German: John Albert de Mandelslo.

Of these, the accounts of Jourdain, Terry, Methwold, Pyrard, Pelsaert, Della Valle, and Monseratte were written before Shivaji's birth and those of Manrique and Mandelslo and most of those of Mundy were written when Shivaji was but a child or very young. These are of course of no direct use for the life of Shivaji, but they do provide information useful to understand the background. There are brief references to Shivaji in the accounts of Mundy, Master, Tavernier, and Bernier; Fryer, Thevenot and Carré provide short sketches of his life — Thevenot's up to 1666, Carré's up to 1672 and Fryer's up to 1675. Martin's memoirs are invaluable for Shivaji's Karnatak expedition. Of all European contemporaries of Shivaji who have left us accounts of him, Manucci was probably the only one who had actually seen Shivaji.

I have used English texts of Englishmen's accounts and English translations of other Europeans' accounts.

### *Contemporaneous Literature*

#### *Sanskrit*

*Radhamadhav-Vilas*: Jayram Pindye composed this multilingual compilation sometime after Shahji's death (1664). It consists of eleven chapters in a mixture of prose and verse with profuse laudatory references to Shahji. It reveals some information about him unknown to any other source. Shivaji is mentioned twice but the work provides no new information

about him. Pindye himself seems to have left Maharashtra and sought Shahji's patronage in the Karnataka.

## ***Hindi***

*Shivabhooshan*: This work by the poet, Bhooshan, is actually a treatise on figures of speech. But it becomes both unique and interesting in that all his illustrations are drawn from the life of Shivaji. The author states at the end that he completed writing it in June 1673.

It has several laudatory verses which contain many accurate details of Shivaji's life. But these add nothing to our knowledge about Shivaji gleaned from other sources.

I have used the text of the *Shivabhooshan* included in *Sampoorn Bhooshan* (complete Bhooshan) edited by R. G. Kate.

## ***Chronologies***

Chronologies, called *shakavalis* in Marathi, are lists of events and their dates in the Shaka Era. Generally the events are described very briefly, in a sentence or two. The authors of the following Marathi chronologies are not known. But they have proven to be most reliable and are evidently based on credible contemporaneous sources.

**Jedhe Chronology:** This chronology was discovered in the archives of the Jedhe family. Indian National Congress leader Lokmanya Tilak obtained it from Dayajirao Jedhe. The style of handwriting suggests that it was written in the latter half of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century.

It has about three hundred entries, from Aurangzeb's birth (1618) to the siege of Ginjee (1697). Some 181 of these — up to Shivaji's death — pertain to events concerning Shivaji; more

than 150 of these are corroborated by other evidence. The only existing manuscript of the work is preserved at the D.V.Potdar collection in the Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, a well known institute in Pune. I have used the text published in *Shiva-charitra-pradeep*.

**Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology:** The oldest surviving copy of this chronology was discovered in the archives of the Deshpande family of Shivapur. Barring a few variations, this chronology is more or less identical with the Jedhe Chronology. Evidently both are based on a common source. The last entry in the Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology pertains to Shivaji's coronation. The Jedhe Chronology provides several further dates. I have used the text published in *Shiva-charitra-pradeep*.

**Shivapur Chronology:** The known extant copy of this chronology was made in 1801. It contains ninety-nine entries from 1648 to 1681, most of which are independently corroborated. The last nine entries are about Sambhaji, the rest are about Shivaji. I have used the text published in *Shiva-charitra-pradeep*.

### ***Later Histories***

#### ***Persian:***

***Muntakhab-ul Lubab* (Selected Précis):** The author of this monumental work, Khafi Khan, was born in 1663-64 to Mohammad Hashim who was in Mughal service. Khafi Khan followed in his footsteps and joined the Mughal revenue department around 1681. He died c. 1731.

*Muntakhab* is divided into three volumes; the first, which is not extant, covered the period of the Delhi Sultanates up to Ibrahim Lodi. The second deals with the Mughal dynasty from Babar, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, up to

Muhammadshah (1723). The last volume is devoted to the Deccan Sultanates. The writer says he relied on earlier works such as the chronicle written by Firishta, autobiographies of Babar and Jahangir, and the works of Muhammad Kazim and Mustaidd Khan (the *Alamgirnama* and *Maasir-i Alamgiri* respectively) as well as information provided by his brother and some old government officials. He was witness to some of the events that figure in his work. I have used the English translation, entitled *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, of the portion of Khafi Khan's work related to Aurangzeb's reign and also the translated excerpts published in the seventh volume of *The History of India as told by its Own Historians*.

*Maasir-ul Umara* (Biographies of Amirs): This is an Eighteenth Century compilation of biographies of 731 Mughal noblemen. The biographies of the noblemen of Shivaji's time are mostly based on *Badshahnama* of Lahori, *Padshahnama* of Waris, *Amal-i Salih*, *Alamgirnama*, *Maasir-i Alamgiri* and *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*.

*Basatin-us Salatin*: (Gardens of Sultans): This is a history of the Adilshahi Sultanate, with its chapters called *bustan* (garden), written by Muhammad Ibrahim Zubairi. It covers the entire Adilshahi period from its beginning in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century to its annexation by the Mughals in 1686. It was written in 1240 A.H (1824-25), a few years after the fall of the Maratha Empire. The *Muhammadnama*, Ibrahim Asad Khani's work (most probably *Haft Kursi*), *Tarikh-i-Ali* by Nurullah, *Alinama* and *Tarikh-i Iskandari* by Nusrati, Tabaqat-i Adilshahi by Shaikh Abul Hasan, and Khafi Khan's history are the author's chief authorities for Shivaji's times. For the account of Muhammad Adilshah's reign he relies mainly on *Muhammadnama* and for that of Ali Adilshah II on *Tarikh-i-Ali* and *Alinama*. For the period thereafter, he seems to have used the works of Ibrahim Asad Khani, Shaikh Abul Hasan, and Khafi Khan. The Tabaqat-i Adilshahi is not extant and some details in Basatin, not narrated in any other known work, might have been gleaned

from that work. Though not a contemporaneous work, the Basatin is a useful and, with some exceptions, generally reliable source for the life of Shivaji.

The work was translated into Marathi by Narsingrao Vitthal Parasnus at the instance of the Commissioner of Satara Division of Bombay Presidency, Bartle Frere, in 1850. I have used this Marathi translation published under the title *Vijapurchi Adilshahi* and, where necessary, the Persian text published by the Sayyidi Press, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh).

### ***Marathi:***

*Ekkyannav Kalami Chronicle (E.K. Chronicle):* This Chronicle is also known by other names such as Rayarichi Bakhar and Marathi Samrajyachi Chhoti Bakhar (Short Chronicle of the Maratha Empire).

Internal evidence shows that it was written around 1750. It has many glaring errors and often has its chronological sequence confused. It seems that it was written around 1750 or later and that the author was a descendant of a low-ranking officer in Shivaji's administration — possibly one Anaji Malkare. I have used the variorum edition of this chronicle published under the title *Shivachhatrapatinchi 91 kalami Bakhar*.

*Chitragupta Chronicle:* This is mostly an extended version of the Sabhasad Chronicle, but contains some information which the latter lacks. Some details seem to be purely imaginary. The writer is one Raghunath Yadav Chitragupta, the surname 'Chitragupta' being an assumed name; actually, his surname was Chitre. He mentions he was in the service of Sambhaji (Rajaram's son) and wrote this history at the instance of one Yashwantrao Shinde because the Sabhasad Chronicle had become corrupt in course of time. Internal evidence shows that it was written around 1762. I have used the text published in

installments under the title *Chitragupt virachit Shivaji Maharajanchi Bakhar* in the *Kavyetihas-Sangrah* magazine.

**The Tanjore Inscription:** This Marathi inscription, on the walls of the Brihadeeshwar Temple at Tanjore, has the date 13<sup>th</sup> December 1803 inscribed at the end. Its text was composed by Baburao Vitthal, secretary to Sharfoji, the Raja of Tanjore. It gives the history of the Tanjore branch of the Bhosale dynasty, which descended from Shivaji's step-brother Ekoji. But it also includes a biographical account of Shivaji, mostly based on the *Shivabharat*. I have used the text edited by V.K.Rajwade and published in installments under the title *Tanjaurcha Shilalekh* in the *Prabhat* magazine in the issues of Shaka 1828 and 1829 and also the one edited by Sambmurti Rao and published under the title *Marathi Aitihasik Shilalipi, Tanjavar ethil Brihadeeshwarache Deulantali*.

**Chitnis Chronicle:** This chronicle was written at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Malhar Ramrao Chitnis. It is mainly based on Sabhasad as well as the E. K.Chronicle. It contains numerous errors, for which reason its value as a source is very limited. I have used the Marathi text of the chronicle published under the title *Shri Shivachhatrapatinche Saptaprakaranatmak Charitra*.

**Shivadigvijay Chronicle (History of Shivaji's triumphs):** This Chronicle was written in 1818-19. The anonymous author relies mostly on the Chitnis and the E. K. Chronicles. It is full of errors and imaginary details and is almost useless as a source of Shivaji's life. I have used the text published under the title *Shrishivadidvijay* in 1895.

## *Appendix II - Sir Jadunath Sarkar's Critique of Marathi Documents of Shivaji's Times: A review*

According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, no Marathi documents contemporary with Shivaji's time can be used as a source for Shivaji's biography. This is what he says in this regard in his article 'Historical Letters Relating to Shivaji':<sup>3769</sup>

"In the Persian language many letters relating to Shivaji have been traced by me. Some of them were written by Muslim rulers either to him or to his father Shahji, some written by their secretaries to their dictation, others, though addressed to local officers by Muslim sovereigns, throw much light on the affairs of these two Maratha kings. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these letters for the historian of Shivaji. First of all, unlike most Marathi letters, these are exactly dated and thus enable us to get fixed points for reconstructing the correct chronology of Shivaji's and Shahji's careers. Secondly, they have been mostly preserved in the original and therefore cannot be said to have been tampered with by later fabricators, as many title-deeds and legal decisions about heritage in Marathi and Persian languages, fondly cherished by private families in Maharashtra, admittedly are. In the term *letters*, I include newsletters or manuscript reports of proceedings and speeches at the royal court or camp, called *akhbarat*, which are invaluable raw materials for the history of Medieval India.

Finally, these historical letters are really State-papers in the true sense of the term<sup>3770</sup> and therefore

the most valuable original sources for the historian, while the thousands of ‘Letters in Shivaji’s times’ in the Marathi language printed by Rajwade and others are merely petty land grants or succession-certificates, or partition awards, i.e. purely private legal documents, whose only connection with Shivaji is that they were written when he was administering the Pune jagir of his father or had seated himself on the throne!”

Let us examine this argument.

His first claim is that most Marathi historical documents (he is of course referring to letters from the Shivaji period, as the very title of his article is *Historical Letters Relating to Shivaji*) do not bear an accurate date. No clue is available to us to understand how he arrived at this conclusion. However, this contention is not correct: most Marathi documents from the 17<sup>th</sup> Century are precisely dated, and can actually be used as markers while deducing the chronology of events in Shivaji’s and Shahji’s careers. A survey of those documents to determine how many of them bear an exact date will establish the truth or otherwise of Sarkar’s claim. Sarkar does not provide any such survey to substantiate his statement. Nor does he claim to have undertaken such an exercise. Had he done so, he would have immediately retracted from his assertion.

Hundreds of authentic Marathi documents from this period have been published so far. Let us survey the letters published in the first and the fourteenth volumes of the fourteen-volume collection known as *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*. The reason for selecting this particular source is that it primarily deals with Marathi documents contemporaneous to Shivaji’s times. (It is here assumed that the term ‘Shivaji’s Times’ refers generally to the 17<sup>th</sup> Century.) In order to be free of a possible charge of having selected only convenient documents let us review the first and the last volumes.

Vol. I contains 92 documents. If we omit those translated from English or Persian, or those belonging to centuries other than the seventeenth — because we are considering the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, broadly, as Shivaji's times — we are left with 73 documents from this period. Of these, Nos. 25, 44, 48, 50, 61, 79 and 80 have no date on them at all. Nos. 8, 39, 46 have incomplete dates. No. 39 has the date and the month but no year. Nos. 8 and 46 have just years. No. 77 is a bilingual document, the first part in Persian, followed by text in Marathi. *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* contains only the Marathi part of the document, which has the date and the month, but not the year. The Persian part may have the complete date but let us treat it, for the time being, as incompletely dated. No. 19 is an incomplete *mahzar*; its surviving portion has the date and the month, but not the year. The portion which should have the year, in conformity with the customary format, has been lost. No. 55 is a *zabita* (regulation, ordinance) about levies to be paid by each *watandar* of the Shirval Pargana. It only has the year in the opening sentence. As per the convention, the date and the month might have been written towards the end of the document, but that part of the document is missing. We shall consider these six documents as having an incomplete date.

It will thus be clear that the remaining 60 documents (i.e. 82 % of the total) have complete dates. To sum up, of the 73 relevant documents in the first volume of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, 60 have a complete date, 6 have an incomplete date, and 7 are not dated at all.

Vol. XIV contains 44 documents of which 24 belong to the 17<sup>th</sup> Century. No. 4 is a bilingual Persian-Marathi document. Only the Persian part has a date, so we shall not consider it here. Of the remaining documents, No. 42 has no date. No. 5 has the date and the month, but not the year. The part towards the end of No. 34 is missing, and may have contained the date. No. 35 has the year, but not the date and the month. To sum up, of the 23 documents in Vol. XIV that are relevant to our inquiry, 19 (or

about 83 %) have a complete date, 2 have incomplete dates, and 2 have none.

A survey of documents belonging to the 17<sup>th</sup> Century contained in several other sources shows that most of them have complete dates. For example, 84 % of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century letters published in Vol. XV of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane* ('Sources for the History of the Marathas') have complete dates.

In other words, Sarkar's claim that most Marathi historical documents are undated, is baseless and incorrect. Moreover, the undated documents are not necessarily useless. Often, the possible period of the letter can be inferred from the text. Most letters reproduced in *Adab-i Alamgiri* and *Insha-i Haft Anjuman* — both collections of old Persian letters brought to light by Sir Jadunath Sarkar — are undated. And yet, Sarkar has relied on them for his *History of Aurangzib* and *Shivaji and His Times*. He ought to have applied the same logic and norm to Marathi documents.

Sarkar's second argument is that Marathi as well as Persian documents found in Maharashtrian family archives have been tampered with; that later generations of these families made alterations in most of the documents, whereas the Persian documents that Sarkar brought to light were original, unaltered. But nowhere does he say which documents in private archives have been altered or which ones are counterfeit. He should have backed his claim with proof. At the very least, he should have carried out a sample test and then arrived at a conclusion. Instead, he makes a sweeping statement that is contrary to research methodology.<sup>3771</sup> Sarkar has established that two Marathi documents are counterfeit.<sup>3772</sup> He also dubs another three documents as counterfeit, but does not bother to give reasons.<sup>3773</sup> A couple of counterfeit documents cannot prove that most documents in private Maharashtrian archives

are not genuine or have been altered. A few instances of alteration or forgery can be found in any archive, and Marathi archives are no exception. But their proportion is very small. For example, of the 74 documents in Vol. I of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, at least 39 are originals with seals of authorities concerned. The remaining documents could be termed as copies, but their authenticity has never been questioned. Of the 23 documents in Vol. XIV (from the 17<sup>th</sup> century), 21 are original, and two are copies. None of them is counterfeit.

Sarkar's main target is Marathi documents, but he also questions the authenticity of Persian documents in Marathi archives. To examine his stand, one may survey the documents published in the series, '*Aitihasik Farsi Sahitya*' (Historical Persian Documents). It contains 292 17<sup>th</sup> Century documents, of which 226 (77%) are originals with proper official seals and 65 are copies whose authenticity has never been doubted; only one document in the lot is spurious.<sup>3774</sup> To sum up, Sarkar's statement that many documents in the archives of Marathi families are counterfeit, is demonstrably incorrect.

Sarkar's further claim that Persian documents relating to Shivaji which he unearthed are authentic, does not bear scrutiny either. The collections of Persian letters which he brought to light (*Adab-i Alamgiri, et al*) consist of copies, not originals. The collections themselves are not originals, but copies of a copy! A major flaw therein is that the texts of most letters do not have dates. The newsletters (*akhbars*) of Aurangzeb's court are copies of extracts from the originals. Among the letters relating to Shahji and Shivaji that Sarkar unearthed, less than 30 are original and most of them are useful for Shahji's biography. As few as five could be useful for Shivaji's biography. I do not want to underestimate their significance; they are reliable and most useful. But when compared with documents unearthed by Rajwade, Sarkar tilts in favour of his own discoveries. It may be emphasized that the intention of the present exercise is only to restore the balance.

The third point which Sarkar makes is that the Persian documents discovered by him were a valuable original source for historians, whereas those published by Rajwade and others were of use only to private parties (not to Shivaji's biographers), their sole connection to Shivaji being their contemporaneity. Further, he says in the third edition of his *Shivaji and His Times* (p.407) : "The only contemporary records of Shivaji's and even Shambhuji's [Sambhaji's] times that now survive are in English and Persian, and none at all in Marathi." Then, slightly amending this statement, he remarked in the fourth and fifth editions (pp. 373 and 391 respectively) of that work: "Hence, the only *contemporary* records of a truly historical nature relating to Shivaji's and Shambhuji's [Sambhaji's] times, that now survive are in the English, Persian, Portuguese and Rajasthani languages, and none in Marathi." This is obviously an incorrect statement. In fact, most of the documents published by Rajwade and others have been authored by government officials, so it will not be correct to term them as 'private' documents. True, a majority of these documents are related to estates (*watan*) and grants (*inams*). Many state archives of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century have not survived, so most of the existing documents from Shivaji's times have been found among private archives. The families which preserved these documents were hardly interested in their value as historical resources. They were preserved because of their evidential value with regard to *Inams* and *Watans*. Most of these documents are in the nature of *Sanads* (grants), *Khurd-khats*, *Mahzars*, *niwada-patre* (arbitration awards), or the like. Since correspondence relating to political and military developments was not important for familial purposes, *Deshmukhs* and *Deshkulkarnis* were not likely to have preserved it in their archives. As a result, relatively few letters relating to political and military affairs are found in family archives.

Yet, documents about *inams* or *watans* can provide information on various matters like market prices, tax rates,

land measurement, religious beliefs, social customs and practices, and rules of inheritance. This information is useful if one delves into social and economic history. Besides, official letters about *watans* and *inams* — though not being state papers — reveal which officer was in charge of a particular province at the relevant time. Such documents also provide information about the administrative framework of Shivaji's State such as his policies about *watandars*, names of officials, and the social class they came from. Moreover, such documents do occasionally contain references to political and military developments of the period. Such references can be useful as 'corroborative evidence' for ascertaining the accuracy of information found in other sources. Sometimes they throw up completely new information. In short, the documents related to *inams* and *watans* can be extremely useful when researching political history, provided one knows how to look at them. Rajwade and other Maharashtrian historians did not take a narrow view of the scope of history. They did not understand history merely as a record of political and military affairs but believed it comprised matters of all description relating to human life: political, military, social, economic, religious.<sup>3775</sup> Therefore, they gave due importance, from a historical viewpoint, to any document of antiquity which shed light on human affairs. Yet, they did not publish anything and everything they found. Despite the discovery of thousands of documents, Rajwade and others scrutinized them and published only the select ones. If Sir Jadunath Sarkar did not find them important, it must be said that he had had a very narrow view of history.

The following examples would illustrate how Marathi documents of the time help the researcher on various aspects of Shivaji's biography.

(1) A Marathi *mahzar* dated 19<sup>th</sup> December 1625, made in the presence of Nizamshahi general Sabaji Anant, mentions Shahji as "Shahji Bhosale Adilshahi" showing that Shahji was in

Adilshahi service at the time.<sup>3776</sup> The editor of the volume in which the document was published has noticed the importance of this passing reference in the document and has commented upon it in the introduction.<sup>3777</sup>

The *Shivabharat* mentions how, during the reign of Ibrahim Adilshah, Shahji had left the Nizhamshahi Sultanate and joined Adilshahi service.<sup>3778</sup> *Paramanandakavyam*, a Sanskrit poem written shortly after Shivaji's death, has Shivaji say that Shahji had served under Ibrahim, Mohammad and Ali.<sup>3779</sup> *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, too, mentions that Shahji had served the Adilshahi Sultanate during Ibrahim Adilshah's reign.<sup>3780</sup> In a Persian letter to Ali Adilshah Shahji writes that he has served under three rulers of the Bijapur dynasty.<sup>3781</sup> Sarkar is silent on the reason why Shahji said he served three Bijapur rulers. Either it never intrigued him or he could not make sense of it. So he chose to ignore the issue. In any case, nowhere in his biography of Shahji does he mention that Shahji had served the Adilshahi during Ibrahim Adilshah's reign.<sup>3782</sup> This is a major lacuna in Sarkar's biography of Shahji. Had he taken the trouble to carefully study Marathi documents — for instance, the *mazhar* cited above — he could have avoided that error.

(2) The letter Shivaji wrote on 28<sup>th</sup> January 1646 to the officials of Khedebare is published in Vol. II of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* (letter No. 239, p. 240). Shivaji had ordered amputation of hands and feet of the *mokadam* (headman) of village Ranze for an act of misdemeanour. The letter refers to this well known incident and is the earliest among available and authentic letters of Shivaji. This letter is significant because Shivaji was all but sixteen when it was written and it bears his famous *Sanskrit* seals. Sarkar has not taken notice of this important letter.

(3) Letter Nos. 334, 335, 336, 338 in Vol. XV of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane* and letter Nos. 232, 233, 234, 236 in Vol. II of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* give information about Afzal Khan's intention to invade Jawali in 1649. No other source gives this information. Letter No. 338, written by Shivaji to Kanhoji Jedhe, also gives a fair idea of their relations. All these letters are original and authentic.

(4) Letter Nos. 87, 88 in Vol. I of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* give information on the date of death of Nilkanthrao of Purandar, and the relations between his sons, and Shahji and Shivaji. Both letters were written in 1654.

(5) Letter No. 32 dated 10<sup>th</sup> August 1649 in Vol. I of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* corroborates the elaborate account of Fath Khan's campaign against Shivaji given in the *Shivabharat*.

(6) According to the *Shivabharat*, when Shivaji set off for Javali during the Afzal Khan campaign, his general captured enemy territories and laid waste enemy towns on Shivaji's orders. Afzal Khan's letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> September 1659 to the clerks of Terdal Pargana corroborates the *Shivabharat* account. It has been published in *Shiva Charitra Pradip* (p.83). No other source refers to this retaliatory campaign against the Khan.

(7) There are a few letters which tell us how, during his campaign against Shivaji, Afzal Khan tried to wean away the *deshmukhs* of the Mavals by offering them inducements. Afzal Khan's letter dated 17<sup>th</sup> September 1659 to the officials at the Rohida fort says that Village Karanje had been awarded to Kedarji Khopde.<sup>3783</sup> It does not mention why Kedarji was rewarded, but other sources confirm that it was because he had joined the Khan. In a letter dated 30<sup>th</sup> September 1659, Afzal Khan writes to Shivaji Jedhe, a son of Kanhoji's, that instead of serving Shivaji he should join the Khan.<sup>3784</sup> In a similar letter to Vithoji Haibatrao (Silimbkar), Afzal Khan invites him to join the

campaign near Javali, and assures him that he would be well rewarded.<sup>[3785](#)</sup>

(8) Letter No. 344 in Vol. II of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* (dated 21<sup>st</sup> January 1662) was sent by Shivaji to Pilaji Nilkanthrao, the governor of Prabhavali district, showing that Shivaji had captured that district sometime before this date. Shivaji sent him another letter (No. 3 in Vol. XXI of the *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*) dated 21<sup>st</sup> April 1662. This letter, too, mentions Shivaji's expedition in the South Konkan in the previous year (i.e. 1661). It adds that the Surves of Shringarpur and Imperial officials behaved disloyally and were scattered as a result. The *Shivabharat* contains a detailed account of this campaign (which Shivaji undertook after defeating Kartalab Khan), but does not say when it happened. These two letters help in dating it.

The Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies say that Shivaji took Shringarpur on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1661. So the aforesaid letters serve as excellent corroboration for the accounts of the campaign appearing in the *Shivabharat*, and the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies.

(9) Letter No.276 dated 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1662 in Vol. XV of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane* was sent by Shivaji to Baji Sarjerao Jedhe, the *Deshmukh* of Rohidkhore. The letter warns that, according to intelligence reports, the Mughals were about to make a raid in that area. It further instructs Jedhe to "send all the subjects with their womenfolk and children to the lowlands at some secure place where they would be safe from the enemy's depredations" and that he (Jedhe) would bear the sin if the Mughals carried away any captives because of his failure to do this. Very few documents tell us of Shivaji's actions during Shayista Khan's occupation of his territory. This letter is one of them.

(10) Letter No.895 in Vol. V of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, dated Shuhur year 1068 (24<sup>th</sup> May 1667 to 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1668), is a letter of assurance sent by an officer of the Adilshah to the headman of Rahimatpur in Wai Pargana. The letter states that because of the disturbances caused by Raja Shivaji the horse fair in the town was not held for three years, but that it may now be held because the Raja has concluded a treaty with the Adilshah. This letter reflects the impact that Shivaji's raids had on the economy of the Bijapur Sultanate. Besides, it also corroborates the Jedhe Chronology, which mentions that Shivaji concluded a treaty with the Adilshah in August-September 1667. Sarkar ignored these sources, as a result of which his biography of Shivaji does not mention the treaty.

(11) Letter No.54 in Vol. VII of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, dated 15<sup>th</sup> February 1671, states that the Mughals were planning to march on Pune, so Shivaji ordered the town destroyed. It is known that a force under the command of Mughal general Daud Khan was at Junnar in April-May 1670. But no other source discloses that Shivaji had Pune destroyed before the impending attack. (Eventually Daud Khan did not march on Pune, but descended into the Konkan via Junnar.)

(12) Letter No.21 in Vol. VIII of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, dated Shuhur year 1072 (24<sup>th</sup> May 1671 to 24<sup>th</sup> May 1672), is a *zabita* (ordinance) containing Shivaji's instructions for creating a reserve fund to be utilized in the event of a Mughal invasion when money would not be available from any other source.

(13) Letter No.22 in Vol. VIII of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, dated Shuhur year (24<sup>th</sup> May 1671 to 24<sup>th</sup> May 1672), is another *zabita* with instructions that constructions on forts should only be undertaken as per plan, because if too many labourers are hired, it becomes difficult to pay them and, if they are not paid well, they would not work. The document also

informs us that Shivaji had budgeted a total of 175,000 Hons for constructions on various forts in that year.

(14) Letter No.24 in Vol. VIII of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, dated September 8 1671, was sent by Shivaji to Tuko Ram, the Governor of Prabhavali, and refers to an incident of a soldier assaulting a scribe and eventually committing suicide by stabbing himself. Shivaji remarks: " In spite of his being a Maratha he drew his sword against a Brahmin and suffered its consequence." Jivaji Vinayak, another Governor of Prabhavali, had incurred Shivaji's wrath by failing to assist the fleet with the promptitude expected of him. In a letter censuring him (dated 19<sup>th</sup> January 1675), Shivaji says: "Such servants must be pulled up. Who would spare (him) just because he is a Brahmin?" This letter has been published in the same volume (VIII) at serial number 31. These letters are certainly important as they provide information on Shivaji's personality.

(15) Letter No. 27, Vol. VIII of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1671, is addressed to the *Sarsubadar* of Kudal, in which Shivaji expresses his apprehension that prices of domestic salt having escalated, traders might import salt from Bardesh (in Portuguese-controlled territory), which in turn would affect domestic salt production. The governor is therefore advised to levy high custom duty on imported salt so as to make it costlier than domestic salt.

(16) Letter Nos. 10, 11, 15, 16 in Vol. I of *Samarth Sampradayachi Kagadpatre*, too, are useful for understanding relations between Samarth Ramdas (a saint) and Shivaji. These letters (two date from 1672, the other two from 1676) were written by Shivaji to various officials.

(17) Letter No.28, in Vol. VIII of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, dated 19<sup>th</sup> May 1673, is a circular addressed by Shivaji to the commandants of the army stationed at a village in

Chiplun district, issuing instructions about the conduct of troops. It is already quoted at length in Chapter 11. Is that letter not important?

(18) Letter No.746, dated 24<sup>th</sup> May 1674, in Vol. IV of the *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, sent by Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan to the petty officials and officers-in-charge of Wai province, quotes a petition made by one Sidoji Gangaji, a *naikwadi*, to Sharza Khan. An extract from the petition says: "Last year the enemy [Shivaji] took the above mentioned fort [Kelanja]. Gangaji Naik, my father, confronted the enemy.... He killed a few, and was himself killed in action while on duty". This letter establishes that Shivaji's forces took Kelanja sometime between May 1673 and May 1674. The *Jedhe Chronology* says that Shivaji's took Kelanja on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1674. This letter corroborates the Chronology. Further, the Chronology is silent on how the fort was taken, but the letter provides some details. The Chronology and this letter are the only sources that mention the incident.

(19) Letter No. 55 in Vol. I of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* is a *Zabita* dated Shuhur year 1075 (24<sup>th</sup> May 1674 to 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1674) about a tax, called *miras patti*, levied upon the *watandars*. This particular document records the amounts charged upon the *watandars* of Shirval Pargana. The high rates charged throw light on Shivaji's policy about the *watandars*.

(20) Some letters of the period in the *English Records on Shivaji* (Vol. II, Nos.150, 152, 159) mention Shivaji's sack of Athani in 1676. Letter Nos.362 and 363 in Vol. II of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* endorse this. Letter No.363 provides a piece of additional information that Bakaji Farzand led this raid. No.362 is a letter of assurance dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1676 given by Dattajipant Waknis to fourteen traders of Athani. These traders had been taken prisoner and detained at the Panhala fort. The letter says that the traders had promised to pay a ransom of 7,000 Hons within the next two months. Letter No.363 is a sort of promissory note, dated 17<sup>th</sup> March 1676, given by the

detained traders, committing to repay 7,000 Hons to their fellow traders in Athani who had stood surety for securing release of the detainees. These letters reveal how ransom was exacted from captured traders.

(21) A letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1676 from Shivaji to the *subadar* of Kalyan is about provision of salt for the temple at Chichwad. (Published in Vol. IV of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, Sr.No.685.) Earlier, salt-makers of Pen, Panvel and Nagothane used to supply some 30 sacks of salt, free of cost, to the temple. Deo, the resident *mahant* (chief of the mutt) of Chinchwad, had requested Shivaji to formalize this custom in a grant. Shivaji, by this letter, directed that the Pen administration itself should provide four *khandi* of salt, free of charge, to the temple every year, instead of procuring it from the people. Similarly, in earlier times, the administration used to procure for the temple commodities like rice, paddy or clarified butter at prices lower than market rates from farmers of Pavan Maval. Deo also wanted this custom to be formalized in a grant, which would have entitled the temple to buy these provisions from the public at prices lower than the market rates. But Shivaji's letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1676 to the officials in charge of Pavan Maval (published in the same Volume at Sr. No. 683) says that the people should not be burdened with such additional levies in view of inflation. (Earlier, a levy was imposed on the people to make good the loss which the treasury suffered on account of providing such items to the temple at a subsidy.) The letter says that instead of taxing the people, the administration itself should provide these supplies to the temple, even though it caused loss to the treasury. Thereby, the burden of subsidizing the temple was shifted to the government. Letter No. 684, in the same volume, was sent to the *subadar* of Junnar. It contains similar instructions for procuring supplies for the Chinchwad temple from Pavan Maval and Nane Maval. These letters reveal Shivaji's policies regarding taxation and temples.

(22) Shivaji's policy of encouraging agriculture is well illustrated in his letter of 5<sup>th</sup> September 1676 to the *Subadar* of Prabhavali division which is already quoted at length in Chapter 11. The letter says much about Shivaji's policy *vis-à-vis* peasants and the waiver for debts. He waives tax arrears, but makes it conditional on bringing barren land under cultivation and the government profiting by the increased revenue. He does not presume that a waiver would automatically achieve the twin objectives (bankrupt farmers resuming cultivation and the increase in revenue). His policy contemplates a freeze on recovery in the first stage, to be followed by a waiver only after results are seen.

(23) The text of a letter written by Shivaji to Ekoji (c. January 1678) has been published in *Tanjavarache Rajgharane* (pp.36-39). A photograph of the original letter was later published in the magazine *Itihas Sangraha* (Vol. VII, Nos. I-III). It contains valuable information on relations between Shivaji and Ekoji, the Gingee expedition, their meeting and Ekoji's attack on Shivaji's forces after Shivaji left for Raigad. Other sources too corroborate the contents of the letter.

(24) Letter Nos. 33 to 36, Vol. VIII of *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, were written by Shivaji in 1677. They tell us of the salaries of various officials on forts.

(25) Letter Nos. 733 and 735, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1678 and 26<sup>th</sup> March 1679 respectively, in Vol. IV of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, were sent by Shivaji to the governor of Kudal. They shed light on relations between Shivaji and the saintly Mounibava of Patgaon.

(26) Letter No. 340, in Vol. XV of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, dated Shuhur year 1079 (24<sup>th</sup> May 1678 to 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1679), was sent by Shivaji's Minister for Land Revenue, Anaji Datto, to revenue officials of Rohidkhore. It is invaluable for

understanding the system of assessment of tax on agriculture under Shivaji's rule.

(27) Letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> January 1679 (Sr. No. 43, Vol. VI of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*) was sent by Abdul Kadir Miyana to the *Desai* of Kopal. It reveals that the fort then belonged to the Adilshah. But the letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> March 1679 from Anto Hemadri, the revenue official of Kopal, to the commandant of the fort at Kopal (Sr. No. 44 in the same volume of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*) states that the fort had been captured by Shivaji. The next letter (Sr. No. 45) is from Moro Trimal, the *Peshwa*, addressed to the commandant of the fort. It is dated 15<sup>th</sup> March 1679 and also shows that the fort had come into Shivaji's possession. These letters corroborate entries in the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies which mention that the fort had passed into Shivaji's hands on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1679.

(28) In Letter No. 72, Vol. VI of *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya*, dated 28<sup>th</sup> April 1679, Shivaji directs the revenue officials of Bankapur to continue the village of Saunshi as a grant to Kenchangauda, the *desai* of Lakshmeshvar Pargana, but that before handing over the charge of the village to him, the fortification there should be demolished from its foundation. *Deshmukhs* and other feudal lords habitually tarried in depositing the whole of the revenue amount collected by them in the government treasury. They retained a large part of it, on the strength of which they built fortifications, hired private militia and became unruly. Sabhasad says Shivaji rescinded their hereditary grants and began paying fixed salaries in cash or in grain. He also laid down a rule that they should not build fortified houses. Existing fortifications were either pulled down or converted into military garrisons.<sup>3786</sup> Is this letter, which corroborates Shivaji's policy about *watandars* described in the Sabhasad Chronicle, not important?

(29) Letter No. 2236 in Vol. II of *Shivakalin-Patrasar-Sangraha* was written by Shivaji to Ekoji (c. March 1680). It

touches upon events like Diler Khan's campaign against the Adilshah, Shivaji's incursions into Mughal territories to help the Adilshah, his raid on Jalnapur, Diler Khan's retreat, Sambhaji's return to his father from the Mughal camp, among other subjects.

(30) Having learnt that Ekoji had become melancholy and dejected, Shivaji wrote him a letter, "full of energy and good sense", exhorting him to cast away such thoughts from his mind. The letter is published in *Tanjavarche Rajgharane*, pp. 42-43. It is undated, but apparently it was written post-1678, after Shivaji's return from Gingee. It is already quoted in Chapter 18. It succinctly reveals Shivaji's view of life.

It will be seen that reference to as many as 54 letters has been made in the 30 examples stated above. One of them is related to Shahji; the others inform us about various aspects of the life and times of Shivaji such as his personality, his relations with various persons, his civil and military administration, his policies about *watandars* and peasants, or military expeditions undertaken by him or related to him. This was not an exhaustive overview. There are several other Marathi letters which constitute a valid source for a biography of Shivaji. These were just a few instances.

Of these 54 letters, 43 are originals and 11 are copies. Of the 43 original letters, 30 bear complete dates, 5 have partial dates and 8, no dates at all. All the letters which bear complete dates are authentic. But Sarkar has not used any of these letters for his biography of Shivaji.

He mentions *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, (Vols. VIII to XXVI), *Shiv-Charitra-Sahitya* (Vols. I to IX), *Shivakalin-Patrasar-Sangraha* (Vols. I to III), *Shiva Charitra Pradip*, et al, in the list of sources in his biography of Shivaji.<sup>3787</sup> He says he has "considered it necessary in the interests of historical truth to give every fact, however small, about him [Shivaji] that has been

ascertained on unimpeachable evidence and to discuss the probabilities of others.”<sup>3788</sup> He also assures us that he has made “exhaustive and minute use of the available sources, both printed and MS. — in Persian, English, Marathi and Hindi, as well as the Dutch Records in the India Office, London.”<sup>3789</sup> In actual fact, however, he has hardly used a dozen Marathi documents for his biography of Shivaji.<sup>3790</sup> Whatever Sir Jadunath Sarkar may claim or believe, he has overlooked several Marathi documents which have a bearing on our understanding of Shivaji.

This disdain for Marathi documents has led to several errors in Sarkar’s work. Here are a few instances:

- (1) Shahji had switched over to the Adilshah during the reign of Ibrahim Adilshah. Sarkar does not mention this.
- (2) During Afzal Khan’s expedition against Shivaji, Maratha forces had made an incursion into Adilshahi territory. Sarkar’s work does not mention this.
- (3) Sarkar does not mention Shivaji’s treaty with the Adilshah concluded in 1667.
- (4) In all the five editions of his biography, Sarkar states that fort Kondhana was renamed ‘Sinhgad’ after Tanaji Malusare, Shivaji’s lieutenant, who wrested it back from the Mughals.<sup>3791</sup> This is a misconception. The force led by Tanaji recaptured the fort on 4<sup>th</sup> February 1670, but he himself was killed in this assault.<sup>3792</sup> In a letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1663, sent by Shivaji to Moro Trimal, the *Peshwa*, and Nilo Sondeo, the *Muzumdar*, he mentions the fort by the name ‘Sinhgad’ four times.<sup>3793</sup> This was seven years before Tanaji’s death. No historical source says that Kondhana was renamed Sinhgad

after Tanaji's fatal exploit. This myth originated in a popular Marathi novel by H. N. Apte (*Gad Aala Pan Sinh Gela*), the first edition of which was published in 1904. Somehow, Sarkar might have heard of it and included it in his (historical) biography of Shivaji as a fact. *Unimpeachable evidence* indeed!

(5) Sarkar says Marathas plundered Athani in April 1976.<sup>3794</sup> He is misinformed. A letter of assurance, granted by Dattaji Waknis to 14 traders who had been taken prisoner during the raid, is dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1676.<sup>3795</sup> It is an authentic document that says these traders were captured at Athani and detained on Panhala. It follows that the raid on Athani must have taken place prior to 14<sup>th</sup> March 1676. Sarkar got it wrong because he did not take this letter of assurance into consideration. Nor did he consider even contemporary English documents which refer to this raid. An English letter dated 13<sup>th</sup> March 1676, sent to Surat from the Rajapur factory, mentions that Shivaji had plundered Athani.<sup>3796</sup> Therefore, the raid must have occurred even before 13<sup>th</sup> March. So this is Sir Jadunath's "exhaustive and minute use of the available sources, both printed and MS. — in Persian, English, Marathi and Hindi"!

Sarkar had a general knowledge of Marathi. But the Marathi documents from Shivaji's times are in the *Modi* script (a cursive form of the Marathi *Devanagari* script), of which Sarkar had no knowledge.<sup>3797</sup> Hence, he could not have, ordinarily, read original Marathi documents. But the texts of the documents edited by Rajwade and others have been published in *Devanagari* and Sarkar could very well have read them. Persian words were abundant in 17<sup>th</sup> Century Marathi, and Sarkar knew Persian. Yet, rudimentary knowledge of Marathi is not enough for understanding these documents because:

(1) Punctuation marks were not used in old Marathi writing. No spaces are left between sentences and words. Even

published texts of historical Marathi documents are, generally, printed without punctuation, which can lead to misinterpretation.

(2) Some *Modi* characters look quite similar and therefore *Devanagari* transliteration of *Modi* documents often contains errors. The researcher who knows *Modi* can correct them, but one who does not, will not be able to do so.

(3) Arabic and Persian words in old Marathi documents often appear in corrupted forms. Many such words are now obsolete in Marathi.

(4) In certain cases, words that are current even in modern Marathi have different meanings in old Marathi.

It would be possible to understand the gist of a document even if one does not have knowledge of 17<sup>th</sup> Century Marathi; but such surmising is not enough to understand it fully for the purpose of researching history. And when one is dealing with thousands of such documents, such laboured reading would not suffice. The documents have to be perused and re-read several times to grasp their meaning and to perceive interconnections between them. This task is undoubtedly arduous but if one intends to use these documents, unavoidable. It can be most frustrating for a beginner.

One wonders if Sir Jadunath Sarkar had ever tried to read at least the *Devanagari* transliterations of *Modi* documents. Had he read them, he would not have said that no *contemporary* Marathi records of a truly historical nature from Shivaji's times exist. Such documents do indeed exist and were known even when Sarkar made this audacious statement. He studied neither the original *Modi* documents, nor their texts published in *Devanagari*. Since he was not capable of using Marathi documents, he simply trashed them. Sour grapes!

Sarkar claims in the first and the second editions of *Shivaji and His Times* that he made “exhaustive and minute” use of available sources, both printed and manuscripts, in Persian, English, Marathi and Hindi. Historian D. V. Potdar remarked that it was against the scientific temper for a researcher and historian of Sarkar’s stature to claim without any qualms that he had dealt with all Marathi sources despite his ignorance of Marathi or *Modi*. Commenting on this, Sarkar says in a letter he wrote to G. S. Sardesai on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1930 that, apart from the published texts and the manuscript of the Jedhe Chronology, no *Modi* manuscripts were available. He also says that he considers thousands of other private *Modi* papers – awards, grants, etc – as unusable, so his inability to decipher *Modi* presented no difficulty. One wonders, however, how Sarkar judged these unpublished manuscripts as useless when he could not read them in the first place?

Sarkar learnt Marathi at an advanced age, which was admirable. The intention here is not to mock him. Nevertheless, since he says there are no contemporaneous Marathi documents pertaining to Shivaji’s life, one needs to examine his knowledge of Marathi. The following examples from his translation of the Jedhe Chronology would illustrate that his knowledge of the language was rudimentary at best.

(1) An entry in the Jedhe Chronology says: “Aurangzeb decided to wrest away Bidar from Adilshah, and came to Bidar.”<sup>3798</sup> The Marathi word used here is ‘*tah*’, which Sarkar translates as ‘treaty’, and hence his version (incorrectly) reads: “Aurangzeb makes a treaty with Adilshah for taking Bidar and comes to Bidar.”<sup>3799</sup> In modern Marathi, *tah* indeed means a treaty between two states. But in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, it meant a ‘decision’ or ‘resolve.’

(2) The entry in the Jedhe Chronology related to Afzal Khan’s killing says that Khandoji Khopda was taken prisoner

and punished by the Raja (Shivaji).<sup>3800</sup> Sarkar's version is "Khandoji Khopda was captured alive and was put to death."<sup>3801</sup> He translated the phrase '*shast karne*' as 'to execute, to put to death' when, in fact, it means 'to punish'.

(3) Another entry in the Jedhe Chronology says: "Shivaji himself raided Shaista Khan in Pune. The Khan lost his hand. Then he fled. His son Abdul Fateh was killed. When Shivaji (had) entered Lal Mahal, Chandji Naik, the son of Kanhoji Naik, was with him during the battle."<sup>3802</sup> Sarkar mixes up the sequence of events in his translation of the last sentence in the extract from the Jedhe Chronology. He says: "Shivaji then entered the Lal Mahal. Chandji Nayak, son of Kanhoji Nayak, was with him during the campaign"<sup>3803</sup> His version implies that Shivaji entered the Lal Mahal *after* the Khan's hand was severed and his son killed. In reality, these events took place after Shivaji and his men had forced an entry into the Lal Mahal.

(4) Another entry in the Jedhe Chronology refers to the siege of the Salher fort. Sarkar translates it as "Moropant with forces raised the siege laid on the ridge of Salher and captured the fort."<sup>3804</sup> He has it completely wrong: Salher was in the possession of Shivaji's men; there was no question of Moropant capturing it. The Mughals had invested it. Moropant attacked the Mughals from outside to break the siege, and then reinforced the garrison.<sup>3805</sup> Sarkar mistranslates the Marathi word for 'reinforcement' as 'capture'.

(5) The Jedhe Chronology also refers to Moropant's raid on Nasik. It says that Moropant plundered Nasik and took prisoner Vikram Shah, the Raja of Jawhar, and Siddi Fakir, the Mughal Faujdar.<sup>3806</sup> Sarkar's translation reads: "Moropant Peshwa looted Nasik. Vikram Shah, the ruler of Jawhar was there. He and Siddi Fakir, the Mughal *Faujdar* were plundered and victory

was gained.”<sup>3807</sup> The Jedhe Chronology does not say that they were plundered.

Sarkar commits such blunders despite the fact that the Marathi of the Chronology is relatively simple. Faced with other 17<sup>th</sup> Century Marathi documents, he would have been quite out of his depth. His knowledge of modern Marathi was not perfect either. One may overlook this handicap, considering that it was not his mother tongue. But the above examples belie his claim to proficiency in Marathi. In spelling Shivaji’s name, he commits an even more egregious mistake. In some places he writes the name of the Maratha king as ‘Shiva’, omitting the last syllable. He probably believed ‘ji’ to be a deferential suffix that could be retained or removed at will. Persian and Urdu sources often contemptuously refer to Shivaji as ‘Siva’; it was a deliberate distortion of the name. *Shivaji* was one single name.

The fact of the matter is this. Sir Jadunath Sarkar had really not studied the sources for Shivaji’s biography (in particular, Marathi documents) in any depth. He had not set out to write Shivaji’s biography at all. Shivaji caught his fancy while he was working on the biography of Aurangzeb. While researching Aurangzeb, he had gathered some information (mostly from Persian sources) on Shivaji and decided to utilize it. He added some more tit bits to this material and churned out his biography of Shivaji. In a letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> November 1946 to Dr. Raghubir Sinh of Seetamau, Sarkar says: “Aurangzib is my life work; Shivaji is only an incidental off-shoot of it.”<sup>3808</sup> As a consequence, his research on Shivaji was half baked. While he ignored Marathi sources, he did not do justice to Persian sources on Shivaji either. He used Marathi sources only as a formality. By finding imaginary faults in Marathi documents (they are fake / undated / not state papers / altered) he conveniently shunned the labour which their study would have rightly entailed.

## **Appendix III - Shivaji and Saints**

### *Did Saints Prepare the Ground for the Advent of Shivaji?*

A people not unified by indigenous philosophical inspiration would easily fall prey to an alien proselytizing religion like Islam. Literature pertaining to the philosophy and teachings of any persuasion forms the bedrock on which its edifice is built. The religious scripture and literature of the Hindus was in Sanskrit, which few even among Brahmins could understand. By rendering certain portions of it into Marathi and thus making it accessible to all, as also by creating their own devotional compositions, many men and women of saintly disposition in Maharashtra contributed substantially to a rejuvenation of the Hindu religion. This religious revival was not limited to the Brahmins or 'upper' castes but touched all strata of Hindu society; even those who were then regarded as 'untouchables' came under its sway. But for this wholesome influence, this section of Hindu society, deprived as it was of even basic human rights, would easily have succumbed to the temptation of embracing an alien faith. And who could have blamed them?

However, the profusely spiritual but essentially apolitical Hindu philosophy predominantly concerned itself with emancipation of the soul rather than emancipation from alien and oppressive rule. As such, this religious revival contained nothing that promoted political aspirations of the people or their desire for liberation from Muslim rule.<sup>3809</sup> Some scholars have imagined that there was a great political awakening in Maharashtra, prior to the rise of Shivaji, as a result of the work done by saints.<sup>3810</sup> Not an iota of evidence exists to presuppose that anything like this happened. Save for a few isolated

examples, no one was willing to fight for the protection of their temples — the very symbols of their religion, not to speak of political independence. Thousands flocked to places of pilgrimage when their Muslim masters allowed them to do so, of course for a fee, but no one resisted or even protested when the temples at Kashi and Mathura, Tryambakeshwar and Pandharpur, were demolished. Afzal Khan destroyed or desecrated a number of temples, obviously without bothering about the reaction of the Hindus in his service. He must have known he could do so with impunity. The destruction of Afzal Khan and his army was an event so unprecedented and momentous that it must have caused Shivaji's name to resound throughout Maharashtra, if not the whole of India. Had such an awakening indeed occurred, we should have found the ripples of that event spreading to other places in the country and inspiring like resistance to Muslim rule. For instance, we might have heard that the people at Satara refused to pay revenue, or a government outpost at Pandharpur was attacked by a mob, or a government courier was intercepted at Phaltan. Not a single incident of this nature finds mention in the mass of documents discovered so far; on the contrary, there is abundant evidence to show that people everywhere were as submissive as ever. The revolution which Shivaji carried out goes with him; it never precedes him.

It may be asked how Shivaji won a following if there was no political awakening in Maharashtra. The answer is that where even petty rebels could get adherents without any kind of political revival, it could not have been too difficult for Shivaji with his magnetic personality, and appeal of his cause, to get a following at the beginning of his career, especially with the base he enjoyed in the shape of his father's *jagir*. And once it became evident that he cared for his own men and led them to extraordinary success, men naturally flocked to his banner. And, if a political awakening had occurred at all, it did not anticipate him; it was created by him. It may be asked, if the Hindu religion survived a few hundred years of bigoted rule

without any political stirring whatsoever, why could it not have survived indefinitely without Shivaji? The answer is that there already was a trickle which was draining out of the vast masses of Hindu society. This could not have continued indefinitely. Under the rule of a more fanatic and determined ruler like Aurangzeb, this trickle would soon have become a torrent and India would have suffered the same fate as did Iran or Afghanistan.

A man of Shivaji's ability was bound to rise as a leader of men in whatever conditions he was placed. The saints of Maharashtra did play a role in the fact that he did so as a leader of the Hindus, because, but for them, it is doubtful whether the Hindus would have retained their vast numerical superiority. But, beyond this, they do not seem to have played any part whatsoever in his *political* advent, and he cannot be said to have been an inevitable outcome of their teachings and work. It must be remembered that the caste system, too, had an important role in preventing Hindus from deserting their religion in large numbers. Caste gave one a sense of belonging. To become an outcaste was a fate worse than death. Therefore, it acted as a firewall and dissuaded a person from apostasy, for to forsake one's religion was to forsake one's caste, unless a large number from a caste joined together in conversion. The caste system, it needs to be noted, had also penetrated into the Muslim and Christian societies in India.

Feuds among Muslim states and their numerical inferiority forced Muslim rulers to employ Hindus in their civil and military services in large numbers.<sup>3811</sup> This must equally have proved beneficial to Shivaji by providing him trained manpower for both these departments of administration. And the most important circumstantial factor in the advent of Shivaji was the base provided him by his father in his *jagir*. Perhaps it was his father, who had once measured swords against the might of the Mughal Empire as the virtual ruler of

the Nizamshahi Sultanate, which might have been the guiding star for the young Shivaji.

### *Shivaji's Personal Relations with Saints*

Some of the saints who lived in Shivaji's time and find mention in contemporaneous documents are noticed below.

#### *Tukaram*

Shivaji came to Pune with his mother around 1642 and Tukaram, a renowned exponent of the *Varkari* (or *Bhagvat*) cult who lived in the nearby village of Dehu, passed away in 1650. It is quite possible that Shivaji might have met the saint sometime during these eight years, but there is no contemporaneous record of such a meeting. Later date sources narrate some apocryphal stories about the relations between Tukaram and the young Shivaji. One, recounted in the Chitnis Chronicle, is briefly as follows:

Once Shivaji, attended by only two servants, went from Sinhagad to attend a *kirtan*<sup>3812</sup> delivered by the saint at Pune. Learning of this, the Muslim commander of a nearby garrison sent a body of 2,000 Pathans who surrounded the house in which the *kirtan* was being held. The saint, unruffled, prayed for the intervention of Panduranga (an incarnation of Vishnu) and continued with his *kirtan*. Meanwhile God himself, appearing in the form of Shivaji, rode out of the house. The deceived Pathans gave chase, were lured into a forest and destroyed by Panduranga. Shivaji returned to Sinhagad after the *kirtan* was over.<sup>3813</sup>

#### *Ramdas*

Ramdas, usually known as 'Samarth' in the Ramdasi cult which he founded, propagated the worship of Rama. That

Shivaji held him in great reverence is proved by the facts that: (i) The Ramdasi order was the greatest beneficiary of religious grants endowed by Shivaji.<sup>3814</sup> (ii) Two of Shivaji's letters dated 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1672 have survived which order the commanders of Mahipatgad and Sajjangad forts to let Ramdas reside there and also to look after him well.<sup>3815</sup> This privilege is not known to have been granted to any other person. (iii) Ramdas is mentioned in these two letters in reverential terms reserved only for deity and greatly respected persons.<sup>3816</sup>

While some scholars have suggested that Ramdas was Shivaji's political mentor, some have even gone to the extent of asserting that Shivaji was but an instrument in the hands of Ramdas<sup>3817</sup> All these suggestions and assertions do not have even a shred of contemporaneous evidence to support them.<sup>3818</sup> What they have, instead, is a mass of later date chronicles ascribing supernatural powers to Ramdas (mostly written by members of the Ramdasi cult) and a few fabricated documents forged to support claims on grants. One may cite a letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> September 1678, for instance, purportedly addressed by Shivaji to Ramdas.<sup>3819</sup> This blatant fabrication reminds one of the infamous and fraudulent 'Donation of Constantine'. Almost every sentence in the document smacks of forgery. It is, of course, referred to in the Chronicle of Ramdas, written by a certain Hanuman in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century, which is nothing but a narrative of miracle after miracle, such as raising of the dead, supposed to have been performed by Ramdas.<sup>3820</sup> A Chronology, known as the *Wakenishi Tipan*, which is nothing but a summary of that Chronicle, may also be cited.<sup>3821</sup> It has been asserted by some on the strength of this fraudulent Chronology that Shivaji had met Ramdas in as early as 1649. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The meeting between Shivaji and Ramdas probably took place at a much later

date.[3822](#) However, this is not to doubt that Shivaji, who was a devout person, held the saint in great reverence as mentioned above, just as he did a few others. Ramdas is also credited by some to have formally initiated Shivaji into spiritualism (*anugraha*).[3823](#) Perhaps he might have. But then, he was not the only one to do so. For instance, Narayan Deo of Chinchvad is also credited to have done the same according to what is stated in the *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, a far more reliable source.[3824](#)

Ramdas rejoiced at Shivaji's success and the poems he composed eulogizing him pay the best tribute to the Maratha King.[3825](#)

### *Maunibava of Patgaon*

Little is known about Maunibava, who lived at Patgaon, a village in the present Kolhapur District. Shivaji had made certain grants to him and had met the holy man at Patgaon in 1678, as mentioned in Shivaji's own letter.[3826](#)

### *Narayan Deo of Chinchvad*

A disciple of Ganesha, he lived at Chinchvad, a few kilometers from Pune. Shivaji's reverence for him is already mentioned elsewhere.

## **Appendix IV - Birth Date of Shivaji**

The controversy which had raged over Shivaji's birth date has finally been settled, with all among the present generation of scholars agreeing upon Falgun Vadya 3, Shaka 1551, corresponding to 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630, as the correct date. A brief account of the debate is given below for those who might be interested in the subject.

The E. K. Chronicle gives Shivaji's birth date as Monday, Vaishakh Shuddha 5, Shaka 1549, the year by name *Kshaya*.<sup>3827</sup> If we ignore the name of the year, the date would correspond with 9<sup>th</sup> April 1627. The first objection against this date is that the name of the year does not correspond with the Shaka year. Secondly, the chronicle's description of the circumstances at the time of Shivaji's birth does not correspond with the date. These were, according to the chronicle, as follows: 'While Shahji was in the fort of Mahuli, his father-in-law Jadhavrao, as a Mughal general, laid siege to that fort. Shahji broke out of the siege with his expecting wife Jijabai but was pursued by Jadhavrao. During his flight, Shahji was compelled to leave his wife behind. Her father, Jadhavrao, came up with her and escorted her to the Shivneri fort where soon afterwards she gave birth to Shivaji.' This is what the chronicle tells us. However, Mahuli was a Nizamshahi fort and, in 1627, Shahji was in the service of the Adilshah.<sup>3828</sup> He was indeed besieged in the fort of Mahuli, but that was in 1636 when Jadhavrao, having been murdered in 1629, was not alive.<sup>3829</sup> But even if we disregard the circumstances narrated in the chronicle, the birth date of Shivaji it gives is implausible. There is no doubt whatsoever that Shivaji was born at Shivneri. As Shahji was in Adilshahi service in 1627, there is no possibility that he could have left his wife in a

Nizamshahi fort like Shivneri when the two Sultanates were at war with each other.

The Chitnis Chronicle gives Thursday, Vaishakh Shuddha 2, Shaka 1549, the year by name *Prabhava* as Shivaji's birth date.<sup>3830</sup> The date corresponds with 7<sup>th</sup> April 1627, but it was a Friday, not Thursday. Besides, the circumstances at the time of Shivaji's birth, as described in the chronicle, were similar to those narrated in the E. K. Chronicle. It may also be noted that both the chronicles were written long after Shivaji's death and are full of errors.

There is a plethora of other later date sources which give Shaka 1549 as the year of Shivaji's birth with other details as in the E. K. or Chitnis Chronicles.<sup>3831</sup> But it is evident that all of them have copied the date from one of these two chronicles and cannot be regarded as independent sources. But, for want of any other evidence, historians were forced to accept either of the dates given in these two chronicles.

The Jedhe Chronology, which Lokamanya Tilak brought to public notice in 1916, gives Friday, Falgun Vadya 3, Shaka 1551, the year named *Shukla* — corresponding to 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630 — as the date of Shivaji's birth.<sup>3832</sup> It also gives precise references to some other astronomical details that perfectly correspond with each other. It was further noticed that almost all the other entries in the Chronology are correct. This new date amazed academia of the time because it was completely different from those given by any source that was then available.

Then, about 1918, S. M. Divekar found a Tamil manuscript in the Saraswati Mahal Palace Library at Tanjore which, too, gives Falgun Vadya 3, Shaka 1551 as the date of Shivaji's birth. On further investigation, he discovered that the manuscript was a translation of an epic in Sanskrit, which

he called the *Shivabharat*, and traced copies of it in the same library.<sup>3833</sup> This epic, which was written at the behest of Shivaji and was found to be extremely reliable, also gives Shivaji's birth date as Falgun Vadya 3, Shaka 1551.<sup>3834</sup>

Thus began a controversy about the date of Shivaji's birth and, every year, two separate functions were held to commemorate the event.

Soon afterwards, Gaurishankar Hirachand Ojha, an erudite historian, found a horoscope chart of Shivaji in a private collection of horoscopes owned by a well known astrologer family of Beawar in Rajasthan. This chart, too, gives Friday, Falgun Vadya 3, Vikram Samvat 1686 (i.e. Shaka 1551) as the birth date. His article about the discovery was published in the August 1925 issue of the Hindi magazine *Sudha*.<sup>3835</sup> Two more horoscope charts of Shivaji came to light subsequently: one found in a private collection at Baneda in Rajasthan in 1930 and the second, in the Anup Sanskrit Library at Bikaner in 1935.<sup>3836</sup> The dates given in these correspond with 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630. A comparison of these three horoscopes shows that none was copied from the other two; all three are independent and correct in their astronomical details.<sup>3837</sup>

In 1966, the Government of Maharashtra appointed a committee of seven historians to determine the correct birth date of Shivaji. Five of these gave their opinion that 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630 was the correct date. The remaining two stated that they were in favour of continuing with the traditionally accepted date since, in their opinion, no conclusive evidence for 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630 was available.<sup>3838</sup> Had the committee tabled a resolution to adopt 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630 as the correct date, it would undoubtedly have been

carried since five of its members were in favour of that date. Instead, they chose merely to submit their opinions in their report and leave the decision to the government who, as could only be expected, maintained a status quo. So Vaishakh Shudhha 2, Shaka 1549 continued to figure in all text books issued by the government. Thus it came about that all historians who had any knowledge of the subject continued to declare that Falgun Vadya 3, Shaka 1551 (19<sup>th</sup> February 1630) was the correct birth date while history teachers in school were compelled to teach their students that Vaishakh Shudhha 2, Shaka 1549 (7<sup>th</sup> April 1627) was the date of the event. This ridiculous situation came to an end in the year 2000 when the Government of Maharashtra accepted 19<sup>th</sup> February 1630 as the true birth date.

## **Appendix V - Shivaji's Family**

### ***Shahji's Consorts and Children***

The names of two of Shahji's wives are known. His elder wife Jijabai, Shivaji's mother, was the daughter of Lukhji Jadhavrao. Sambhaji was Jijabai's elder son.<sup>3839</sup> His birth date is not recorded in any reliable source, nor is the exact date of his death known. However, it seems from available sources that he died during the Kanakgiri Campaign in 1654.<sup>3840</sup>

Shahji's younger wife Tukabai bore him a son called Ekoji.<sup>3841</sup> He was younger in age than Shivaji.<sup>3842</sup> The Jedhe Chronology says he died in the month of Pausha of Shaka 1606 (27<sup>th</sup> December 1684 to 24<sup>th</sup> January 1685) in Tanjore.<sup>3843</sup>

Shahji had some sons born out of wedlock, among whom Santaji, Bhivji, Pratapji and Hiroji may be mentioned.<sup>3844</sup> It would be remembered that Hiroji lay in bed in place of Shivaji when the latter escaped from Agra. Santaji, who was with Ekoji, joined Shivaji during the Karnataka expedition. He was younger than Shivaji.<sup>3845</sup> Bhivji and Pratapji, too, were with Ekoji and were taken prisoner when Ekoji attacked Maratha forces in the Karnataka after Shivaji's departure for Raigad.

### ***Shivaji's Wives and Children***

Shivaji had eight wives.<sup>3846</sup> The eldest, Saibai, hailed from the Nimbalkar family.<sup>3847</sup> She bore him his eldest son, Sambhaji, in the Purandar fort on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1657.<sup>3848</sup> She died

on 5<sup>th</sup> September 1659.<sup>3849</sup> Shivaji's younger son Rajaram was born to Soyrabai on 24<sup>th</sup> February 1670 on Rajgad.<sup>3850</sup> Shivaji also had six daughters who were married into Maratha families.<sup>3851</sup> One of his wives, Putalabai, performed the rite of *sati* after Shivaji's death.<sup>3852</sup>

Some commentators aver that Shivaji's multiple matrimonial alliances had political motives, such as uniting leading Maratha families in the common cause of self rule.<sup>3853</sup> There is no denying the fact that examples abound in history of marriages among nobility with this motive, but that should not mean that *every* such matrimonial alliance was made for political reasons alone. No evidence exists to establish that Shivaji's marriages had such motive or that he gained politically by them. Nor is it sound reasoning to claim that every act committed by Shivaji necessarily had political overtones. Polygamy was common in those times. When even a petty *deshmukh* like Kanhoji Jedhe could have five wives, it should astonish none that Shivaji had eight.<sup>3854</sup> It must, however, be conceded that few records, if any at all, exist to show that other contemporaries of Shivaji also had as many as eight wives. But it must be remembered that Shivaji had become a legend in his own time and, as a famous personality, then as now, much more information about him came to be written down and researched. Others, not as great as Shivaji, might well have escaped like attention.

Shivaji was succeeded by his son Sambhaji. In 1682, Aurangzeb himself arrived in the Deccan to direct the campaign against him. He laid siege to and captured Bijapur, the walled capital of the Adilshahi Sultanate, in 1686. Sikandar Adilshah was taken prisoner and the Sultanate was annexed to the Mughal Empire. The Emperor captured the fort of Golconda in the following year. Abul Hasan Qutbshah was taken into

captivity and that Sultanate, too, became a province of the Empire. Sambhaji was taken prisoner in a surprise raid at Sangameshwar in 1689. He was paraded through the Imperial camp in a humiliating manner, his eyes were gouged out and he was executed after a few days. Undeterred, the Marathas raised Rajaram to the throne at Raigad. Not long afterwards, the Mughals laid siege to that fort, too. Rajaram, with a few followers, escaped and went to Gingee to continue the struggle from there. Raigad fell to the Mughals and Sambhaji's widow, Yesubai, was taken prisoner along with her son Shahu. Rajaram died in 1700 and his widow, Tarabai, took over the reins of the Maratha kingdom in the name of her son, Shivaji II, and prosecuted resistance to the Mughal invasion resolutely. Aurangzeb, unable to subdue the Marathas for all of the quarter of a century that he chose to remain in the Deccan since 1682, could never return to north India and died a frustrated man near Ahmednagar in 1707. Soon afterwards, Shahu was released by the Mughals in the hope of setting him against Tarabai. Yesubai remained in Mughal captivity till 1719 when Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath's diplomacy prevailed and he secured her release.

## **Appendix VI - Shivaji's Literacy**

In his History of the Mahrattas, Grant Duff says:

“Marathas seldom can write and read; they consider all such learning the business of a karkoon [clerk], and if not degrading, at least undignified. Shivaji could never write his name, but he was a good archer and marksman, skilled in the use of the spear, and of the various swords and daggers common in the Deccan.”<sup>3855</sup>

Duff may be correct in saying that literate Marathas were a rarity among the laity, since literacy rates in India were indeed low in those times. However, he offers no evidence to prove that Shivaji, too, was illiterate. Perhaps he had no evidence, but found it difficult to avoid the temptation of making a sensational statement.

In pre-British Maharashtra, Brahmins and Prabhus were the two ‘scribe’ castes, in that their calling required them to be literate. But that does not necessarily imply that other communities had no literate members. Santaji Jagnade, a disciple of the saintly Tukaram belonged to the *Teli* (oil seller) caste; yet a compilation of Tukaram’s verses in Jagnade’s handwriting is extant. A note may be found therein saying, “In the handwriting of Santaji *Teli* Jagnade Town of Chakan.”<sup>3856</sup> The Chronicle of the Deshpandes of Khedebare, written by a contemporary of Shivaji, we find a reference to a member of the *Kunbi* (peasant) caste who could not only read and write, but was even employed as a clerk.<sup>3857</sup> These are examples from the commoners. Many instances may be found of members of non-Brahmin gentry being literate. Handwritings of members of non-Brahmin noble families like Rajaram, his queen Tarabai,

Shahu, Sambhaji (Rajaram's son), Malharrao Holkar, Mahadji Shinde and Ahilyabai Holkar are extant; it may be noted that the last one of these was a woman.<sup>3858</sup> So a statement as sensational as 'the son of nobleman Shahji was illiterate' should be backed by ample irrefutable evidence, which Grant Duff fails to provide.<sup>3859</sup>

Jadunath Sarkar, too, held Shivaji was illiterate. He writes:

"The weight of evidence is in favour of the view that Shivaji was unlettered, like three other heroes of medieval India, — Akbar, Haidar Ali, and Ranjit Singh. The many Europeans who visited him never saw him write anything; when they presented any petition to him the Rajah always passed it on to his ministers to be read to him. No piece of writing in his own hand is known to exist."<sup>3860</sup>

His assertion that none of the Europeans who met Shivaji ever saw him write anything is baseless. Nowhere do European visitors categorically state that they *did not see* Shivaji reading or writing. If they had seen him performing those acts, it does not find mention in their accounts.<sup>3861</sup> But that cannot prove that Shivaji was illiterate. At least a dozen accounts of Shivaji's encounters with European visitors are available but they are not extensive, being mere summarizations of the visitors' dialogues with him. It is possible that several things which might have interested a modern historian (or reader) did not seem so to them. For example, none of these accounts describes Shivaji's personal appearance. There are a few descriptions of Shivaji noted down by Europeans, but they do not emanate from personal meetings. One exception is Herbert de Jager and Nicolaes Clement: while they say Shivaji was wearing a fine embroidered robe and a turban, without mentioning any details about his looks.<sup>3862</sup> It may therefore be said that *mere absence* of

accounts testifying to his literacy cannot prove that Shivaji could not read or write.

Europeans met several other Indians from this period and yet have left us no account of their literacy. For instance, the Italian traveler Niccolao Manucci was in Mirza Raja Jai Singh's service for two years and even claims that he used to frequently engage with him in a game of cards.<sup>3863</sup> But nowhere in his prolific writings does he mention that he *actually saw* Jai Singh reading or writing. Needless to state, lack of specific mention is clearly insufficient to conclude that Jai Singh was illiterate. The same logic must apply in the case of Shivaji.

Sarkar also says, whenever European visitors submitted any petitions to Shivaji he would hand them over to his ministers to be read out to him. However, just one instance is on record where this happened. Some Englishmen, including John Child of the Rajapur factory, called on Shivaji at Rajapur on 25<sup>th</sup> March 1675. In their account of the meeting they state: "At length we presented him our paper of desires, which after had been read to him, with a little pause, seriously looking on us, [he] said that it was all granted us. He would give us a *farman* for all."<sup>3864</sup> This single instance is simply not enough to say he was illiterate. Moreover, it was common practice or convention prevalent at oriental courts for ministers to read out to the king letters or petitions addressed to him, as accounts of the Mughal and Bijapur courts would amply illustrate.<sup>3865</sup>

Sarkar further says no documents containing Shivaji's handwriting exist. However, in order to be able to identify a certain portion of a document as *Shivaji's handwriting*, one must first not only possess a foolproof method of defining the portion of text as his handwriting but also be conversant with the style of letter writing in those times.

Rulers in India rarely *wrote* their letters themselves; their scribes or clerks did the actual writing. Adding one's signature to the letter in testimony of its authorship is a modern practice; it was not prevalent in pre-British India. Often, letters bore seals as a proof of authenticity. Sometimes, the master would write a few sentences in his own hand towards the end of the document.

It is observed that the same convention was followed in letters Aurangzeb wrote. The *Alamgirnama* says Aurangzeb used to write a few words in his own hand in the top margin, by way of a courtesy perhaps, in letters addressed to Princes and high ranking noblemen.<sup>3866</sup> Several such letters of the Emperor are extant.<sup>3867</sup> Old Marathi letters, too, followed a similar practice. Some commonly employed standard, conventional phrases in the concluding lines would be written at the end of letters addressed to relatives and intimates by the person who authored the letter.<sup>3868</sup> Such handwriting, however, is not found on letters written to lower level officials or commoners. When several specimens of a person's handwriting are available it is possible to identify a letter which he might have written entirely in his own hand.<sup>3869</sup>

Thus, while seeking a specimen of Shivaji's handwriting (in letters authored by him), the researcher needs to focus on the concluding lines where the handwriting is most likely to differ from that of the rest of the text. But such letters (if any are at all extant) would necessarily be few. No doubt, letters sent by Shivaji to his officials must have been filed away in official archives at their respective destinations, while those he issued while on campaigns would have been preserved in the records at his capital. But Maratha state archives, both at the capital and provincial headquarters, did not survive beyond a few years after Shivaji's death. The letters discovered by modern researchers were found in private archives and, most of them

being orders to officials relating to grants or rewards to individual families, are not likely to contain concluding lines in Shivaji's hand.

About two hundred letters written by Shivaji have been found so far, of which about a hundred and twenty-five are original and the remaining, copies.<sup>3870</sup> The copies obviously would not have the original writer's handwriting. Most of the originals are related to grants, rewards, rulings, or other such issues and are thus in a generally standardized format, originating from Shivaji's administrative office. These do not, and could not be expected to, bear Shivaji's handwriting. There are hardly a dozen letters which could fairly be *expected* to contain some text in Shivaji's own handwriting.<sup>3871</sup> Unfortunately, we know of most of these letters only from their texts that were published many years ago; present whereabouts of most of them are not known. Also, most of these letters have not been photographed.<sup>3872</sup> As a consequence of these circumstances, letters bearing Shivaji's handwriting may never be discovered.

Therefore, a researcher must start with the premise that no specimen of his handwriting has yet been found. However, this does not lead to the inference that Shivaji was illiterate. Handwritings of several other historical figures have not been found. For example, *farmans* issued by the various Nizamshahs are extant, but their handwriting is not available. Many letters authored by Nizamshahi minister Malik Ambar are available but not a single specimen of his handwriting exists. Even Vaman Pandit, the 17<sup>th</sup> Century poet, did not leave behind a sample of his handwriting. The handwriting of Paramanand, composer of the *Shivabharat*, is not available. Nor, indeed, is that of Gaga Bhatt or Krishna Jyotishi, composer of the *Karana Kaustubh*, a treatise on astronomy that was commissioned by Shivaji. Similarly, handwritings of Adilshahi and Qutbshahi rulers of the time have not been found though several of their

*farmans* are extant. It is incorrect to aver, on the basis of non-availability of a specimen, that all these persons were illiterate; indeed, none has done so.

Thus, Sarkar's inference that Shivaji was illiterate is illogical. Not only is there evidence to assert that Shivaji *could not have been illiterate* (or, at least, that it would be incorrect without due substantiation to assume that he was so), but also certain proof that in fact he could read and write.

(1) In Jayram Pindye's *Radhamadhav-Vilas* the poet, recalling his first audience with Shahji, describes several aspects of his Court like his daily routine or the poets he patronized. Shahji asked the poet to recite a verse or two, upon which Pindye had a good singer recite his previously composed *Radhamadhav-Vilas*. Shahji was pleased but desired (according to a common practice of the time) other scholars and poets in the Court to pose riddles to Pindye, whose ability to solve them would prove his talent. Shahji himself offered a Sanskrit line as the first half of a couplet by way of a riddle. Pindye immediately composed the second to render the couplet complete. Thereafter, fifteen others in the assembly presented Sanskrit riddles and Sambhaji, Shahji's son, was one of them.<sup>3873</sup>

A poet once recited a couplet in the presence of Ekoji, Shahji's son. Pindye immediately composed another couplet, replacing the second line with one in praise of Ekoji.<sup>3874</sup>

Pindye records having recited to Shahji's other son, Koyaji, the same riddles he had solved before his patron.<sup>3875</sup>

It therefore seems from the *Radhamadhav-Vilas* that Shahji and his sons — Sambhaji, Ekoji and Koyaji — all knew Sanskrit. It is quite possible that Pindye was given to wild exaggeration while praising his patrons in order to curry favour with them. But it was hardly worth Pindye's while composing flattering

verses in Sanskrit if the language was incomprehensible to Shahji and his sons. So, even if one discounts exaggeration, the fact remains that Shahji and his sons knew Sanskrit.

Secondly, there is no reason to believe that *everything* he wrote was false. If Pindye's observations merit disqualification as history just because he was a beneficiary of Shahji's patronage, the same rule should apply to the authors of the *Alamgirnama*, *Badshahnama*, *Muhammadnama* and other Court histories, and those accounts discarded as false since their respective authors, too, enjoyed patronage. The fact of their status as protégés notwithstanding, the veracity of many of their accounts is corroborated by other sources, which is also the case with Pindye. His statements must be given credence unless proven otherwise, or seem improbable *per se* or are not backed by any evidence at all. The *Radhamadhav-Vilas* thus establishes that Shahji and his sons knew Sanskrit.

Is it improbable that Shahji, a Maratha by caste, should know Sanskrit? It is not. True, most of the people who knew Sanskrit were Brahmins, but others were not prohibited from learning it. Tavernier says he saw Raja Jai Singh's and other noblemen's children studying Sanskrit at a school the Raja had built in Banaras.<sup>3876</sup> The authorship of a Sanskrit work, the *Budhabhushanam*, is attributed to Shivaji's son Sambhaji. There is no reason to disbelieve this. It is not a work of extraordinary scholarship but largely a compilation of Sanskrit verses and passages dealing with politics extracted from other works. Even if the possibility of a ghost author is conceded, it still indicates Sambhaji's familiarity with Sanskrit. So it is not improbable that Shahji, who had patronized many Sanskrit scholars, had studied the language himself.

One may argue that mere ability to understand and converse in a spoken language does not necessarily imply that the person also knew how to read and write it. However, Sanskrit was not a language of ordinary communication in the

17<sup>th</sup> Century; those who could speak it had had to first learn it for which purpose the initial natural step would have been knowledge of the script. It follows, then, that Shahji and his sons Koyaji, Sambhaji and Ekoji could read and write Sanskrit.

And if that was the case, why would only Shivaji, who was living with his father till he was 12, be deprived of education? Shahji led a hectic life between 1630 and 1636, but that did not mean his household activities had come to a standstill. And he had become more settled in the next four years. It is certain that Shahji must have arranged for Shivaji to receive instruction in the alphabet. It must be admitted that Emperor Akbar also received an education, his father having appointed personal tutors for him, and yet remained illiterate. But Akbar's was a unique case; there is *positive* evidence to prove he *was* indeed unlettered. No such *positive* evidence is available to say Shivaji was illiterate.

(2) A letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> June 1661, sent by the English officers Henry Revington and others (while they were in Shivaji's custody at Songad) to the Surat Council, contains the clear instruction that whatever communication the council may send to Shivaji (for negotiating the Englishmen's release) must be *delivered to Shivaji himself* and not to his ministers because the letter writers suspected that Shivaji's ministers sometimes distorted the contents while reading letters to him.<sup>3877</sup> They wanted Shivaji himself to read the letter. It then follows that these Englishmen, who had actually met Shivaji, believed that Shivaji could read. While they have not stated that they ever actually *saw* him reading or writing, it is entirely possible that they *might have* seen him doing so.

(3) Cosme da Guarda says Shivaji toured his state on foot, incognito. (This was when the Shayista Khan invasion was imminent.) He writes: "Leaning on his sword, he went about taking note of everything that happened; and he jotted on the palm of his hand all important points which he might

(otherwise) forget, and for that purpose he always carried an inkstand with him.”<sup>3878</sup>

This account, although quite possibly imaginary, is sufficient to show that Guarda believed Shivaji to be literate and that he (i.e. Guarda) had not heard any gossip to the contrary.

(4) In his account of Shivaji’s escape from Agra, Khafi Khan writes that while making his way back to Maharashtra, Shivaji left an exhausted Sambhaji with a Brahmin living in Allahabad and that the Brahmin had been given orders to keep Sambhaji with him “until he received a letter in Shivaji’s own hand.”<sup>3879</sup> Hence, irrespective of the truth of this account, Khafi Khan also believed Shivaji was literate.

(5) The Chitnis Chronicle enumerates the arts Shivaji studied during his education: writing, horse-riding, elephant-riding, wrestling, archery, use of guns, and scriptures.<sup>3880</sup>

To sum up, Shahji, his sons Sambhaji, Ekoji and Koyaji knew Sanskrit, and there is nothing to suggest that Shivaji alone had not received education. His contemporaries Revington and Cosme De Guarda, the 18<sup>th</sup> Century historian Khafi Khan, and the 19<sup>th</sup> Century chronicler Chitnis also believed that he was literate.

Besides this, there is concrete evidence which establishes that he could read and write.

(1) Shivaji’s forces looted the English factory at Rajapur in 1661. The English held protracted negotiations with him for securing reparation. A memorandum regarding these is incorporated in the minutes of the meeting of the Mumbai Council, dated 6<sup>th</sup> October 1673. The substance of the relevant portion of the memorandum is as follows:

The English had sent a certain Narayan Shenavi as their envoy to Shivaji to hold talks. Shenavi returned to Mumbai along with Shivaji's envoy, Bhimaji Pandit, on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1673.

Bhimaji and the English officials met at John Child's house on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1673. The English demanded 39,957 *pagodas* and 36 *Jittal* along with interest in compensation. Bhimaji argued that this amount far exceeded the actual value of loot, which could not have been more than 4,000 *pagodas*. On this, according to the memorandum, the Englishmen replied:

“To all which we answered that although he pleaded his master received no more than about 4,000 pagodas and brings Narayan Shenavi, who was employed in this affair by the President and Council, to Shivaji, as a witness to persuade us that he received no more, *Shivaji Rajah himself showing Narayan Shenavi an old book wherein the particulars were mentioned*, which although granted to be true, yet Shivaji Rajah ought in justice to make us full satisfaction, for had not he robbed Rajapur the Company had never sustained that loss.”<sup>3881</sup>

This shows that on the earlier occasion when Shenavi had been granted audience, Shivaji *showed him a register* in which details of the loot were recorded. Yet, the memo said, Shivaji ought to pay what the English were demanding because the issue of compensation arose only because of the action that his forces had carried out. The factory would have suffered no damage had there been no raid. What is remarkable is the reference to Shivaji *showing* the English emissary a register, clearly suggesting he could read the register entry himself.

(2) Shahji surrendered near Mahuli in 1636 and joined the service of the Adilshah. He was then dispatched to Karnataka under the command of Randaula Khan. As a reward for his

achievements, Shahji was awarded the town of Bangalore. The *Shivabharat* says: “As Shivaji turned seven, Shahji thought his son was eligible to start studying the alphabet. He, along with other boys of his age, was handed over to a teacher. Before the teacher was done with the first letter, this child would write the second. The teacher taught him the script, which is the doorway to all disciplines. The Guru took pride in this intelligent, well behaved, handsome and charismatic little prince, who learnt the alphabet so quickly, and he, in his mind, noted ‘here is an extraordinary child.’”<sup>3882</sup>

These two pieces of evidence matter more than the all too elusive specimen of Shivaji’s handwriting. Such accounts, in the case of men and women of history, constitute solid evidence. To say that a particular handwriting is of a particular man is after all an inference, an induction. To actually see a person writing is the most conclusive evidence of his literacy. It is not possible to do this in the case of historical personages. In their case the next best evidence is to have the testimony of someone who had known the person well or had the opportunity to see him reading or writing. We do have such a witness in the person of Paramanand.

It will not suffice to say that Sir Jadunath Sarkar had not accepted the *Shivabharat* as evidence of Shivaji’s literacy because that epic, in his opinion, having been composed as mere adulation of a patron, could not qualify as a source of history. For, Sarkar does not reject it in its entirety: he views it reliable enough for his account of Shivaji’s Konkan expedition of 1661 in *Shivaji and his Times*.<sup>3883</sup> If that is so, why should a statement appearing in the same epic that Shivaji had learnt the script, be unacceptable to him? There is nothing in it that is incomprehensible, unprecedented, illogical, improbable, impossible or superhuman.

For the sake of probity in research, it would behoove the researcher, who considered even such evidence of Shivaji's literacy as unreliable or insufficient, to hold, at most, that it could not be said with certainty that he was literate because no positive evidence existed to prove that he was so. But how sound or equitable as a scholastic exercise is it for him to instead conclude, without an iota of evidence, that Shivaji was illiterate?

To sum up, Duff and Sarkar's conclusion that Shivaji was illiterate is baseless. There is enough evidence to infer that he could not have been illiterate but that *he could* read and write.

## **Appendix VII - A Spurious Farman**

In the session of the Indian Historical Records Commission, held at Guwahati in February 1990, Dr. G. T. Kulkarni read a paper entitled 'An Imperial Farman of Shah Jahan – Shivaji in the Mughal Service (?). It was later published in the Proceedings of the Commission (pp.19-23). The English rendering of the *farman* given by Dr. Kulkarni in the paper is as follows:

"Shivaji Bhosala, worthy of royal favours and obligations, and on whom Imperial favours have been bestowed, should know that Raghunath Bhat, son of Mahadev Bhat, astrologer, and resident of Manglur, Sarkar Basim (Washim), Subah Berar [Varhad], Payanghat, who is unparalleled in the field of astrology and medicine, and for long who is also engaged in the prayers of God.

He has applied through the most loyal, the great Khan Asif Jah, for service. On account of his excellence in astrology and medicine, the royal favours are bestowed upon him. In the Subah of Berar, from Pargana Ankola and Pargana Dahinda and Pargana Karanja Bibi, lands and cash have been given in *inam* (free gift) on account of daily and annual subsistence. Get the horoscope prepared from this worthy and deserving person. See that it is accomplished and the same is received by you. Ensure that whatever is within your power is not denied to him. And acquaint us with all the speed about your state of affairs.

And write in detail about events and contingencies (produce/revenue) from that region, so that the same will be placed before the Emperor. This will help an increase in the objects sought by you and enhance your reputation and confer favours on you by the royal court."

Dr. Kulkarni comments in his paper: "A horoscope of His Majesty was to be prepared by him [Raghunath Bhat], and Shivaji was asked to procure the same positively and acquaint the Imperial Court about the facts regarding himself as well as the happenings in that region including the produce and revenue."<sup>3884</sup> This comment is absolutely erroneous. The *farman* says "*tale-nama aan laiq-ul inayat wa al-ihsan*", i.e. "horoscope of that [who is] worthy of favour and kindness." Who is this person who is worthy of favour and kindness? Certainly not the Emperor; he is someone who is worthy of favour and kindness of the Emperor himself, as anyone who has some knowledge of the style of Mughal *farmans* would readily understand. The *farman* begins with these words: "*Laiq-ul inayat wa al-ihsan maurid-i marahim bi-karan Sivaji Bhosala*" i.e. "Shivaji Bhosale who is worthy of favour and kindness and who is the object of boundless gifts." So the person worthy of favour and kindness whose horoscope was to be prepared was none other than Shivaji. Had the Emperor desired to get his own horoscope rendered by this Raghunath Bhat, he would have sent a couple of *ahadis* to get the work done or would have summoned him to the Imperial Court.

In his introductory remarks Dr. Kulkarni says: "This *farman* is related to the ancestors of the Joshi family, who were well respected and recognized by the emperor Jahangir. Since Jahangir's time and under Shah Jahan the family had received royal patronage for their expertise in astrology and medicine. And in order to look after their welfare, and ensure that the royal favours and gift lands bestowed on them were properly


received by them, an Imperial officer seems to have been appointed and that officer was none else but Shivaji Bhosala. Hence the imperial *farman* has been directly addressed to him.”<sup>3885</sup> So, Dr. Kulkarni wants his readers to believe that Shivaji, residing at Pune — and not any other officer in Varhad — was to look after the welfare of this Joshi family, residing at Manglur (*sic.* Mangrul-Pir), 475 km away in Varhad, and was to ensure that the imperial favours bestowed on them were properly received by them! The absurdity of Dr. Kulkarni’s fantastic theories is self-evident and needs no further comment.

The conclusions drawn by Dr. Kulkarni on the basis of this *farman* are that it “suggests the distinct possibility that Shivaji was in the Mughal service for a period of nearly eight years during 1648 to 1656” and that “it is this association with the Mughals, for a period of seven to eight years (1648-1656) that he really learnt the art of diplomacy and statecraft.”<sup>3886</sup> We must concede, nonetheless, that these preposterous conclusions do have the virtue of originality.

Dr. Kulkarni had not exhibited the original or even a photocopy of the document when he read the paper, nor was its Persian text or photocopy published along with it. He claims in his therein that the *farman* was shown to him “a few months back” by one of the descendants of the Bhat (Joshi) family residing at Akola in Vidarbha. His memory, however, must have failed him when he wrote those lines. The *farman* was shown to him in Pune within the premises of the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal by Vinayak (alias Vinay) Damodar Dixit, whose father, who was about ninety years old then and fond of collecting old manuscripts, had purchased it at Mangrul (Varhad) some 25-30 years before, i.e. about 1960. I first saw it in Vinay Dixit’s home about 15<sup>th</sup> April 1991. My condensed translation of the *farman* is as follows:

Shah Jahan to Shivaji Bhosala

Raghunath Bhat, son of Mahadev Bhat, residing at Manglur, *Sarkar* Basim, *Suba* Berar, Payan Ghat, is unequalled in the arts of astrology and medicine. Through the mediation of Asaf Jah, he has obtained the good fortune of serving us and has been granted the villages in the *parganas* of Akola, Dahinda, and Karanja-Bibi in the *suba* of Berar. He intends to prepare your horoscope and bring it to you. We trust that you, in accordance with your ability, will not withhold from showing as much generosity [to him] as possible. Know that we are fully attentive to your reports; continue sending to us detailed accounts of the events in that territory so that you will receive our favours. Date: the month of Farwardin, 30<sup>th</sup> year of the reign [of Shah Jahan].



The forged farman.

By courtesy of Mr. Vinayak D. Dixit.

(Photograph by Rajendra Joshi, Pune)

The document bears Shah Jahan's monogram (*tughra*) and round seal at the top. Both are genuine. The text of the *farman* is

of course written on only one side of the paper. The reverse bears Asaf Khan's seal along with the endorsement that it was issued through the mediation of Asaf Khan. Both the seal and the endorsement are genuine. The date as written in the *farman* contains only the month and the year, not the date of the month. In the 30<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Shah Jahan, the month of Farwardin commenced on or about 11<sup>th</sup> March 1656 and ended on or about 10<sup>th</sup> April 1656.

That the *farman* is blatantly spurious is evident even from its English translation, not to speak of its Persian text. Consider the following points:

(1) The *farman* recommends to Shivaji an astrologer who wants to prepare his horoscope. At that time Shivaji had not risen to fame. What connection did he have with Shah Jahan so that the Emperor should recommend an astrologer to him? Even if we assume that Shivaji was a *mansabdar* of Shah Jahan it would be inconceivable to anyone who knows anything about the etiquette of the Mughal Court that the Emperor would send him a *farman* recommending an astrologer in this fashion.

(2) What was the propriety in mentioning *details* of the grants bestowed upon the astrologer in this document whose avowed purpose is merely to recommend him to Shivaji?

(3) The *farman* bears Asaf Khan's seal along with an endorsement that it was issued through his mediation. But Asaf Khan had died in the 15<sup>th</sup> year of Shah Jahan's reign, i.e. in 1641.<sup>3887</sup> How could the *farman* have been issued through the mediation of a dead man?

(4) The text of the *farman* addresses Shivaji in the second person plural i.e. as *shuma*.<sup>3888</sup> In most cases, *farmans* of Shah Jahan (or any other Mughal Emperor) address the recipient in the *third* person singular.<sup>3889</sup> In a *nishan* Prince Murad Bakhsh sent to Shivaji's father Shahji in 1649, the latter is addressed in

the third person singular. So why should Murad Bakhsh's father (Shah Jahan) address Shahji's son (Shivaji) in the second person plural? Whoever is conversant with the style of the Mughal *farmans* would be amazed at this gross breach of the epistolary style. Had Shah Jahan really written a *farman* to Shivaji, it is highly improbable that it would address the latter in the second person plural (i.e. as *shuma*). It may be noted that in his *farmans* to Shivaji written in 1658 and 1659, Aurangzeb has addressed him in the third person singular.<sup>3890</sup>

(5) The names Mahadev Bhat and Payan Ghat as written in the *farman* contain the Urdu letter called *te* (lingual 't', pronounced as in 'mute' in English). The Persian language has the dental 't' (pronounced as in 'tante' in French), but not the lingual 't'. Urdu has both, the dental and lingual 't'. At least till the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, the dental 't' was used in Persian manuscripts in place of the lingual 't' when there was occasion to write a proper noun which contained the lingual 't'.<sup>3891</sup> It is thus incredible that a lingual 't' should occur twice in a document purported to be a *farman* of Shah Jahan. The lingual 't' (adopted from Urdu) is found in Persian printed works if it occurs in a proper noun. One may find it even in Persian manuscripts written in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century.

(6) The Payan Ghat [Pain Ghat] *suba* was created by Shah Jahan's order dated 17<sup>th</sup> November 1634. It comprised the whole of Khandesh and most of Varhad.<sup>3892</sup> But in July 1636, Shah Jahan appointed Aurangzeb as *Subadar* of the four *subas* of the Deccan, viz. Daulatabad, Telangana, Khandesh and Varhad.<sup>3893</sup> So Payan Ghat ceased to exist as an administrative unit since then.

(7) The quality of the handwriting on the obverse is nowhere near the standard of Mughal *farmans*.


(8) The *farman* gives the month and regnal year of Shah Jahan, but not the date of the month. This is unusual and, in

view of other inconsistencies, highly suspicious.


(9) The month given (Farwardin) is a month in the *Ilahi* calendar introduced by Akbar. It was used in Jahangir's *farmans*, and also in Shah Jahan's *farmans*, but only during the first few years of his reign. It was not used, as far as I know, in his *farmans* at least in the last few years of his reign.<sup>3894</sup> So, it is strange, and, in view of other inconsistencies, highly suspicious that the *farman* is dated in a month from the *Ilahi* calendar.

(10) In Mughals *farmans* addressed to Hindus, the epithet "muti-ul Islam" ("submissive to Islam") was usually, if not invariably, used before the name of the recipient.<sup>3895</sup> That it is not used in this *farman* is — again in view of other inconsistencies — highly suspicious.

(11) There are certain constructions, which, from a grammatical point of view, are unusual. As most readers cannot be expected to be familiar with the Persian language, I shall not discuss specific examples here. Those who know the language should not find it difficult to notice them.<sup>3896</sup> This, too, gives rise to suspicion about the authenticity of the *farman*.



Top : A photograph of the *farman* held against bright light shows up the Persian letter 'nun' from the original writing — scraped off by the forger — below the letter *ha'i hauwaz* or *ra'i muhmala* in the word *mustazhar* in the second line.



Bottom : Reverse of the *farman* with Asaf Khab's seal and endorsement.

By courtesy of Vinayak D. Dixit  
(Photographs by Rajendra Joshi, Pune)

(12) A physical examination of the *farman* reveals that the portion of the paper on which the lines are written is white, while the rest of the paper has turned yellowish. Measurement by micrometer showed that the thickness of the white portion is less by one third than that of the yellowish portion. The *farman* bears a stain-mark running from top to bottom on the right hand side (from the viewer's point of view) and passing close to the edges of the written lines. This stain-mark bends to form a curve as it passes the edge of each line. (The first two lines of any Mughal *farman* are half the length of the lines below. This fact is reflected in the shape of the stain-mark.) If the *farman* is held with its back to the light, a few letters of the original text may be seen through the white layer. Thus, that the document is spurious is not a mere inference; it is an established fact.

To sum up: The *farman* is spurious. The fabricator did not tamper with the invocation *Allah hu Akbar*, Shah Jahan's seal and his monogram (*tughra*) at the top on the obverse or Asaf Khan's seal and endorsement on the reverse. All these are genuine. Other lines of the original text have been scratched out and replaced by new text. It seems that the fabricator desired to establish that his ancestor held in grant the *parganas* of Akola, Dahinda, and Karanja-Bibi and that he was astrologer to Shah Jahan and Shivaji. He possibly hoped this would enable him or his client to claim certain rights in those *parganas* and to obtain the patronage of the high and the mighty. The motive of the fabricator notwithstanding, the document is unquestionably spurious.

Another document, purported to be Shah Jahan's *farman*, was purchased along with the one discussed above by Vinayak Dixit's father. Dr. G. T. Kulkarni read a paper on it, assuming it to be a genuine document, in the 53<sup>rd</sup> Session of the Indian History Congress. It was published in the proceedings of that session (pp.199-204). As it has no bearing on Shivaji's life I shall not discuss it here, but shall only quote Professor Irfan Habib's

remarks thereon: “Shahjahan *farman*, 1628, deciding a complaint regarding customary rights of an astrologer (*joshi*) in certain villages of *pargana* Manglaur (Magrol), *sarkar* Basim, Berar. Facsimile reprod. With transl. and commentary by G. T. Kulkarni in *PIHC*, 53<sup>rd</sup> session, 1992-93, Warangal, 199-204. Inspection of the original document, through the courtesy of Mr. G. B. Mehendale of Pune, has shown that the seal (containing the only date in the document: AH 1037) and *tughra* are genuine, but the present text on the front has been written after the short text of the original had been washed and scratched off; moreover the *zimn*-text was written in only after the top portion of the original *farman* had been lost. The absence of dates and the normal formula in the *zimn* also adds to the suspicions of forgery.”<sup>3897</sup>

The document is of privately owned; Dr. Kulkarni had not exhibited it, or its photograph; he had not given the Persian text of it. He had not disclosed its whereabouts, and his statement about its ownership is likely to mislead the readers. Therefore I thought it necessary to give the readers the benefit of opinions of two scholars, apart from my own comments, about the document. These are appended below.

On 11<sup>th</sup> November 1995 I showed two Persian documents, purported to be Shah Jahan's *farmans*, to Professor Irfan Habib at Centre for Advanced Studies in History, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. (Mr. Vinayak Dixit, the owner of the documents, had kindly permitted me to take them along with me.) I requested Professor Habib to give me his opinion in writing after examining the documents which he kindly did. I am quoting it below with his permission. Footnotes have been added by me for clarifications. Additions in square brackets are also mine. *Farman* I in the note is the subject of this appendix.

## “NOTE

Mr. G. B. Mehendale (8, Vyadeshwar Lodge, Deshmukh Wadi, 1824B, Sadashiv Peth, Pune 411030) kindly brought to this Centre two purported *farmans* of Shahjahan, which have been previously brought to scholarly notice by Dr. G. T. Kulkarni at the Historical Records Commission session (which I did not attend) and the Indian History Congress, Warangal, 1992-93 session, where I saw a photocopy of *Farman* II (the Proceedings as published included a reproduction of both sides of the *farman*, between pp. 202-3).

1. *Farman* I (beg. [Here the Professor has written in his own hand the first few words of the document in Persian script.])

An examination of the original discloses that it is genuine in so far as its paper, invocation,<sup>3898</sup> Imperial Seal and *tughra*<sup>3899</sup> on the obverse and the seal of Asaf Khan (with AH1037/*san-i-ahad*) and the accompanying signed endorsement of *Asaf Khan* (*ba risala-I kamtarin-I Ikhlas-keshan Asaf Khan* <sup>3900</sup>) on the reverse are concerned. The Imperial Seal in the circle for Abu Sa'id carries the year 1038. The golden ink used in the invocation and *tughra*, and the absence of texts *zimn*<sup>3901</sup> and seals and endorsements of offices indicates that the original contained a rescript addressed to some important official at the recommendation of Asaf Khan, *Wakil us Saltanat*.<sup>3902</sup>

But the text at present found on the obverse is an obvious forgery. Inspection showed that all the lines of the original were washed off, the original text scratched out (making the thick paper very thin on the portions affected), and the forged text overwritten on it. The many other indications that the text cannot possibly be genuine are as follows:-

1. The main text on the obverse is *shikasta amez*,<sup>3903</sup> which is not possible in an Imperial *farman*.
2. The *shikasta* is also irregularly written, and obviously on camp: see *wuzrai mani ‘ush-shan* (sic), with the ink in the top of ‘ain spread out with the damp at the time of writing.
3. There was no *suba Payanghat* in A.H.1038/ 1 R. Y. of Shahjahan.
4. The date *Farwardi Mah Ilahi 30 Julus* in the bottom line is impossible, since Shahjahan shifted from the solar (*Ilahi*) to the lunar (*hijri*) calendar for calculating his regnal years in the 10<sup>th</sup> Regnal Year No *Farman* after the 10<sup>th</sup> R. Y. of Shah Jahan is or can be dated in the *ilahi* calendar.
5. The title *yar-i wafadar Asaf Jah* (4<sup>th</sup> line) was not held by Asaf Khan and suggests 18<sup>th</sup> century titulary influence (Nizam’l Mulk Asaf Khan).

I do not go into the implausibilities of Shahjahan addressing such a *farman* to Shivaji at the end of his reign (30<sup>th</sup> R. Y. solar would be 1657-58). Aurangzeb, not “Asaf Jah”, nor Asaf Khan long dead, was Viceroy of the Deccan at this time.

2. Farman II beg. [Here the Professor has written in his own hand the first few words of the document in Persian script.]

As with Farman I, the Imperial seal (dated A. H.1037) and tughra are genuine. It contained a text possibly of a nature similar to that of *Farman* I, but

this has been washed off and scratched out. A fresh text has been written in *nasta'liq*<sup>3904</sup> in the front.

The *nasta'liq* though clear is not of the Imperial standard. The text on reverse (*zimn*) begins too low on the back, leaving much of the top space blank (backing the space behind the invocation, which is lost). This could not happen in ordinary cases. Obviously, as in Farman II the reverse was blank (except for a seal and endorsement at the top as in Farman II).<sup>3905</sup>

But the text of the *zimn*, if it is detached from the date of the original seal, seems to copy a genuine text. The endorsement of Mahabat Khan, with his *parwana* (from the reign of Jahangir) copied in the *zimn* seems also to be a genuine text (no ref. to *Pa'inghat*, for example). Apparently, the forger copied the entire text of the *zimn* from some other genuine *parwana* or *sanad* probably of a 17<sup>th</sup>-century date. This makes it possible that the *farman*'s forged text on the obverse is also copied from a copy of a genuine 17<sup>th</sup> -century *farman* (lost by the possessor); but even this genuine text now lost could not have belonged to A. H.1038 or early regnal years of Shahjahan.

[signed]

Irfan Habib  
Coordinator CAS in History, AMU ,Aligarh  
11 November 1995"

Mr. Rajendra Joshi, a Persian scholar (who has won the 'Jaffer Cassum Moosa' Gold Medal in M.A., Persian, University of Mumbai, 2010) is a regular visitor to Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Pune, where he has seen several old Persian documents including Mughal and Adilshahi *farmans*. On 31st July 2011 he

and I visited Mr. Vinayak Dixit's home at Anand Nagar, Paud Road, Pune 411038 to examine the documents cited in Professor Irfan Habib's note. After examining them Mr. Joshi took several photographs of the document, purported to be Shah Jahan's *farman* to Shivaji, three of which have been printed here. In an e-mail sent to me on 3rd August 2011 he has expressed his impressions about the document, concluding: "I am thoroughly convinced that it is a forgery."

## **Appendix VIII - Imprisonment of Rajapur Factors**

In March 1661, Shivaji took into captivity eight Englishmen who were in their factory at Rajapur.<sup>3906</sup> They were:

1. Henry Revington<sup>3907</sup>
2. Randolph Taylor<sup>3908</sup>
3. Robert Ferrand<sup>3909</sup>
4. Richard Napier<sup>3910</sup>
5. Richard Taylor<sup>3911</sup>
6. Philip Giffard<sup>3912</sup>
7. A surgeon, probably Robert Ward<sup>3913</sup>
8. William Mingham

Of these, the first seven were servants of the East India Company. The last named requires some explanation. He was a gunner's mate on the ship *London* which was sent from Surat to Rajapur in 1659. The Rajapur factors employed him on their own at an annual salary of £30. Their idea was to send him to Rustam-i Zaman.<sup>3914</sup> It was this Mingham who was appointed commander of Afzal Khan's junk which Revington had taken over as security for his dues and renamed the *Rajapur Merchant*.<sup>3915</sup> He had then proceeded to Panhala with Revinton.<sup>3916</sup>

It will be remembered that the English factors at Rajapur had discoursed with the commander of the Maratha detachment that had arrived at Rajapur in 1660 about the proposed assistance of the English for the reduction of Danda Rajpuri. Now, during their imprisonment at Rajapur, a Maratha officer again discoursed with the English prisoners on the same subject and promised them a place called Mith Bandar<sup>3917</sup> evidently if they provided assistance for the

reduction of Danda Rajpuri. The prisoners replied that they could not discourse on the subject until they were released and paid for the losses they had suffered, whereupon the officer set a ransom on their head.<sup>3918</sup>

Richard Napier had been ill since his arrival from England. In their letter written from Rajapur on 16<sup>th</sup> February 1660, Revington, Randolph Taylor and Giffard had informed the Surat Council that Richard Napier — “who came out of England a melancholy person and so continued” — was dangerously ill and was not expected to live.<sup>3919</sup> He died in captivity at Rajapur about 10<sup>th</sup> May 1661.<sup>3920</sup> The rest of the English prisoners were removed from Rajapur to the Wasota fort and from there to Songad<sup>3921</sup> fort sometime before 8<sup>th</sup> June 1661.<sup>3922</sup>

At Songad, a Maratha officer again interviewed the prisoners.<sup>3923</sup> When he demanded ransom, the prisoners replied that they had lost all they had at Rajapur and their masters would pay nothing for their release. Then the officer asked them what business they would perform for his master [Shivaji], whereupon they broached the subject of Danda Rajpuri but demanded that they should first be released. The officer told them that this would be done after Danda Rajpuri was taken. On this the prisoners said that the money that had been taken from them might be kept for security. The officer replied that they would not value the money once they were released and, furthermore, that if they were not in his custody the English would enter the fort first and keep it for themselves. The prisoners pointed out that he need not fear such a thing for to enter the fort after the English had made the breach would be the responsibility of his men who should be lying under the breastworks upon the island to ply small shot and secure the mortars. On the other hand, they had reason to question his compliance with the agreement after the English had fulfilled their part of the bargain. The prisoners also remarked that the Mughals would be ready to pay Rs.300,000 for this job.

In another interview held a few days later, the officer asked them to write to Surat for the payment of their ransom. The prisoners replied as their masters would pay nothing it would be better to write of business. But the officer insisted that they must write about money and told them that he himself would write to their masters to demand 100,000 pagodas.<sup>3924</sup>

Informing Surat of these proceedings, the prisoners in their letter of 10<sup>th</sup> June 1661 opined that his demand for ransom was made only to ensure English assistance against Danda Rajpuri and suggested that in return for such assistance, the English president should demand not only their liberty but also a port town with half its customs, exemption from import and export duties and liberty to build a castle at that port besides some other less important concessions.<sup>3925</sup> They concluded:

“This castle [Danda Rajpuri] is the only aim he [Shivaji] has and could he be persuaded to the belief of us, he would be real to us... for our purposes we may very well promise and endeavour the business upon these conditions, which he will be bound to, but whether you approve of the conditions or not, let him not know so much, for if you do not like them you may make some evasion or other when we are at liberty, and one thing let us inform you that that castle is not to be taken by the English for themselves, without good store of men, and where will you have then but from Shivaji, which was our design, and he to have the country and the castle too, giving us any other port town to build a castle upon. We pray God to send us out of his hands.”<sup>3926</sup>

The Surat Council wrote some persuasive letters to Shivaji for the release of the English prisoners, but none of these—as they informed the Company in their dispatch of 7<sup>th</sup> December 1661—was taken notice of.<sup>3927</sup> Meanwhile Revington fell sick

and was therefore released on parole together with the surgeon and William Mingham, the sailor, on promise of return when he would be well. Revington and the other two arrived at Surat on 17<sup>th</sup> October 1661.<sup>3928</sup>

Henry Revington had returned to Surat, ruined and broken in health, and died on 11<sup>th</sup> December 1661.<sup>3929</sup> The next day, a consultation was held at Surat and it was recorded in the minutes that he had died intestate and heavily indebted by reason of his losses in the Deccan. It was decided that his personal belongings be sold to defray the wages of his servants and the little estate remaining should be applied for the discharge, as far as possible, of his debts.<sup>3930</sup>

The Surat Council received three more letters from the English prisoners who were now removed to Rairi.<sup>3931</sup> In reply, the Council wrote on 10<sup>th</sup> March 1662 that they had too much work on hand to spend time unnecessarily "in inditing and sending costly letters to a rogue [Shivaji] that takes no notice of them, for never yet any answer was returned." The Council then rebuked the prisoners for their "disrespect and abusive language." The prisoners were also informed that the bill of exchange which they drew (probably for current expenses) upon the Surat factory, was promptly paid but the Council could not put up with Shivaji's unreasonable demands for money and had they known any other way to obtain the liberty of the prisoners they would not have failed to put it in practice. They concluded the letter thus:

"How you came in prison you know very well. It was not for defending Company's goods; it was for going to the siege of Panhala and tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English....It [i.e. Shivaji's action] was but as any other would do, having power to revenge himself of such affronts; for merchants are not to sell their goods, when if of that nature as granadoes, to go and shoot them off against

an enemy; for merchants while trading in a strange country and [where they] may live quietly — if [they are] not [found] meddling — must look for a requital of their deserts... none but what rehearsed is the cause of your imprisonment; Mr. Revington having himself mentioned the commands of Shivaji [?not] to sell any, are cast in your teeth of being at Panhala castle because he [Shivaji] would return the injury as he hoped more to his satisfaction if he could obtain money than to word it.”<sup>3932</sup>

But despite these harsh words the Surat Council were doing everything in their power to obtain the liberty of their compatriots. On 27<sup>th</sup> March 1662, they gave a commission to Captain Edward Mason of the *Royal Welcome*<sup>3933</sup> which was sailing for Persia to seize any Malabar or Deccan vessels he might encounter, take out the goods, set the vessels on fire and disembark the men on the next convenient shore.<sup>3934</sup> On 17<sup>th</sup> May 1662, they wrote to the prisoners:

“We are unacquainted with your condition or that of the country, not knowing where either the King of Bijapur or Shivaji is, that we might address ourselves by a letter unto them for your release, therefore have sent a letter to either unto yourselves to send forward to them.”<sup>3935</sup>

In the same letter they also assured the prisoners that as soon as the *Hopewell*<sup>3936</sup> and the *Royal Welcome* returned from Persia they would give them commission in August or September to lie off Vengurle or Kharepatan to seize the junks returning from Mokha and Persia and thus obtain captives to ensure the liberty of the English prisoners. They wrote:

“It is reported the Old Queen [Badi Sahiba]<sup>3937</sup> is to return and if it be our good fortune to light on her, surely the King [Adilshah] will not fail to procure your

release for her beside a return of satisfaction [for the losses suffered at Rajapur]. What you hear or can hear concerning her, or any junks or persons of quality expected, give us advice that we may proceed accordingly."

Finally they changed their mind about sending a letter to the prisoners to be forwarded by them to the Adilshah supposing that it would be difficult for the prisoners to do so, and wrote that they themselves would send it by other conveyance.

In accordance with their promise, the Surat Council decided in their meeting of 21<sup>st</sup> July 1662 to issue a commission to the commander of *Hopewell* to lie off Rajapur and Kharepatan and another to the commander of the *Royal Welcome* to lie off Vengurle, Dabhol and other adjacent ports to seize the Queen of Deccan [Badi Sahiba] who was expected to return from Mokha. They were to lie off those ports till 20<sup>th</sup> September and then return to Karwar.<sup>3938</sup> The commissions which were issued on the same day ordered the commanders to seize any ships belonging to "any Deccan people, either to the King of Deccan [i.e. the Adilshah], Shivaji, or any merchants of the country." The commissions also instructed the commanders that if the Queen of the Deccan fell into their hands they were to bring her to Swally treating her "with all the respect requisite to be showed [to] so eminent a person."<sup>3939</sup>

But the Surat Council was soon disillusioned about the efficacy of this action. On 19<sup>th</sup> August 1662, they wrote to the prisoners at Rairi:

"We received a letter from the merchant unto whom we writ in Rajapur for the delivery of our letter unto the King of that country, who according unto our desire delivered it and received a verbal answer that for him [i. e. the Adilshah] to write to Shivaji was

to no purpose; he [i.e. Shivaji] would not regard it, but an army of his [Adilshah's] was proceeding towards him [i. e. towards Shivaji] and he [Adilshah] hoped that might accomplish his and our desires for so soon as able he would set you free, and promised further he would write in a few days unto us. Upon the receipt of this letter we shall again address ourselves unto him, and hope, the Monsoon being near ended, some opportunity will offer to put into practice our desires for your liberty, either by some person falling into our hands or procurey [procurement] of them from the shore [by the Adilshahi forces]. Our endeavours shall not be wanting.”<sup>3940</sup>

The Surat Council soon afterwards sent Mathew Noel to Chaul to negotiate for the release of the English prisoners. On 26<sup>th</sup> September 1662, the Council received a letter from Mumbai informing them that Noel had arrived there from Chaul and had brought “letters from the said Mr. Taylor giving a relation of their imprisonment, and likewise a way proposed for their release, by intercepting the Queen of Bijapur [Badi Sahiba] remaining now incognita at Chaul.”<sup>3941</sup>

In their letter of 14<sup>th</sup> November 1662, the Surat Council informed the prisoners at Rairi of one more approach they were attempting to procure their release.<sup>3942</sup> They were in consultation with Benidas, Velji and others.<sup>3943</sup> Benidas was to use his contrivance by a Brahmin to be sent to Shivaji to deal with his Brahmin officers. Velji was also given commission to do whatever may be suitable to procure the release of the prisoners. The new President<sup>3944</sup> would also request the governor of Surat that he, with some other principal officers, should write to Shayista Khan, who, the Council was informed was pressing hard upon Shivaji, to work for their liberty.

The prisoners themselves were also trying to obtain their release. On 20<sup>th</sup> December 1662 they wrote from Rairi to the

## Surat Council:

"As yet there is no alteration in our condition....We daily expect the return of the governor of this castle and then hope to conclude on something. God grant us once free from this misery, for the better effecting of which we propose to enorder Harji<sup>3945</sup> at Chaul to voyage to Rajapur and try if the merchants there can prevail with Raoji Pandit, governor of those parts, to write to his master in our behalf, which if that rogue [i. e. Raoji] will be persuaded to do it will be very advantageous to us."<sup>3946</sup>

On 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1663, the Surat Council issued commission to one more vessel — the *Convertine*.<sup>3947</sup> The commission ordered the commander of that ship, Captain John Tinker, to sail into the Rajapur River and seize two vessels which, the Council was informed, were being fitted out by Shivaji for a voyage to Mokha.<sup>3948</sup> The commander was also instructed to take care that the goods in the ships were not purloined for "at the concluding of Articles of Peace, the Company will be required to restore all things again." Should he think that the soldiers on board would be unruly and plunder the vessels, he was to desist from the attempt.

But the prisoners were released while this commission was being written out.<sup>3949</sup> On 17<sup>th</sup> January 1663 they were sent for by Raoji Pandit to Rajapur where they arrived from Rairi on the 29<sup>th</sup> of the same month. Unfortunately Raoji had gone to Kharepatan and till his arrival four days later, the Englishmen had to remain in irons, for the guards refused to remove those until they had handed over the prisoners to Raoji. At Raoji's arrival, the irons were removed and they were presented before him. He told them that he had written a letter to the President and the answer which he had received gave hopes of an accommodation between the English and his master. The prisoners first asked to be declared free men, which Raoji

immediately did. Then they pointed out that their masters would never consent to an agreement with persons who had injured their estates and servants unless reparations were first made and that if they lost a pice they would spend ten more to recover it for they were careful that none of their servants should be wronged. Raoji told them what was past must be forgotten and that they would never again be injured. To reinforce his assurance he showed them "a writing from his master with his own *chop* [*chhap*, seal] and others accustomary to it, as also the print of the Rajah's hand on the top of the paper, done with sandal, declaring his resolve to tend as prementioned." The Englishmen expressed their belief that their masters would be ready to trade with the Raja's dominions provided reparations were made, and assured Raoji that his master would not be a loser thereby. Raoji then obliged them to take an oath that they would not attempt to leave Rajapur without his knowledge until the differences between his master and the English were composed and then gave them leave to depart. Throughout this conversation, nothing was said on the subject of Danda Rajpuri.

In their letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> February 1663 the Englishmen informed the Surat Council of this interview and observed:

"We believe the Rajah would gladly afford the Company any place convenient for them in his possession, with several other advantages, if they would assist him in taking of Danda Rajpuri castle, which if commanded by you, we will discourse with Raoji about, but as yet have not said a word of that nature."<sup>3950</sup>

On 9<sup>th</sup> February 1663, the *Convertine* which was commissioned to seize the two vessels arrived in Jaitapur Road. The Englishmen had left a letter there to be carried aboard any English ship that was discovered near the port. On receipt of that letter, the commander of the ship asked them by a letter to

come aboard. Accordingly Randolph Taylor and Philip Giffard went aboard. The commander showed them the commission he had for surprising the two vessels and urged the necessity for following it as no provision was made in the instructions for any accident that might intervene. But Taylor and Giffard pointed out the inadvisability of thus rupturing the negotiations for an agreement and the danger to which Ferrand and his companion would be exposed by such action. These arguments, reinforced by the fact that the vessels were not fully laden and had nothing valuable in them, dissuaded the commander to forego the attempt. The ship departed on 13<sup>th</sup> February.<sup>3951</sup>

After departure of the *Convertine* the Englishmen at Rajapur had some discourse with Raoji during which they told him "how necessary it will be for him, if he desires the good and settlement of the country, to conclude this business." In reply, Raoji proposed that the English should receive satisfaction by remittance of half the customs due from them at the port till satisfaction was made. The Englishmen replied that this proposal would not be acceptable, whereupon Raoji asked them to stay till he received an answer from the President.<sup>3952</sup>

In their letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> February, the Englishmen at Rajapur informed the Surat Council of the events that had occurred since the *Convertine's* arrival at the port. In conclusion they advised that before the *Convertine* would return to Rajapur, Shivaji's vessels would depart for Mokha and at least two or three vessels should be employed to intercept them so as to bring pressure upon Shivaji to come to reasonable terms. They also informed the Council that they had heard that the three vessels from Dabhol and one from Achare were to depart for Persia and Muscat, and wrote that they would be glad if any of these could be intercepted. They added that if negotiations with Shivaji were not speedily concluded, they intended to get away before notices came of anything that would be done by the English against Maratha vessels.<sup>3953</sup>

Sometime before 30<sup>th</sup> March 1663, the *Convertine* arrived at Rajapur during its return journey and brought off Randolph Taylor and Richard Taylor to Surat.<sup>3954</sup> On 18<sup>th</sup> March the Rajapur factors received the Surat dispatch of 24<sup>th</sup> February with letters enclosed for Raoji and the merchants. Giffard delivered the letter to Raoji and told him, in accordance with the President's order, that the Surat Council did not consider their servants at Rajapur free till they could come and go when and where they pleased. On this Raoji assured them that if they did not think themselves at liberty there, they might go upon the receipt of the next letter from Surat but he hoped that Taylor's departure should have removed all misgivings. He also proposed that a bania might be sent with full powers to treat on the business to end all differences speedily. Then, on 29<sup>th</sup> March 1663, Raoji gave Giffard a letter addressed to the President which the Rajapur factors enclosed with their dispatch dated 30<sup>th</sup> March to Surat.<sup>3955</sup>

Though the Englishmen obliged to remain at Rajapur were at liberty to communicate with Surat, the Surat Council was anxious to get them back.<sup>3956</sup> On 12<sup>th</sup> May, Giffard and Ferrand received the Council's letter of 23<sup>rd</sup> April and in compliance with the Council's order they left Rajapur on 16<sup>th</sup> May. Nobody hindered their departure, "Raoji being gone along with the Rajah to Kudal, and so to Vengurle." They arrived at Kolhapur on 19<sup>th</sup> May and in their dispatch dated 24<sup>th</sup> May to Surat, wrote of their intention to set out for Goa the next day. Due to a general report that the English had burnt the Adilshah's ships at Mokha, they thought it dangerous to remain at Kolhapur and had therefore made "a suit of Moorman's clothes each" and had planned to "go under the name of Persians that Shivaji took prisoners last year and now hath let go."<sup>3957</sup> On 26<sup>th</sup> May they set out from Kolhapur and arrived at Goa on 31<sup>st</sup> May.<sup>3958</sup>

On 17<sup>th</sup> October 1663, the *Loyal Merchant* was sent down the coast to procure pepper and other goods, with Randolph

Taylor as her supercargo.<sup>3959</sup> In the commission given to him, the Surat Council gave vent to their impotent rage against Shivaji thus:

“We have thus pitched on you to the managing of this [trade] affair...you having so faithfully discharged yourself in the like occasion until you were unhappily surprised in your residence at Rajapur by that perfidious rebel Shivaji, against whom as yet we have not had either conveniency of force or time, since you were all freed from your bonds; which is the reason we have desisted from calling him to an account. But forbearance is no acquittance. We are resolved to vindicate our Masters wrongs and your sufferings so soon as we can be provided for them; for as yet we are altogether incapable for want of shipping and men necessary for such an enterprise. Wherefore Patientia.”<sup>3960</sup>

On 24<sup>th</sup> October 1663, the *Loyal Merchant* touched at Jaitapur Road whereupon Randolph Taylor dispatched two banias to Rajapur with letters for Raoji Pandit. Two representatives of Raoji came the following day to Jaitapur to discourse about the difference between Shivaji and the English. But the Englishmen found, so writes Taylor from Karwar, that though Raoji had promised to satisfy the English for their losses by paying half the amount in cash and the remainder by remittance from the customs, his representatives had no power to settle the claims except entirely by the latter method. Taylor refused to entertain this proposal. While this discourse was going on the English tried to sell some of their goods to the Rajapur merchants but the latter dared not buy anything from them until some conclusions were made with Raoji. On 27<sup>th</sup> October 1663, the *Loyal Merchant* sailed for Goa, thus leaving the dispute still open.<sup>3961</sup>

## **Appendix IX - Who Wrote the Letter of Remonstrance Against the Jizya?**

### *Aurangzeb's Imposition of the Jizya*

The *jizya* is a capitation tax that the Islamic doctrine commands Muslim rulers to levy on their non-Muslim subjects. It is based on an injunction of the Quran: "Fight those who do not profess the true faith, till they pay *jizya* with the hand in humility."<sup>3962</sup> In Arabia it is to be imposed upon Jews and Christians, but cannot be accepted from idolaters or apostates; they had no choice but death.<sup>3963</sup> People granted security of life and property after levy of the *jizya* are known as *dhimmis* (or *zimmis*).<sup>3964</sup> According to at least one authority on the Quran, idolaters outside Arabia must also be killed, unless of course they accept Islam. But many others agree that it is lawful to reduce them to slavery, thus allowing them a respite during which it may please Allah to direct them to the right path, i.e. Islam.<sup>3965</sup> In practice, however, a milder course was adopted and in countries outside Arabia conquered by Muslims, idolaters were allowed the status of *dhimmis*, and thus granted security of life and property on payment of the *jizya*. The Quran enjoins that the *jizya* is to be paid "with the hand in humility." Therefore, according to many Muslim commentators, the *jizya* must be paid in a manner humiliating to the *dhimmis*. The *dhimmi* may not send it by the hand of a servant; he must come in person to pay it. He must make the payment standing, while the officer receiving it remained seated.<sup>3966</sup> The imposition of the *jizya* was not only a humiliation, it was also financially a great burden, especially on the poor.<sup>3967</sup> Akbar abolished this tax in 1564.<sup>3968</sup> Though Jahangir did commit some acts of bigotry and though Shah Jahan was no less a bigot than Aurangzeb, both of them had sense enough to ignore, for political reasons,

the injunction in the Quran and not re-impose the tax. For several years after his enthronement, Aurangzeb had followed the practice of his predecessors regarding *jizya*, evidently as a matter of policy. But he could not bear this violation of his religion any longer. He threw political expediency overboard, decided to follow the dictates of his religious conscience, and re-imposed the *jizya*. The *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* records:

“As all the aims of the religious Emperor were directed to the spreading of the law of Islam and overthrow of the practices of the infidels, he issued orders to the high *diwani* officers that from 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1679, in obedience to the Quranic injunction ‘till they pay commutation money (*jizya*) with the hand in humility’ and in agreement with the canonical traditions, Jizya should be collected from the infidels (*zimmis*) of the capital and the provinces. Many of the honest scholars of the time were appointed to discharge the work [of collecting *jizya*].”<sup>3969</sup>

## The letter of Protest

This letter, written in protest against Aurangzeb's imposition of *jizya*, was, first brought to public notice by Robert Orme, historian to the English East India Company, gave an English translation, done by the linguist C. W. Boughton Rouse, in his *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire* first published in 1782.<sup>3970</sup> There, Orme attributed it to Jaswant Singh. The whereabouts of the Persian copy from which this translation was done are unknown. Then, in 1803, Stephen Weston (1747-1830), “antiquary and man of letters”, published the Persian text of the letter and its English translation in his *Spirited Remonstrance from Raja Subah sing to Emperor Aurangzebe*.<sup>3971</sup> (I have not been able so far to obtain a copy of this book, but it seems that this Subah sing must be Shobha singh, a petty *Zamindar* in Bengal who revolted against Mughal rule in 1695 and died c.1698). Then, Lieutenant-Colonel James Tod's Munshi

(Persian scribe) obtained a copy of the Persian letter at Udaipur “where”, according to Tod, “it is properly assigned to the Rana.”<sup>3972</sup> Tod did not get it separately translated, but reproduced the one made by Boughton Rouse in his *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. I, published in 1829.<sup>3973</sup> I do not know if anyone has made a search for the Udaipur copy thereafter. The letter next appears, again in the form of an English translation, this time done by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, published in *The Modern Review* issue for January 1908. He had discovered the letter in a Persian collection of letters entitled *Khutut-i Shivaji*.<sup>3974</sup> Two copies of this collection were extant, one in Royal Asiatic Society, London, and the other in The Asiatic Society of Bengal (known since 1951 as ‘The Asiatic Society’), Kolkata. As we shall see, several differences exist in the texts of the letter in these two copies, as well as in other versions. Sarkar’s translation, made from the latter copy, with some emendations from the London copy, was reprinted in his *History of Aurangzib*.<sup>3975</sup> Sarkar attributed the authorship of the letter to Shivaji. As far as I am aware, the Persian texts of any of these copies have never been published. Apart from these modern English translations of the letter, some old Marathi translations are extant.<sup>3976</sup>

Recently, Dr. Vijay Bedekar (Thane, India) and Dr. Madhukar Ambekar (London) procured for me a photocopy of the *Khutut-i Shivaji* in the Royal Asiatic Society, London. A friend of mine tried hard to trace the copy of the collection in The Asiatic Society, Kolkata, only to find that it has curiously gone missing! Fortunately, a copy of that manuscript, made for Sir Jadunath Sarkar, has been preserved in the National Library, Kolkata. Before commenting on the authorship of the letter, I shall give below an English rendering of the Persian text available in the copy of the *Khutut-i Shivaji* that is preserved in Royal Asiatic Society, London.<sup>3977</sup> As already mentioned, there are several differences, some important ones, in various versions of the letter, of which some are mentioned in footnotes.

Letter to Emperor Aurangzeb that Neel Prabhu Munshi had written on behalf of Maharaja Shivaji:[3978](#)

This firm and constant well-wisher Shivaji[3979](#) after rendering thanks for the grace of God and favours of the Emperor — which are clearer than the sun — submits to those who kiss the foot of the throne of the Sultanate:

Although because of Fate this well-wisher came away from [your] sublime Presence without taking leave, he is ever ready, as is proper, to fulfill the obligations of service and gratitude.

The excellent services of this well-wisher are well known to the sultans, amirs, princes, and rajahs of the Empire of Hindustan and to [the rulers of] Iran, Turan [Turkomania], Balkh [in Afghanistan], Rum [Constantinople], and Sham [Syria], and to the inhabitants of the seven climes and travellers by land and sea, and their light may have flashed on the comprehensive mind [of Your Majesty]. Therefore with a view to render services and earn Your Majesty's favours he is submitting these words in the interest of public welfare.

Recently, it has come to my knowledge that because of the expedition against this well-wisher the imperial treasury has been emptied of money and material. Therefore, you have ordered that money should be exacted from the Hindu community in the form of *jizya* and with it the Empire should be supplied with material.

May the Emperor be safe! Emperor Akbar ruled with absolute authority and justice for fifty-two years. In his reign he adopted the policy of universal

toleration (*sulh-i kul*) towards various communities — such as *Isawi* [followers of Jesus, Christians] Dawudi [followers of David, Jews], Mahmudi,<sup>3980</sup> sky-worshippers, those who follow the religion of the King [*malakiyas*], those who follow the elements [*unsarias*], secularists, Brahmins, and Sewrahs.<sup>3981</sup> The aim of his comprehensive mind was the protection of, and kind treatment to, the whole human race. Therefore he became renowned by the appellation of *Jagadguru* [Spiritual Guide of the World]. Because of such blessings upon him, wherever he cast his eyes conquest and prosperity came forward to greet him and he conquered most of the rulers. Emperor Nuruddin Jahangir held the shade of his grace over the dwellers of the world for twenty-two years and obtained eternal life which is but another word for piety and a good name.<sup>3982</sup>

[Verse:] He who lives with a good name gains eternal wealth, for, after him, the remembrance of his liberality keeps his name alive.

The power and majesty of these emperors can be understood by the fact that Emperor Alamgir abandoned their policy and has become confounded. They too had the power to impose *jizya*. But they considered all men, high and low, creatures of God, examples of various religions and sects and did not give place to bigotry in their hearts. Their benevolence and kindness endure on the pages of Time. Therefore prayer and praise for these pure souls will find place for ever in the hearts, and on the tongues, of great and small. Prosperity is the result of intentions. Therefore their wealth and fortunes went on increasing, as God's creatures reposed in the cradle of peace and safety, and [their] undertakings succeeded.

In the reign of Your Majesty most of the forts and territories have gone out of your possession and those which remain will also go soon, because there would be no failure on my part in laying them waste. Your subjects are trodden under foot; the revenue from every district has declined; it is difficult to collect one thousand in place of one hundred thousand. When misery and penury have made their homes in the palaces of the emperor and the princes, the condition of amirs and *mansabdars* is not difficult to imagine. At this time military chiefs and their horsemen are lamenting; Musulmans are weeping, Hindus are grilled; the people are in want of bread and every day slap their cheeks and turn them red.<sup>3983</sup> How could the royal bounty allow you to demand the oppressive *jizya*? This evil [news] will spread from east to west and will be recorded in the book of time that the Emperor of Hind [India, Hindustan], becoming jealous of beggars' bowls is exacting *jizya* from Brahmans, Sewrahs, yogis, Sanyasis, Bairagis, indigents, poor people, paupers and the distressed and displays his valour by attacking the dishes of the beggars! He is letting down the name and honour of the House of Timur.<sup>3984</sup>

May Your Majesty remain safe! In the Divine Book and Word of God [the Quran] He is called the Lord of All Men and O! Lord of the Musulmans.<sup>3985</sup> The communities of infidelity (*kufir*)<sup>3986</sup> and Islam are a mixture of contrasting colours, creating concord by the divine painter [God]. If it be a mosque the call [to prayer] is given in His remembrance; if it be a house of images [Hindu temple] the bell is rung in yearning for Him. To display bigotry for any man's religion is to turn away from the Book [the Quran]. To draw new figures on the picture is to find fault with the painter.

Verse: "Do not lay your hand in disapproval on anything you see, be it elegant, be it ugly; whoever finds fault with the handiwork, finds fault with the craftsman."

In justice, *jizya* is not at all lawful.<sup>3987</sup> For governance it is ill-disposed and also offensive. In law and equity, it is unlawful. In former times Sultan Ahmad Gujarati deviated from the path of reality, cast away his mind in the thorny ground of foolish imagination, and got cut off from the [proper] course.<sup>3988</sup> To become imprisoned in the last days would not be agreeable and safe.

[Verse:] A distressed heart fumigates more than the mustard thrown in fire.

Any way it is advisable to remove the foulness of bigotry from [Your Majesty's] comprehensive mind and cast the glance of favour upon the miserable men who have the ring of obedience in their ears [i.e. who are in imperial service]. If you consider piety to consist in oppressing the people and attacking the Hindus you should first exact *jizya* from Raj Singh.<sup>3989</sup> When I hear of it, then it would not be difficult that this well-wisher would present himself to render service.<sup>3990</sup> But to oppress ants and flies is very far from displaying manliness and valour. It is strange that your servants avoid telling you the truth and cover a blazing fire with straw. May the sun of the Sultanate shine above the horizon of glory!

## The Riddle and Probable Solution

The question is who the real author of this letter is. The version given above specifically attributes it to Shivaji. But there are other contestants for its authorship. According to Weston it was Rajah Soubah Sing. Orme has attributed its authorship to Jaswant Singh, but he may be ruled out because he had died before the *jizya* was imposed by Aurangzeb. Still, there are two others left in the field, viz. Raj Singh and Sambhaji. If we accept Ram Singh in place of Raj Singh in the last paragraph, then Raj Singh could very well be the author of this letter. And whether it is Raj Singh or Ram Singh, Sambhaji's claim remains unaffected. Thus, if this letter is no more than a piece of fiction, as has been suspected by some scholars, there are four possible candidates for its authorship: Shivaji, Sambhaji, Raj Singh and Rajah Soubah Sing. And I am going to field one more—Aurangzeb's fourth son Prince Muhammad Akbar. My reasons for the conclusion that this letter could not have been written by Shivaji and might have been written by Muhammad Akbar are as follows:

1. The author of the letter says at the beginning that he had come away from Aurangzeb without taking leave. This could not be an allusion to Shivaji's escape from Agra in 1666, because the statement suggests that it was the *first* letter which the author wrote to Aurangzeb after coming away from him. Shivaji had written petitions to Aurangzeb and his officers after his escape and the Emperor had conferred the title of Raja upon him.<sup>3991</sup> So there would have been no propriety in broaching the subject (of his having come away without leave) after an interval of 13 years. On the other hand, this could very well be the first letter which Muhammad Akbar wrote to his father after deserting him.

2. The letter is dripping with pride for the House of Timur and Emperors Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan. It is quite natural for Muhammad Akbar to do so. In fact another letter of his, also in the *Khutut-i Shivaji* (f. 17 b)<sup>3992</sup> reminds his father that "the former Emperors *arsh-ashyani* [i.e. Akbar] *firdaus-*

*makani* [i.e. Jahangir] and *sahib-qiran sani* [i.e. Shah Jahan] attained their desired object after great exertions.”<sup>3993</sup>

3. Muhammad Akbar considered the Empire as his heritage; it was natural for him to evince anxiety about its fate.<sup>3994</sup> Shivaji, on the other hand, could not have cared less about what happened to it, his aim being to destroy it. Aurangzeb’s imposition of the *jizya* was detrimental to the Empire. Why would Shivaji enlighten him about it? Muhammad Akbar had taken refuge with the Rajputs for which reason also it was natural for him to protest against the *jizya*. In fact, he does so in his letter cited above.<sup>3995</sup>

4. It is strange that copies of the letter are found in Rajasthan and Maharashtra and that it is attributed to not less than five persons: Shivaji, Sambhaji, Raj Singh, Jaswant Singh, and Rajah Soubah Sing. Muhammad Akbar had fled from Rajasthan to the Deccan and had taken refuge with the Maratha King Sambhaji. It is probable that *munshis* in the service of Sambhaji as well as those in the service of Rajput rajas took down copies of the letter for their collections of model letters. This would explain why copies are found in these two provinces.

It is not unusual to find letters in such collections attributed to wrong persons. For instance, a letter in *Khutut-i Shivaji* (f.24 b-25a), attributed to Dilir Khan, informs Shivaji that his son Sambhaji had been granted the *mansab* of 6000 *dhat/6000 sawar/5000 du aspa sih aspa*, a flag, kettle drums and a present of eight million *dams* by the Emperor. But this letter, which must have been written in 1675 when Shivaji concluded a sham treaty with the Mughals, could not have been written by Dilir Khan who was at the time *subadar* of Multan (Sindh).<sup>3996</sup> It must have been written by Khan Jahan Bahadur Zafar Jang Kokaltash (Bahadur Khan). The fact that the letter written in protest against the *jizya* has been assigned to five persons — Raja Soubah Sing, Jaswant Singh, Raj Singh, Shivaji, and

Sambhaji — shows that it has been wrongly attributed to at least four, if not all of them.

Some scholars have cast doubts about the genuineness of the letter. For instance: Zahhiruddin Faruki says: "The truth is that the letter is transparently spurious."<sup>3997</sup> And Elphinstone comments: It is not improbable that it is the work of some private Hindu politician who chose this way of publishing a sort of manifesto against the Government."<sup>3998</sup> These remarks are not without substance. I do not know of any other document, except a piece of fiction, of which so many copies were made. The fact that so many copies of the document are found in diverse places and these are attributed to not less than five different persons suggests that it was originally written as a piece of fiction.

My conclusions, therefore, about the authorship of this document are:

- (1) It could not have been written by, or at the behest of, Shivaji.
- (2) In all probability it is a piece of fiction.
- (3) If at all it is genuine, it was most probably written by Aurangzeb's son Muhammad Akbar.

## **Appendix X - Portraits of Shivaji**

John L'Escalot, the English chaplain at Surat, has left us a description of Shivaji in his letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> January 1664.. He writes: "His person is described by them who have seen him to be of mean stature, lower somewhat than I am erect, and of an excellent proportion; active in exercise and whenever he speaks seems to smile; a quick and piercing eye, and whiter than any of his people."<sup>3999</sup>

The Frenchman Thevenot, who travelled in the Deccan from January 1666 to February 1667, also describes him. He says: "This Raja [Shivaji] is short and tawny, with quick eyes that show a great deal of wit. He eats but once a day commonly, and is in good health."<sup>4000</sup> Thevenot had not seen the "Raja" either and he does not mention who his informants were.

Parkaldas, Jai Singh's officer who was at Agra when Shivaji visited Aurangzeb's court there, might have seen him. He writes: "Shivaji looks lean and short. He is very handsome and fair. The mere sight of him is enough to tell that he is a brave and courageous man. He keeps a beard."<sup>4001</sup> That Shivaji sported a beard is mentioned in the *Shivabharat* also.<sup>4002</sup>

Surprisingly, many Englishmen who had visited Shivaji have left no details of Shivaji's appearance.

The common points in all the available descriptions are:

1. Fair complexion.
2. Short or medium height.
3. Exceptionally piercing eyes.
4. Beard.

At least three near-contemporaneous portraits of Shivaji have survived. They correspond with the last two points of these descriptions and also with each other. These, in brief, are as follows:

1. In 1701 Manucci sent three parts of his memoirs to Europe with an officer of the French East India Company, Boureau Deslandes. With these he had also sent a set of 56 miniatures in colour.<sup>4003</sup> About these he says:

“Before I left the Mughal dominions [that is before 1686], to satisfy my curiosity I caused portraits to be painted of all the kings and princes from Timur-i-lang to Aurangzeb including the sons and grandsons of the last named, together with the portraits of the ruler over Bijapur and Golconda, of some of the chief Hindu princes and other famous generals. The artist was a friend of mine, Mir Muhammad, an official in the household of the prince, Shah Alam, and all were copied down from originals in the royal palace....Meanwhile to get them I have spared no expense, and have given Many presents; and the whole was carried out under great difficulties, it being incumbent on me to observe profound secrecy as to my having the copies....It should be remembered that all portraits showing nimbus and an umbrella over the head are those of persons of blood royal.”<sup>4004</sup>

These 56 miniatures, bound in a volume, were carried off by the French from Italy in 1797 as part of the booty during their war against Austria. The volume now forms part of the collection in the *Cabinet des Estampes* in *Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris), classed as O. D. No. 45 (*réservé*). It is labeled on the outside, ‘*Histoire de l’Inde depuis Tamerlank jusqu’à Orangzeb, par Manucci*’ and bears the year 1712. Opposite each picture is a description in French, evidently composed by Manucci.<sup>4005</sup>

Of these miniatures, 41 are portraits and the rest depict scenes, such as an elephant fight, a palanquin, a hunter and his cheetah, and *sati*. The portraits include one of Shivaji. Most of the other portraits are those of his contemporaries like Aurangzeb, Murad Bakhsh, Shayista Khan, Dilir Khan, Sharza Khan and Madanna; only a few, like those of Timur and Akbar, belong to pre-Shivaji times. All these pictures are reproduced, in black and white, in Irvine's translation of the *Storia do Mogor*. Among these, Shivaji's portrait is printed in Vol. III facing p. 384. Below it is the legend "Rajah Shiva Ji, Mahrattah" presumably taken from the description provided by Manucci. This picture is reproduced in colour in the Marathi book *Shivarajasi Athavave*, published by the Government Printing Press of the Government of Maharashtra. The scene depicts a procession with Shivaji on horseback attended by some 25 footmen. The word 'SEVAGI' is inscribed at the top of the portrait. The notable features of his face in this picture are a black beard and mustache, and long straight nose. The turban has a black plume at the back and a tassel (of pearls?) suspended below it.

2. A near-contemporaneous portrait of Shivaji is preserved in the British Museum, viz., MS. Add. 22, 282 (Picture No.12). In the top right corner, it bears a Dutch inscription "Sieuwagie gewezen Maratise vorst", which means, "Shivaji the former Maratha prince" or, we might say, Shivaji, the *late* Maratha prince. This set of Indian portraits contains a portrait of Aurangzeb also which is inscribed with a Dutch legend "Orangzeeb 4' [vierden] zoon van Sjah Sjahaan, en gegenwoordigen groten Mogol" meaning "Aurangzeb, fourth son of Shah Jahan, and the present Great Mughal."<sup>4006</sup> As Shivaji died in 1680, and Aurangzeb in 1707, this set of portraits seems to have been made, or, in my opinion, copied, between these two dates. As the inscriptions on the portrait are in Dutch, the anonymous artist almost certainly must have been a Dutchman. This portrait covers the figure up to the waist. The features are distinguished by a black beard and mustache, and

an aquiline nose. The turban is similar to that depicted in Shivaji's portrait in Manucci's collection, with a black plume at the back and a white tassel suspended from it.

3. *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (Old and New East Indies) by François Valentyn<sup>4007</sup>(1666-1727) was published at Amsterdam in five volumes (printed in eight separate books) from 1724 to 1726. The author had lived as a padre in the Dutch East Indies for about fifteen years. His monumental work contains several black and white maps, charts, diagrams, landscapes, and portraits. *Deel IV, Stuk 2* (Volume IV, Part 2), entitled *Beschryving...van de Levens der Groote Mogols*, published in 1726, contains, among other subjects, biographical sketches of Mughal Emperors and an account of Surat. Portraits of Mughal Emperors and some other illustrations, including a portrait of Shivaji, are also printed in it.<sup>4008</sup> These portraits seem to have been acquired in 1712, when the delegation of the Dutch East India Company visited the Mughal court. The name of the artist is not known. Some of these have been reproduced in the second revised edition of an English translation of Bernier's *Travels in the Mogul Empire* published by the Oxford University Press in 1916. Shivaji's portrait is among them, printed at page 187. Below it is the legend, *Den Heer Seva Gi* (The Lord Shivaji). This portrait is a bust, showing Shivaji with a black beard, mustache, long sidelocks and an aquiline nose. The turban is similar to that in the two portraits described above, but there is no plume, only the tassel. His hands are resting on a railing.<sup>4009</sup>

The facial features in all these portraits is remarkably similar and in keeping with the pen-portraits of Shivaji drawn by his contemporaries. So these portraits, especially the first two, might be regarded as authentic portraits.

## **Appendix XI - Coinage in Shivaji's Times**

A coin in Shivaji's times was not merely a symbolic representation of value. It was actually worth the value of the metal intrinsic to it. Since the imprint on a coin was a guarantee that the coin was made from a particular metal (or alloy) of a certain weight and purity, it was not necessary to check these attributes every time a cash transaction was done. In the Mughal Empire, imported gold and silver as well as coins had to be submitted to government mints for striking coins and a specific fee had to be paid as mintage.<sup>4010</sup> Since the value of a coin was in fact equivalent to the value of the metal it contained, the exchange rate of coins made of different metals would fluctuate according to the rise and fall in metal prices at any specific place and time.<sup>4011</sup>

Some systems then prevalent to facilitate commerce and money transfer were:

*Toda*

Tavernier writes:

"When you desire to make a payment of 1000 or 2000 pagodas, the [money] changer, when receiving his dues, encloses them in a little bag, on which he places his seal, and when you wish to pay a merchant for his diamonds, you take him, with the bag, to the changer, who, on seeing his own seal intact, assures him that he has examined all the coins, and will be responsible if any do not prove good."<sup>4012</sup>

The little bag of money described by Tavernier was called a *toda*. Before sealing it, the amount it contained and the name of

the person who owned it was written on the *toda*. Such sealed *todas* were used like currency for trading.<sup>4013</sup>

### *Hundi*

The *hundi* was a letter of credit given by a commercial house (*pedhi*) against the sum of money that was deposited with him. This made it possible for the bearer to encash the amount from a *pedhi* in another town by presenting such letter. The *hundi* facilitated financial transactions and eliminated the risk of travelling with large sums of money.

### *Barat:*

A *barat* was an order in writing made by a person directing another to pay a certain sum of money to the person named in the order.<sup>4014</sup> The *hundi* was like a draft, whereas the *barat* was like a cheque. Generally, a *barat* was drawn by a higher office on a lower office, or by a creditor on a debtor. For instance, a *jagirdar* would issue a *barat* on the treasury of a *pargana* in his *jagir*. So sometimes a *barat* was not honoured for lack of funds or also because the higher office would secretly instruct the lower office not to honour it.<sup>4015</sup>

## **Coinage Commonly Used in Shivaji's Times**

Only such coins of Shivaji's times which have been mentioned in the text are noticed below.

### *Ashrafi or Muhar*

This was a gold coin issued in the Mughal Empire and was made of high-purity gold; it weighed around 170 grain, and was the equivalent of a sum between Rs.14 and Rs.16.<sup>4016</sup>

### *Dam*

The Dam or Paisa was a copper coin struck by the Mughals, had a diameter of about 2 to 2.5 cm and weighed about 320 grains. The exchange rate of the Dam with the Rupee, and of course with any other non-cupric coin, would fluctuate according to the rise and fall in the relative prices of copper and other metals. However, irrespective of this fluctuation, payment of salaries of Mughal *mansabdars* and calculation of revenues and income from *jagirs* was always done at the fixed rate of 40 Dams to a Rupee.<sup>4017</sup>

### *Écu*

One Écu was equal to 3 Livre. The Livre was an imaginary French unit of value used for accounting purposes.<sup>4018</sup>

1 Rupee = 1.5 Livre<sup>4019</sup>

### *Fanam or Falam*

The Fanam or Falam is a corrupt form of the Sanskrit word, *Panam*.<sup>4020</sup> It was a gold coin struck by the Hindu kings of South India and weighed around 5-6 grains. The amount of gold in this coin was less than that in the Hon. One Hon was worth 15-16 Fanams.<sup>4021</sup>

The British used to strike Fanams in their Madras [now Chennai] colony; the Dutch minted Fanams in their Pulicat colony and the Danes, in their Tranquebar colony. One Hon was worth 32-36 Madras Fanams, and 24 Pulicat or Tranquebar Fanams.<sup>4022</sup>

It is stated in Rajaram's letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> February 1696 that one Padshahi Hon was worth 16 Chhatrapati Falams.<sup>4023</sup> It is quite clear that this Falam was issued by the Maratha Chhatrapati, but there is no way of knowing who introduced it first, Shivaji, Sambhaji, or Rajaram. But it seems probable that it was first issued by Rajaram while he was at Gingee.

### *Guilder or Florin*

This unit of currency was used for maintaining accounts of the Dutch East India Company.<sup>4024</sup> One Guilder was equal to 20 Stuivers and the exchange rate for one Rupee was 24 Stuivers.<sup>4025</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}1 \text{ Rupee} &= 1.2 \text{ Florin} \\1 \text{ Florin} &= 5/6^{\text{th}} \text{ Rupee}\end{aligned}$$

### *Hon*

The Hon was a gold coin. It was also called the Varah. The *varah* (the ‘wild boar’, third incarnation of Vishnu in Hindu mythology) was the royal emblem of the Chalukyas of Vatapi, and their coins also had the likeness of the boar inscribed on them, from which the coin might have got its name. It continued to be known as the Varah, however, even when the coin no longer carried the image.

The Hon was called ‘Pagoda’ by Europeans possibly because it had the image of an idol inscribed on it and, since idols were worshipped in temples which were called ‘pagodas’ by them, the coin was also given that name.<sup>4026</sup> Hons minted by the Emperors of Vijaynagar weigh about 52 grains and are 1 to 1.25 cm in diameter. Sometimes, adjectives like Harihari, Achyutrai, Devrai, Shreerangrai were also used for Hon. It is quite clear that such names were derived from the respective Emperor in whose reign they were struck. It is also observed that adjectives like ‘Dharwadi’ or ‘Adavni’ were used to distinguish between them on the basis of names of the towns (Dharwad and Adoni) where they were struck.

The Adilshah and Qutbshah also issued Hons.<sup>4027</sup> A farman dated 29<sup>th</sup> May 1654 issued by Muhammad Adilshah mentions some ‘Muhammadshahi Hons’ which were struck in his

name.<sup>4028</sup> Some Hons minted during his reign are available. They weigh around 52 grains and measure 1 cm in diameter.<sup>4029</sup> Some Marathi and Persian documents mention the ‘Padshahi’ Hon.<sup>4030</sup> It seems that Adilshahi Hons were also known by that name.

The British first struck Pagodas (i.e. Hon) in their Armagaon Colony and later in their Madras (now Chennai) Colony, the Dutch in their Pulicat Colony, the Danes in their Tranquebar Colony and the Portuguese in their Meliapur (San Thomé) Colony.<sup>4031</sup> The English Pagoda featured an image of the deity Vishnu on one side, while the other was blank.<sup>4032</sup>

One finds mention of two types of Hons in 17<sup>th</sup> Century European documents, especially those originating from the Coromandel Coast: Old Hons and New Hons.<sup>4033</sup>

Tavernier writes:

“Payments are made there [Golconda] with old pagodas, well worn, and coined many centuries ago by different Princes, who reigned in India before the Muhammadans gained a footing in the country. These old pagodas are worth 4 ½ rupees, i.e. 1 rupee more than the new, although they do not contain more gold, and consequently do not weigh more; this will be a cause of astonishment if I do not explain the reason. It is that the shroffs or [money] changers, in order to induce the king [Qutbshah] not to have them recoined, pay him annually a large sum, because they themselves thereby derive a considerable profit; for the merchants never receive these pagodas without the aid of one of these changers to examine them, some being defaced, others of low standard, others of short weight, so that if one accepted them without this examination he would lose much, and would have the trouble to return them, or perhaps lose from

1 to even 5 or 6 per cent, in addition to which he must pay the shroff 1/4<sup>th</sup> per cent for their trouble. When you pay the miners they will also receive these pagodas in presence of the changer who points out to them the good and bad, and again takes his 1/4<sup>th</sup> per cent.”<sup>4034</sup>

However, a letter dated 1<sup>st</sup> December 1667, sent by the British factors at Maddapolam to the East India Company’s main office in London, says that the Qutbshah had made it compulsory for his officials to remit revenue into his treasury in old Pagodas. Hence, the demand for old Pagodas had exceeded the supply. Thus, by artificially raising the value of Pagodas, the Qutbshah was earning a sum equal to the tribute he had to pay to the Mughal Emperor!<sup>4035</sup> By the treaty of 1636, the Qutbshah had agreed to pay an annual tribute of 200,000 Hon, i.e. 800,000 rupees, to the Mughal Emperor.<sup>4036</sup> Reckoning the tribute in rupees and paying it in old pagodas, the Qutbshah would have been required to pay less than 200,000 pagodas because of their artificially raised price. But Shah Jahan saw through the trick and demanded that the amount of tribute must be reckoned in old pagodas and paid in rupees at the rate of five rupees per pagoda!<sup>4037</sup> It seems that during Aurangzeb’s reign an annual tribute of Rs.1,000,000 was being realized from the Qutbshah by reckoning it in old pagodas and realizing it in rupees.<sup>4038</sup> Yet, it seems that the artificial increase in the price of the old pagoda was proving profitable to the Qutbshah, for at least till 1667 the market price of an old pagoda was higher than its intrinsic value.<sup>4039</sup>

Many types of Hons were in circulation and their prices varied. It is difficult to distinguish between the old and the new Hons. Particular types of Hon minted by the Emperors of Vijaynagar were called the old Pagodas whereas Hons struck by the British in the Chennai mint were included in the category of new Pagodas. It also seems that some other Hons were considered as new Pagodas. The price of old Pagodas was more

than their intrinsic value. It was not as if all Hons or Pagodas fell in these two categories. Some belonged to neither.

It may be said from available documents that the Padshahi Hon was predominantly in circulation in Maharashtra.<sup>4040</sup> ‘Nishani’ Hons were used in South Konkan.<sup>4041</sup> The value of one Padshahi Hon was about Rs.3.75.<sup>4042</sup> One Padshahi Hon was worth 1.25 Nishani Hon.<sup>4043</sup>

### *Shivaji’s Hon*

Shivaji, as already mentioned, commenced striking coins in his own name since his coronation. Among these, his Hon is very rare and fabrications abound. The one preserved in the Prince of Wales Museum is, in my opinion, of undoubted authenticity. It is about 1.3 cm in diameter and weighs about 2.8 grams. It bears the legend ‘Shree | Raja | Shiv’ on one side and ‘Chhatra | Pati’ on the other. A variety of Hon, called the Shivarai Hon, is mentioned in documents long before Shivaji’s coronation.<sup>4044</sup> These, in all probability, were issued during the reign of Emperor Sadashivrao of Vijayanagar (c.1541-1570).

### *Jittal*

The *Ain-i Akbari* says that the Dam was divided into 24 imaginary parts called the Jittal to facilitate accounting. Only accountants made use of this unit.<sup>4045</sup>

Another Jittal seems to have been in use. It appears from a British account sheet written in 1676, that 48 Jittals were worth a Sangari Pagoda or Hon.<sup>4046</sup> Fryer, while giving information about the coins prevalent in Rajapur, says that the exchange rate for 1 Pagoda (i.e. 1 Hon) was 48 Jittals. He also states that the Jittal was “an imaginary coin”.<sup>4047</sup>

An English letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> January 1650 shows that Jittal was prevalent in and around Surat, and 48 Jittals were worth 1

Mahmudi.<sup>4048</sup> Perhaps, even this Jittal was not a tangible coin, but only an imaginary unit of currency.

### *Lari*

The Lari was a silver coin weighing about 4.7 grams. It was made by bending a silver wire about 7.5 to 10 cm long and about 1/3 cm thick into a shape resembling a hairpin. Both the tips of this wire were flattened and a stamp punched on them.<sup>4049</sup> These coins were struck on the Konkan coast under Adilshahi rule and were in circulation mainly in that province.<sup>4050</sup>

Pietro Della Valle says that the Lari received its name because it was first struck in a city called Lar in South Iran.<sup>4051</sup> Some old documents mention the Dabholi Lari, Chauli Lari, Basri Lari and Hurmuji Lari, obviously named after the towns where they were struck.<sup>4052</sup> Several old documents mention the Lari without any adjective; it seems therefore that the value of all Laris struck at different places was more or less the same.

Conversion rate of the Lari with other coins was as follows:<sup>4053</sup>

1 Real of Eight = 5.5 to 6 Laris  
1 Rupee = 2.5 to 3 Laris.

### *Mahmudi*

The Mahmudi was a silver coin and was first issued in the reign of Mahmud Begada, Sultan of Gujarat (1458-1511). It weighed around 80-90 grains. It seems that Akbar, after conquering Gujarat in 1572, introduced the Rupee there. However, even thereafter, the Mahmudi was in circulation in Gujarat and adjoining provinces for many years. The King of Baglan used to strike these coins in Mulher.<sup>4054</sup>

The exchange rate of the Mahmudi with other coins was as follows:[4055](#)

1 Rupee = 2.5 Mahmudis  
1 Real of Eight = 5 Mahmudis  
1 Shilling = 1 Mahmudi

### *Pound-Shilling-Pence*

The Pound was an English coin made in gold. 1 Shilling was worth 12 Pence and 20 Shillings were equal to 1 Pound.

The exchange rate of the Pound with other coins was as follows:[4056](#)

1 Rupee = 2 Shilling and 3 Pence  
1 Mahmudi = 1 Shilling  
1 Real of Eight = 5 Shillings

### *Real [pl. Reis] / Piece of Eight*

The Real, a Spanish silver coin, is mentioned in contemporaneous English sources as the 'Real of Eight' or 'Piece of Eight'.[4057](#) A coin of eight reis is intended there. It was also called the Dollar.

The exchange rate of the Real or Piece of Eight with other coins was as follows:[4058](#)

1 Real of Eight = 2 Rupees  
1 Real of Eight = 5 Shillings  
1 Real of Eight = 5 Mahmudis  
1 Real of Eight = 2 Sherafin

A Portuguese coin, also called the Real (pl. Reis), was an imaginary coin used only for accounting purposes.[4059](#)

### *Ruka and Taka*

The Ruka was a copper coin. Taka was just an imaginary unit used for keeping accounts.<sup>4060</sup> One taka was equal to 48 rukas. One Padshahi Hon was worth 10 to 12 takas.<sup>4061</sup>

The Ruka and Taka were common mostly in the Nizamshahi and Adilshahi territories, i.e. in areas that were predominantly Marathi speaking.

### *Rupee*

The Rupee was a Mughal coin made of high purity silver with a diameter of 2 to 2.5 cm. It weighed about 175 grains. One anna was worth one sixteenth of a Rupee.

The exchange rate of the Rupee with other coins was:

- 1 Rupee = 2.5 Mahmudis
- 1 Rupee = 2.5 to 3 Laris
- 1 Rupee = 2 Shillings and 3 Pence
- 1 Rupee = 0.5 Real of Eight.

### *Sherafin*

The Sherafin was a Portuguese coin minted in the Portuguese colonies in India. One rupee was worth 1.3 sherafins.<sup>4062</sup>

### *Shivrai*

The Shivrai was a copper coin issued by Shivaji and featured the legend 'Shree | Raja | Shiv' on one side and 'Chhatra | Pati' on the other. Around these words, on both the sides, is a circle of dots. Copper coins of this description have been found in such a vast number (and are still being found), that it seems improbable all of them were struck during Shivaji's reign. Some

of them must have been minted during his rule; some might have been issued during the rule of his descendants of the Satara and Kolhapur lineages. However, there is no doubt that the first Shivrai coins were struck under Shivaji's authority. Some coins, quite similar to Shivrai coins but far fewer in number, bearing names like Shree Rajaram Chhatrapati, Shree Shahu Raja Chhatrapati, Shree Ram Raja Chhatrapati and Shree Raja Chhatrapati are also found.<sup>4063</sup>

Shivaji's letters of grant and appointment issued after his coronation have his name written as 'Shree Raja Shivachhatrapati.' No letters or other documents written before his coronation have his name styled thus. Hence, it seems that coins bearing the name 'Shree Raja Shivachhatrapati' must have been issued after his coronation.

Shivrai coins featuring 'Shree Raja Shivachhatrapati' are not necessarily all of the same weight.<sup>4064</sup> Their value must therefore have varied according to their weight. It appears from a reference that their price was expressed in a unit known as the *Ruka*.<sup>4065</sup>

#### A note on silver coins purported to be issued by Shivaji

Some researchers have produced silver coins which according to them were minted by Shivaji.<sup>4066</sup> However, I reject these claims for the following reasons:

1. Since Shivaji is profoundly revered and worshipped by the people of Maharashtra, coins and other objects of his times command immense value. This creates the very real possibility of counterfeit objects being represented as genuine. A number of methods are available for determining authenticity of documents. But this is not the case where metals, especially gold and silver are involved. Anybody can make an impression of Shivaji's name on a piece of gold and attempt to pass it off as a coin struck under his authority. It would be improper to accept

such a piece as a genuine coin without first subjecting it to thorough examination. As far as is known about these purported coins of Shivaji, they have not undergone such examination. Without even fleetingly doubting the integrity of the researchers concerned, it would be too much to assume that they had not been led into error of judgement by other interested parties.

2. There is no contemporaneous evidence that Shivaji ever struck silver coins. Shivaji had issued copper Shivrai coins. Though there is no contemporaneous evidence that he issued gold coins, a Hon with an imprint of Shivaji's name on it has been found long ago when the possibility of it being deliberately forged was very remote or non-existent. It may thus be assumed that Shivaji had struck gold coins. The silver coins, on the other hand, have come to light in recent times when the idea of forging coins could occur to someone.

3. Shivaji's administrative system, before his coronation, was largely modelled on the Adilshahi, where copper coins like Ruka-Taka or gold Hons were prevalent. Hence, it seems quite natural that Shivaji did issue copper and gold coins. The silver Lari was prevalent in the Adilshahi Konkan and it should astonish none if Shivaji had struck these. However, the silver coins purportedly attributed to Shivaji are not modelled on Laris, but are modelled on the Rupee, which was a Mughal coin. It seems unlikely that Shivaji would strike coins modelled on the Mughal Rupee.

For these reasons, it is difficult to accept the claim that the silver coins under discussion were issued by Shivaji. Needless to state, the reasons here given for eyeing their authenticity with suspicion, are insufficient and hence, not decisive. Therefore, while it cannot be vehemently said that they were not minted by Shivaji, it must be borne in mind that no evidence proves that the coins were struck by Shivaji except that his name is inscribed on them. Unless and until conclusive evidence

becomes available, it is incorrect to assume that Shivaji struck these silver coins.

## **Appendix XII - Weights and Measures**

The principal unit of measurement by weight or by volume was called the *man*.<sup>4067</sup> In the Mughal Empire, grain, indigo, quicksilver and various other articles of consumption were measured by weight. In his account of the Mughal Empire, Pelsaert says: "No goods are sold by measure as we sell grain, etc., but everything is weighed by the *maund*."<sup>4068</sup>

The *man* by weight contained 40 *sers*.<sup>4069</sup> But there were different varieties of the *man* by weight, because the weight of the *ser*, and therefore that of the *man*, differed from place to place, and, in some cases, even at the same place for different commodities.<sup>4070</sup> The main types (with local variations) were as follows:

(i) The Surat (or Gujarat) *man* of about 33 pounds

Pelsaert says that "in Surat, and practically throughout Gujarat", "a *ser* weighs only 18 pice or  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. (Holland), 24 pice weighing 1 pound."<sup>4071</sup> This makes a *man* equal to about 32.7 English pounds.<sup>4072</sup> An English letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> September 1631 from Surat to Bantam says that the price of rice was one Mahmudi for 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  *sers*.<sup>4073</sup> On receipt of a copy of the letter in London, this price was converted into "rice 12d. for 30 oz." in a marginal note.<sup>4074</sup> Taking the worth of a Mahmudi at one shilling, the weight of a *ser* works out to  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. and that of the *man* to 30 lb. A letter dated 17<sup>th</sup> January 1643 from Swally to the Company mentions their having bought Agra indigo at Rs.32 per Surat *maund* "which is 26 $\frac{3}{4}$  d."<sup>4075</sup> Taking the value of a rupee as 2 shillings 3 pence, the weight of the Surat *man* mentioned in the letter comes to about 32.3 lbs. Another letter, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1646, from Swally to Company mentions that the *man* of 40 *sers*, that was used to weigh elephant's tusks,

weighed about 33 pounds.<sup>4076</sup> Tavernier says that at Surat the *man* used for weighing indigo was 42 *sers* or “34½ of our *livres*.<sup>4077</sup> The *man* of 42 *sers* was *pucka* or *pukka man* as against the ordinary *man* of 40 *sers*. If the *pucka man* was equal to 34 ½ French *livres* then the *man* of 40 *sers* would be equal to about 32⁶/₇ *livres*, i.e. about 35 lbs.<sup>4078</sup> According to Mandelslo, the *man* of 40 *sers* was equal to 30½ *livres* i.e. about 32.4 pounds.<sup>4079</sup> Thevenot says that the Surat *ser* was equal to about 14 ounces (French).<sup>4080</sup> This makes a *man* of 40 *sers* equal to 35 *livres*, i.e. about 37 pounds. It seems that these various sources are referring to the same variety of *man* and that it weighed somewhere between 30 and 35 pounds, or rather close to 33 pounds.

(ii) The Akbari *man* of around 54 pounds used around the Agra region

According to the *Ain-i Akbari*, Akbar fixed the weight of a *ser* at 30 *dams*.<sup>4081</sup> Pelsaert says that the Akbari *ser* weighed 30 paisa or 1¼ pounds and that the Akbari *man* weighed 50 lb.<sup>4082</sup> He also says that at Patna a *man* of silk weighed 50 pounds and that at Agra the *man* of cloves, nutmeg, mace, sandalwood, and quicksilver weighed 50 pounds.<sup>4083</sup> The pound meant by Pelsaert was the Holland pound which he says weighed 24 pice.<sup>4084</sup> This makes an Akbari *man* equal to about 54 pounds. Tavernier mentions a *man*, used for weighing Indigo, which, he says, was equal to 53 *livres*.<sup>4085</sup> This makes a *man* equal to about 56.3 pounds. Tavernier does not mention whether this was a *man* of 40 *sers* or of 42 *sers*. If it was of 42 *sers*, then the one of 40 would weigh about 53.5 pounds. Elsewhere in his memoirs, he states that a *man* around Agra used for measuring indigo was equal to 51¾ of “our [i.e. the French] *livres*.<sup>4086</sup> This makes a *man* equal to about 55 pounds.

(iii) The Jahangiri *man* of about 65 pounds:

Pelsaert says that a Jahangiri *ser* was equal to 1½ lb. and a Jahangiri *man* equal to 60 lbs.<sup>4087</sup> These are Holland pounds. This makes a *man* equal to about 65.4 English pounds. Mundy states that “16 *maund* Jahangiri” were “near 1000 [lb.] weight English.”<sup>4088</sup> This makes a Jahangiri *man* equal to 62.5 lbs. Elsewhere he writes: “The weight [here at Patna] 37 pice to a *ser* and 40 *ser* to one *maund*; 22 pice is nearest 1 lb. English of 16 ounces.”<sup>4089</sup> This makes a *man* at Patna equal to about 67.25 pounds. This, too, therefore, may be the Jahangiri *man*.

(iv) The Bengali *man* of about 74 pounds:

At one place in his account, Tavernier has stated that the ordinary *man* was equal to 69 livres.<sup>4090</sup> This makes a *man* equal to about 73.7 English pounds. According to Dutch sources, the *man* in Bengal was equal to 68 Dutch pounds.<sup>4091</sup> This makes a *man* equal to about 74.12 English pounds.

(v) *Man* of 128 pounds

A 1642 English letter from Balasore says that a *man* of cloth was 64 pounds and that of sugar, 128 pounds.<sup>4092</sup> So the latter was about double the weight of the Jahangiri *man*.

Besides these five varieties, another was noticed in south India. It was

(vi) The *man* of about 25 pounds (with local variations)

Writing towards the end of 1614, an anonymous Dutch author states that in the kingdom of Golconda one *khandi* or *bahar* was 480 pounds in some places and 500 pounds in others, and that each *khandi* contained 20 *maunds* and each *maund* contained 40 *sers*.<sup>4093</sup> His pounds are presumably Holland pounds, which gives us 24 or 25 Holland pounds to the *man*. In his account of the Qutbshahi Sultanate, Schorer writes in 1616 that one *maund* was equal to 23 Holland pounds at

Tegenapatnam (i.e. Devanampattinam), 25 Holland pounds at Nizampatnam and 24 Holland pounds at Pulicat and Machilipatnam.<sup>4094</sup> A letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1619 from Machilipatnam to the Company states that a *man* of silk was about 26 English pounds.<sup>4095</sup> Another dated 27<sup>th</sup> August 1621 from the same place to the Company says that at Petapolly a *man* of brass was 26 pounds.<sup>4096</sup> According to an English letter written about May 1620, a *khandi* of pepper at Bhatkal was “found, by trial thereof with our English weights, to contain 502 pounds net.”<sup>4097</sup> This makes the weight of a *man* equal to about 25 pounds. A letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> October 1621 from Chaul to the Company say that at Dabhol a *man* of pepper was between 24 and 25 pounds.<sup>4098</sup> Writing in 1625 or 1626 about the Qutbshahi Sultanate, Methwold states that one *viss* was equal to 3 pounds English weight.<sup>4099</sup> One *man* contained 40 *sers* or 8 *viss*.<sup>4100</sup> So one *man* was equal to 24 pounds English. Pelsaert mentions that the *maund* of 25 [Holland] pounds was used to weigh cloves at Machilipatnam.<sup>4101</sup> This would be equal to about 27 English pounds (avoirdupois).

It is not clear whether the *mans* of pepper at Chaul and Bhatkal were *maunds* by weight or *maunds* by volume. In south India, several articles were measured by volume rather than by weight. It is possible that the *man* of pepper was a measure by volume and the Englishmen might have converted it into pounds for their convenience. But the *man* of silk and that of brass must have been measures of weight. It may also be noted that the anonymous Dutch author, Schorer and Methwold have given their scales in general terms not relating to any particular commodity. So these, too, must have been *mans* by weight.<sup>4102</sup>

Gold, silver, and precious stones were weighed in *tolas*. The scale was twelve *masas* to one *tola* and one *masa* to eight *ratis*.<sup>4103</sup> Tavernier says that weight of a *tola* “amounts to 9 deniers 8 grains of our weight.”<sup>4104</sup> Each *tola* would therefore be equivalent to 187.5 grains Troy or about 12.15 grams.

In Adilshahi and Nizamshahi territories, various kinds of grain were measured by volume; certain articles of consumption like sugar, jaggery and oil were measured by weight; ghee was measured by either of these two methods.<sup>4105</sup> Two types of *man* by volume were used for measuring grain; one containing 16 *payalis* and the other containing 12. The *khandi* of both types contained 20 *mans*; the one containing 20 *mans* of 16 *payalis* each was called the *solule khandi* and the one containing 20 *mans* of 12 *payalis* each was called the *barule khandi*.<sup>4106</sup> Each *payali* in both types was of 4 *sers*.<sup>4107</sup> Due to variations in *mans* by volume, it is not possible to give their present equivalents. Units of weight used for measuring ghee and oil were different. These were measured by *taks*, 72 of which made a *ser*, and 40 *sers* made a *man*.<sup>4108</sup> Sometimes these were also used for measuring grain, sugar and jaggery.<sup>4109</sup>

## Measurement of Length

The units used for measurement of length were *tasu*, *gaz*, *kathi*, *kos* and *gao*.

Europeans generally used the Portuguese term *covado* (cubit) or its corrupt form for the *gaz*.<sup>4110</sup> The *gaz* was equal to 24 *tasus*.<sup>4111</sup> It was used for measurement of cloth and land. The length of the *gaz* varied from place to place.<sup>4112</sup> The *tasu* of Surat was slightly larger than an inch.<sup>4113</sup> The main types of *gaz* were: In Gujarat the *gaz* was equal to about 27 inches.<sup>4114</sup> The *Ilahi gaz* introduced by Akbar was equal to about 32 inches and was in use around Agra.<sup>4115</sup> The *Jahangiri gaz* introduced by Jahangir was equal to about 40 inches and was used around Patna.<sup>4116</sup>

In Maharashtra the unit of measurement of farm land was the *kathi* (stick). One *kathi* was equal to 84 *tasus*, or five cubits plus the length of five *muthis* (fists).<sup>4117</sup>

The *kos* was used for measurement of distance. Like the *gaz*, the length of the *kos*, too, differed from place to place.<sup>4118</sup>

Generally speaking, it was between 2 and 2 1/2 miles.<sup>4119</sup>

The *gao* was a very vague unit for expressing distance, the length attributed to it varying from 2.5 to 9 miles.<sup>4120</sup>

### **Measurement of Area**

Area of land was measured in *bighas*. Like the units of length, the *bigha*, too, varied from place to place. The *bigha* introduced by Akbar was 3600 square *gaz* (i.e. about 25,600 sq. feet, or about 2378 sq. meters, which is approximately 0.59 acre or 0.239 hectare).<sup>4121</sup> In Maharashtra, one *bigha* was equal to 400 square *kathis*.<sup>4122</sup> One hundred and twenty *bighas* made a *chavar*.<sup>4123</sup>

## **Appendix XIII - Notes on Maps**

Features like political boundaries or roads represented in maps are, after all, man-made and, while they are not verbal statements, their graphic essence is a definitive statement all the same. Therefore, just as verbal statements need supporting evidence, it necessarily follows that graphic statements also need to be backed by some reference that corroborates them.

An explanation is sought to be provided here of the premises upon which various maps contained in the present work have been drawn.

The boundaries shown in these maps are not exact or accurate. Indeed, they cannot be, because dependable information of exact geographic boundaries prevailing in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century is not available. As such, well established, accepted and relatively unambiguous points of reference have been used for the purpose of ascertaining such features with the greatest degree of accuracy - which village was part of whose territory, or some prominent mountain range, or the course of a river. These maps may not be accurate but they suffice for a general idea of the particular topic under discussion. (Not all the places mentioned in the appendix are shown in the maps, especially in maps 1 and 4, for want of space. However all places pertinent to the narrative are shown.)

### **Map 1 – India in 1650 (Map facing page ... )**

#### ***Eastern Boundaries of the Mughal Empire:***

The southern end of the eastern boundary of the Mughal Empire touched the Bay of Bengal north of Chittagong situated in Arakan.<sup>4124</sup> The Mughals conquered it in 1666.<sup>4125</sup> To its north was the kingdom of Tripura, with Udaypur as its capital.<sup>4126</sup> No

evidence is available to demarcate the exact boundary between Mughal dominions and Tripura. In the map, the boundary of the then Tripura State is assumed to be the same as the western boundary in our times. To the north of Tripura lay the tribal kingdom of Kachars, with its capital at Maibong. It covered the North Kachar Hills and a large part of the present day Nowgong District.<sup>4127</sup> From Sylhet, the boundary of the Mughal Empire turned west, where was located the kingdom Jaintiya with Jaintiyapur as its capital.<sup>4128</sup> In 1612-13 the Mughals captured Sylhet.<sup>4129</sup> The King of Tripura and the King of Jaintiya had raided Sylhet in the latter half of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>4130</sup> So it must have been close to the boundaries of these two states.

### *Northern boundaries of the Mughal Empire:*

The State of Assam, with Gargaon as its capital, was situated beyond the eastern end of the northern boundary of the Mughal Empire.<sup>4131</sup> The eastern boundary of the kingdom of Assam was near the village of Sadiya.<sup>4132</sup> To the north of Assam was the hilly region of the Miri and Dafla tribes and to the south, that of the Khasia, Kachari and Naga tribes.<sup>4133</sup> By the treaty of 1638-1639, the river Bar was designated as the boundary between Assam and the Mughal Empire.<sup>4134</sup> The region of Koch Hajo, to the west of the Bar, was a part of the Empire.<sup>4135</sup> To the west of Koch Hajo lay the kingdom of Coochbihar. The Sankosh River was the boundary between Koch Hajo and Coochbihar.<sup>4136</sup> To the east of Coochbihar was the river Brahmaputra, to its south was the town of Ghoraghat and to its west, the region of Tirhat.<sup>4137</sup>

To the north of Koch Hajo was the kingdom of Bhutan.<sup>4138</sup> To the west of Bhutan was situated the kingdom of Sikkim. Some portion of eastern Nepal was part of Sikkim then.<sup>4139</sup> Darjiling, too, was a part of Sikkim.<sup>4140</sup> To the west of Sikkim were the dominions of several small kingdoms in Nepal.<sup>4141</sup> The southern boundary of Nepal, as it exists today, has been assumed in the map to be the same as is prevalent today.

Tavernier says Gorakhpur is “the frontier town of the territories of the Great Mughal in the direction of the kingdom of Bhutan although they extend 5 or 6 leagues further.”<sup>4142</sup>

To the west of Nepal lay the kingdoms of Garhwal and Kumaon. The capital of the former was at Srinagar, not to be confused with the famous city of the same name in Kashmir.<sup>4143</sup> Dun (now Dehra Dun) was situated in Garhwal.<sup>4144</sup> Almora and Naini Tal are parts of Kumaon. To the west of Garhwal was situated the kingdom of Sirmour, with its capital at Nahan, 30 km west of the town of Sirmour. These three were small kingdoms in hilly areas. Their boundaries shown in the map are not exact. They have been drawn tentatively on the basis of above information.

Srinagar was the capital of Mughal *suba* of Kashmir.<sup>4145</sup> The Mughals had conquered the kingdom of Baltistan (also known as Little Tibet), which lay to the north of Kashmir, in 1637.<sup>4146</sup> Its capital was at Skardu.<sup>4147</sup> Adjacent to Baltistan, beyond the mountain ranges of Zanskar and Deosai, was the kingdom of Ladakh — or Greater Tibet — with its capital at Leh.<sup>4148</sup> To the north of Ladakh and Baltistan, beyond the Karakoram Range, lay the kingdom of Kashghar ruled by a Tartar sultan.<sup>4149</sup>

The Mughals annexed the provinces of Balkh and Badkhshan, which used to be part of the Sultanate of Bukhara, in 1646. However, the difficult terrain, adverse climate, and scarcity of supplies coupled with the resistance offered by the Sultan of Bukhara, forced them to withdraw from those provinces in 1647.<sup>4150</sup>

### *Western boundaries of the Mughal Empire*

Kandahar was a *suba* of the Mughal Empire till 1648. The Shah of Iran laid siege to the fort of Kandahar in 1648 and the fort commander surrendered it to him in February 1649. The Mughals could never recover it again.<sup>4151</sup> In the map, the

western boundary of the Empire has been shown as the western periphery of Kabul and Ghazni, meeting the Arabian Sea to the west of Thatta which was the headquarters of a *suba* of the same name in the Empire.

### *Southern boundaries of the Mughal Empire*

On the south western side of the Mughal Empire was the Portuguese occupied region with its border up to the Par River, north of Daman.<sup>4152</sup> To the east was the small principality of Ramnagar and to its south, an equally small principality called Jawhar.

The southern boundaries of the Empire coincided with those of the northern boundaries of the Adilshahi Sultanate. These have been explained in the notes on Map No. 4.

The Qutbshahi Sultanate was situated to the east of the Adilshahi Sultanate. The town of Kaulas was in Qutbshahi dominions.<sup>4153</sup> A village named Kalwaral (18° 27' N 78° 16') lay to the south of Indalwai on the Aurangabad–Golconda route. The boundary between the Empire and the Qutbshahi Sultanate lay about one and a half league further on.<sup>4154</sup> Further to the east, the fort of Ramgir was in the Qutbshahi Sultanate. It was ceded to the Empire by the treaty of 1656.<sup>4155</sup> Srikakulam on the coast of the Bay of Bengal was in the Qutbshahi Sultanate.<sup>4156</sup>

The boundaries of smaller kingdoms and principalities like Mewar, Garh-Katanga, and Deogarh shown in the map have no historical basis; they are arbitrary, drawn merely to illustrate their smallness. The capital of Garh-Katanga was at Chauragarh. The capital was moved to Ramnagar (on the bank of the Narmada, 13 km east of Mandla) after the Mughals captured it.<sup>4157</sup> Nagpur formed a part of the kingdom of Deogarh.<sup>4158</sup> Pavnar was in the Mughal Empire.<sup>4159</sup>

### *Ramnagar and Jawhar*

Both these kingdoms were to the east of the Northern part of Portuguese territories. I have presumed that their eastern boundaries jutted on the Sahyadri Range. The southern boundary of Jawhar is drawn keeping in view the fact that the fort of Mahuli was in the Adilshahi Sultanate.<sup>4160</sup> The boundary between Jawhar and Ramnagar, as shown in the map, is arbitrary.

### ***Adilshahi Sultanate***

The northern boundaries of the Adilshahi Sultanate coincided with the southern boundaries of the Mughal Empire. These have been explained in the notes on Map No.4.

Bhalki, Bidar, Chincholi, Chitguppa, Yadgir, Raichur, Kurnool, Nandyal, Sriwal, and Ahobilam were in the Adilshahi dominions and Kaulas, Koilkonda, and Jatpol in the Qutbshahi dominions.<sup>4161</sup> Thevenot, who had travelled from Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) to Burhanpur by way of Bidar in 1666, mentions that the Qutbshahi dominions end between Kohir and Sajjapur.<sup>4162</sup> Martin also mentions that Kohir was the last (important) place in the kingdom of Golconda.<sup>4163</sup> Jivangi (17° 15' N, 77° 25' E) in the Qutbshahi Sultanate was situated near the Adilshahi boundary.<sup>4164</sup> These facts have been used to draw the boundary between the two Sultanates.

The account of Adilshahi conquests in the south given in the *Muhammadnama* has been used to draw the boundary between the Adilshahi Sultanate and the Vijayanagar Empire.<sup>4165</sup> Fryer counts the Raja of Sonda among Adilshahi war lords.<sup>4166</sup> He seems to have been a tributary of the Adilshah.

### ***Qutbshahi Sultanate***

The boundaries of the Qutbshahi Sultanate with the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate have already been described. The accounts of Qutbshahi conquests in the south in

various sources have been used to draw the southern boundary of the Sultanate.<sup>4167</sup>

### *Ikkeri*

The Tadri (also called the Aghnashini) River formed the northern boundary of the Kingdom.<sup>4168</sup> The town of Kasaragod (12° 25'N, 74° 55' E) was situated near the boundary between the Kingdom of Ikkeri and the kingdom of Kolattiri.<sup>4169</sup> Sringeri, Shimoga and Banavasi were situated in the kingdom of Ikkeri.<sup>4170</sup>

### *Mysore*

By 1650, the Adilshahi army had conquered Belur, Chikanayakanhalli, Shaviganga, Bangalore, Hosur, Raydurg and Virbhadradurg.<sup>4171</sup> Bagur, Turuvekere, Nagamangala, Huliyurdurg and Ramgiri were in the kingdom of Mysore.<sup>4172</sup> Coimbatore, Erode and Salem were in the kingdom of Madura and Satyamangalam in the kingdom of Mysore.<sup>4173</sup>

### *Vijayanagar*

The boundaries of the ‘Empire’ are drawn taking into view the expansion of the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Sultanates up to 1649-50.

### *Madurai*

The northern, eastern, and southern boundaries are drawn considering the fact that the towns of Coimbatore, Erode, Salem, Tiruchchirappalli, Kannivadi, Dindigul, Rameswaram, Tuticorin, and Kanniakumari were situated in the kingdom of Madurai.<sup>4174</sup> I have assumed that the Western Ghats must have formed its western boundary.

### *Tanjore*

Karaikal, Devanampattinam, Porto Novo, Nagapattinam, Mannargudi were situated in the kingdom of Tanjore.<sup>4175</sup>

### ***Kolattiri***

The kingdom was situated between the kingdom of Calicut in the south and the kingdom of Ikkeri in the north. The kingdom of Calicut extended southward from Kottakkal.<sup>4176</sup> The kingdom of Ikkeri extended from Kasaragod northward.<sup>4177</sup> I have assumed that the Western Ghats formed the western boundary of the kingdom of Kolattiri.

### ***Calicut***

The kingdom of Cochin was situated to the south of the kingdom of Calicut. Chetwayi (also known as Chowghat) in the kingdom of Cochin was near the southern boundary of kingdom of Calicut.<sup>4178</sup> I have assumed that the Nilgiris formed its eastern boundary.

### ***Cochin***

The kingdom of Porakkad was situated to the south of Cochin.<sup>4179</sup> Further to the south were the principalities of Kayankulam and Kollam.<sup>4180</sup>

### ***Travancore***

The capital of this kingdom was at Kalkulam ( $8^{\circ} 20' N$ ,  $77^{\circ} 15' E$ ).<sup>4181</sup>

### **Map 2 – Portuguese Goa (Map facing page ... )**

For Old Conquests (*Velhas Conquistas*) and New Conquests (*Novas Conquistas*) see *India and Pakistan: A General and*

*Regional Geography*, map on p.666 and *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, pp. 418, 429 n and map at the end.

For the fortification walls in Goa and Bardesh see *Studies in Indian History* by Surendranath Sen, p.241; Bocarro, map facing p.214; Indian Atlas, Quarter Sheet 41/S.W.; and *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, map at the end.

### **Map 3 – Mumbai and Environs (Map facing page ... )**

For the original seven islands of Mumbai see *The Rise of Bombay*, map facing the title page and *Maharashtra State Gazetteers: Greater Bombay District*, Vol. I, map facing p.344. The first of these, prepared in 1843, shows the original seven islands of Mumbai and the second shows reclamations made in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries. The land surrounded by Islands 3 to 7, which used to be submerged at high tide, was marshy. The creek between Kolaba Island (Island 1) and Old Woman's Island (Island 2) was shallow and could be crossed on foot during ebbs. All these islands were joined by piers in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries, and the marshland between them was filled up with earth dug out of the hills on the islands. A causeway was completed in 1845 to join Mahim with the island of Sashti.<sup>4182</sup>

These seven islands, along with two others on their east called Cross and Butcher's Islands, were occupied by the British in 1665.

### **Map 4 – The Deccan, 1636 (Map facing page ... )**

The map shows the boundaries in January 1629 and the division of the Nizamshahi Sultanate between the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate in 1636.

The Nizamshahi border, beginning from the Rahude Pass in the Sahyadri Range, runs east for some distance before turning north. The kingdom of Baglan to its north and west was

conquered by the Mughals in 1638.<sup>4183</sup> Forts like Salher and Hatgad were situated in this kingdom.<sup>4184</sup> Further south, forts like Achalgad, Ahiwant, Dhodap, and Kanchan-Manchan were in the Nizamshahi Sultanate. They were captured by the Mughals in 1636.<sup>4185</sup> The boundary between Baglan and the Nizamshahi Sultanate shown in the map takes this fact into account. To the east of Baglan, Galana fort, Antur, Sutonda fort, Taltam fort, Sindkhed, and Paithan were situated in the Nizamshahi Sultanate.<sup>4186</sup> Jafarnagar, Shahgad, Ahmednagar and Beed belonged to the Mughal Empire and Chembargonda (now Shrigonda), Dharur and Kandhar to the Nizamshahi Sultanate.<sup>4187</sup> The boundary between the Empire and the Nizamshahi Sultanate has been drawn accordingly. The eastern tip of the southern boundary of the Sultanate touches the Godavari River. Further east, Ramgir belonged to the Qutbshahi Sultanate.<sup>4188</sup> Deglur, Udgir, Solapur, Indapur, Shirwal, Pune and Bhor belonged to the Nizamshahi Sultanate and Wai, Naldurg, Bhalki and Bidar to the Adilshahi Sultanate.<sup>4189</sup> The southern boundary of the Nizamshahi Sultanate has been drawn accordingly. In the Konkan, Chaul and Janjira were in the Nizamshahi and Dabhol was in the Adilshahi.<sup>4190</sup> Therefore the Savitri River has been assumed to be the southern boundary of the Nizamshahi Sultanate. Further north, the eastern boundary of the Portuguese territory formed the western limits of the Sultanate. The fort of Mahuli was situated in the Nizamshahi Sultanate.<sup>4191</sup> This fact has been taken into account to determine the northern limits of the Nizamshahi territory in the Konkan. Further north, the Western Ghats have been assumed to be the boundary between the Sultanate and the kingdoms of Jawhar and Ramnagar.

The Nizamshahi Sultanate was extinguished in 1636 and its territory was divided between the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate. Nane Maval, the *parganas* of Chakan, Pune, Indapur and Wangi, and the forts of Paranda and Nilanga were in Adilshahi territory, and Chembargonda, Rasin, Udgir and

Ausa were in Mughal territory.<sup>4192</sup> The boundary between the Empire and the Sultanate has been drawn accordingly.

### **Map 5 – Five Parganas and Twelve Mavals (facing p. - -)**

The map shows the *parganas* of Pune (with its six subdivisions), Chakan, Indapur, Supe, and Shirwal and the twelve Mavals, viz. Nane Maval, Pavan Maval, Paud Khore, Muthe Khore, Mose Khore, Kanad Khore, Gunjan Maval, Velvand Khore, Hirdas Maval, Rohid Khore, Khedebare and Karyat Maval. It may be noted that Karyat Maval is counted among the Mavals and it is also a subdivision of Pune Pargana. The boundaries of these have been drawn after plotting the villages in each. The old lists of villages preserved in the Pune Archives were used for the purpose, supplemented by a few other published Marathi documents. (For details see my Marathi biography of Shivaji *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part II, Appendix 21.)

### **Map 6 – Jawali, 1655 (facing p. - )**

The map shows approximate extent of the principality of Jawali in 1655. The crest line of the Sahyadri Range passes through the passes of Shewtya, Madhe, Gopya, Varandha, Dhavalya, Ambenali, par and Hatlot. To its west lies the Konkan (lowlands) and to its east the Desh (uplands). Hirdas Maval and Rohid Khore are to the north of the plateau of Rayreshvar. To their south were the valleys called Jambhul Khore and Jor Khore with their headquarters at Jambhali and Jor respectively. Both these were parts of the Murhe subdivision of Wai Pargana.<sup>4193</sup> Further to the east was its Haveli subdivision. The Wai Pargana was under the Adilshah's control, but it seems that the valleys of Jambhul Khore and Jor Khore, as well as the fort of Rairi, were appropriated by the recalcitrant Chandrarao.<sup>4194</sup> The *pargana* of Kudal, to the south of Panchgani, fell within the jurisdiction of the fort of Chandan.<sup>4195</sup> The fort of Rairi, with the district of Birwadi under its jurisdiction, had passed under the Chandrarao's control at least since 1652.<sup>4196</sup> The approximate

extent of the Chandrarao's principality in 1655 has been shown in conformity with these details. The route from Wai to Par has been taken from the East India Company's map No. 39.

Map Nos. 7 to 20 have been drawn in conformity with the narrative in the present work and need no further explanation. The political boundaries shown in these maps are of course approximate.

<sup>1</sup> Corruption of the Arabic Khalifa, a successor.

<sup>2</sup> Ghazni was formerly called Zabul. (*The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.411.) It is 120 km south-southwest of Kabul.

<sup>3</sup> Varangal, in Andhra Pradesh, 140 km northeast of Hyderabad. Dwarasamudra (now Halebidu), in Hassan District of Karnataka, 32 km north-northwest of Hassan.

<sup>4</sup> Remains of its once magnificent capital, Vijayanagar, are at Hampi, on the south bank of the Tungabhadra, 50 km west-southwest of Bellary in Karnataka.

<sup>5</sup> In 1422 the capital of the Bahamani Sultanate was shifted from Gulbarga to Bidar.

<sup>6</sup> Malwa is the name of a region which includes some districts of the western part of Madhya Pradesh. Jaunpur, in Uttar Pradesh, is the headquarters of Jaunpur district, 210 km southeast of Lucknow.

<sup>7</sup> Mughal, Moghul, Mogul, etc. are forms of the same name, derived from Mongol, applied to the empire founded by Babar and all things connected to it. In a wider sense all fair skinned Muslim foreigners in India, except the Afghans, were called Mughals. See Bernier, pp.47, 209.

<sup>8</sup> Kanua (or Khanua) is in the Bharatpur District of Rajasthan.

<sup>9</sup> Corrupt form of Achalpur, 45 km northwest of Amravati in Maharashtra.

<sup>10</sup> A misnomer, because the battle was fought south of the Krishna; Talikota is 30 km north of the river.

<sup>11</sup> In the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh, 65 km south of Anantpur and 180 km southeast of Vijayanagar.

<sup>12</sup> *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p. 132; Mundy, Vol. II, p. 152.

<sup>13</sup> In Tripura state, 40 km south-southeast of Agartala.

<sup>14</sup> *The History of Bengal, Muslim Period: 1200-1757*, p. 242-43, 301-02; *Tripura District Gazetteer*, pp.86-88.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.88. Tavernier, too mentions (Vol. II, p.216) that the King of Tripura struck gold coins.

<sup>16</sup> Maibong ( $93^{\circ}8'$  E,  $25^{\circ}20'$ N) is 165 km southeast of Guwahati.

<sup>17</sup> *A History of Assam*, pp. 299-307; *The History of Bengal, Muslim Period: 1200-1757*, pp.281-83, 290-91.

<sup>18</sup> *A History of Assam*, p. 321.

<sup>19</sup> It is 35 km northeast of Sylhet (Bangladesh), near India's border.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp.310, 314-15.

<sup>21</sup> *Alamgir Nama*, p.704; *A History of Assam*, p.153-55. Gargaon is 300 km east- northeast of Guwahati.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp.128, 156, 172-73, etc.

[<sup>23</sup>](#) It rises in Bhutan and empties into the Brahmaputra, about 200 km west of Guwahati near the border between India and Bangladesh.

[<sup>24</sup>](#) The town of Hajo is 25 km west-northwest of Guwahati.

[<sup>25</sup>](#) Ibid., pp.56-57.

[<sup>26</sup>](#) Ibid., pp.65-70; *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, pp.1066-68, 1081-82, 1093-94.

[<sup>27</sup>](#) *A History of Assam*, pp. 66-70, 110; *The History of Bengal, Muslim Period: 1200-1757*, pp. 284-88.

[<sup>28</sup>](#) *Sikkim and Bhutan*, pp. 60-64. Tavernier (Vol. I, p. 257; II, pp. 202, 206) mentions the kingdom of Bhutan.

[<sup>29</sup>](#) *The Himalayan Gateway: History and Culture of Sikkim*, p. 4-5, 22-23, 30-33

[<sup>30</sup>](#) Patan, 8 km south, and Bhatgaon, 12 km southeast, of Kathmandu.

[<sup>31</sup>](#) *Medieval Nepal*, Vol. II, p. 55, 61, 74, 380-93, etc.; Marshall, p. 161, 167-68, 370.

[<sup>32</sup>](#) *Medieval Nepal*, Vol. II, p. 1-2.

[<sup>33</sup>](#) *The Akbarnama*, Vol. III, p. 812; *Tuzuk-i-Jehangiri*, Vol. I, p. 218.

[<sup>34</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part 2, p. 90-93.

[<sup>35</sup>](#) Now Dehradun.

[<sup>36</sup>](#) Waris, pp. 92b, 98b-99b, 105a, 106b and 116b.

[<sup>37</sup>](#) See, for instance, *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 351, 359-60; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p. 159; *Alamgir Nama*, p. 920-23; Pelsaert, p. 33.

[<sup>38</sup>](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 920-21

[<sup>39</sup>](#) Ibid., pp. 921-22.

[<sup>40</sup>](#) *Ladak: Physical, Statistical and Historical*, pp. 329-30.

[<sup>41</sup>](#) See, for instance, *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 351, 364; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p. 109; *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 922-23; Pelsaert, p. 33.

[<sup>42</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 281-88; II, pp. 93, 98, 159

[<sup>43</sup>](#) *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p. 273-78, 317; Waris, pp. 90b-91a.

[<sup>44</sup>](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p. 133.

[<sup>45</sup>](#) Ibid., pp. 43, 48, 133-34; *Portuguese-Maratha Relations*, p. 58.

[<sup>46</sup>](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp. 41-42, 47, 132-33; *Portuguese-Maratha Relations*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>47</sup> See, for instance, *Assentos*, Vol. III, pp. 102, 167, 172; IV, pp.252-54 (n.1), 556.

<sup>48</sup> Bocarro, p.136.

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in *Assentos*, Vol. III, p.169 (n.1).

<sup>50</sup> *Assentos*, Vol. III, pp. 419, 421; *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.46, 52; *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 307-08; II, No.163.

<sup>51</sup> *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.177 (n.16).

<sup>52</sup> Waris, p.106a; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.160-62.

<sup>53</sup> Garh 3 km, and Katanga 6 km, west of Jabalpur. In 18<sup>th</sup> Century Marathi documents the principality was called Garh-Mandla. Mandla, headquarters of the district of the same name, is 75 km south-southeast of Jabalpur.

<sup>54</sup> Chauragarh, 70 km southwest of Jabalpur.

<sup>55</sup> *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 323-24, 327-31; *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XV, p.439.

<sup>56</sup> *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.94-95.

<sup>57</sup> *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp.363, 379, 388, 411.

<sup>58</sup> Orchha, 270 km north northwest of Jabalpur.

<sup>59</sup> *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part 2, pp.94-95, 110-11.

[<sup>60</sup>](#) Ramnagar, 13 km east of Mandla.

[<sup>61</sup>](#) *Jabalpur District Gazetteer*, p.92.

[<sup>62</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 230-33.

[<sup>63</sup>](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 210-15.

[<sup>64</sup>](#) Waris, pp.105a-b; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.210-13, 214-15, 218-19, 226, 228, 230, 234-35.

[<sup>65</sup>](#) Waris, pp.110b, 112b.

[<sup>66</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part 2, 117, 231-32; Waris, pp. 105b, 111a, 112b.

[<sup>67</sup>](#) *EFI* (1642-1645), p.67 (n.2).

[<sup>68</sup>](#) The capital was shifted from Penukonda to Chandragiri in or before 1597. (*The Aravidu Dynasty*, Vol. I, pp. 310-13, 319-20, 337-38, 434-35, 464-65.) It was again moved in 1606, this time to Vellore. (Ibid., p.320.) But perhaps according to prevalent custom, contemporaneous writers continued to refer to the Empire by the name ‘Vijayanagar’. Dutch and Portuguese documents confirm that Vellore was the capital after 1606. (*Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XI, part I, pp. 115-16, 118-19.)

[<sup>69</sup>](#) The Qutbshahi general Mir Jumla captured Udayagiri (Nellore district) towards the end of 1645 or in early 1646, Pulicat (Chingleput district) in 1646, and Chandragutti (Anantpur district) and Gandikota (Cudappah district) in 1651. The Adilshahi general Mustafa Khan captured Virbhadradurg

(Dharmapuri district), Gudiyattam, Ambur and other forts (North Arcot district) in 1646. (Based on *Muhammad Nama* and Dutch and English documents.)

[70](#) *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.264; *EFI* (1642-1645), pp.193-94 (n.1).

[71](#) *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.264; *EFI* (1642-1645), pp.44-45, 80, 193-94.

[72](#) Chandragiri, about 14 km southwest of Tirupati.

[73](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp. 398-411, 427-48; *Basatin*, Ch. 6; *EFI* (1651-1654), Introduction, p. xxxiii.

[74](#) *The Tamil Country under Vijayanagar*, p.229.

[75](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.347-373; *Basatin*, Ch.6.

[76](#) Keladi, 6 km north of Sagar which is 60 km west-northwest of Shimoga in Karnataka.

[77](#) *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, pp. 114 (n.25), 250, 267, 270. In his letter to the Governor General of the Dutch East India Company, the king, Bhadrappa Nayak styles himself as the king of Keladi. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.99.) The official history of the kingdom, in Kannada verse, is called the *Keladi-nripa-vijayam* (Triumphs of the Kings of Keladi).

[78](#) Ikkeri, three km south of Sagar.

[79](#) *EFI* (1618-1621), pp. 56, 81; *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, pp. 250, 267.

<sup>80</sup> *Muhammad Nama*, pp. 146-50 (English translation in *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part II, English section); *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp.375-79, *Keladi-nripa-vijayam*, c.6, PP.97-98 (vide SCVS, Vol. I).

<sup>81</sup> *Keladi-nripa-vijayam*. Bednur is a corruption of Bidururu. The place is now known as Nagar. (*Shimoga District Gazetteer*, p.658.) It is 60 km west-southwest of Shimoga.

<sup>82</sup> *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.343, 350; *ERS*, Vol. I, No.82.

<sup>83</sup> *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, p.267.

<sup>84</sup> Canara: *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 120, 239, 245, 343-44, 347; *Dagh Register* (vide *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.99-100; Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, p.125). Malnad: Mundy, Vol. III, Part I, p.81; *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, p.143.

<sup>85</sup> *EFI* (1618-1621), pp.66, 70, 77, 81, 252.

<sup>86</sup> *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.261, 342.

<sup>87</sup> *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, pp. 97-98, 263-65.

<sup>88</sup> *Muhammad Nama*, pp.150-78 (English translation in *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part II, English section); *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp.378-84; Assentos, Vol. III, Addenda, letter No.19; *Kanthirava-Narasaraja-Vijayam* (vide SCVS, Vol. I); *Keladi-nripa-vijayam*, (vide SCVS, Vol. I).

<sup>89</sup> 7 km north of Kannur the bank of the Valapattanam River.

<sup>90</sup> Pyrard, Vol. I, p.448. For these Malabari pirates see *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 153; II, No. 493; Della Valle, Vol. II, pp.201, 356, 361-62; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 31-32, 142-43.

<sup>91</sup> Zamorin is a corruption of Samoothiri (Lord of the sea). But in no sense was he a lord of the sea. His only claim to that title lay in the fact that his dominion was in the coastal strip.

<sup>92</sup> Pyrard, Vol. I, pp. 336-37, 347, 350, 356-57, 408; Della Valle, Vol. II, pp.361-62.

<sup>93</sup> *The Dutch in India*, pp. 171-75, 177-78.

<sup>94</sup> *History of Kerala*, Vol. II, Notes, pp. 662-65, 85, 225-29; *The Dutch in India*, pp. 172, 175-77.

<sup>95</sup> Kalkulam, 15 km northwest of Nagercoil in Kanyakumari district of Tamil Nadu.

<sup>96</sup> *History of Kerala*, Vol. II, Notes, pp.20-21; *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.324.

<sup>97</sup> *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, pp.248, 257-58; Badauni (Translation in Elliot, Vol. V, p. 515).

<sup>98</sup> *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 710, 712-13; *Mirat-i Alam* (Translation in Elliot, Vol. VII, p.164).

<sup>99</sup> See, for instance, *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.189-92.

[<sup>100</sup>](#) For the best explanation of the *Mansabdari* system see *The Mansabdari System and the Mughul Army*.

[<sup>101</sup>](#) These were 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 3500, 4000, 4500, 5000, 6000, and 7000. (*SDSR*, No.37.)

[<sup>102</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.113.

[<sup>103</sup>](#) *The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p.87.

[<sup>104</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, pp.192, 217, 288, 395.

[<sup>105</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.506-07.

[<sup>106</sup>](#) *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, pp.202-03.

[<sup>107</sup>](#) This can be deduced from the list of *mansabdars*, evidently arranged according to seniority, given in the *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.292-328 and Vol. II, pp. 717-52. Also, several examples can easily be found in the *Badshah Nama* and *Alamgir Nama* to show that an increment in the *sawar* figure without any change in the *dhat* figure of a *mansabdar*'s rank was regarded as promotion. An anomaly in the system was that a *mansabdar* could have a higher *sawar* figure in his rank than that in the rank of another senior to him. For instance: Parsoji Bhosla (3000 *dhat*/1500 *sawar*), Safshikan Khan (2500 *dhat*/2000 *sawar*) and Uzbak Khan (2000 *dhat*/2000 *sawar*). See *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 721-26 (List of *mansabdars* towards the end of 20<sup>th</sup> year of Shah Jahan's reign).

[<sup>108</sup>](#) See, for instance the list of *mansabdars* given in *Badshah Nama*.

[109](#) *SDSR*, No.37.

[110](#) For instance, on 26<sup>th</sup> February 1628 Shah Jahan conferred upon Abul Qasim Gilani the rank of 1500 *dhat*/50 *sawar* and the title of *Hakim ul-Mulk* (Physician of the State). *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.182.

[111](#) *SDSR*, No.37. An English translation of this document has been printed in *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, pp. 277-80.

[112](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, Nos. 49, 69, 71, 76, 80.

[113](#) *Jama* is Arabic for collecting, assembling, accumulation, aggregate amount. The revenue assessment was stated in *dams* and was therefore called *jamadami*, though the money in use was the rupee. For the purposes of revenue and salary statements, the *dam* had become a money of account and calculations were made at a fixed rate of 40 *dams* to the rupee. In the market, however, a rupee (which was a silver coin) fetched much more than 40 *dams*, which were made of copper.

[114](#) *Hasil* (the outcome, produce, harvest) is an Arabic word.

[115](#) See, for instance, *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 185-87, 216-17.

[116](#) A greater number of horses was useful to provide replacements for casualties. It would also reduce the strain on the mounts and therefore contribute to greater endurance.

[117](#) Pay scales ranged from ‘one monthly’ to ‘twelve monthly’. But whatever may the pay scale be the service was for the entire year. ‘One monthly’ pay scale did not mean service for only one

month in a year. ‘One monthly’ pay scale was 1/12<sup>th</sup> of the ‘twelve monthly’ pay scale, ‘two monthly’ pay scale was 2/12<sup>th</sup> of the ‘twelve monthly’ pay scale, and so on. Hence these names for pay scales.

[<sup>118</sup>](#) *The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, p.56. Based on the *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, a book of regulations written during Aurangzeb’s later years. Details given in the table are corroborated by contemporary documents. See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, No. 3/371 in p.266 (11<sup>th</sup> September 1660).

[<sup>119</sup>](#) *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, p.56 (Based on *Khulasat-us Siyaq*); *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, P.506-07. Details given in the table are corroborated by contemporary documents. See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Vol. I, part II, Nos. 4/420 in p.37 (13<sup>th</sup> August 1661), 4/605 in p.54 (21<sup>st</sup> October 1661), 4/816 in p.74 (16<sup>th</sup> December 1661).

[<sup>120</sup>](#) *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Persian text, Vol. I, p. 227-29.

[<sup>121</sup>](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, Persian text, p.160; *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Vol. I, part II, Nos. 4/245, 4/248, 4/826, 5/955, 5, 1064, 5/1533.

[<sup>122</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol.II, pp.711-12; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.118-20, 120-22, 125-27, 130-34, 138-40, 140-43, 148-50, 156-58, 164-68, 177-79, 189-92, 216-18, 227-29; *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Vol. I, part II, section H/1 (from p. 274 onwards), Nos. 9, 27, 36, 37, 39, 45, 56, 62, 65, 79, 95, 97, 101, 104, 105, 126, 139.

[<sup>123</sup>](#) *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.378-79; *Bernier*, pp.216-17, 271.

[124](#) Manucci, Vol. II, p.379.

[125](#) *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, pp.42-43.

[126](#) Ibid.

[127](#) There were no welfare states then. Sometimes the rulers spent money on public works such as free distribution of food during famine and provision of drinking water on highways. But such works were performed out of piety and for benefit in the next world, not as a duty of rulership. Besides, a minuscule portion of the revenue was spent on them. In a democracy, the State is a welfare state and even the most corrupt rulers have to spend a substantial portion of the revenue on public utilities such as schools and medical facilities.

[128](#) Hawkins (*Early Travels in India*, p.114); Pelsaert, p.54; Manucci, Vol. II, p.378.

[129](#) SCS, Vol. II, No.163; III, Nos.457, 465.

[130](#) Bernier, pp. 225, 227.

[131](#) Hawkins (*Early Travels in India*, pp. 83, 91, 93); Bernier, p.227; *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, Nos. 2, 5 and 7 (in pp.56-47), No.243 (p.62), No.250 (p.63), No.306 (p.65).

[132](#) As far as possible, *mansabdars* were assigned *jagirs* in the same *suba* in which they were posted. For instance, one Murshid Quli was assigned a *jagir* in North India. When he was transferred to the Deccan he was assigned a *jagir* in the Deccan. (*Adab*, Vol. I, p. 122.)

[<sup>133</sup>](#) Hawkins (*Early Travels in India*, pp.83, 91, 93, 114); Bernier, p.227.

[<sup>134</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Tuzuk*, Vol. I, pp. 377 and 389; *Badshah Nama*, Vol.I, Part I, pp.398, 401; *SDAR*, p.121.

[<sup>135</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, No.80 (Persian text).

[<sup>136</sup>](#) *Ibid.*

[<sup>137</sup>](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, pp. 242, 266; Bernier, p.213; Manucci, Vol. II, p.378.

[<sup>138</sup>](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, pp.242, 265-66; Badauni (English Translation in Elliot, Vol. V, p.514).

[<sup>139</sup>](#) Bernier, pp.216, 243; Manucci, Vol. II, p.376.

[<sup>140</sup>](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol.I, book II, Ain II.

[<sup>141</sup>](#) Manucci, Vol.II, p.376.

[<sup>142</sup>](#) *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol.I, p.229.

[<sup>143</sup>](#) *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/17, 1/166, 1/350, 1/593, 1/604.

[<sup>144</sup>](#) *SDSR*, Nos.2, 23, 73, 79,135.

[<sup>145</sup>](#) *SDSR*, No.79.

[146](#) Any white horse was called a blue (*nila*) horse. See *Raj-vyavahara-kosh* (SCP, p.157).

[147](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, Nos.2, 73; *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, No.186 (p.319); *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, Nos. 1/1256, 1/1566, 1/1621, 1/1627, 2/254, 3/673, 3/885; part II, Nos. 4/441, 4/451, 4/458, 4/574, 5/1397.

[148](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, pp.266-67; Bernier, pp.262-63; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.377-79; IV, p.408; *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, p.109 (No.3864), p.318 (No. 144); *SDAR*, pp.59-61 (A.R.No.4996), pp.125-27 (A.R.No.807), pp.143-45 (A.R.No. 4972).

[149](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, part II, Nos. 4/291, 4/519, 4/553, 4/555, 4/586, 4/597, 4/700.

[150](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, part I, Nos. T.P./35, T.P./57, T.P./60, T.P./67, T.P./70, 1/759, 1/765, 1/782; part II, Nos. 5/387, 5/438, 5/1398.

[151](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, part I, Nos. T.P./177, 1/17, 1/166, 1/350, 1/593, 1/604, 1/688, 1/1354.

[152](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, part II, Nos. 4/1216, 4/1218-20, 4/1226-27, 5/111, 5/554, 5/569, 5/579, 5/910, 5/918, 5/921, 5/929-30.

[153](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, No. 73; *SDAR*, pp.123-24 (A.R.No.169),133-34 (A.R.No.4974).

[154](#) In such cases a person was appointed as guardian during the boy's minority.

[155](#) Waris, pp. 107b-108a.

[156](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part II, p.166; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.54, 81; *SDSR*, Nos.101-03, 105-07; *SDAR*, pp.12-27 (A.R. No. 807).

[157](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol.I, part I, p.182; Part II, p.68; Vol. II, p.103; *Tuzuk*, Vol. I, p.24; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.58-59.

[158](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, No. 67 (Persian text); *SDAR*, pp.125-27 (A.R.No.807).

[159](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.94, 166; Waris, pp. 106a.

[160](#) *Tuzuk*, Vol.I, p.205

[161](#) Waris, p.80a.

[162](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.471.

[163](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, pp. 112 (Nos.3927 and 3930), 115 (No.3958), 119 (No.4123); 162-64 (No.58) 168-69 (No.62).

[164](#) Waris, p.108b.

[165](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.402.

[166](#) For the report of his death see *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.223. His age is not mentioned there. But it is known that he was born in 1605. See his birth chart in *Bharat-Kaumudi*, p. 755.

[167](#) Terry, pp.391-92; Pelsaert, pp.54-56, Bernier, pp.204, 211-12; Careri (*Indian Travels*, p.241); Ovington, p.251; *SDSR*, Nos.56 and 62; *Amal-i Salih*, Vol.III, pp.246-48.

[168](#) *Mughal Administration*, pp. 29-32. See also *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, p.446; Vol. II, p.132; Pelsaert, p.54; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.418-19.

[169](#) For instance, when, in 1645, Shah Jahan promoted Sadullah Khan to 5,000 *dhat*/1,500 *sawar* and appointed him *diwan*, Ali Mardan Khan held the rank of 7,000 *dhat*/7,000 *sawar*/5,000 *du aspa sih aspa*, Saeed Khan Bahadur Jafar Jang, the *subadar* of Punjab, the same rank and Islam Khan, the *subadar* of the four *subas* of the Deccan, 6,000 *dhat*/6,000 *sawar*/5,000 *du aspa sih aspa*. See *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 321, 356, 430, 431 and 433.

[170](#) *Mughal Administration*, pp. 35-40. See also *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, p.446.

[171](#) *Mughal Administration*, pp. 40-44. See also Bernier, p.186; Manucci, Vol. II, p. 419.

[172](#) These factories were places where workers were assembled and put to work under supervisors. Cloth and *khilats* were produced in the imperial factory at Burhanpur. (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp.140-43, 145-47.) Princes, princesses and *mansabdars* of high rank too owned such factories. For instance, Aurangzeb and his sister Jahan Ara had factories producing cloth at Burhanpur

during Shah Jahan's reign. (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp.145-47.) The *Amir-ul Umara* [Ali Mardan Khan] had factories producing cloth and carpet in Punjab and Kashmir. (*Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.240.)

[<sup>173</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SDAR*, pp.90-92 (A.R.No.164), 238 (A.R. No. 4985).

[<sup>174</sup>](#) *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp.38-39.

[<sup>175</sup>](#) On 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1659 Aurangzeb promoted Muhammad Amin Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi*, to 5,000 *dhat*/4,000 *sawar*. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.426.) Even then many *mansabdars* outranked him. For instance, *Amir-ul Umara* [Shayista Khan] (7,000 *dhat*/7,000 *sawar*/ 7,000 *du aspa sih aspa*), Jafar Khan (6,000 *dhat*/6,000 *sawar*/ 6,000 *du aspa sih aspa*), Mahabat Khan, *subadar* of Kabul (6,000 *dhat*/5,000 *sawar*/ 3,500 *du aspa sih aspa*), Maloji (5,000 *dhat*/5,000 *sawar*). See *Alamgir Nama*, pp.130, 157, 229, 427. Maloji mentioned here was the son of Shahji's uncle Vithoji.

[<sup>176</sup>](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.391-92.

[<sup>177</sup>](#) 'Muhatasib' is Arabic for accountant, but in the sense of the appointment, the officer was expected to keep an 'account' of religious and moral behaviour according to Islamic doctrine.

[<sup>178</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.65; Manrique, Vol. II, p.152; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.78, 86-87.

[<sup>179</sup>](#) Waris, pp. 12a, 18b.

[<sup>180</sup>](#) This is evident from the Mughal State papers such as *farmans* and *akhbars* (newsletters of the Mughal Court). Besides, several Europeans, who had traveled in the Mughal Empire have

mentioned this fact. See, for instance, Monserrate, p.49; Manucci, Vol. I, p. 87; Ovington, p.247.

[<sup>181</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 132. The word in the original is ‘Hindustani’. Persons of Indian origin have been called Hindustani speaking (*Hindustani zabanan*) in the *Badshah Nama*.

[<sup>182</sup>](#) Manucci, Vol. II, pp.346-47. See also *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.132-33.

[<sup>183</sup>](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1095-96. The word in the original is Hindi. Aurangzeb of course knew Arabic also.

[<sup>184</sup>](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.861-63.

[<sup>185</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, p.141.

[<sup>186</sup>](#) Witness his handwriting in *farmans* preserved in the Central Record Office at Bikaner.

[<sup>187</sup>](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.1094-95.

[<sup>188</sup>](#) The following account of the daily routine of Shah Jahan, except otherwise stated, is taken from the *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, pp.144-54.

[<sup>189</sup>](#) This practice, called *Zaroka Darshan*, was started by Akbar. Several Europeans have mentioned it. See, for instance, Monserrate, p.176, Mundy, Vol. I, pp.102, 127; Manrique, Vol. II, pp.161-62.

[<sup>190</sup>](#) *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Aam* literally means State Room for the Select (i.e. noblemen) and the commoners. Of course it was not open to all commoners as such, but only to all state officials and *mansabdars*. *Daulatkhana-i Khas* was open only to *mansabdars* of high rank.

[<sup>191</sup>](#) All orders (regarding grants, appointments, promotions, etc.) passed by the Emperor were again placed before him after a week or two for confirmation and were acted upon only after they were confirmed. The officer responsible for submitting the orders for confirmation was called *darogha-i arz mukarrar*.

[<sup>192</sup>](#) See, for instance, Mundy, Vol. II, p.200; Manrique, Vol.II, pp.162-63; Bernier, pp.260-64; Tavernier, Vol. I. pp.80-82.

[<sup>193</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.221-23. See also Bernier, p. 261; Mundy, Vol. II, p. 200.

[<sup>194</sup>](#) *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, p.395.

[<sup>195</sup>](#) Waris, pp. 96a, 97a.

[<sup>196</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.193-94.

[<sup>197</sup>](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, Persian Text, p.171.

[<sup>198</sup>](#) Bernier, p. 261. See also *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, p. 75.

[<sup>199</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. I, p. 201.

[<sup>200</sup>](#) Bernier, p. 214.

[<sup>201</sup>](#) *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Aam* literally means State Room for the Select (i.e. noblemen) and the commoners. Of course it was not open to all commoners as such, but only to all state officials and *mansabdars*. *Daulatkhana-i Khas* was open only to *mansabdars* of high rank.

[<sup>202</sup>](#) The word *ghuslkhana* literally means bathroom. In Akbar's time his *diwan*, *bakhshi*, or other senior officials would apprise him with matters needing immediate attention at a place between the *diwankhana* (court hall) and the harem close to his bathroom. Since then the private audience hall where such issues were discussed began to be known as the *ghuslkhana*. Shah Jahan named it the *daulatkhana-i khas*. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.148; Vol. II, p.220.) However, European narratives continued to refer to it as the *ghuslkhana*. See, for instance, Terry, p.371; Roe, pp.85-86; Pelsaert (*Jahangir's India*), p.53; Mundy, Vol. II, p. 201; Bernier, p.265; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.462-63.

[<sup>203</sup>](#) This is a Turkish word, used to collectively describe various symbols of royalty and sovereignty. Made of silver and held aloft on silver staffs, these included, among others, representations of a fish, an *azhdaha* [a dragon], a lion, a balance, the palm of the hand, the sun and a horse-tail. (Bernier, pp.266-67; Careri in *Indian Travels*, p.221; Manucci, Vol. II, p.74.) Another symbol used was a golden ball suspended between two palms of the hand. (Careri in *Indian Travels*, p.210.) It was called the *kaukaba*, an Arabic word meaning star. (*The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, p.16.) At the change of guard every evening those who had finished their guard duty would array themselves on the left of the *qur* and those who had just reported for duty, on the right. Together, they would offer salutations to the *qur*. Bernier says (p.266) *mansabdars* assigned to guard duty offered salutations to the Emperor every evening at which time the *qur* ("*kours*") used to be in front of them.

[204](#) *Qiran* is an Arabic word which means the greatest conjunction of planets. *Sahib-i Qiran* means the lord of the happy conjunction. It is an epithet of Timur who is said to have been born at such an auspicious moment.

[205](#) The account of Aurangzeb's daily routine is taken from the *Alamgir Nama*, pp.1096-1106.

[206](#) The description of this routine in the *Alamgir Nama* (pp.1098-99) closely matches that given in the *Badshah Nama* about Shah Jahan and is therefore omitted here.

[207](#) The details in the *Alamgir Nama* (pp.1099-1103) of the proceedings in the *Daulatkhana-i Khas o Aam* and in the *ghuslkhana* are generally similar to those described in the *Badshah Nama* about Shah Jahan and are therefore omitted here.

[208](#) The *Alamgir Nama* (p.1106) states that he lies down in bed just two-three *gharis* [48 to 72 minutes] during the night and that his hours of rest and sleep do not exceed one *prahar* [three hours] daily. Manucci too states (Vol. II, p. 332) that Aurangzeb is continuously engaged in work and sleeps only three hours [a day]. It is quite possible that his hours of sleep were shorter than most people.

[209](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, Book I, Ain 16; Bernier, pp.359-61; Manucci, Vol. II, p.67. Two sets of tents were kept for the Emperor and his noblemen. While they were encamped at one place the other set of tents was sent ahead so that by the time the Emperor and his entourage arrived at the next place of halt the tents would have been already pitched there ready for occupation. By then the first set of tents would be moving forward to the next place of halt. The set sent ahead was called the *peshkhana*.

[210](#) Bernier, pp.360-62.

[211](#) Since the turn of each came once a week the arrangement was called *Haftchauki*. *Haft* is Persian for seven.

[212](#) The celebration of the festival of *Nauroz* in the Mughal court has been described in several Persian histories such as the *Badshah Nama*, *Padshah Nama* of Waris and *Amal-i Salih* and also in Europeans' accounts. *Nauroz* is the first day of the Iranian solar year, i.e. 1<sup>st</sup> Farwardin.

[213](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.133-34, 678-79; *Alamgir Nama*, pp.227-29, 425-26, 445-46, 562.

[214](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.390-91.

[215](#) *Tula* (weighing oneself against gold, silver or any other object according to one's capacity and distribute it in charity) was regarded as a righteous deed by the Hindus and was emulated by the Mughal Emperors.

[216](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.46.

[217](#) Ibid., p.48.

[218](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol.II, pp. 710-11. Names in parentheses are added by me.

[219](#) *Badshaha Nama*, Vol. II, pp.125-26, 166

[220](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, vol. II, p.430; Waris, p. 105b

[221](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, No.62; *SDAR*, p.27 (A.R. No.632); *SWD*, Persian section, pp.59-60 (Nos.1-2), pp.79-80 (No.17), p. 125(No.1), p.132 (No.9).

[222](#) See, for instance, *SWD*, Persian section, pp.64-65 (NO.2), pp. 65-66 (No.3), p. 69 (No.6).

[223](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, part I, Nos. T.P./113, 1/283, 1/342; *SDSR*, Nos.74, 115.

[224](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.1081; Hawkins (*Early Travels in India*, pp.400-401); Bernier, p.231; Thevenot (*Indian Travels*,p.26); Manucci, Vol. II, p. 128, 331-32,421; Ovington, p.228.

[225](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.373; Waris, p.102a.

[226](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.150,639; Waris, pp.3a, 83b, 86a.

[227](#) *IHC*, Vol. XIII, pp.184-85.

[228](#) The extracts are taken from Persian section of *SWD*.

[229](#) Commandants of forts were forbidden to come out of the fort without the express permission of the Emperor. See Fryer, Vol. I, pp. 332, 339; Ovington, pp.217, 227.

[230](#) *SDAR*, pp.29-30 (A.R. No. 4970).

[<sup>231</sup>](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.1081; *Mirat-i Ahamadi, khatima*, p.175; Manucci, Vol.II, p.331.

[<sup>232</sup>](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.78 (p.69).

[<sup>233</sup>](#) These are published in *AFS*, Vols. I-V, *MIS*, Vols. XV and XX, and *SCS*, Vols. I-XIV. I have not given detailed references for the Adilshahi administration. Interested readers may consult these volumes where they can easily find plenty of references for the information given in this section.

[<sup>234</sup>](#) Not to be confused with the *wazir* or *diwan* in Mughal administration. *Wazirs* were more or less akin to Mughal *mansabdars*.

[<sup>235</sup>](#) For the use of the term *mukasa* see *AFS*, Vol. I. No.60; V, No.128; *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos.128, 207; III, Nos. 514, 516, 526, 538. And for *Jagir* see *AFS*, Vol. I, No. 60; III, Nos.23, 88; *SCS*, Vol. XIV, No.34. The word *mukasa* was more prevalent in the Adilshahi and Nizamshahi Sultanates. It cannot be derived from any Persian or Arabic word and seems to be of native origin.

[<sup>236</sup>](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.57, 146.

[<sup>237</sup>](#) Again, detailed references have not been given for this section. Interested readers may consult the volumes cited in fn 27 above.

[<sup>238</sup>](#) *Tarf* or *taraf* (side, quarter), *qaryat* (villages) and *samt* (direction) are Arabic words. *Tapa* is probably of native origin. All these words were used in the sense of a subdivision of a *pargana* or *muamala*.

[<sup>239</sup>](#) *AFS*, Vol. I, No.60; III, Nos.18, 76.

[240](#) AFS, Vol. V, No.114. See also Ibid., Vol. III, No. 79.

[241](#) Ali Adilshah's *farman* to Lakham Sawant, the *sardesai* of Kudal, dated 26<sup>th</sup> May 1665 — *Shiv-charitra Samshodhan Vritta* (Rajyabhisek Shaka 300), pp.22-23.

[242](#) *House of Shivaji*, p.81; AFS, Vol. V, No. 92.

[243](#) SCS, Vol. VIII, No.84.

[244](#) SCS, Vol. VII, No. 54.

[245](#) SCS, Vol. III, No.646.

[246](#) The account of the village administration in Maharashtra is mainly based on Marathi records of 17<sup>th</sup> Century published in MIS, Vols. XV and XX and SCS, Vols. I-XIV.

[247](#) Of these, the word *mujeri* is of Arabic origin; all the others are vernacular.

[248](#) SCS, Vol.VII, No.67 (p.119).

[249](#) There was no need for them to till the land themselves. They could appoint farm labourers to till the land and would get the share of the crop equivalent to tax to themselves.

[250](#) In some areas, the *deshmukh* was called *desai* and in some the *deshkulkarni* was called *deshpande*.

[251](#) SCS, Vol. I, No. 45.

[252](#) *Istiwa* is an Arabic word which means ascending or coming to maturity. As the taxes were charged on an ascending scale, till they reached the normal rate, the concession was called *istiwa*.

[253](#) SCS, Vol. I, No.8.

[254](#) SCS, Vol. I, No.30.

[255](#) SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 205-07, 233.

[256](#) *Purandare Daftar*, part III, No.163; BISM Quarterly, Vol. XXX, Nos. 3-4, document No.56.

[257](#) SCS, Vol. I, Nos. 41, 59, 60, 65.

[258](#) *Sanads and Letters*, pp.183-84 (No.34); *Saptam Sammelan Vritta*, pp.55-57.

[259](#) SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 96, 281 (p.276).

[260](#) See, for instance, SCS, Vol. II, No.93 (p. 113); III, No. 636; IV, No. 743.

[261](#) The term *got* includes, in this sense, the entire population.

[262](#) See, for instance, SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 209, 294, 297; *SDSR*, No.65; *SDAR*, p.18 (A.R.No.630), pp.33-34 (A.R.No. 621), pp.49-50 (A.R.No.4953), p.105 (A.R.No.10); *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, pp.255-59.

[263](#) This was done, presumably, to expose frauds and weed out excessive grants.

[264](#) *SCS*, Vol. III, No.548.

[265](#) *SCS*, Vol. VII, No.39; *MIS*, Vol. XX, Nos.94, 98-105.

[266](#) *SCS*, Vol. VIII, No.765. The system is mentioned in Persian as well as Marathi documents. See, for instance *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 134-35, 138-40, 153-56; *SCS*, Vol. II. No. 99 (p.128); IV, No. 684; IX, No. 55; *MIS*, Vol. XX, No.32.

[267](#) *SCS*, Vol. VIII, No.26.

[268](#) *The Economy of the Mughal Empire*, pp.95-125.

[269](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. VII, No.65; XI, No.96.

[270](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, No.191; VII, No.65; *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 12, 26, 33; XX, No.32.

[271](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No.5; II, No.186; IV, No.691; VI, No.16; XI, No.96.

[272](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.710-12.

[273](#) *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, pp.163-64.

[274](#) Due to various reasons such as wars and famine, a great difference existed between the *jama* and the *hasil*. When Aurangzeb was the *subadar* of the four *subas* of the Deccan for the second time (1652-58) he reported the revenue situation in

a letter thus: “After subtracting the difference, the *jamadami* of these *subas* comes to 1,449,000,000 *dams* [i.e. Rs.36,225,000] and revenue realization ...is 10,000,000 rupees, which does not amount to even three monthly [i.e. one fourth].” (See *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 56-58.) Subtracting the *jama* of the provinces of Balkh, Badakhshan and Kandahar (Rs. 4,500,000) from the *jama* given in the *Badshah Nama* (Rs. 220,000,000) we are left with Rs.215,500,000. Subtracting from this figure the revenue of the four *subas* of the Deccan (including Baglan) mentioned in *Badshah Nama* (Rs.45,500,000) we are left with Rs.170,000,000. Assuming that two thirds of this amount was realized, the realization comes to about Rs.113,300,000. If we add to it Rs.10,000,000 as the actual realization (*hasil*) of the four *subas* of the Deccan the actual realization for the Mughal Empire comes to about Rs.123,300,000.

[275](#) *Jahangir's India*, p.47.

[276](#) Ibid., p.54.

[277](#) Ibid., pp.55-56.

[278](#) Ibid., pp.57-58.

[279](#) Bernier, p.205.

[280](#) ‘Timariots’ here is intended to mean ‘Mughal Emperors’, who were descendants of Timur.

[281](#) Ibid., pp.226-27.

[282](#) Ibid., p.230.

[283](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, part II, pp.508-10.

[284](#) *Relations of Golconda*, pp.10-11.

[285](#) See, for instance, Waris, p.19b (Gujarat, 1648), 42a (Agra-Delhi route, 1650).

[286](#) *Jahangir's India*, pp. 58-59.

[287](#) This 'Raja Piepel' was, probably, the Raja of Rajpipala, whose capital had been at Nandod, 60 km east-northeast of Bharuch. Rajpipala is 10 km from Nandod. When the Mughals seized his capital he retired to the mountainous territory further south. He was included among the chieftains who levied contributions and were called 'Garacias' or 'Gracias' perhaps from the Sanskrit 'gras' (a mouthful, morsel). See *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vol. I, part I, p.226; *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Gujarat: Surat and Broach*, Vol. II, p.214. Dr. Pissurlencar (*Assentos*, IV, p. 258 n.) has derived 'Gracias' from the Portuguese 'grasso' i.e. territory assigned for the expenses of a prince.

[288](#) For a map of the route see Mundy, Vol. II, map facing p.78.

[289](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.72-74.

[290](#) Mundy also provides a sketch of these 'towers' ( Mundy, Vol. II, Illustration No.6, facing p. 108). Manucci (Vol. I, p. 134) and Tavernier (Vol. I, p. 48) also describe similar scenes. Manucci further says he had made several trips between Agra and Delhi during his thirty-five year stay in India, and had at every such journey witnessed numerous freshly severed heads as well as bodies strung up on trees by the wayside. Tavernier, too, had

observed such towers on the Agra – Burhanpur route in 1665 (see Vol. I, p. 48).

[291](#) There is the following marginal note here: “The estate of the common people – their miseries.”

[292](#) Mundy appears to be alluding to a marauding Rajput tribe called Gakkhar.

[293](#) All places mentioned in the narrative are shown in Mundy, Vol. II, map facing p.78.

[294](#) Ibid. pp.89-90.

[295](#) Ibid., pp.109-11.

[296](#) Earlier Mundy has described them thus: “We saw a good company in our way (where we must go), armed with long bows and swords, all naked, except a little sash [turban] about their heads and a cloth about their middle.” (Mundy, Vol. II, p. 110.)

[297](#) Ibid., pp. 118-19.

[298](#) The Raja might be a *mansabdar* holding the district in *jagir*.

[299](#) Ibid., p.129.

[300](#) Ibid., pp.172-73.

[301](#) Ibid. p.179.

[302](#) Ibid., p.180-81

[303](#) Ibid., pp.185-86.

[304](#) Bayana is 65 km from Fatehpur [Sikri].

[305](#) Ibid., p.234.

[306](#) Pansar is 30 km north of Ahmedabad.

[307](#) Ibid., p.265.

[308](#) Bernier, pp.208-11.

[309](#) Here the word Gentiles is used to mean Hindus.

[310](#) Plural of *amir* (a nobleman).

[311](#) Son-in-law of Muhammad.

[312](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, Note on pp.604-06.

[313](#) See the list of *mansabdars* given in Waris, pp.123b-130a.

[314](#) See the lists of *mansabdars* given in the *Badshahnama* towards the end of its narrative of the first 10 and 20 years of Shah Jahan's reign and the list given in Waris towards the end of 30<sup>th</sup> year of Shah Jahan's reign.

[315](#) AFS, Vol. I, No.3. See the introductory note by G.H. Khare in pp.5-8.

[316](#) SCS, Vol. IX, No.21 (p.29).

[317](#) SCS, Vol. IX, No.36.

[318](#) AFS, Vol. V, No.71.

[319](#) Unpublished documents preserved in BISM, *rumal* (bundle) No. 2 in the G. H. Khare Collection, Document Nos. 1366/27, 1367/27, 1469/27, 1564/27, 1609/27.

[320](#) *Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, pp.316-17.

[321](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.108.

[322](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, pp.451-52. (For a condensed English translation of this passage see *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, p.36.

[323](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.178.

[324](#) Here appears a note in the margin thus: “A desperate resolution.”

[325](#) *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, p.192 (No.396).

[326](#) Manrique, Vol. II, p.211.

[327](#) *The Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No.49: *Bijapur Inscriptions*, pp.82-85.

[328](#) *Portuguese-Maratha Relations*, note 98, p.68. The year mentioned there (1664) is incorrect. It should be 1654. See

*Portugej-Marathe Sambandh*, 59 (fn 98).

[329](#) *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, 1921-1922, pp.10-12.

[330](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 231-32.

[331](#) *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, 1937-1938, pp.52-54.

[332](#) Ibid. p.53 (n.2).

[333](#) Ibid.

[334](#) *Copper-plate and Stone Inscriptions of South India*, pp.385-86  
vide *Hindu Temples: What Happened to Them*, Vol. II, pp.122-23.

[335](#) His article entitled *Why Shivaji the Great Fought for Independence* published in *Smarika*. pp.1-6. Some examples of such mosques in Maharashtra are: (1) At Karad (Satara district) – Article by Y.R.Gupte (Late Assistant Superintendent for Epigraphy) in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. VI, pp.192, 194. (2) Newasa (Ahamadnagar district) – Y. R. Gupte's article in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No.1, pp.2-4. (3) Erandol (Jalgaon district) – Article by P.M.Chandorkar, *BISM Shashth Sammelan Vritta*, pp.202-03. (4) Mardi (in Solapur district) and Ambajogai (Beed District) – G.H.Khare's article in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No.4, pp.7-8. (5) Mangalvedhe (Solapur district) – *Select Articles*, pp.2-3.

[336](#) *History of Shahjahan of Dihli*, pp.294-95.

[337](#) Ibid., p.295.

[338](#) *FBS*, pp.107-08

[<sup>339</sup>](#) *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, pp.249-59 (No.503).

[<sup>340</sup>](#) *Sanads and Letters*, pp.32-33 (No.33).

[<sup>341</sup>](#) The account in this paragraph is taken from the *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 94-100, 106-19, 121-23, 133, 139.

[<sup>342</sup>](#) The headquarters of a district of the same name in Bihar.

[<sup>343</sup>](#) For the account in this paragraph see *Badshah Nama*, Vol.I, Part II, pp.271-74.

[<sup>344</sup>](#) *EFI* (1624-1629), p.189.

[<sup>345</sup>](#) *Studies in the History of Gujarat*, p.54.

[<sup>346</sup>](#) *EFI* (1634-1636), p.259.

[<sup>347</sup>](#) *Waris*, p.98b.

[<sup>348</sup>](#) *Chintamani-Prashasti* vide *Studies in the History of Gujarat*, pp.54-55.

[<sup>349</sup>](#) *Mandelslo's Travels in Western India*, pp.23-25.

[<sup>350</sup>](#) *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, p.194; Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, p.13-14). See also Tavernier, Vol. I, p.59.

[<sup>351</sup>](#) *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, p.194.

[352](#) On 4<sup>th</sup> September 1646 Shah Jahan appointed Shayista Khan *subadar* of Gujarat. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, P.583.) Then on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1648 the Emperor appointed Prince Dara Shukoh to that post, ordered Baqi Beg to oversee the administration of that *suba* on behalf of the Prince and conferred upon him the title of Ghairat Khan. (Waris, p.19b.)

[353](#) *Studies in the History of Gujarat*, pp.58-59.

[354](#) Satidas is a corruption of Shantidas. Jawahari means jeweller. Zaveri is its corrupt form.

[355](#) The *mihrab* is a small arched recess oriented in the direction of Mecca from where the Imam leads the congregation in prayer.

[356](#) A community of merchants who had been converted to Islam.

[357](#) *Indian Travels*, pp.13-14.

[358](#) *Studies in the History of Gujarat*, p. 59.

[359](#) Dhandhera (23° 31' N, 76° 16'E) is in Shajapur district of Madhya Pradesh.

[360](#) Indraman's story narrated in this paragraph is taken from the *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.142, 223, 234-35. See also SDSR, Persian text of No.15 (p.48). The English summary given there is incorrect.

[361](#) Aurangzeb's letter to Shah Jahan (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 185-86).

[362](#) Ibid.

[363](#) Ibid.

[364](#) Aurangzeb's letter to Shah Jahan (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 467-68).

[365](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.43-44.

[366](#) For the first, see *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, p.22; for the second, see *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, p.169.

[367](#) For the first, see *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, p.22; for the second, see *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, p.169.

[368](#) The Keshavrai Temple at Mathura was demolished and a mosque was erected in its place. The idols in the temple were brought to Agra and buried under the steps of the Begum Sahiba Mosque.

[369](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.51-52, 55, 60, 107-8.

[370](#) *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.87.

[371](#) These have been published, with an English translation, in *Kitab-i-Nauras*.

[372](#) *Basatin- us Salatin*, Ch.5 (pp.282-83).

[373](#) See, for instance, *AFS*, Vol.III, Nos. 36-41, 44, 46-49; V, Nos.132-33.

[<sup>374</sup>](#) See, for instance, SCS, Vol. IV, No.680; V, No. 887; XI, No.94.

[<sup>375</sup>](#) The only exception till the end of Aurangzeb's reign was Asaf Khan, father-in-law of Shah Jahan. He had attained the rank of 9,000 *dhat*/9,000 *sawar* in 1630. (See *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.113, 193; Part II, p.292.) The princes' ranks used to be much higher. Their ranks at the end of twentieth year of Shah Jahan's reign were: Dara Shukoh, 20,000 *dhat*/20000 *sawar*/10,000 *du aspa sih aspa*; Shuja, 15,000 *dhat*/ 10,000 *sawar*/ 8,000 *du aspa sih aspa*; Aurangzeb, 15,000 *dhat*/ 10,000 *sawar*/8,000 *du aspa sih aspa*; Murad Bakhsh, 12,000 *dhat*/9,000 *sawar*. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.717.)

[<sup>376</sup>](#) 7,000 *sawar* + 7,000 *du aspa sih aspa* = 14,000. This figure is to be divided by three as per the 1/3<sup>rd</sup> rule.

[<sup>377</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.715.

[<sup>378</sup>](#) *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, pp.15, 163-64.

[<sup>379</sup>](#) Ibid. pp.163-64.

[<sup>380</sup>](#) *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part II, Nos. 1067-1146, 1149-50, 1152-1232.

[<sup>381</sup>](#) Terry, pp.150,152; Mundy, Vol. II, p.196 and illustration No. 13 (facing p.194) drawn by Mundy; Bernier, pp.47-48, 371; Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, pp.61-62); Manucci, Vol. I, pp.274, 280 and illustration facing p. 258; II, pp.376, 437-38; Fryer, Vol. II, p.211.

[<sup>382</sup>](#) *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.229.

[383](#) Ibid. pp. 227-29.

[384](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, pp.259-60.

[385](#) See, for instance, *SDAR*, pp.57-59 (A.R.No. 4458).

[386](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.146; II, p.40, 181; *Alamgir Nama*, p.487.

[387](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, pp. 249.

[388](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./8, T.P./10, T.P./12, T.P./14, T.P./68, 1/639.

[389](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./69, T.P./106, T.P./152, T.P./154.

[390](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./33, T.P./133; Part II, No. 4/253.

[391](#) See, for instance, Waris, p.70b; *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./8, T.P./10, T.P./16, T.P./56, 1/798, 1/1323.

[392](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos.T.P./6, T.P./24, T.P./64, T.P./69, T.P/104, T.P./106, T.P./154, 1/639.

[393](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./69, T.P./639, S.D.S.R., Persian text of

Nos. 7, 29; S.D.A.R., pp.57-59 (A.R. No. 4458, Persian text).

[<sup>394</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos.T.P./69, T.P./106,T.P./135, T.P./138, T.P./141, T.P./152, T.P./154, T.P./156, T.P/178, T../202, 1/1461 TO 1/1465.

[<sup>395</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, PART I, Nos. 1/460, 1/951, S.D.A.R., pp.57-59 (A.R. No.4458, Persian text).

[<sup>396</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.715.

[<sup>397</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./11, T.P./16, T.P./19, T.P./29, T.P./69, T.P./138, T.P./141, T.P./163, 1/8, 1/12, 1/1159, 1/1375.

[<sup>398</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Muhammad Nama*, pp.126, 226; *Alamgir Nama*, p.1019; A.F.S. Vol. III, No.10; M.I.S., VOL. XX, No. 119(pp.161-62).

[<sup>399</sup>](#) See, for instance, *AFS*, Vol. I, Nos. 61, 62, 64.

[<sup>400</sup>](#) For Adilshahi troopers see, for instance, *Firishta*, Vol. III, pp. 31,86; *Shivabharat*, c. 22, v. 25-26. For Qutbshahi troopers see, for instance, *Tavernier*, Vol. I, p.127.

[<sup>401</sup>](#) *Waris*, pp.60a, 63a.

[<sup>402</sup>](#) *Bernier*, pp. 217, 352; *Tavernier*, Vol. I, pp. 48-49.

[<sup>403</sup>](#) For this method of fabrication see *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp. 115, 121, 123, 126; *Bijapur and its Architectural*

*Remains*, p.31.

[404](#) Waris, pp. 60a, 70a; *SDAR*, pp.90-92 (A.R.No.164), 213-15 (A.R.No.839, Persian text).

[405](#) See, for instance, *EFI* (1646-1650), pp.250-52,317; (1655-1660), p.199.

[406](#) Mundy, Vol. V, p.99.

[407](#) See, for instance, *EFI* (1646-1650), pp. 250, 256, 259, 317; (1655-1660), pp.159-60, 199, 250-52, 264 (n.1), 366, 370-73, 375, 377-78, 382, 386; (1661-1664), p.54.

[408](#) See, for instance, *EFI* (1655-1660), pp.154, 211; (1665-1667), pp.10, 166, 169; (1668-1669), p.95. Of course, occasionally a few were sold. See, for instance, *Ibid.*, pp.28, 95, 270.

[409](#) For instance, during the siege of Kandahar in 1653 Dara Shukoh's siege train included three big guns. Of these, two fired a ball weighing one maund and eight seers by Akbari weight (i.e. 29 kg) and one fired a ball of one maund and sixteen seers by Akbari weight (i.e. 34 kg). See Waris, p.70a.

[410](#) In 1652 Shah Jahan sent Aurangzeb to take the fort of Kandahar. The artillery given with him included 8 big guns for "breaking the forts", 20 small guns, each firing a ball of 2 to 2.5 seers weight, which were placed at the front during a battle, 20 *hathnals* (guns placed on the backs of elephants) and 100 *shutarnals* (guns placed on the backs of camels). See Waris, p.60a.

[411](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, p. 119; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol.I, p.145; Roe, p.286; Terry, pp.141-42; Waris, pp.60a,71a;Mundy, Vol.II,

pp. 190, 194, 236-37; Manucci, Vol. I, pp. 266, 275; Bernier, pp. 47, 217-18; Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 303; ERS, Vol. I, P. 428.

[412](#) The description is from Terry, pp. 141-42.

[413](#) Terry's mention of a tennis ball should cause no surprise; the game of tennis was in vogue in England from well before the 16<sup>th</sup> Century. Mundy (Vol. II, p. 211) says that the circumference of the ball fired from the guns placed on the backs of camels would be about five or six inches. Bernier (pp. 217-18) says that the gun on the back of the camel would be about twice the size of a musket.

[414](#) *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp. 136-37.

[415](#) There is a misconception that the rocket was invented by Tipu! Even Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the former President of India, writes in his autobiography: "The development of Indian rockets in the twentieth century can be seen as a revival of the eighteenth century dream of Tipu Sultan." (*Wings of Fire*, p. 42. Universities Press, Hyderabad. 16<sup>th</sup> impression, 2003.) If he means to suggest, and that is how many people have interpreted this remark, that the rocket was an invention of Tipu or any one of his followers, the good Dr. Kalam mistaken. Rockets were in use in India for well over a hundred years before Tipu's birth. The use of rockets by Tipu's army in the Anglo-Mysore wars towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century provided an impetus to research on rockets by the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich (London). The rocket developed there was chiefly the work of William Congreve. It was first used by a British warship in 1806 and then by a British unit in the Battle of Leipzig (1813). It was also used by the British army in the Battle of Waterloo (1815).

[<sup>416</sup>](#) Bernier, p.48; *EFI* (1655-1660), p.279 (n.1); Waris, p.70a-b; *SDSR*, Persian text of Nos. 124, 139; *SDAR*, pp.29-30 (A.R.No.4970, Persian text).

[<sup>417</sup>](#) *A Narrative of the Campaign India*, p.295.

[<sup>418</sup>](#) Bernier, p.48; *A Narrative of the Campaign India*, p.295; *SPD*, Vol.XX, No.86; *Aitihasik-Lekh-Sangrah*, Part VIII, No.4369.

[<sup>419</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/134, 1/153, 1/318, 1/348, 1/568, 1/1002, 1/1004, 1/1021, 1/1022.

[<sup>420</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/52, 1/53, 1/55, 1/131, 1/179, 1/318, 1/343, 1/992, 1/1002, 1/1004, 1/1007, 1/1018, 1/1021, 1/1022, 1/1050, 2/636, 2/683, 2/684, 2/691, 2/703, 3/59, 5/113, 3/131, 3/145, 3/378, 3/605, 3/611, 3/778, 3/818. All these are salary papers.

[<sup>421</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/992, 1/1002, 1/1004, 1/1018, 1/1019, 1/1022, 1/1023. All these are surety bonds.

[<sup>422</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SDAR*, pp.138-40 (A.R.No.100, Persian text). We find several Europeans employed as gunners in the Mughal artillery. See, for instance, Bernier, p.38 (French), 73 (Portuguese, English, French, German), 93 (French and other Europeans), 185 (Portuguese, English, French, German); Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.48-49 (French, English, Dutch), 117-18 (English, Dutch); *SDAR*, pp.134-35 (A.R.No. 107, Persian text, Firangis), pp.134-35 (A.R.No.107, Persian text, Firangis), p.143 (A.R.No.720, Persian text, Firangis); *SWD*, p.92 (Firangis); *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 251 (English).

[<sup>423</sup>](#) *FBS*, p.107.

[<sup>424</sup>](#) Bernier, p.217.

[<sup>425</sup>](#) See, for instance, Martin, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 538, 765-66; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 150, 163-64; *Alamgir Nama*, p.994, 1015; *SWD*, Persian section, pp.4,,17-18,24; Waris, pp.110a-111b; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.228, 231.

[<sup>426</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./212, 1/202, 1/205, 1/206, 1/916, 1/917, 2/73, 3/614,3/758,3/759.

[<sup>427</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./44, 1/50, 1/202, 1/205, 1/206, 1/226, 1/712, 1/729, 3/177, 3/343, 3/619-21.

[<sup>428</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.715.

[<sup>429</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, T.P./44 and T.P./216, T.P/210 and T.P./213.

[<sup>430</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/740, 1/1358, 3/121, 3/130, 3/133, 3/177, 3/191, 3/343, 3/722, 3/724. All these are attendance records of various *sadis*.

[<sup>431</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./93, T.P./99, 2/669, 2/670, 3/114, 3/160, 3/169.

[<sup>432</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./99, T.P./225, 1/210, 1/228, 1/229, 1/916, 1/917, 2/74, 2/231, 2/572, 3/18, 3/29, 3/835; Vol. II, Nos. 6/292, 6/387, 6/388, 6/439, 6/1180. All these are salary records.

[<sup>433</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./249, 1/433, 1/1282, 3/616; Vol. II, Nos. 6/387, 6/1766. *Sadiwals* who were required to keep one or two horses were called *sawar sadiwals* (mounted *sadiwals*) and others were called *piyada sadiwals* (*sadiwals* on foot). See *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Part I, No. T.P./40; *SDAR*, pp.90-92 (A.R. No.164, Persian text)

[<sup>434</sup>](#) *SDSR*, No. 72 (Persian text); *SDAR*, pp.129-31 (A.R.No. 708, Persian text); *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./45, T.P./87, 1/126, 1/141 TO 1/150, 1/681, 1/712, 1/713, 1/716 to 1/718, 2/69; Vol. II, No. 6/438.

[<sup>435</sup>](#) Bernier, p.47; Manucci, Vol. I, plate IX, Vol. II, plate XIII to XVII; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 145, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, p.97; Vol. II, pp. 483, 507,715; Waris, pp. 60a, 70b, 105a; *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos.T.P./44, T.P./114, T.P./231, 1/36, 1/93, 1/120, 1/122, 2/304, 2/308, 2/417, Terry, p.150; Fryer, Vol. II, p.111.

[<sup>436</sup>](#) Bernier, p.217; *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p.104.

[<sup>437</sup>](#) See, for instance, Martin, Vol. I, Part II, PP.532, 548, 552; *SWD*, pp.4, 8,14.

[<sup>438</sup>](#) Waris, 19b.

[<sup>439</sup>](#) *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part II, No.4/109.

[<sup>440</sup>](#) See, for instance, Manucci, Vol. I, p.275 and illustration facing p.251; *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp.175-76; *Tarikhi-i Iskandari*, p. 16 (v.33).

[<sup>441</sup>](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.104.

[<sup>442</sup>](#) Bernier, pp.52-54.

[<sup>443</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.715.

[<sup>444</sup>](#) *Tufangchi* is Turkish for musketeer. *Top-andaz* and *Gola-andaz* are synonymous, meaning artilleryman, gunner.

[<sup>445</sup>](#) Bernier (p.219) says there were always 35,000 to 40,000 troopers with the Emperor and that the total number of troopers in the Mughal cavalry including these and those in the provinces would be over 200,000. As for the infantry he says (p.219) that the total number of musketeers and artillerymen with the Emperor would not be more than 15,000.

[<sup>446</sup>](#) Here are some examples: (1) In February 1636 Shah Jahan dispatched against Shahji and other Nizamshahi warlords three armies: 20,000 troopers under Khan-i Dauran, 20,000 troopers under Khan-i Zaman and 8,000 troopers under Shayista Khan. Later when he learnt that the Adilshah was providing succour to Shahji he assembled one more army of 10,000 troopers under Sayyid Khan-i Jahan and ordered that he, Khan-i Dauran and Khan-i Zaman should invade and devastate Adilshahi territory. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part II, pp.135-37, 139-41.) Thus these four armies totaled 58,000 troopers in a major campaign, directed by the Emperor himself. (2) In 1646 Shah Jahan

dispatched an army under Prince Murad Bakhsh to capture the provinces of Balkh and Badkhshan (in Afghanistan). It comprised 50,000 troopers and 10,000 foot soldiers including musketeers, rocketeers and artillerymen. (*Ibid.* Vol. II, p.483.) (3) In 1652 Shah Jahan dispatched an army under Prince Aurangzeb to recapture the fort of Kandahar from the Iranians. It too comprised 50,000 troopers and 10,000 foot soldiers including musketeers, rocketeers and artillerymen. (*Waris*, p. 60a.)

[447](#) Bernier, p.219.

[448](#) Fryer, Vol. II, pp.51-52.

[449](#) *Basatin*, Persian text, p.346.

[450](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.158.

[451](#) In 1657, Prince Aurangzeb invaded the Adilshahi Sultanate, captured the fort of Bidar and then laid siege to the fort of Kalyani. While the siege was in progress an Adilshahi army of about 30,000 troopers under Khan Muhammad arrived to relieve the fort and was defeated by Aurangzeb. (*Adab.*, Vol. I, pp.519-21.)

[452](#) Bernier, p.55.

[453](#) Louis de Bourbon, Prince of Condé (1621–1686), and Marshal Turenne (1611–1675) were very able French generals.

[454](#) See, for instance, Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./229, 1/736, 2/185, 3/368; SWD, Persian section, pp.63-64 (No.1), 66 (No.4).

[455](#) *Mandelslo's Travels in Western India*, pp.34-35.

[456](#) *Indian Travels*, p.12.

[457](#) It seems that the concept of some sort of uniform for soldiery was not entirely unknown in India. However, except for a few short lived exceptions, that concept was never applied in practice. Firishta says that Ismail Adilshah, who ruled from 1510 to 1534, had introduced a regulation requiring each soldier to don a red, twelve-pointed Turkish cap and that it was strictly followed till his death. (Firishta, Vol. II, p.33. See also *Basatin*, Ch.2.) The uniform was not introduced even in European armies till the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century. See *Cambridge Modern History* (1599–1610), p.185.

[458](#) *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p.183.

[459](#) Terry, p.347; Mundy, Vol. II, p. 193. Terry also provides an illustration of the Mughal standard. (See the second of the three illustrations inserted between pp.346 and 347 of the edition of 1777 of his book.) It seems that Mundy erred in saying that the standard depicted a tiger. There was a very strong influence of Iranian culture in the Mughal court and the lion was an important symbol in Iranian heraldry.

[460](#) *Tuman-tok*, a standard with yak tails, was awarded to very senior amirs. (*The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, p. 52.) Jahangir awarded it to Prince Khurram (later Shah Jahan) in 1607. (*Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p. 87.) Shah Jahan, at the time of his coronation in 1627, promoted Mahabat Khan to the rank of 7,000 *dhat*/ 7,000 *sawar*/ 7,000 *du aspa sih aspa* and conferred upon him the *Tuman-tok*. (*Badshsh Nama*, Vol. I, p.117.) In the same year he awarded it to Asaf Khan. (Ibid., p.179-80.) Aurangzeb awarded

it to *Amir-ul Umara* (Shayista Khan) in 1659. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.426.) *Mahi Maratib*, a standard with a representation of a fish, was also regarded as a great honour. (*The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 83.) Aurangzeb awarded it to Khan Jahan Bahadur in 1673. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 79.)

[<sup>461</sup>](#) *Basatin* (Ch. 4, Section 5) says that the Adilshahi standard was yellow; but once Ali Adilshah I defeated the Nizamshah, captured his standard which was green and adopted it as his own. But later it again says (Ch.5, Section 45) that the Adilshahi standard was yellow during the reign of Ibrahim Adilshah II and that he named it *Nishan-i Nauras*.

[<sup>462</sup>](#) Bernier, p. 43, 219-20, 365-67, 369.

[<sup>463</sup>](#) *Indian Travels*, p.218.

[<sup>464</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 241-42; Part II, pp.135-36.

[<sup>465</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 302; Waris, pp.32a-b, 64a.

[<sup>466</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Muhammad Nama* p. 226.

[<sup>467</sup>](#) For instance: (1) When, in 1633, the Mughal army under Mahabat Khan laid siege to the fort of Daulatabad, the Mughal province of Khandesh could be said to have been his base. (2) The Mughal army tried to recapture the fort of Kandahar thrice: in 1649, 1652 and 1653. During these campaigns the Mughal province of Kabul or the triangle Ghazni–Kabul–Peshavar could be said to have been their base.

[<sup>468</sup>](#) For instance: (1) During the siege of Daulatabad, Mahabat Khan's army was receiving its supplies from Burhanpur (the capital of the province of Khandesh) by way of Jafarnagar. See *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, pp.505, 517. (2) During their campaigns against Kandahar the base of the Mughal army was at Kabul. In 1649, and again in 1652, while Aurangzeb and Sadullah Khan had invested that fort the Emperor, Shah Jahan, was staying at Kabul. (See Waris, pp.30a, 34a, 59b, 67a.)

[<sup>469</sup>](#) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XI (edition of 1664), pp.703, 705-06; The Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. XIV, p.392.

[<sup>470</sup>](#) See, for instance, Mundy, Vol. II, pp. 53 (thousands of bullocks laden with grain), 95 (14,000 thousand bullocks laden with grain), 98 (20,000 bullocks laden with sugar), 262 (2,000 bullocks); Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.32-33 (convoys of 10 to 12 thousand bullocks laden with grain, salt, etc.; Thevenot in *Indian Travels*, p.103 (convoys of over a thousand bullocks laden with cloth).

[<sup>471</sup>](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, p.33; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, p.233.

[<sup>472</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.95-96; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, p.233; *EFI* (1624-1629), p.270; (1634-1636), p.225; Martin, Vol. I, Part II, pp.779-80.

[<sup>473</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.95-96.

[<sup>474</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.96, 262; Cosme de Guarda (*FBS*, p.97); *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p.192.

[<sup>475</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.96; Tavernier, Vol. I, p.35.

[<sup>476</sup>](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.96, 98; Martin, Vol. I, Part II, p.780.

[477](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.96.

[478](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.96 (not more than six to seven miles); Martin, Vol. I, Part II, p.780 (three to four leagues). Each French league was equal to 2 miles and 743 yards.

[479](#) There were bridges (of stone, bricks or wood) over small rivers at a few places. See, for instance, Monserrate, p.98, 105; Mundy, Vol. II, pp.64, 89, 91; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 53, 93, 98, 104. The travelogues of Europeans, such as Della Valle, Mundy, Tavernier, Carre and Bernier, show that there were no bridges over big rivers.

[480](#) See, for instance, Mundy, Vol. II, pp.278-79; Della Valle, Vol. I, p. 65.

[481](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.133, 144.

[482](#) Bernier, p.381; Mundy, Vol. II, p.28; Tavernier, Vol.II, pp.225, 311; Thevenot and Careri (*Indian Travels*, pp.73, 208).

[483](#) See, for instance, Mundy, Vol. II, pp.55-56. On an average, each bullock carried 120 kg of goods. (Mundy, Vol. II, p. 95, 98; Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 32.) A large convoy of bullocks would cover about 15 km per day. To supply the requirement of grain (about 100 MT) of an army of 10,000 horsemen, about 833 bullocks (each carrying 120 kg) had to reach its camp every day. If the army was encamped 150 km from its base,  $16,660$  bullocks would be required to keep it supplied. ( $20$  days to and fro  $\times 833 = 16,660$ , say 11 bullocks per 1000 trooper-km.) At this rate about 55,000 bullocks would be needed to keep an army of 50,000 horsemen supplied at a distance of 100 km from its base. Actually no such detailed logistical planning was made

and armies kept going on the demand and supply principle. Convoys carrying the supplies did not reach the camp every day; a convoy of 10 or 20 thousand bullocks would arrive every few days. (See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, part I, pp. 505-07, 514, 517-19.)

[484](#) *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, pp.233-34; Waris, p.70a; AFS, Vol. III, no.72; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.505-07, 514, 517-19.

[485](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. IV, No.691; V, No.764, 775; VI, No.11, 12; *MIS*, Vol. XX, No.32.

[486](#) Cosme de Guarda observes: "Some rebels or chieftains, therefore, save themselves for a long time by burning the fields, as big armies are unable to seek them and they are strong enough for small forces." (*FBS*, p.44.) This, perhaps inadvertently, echoes the remark of Henry IV of France (1553–1610) that "Spain is a country where small armies are beaten and large ones starve."

[487](#) Cosme de Guarda (*FBS*, pp. 44, 46, 94-95). See also *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, p.47. *Alamgir Nama*, p.203.

[488](#) Bernier, pp.365-66.

[489](#) For pontoon bridges see *The Akbarnama*, Vol. II, p.399; Monserrate, p.81, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp. 92, 101; II, pp.38-39, 41; Bernier, pp.380, 386-87. Some description of these pontoon bridges is provided by Monserrate (p.81) and Bernier (p.380).

[490](#) Waris, pp.68a-b.

[491](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.189, 192.

[492](#) See, for instance, Waris, p.99a; *Alamgir Nama*, p.652.

[493](#) For instance: (1) Muazzam Khan set out from Delhi with 20,000 troopers on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1656 to join Prince Aurangzeb at Aurangabad for the invasion of the Adilshahi Sultanate. Marching by way of Gwalior and Kolaras he reached in the vicinity of Aurangabad on 18<sup>th</sup> January 1657. (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp.430-32, 432-34, 546-48; II, pp.684-85; *Amal-I Salih*, Vol. III, p. 249.) The usual route was Delhi, Agra, Dholpur, Gwalior, Narwar, Kolaras, Sironj, Sehore, Handiya, Burhanpur and Aurangabad. (Mundy, Vol. II, pp.51-65; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 45-53.) Distances in straight lines between these places totaled 1065 km. By Rennell's rule the distance by route would be about 1200 km. (For that rule see *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan*, pp.5-7) Muazzam Khan covered this distance in 50 days. So the average speed of his march was 24 km a day. This average would increase if we omit the days of halt. (2) After defeating Dara Shukoh in the Battle of Samugarh Aurangzeb crowned himself and then set out in pursuit of Dara. Some of the marches he made during the pursuit were: 13<sup>th</sup> September 1658, 9 (*jaribi*) *kos* (about 36 km); 14<sup>th</sup> September, 9 *kos*; 15<sup>th</sup> September, 7 *kos*; 16<sup>th</sup> September, 8 *kos*; 17<sup>th</sup> September 1658, 11 *kos*. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 200-03.) (3) A *dasturul amal* (regulation) of c.1706-7 says that the expected day of arrival of a *mansabdar* summoned by the Emperor was calculated by allowing him a week after receipt of the summons for making preparations to set out, and adding to it a travel time at 7 *jaribi kos* (or 28 km) per day. (*The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp. 216-17.)

[494](#) For instance: (1) In 1630, during the pursuit of Khan Jahan Lodi, a rebel *mansabdar*, a Mughal force under Azam Khan defeated him near Bid and then pursued him for three *kos*. By then, since the first *prahar* (about 9 p.m.) of the previous night till the third *prahar* of the day (about 3 p.m.), it had covered a distance of over 30 *kos*. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, p.325.) If

we take these *kos* to be the smaller ones, each of about 2.5 km, the distance covered by Azam Khan in 18 hours would be about 75 km. (2) After Dara Shukoh's defeat at Samugarh, a Mughal force of 9,000 troopers under Shaikh Mir was pursuing him. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 208-09.) In October 1658 after crossing the Sindhu (Indus), they covered a distance of about 80 *kos* in three marches and then covering 12 more *kos* on the fourth day reached the town of Sukkur on the west bank of the river. (Ibid., pp.273-74.)

[<sup>495</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, p.235; *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 905-07;  
*Alamgir Nama*, pp.226, 231-32.

[<sup>496</sup>](#) Waris, pp. 70a, 74a, 75a; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 229-32, 244-45.

[<sup>497</sup>](#) Irvine remarks: "This regard for lucky and unlucky days was a great obstacle to the Moguls' success in war, as it often prevented them from taking the most obvious advantages of the enemy." (*The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p.202.) He cites R.O. Cambridge's *Account of the War in India, 1750-60*, Introduction, p. xi, as his authority for his remark. I have not seen that book. Perhaps there might have been such instances in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. But I do not know of a single instance of an opportunity being squandered by the Mughals in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century on account of the astrologer's advice.

[<sup>498</sup>](#) For descriptions of Mughal camps see Terry, p.401; Bernier, pp.365-67, 369; Cosme de Guarda (*FBS*, pp.42, 93-96); Ovington, p.116; Careri (*Indian Travels*, p.217); *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, p.271; *Badshah Nama*, Vol.II, p.265; *Alamgir Nama*, p.653; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.145.

[<sup>499</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 317, 380, 414; Part II, p. 41. A force of 10,000 troopers (each with one

mount) would need 60,000 kg of hay per day for the horses. If we take into account other animals with such a force, its need for hay could easily go up to about 75,000 kg per day. A train of 625 bullocks would be required to carry it.

[500](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, Nos. 56, 64, *SWD*, Persian section, p.152 (No.8).

[501](#) There were private courier services. These couriers were called *bazar qasids*.

See, for instance, *EFI* (1655-1660), p.197. Evidently they were used mainly by merchants.

[502](#) Pelsaert (*Jahangir's India*), p.58.

[503](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, No. 15.

[504](#) *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp. 216-17.

[505](#) See, for instance, *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 40-42; *SDAR*, pp. 47-48 (A. R. No. 164, Persian text).

[506](#) See, for instance, *SDSR*, No.51, 64.

[507](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 125, 144; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 203-05.

[508](#) *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, pp. 355-56 (1674), 465-66 (1683).

[509](#) See, for instance, *Nivadak Lekh*, pp.186-87 (letter no.9, for Adilshshi); Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 233 (Qutbshahi).

[510](#) SDSR, Nos.113; SDAR, pp.122-23 (Persian text of A.R.No. 938); *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/485, 1/600. 1/761, 1/1152, 1/1162.

[511](#) Firishta, Persian text, Vol. I, p. 58. (English translation in *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India*, Vol. I, pp. 99-100.)

[512](#) Monserrate, pp.85, 125, 140.

[513](#) The following description is based upon various accounts of the following battles:

(1) Kandahar (1649), Aurangzeb against the Persians – Waris, p.27b. (2) Battle of Dharmatpur, near Ujjain (1658) Aurangzeb and Murad Bakhsh against Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan – *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 61-63, 65. (3) Battle of Samugarh (1658), Aurangzeb and Murad Bakhsh against Dara Shukoh – *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 91-92, 94-95; Bernier, pp.47, 49; Manucci, Vol. I, 275-76. (4) Battle of Khajwah (1659), Aurangzeb against Shuja – *Alamgir Nama*, pp.245-46, 249,251-52, 257. (5) Battle of Deorai (1659), Aurangzeb against Dara Shukoh – *Alamgir Nama*, p.304.

[514](#) In the Battle of Samugarh (1658) Dara Shukoh's army, according to Bernier (p.43), comprised by the least estimate 100,000 troopers, more than 20,000 infantry, and 80 guns. When Shuja was defeated in the Battle of Khajwah (1659) 114 big and small guns fell into Aurangzeb's hands. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.265.) So, it would seem that an army of 50,000 would normally have about 40 to 50 guns.

[515](#) The term 'division' is used here in the sense of a temporary collection of the contingents of a number of *mansabdars*. It has

no similarity whatsoever with the modern military formation called division.

[516](#) Based on accounts of the following battles: (1) Battle of Dharmatpur – *Alamgir Nama*, pp.61-63, 65-66. (2) Battle of Samugarh – Ibid., pp.91-96. (3) Battle of Khajwah – Ibid., pp.245-51.

[517](#) This general description of battle is based on accounts of the following battles: (1) Battle of Darmatpur – *Alamgirnama*, pp.66-73. (2) Battle of Samugarh – Ibid., pp.96-105; Bernier, pp.47-54; Manucci, Vol. I, pp. 276-81. (3) Battle of Khajwah – *Alamgirnama*, pp.257-64.

[518](#) During the Battle of Samugarh, iron chains joining the guns of Dara Shukoh's army were ordered to be removed to enable his horsemen to charge forward. (Manucci, Vol. I, p.277.) And when they reached the enemy's frontline they removed the chains joining the enemy's guns. (Bernier, p.49.) Perhaps gaps might have been left in the line of one's guns to enable the troopers to sally out.

[519](#) Bernier, pp.49-50.

[520](#) For instance: (1) Battle of Talikota (1565) – *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India*, Vol. I, p. 78; III, p.151. (2) Battle of Vellore (1647) – *Muhammadnama*, pp.302-09. (3) Ali Adilshah's battle against Siddi Jauhar (1661) – *Tarikh-i Ali Adilshahi*, pp.127-33.

[521](#) See, for instance, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, P.220; II, pp.156, 271; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 317, 380-81, 505-07, 514, 517-19; Part II, pp.37-42, 44, 46, 158, 162, 164.

[522](#) See, for instance: (1) *Bargigiri – Badshah Nama*, Vol.I, Part I, p.380. (2) *Qazzaqi – Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, P.271; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 380; Vol. II, p.704. (3) *Jang-i Qazzaqana* – Ibid., pp.705-06. (4) *Jang-i Gurezi – Basatin*, Marathi translation, pp. 265-66. Marathas were frequently called Bargis. See, for instance, *Firishta*, Vol. II, p.118. Briggs has rightly translated the term as Marathas. (See *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India*, Vol. III, p.143.) Perhaps it was derived from Persian *Baragi*, a pack-horse, because the Marathas used small horses and excelled in light cavalry tactics. Qazzaq means a Cossack, and *qazzaqi* means tactics employed by the Cossacks. *Jang-i Qazzaqana* means Cossack warfare.  
*Gurezi* - Persian for running away, flight. *Jang-i Gurezi* means running fight.

[523](#) During the Mughal invasion of Assam in 1662 the Assamese garrison of fort Jogighopa (120 km west of Guwahati) had planned to cut the line of supply of the Mughal army. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.697.) In 1790, during the war against Tipu, a Maratha army, led by Haripant Phadke and Parashurambhau Patwardhan, and supported by a detachment of the English, laid siege to the fort of Dharwad. Describing it Lieutenant Edward Moor, then serving in the English army of Mumbai, writes that if the Maratha army had advanced southward without taking the fort its large garrison would have prevented any supplies from reaching the Marathas, while to continue the advance by blockading the fort would have required a separate army. (*A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment and of the Mahratta Army*, pp.38-39.)

[524](#) The fort of Kandahar in Afghanistan was on the route from Iran to India. It was at the junction of two routes to Delhi: one by way of Multan and another by way of Kabul. (Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.73-74.) The fort of Solapur was on the route to Bijapur from the north by way of Dharashiv. The fort of Shivneri was on the way from Kalyan to Ahmednagar by way of Naneghat.

[525](#) For instance: Bijapur – Nine meters high and six meters thick. (*Bijapur and Its Architectural Remains*, p.28.) Wall around Bidar city – five to fifteen meters thick. (*The Strongholds of India*, p.40) Outermost wall of Golconda – five to ten meters thick. (Ibid., p.55.) Agra fort – 31 meters high. (Ibid., p.108.) Wall on the landward side of the Red fort of Delhi – about 30 meters high. (Ibid., p. 126) Protective walls around towns were not as massive. For instance, the wall around Ahmednagar had a circumference of five kilometers. It was about 3.5 meters high and 1.5 meters thick. (Ahmednagar District Gazetteer, Edition of 1884, p.652.)

[526](#) For instance: Bijapur (*Bijapur and Its Architectural Remains*, p.28); Agra (*The Strongholds of India*, p.108.)

[527](#) For its description see *Alamgir Nama*, pp.423-25, 933.

[528](#) SDAR, p. 65 (Persian text of A. R. No. 4984/1); *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 358-59, 376.

[529](#) For instance, the Red Fort Of Agra (*The Fortified Cities of India*, pp.108-09).

[530](#) For instance, Daulatabad (*The Strongholds of India*, pp. 37, 38, 38a); Vellore (*The Fortified Cities of India*, p.97).

[<sup>531</sup>](#) *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment and of the Mahratta Army*, pp. 24, 28, 31, 39, 41, 110, 143, 311; *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions*, Vol. II, p.687,707; *Ahmednagar District Gazetteer*, edition of 1884, pp. 693, 695 (and n.6).

[<sup>532</sup>](#) Fryer, Vol. I, p. 333. See also Poona District Gazetteer, edition of 1885, Part III, pp.154-58.

[<sup>533</sup>](#) *SDAR*, pp.119-20 (A.R.No.4975); Fryer, Vol. I, pp. 332, 339; Ovington, pp.217, 227.

[<sup>534</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SDAR*, pp.99-100 (A.R.No.4961).

[<sup>535</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb's Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. T.P./11, T.P./16,1/1, 1/6, 1/13, 1/51, 1/53, 1/54, 1/55, 1/75, 1/125, 1/140, 1/318, Part II, 5/1383, 5/1410. These are attendance and salary papers of various men employed in Mughal forts.

[<sup>536</sup>](#) Ibid., Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 1/131, 1/151, 1/511, 1/683, 3/610.

[<sup>537</sup>](#) For instance: In December 1648 the Shah of Iran laid siege to the Mughal fort of Kandahar. As he was marching towards the fort, the Mughals reinforced its garrison with 2,000 men. When the fort capitulated in February 1649, its garrison comprised 4,000 archers and swordsmen and 3,000 musketeers. (Waris, 21a, 26a.) So the original garrison of this fort, which was of great strategic importance, must have been about 5,000.

[<sup>538</sup>](#) *SWD*, Persian section, pp.140 (No.19).

[<sup>539</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, p.205.

[540](#) Ibid., Vol. II, p.105.

[541](#) In 1647 there were 40,000 foot soldiers in the Mughal army. Of these, 10,000 used to be with the Emperor and the rest were posted in the provinces (*subas*). So, on an average, there would be about 1,500 infantry in each *suba*. The territory of the Deccan was on the frontier and it had a large number of forts. So the strength of infantry posted in the four *subas* of the Deccan might be greater than the average. If we assume that there were 8,000 foot soldiers in the four *subas* of the Deccan and that all of them were posted in forts there would be, on an average, about 100 foot soldiers in each of these forts. In peace time about 30 to 40 thousand troopers were posted in the four *subas* of the Deccan. If we assume that about half of them were posted in the forts, each fort would have, on an average, 275 troopers in its garrison.

[542](#) For instance: “Raher” (Rayri or Raigad) in 1644 (AFS, Vol. I, No.31); Rohida in 1638 (Ibid., No.44); Parali in 1662 (Ibid., No.26); Chandan in 1662 (AFS, Vol. II, No. 12).

[543](#) For instance, AFS, Vol. I, Nos. 26, 39, 69; Vol. II, No.12; SCS, Vol. II, No.341 (p.343).

[544](#) See, for instance, AFS, Vol. I, No.39 (Murabdeo); III, No. 80 (Badami); V, No.134 (Shahdurg).

[545](#) For instance, Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan held the Wai Pargana in *mukasa* and had control over the fort of Kelanja in that *pargana*. (See MIS, Vol. XX, Nos. 121-23; SCS, Vol. IV, Nos. 744-45.)

[546](#) Waris, pp.70a-71a.

[547](#) Waris, p.70a.

[548](#) Waris, pp.74a-75a, 77b,78b-79a.

[549](#) *Akbar Nama*, Persian text, Vol. II, p.246 (English translation in *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, pp.467-68);*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 358, 375; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.67-70, 70-75, 77-80; *Alamgir Nama*, p. 705-06.

[550](#) *Akbar Nama*, Persian text, Vol. II, p.246 (English translation in *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, pp.467-68).

[551](#) Waris, p.34b. See also *Akbar Nama*, Persian text, Vol. II, p.246 (English translation in *The Akbar Nama*, Vol II, pp.467-68).

[552](#) Waris, p.77b.

[553](#) Waris, 25a, 34b.

[554](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.358-59; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.67-70, 77-80; *Alamgir Nama*, p.706. When Dara Shukoh laid siege to the fort of Kandahar in 1653 a *damdama*, taller than the fort, was raised within 40 days. It was 75 *gaz* [about 68 meters] wide, 55 broad and 27 high. A gun firing a ball of four or five *seers* [2.5 to 3 kg] was mounted on it. Besides an earthen wall, 35 *gaz* wide and 17 *gaz* high was built to protect the workers. One hundred thousand rupees were spent on building the *damdama* and the wall. (Waris, pp.77b-78a.) This is the only instance I have found of the measurements of a *damdama*.

[555](#) Waris, p.34b.

[556](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.437; Waris, p.34b; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.67-70. 70-75, 77-80, 85-87. It seems that the tasks of pushing forward trenches and mine galleries were impeded, perhaps due to seepage, if the water was not drained out. Waris (p.78a) tells us that during Dara Shukoh's siege of Kandahar in 1653 a canal three *gaz* wide and seven *gaz* deep was started from a distance of 5,000 *gaz* from the ditch, that when it reached a distance of 30 *gaz* from the ditch a tunnel was pushed forward from it up to the ditch and that the water in the ditch was drained out through that tunnel. One *gaz* is about 90 cm.

[557](#) During Akbar's siege of Chittorgarh in 1567-68 one of the two mines which were prepared was filled with 80 [Akbari] *maunds* [about 2,000 kg] of gunpowder and the other with 120 [Akbari] *maunds* [about 3,000 kg]. (*The Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, p.468.) When the Mughal army laid siege to the fort of Ahmednagar in 1600, a mine was filled with 180 [Akbari] *maunds* [about 4,000 kg] of gunpowder and when it was fired, the explosion made a 30 *gaz* wide breach in the rampart. (*The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, p.1159.)

[558](#) *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, P.1158; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.438; Vol. II, pp. 266-67; Khafi Khan (English translation in *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, pp.330-31).

[559](#) Waris, pp. 78a-b.

[560](#) Waris, p.78a; *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.260.

[561](#) For instance: (1) In 1631 a Mughal army under Azam Khan laid siege to Paranda. After a month no fodder was left within 20 *kos* [about 50 km] of the fort. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.360.) (2) In 1634 a Mughal army under Mahabat Khan laid siege to Paranda. After four months the army was well supplied

with grain, but no fodder and firewood was left within 10 or 12 *kos* of the fort. So every time they went out, the foraging parties had to cover a distance of 20 *kos*. (*Ibid.*, Vol. I, Part II, p.46.)

[562](#) *Muhammad Nama*, p.203 (*damdamas*), 408-09 (mining galleries); *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, p.402b (mining galleries and “*sar-kob*”, i.e. *damdama*).

[563](#) *SDAR*, pp.83-84 (A.R.No.733).

[564](#) All these are taken from *SWD*.

[565](#) These are honorifics of Muazzam Khan.

[566](#) Shuja is Arabic for intrepid, warlike, daring, brave. In Aurangzeb’s reign, his brother Shuja was referred to as Nashuja, i.e. one who is not brave!

[567](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, p.682.

[568](#) *Basatin*, Ch.8.

[569](#) *Mughal documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, No.2/451; AFS, Vol. VI, Nos. 120, 132, 278, 301, 443, 468, 472, 499, 539, 552-53.

[570](#) *Mughal documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Vol. I, Part I, No. 5/501; AFS, Vol. VI, Nos. 131, 406. These were quite junior officers having *mansabs* of 100 or 150 *dhat*.

[571](#) For Malabarlis see Pyrard, Vol. I, p. 448; Della Valle, Vol. II, pp.201, 356, 361-62; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.31-32,142-43. *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 153; Vol. II, No. 493. For Sanjanis see *EFI* (1668-

1669), p.12 (n.1); Carre, Vol. I, p.135; Manucci, Vol. II, p.227; Ovington, pp.162-63,438-46. For Vadhels see *EFI* (1655-1660), pp.78-80; (1668-1669), p.12 (n.1).

[572](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.433-39 (Against the Portuguese settlement at Hugali), Vol. II, pp. 72-76 (Against the kingdom of Assam).

[573](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 941-942, 946; Bernier, pp.174-76, 179.

[574](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol.III, pp.220-45.

[575](#) Waris, p.79b.

[576](#) The Indian army in British India is a case in point.

[577](#) The term division is merely intended to mean a temporary grouping, in no way comparable to the formation called a division in modern armies.

[578](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.483-86.

[579](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.30-31.

[580](#) Ibid., p.33.

[581](#) I think this illustration was used, though in a different context, by the famous military analyst Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart. But I do not have the reference at hand.

[582](#) Cartazes were issued by officers in Portuguese settlements and also by Portuguese commercial agents (called *feitores*)

residing in various ports outside the Portuguese settlements. See, for instance, *Jourdain*, p.198; *EFI (1618-1621)*, P.252; *Pyrard*, Vol. I, p. 405.

[583](#) For the Portuguese system of *cartazes* see *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.27-28; *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*, p.48.

[584](#) See, for instance, *Assentos*, Vol. III, Nos. 13, 19; IV, Nos. 16, 84.

[585](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.433-39,470-72, 485-86, 534-35. For English translation see *The History of India as Told by its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, pp. 31-35, 42-43.

[586](#) *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, pp. 97-99; *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, p.303.

[587](#) For their expulsion from Sri Lanka see *The Dutch in India*, pp.167-68 and from Nagapattinam and other places see *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, pp.324-29; *History of Kerala*, Vol. I, pp. 27,172,190-91,205-06,316-18,329, and 379 of notes.

[588](#) *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, p.147; *Jan Company in Coromandel*, p.101.

[589](#) See the minutes of their meetings in *Assentos*, Vols. I-IV.

[590](#) *Assentos*, Vol. III, No.99; IV, No.79; *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, pp.205, 227-28, 267-68,302; *Pyrard*, Vol. II, Part II, pp.76-77.

[591](#) This Goa was on the south bank of the Mandavi River, 10 km east of Panaji. The Old Goa (*Goa Velha* in Portuguese) which was

the capital of the Kadamba kings was on the northern bank of the Zuari River. The capital was shifted from Goa to Panaji in 1759. The new capital (Panaji) was then renamed as *Nova Goa* (New Goa). Since then the old capital (Goa on the bank of the Mandavi) was called *Velha Cidade da Goa* (Old City of Goa) or merely *Velha Goa* (Old Goa). (*Goa Gazetteer*, pp. 796-97; *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XII, pp. 256, 266-67.)

[<sup>592</sup>](#) For the Par River as the northern boundary of this coastal strip see Bocarro, pp.133-36.

[<sup>593</sup>](#) This figure is compiled from details given in Bocarro.

[<sup>594</sup>](#) See, for instance, Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, 42-43, 83-88.

[<sup>595</sup>](#) For an English translation of this order see pp.30-32 of the introduction by Edward Gray to *The Voyage of François Pyrard*.

[<sup>596</sup>](#) *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*, p.207

[<sup>597</sup>](#) Ibid., p.208.

[<sup>598</sup>](#) Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, pp.182-84; *A History of British India*, Vol. I, p.165.

[<sup>599</sup>](#) *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*, pp.207, 379. See also *A History of British India*, Vol. I, p.165.

[<sup>600</sup>](#) *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*, pp.207, 379.

[<sup>601</sup>](#) See, for instance, Pyrard, Vol. I, pp.439-40; Vol. II, Part I, p.45; Mundy, Vol. III, Part I, pp.44-45; Bocarro, pp.270-73,277.

[602](#) For galiots, their equipment, etc., see Carre, Vol. I, p.115; Vol. III, p.760; Bocarro, pp.106-07,242,275; Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, p.117; *Regimentos*, p.118.

[603](#) For galleons, their equipment, etc. see Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, pp.117-18,180-81; Bocarro, pp.271-73; *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XI, Part I, pp.10-11, 13; *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, p.170.

[604](#) Bocarro, pp.155, 184, 270; Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, pp.181-82, 257; Carre, Vol. III, p.725; *EFI (1624-1629)*, P.260.

[605](#) Bocarro, pp.106-07; *Assentos*, Vol. III, No. 113 (p.202); IV, No. 30 (p.88).

[606](#) Pyrard, Vol. I, pp. 439-40; Vol. II, Part I, p.45; Mundy, Vol. III, Part I, pp.44-45, Bocarro, pp.270-73, 277.

[607](#) For these fleets, their composition and movements see Bocarro, pp.242-44, 283-86, 399; Carre, Vol. III, p. 760; Pyrard, Vol. I, pp. 438-40; Vol. II, Part I, pp.116-18, 245-47, 256-57; Jourdain, p.173; Della Valle, Vol. I, pp.132, 137-38, 143; Vol. II, pp. 299-300, 353-55; Fryer, II, p.41; Manrique, Vol. II, p.3; *Assentos*, Vol. III, pp.12, 195, 206; IV, p.292; *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XI, Part I, pp.9-10.

[608](#) Fryer, Vol. II, p.16; Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 118-19, 122, 124-26,128-31,199; Bocarro, pp.271-72, 275, 296-97; *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, pp.253-54.

[609](#) For Muslims in Portuguese warships see *EFI (1624-1629)*, p.259; Della Valle, Vol. I, p.153; II, pp.196-97.

[610](#) Bocarro, p.223.

[611](#) Information about the northern Region is compiled from Bocarro, pp. 103-206.

[612](#) Information about the central region is compiled from Bocarro, pp. 206-307.

[613](#) The name of the island is, in fact, Tisvadi. The capital, Goa, was situated in this island.

[614](#) Mormugão, Marmagão, etc., are Portuguese corruptions of this name. Madgaon (Portuguese Margão), in Sashti, is a different place. In 1917 the Portuguese rulers amalgamated surrounding villages with Murgaon to form a city which they named Vasco da Gama (Vasco for short).

[615](#) In Portuguese settlements only Christians were allowed to bear arms. See *Pyrard*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 34, 82.

[616](#) Compiled from Bocarro, pp.307-62.

[617](#) About this time, the rate of exchange was Rs.1.1 for one xerafin.

[618](#) Bocarro, pp. 290-99, with corrections.

[619](#) Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, p.193.

[620](#) Della Valle, Vol. II, P.392.

[<sup>621</sup>](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.93-94 (and n.8); Carre, Vol. I, pp. 132, 170-72.

[<sup>622</sup>](#) Bocarro, pp.208-10,214,224,232-33.

[<sup>623</sup>](#) The information in this section is mainly derived from *The Goa Inquisition*. See also Pyrard, Vol. II, Part I, pp.92-95, 135; Carre, Vol. I, p.133; Fryer, Vol. II, pp.24-25, 27; *EFI (1665-1667)*, pp.45-46,309-10; *ERS*, Vol. II, p.202.

[<sup>624</sup>](#) *The Goa Inquisition*, p.55.

[<sup>625</sup>](#) As late as 20<sup>th</sup> January 1738 a high ranking official of the crown observed in a letter to the King of Portugal: “*I have not yet seen a Hindu converted to our Holy Faith who did not come to it for his convenience, to enjoy the privileges of the Cathecumen, or in order that his debts may be paid.*” (*The Goa Inquisition*, p.138.) Forwarding this letter to the king, the viceroy wrote that he was in entire agreement with it. (*Ibid.*, pp.138-39.)

[<sup>626</sup>](#) Information in this section is mainly derived from *A History of British India*, Vols. I and II.

[<sup>627</sup>](#) The information in this section is mainly derived from *The English Factories in India*, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vols. I and II, and *The Travels of Peter Mundy*, Vol. II.

[<sup>628</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI (1668-1669)*, PP.126, 169; Vol. I, p.235.

[<sup>629</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p.254.

[<sup>630</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI (1624-1629)*, Introduction, pp. xxxiv-xxxiv, pp.34-35; (*1642-1645*), Introduction, p.xix; (*1661-1664*),

pp.326, 365; (1665-1667), pp.107, 167,239; (1668-1669), pp. 93, 126, 184, 281; Vol. I, p. 49; Fryer, Vol. I, p. 7

[<sup>631</sup>](#) See, for instance, *A Calendar of the Court Minutes* (1674-1676), pp.17,70; (1677-1679), p. 107; *EFI*, Vol. II, p.235.

[<sup>632</sup>](#) Compiled from introductions to *A Calendar of Court Minutes*, Vols. for 1640 to 1663.

[<sup>633</sup>](#) Compiled from introductions to *A Calendar of Court Minutes*, Vols. for 1660 to 1670.

[<sup>634</sup>](#) Compiled from introductions to *A Calendar of Court Minutes*, Vols. for 1671 to 1676.

[<sup>635</sup>](#) Information in this paragraph is derived from the Vols. of *The English Factories in India*.

[<sup>636</sup>](#) For instance, The Surat Council had seven ships at their disposal at the beginning of 1642: *Diamond*, *Expedition*, *Francis*, *Prosperous*, *Seahorse*, *Supply*, and *Swan*. Of these, the carrying capacity of the smallest, *Prosperous*, was about 30 tons. That of *Francis* was somewhat less than 100 tons. It had a crew of 30 men. See *The English Factories in India* (1642-1645), pp.14, 19-20. In 1673 the Madras council had four small ships: *Arrival*, *Diligence*, *Ganges* and *Madras*. (*The English Factories in India*, Vol. II, pp. 342-43, 357, 368) Of these, the carrying capacity of *Arrival* and *Ganges* was 70 and 40 tons respectively (Ibid., p.152 – n.5); that of *Diligence* was 60 tons. See Ibid. (1668-1669), pp.126, 169.

[<sup>637</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI* (1618-1621), pp. 2, 278; (1622-1623), pp. 4, 27-28, 203, 204, 216, 342; (1665-1667), PP.32-33; Vol. I, pp. 343, 350, 353; *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 81. For the text of such a

license see *EFI* (1630-1633), p. 284, and for summaries see *Ibid.*, p.284 (and n.3).

[<sup>638</sup>](#) See, for instance, *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 335, 353.

[<sup>639</sup>](#) *EFI* (1624-1629), pp.117, 120-23, 128-29, 133-36, 145, 147, 342-44, 358-59.

[<sup>640</sup>](#) *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, pp. 13-18.

[<sup>641</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, 22-23, 25, 28-29.

[<sup>642</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, p.28.

[<sup>643</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29, 85, 104-06.

[<sup>644</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, p.28, Fryer, Vol. I, p. 104 and figure facing p.103.

[<sup>645</sup>](#) *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, pp. 204-07.

[<sup>646</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, pp.88-89.

[<sup>647</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, p. 366.

[<sup>648</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, pp.217, 375, 385-88.

[<sup>649</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI* (1655-1660), pp.174-76.

[<sup>650</sup>](#) *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, pp. 373-75.

[<sup>651</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, p.364.

[652](#) Ibid., p.214; *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.177, 182, 367; (1665-1667), p. 108.

[653](#) *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.123-44, 214-18, 332-41; (1665-1667), pp.37-41.

[654](#) Ibid., pp.72,307.

[655](#) Ibid., pp.38,65.

[656](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), pp.69, 300-01; (1668-1669), p. 223; Fryer, Vol. I, p. 177.

[657](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), pp.69-73.

[658](#) Ibid., pp.45, 290.

[659](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), pp.310-313; (1668-1669), p.59 (and n.4).

[660](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), pp.55-62, 64-65.

[661](#) “A name used in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries for dark-skinned or half-caste claimants of Portuguese descent, and Christian profession.” (Hobson-Jobson, p.933.)

[662](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), p.67.

[663](#) Ibid., p.237.

[664](#) Ibid.

[665](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), pp. 38-40, 44, 68-69.

[666](#) *Ibid.*, 66-68.

[667](#) *Ibid.*, pp.100, 216, 218, 223, 2323-33, 237, 250, 254.

[668](#) Information about the plan and construction of the fort is compiled from *EFI*, Vols. I and III.

[669](#) *EFI*, Vol.I, p.72.

[670](#) *Ibid.*, pp.30, 52-53.

[671](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), pp.56, 217-19, 224, 228, 236, 238, 246, 254; Vol. I, pp. 4, 23, 36-37, 42, 44, 56, 78, 106, 165; Fryer, Vol. I, p. 177.

[672](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), pp. 240-41.

[673](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 237-38, 241.

[674](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 19, 73, 139-40, 177, 237.

[675](#) The rate of exchange about this time was thirteen xerafins for ten rupees.

[676](#) *Ibid.*, p.129; III, pp.32-33, 81-83.

[677](#) Derived from relevant Vols. of *EFI*.

[<sup>678</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 31, 104, 113, 144, 157-58, 169, 241, 265, 324, 333.

[<sup>679</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 68, 73-74, 77, 84, 111-12, 123, 140.

[<sup>680</sup>](#) The climate of Mumbai did not suit Englishmen; mortality rate among them was high. (See, for instance, *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 27-28, 81-82, 93, 141, 143.) Of the 40 English recruits who arrived in Mumbai in September 1677, nearly half had died by January 1678! (*Ibid.*, pp. 175, 177.) Of course, once a person got used to the climate the chances of his survival must have been much greater.

[<sup>681</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 9, 54-55.

[<sup>682</sup>](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p. 72.

[<sup>683</sup>](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), p. 67.

[<sup>684</sup>](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 43, 87, 96; Vol. III, p. 168.

[<sup>685</sup>](#) See, for instance, *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 73, 154

[<sup>686</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 154, 158, 183.

[<sup>687</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, p. 44; III, pp. 15-16.

[<sup>688</sup>](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 128, 155, 157-58, 178; Vol. III, P. 17 (n.2)

[<sup>689</sup>](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p. 33.

[690](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), p.246.

[691](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 45 (and note), p. 61 (note).

[692](#) *EFI* (1668-1669), p.45.

[693](#) For information about the militia see *EFI* (1668-1669), pp.51, 59, 61, 73, 128, 221, 146; Vol. I, pp. 17, 216-17; III, p. 84.

[694](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 61.

[695](#) Compiled from *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company*, Appendix 5.

[696](#) For the dividends announced see *A Calendar of Court Minutes* Vols. from (1660-1663) to (1677-1679).

[697](#) The information in this section is gleaned from *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, *The Dutch in India*, *A History of British India*, Vol. I, *The Dutch in Western India*, *The Dutch in Malabar*, and *Jan Company in Coromandel*

[698](#) The Dutch Republic (now The Netherlands) was called the United Provinces then.

[699](#) In 1677 the Dutch factory at Vengurle was placed under the Dutch commander at Kochi who was subordinate to the Dutch governor in Sri Lanka.

[700](#) *The Dutch in Malabar*, pp. 11-12.

[701](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), pp. 32-33.

[<sup>702</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Jan Company in Coromandel*, p.120.

[<sup>703</sup>](#) *EFI (1665-1667)*, pp.13, 210, 214.

[<sup>704</sup>](#) *Jan Company in Coromandel*, pp.192-95.

[<sup>705</sup>](#) *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, p.46.

[<sup>706</sup>](#) For information in this and the next paragraph see *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XIX, pp.12-15; *EFI (1618-1621)*, introduction, pp. xxxxiv-xxxxvi; *Jan Company in Coromandel*, pp.113-15; *John Company at Work*, p. 364; *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XIII (Second Edition), p.340.

[<sup>707</sup>](#) About 80 km east northeast of Thanjavur.

[<sup>708</sup>](#) The Danes owned the place till 1845 in which year they sold it off to the English East India Company. See *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XIII (second edition), p.340.

[<sup>709</sup>](#) *Martin*, Vol. I, Part I, p.320.

[<sup>710</sup>](#) *EFI (1637-1641)*, p.316; *(1642-1645)*, p.42.

[<sup>711</sup>](#) For the full story of this dispute see Bowrey, pp.181-90. See also *EFI (1642-1645)*, p.154; *(1646-1650)*, p.174; *(1661-1664)*, pp.182-83; Vol. II, pp. 361-63, 380; *Martin*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 156; *Master*, Vol. I, pp. 318-19.

[712](#) Information in this section is derived from *The French in India*.

[713](#) The story of this expedition is mainly gleaned from Martin, Vol. I, Part I, and Carre, Vol. II (Ch. 3 to 7).

[714](#) The account of the French settlement at Pondicherry is taken from Martin, Vol. I, Parts I and II.

[715](#) This would mean that the French would have the right to collect taxes from the Village, in lieu of which they would pay to Sher Khan a fixed amount in a lump sum or installments.

[716](#) Shahji's birth date is taken from his birth chart published in *Bharat-Kaumudi*, Part II, p.755 and ASN, Vol. IX, p.95. For Sharifji's birth, see *Shivabharat* 1:74-89.

[717](#) *Shivabharat*, 2:1-5; SCS, Vol. V. No. 875 (pp.126-27). No details of the battle are known.

[718](#) *Shivabharat*, 2:29-35.

[719](#) Ibid., 38-45.

[720](#) From 1614 to 1629, he had transferred his allegiance from one master to another not less than seven times! Interested readers may consult the following in the order given: *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.169; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp.312-13, 398-99; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, 182; *EFI* (1618-1621), p. 332; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, p. 218.

[721](#) *Shivabharat*, 3:1-2.

[722](#) Ibid., 4:49-67.

[723](#) Ibid., 5:1-16.

[724](#) SCS, Vol. I, No.22 (p.40).

[725](#) *Sarlashkar* is Persian for the leader of an army. But it was used as an honorific and not in its literal sense.

[726](#) Ibid., No.23.

[727](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No. 398. Shahji is styled *sarlashkar* in two more of his letters . See SCS, Vol. VII, No. 12 (15<sup>th</sup> August 1625) and MIS, Vol. XX, No.230 (8<sup>th</sup> March 1628).

[728](#) SPSS, Volume II, No. 1901; *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, p. 319b; *Paramanadakavya*, p.63; Shahji's letter to Ali Adilshah (*Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Persian section, pp.26-28 (English translation in *House of Shivaji*, pp. 86-88).

[729](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No. 398; SCS, Vol. VII, No. 12.

[730](#) It was held by Sarkash Khan at least till 25<sup>th</sup> February 1624 and again in 1627. (SCS, Vol. II, No.117; XIV, No.13.) In 1627, the Pune Pargana was in the Nizamshahi Sultanate. (SCS, Vol. I, No.22 and MIS, Vol. XX, No. 230.) So, we may assume, unless there is contrary evidence, that Sarkash Khan was a Nizamshahi nobleman.

[731](#) SCS, Vol. I, No. 22.

[732](#) *Shivabharat*, 5:17-20.

[733](#) Unpublished document, Pune Archives, *Samshodhanasathi Nivadlele Kagad, Rumal* No.52, document No.23732.

[734](#) *SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 1901.

[735](#) We have seen that Adilshahi noblemen were called *wazirs*. To make up their contingents they used to employ subordinates who were called *sardars*. These *sardars* too maintained bands of soldiers in lieu of which they were assigned sub-*mukasas* by their masters. (See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. IV, No.722; V. No.921– pp.163-64; *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.334) But a *sardar* would be a private employee of a *wazir*. So there was a great difference between the status of a *wazir* and that of a *sardar*.

[736](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 23.

[737](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.2-4; *A. K. Chronicle*, pp.40-42.

[738](#) *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, p. 297a; *Basatin*, Ch. V; *Kundgol Chronology (BISM Quarterly)*, Vol. VI, p.187.

[739](#) It seems that physically imperfect or handicapped men were regarded unfit to ascend the throne. See, for instance, *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.173.

[740](#) *Basatin*, Ch. VI; *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp. 296b-298a, 315b, 345b; *Muhammad Nama*, pp.47-49, 57-58; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.359-60.

[741](#) *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 230.

[<sup>742</sup>](#) *Shivabharat*, 9:27.

[<sup>743</sup>](#) *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, p.319b.

[<sup>744</sup>](#) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. I, Nos.2-3, pp.35-36 (letter No.3).

[<sup>745</sup>](#) *Shivabharat*, 8:8-18.

[<sup>746</sup>](#) For the narrative from Khan Jahan Lodi's treachery to Shahji's expulsion from Khandesh, see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 199, 148-51, 271-73.

[<sup>747</sup>](#) The Emperor gave Darya Khan leave to go to the Deccan on 5<sup>th</sup> August 1628. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.226.) So it may be assumed that he arrived there in September 1628. Shahji's raid into Khandesh is narrated in the *Badshah Nama* towards the close of the first year of the Emperor's reign. That year ended on 16<sup>th</sup> January 1629. (*Ibid.*, p.251.) So Shahji's raid must have taken place in the last quarter of 1628.

[<sup>748</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.378; *Basatin*, Ch.VI; *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp. 292b-293b, 319a.

[<sup>749</sup>](#) For the story of the murder see *Shivabharat*, 8:20-32; *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p.16); *Basatin*, Ch.VI; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.308-09.

[<sup>750</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.308-09; *Basatin*, Ch.VI.

[<sup>751</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 309-10,400.

[<sup>752</sup>](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 6; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 327; *Shivabharat*, 8:33.

[753](#) *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp.315b-316a.

[754](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.61-64.

[755](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp. 64-67; *Futuhat-I Adilshahi*, pp.317b-319b. This Kannur is 22 km north of Bijapur.

[756](#) *Basatin*, Ch. VI; *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 27 (p.50); *Sanads and Letters*, pp. 107-08 (No.12), *MIS*, Vol. XVI, No. 16; XVIII, No.10 (p.29).

[757](#) Bhuleshwar, 40 km east-southeast of Pune.

[758](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.327-28.

[759](#) Ibid., pp.329-31.

[760](#) Ibid., pp.367-68.

[761](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 6; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 344-46, 356, 379; *Muhammad Nama*, pp.71-72, 75-76.

[762](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.343-47, 354-56, 366-67, 379.

[763](#) Ibid., pp.357-61, 370-71, 374-78, 380.

[764](#) *Basatin*, Ch.VI; *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp.325a-326a; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.378; *Jedhe Chronology (SCP*, p.16). See also *SCS*, Vol. II, No.251.

[765](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.378-79.

[766](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 395, 402, 409-11, *Basatin*, Ch.VI; *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p.16).

[767](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 404-06, 411-17, 421, 424, 427-28; *Muhammad Nama*, pp.77-81.

[768](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 496-97. The exact date of this event is not mentioned in any source, but can be placed sometime between March and June 1632. Fath Khan's son reached the Mughal Court with tribute in February 1632. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.409-11, 417.) Shahji left Mughal service thereafter but before Muhammad Adilshah's letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1632 which is cited below.

[769](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, P.442. See also *Sanads and Letters*, pp.102-3 (No.5), 103-04 (No.6); *MIS*, Vol. XX, No.257; *SCS*, Vol. VIII, No.20. These are Shahji's orders to officials of the Gulshanabad (i.e. Nasik), Sangamner and Pune Parganas.

[770](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.442.

[771](#) Ibid., p.497.

[772](#) *AFS*, Vol. III, No. 69.

[773](#) Galana, 23 km north of Malegaon.

[774](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.441-44.

[775](#) The narrative in this section is based on *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 497-528, 540-41. *Futuhat-i Adilshahi* (pp.326b-

327b), *Muhammad Nama* (pp.98-101) and *Basatin* (Ch.VI) give very short accounts.

[776](#) Later renamed Aurangabad.

[777](#) When the Mughals captured Ahmednagar Bahadur Nizamshah had fallen into their hands. (*The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, p.1159.) He was imprisoned in the Gwalior Fort and was still there. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 540.)

[778](#) *Basatin*, Ch. VI; *Muhammad Nama*, p.102; *Futuhat-I Adilshahi*, p.346b; *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p.16). See also *Assentos*, Vol. II, pp.113-15.

[779](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.101-02; *Basatin*, Ch. VI.

[780](#) *Futuhat-I Adilshahi*, p.346b; *Basatin*, Ch. VI.

[781](#) *Shivabharat*, 9:5-7.

[782](#) *Basatin*, Ch. VI.

[783](#) *Shivabharat*, 9:1-4; *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 999.

[784](#) *Antigualhas*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.52-53.

[785](#) The *Shivabharat* (8:41-45), too, states that the Nizamshahi Sultanate had 84 hill forts, besides several castles in the plains, and sea forts.

[786](#) The account of the siege is based on *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.536-38; Vol. II, pp.34-46. It is generally corroborated

by the diary of Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Linhares. See *Antigualhas*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.45-58.

[787](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 67-70.

[788](#) The account in this section is based on *Muhammad Nama*, pp.122-31; *Futuhat-i Adilshahi*, pp. 332a-343b; *Basatin*, Ch. VI.

[789](#) The account in this section is taken from *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 104-5, 118-119, 123-33, 135-41, 144-45, 152.

[790](#) *Ibid.*, pp.167-75, 180, 202.

[791](#) The account in thus section is taken from *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.139, 141, 148-50, 160-65, 176-77.

[792](#) The account in thus section is taken from *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 225-30, 255-56.

[793](#) Two other Nizamshahs were already there at this time! (Bahadur) Nizamshah who had been taken prisoner when the Mughals captured Ahmednagar during the reign of Akbar, and the Nizamshah (Husain II) who had been taken prisoner when they captured Daulatabad in 1633. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, p.256.) To them was now added a third, Murtaza II.

[794](#) Except otherwise stated the account in this section is taken from *Muhammad Nama*, pp.146-78.

[795](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar has drawn the same conclusion. He mentions a similar incident in which Khan-i Dauran, the Mughal *subadar* of Orissa, murdered Krishna Bhanja, the Raja of Mayur Bhanj, who had sued for peace, on the pretext that the

Raja had drawn his sword upon the Khan. In that case the Dutch factors of Balasore reported that the allegation was made to cover the Khan's treachery. Sir Jadunath observes: "A defeated and submissive chieftain, away from his own army, does not attempt murder in his enemy's den; he humbly seeks peace by every means in his power." (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.63 n.)

[796](#) This account of the siege of Shrirangapatna is taken from *Kanthirav-narasraj-vijayam*. A Portuguese letter from Basrur, written to the Portuguese viceroy at Goa on 24<sup>th</sup> February 1639 corroborates it. (*Assentos*, Vol. III, *Addenda*, No.19 (pp.652-53.) The *Muhammad Nama*, which is usually bombastic and verbose in the extreme, winds up the account (pp.159-60) of the siege in 12 lines (about 125 words) and that too with a minimum of detail and much verbiage. It says that Randaula Khan raised the siege as the Raja promised to pay a tribute of 500,000 hons and that the amount was paid after the Khan's return to Bijapur. But this is not corroborated by any other source. This, together with its uncharacteristic brevity and modesty, leads me to reject its account. It may be noted that hereafter, as we shall see in the next chapter, Adilshahi armies turned eastward in their career of conquest, evidently because their southward progress was stopped by the strong arm of Mysore.

[797](#) *Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Persian section, pp.21-22. Also published in AFS, Vol. V, No.113.

[798](#) For instance: (1) Akbar's *farman* to Khan-i Khanan Abdul Rahim styles him as *farzand*. (*Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, p.103.) (2) Jahangir's *farman* to Adilshah styles him as *farzand*. (*Ibid.*, p.103.) (3) Khan Muhammad is styled as *farzand* in a *farman* dated 11<sup>th</sup> September 1656 of Muhammad Adilshah. (*Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Persian section, pp.24-25.) (4) Afzal Khan is styled as *farzand* in a *farman* of Ali Adilshah dated 30<sup>th</sup> January 1658. (*Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Persian section, pp. 25-26.)

[799](#) Marathi translation in *Nivadak Lekh*, 185,

[800](#) Other *farmans* in which Shahji is styled as Maharaja and *farzand* are AFS, Vol. V, No. 19 (11<sup>th</sup> January 1648) and *Nivadak Lekh*, p.188 (27<sup>th</sup> May 1658).

[801](#) Murar Jagdeo, in a Sanskrit deed of grant issued by him in 1633, styles himself *Rajadhiraj Maharaj*. (*Sanads and Letters*, pp.18-21.) But this cannot be regarded as a proof that the title had been bestowed upon him by the Adilshah. We can consider it as an ‘official’ title only if it is found used to address or refer to him in a *farman*, not merely in some letter he or one of his subordinates wrote.

[802](#) For date, see *Shivabharat*, 6:26-31; *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p.16); Beawar horoscope, published in *Birth-date of Shivaji*; Baneda horoscope, published in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. III, p.125 (photograph, facing p.113); Bikaner horoscope, published in *Bharat-Kaumudi*, Part II, p.755 and ASN, Vol. IX, pp.95-96; Jaipur horoscope, published in *Studies in Shivaji and His Times*, p.23. These horoscopes are astronomically correct. The Baneda horoscope was found in a collection preserved by a famous astrologer family. For place of birth, see *Shivabharat*, 6:63, 8:1; *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p.16).

[803](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol.I, Part II, pp.149-50.

[804](#) Marathi chronicles narrate that Shahji visited Shivaji in later years. (*A.K. Chronicle*, pp.118-21; *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.124-27; *Shri Shividigvijay Chronicle*, pp.139-42; *Shedgaokar Chronicle*, pp.65-69.) But all of them are unreliable and are full of anachronisms in their narrative of that supposed event. For instance, the last named chronicle says that the visit took place

in Shaka 1589-1590 (1667-68). But, as we shall see, Shahji had already died in 1664.

[805](#) *Shivabharat*, 9:20-44. See also *Muhammad Nama*, p.159.

[806](#) *Shivabharat*, 9:43-59.

[807](#) *Ibid.*,9:60.

[808](#) *Ibid.*,9:70-71.

[809](#) *Ibid.*,10:1-27.

[810](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.3. Peshwa is a Persian word which in India was used to denote the chief executive officer and, later, the prime minister. Some historians interpret Shahji's decision to send such a staff to Pune with Shivaji as a calculated attempt to initiate Maratha sovereignty. But contemporary historical documents indicate that it was common practice in those times to appoint such a staff to administer large estates. Even Kanhoji Jedhe, *deshmukh* of Bhor *taraf* comprising just 22 villages, had a person working for him in the capacity of Peshwa. (*Shri Ramdasichi Aitihasik Kagadpatren*, Part I, No. 15.) The extent of Shahji's *mukasas* in the Pune region, with over 500 villages, was much larger than the Bhor *taraf*, and there should be nothing remarkable that Shahji provided a Peshwa and other officials to assist Shivaji.

[811](#) There is no reliable evidence and, considering the course of events, it is unlikely that the father and the son ever met again after the latter's arrival from Bangalore to Pune.

[812](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.30-33.

[813](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:21.

[814](#) *SCS*, Vol. XIV, No.39 (p.67).

[815](#) This is gleaned from orders about a grant, issued by Shahji or his subordinates, and other Marathi documents. Most of these have been published in *MIS*, Vols. XV-XVIII, XX, *SCS*, Vols. I-XIV, *SPD*, Vol. XXXI and *Sanads and Letters*. Interested readers may consult my Marathi Biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part II, Appendices XIX, XXX and XXXVI.

[816](#) See the appendices cited in note 11 above.

[817](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 82 (p.96); II, Nos. 108,139; VIII, No. 51; *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No.20; XVII, Nos. 13,16; XVIII, No. 11; XX, No. 279; *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. I, Nos. II-III, p.37.

[818](#) Shivaji's letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> July 1679 to an officer– *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No.41.

[819](#) See, for instance, *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 7; XVIII, Nos. 7, 8, 9; *SCS*, Vol. I, Nos. 26-27; III, No.517; VII, Nos. 31-32; XI, No.66. *Mahal* is an Arabic word which was used in India to denote 'district.' Some historians are under the misconception that Dadaji was a *subadar* appointed by the Adilshah and that while in that office he was also looking after Shahji's *mukasas*! Actually he was a *subadar* appointed by Shahji to look after his *mukasas*. (The difference between the two types of *subadars* is explained above. See pp. - ) Dadaji's headquarters was at fort Kondhana (renamed Sinhgad by Shivaji), near Pune. Evidently Shahji was given control over the fort also. It was exercised on his behalf by his private employee Dadaji. A *subadar* appointed by the

Adilshah was a very high rank and no Hindu, not even Shahji, was ever appointed to that post.

[820](#) For this famine, which affected Gujarat and Western Maharashtra, see *MIS*, Vol. XV, No. 414; XVIII, No.10 (p.29); *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos. 292-93; III, No. 630; XIV, No.13; *BISM Itivritta* for Shaka 1838 [annual report], pp.51-52; *Jedhe Chronology (SCP*, P.16); *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 362-64 (English translation in *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, PP.24-25); *Shivabharat*, 8:48-55; Mundy, Vol. II, pp.38-40, 43-44, 47-48, 52, 248, 265-66, 271-76, 282, 286, Appendix A (pp.339-49); *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Persian text, Vol. I, p.205 (English translation, p.179). Mundy (II, pp. 272-76) says more than a million died in the famine.

[821](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos.95-96, 104 (p.137); *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No. 63; *A. K. Chronicle*, pp. 40-43; *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.30, 34.

[822](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No.7; XVIII, Nos. 7, 8, 9; *SCS*, Vol. I, Nos.26-27; VII, No.32; XI, No. 66; *A. K. Chronicle*, pp. 40-43; *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.30, 34; *Bandal Chronicle* (ASN, Vol. X, pp.4-5).

[823](#) *SPD*, Vol. XVII, No.52.

[824](#) *SCS*, Volume II, No.110; *MIS*, Vol. XIII, No.18; *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. VII, p.46;  
*BISM Itivritta* for Shaka 1835 (annual report), p.41. A judgment passed by Dadaji in 1637 was modified by Shivaji in 1657. Yet, in so doing, he evinces utmost respect for Dadaji's sense of justice and does not say he had erred. (See *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No.7 for Dadaji's judgement and *Ibid.*, No.10 for Shivaji's judgement.)

[825](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No.120; VIII, No.211; *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 237; *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No. 18. All these Shivaji's letters which mention

Dadaji's death in most respectful language. The earliest of these is dated 19<sup>th</sup> July 1647. Dadaji's latest letter is dated 13<sup>th</sup> July 1646. (ASS, Vol. I, No.135.)

[826](#) *Sanads and Letters*, pp.107-08.

[827](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, No.120; VIII, No.211; *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 237; *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No. 18.

[828](#) *Purandare Daftar*, Vol. III, pp.132-33, 131. See also Jedhe Chronicle (*SCP*, pp.40-41).

[829](#) *A. K. Chronicle*, pp.37-39; *SPD*, Vol. XXII, No.292. Chitnis Chronicle (p.34) has incorrectly given the name of the mansion as 'Rangmahal', evidently after the name of the mansion in Satara which was the capital of the senior branch of the Maratha royal family since Shivaji's grandson Shahu ascended the throne. The correct name (Lal Mahal) is also mentioned in the Jedhe Chronology. (*SCP*, p.22.)

[830](#) *BISM Dwitiya Sammelan Vritta*, pp.265-69. In his *farman* dated 30<sup>th</sup> January 1642 to Shahji, Muhammad Adilshah wrote to the effect that Rustum-i Zaman was always full of praise for Shahji. (*Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Persian section, pp.21-22.) Rustum-i Zaman is a title which Muhammad Adilshah bestowed upon Randaula Khan in 1636. (*Muhammad Nama*, pp.146-47.)

[831](#) If this surmise is correct, Randaula Khan must have died before 20<sup>th</sup> August 1643.

[832](#) *Nivadek Lekh*, p.185.

[833](#) *Ibid.*

[834](#) *SDSR*, No.57. Persian text. The English translation provided there is incorrect.

[835](#) *SDSR*, No. 60. Persian text.

[836](#) At this time, Uzbak Khan was commandant of fort Ausa which was near the border between the Mughal Empire and the Adilshahi Sultanate. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.22; *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, p. 228; *Maathir-ul-Umara*, Vol. II, p.971.) The news he sent to his representative (or, in modern parlance, liaison officer) at the provincial capital is incorporated in the newsletter.

[837](#) *AFS*, Vol. I, No. 48. The original is in the collection of BISM, Pune.

[838](#) *Haram-khwar* in the original. I think it refers to Shahji, not Dadaji.

[839](#) They were two of the six brothers who were hereditary *mokadams* of the village of Bhadale in the Wai Pargana. (*SCS*, Vol. V, No. 921 (pp. 162-67). It was Shivaji's claim that Baji became a *wazir* due to Shahji's recommendation. (See p. – above.) During the reign of Sikandar Adilshah, Baji Ghorapade's son Maloji acquired the Mudhol Pargana in Karnataka as his *mukasa*. His descendants later rose to some prominence and became rulers of a princely state in British India. Towards the end of 1628 or early in 1629, several documents, including a false genealogy, were forged mainly to support the family's financial claims on the government. Incidentally, these documents link the Ghorapade family to the Bhosale family of Shivaji and both of them to the House of Mewar in Rajasthan. Fortunately for history, the forgeries are too obvious. For

instance, in one of the documents purported to be a *farman* of Bahmani sultan Mahmud, who ruled from 1482 to 1518, the forger has erred in giving the name of the sultan's father as Dawud instead of Muhammad! In my Marathi biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati* (Part II, Appendix VIII), I have thoroughly discussed all of these forged documents which have come to light so far.

[<sup>840</sup>](#) SCS, Vol. I, No.82 (p.96); II, Nos. 118, 119, 149; III, Nos. 515, 518, 519, 547; *Sanads and Letters*, pp.105-06 (No. 8); ASS, Vol. I, No.135; MIS, Vol. XX, No.10.

[<sup>841</sup>](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:43-45.

[<sup>842</sup>](#) SCS, Vol. II, No. 239 (p.240). There are three documents predating this, which are purported to be Shivaji's letters. These are: (1) SCS, Vol. VII, No. 20. 17<sup>th</sup> January 1632. With seals. SCS, Vol. III, No. 626 is a copy of it. (2) SCS, Vol. III, No. 633. 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1638. Without seals. (3) MIS, Vol. XV, No.268. 18<sup>th</sup> March 1645. Without seals. All these are fabrications. For a detailed discussion, see my Marathi biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part II, Appendices XVIII, XXVI and XXIX. There is one more letter (MIS, Vol. XV, No. 437) which, from its published text, would seem to predate this (24<sup>th</sup> September 1639) because the editor has read the year incorrectly. Its correct date is 7<sup>th</sup> June 1649. (See BISM Quarterly, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2, pp. 117-18 and photograph facing p.118.).

[<sup>843</sup>](#) Two types of seals were used in official Marathi correspondence. The one, which we may call the principal seal, invariably included the name of the person to whom the seal belonged and was usually imprinted at the top of the letter. The other, which we may call the closing seal, was comparatively smaller in size, did not include the name of the person but merely words indicating closure and was imprinted to close the

letter. The principal seal was not obligatory; it was not imprinted on each and every letter. The closing seal was imprinted on all official letters, with or without the main seal.

[<sup>844</sup>](#) Instead of “shines forth” (*rájate*) we might say “reigns”, “rules”, or “governs”.

[<sup>845</sup>](#) About 200 letters attributed to Shivaji have come to light so far. Of these, about 75 are copies, the rest are originals. About 25 to 30 of the total are spurious.

[<sup>846</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. I, No.22; I, Nos. 119, 140, 209; VII, Nos. 794, 910, 912; VII, no. 24.

[<sup>847</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 115 (1622), 149 (1644-45).

[<sup>848</sup>](#) Shahji – *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos.117-18, 122, 140. Jijabai – BISM Quarterly, Vol. I, Nos. II-III, p. 37 and photograph facing p. 32. I have seen the original in the collection of BISM, Pune.

[<sup>849</sup>](#) See, for instance, *ASS*, Vol. I, No. 135; *SCS*, Vol. I, No.26; III, No.517; XII, No. 66.

[<sup>850</sup>](#) A corruption of Persian *sahib* which, in India, was used as a title of courtesy, equivalent to Mr. and Sir. Here *saheb*, inserted by the scribe, refers to Shivaji himself.

[<sup>851</sup>](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.5 (and n.); *A.K. Chronicle*, pp.55-58; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 284.

[<sup>852</sup>](#) *SCP*, p.50.

[<sup>853</sup>](#) *A. K. Chronicle*, pp.55-58.

[854](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.36-38.

[855](#) *MIS*, Volume XVI, No.78.

[856](#) *Jedhe Chronicle*, p.41.

[857](#) The narrative in this section is based on *Muhammad Nama*, pp. 263-332; *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.264; *EFI* (1646-1650), pp.25-26, 70

[858](#) This Damarla might be Damarla Venkatadri who granted Madras (now Chennai) to the English East India Company.

[859](#) *Aitihasik Sphuta Lekh*, pp.25-29.

[860](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:4-6. The *A. K. Chronicle* (pp.55-60) too gives the names of Chandrarao's sons as Bajirao and Krishnarao.

[861](#) Among Maratha Hindus the name of the father is usually never given to the son, and certainly not when the father is alive. Krishnarao and Krishnaji are forms of the same name, Krishna, and Bajirao too is a form of Baji.

[862](#) *SCS*, Vol. III, No. 639 (pp.229-30).

[863](#) A chronicle of the Kondhavi Pargana (*Shri-Ramdasichi Aitihasik Tipane*, p.5).

[864](#) *SCS*, Vol. X, p.54 (entry No.5).

[865](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 232.

[866](#) *BISM, Itivritta, Shaka 1838*, pp.6-7.

[867](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 120; VIII, No.21; *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 237; *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No. 18.

[868](#) *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 53. This is a *mahzar* presided upon by Dadaji Kondadeo. The beginning of the document, where Dadaji's name should have been, is lost. But we know from another document, a letter of Dadaji Kondadeo, that the *mahzar* was presided over by him. (*SCS*, Vol. I, p. 96).

[869](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 82.

[870](#) *Ibid.*

[871](#) *SCP*, p.55.

[872](#) *SCP*, p.41.

[873](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.347-56.

[874](#) *Basatin*, Ch.6.

[875](#) *Shivabharat*, 11:3 to 12:110.

[876](#) *AFS*, Vol. IV, No.1 and note 1 (pp.21-22).

[877](#) *SCP*, p.41.

[<sup>878</sup>](#) For instance: (1) In its account of the Battle of Bhatavadi, it gives names of several noblemen in the Mughal, Adilshahi and Nizamshahi armies. (4:6-68.) Some of these are corroborated by the *Futuhat-i Adilshahi* (pp.287a-291b). (2) It gives several names of Mughal officers in Shayista Khan's army which Aurangzeb dispatched against Shivaji. Many of these are corroborated by the *Alamgir Nama* and Persian documents.

[<sup>879</sup>](#) *SCP*, pp.17, 50.

[<sup>880</sup>](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 6.

[<sup>881</sup>](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp. 356-73. Verbose descriptions without any useful information and a long poem on the victory have been omitted.

[<sup>882</sup>](#) He died on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1648. *Basatin*, printed Persian text, pp.327, 346.

[<sup>883</sup>](#) These were titles of Khan Muhammad. See *Muhammad Nama*, pp.226-27, 371.

[<sup>884</sup>](#) The date was 27<sup>th</sup> December 1648. (*Basatin*, printed Persian text, pp.328, 346.)

[<sup>885</sup>](#) The first day of the Iranian New Year (1<sup>st</sup> Farvardin) is called *Nauroz* (New Year's Day). In 1649, it coincided with 11<sup>th</sup> March. The festival of Nauroz is celebrated for a week.

[<sup>886</sup>](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:1-6.

[<sup>887</sup>](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:7-12.

[888](#) AFS, Vol. II, No.20.

[889](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:7-14, 14:15-16.

[890](#) SCS, Vol. I, No. 32.

[891](#) Afzal Khan's army which was dispatched against Shivaji in 1659 comprised 10 or 12 thousand horsemen besides foot soldiers. At that time, Shivaji had grown much more powerful than he was in 1648.

[892](#) SCS, Vol. I, Nos. 41 (p.62), 87, 88.

[893](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:14, 48.

[894](#) MIS, Vol. XX, Nos. 55-56.

[895](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:15-16.

[896](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:8-14, 63-64.

[897](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:13-14.

[898](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:15 to end of 14.

[899](#) *Jedhe Chronicle* (SCP, pp.41-42).

[900](#) SCS, Vol. V, NO.773.

[901](#) SCS, Vol. IV, No.754.

[902](#) ASN, Vol. X, p. 7; MIS, Vol. XVII, No. 9. “Gajahaliyamadhye” in p.7 of ASN, Vol. X is an error for “galabaliyamadhye”.

[903](#) *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p.17).

[904](#) *Shivabharat*, 13:1-6, 15:14-16, 39.

[905](#) Murad Bakhsh left Delhi on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1648 to take charge of the *subadari* of the Deccan. (Waris, p.19b.) He was 24 years old at that time and the Emperor had appointed Shahnawaz Khan as his guardian (*ataliq*) when he was *subadar* of the Deccan. (Waris, p.38a.)

[906](#) The copies, probably made for Grant Duff, were in the collection of historian D.B.Parasnisi. Sir Jadunath Sarkar got them copied for his collection. Copies of these are preserved at Shree Natnagar Shodh Samsthan, Sitamau (Mandsaur District, Madhya Pradesh). I have used these Sitamau copies.

[907](#) It was a custom to make an imprint in sandalwood paste of the palm of the sender's right hand on a letter that gave assurance, symbolically to signify that complete protection had been extended to the addressee.

[908](#) This is an allusion to Shahji's rebellion against the Mughal Emperor in 1632. (See p. -.)

[909](#) Waris, p.38a.

[910](#) This Ragho Pandit must be Raghunath Pandit who later became minister for religious endowments and charities (Panditrao) in Shivaji's administration. In 1665, as we shall see, he was sent as Shivaji's envoy to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

[911](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.373-75.

[912](#) *Zindan-i Ibrat* i.e. prison of example, or prison of warning – a correctional facility.

[913](#) A title.

[914](#) This suggests that Shahji had retained possession of Kondhana, and possibly Pune Pargana, as his perpetual estate when he joined the Adilshahi Sultanate in 1636. The *Shivabharat* (9:20) too says when Shahji capitulated (in 1636) he retained possession of his “own country”. This also explains why Shivaji was so reckless as to recapture it, in Shaka 1569 (1647-48), from the Adilshahi commandant.

[915](#) Kundurpi, 70 km southwest of Anantpur in Andhra Pradesh. (*Anantpur District Gazetteer*, p.868.)

[916](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar mentions in his *House of Shivaji* (p.64 n.) that a son was born on 5<sup>th</sup> May 1649, and the Court rejoicing that followed was utilized to release the political prisoner Shahji eleven days later. Sarkar cites the *Muhammadnama* and the *Jedhe Chronology* as evidence for this claim. He makes a similar statement in his *Shivaji and His Times* (p.39), too, and cites the *Muhammadnama*, the *Jedhe Chronicle* and the *Surya-Vamsham* [i.e. the *Shivabharat*] in support. But none of these sources states that the birth of a son to the Adilshah was used as an occasion to release Shahji. Indeed, none of them except the *Muhammadnama* mentions the birth; in fact, the *Muhammadnama* mentions the release of Shahji *before* reporting the birth of the son.

[917](#) *Shivabharat*, 15:1-53.

[918](#) *Shivabharat*, 16:1-65.

[919](#) *SCP*, p.17.

[920](#) *Purandare Daftar*, Part III, p.131; *SCS*, Vol. I, Nos. 33, 45.

[921](#) *SCP*, p. 17.

[922](#) A term of endearment for the name Shivaji.

[923](#) Seven of these are addressed to Kanhoji Jedhe (one by Shivaji and six by Afzal Khan or his officials) and one to the officials of the Wai Pargana. These are, in chronological order, *SCS*, Vol. II, No.232; *MIS*, Vol. XV, Nos.334, 336, 338; *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 236; *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.335; *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos. 233, 234.

Of these, only one (*MIS*, Vol. XV, No.335) bears the full date, one (*MIS*, Vol. XV, No.334) bears only the year, one (*MIS*, Vol. XV, No.336) bears date and month but no year, two (*MIS*, Vol. XV, No.338, *SCS*, Vol. II, No.233) bear date and month of receipt only, and three (*SCS*, Vol. II, Nos. 232, 234, 236) bear no date at all. But, comparing these letters with one another, it is possible to estimate the date of all of them. For details, see my Marathi biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part I, pp. 704-10.

[924](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No.232-33; *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.335. Till 1648, the commandant of the Rairi Fort was appointed by the Adilshah. (AFS, Vol. I, Nos. 31-32.; *SCS*, Vol. X, No.9.) When Shivaji invaded Jawali in 1656, the fort was in Chandarao's possession. He must have appropriated it sometime between 1648 and 1656, perhaps before Afzal Khan planned to invade Jawali.

[<sup>925</sup>](#) SCS, Volume II, No.232, 233-34 236; MIS, Vol. XV, No. 334,336.

[<sup>926</sup>](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No. 338.

[<sup>927</sup>](#) The narrative in this section is based on *Muhammad Nama*, pp.385-411, 427-448; *EFI* (1651-1654), pp. xxv, xxxiii, 99, 111; *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.267; and *History of Mysore*, Vol. I, p. 147.

[<sup>928</sup>](#) Gandikota in Kadapa (Cudappah) district and Gooty (Gutti) in Anantapur district of Andhra Pradesh.

[<sup>929</sup>](#) Chandragiri is now included in the Municipal Corporation limits of Tirupati.

[<sup>930</sup>](#) A. K. *Chronicle*, pp.40-42.

[<sup>931</sup>](#) Chitnis *Chronicle*, pp.25-26.

[<sup>932</sup>](#) Ibid., pp.75, 78-79, 81.

[<sup>933</sup>](#) *Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, P.18.

[<sup>934</sup>](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.11.

[<sup>935</sup>](#) SCP, p.17.

[<sup>936</sup>](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No.92.

[<sup>937</sup>](#) *Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies* (SCP, pp.18, 50).

[<sup>938</sup>](#) *Marati Daftar*, Vol. III, No.5 (p.24).

[<sup>939</sup>](#) *SCS*, Vol. XIV, No.14.

[<sup>940</sup>](#) *Faramin-i Salatin*, pp.208-10 (No.138).

[<sup>941</sup>](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 207,209; *AFS*, Vol. I, No.42.

[<sup>942</sup>](#) See, for instance, *AFS*, Vol. I, Nos.44, 46-47, 49-50; II, No.21; *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.272.

[<sup>943</sup>](#) *AFS*, Vol. I, Nos. 44, 46, 47, 49; II, No. 21; Inscriptions on a gate of the fort dated 1656 (*Bhor Samsthan Aitihasik Vastusangrahalaya Pradarshika*, pp.15kh-16).

[<sup>944</sup>](#) *AFS*, Vol. II, No.21.

[<sup>945</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, No.22 (p.27).

[<sup>946</sup>](#) *Ibid.*, No.22 (pp.28-30).

[<sup>947</sup>](#) *SCP*, pp.44-45.

[<sup>948</sup>](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No.22.

[<sup>949</sup>](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 87.

[<sup>950</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. I, Nos. 53, 56, 91.

[951](#) This is borne out by the fact that the village of Jejuri in Pune Pargana and Supe Khurd in Supe Pargana were granted to Nilakanthrao by Shahji or Shivaji out of the *mukasas* bestowed upon them. (*SCS*, Vol. I, No.41; II, No. 138; VII, No. 33.)

[952](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 87.

[953](#) See, for instance, *Records of the Shivaji Period*, Nos. 4-5; *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 21 (pp.35-37).

[954](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No. 88.

[955](#) Babaji Naik's family name has not been mentioned in Shivaji's letter. It is most likely to have been 'Punde'. His full name is mentioned in a *mahzar* dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 1657 delivered in Shivaji's presence. (*MIS*, Vol. XVII, No.10. There, Babaji is incorrectly printed as Balaji. I have seen the original.) This Babaji Naik Punde was later appointed to the Adilshahi court at Bijapur as Shivaji's envoy. It is not known when he was given that assignment, but it must have been soon after a treaty was signed between Shivaji and the Adilshah in 1667. He was recalled when that treaty was broken in 1672. (*Jedhe Chronology – SCP*, p.26.) Babaji died in 1675. (*Jedhe Chronology – SCP*, p.27.) 'Naik' was an appellation of regard by which he seems to have been known.

[956](#) *Ibid.*, No. 92.

[957](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. XII, Nos. 123, 129-30.

[958](#) *SCS*, Vol. VII, No. 43; *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No. 57 (pp.81-82).

[959](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.5.

[960](#) SCS, Vol. VII, No. 43.

[961](#) *Jedhe and Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronologies* (SCP, pp.18, 56).

[962](#) SCS, Vol. I, Nos. 53, 56-57, 59-60, 65-66, 71, 91; III, Nos. 398, 400-03, 406.

[963](#) The narrative in this section is based on Waris, 102b, 109b-113a; Bernier, p.21; *The Life of Mir Jumla*, p.65 and several letters in *Adab*, Vol. I.

[964](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.362-63. See also Ibid. pp.351-52.

[965](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 233-36.

[966](#) Literally, born in the family.

[967](#) In a letter written in January 1656, Aurangzeb had informed Shah Jahan: “Adil Khan [i.e. the Adilshah] had sent a *bhatyara* named Afzal, with 15 to 20 thousand horsemen to succour Qutb-ul Mulk [i.e. the Qutbshah] and he has reached within 20 *kos* of Hyderabad.” (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 246-49.) *Bhatyara* is a caste among Indian Muslims.

[968](#) SCP, p.42.

[969](#) *Shivakavya*, c.5. See also *Chronicle of the Kondhavi Pargana* (*Shri-Ramdasichin Aitihasik Tipane*, pp.4-8); *More Chronicle* (*Aitihasik Sphut Lekh* [Part I], pp.26-29); *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.55-61.

[970](#) SCP, P.50. See also the *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, pp. 17-18).

[971](#) *Jedhe Chronicle* (SCP, p.42).

[972](#) SCP, p. 50.

[973](#) *Shivakavya*, 5:54-64.

[974](#) SCP, p.18.

[975](#) *Chronicle of the Kondhavi Pargana (Shri-Ramdasichin Aitihasik Tipane*, pp.4-8); *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.55-61; *More Chronicle (Aitihasik Sphut Lekh* [Part I], pp.26-29). The *A.K.Chronicle* states that both Baji and Krishnaji were executed. But Baji Chandrarao had met Jai Singh in March 1665. (Jai Singh's letters to Aurangzeb, one written about 25<sup>th</sup> January, and one written about 28<sup>th</sup> or 29<sup>th</sup> March, 1665. (*Insha-i Haft Anjuman*, photocopy of Sir Jadunath Sarkar's manuscript in the government archives at Aurangabad, pp. 25,35).

[976](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle (Siva Chhatrapati*, p.7); *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.55-56; *Chronicle of the Kondhavi Pargana (Shri-Ramdasichin Aitihasik Tipane*, pp.4-8); *More Chronicle (Aitihasik Sphut Lekh* [Part I], pp.26-29); *Chitre Chronology (SCS, Vol. X, p.54)*.

[977](#) SCS, Vol. III, No. 639 (p.229).

[978](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:15.

[979](#) *Shivabharat*, 31:31-34.

[980](#) *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No.22; *MIS*, Vol. XX, No.51; *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.4.

[981](#) SCP, p.50. See also the *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p. 18).

[982](#) *Records of the Shivaji Period*, No. 19.

[983](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.4.

[984](#) The ‘*post*’ was a token gift, usually in cash, made by one’s elder relations during the festive season.

[985](#) The narrative in this section is mainly based on *EFI* (1655-1660), pp. 91-93, 95, 97-99, 135-36, 176 and letters in *Adab*.

[986](#) Waris, p.114a. The previous *Wazir* (*Diwan*) had died on 8<sup>th</sup> April 1656 (Waris, pp.107b-108a.) Since then, Rai Raghunath, a Hindu, was looking after the affairs of that office which had been deliberately kept vacant for Mir Jumla. See *EFI* (1655-1660), pp.66-67.

[987](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 389-91, 410-12, 414-15, 420-22. See also *Adab*, Vol. II, p. 899-902.

[988](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 417-18; II, pp.759-60.

[989](#) After the failure of this attempt to regain his ‘Empire’ Shriranga was unable to retain even the small territory he had around Chandragiri. Shivappa Nayak of Ikkeri gave him refuge, and assigned to him the district of Belur. (*Keladi-nripa-vijayam*, c.7.) After 1663, he seems to have been living under the patronage of the Nayak of Madura, Chokkanatha. (*History of Mysore*, Vol. I, pp. 227-30.) We know very little about his later years and, in any case, we are not concerned with that here. From the following passing reference in an English letter dated

16<sup>th</sup> December 1672 from Ft. Saint George (Madras, now Chennai) to the Company's headquarters in England, he seems to have died in 1672, less than two years before Shivaji's coronation: "Another cloud begins to gather towards the mountains where the old Gentue [Hindu] King of Karnataka [i.e. Shriranga], whose harsh carriage to his great ones was the loss of this country, being newly dead, a brother's son succeeds in his rights." (*ERS*, Vol. I, No.334.) Several post-1672 deeds of grant attributed to Shriranga are extant. Some of these are certainly fabrications and the rest not above suspicion. Shriranga's nephew (brother's son), Kodandarama, was commanding the army of Ikkeri in 1674-75. (*Sources of Vijayanagar History*, pp.312, 318.) There is no reliable information about the history of the dynasty (called the Aravidu dynasty) hereafter, although there is a family which claims descent from it.

[<sup>990</sup>](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 759-60.

[<sup>991</sup>](#) Waris, p.118a.

[<sup>992</sup>](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp. 55-56. The year given there (1066 A.H.) is incorrect; it should be 1067 A.H.

[<sup>993</sup>](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp.41-46.

[<sup>994</sup>](#) Fryer, Vol. II, p.55.

[<sup>995</sup>](#) Manucci, Vol. III, p.233.

[<sup>996</sup>](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.432-34; *EFI* (1655-1660), PP.249-50; *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.36-37.

[997](#) In a letter to Muazzam Khan (c. 10<sup>th</sup> December 1656)

Aurangzeb wrote: "Muhammad Aman [Mughal ambassador at Bijapur] has informed me that at present there is complete chaos in the Adilkhani [i.e. Adilshahi] Karnataka and the chieftains in that territory have captured some forts from the Bijapuris and have laid siege to some." (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 424-26. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 432-34.) *Keladi-nripa-vijayam* (c.7) states that in 1657-58 Shivappa Nayak, having learnt that the Sultan of Bijapur had died, recaptured forts such as Ikkeri and Sorab, which the Muslims had captured in the past. There are two *farmans* which refer to the incursions of a certain Shiva in the Adilshahi Karnataka. The first, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1656, was sent to Venkatadri Nagoji, the *Desai* of Gadag, ordering him to join with his foot soldiers the army under Khan Muhammad's son, Muhammad Ikhlas Khan, who had been assigned the *subadari* of [Adilshahi] Karnataka and sent to drive away the "ill-fated" Shiva. (*AFS*, Vol. III, No. 76.) The second, dated 5<sup>th</sup> January 1657, was sent to Hanumantgonda, the *Desai* of Guttal. It states that as the treacherous Shiva had forayed into Adilshahi territory, Muhammad Ikhlas Khan was assigned the *subadari* of [Adilshahi] Karnataka and sent to drive him out and that, as the *Desai* with his men had fought and defeated Shiva's men in the Masur Taraf, he had been rewarded with the grant of two villages. (*AFS*, Vol. III, No. 18.) There is a third, dated 1<sup>st</sup> December 1656, which mentions Muhammad Ikhlas Khan, but not Shiva. It orders Rauloji Ghorpade to join the *subadar* of [Adilshahi] Karnataka, Muhammad Ikhlas Khan, for the campaign and assures him that he would be awarded a *jagir* commensurate with the force he would muster. (*AFS*, Vol. I, No. 60.) The *farman* does not say against whom the campaign was planned, but from the contents of the other two *farmans* cited above it is obvious that the one against Shiva is implied. The question that remains to be resolved is who this Shiva is. Shiva is a term implying either contempt for, or familiarity to, a person named Shivaji or Shivappa. Till now many historians have believed this Shiva to be Shivaji, son of Shahji. The present author, too, had made the same error in the main text of his *Shri*

*Raja Shivachhatrapati* in Marathi, but corrected it in a supplementary note. It is evident from the *farman* dated 5<sup>th</sup> January 1657 that the men of this Shiva had penetrated as far as Masur in Karnataka. This Masur, 125 km south-southeast of Dharwad, was about 450 km from the boundary of Shivaji's domain at that time and 60-70 km from the boundary of the kingdom of Ikkeri. Therefore I am inclined to believe that this Shiva was Shivappa Nayak of Ikkeri and not Shivaji. It may be noted that Masur is 30 km east of Sorab.

[998](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.104-05.

[999](#) *Ibid.*, pp.105-06.

[1000](#) *Ibid.*, pp.419-20; Waris, p.118a.

[1001](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 684-85; Waris, p.118a.

[1002](#) Aurangzeb's letter to Muazzam Khan, c. 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1656, and to Shahnawaz Khan. (See *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.426-30, 546-48.)

[1003](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.430-32; 432-34; II, pp. 682, 683-84, 684-85, 905-07.

[1004](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 432-34. See also Aurangzeb's letter to Shahnawaz Khan. (*Ibid.*, pp. 546-48.)

[1005](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 684-85; *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.249.

[1006](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.683-84.

[1007](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 423-24

[1008](#) Ibid., pp.509-11, 551-52, 592, 619-21.

[1009](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, pp. 249-61; *Shivapur Chronology (SCP)*, p.50).

[1010](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.511-13.

[1011](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p. 254.

[1012](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 583-85.

[1013](#) Ibid., pp. 521-22; *Alamgir Nama*, p.29.

[1014](#) Ibid., pp. 521-22; *Alamgir Nama*, p.29.

[1015](#) *Amal-I Salih*, Vol. III, p.262; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 257-58; II, p.737.

[1016](#) *Amal-I Salih*, Vol. III, pp. 262-63.

[1017](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, p.680.

[1018](#) This helps us to make an estimate the date of the letter. Muazzam Khan's success implies his promotion to 6,000 *dhat*/6,000 *sawar* and appointment as *Diwan (Wazir)* on 8<sup>th</sup> Jul 1656. (See Waris, p, 114a.) Muazzam Khan was a partisan of Aurangzeb, which is why Multafat Khan congratulates him.

[1019](#) Ibid. p. 426-30. The letter mentions receipt of Muazzam Khan's letters dated 11<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> December [1656]. Though it is omitted here, it helps us to make an estimate of the date of this letter.

[1020](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.685-87.

[1021](#) This helps us to make an estimate of the date of the letter.

[1022](#) Sitamau copy. (See note 85 above.)

[1023](#) This must be Sonaji Vishwanath, the Dabir (Secretary for External Affairs).

[1024](#) Aurangzeb's letter to Muazzam Khan, c. 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1656, and to Shahnawaz Khan. (See *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.426-30, 546-48.)

[1025](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.550-55; II, pp.685-87.

[1026](#) Ibid., pp. 513-14. See also *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.254.

[1027](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.789-90. See also *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.254.

[1028](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.513-14; II, pp.514-16, 689-90. See also *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.254.

[1029](#) Better known by his first title Shayista Khan. On 29<sup>th</sup> May 1656 the Emperor promoted him to the rank of 6,000 dhat/6,000 sawar and conferred upon him the title of Khan Jahan. (Waris, p. 113a.)

[1030](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.513-14; II, pp. 514-16, 689-90. See also *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.254.

[1031](#) Ovington, pp.217, 227. See also *SDAR*, pp. 19-20 (A.R.No. 4975).

[1032](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.688-89.

[1033](#) Mambaji was the son of Shahji's paternal uncle, Vithoji. About 1636, Shahji had assigned to him 20 villages in the Sandas sub-division of the Pune Pargana. (*Sanads and Letters*, pp. 107-08.) So he must have been working for Shahji then. He seems now to have become an Adilshahi nobleman. He was present in Afzal Khan's army when the Adilshah sent him against Shivaji in 1659.

[1034](#) The name of the place has been changed to Shrigonda now. It is the headquarters of a taluka in Ahmednagar district.

[1035](#) Ibid., pp.514-16. See also *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.254.

[1036](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.722-23.

[1037](#) Ibid.

[1038](#) *SCP*, p.18.

[1039](#) Fatanji's ballad (BISM Quarterly, Vol. XXXXIV, p.11); *Shivakavya*, 8:39-40; *Sabhasad Chronicle* (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.4).

[1040](#) *Adab*, Sitamau copy, pp.148a-b. This letter is absent in the printed edition.

[1041](#) Rashin, in Karjat Taluka of Ahmednagar District.

[1042](#) Ibid.

[1043](#) Karhe, 13 km north-northwest of Sangamner in Ahmednagar District. Nimone, 5 km northeast of Karhe. (Karhe, called Karhe-Takawe, in Shevgaon Taluka of Ahmednagar District, is not meant here.) Sir Jadunath Sarkar (*Shivaji and His Times*, pp. 51-52 n.) has incorrectly read Garh Namuna in place of Karhe-Nimone. There was no place named Garh Namuna.

[1044](#) Ibid.

[1045](#) Ibid.

[1046](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 514-16, 718-19.

[1047](#) Ibid., pp.718-19.

[1048](#) Ibid., pp.724-26.

[1049](#) Ibid., pp. 690-94.

[1050](#) Ibid., pp.724-26.

[1051](#) Ibid., pp. 690-94.

[1052](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.4.

[1053](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:22.

[1054](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 695-97.

[1055](#) *SCP*, p. 50. According to the Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.18) the battle between Nasiri Khan and Shivaji was fought in the month of Jyeshtha, Shaka 1579 [4<sup>th</sup> May to 1<sup>st</sup> June 1657]. It seems that the date in the Jedhe Chronology is incorrect. For details, see my Marathi biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part I, pp.810-11 (note 787).

[1056](#) *Bhushan (Granthavali)*, v.284; *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, pp. 258-59.

[1057](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 731-33.

[1058](#) Ibid., pp.730-31.

[1059](#) Kadevaleet was the name of a *pargana* comprising some villages in the Shrigonda Taluka of Ahmednagar District and Ashti Taluka of Beed District. (See, for instance, SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 259, 263; XIV, No.41.) There was no village or town of that name. For the correct reading of the name of the *pargana* see Sitamau copy of *Adab*, p. 155b.

[1060](#) Ibid., pp.728-29.

[1061](#) Ibid.

[1062](#) Ibid., pp. 697-98, 728-29.

[1063](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.516-17, 517-19.

[1064](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.734-35.

[1065](#) *MIS*, Vol. XV, No. 441.

[1066](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.735-36.

[1067](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, PP.437-38; II, pp. 700-01, 737-39.

[1068](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 437-38.

[1069](#) He was 66 years old by the solar calendar and 64 by the lunar calendar. (*Waris*, pp.119b, 120b.)

[1070](#) The narrative in this paragraph is taken from *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, pp.263-69.

[1071](#) Bernier, p.25; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 260-62; Manucci, Vol. I, pp. 240-42; *EFI* (1655-1660), pp. 121-22, 131.

[1072](#) *EFI* (1655-1660), p.121.

[1073](#) *Qafla* is Arabic for a caravan, train of pack animals laden with goods.

[1074](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 443-444; II, pp.917-20, 920-21, 923-25, 925-28, 928-30.

[1075](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 737-39.

[1076](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 437-40.

[1077](#) Ibid., pp.438-42.

[1078](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.267; *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.700-01. There is an error in a date in printed edition of *Adab*. For correct reading, see Sitamau copy, pp.149b-150a.

[1079](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, pp.274-76; *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 27-29; *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.934-37.

[1080](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.265.

[1081](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.282, *Alamgir Nama*, p.29; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 437-38; II, pp.700-01, 737-39, 934-37.

[1082](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.913-14.

[1083](#) Ibid., pp.920-21.

[1084](#) Ibid.

[1085](#) *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.267; *Adab*, Vol. II, pp.917-21.

[1086](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 917-20.

[1087](#) Ibid.

[1088](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 917-20, 925-28.

[1089](#) Ibid., pp.923-25.

[1090](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 925-28.

[1091](#) Ibid.

[1092](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 930-33.

[1093](#) Ibid.

[1094](#) Ibid.

[1095](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 928-30.

[1096](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 934-37. Shah Jahan had renamed Bidar as Jafarabad after its conquest. *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p.261.

[1097](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 443-44.

[1098](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 937-42; *Amal-i Salih*, Vol. III, p. 267.

[1099](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.440-42; II, pp. 942-45.

[1100](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.442-43; II, pp.704-05.

[1101](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.446-48.

[1102](#) Ibid.

[1103](#) Ibid.

[1104](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.42; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp.258-61; II, pp.761-64.

[1105](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.43-44; *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 258-61; II, pp. 761-64.

[1106](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 43-44, 46.

[1107](#) Ibid., pp.50, 53.

[1108](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 761-64.

[1109](#) Ibid.

[1110](#) Ibid., pp.764-68.

[1111](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.47. For the text of the *nishan* see *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 764-68.

[1112](#) The Adilshah had always been referred to by the Mughals as ‘Adil Khan’, and the grant of the title ‘Shah’ would place him among the class of sovereigns, at least as far as the Mughals were concerned.

[1113](#) This refers to Shivaji’s invasion of the Konkan from October 1657 during which he captured many forts in that region.

[1114](#) *SCP*, p.18.

[1115](#) Aurangzeb refers to Khan Muhammad as ‘that Black’ because he was an Abyssinian.

[1116](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 440-42. See also Vol. II, pp.942-45.

[1117](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 7.

[1118](#) *SCP*, p.19.

[1119](#) *Sanads and Letters*, p. 114 (No. 6).

[1120](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 98.

[1121](#) *SCP*, p.50.

[1122](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.25, 52); *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.198-99.

[1123](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.91-92.

[1124](#) Pant is an honorific suffix.

[1125](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:44-64.

[1126](#) Ibid., 18:50.

[1127](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 575-76.

[1128](#) *Shivakavya*, 7:1-31. For date, see Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p.50).

[1129](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.18).

[1130](#) This is the earliest reference to Shivaji in Portuguese documents.

[1131](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.35.

[1132](#) *Shivakavya*, 7:1-31.

[1133](#) *Parvatiya* (those inhabiting mountains, hill-folk). It is obvious that the inhabitants of the Mavals (Mavalas) are meant here.

[1134](#) *Yavan-Pattan* in the original. This is a Sanskrit rendering of Islamabad, the name which the Muslim rulers had given to Bhiwandi.

[1135](#) Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology (SCP, p. 56) and Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p.50).

[1136](#) *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 922-23.

[1137](#) *SCP*, pp.18-19.

[1138](#) *Jedhe Chronicle* (*SCP*, pp. 42-43).

[1139](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.4.

[1140](#) Korlai is a small hill fortress on the southern bank of the Chaul creek.

[1141](#) *Shivakavya*, 7:1-31; *Jedhe Chronicle* (*SCP*, pp.42-43).

[1142](#) *FBS*, pp.36-37.

[1143](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, pp.160-61.

[1144](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.575-76.

[1145](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:17-18. See also 18:48-49.

[1146](#) Two inscriptions – one Persian and one Marathi – on a gate of the Rohida Fort, both dated 1656, record that the gate was built by the *havaldar* of the fort, Vitthal Mudgalrao, during the reign of Sultan Muhammadshah [i.e. Muhammad Adilshah]. (*Bhor Samsthan Aitihasik Vastusangrahalaya Pradarshika*, pp.15kh-16).

[1147](#) It was one of the 23 forts which Shivaji ceded to the Mughals in that treaty.

[1148](#) *SCS*, Vol. XII, No. 108.

[1149](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.50, 53.

[1150](#) The name ‘Krishnaji Bhaskar’ figures several times in connection with Shivaji’s biography. One Krishnaji Bhaskar and his brother, Dattaji Bhaskar, were both in Aurangzeb’s service for many years. In 1648, the Emperor bestowed on them the ranks of 100 dhat/ 50 sawar and 100 *dhat*/ 20 sawar respectively. (*SDSR*, No. 76.) Perhaps this was the same Krishnaji Bhaskar mentioned by Aurangzeb in the letter quoted below. The letter does not mention who had written to Krishnaji Bhaskar, but it appears from the context that it was Shivaji. Most probably, Shivaji wrote to Krishnaji Bhaskar to seek his mediation in the matter about which he had written to Aurangzeb. Besides this Krishnaji Bhaskar, two other officials with the same name, living in Shivaji’s times, are known. One of them was an employee of Afzal Khan and the other worked for Shivaji.

[1151](#) See, for instance, *AFS*, Vol. II, Persian text of Nos. 4-7; *SCS*, Vol. XII, No. 128; *Faramin-i Salatin*, p. 62 (No. 43); *Ruqaat-I Alamgiri*, pp.315-16 (Nos.2/119 and 3/200).

[1152](#) Sitamau copy, pp.6a-7b.

[1153](#) The correct form would be Krishna Bhaskar Pandit or Pandit Krishna Bhaskar. Pandit is an honorific. Krishna and Krishnaji are forms of the same name. The letter does not mention who had written to Krishna Bhaskar, but it appears from the context that it was Shivaji. Most probably, Shivaji wrote to Krishna Bhaskar to seek his mediation in the matter about which he had written to Aurangzeb.

[1154](#) Sonaji Vishwanath, Shivaji's Dabir, or Secretary for External Affairs.

[1155](#) On 29<sup>th</sup> May 1658, Aurangzeb and Murad Bakhsh defeated Dara Shukoh in the Battle of Samugarh. Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan were defeated on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1658. The postscript was written soon after 16<sup>th</sup> April 1658, i.e. about two months after the main part of the letter was written. There is no way of knowing why the letter was not dispatched so long after it was written.

[1156](#) It is a letter addressed to the officials of the Supe Pargana. (SCS, Vol. VII, no.140.)

[1157](#) I have followed Prof. G.H.Khare's Marathi translation (from the original Persian) in *Nivadak Lekh*, p. 188 (letter No. 14). For Sir Jadunath Sarkar's English translation from the original Persian, see *House of Shivaji*, p. 84.

[1158](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:24.

[1159](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.4.

[1160](#) Manucci, Vol. II, p.26.

[1161](#) *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.62-64.

[1162](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 3.

[1163](#) Plural of 'sanguiçel', Portuguese name for a type of galiot.

[1164](#) *Portugurses e Maratas*, Part I, p. 4.

[1165](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, pp. 6-7 (n.3).

[1166](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, p.6 (n.3).

[1167](#) *SCP*, p.19.

[1168](#) *BISM, Chaturtha Sammelan Vritta*, pp.73-77. Also Sitamau copy, pp.8a-9a.

[1169](#) Aurangzeb had himself enthroned first on 21<sup>st</sup> July 1658 in a hurried and unostentatious manner because the internecine war was still in full swing. He was crowned a second time on 5<sup>th</sup> June 1659, after his rule had acquired some stability. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp.152-56, 361-52.) He ordered that his '*julus*' [era commencing with the coronation] should begin on 1<sup>st</sup> Ramazan, 1068 A.H. [24<sup>th</sup> May 1658]. (*Ibid.*, pp. 388-89.)

[1170](#) The name of the servant is not mentioned. He must have been Sonaji Vishwanath. There is an endorsement in Marathi on Aurangzeb's *farman* that it was sent with Sonaji. (*BISM, Chaturtha Sammelan Vritta*, p.73.) It must have been inserted by an official of Shivaji.

[1171](#) Aurangzeb bestowed the title of Amir-ul Umara on Khan Jahan on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1658. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.130. He was formerly Shayista Khan. See fn. 41 above.) He appointed the Amir-ul Umara as *subadar* of Deccan to replace Prince Muhammad Muazzam and gave him leave to depart to take charge of his office on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1659. (*Ibid.*, p.416.)

[1172](#) Dara Shukoh, along with his son Sipihr Shukoh, had fled towards Kandahar in Afghanistan and had sought refuge on the way with Malik Jivan – an Afghan feudal landowner. This man

arrested them on 10<sup>th</sup> June 1659 and informed the *faujdar* of Bhakkar, Baqir Khan, who in turn passed on the intelligence to Aurangzeb. The news reached Aurangzeb on 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1659. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.414.)

[1173](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.43-44, 53.

[1174](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp.74-76, 79-80.

[1175](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:1-31; *Sabhasad Chronicle (Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 9); Ballad of Adnyandas (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.10).

[1176](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle (Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 9).

[1177](#) Ballad of Adnyandas (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.10).

[1178](#) *A.K. Chronicle*, pp.62-63; Fatanji's Ballad (*ASN*, Vol.VIII, p.11).

[1179](#) Ali was born on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1638. (*Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp. 21-22.)

[1180](#) (a) English letter from Rajapur, 10<sup>th</sup> December 1659, “10,000 horse and foot.” (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 1, p.3.) (b) Dutch letter from Vengurle, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660. “Awful army”, But later, Afzal Khan is said to have gone to Jawali with 7,000 horsemen. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 475-77.) (c) *Alamgir Nama*, p.577. *Du hazar [2,000] sawar*; but it is obviously an error for “*dah hazar [10,000] sawar*.” (d) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, 12,000 horse besides infantry.” (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.9.) (e) *Bhushan (Granthavali)*, v. 474, 12,000 horsemen. (f) Fatanji's Ballad, 14,000 horse. (*ASN*, Vol. VIII, p.11.) (g) Ballad of Adnyandas, 14,000 horse (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.11.) (h) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.68-69, 15-20 thousand cavalry and 10,000 infantry. (i) *Shedgaokar Chronicle*,

p.24, 12,000 horsemen. (j) Cosme da Guarda, 35,000 cavalry. (*FBS*, P.12.) But his account has many contradictions; e.g. he confuses Afzal Khan with ‘Belulghan’ (i.e. Bahlul Khan).

[1181](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:50-58, 22:52, 23:55.

[1182](#) *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 928.

[1183](#) *Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, pp.18-19.

[1184](#) *Shivakavya*, 12:74.

[1185](#) *Chitragupta Chronicle*, p.27.

[1186](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, p. 247.

[1187](#) *Minor Musalman Castes*, p.3.

[1188](#) *MIS*, Vol. XV, No. 79; *SCS*, Vol. VII, No. 28.

[1189](#) *SCS*, Vol. VIII, No. 24.

[1190](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp. 152-53, 163-66, 168-73, 357-58.

[1191](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:1-8, 38; 19:3, 43; *Shivakavya*, 12:2; Fatanji’s ballad (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XXXXIV, p.14); *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 49 – *Bijapur Inscriptions*, pp. 82-85.

[1192](#) *Adab*, Vol. I, p. 247.

[1193](#) *Amal-i Salih*, III, pp.253, 256.

[1194](#) Ali Adilshah's *farman* to Shahji, dated 30<sup>th</sup> January 1658 (AFS, Vol. V, No. 114).

[1195](#) AFS, Vol. III, No. 79; V, Nos. 121-22.

[1196](#) Afzalpur, 50 km west-southwest of Gulbarga in Karnataka.

[1197](#) SCS, Vol. XI, No. 100.

[1198](#) *Shivakavya*, 12:9.

[1199](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.478.

[1200](#) Carré (FBS, pp.225-27); *Bijapur and Its Architectural Remains*, p. 98.

[1201](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle* (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.11); Ballad of Adnyandas (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.18).

[1202](#) *Basatin-us Salatin*, Ch.7.

[1203](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p. 68 (note 98). The date given there, 27<sup>th</sup> December 1664 is incorrect; it should be 27<sup>th</sup> December 1654.

[1204](#) *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 49 – *Bijapur Inscriptions*, pp. 82-85.

[1205](#) *Shivabharat*, 19:43; *Shivakavya*, 12:7, 9. See also *Shivabharat*, 18:19-24.

[1206](#) *Basatin-us Salatin*, Ch. 6.

[1207](#) The *Basatin-us Salatin* tells us what those were: 1) The Court of Justice used to be located *within* the inner fort in Bijapur. Muhammad Adilshah shifted it to a new building called the Dad Mahal (Court of Justice) that was constructed for the purpose *outside* the inner fortification. 2) Fights between elephants used to be conducted within the fort. But Muhammad Adilshah had an extensive ground made *outside* the fort where those fights began to be held. 3) Muhammad Adilshah conferred the title of Khan-i Khanan on Khan Muhammad (see *Basatin*, Ch. 6). The *Waqiat-i Jahangiri* informs us that it came to the notice of Emperor Jahangir that some of his noblemen were indulging in acts that they did not have a right to do. He, therefore, issued a *farman* listing the acts and things that were the exclusive prerogative of emperors and forbidding their performance by anyone else. This set of rules was called the *Ain-i Jehangiri* (or ‘Rules of Jahangir’). The third rule says that fights between elephants could not be held, while the sixth says that noblemen could not confer titles on their servants (*The History of India as told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VI, pp.325-26). Adilshahi rulers in the past had always held their Courts, as well as the occasional elephant fights, strictly within the fort, and the Mughal Emperor, granting that they were doing those things privately or covertly, had overlooked them. The *Basatin* seems to be saying that Shah Jahan was now annoyed that Muhammad Adilshah had begun doing those things *outside* the fort, i.e. blatantly and publicly.

[1208](#) AFS, Vol. V, Nos. 113, 114, 121, 122.

[1209](#) SCS, Vol. VIII, Nos. 24, 44; MIS, Vol. XX, No. 89; AFS, Vol. I, No.14; V, No. 114.

[1210](#) *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 49 – *Bijapur Inscriptions*, pp. 76-77, 81-82.

[1211](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.5.

[1212](#) *AFS*, Vol. I, No.26.

[1213](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:48; *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.19 (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 25), *A.K.Chronicle*, PP.67.

[1214](#) *SCS*, Vol. XI, No.100. There, Dr. G.H.Khare's reading is “*mulki*” (a country); the present author prefers “*malaki*” (an angel).

[1215](#) Ali Adilshah's *farman* dated 16<sup>th</sup> June 1659 to Kanhoji Jedhe mentions that Afzal Khan had been appointed to extirpate Shivaji. (*Sadhan-chikitsa*, photograph between pp. 287-88. English translation in *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, pp. 142-43.

[1216](#) *Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.11; *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.9-10.

[1217](#) *Shivakavya*, 12:11.

[1218](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:19-22, 19:38, 20:21.

[1219](#) *A.K. Chronicle*, pp. 62-63.

[1220](#) Tuljapur is 140 km north-northeast of Bijapur and Wai, 225 km northwest of Bijapur.

[1221](#) *Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.12.

[1222](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.8. Omitted in English translation.

[1223](#) *Shivakavya*, 12:12.

[1224](#) *MIS*, Volume XX, No. 217 (pp.329-34).

[1225](#) *Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, pp.11-12.

[1226](#) *FBS*, pp.12, 17.

[1227](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:4-14.

[1228](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:15-43.

[1229](#) *SCP*, p.19.

[1230](#) *Ibid.*

[1231](#) *Sadhan-chikitsa*, photograph between pp. 287-88. English translation in *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, pp. 142-43.

[1232](#) *SCP*, pp.19-20.

[1233](#) Naik an honorific.

[1234](#) Dadaji Krishna, as we have seen, was *kulkarni* of Bhor. (*SCS*, Vol. II, No. 218.) Shivaji had appointed him *havaldar* of Kalyan. (Jedhe Chronology – *SCP*, pp. 18-19.)

[1235](#) The Chronology says Talegaon of the Dhamdheres, which is now in Shirur Taluka of Pune District. But it cannot be the one meant by Shivaji, because it was then in Mughal territory. The Talegaon meant by Shivaji could have been the one called Talegaon Dabhade in the Chakan Pargana, which was well within Shivaji's domain then. The compiler of the chronology or the scribe seems to have confused the one with the other.

[1236](#) All these were *deshmukhs*. Bandals of Hirdas Maval, Silimbkars of Gunjan Maval, Pasalkars of Mose Khore, Maranes of Muthe Khore, Dhamales of Paud Khore, Marals of Kanad Khore and Dohars of Velvand Khore.

[1237](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:15-43.

[1238](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp.76-77.

[1239](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:7-12.

[1240](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:13.

[1241](#) *SCP*, p.83 (letter No. 1).

[1242](#) *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 761.

[1243](#) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. VII, p.104.

[1244](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 11.

[1245](#) *SCP*, p. 19.

[1246](#) Krishnarao and Krishnaji are appellatives of the same name, Krishna.

[1247](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle* (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.13-14); A. K. *Chronicle*, pp.62-64. Sir Jadunath Sarkar's translation of the A.K. *Chronicle* into English states at one place that the name of Afzal Khan's envoy was 'Pantaji Gopinath' and just 'Gopinath' at others, while the name of Shivaji's envoy is stated as 'Krishnaji Bhaskar'. This is, of course, incorrect. The *Shedgaokar Chronicle* (pp. 26-29), too, is incorrect in giving the name of Afzal Khan's envoy, calling him Dattaji Bhaskar.

[1248](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:44-46, 64.

[1249](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:44-64.

[1250](#) In 1636, the Mughal Emperor and the Adilshah signed a pact according to which they divided the Nizamshahi provinces among themselves. Then, according to the treaty signed in 1657, Adilshah had agreed to transfer his portion of the Nizamshahi provinces to the Mughals. In reality, however, neither could the Adilshah retain possession over most of it nor could the Mughals take possession because Shivaji captured it during the interregnum. The reference here is to that province.

[1251](#) The six kinds of troops comprise hereditary soldiers, mercenaries, tribal warriors, etc. (*Kautiliya Arthashastra*, pp.487-91.) It is most unlikely that this ancient Indian concept would appear in Afzal Khan's letter; so at least that portion must be an interpolation by the composer of the *Shivabharat*.

[1252](#) This implies the territory which the Adilshah had agreed to cede to the Mughals by the treaty of 1657.

[1253](#) *Shivabharat*, 19:1-12.

[1254](#) *SCP*, pp.20-21; *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.13.

[1255](#) Fatanji's Ballad (*ASN*, Vol. VIII, pp.11-13); Ballad of Adnyandas (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, pp.13-14); *Sabhasad Chronicle* (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.13-17); *A.K.Chronicle*, pp. 62-65, 67-68.

[1256](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp.76-79.

[1257](#) *Basatin*, Ch. VI.

[1258](#) *Shivabharat*, 19:12-23.

[1259](#) *Shivabharat*, 19:24-44.

[1260](#) *Shivaji-Nibandhavali*, Vol. I, English section, pp. 63-71 for Dutch text and 74-84 for its English translation.

[1261](#) *Shivabharat*, 19:44; 23:45-46.

[1262](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:25-31.

[1263](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:13-21.

[1264](#) The *Shivabharat* does not name the place where Netoji halted.

[1265](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:31-47.

[1266](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:48-49.

[1267](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:50. See also *Jedhe Chronology* (*SCP*, pp.19-20); *Bhushan (Granthavali)*, v.474; *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.65-66.

[1268](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:56.

[1269](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:57.

[1270](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:58:61.

[1271](#) *Shivabharat*, 20:62-63.

[1272](#) *Shivabharat*, 21:3-8.

[1273](#) *SCP*, pp.19-20.

[1274](#) Perhaps a part of the ascent between Par and the fort.

[1275](#) There is no unanimity among various sources about the weapon which Shivaji used to kill Afzal Khan. The majority of sources say that the Khan was killed with a dagger; a few add tiger claws which is a weapon similar to the knuckle duster but with claws which would be concealed in the closed fist. Some sources say Shivaji struck the first blow. The narrative here given is what appears in the *Shivabharat*, it being the most reliable source. But the only thing about which there is no uncertainty is that Shivaji killed Afzal Khan during the meeting.

[1276](#) *Shivabharat*, 21:10-56, 83-84.

[1277](#) A kind of long sword with a gauntlet.

[1278](#) The date is confirmed by the Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.20) and *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.70.

[1279](#) *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.69-71.

[1280](#) *A.K.Chronicle*, p.70.

[1281](#) For general belief see, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. I, Nos. 15, 48; Cosme da Guarda (*FBS*, p.102). For Shivaji, see *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 24.

[1282](#) The *Shivabharat* does not mention their names; it merely says “four other Muslims.”

[1283](#) These two were Maratha Hindus.

[1284](#) Evidently an Abyssinian Muslim.

[1285](#) *Shivabharat*, 21:57-78.

[1286](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.25.

[1287](#) The Ballad of Adnyandas (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.22).

[1288](#) The narrative in this section is taken from *Shivabharat*, 21:86; 22:1-72; 23:1-50. It is generally corroborated by several other sources. See, for instance, Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.20); *Sabhasad Chronicle* (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.22-26); Dutch letter from Vengurle, dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.477-78); English letter from Rajapore, dated 10<sup>th</sup>

December 1659 (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 1); Fatanji's Ballad (*ASN*, Vol. VIII, pp.17); *Bhushan (Granthavali)*, V.474; *Alamgir Nama*, p.577.

[1289](#) The Wai Pargana remained in Shivaji's possession, with Manko Ram as administrator, for six months thereafter, as may be seen from the list of administrative officials of the Wai Pargana. (*SCS*, Vol. VI, pp.61, 67.)

[1290](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:51.

[1291](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:52.

[1292](#) In 1662, the forts were in the possession of Adilshahi officers. See *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 921 (pp.167-70); *AFS*, Vol. II, No. 12.

[1293](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:54-56.

[1294](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:57-61.

[1295](#) *Shivabharat*, 23:62-71; date in Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.20, 50, 570). See also English letter from Rajapur to Surat, dated 9<sup>th</sup> December 1659, and to London, dated 10<sup>th</sup> December 1659 [*EFI* (1655-1660), p.251, *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 1 (p.3)]; Dutch letter from Vengurle dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.478); Valentine (*FBS*, p.358); *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, p.81; *Ali Nama*, c.10; Fatanji's Ballad (*ASN*, Vol. VIII, pp.17-18); Ballad of Adnyandas (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.22); Fryer, Vol. II, p.62.

[1296](#) Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, p.50); *Shivabharat*, 23:72.

[1297](#) English letters from Rajapur to Surat dated 20<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1660 (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 8-9).

[1298](#) *Shivabharat*, 24:1-2, 5-6.

[1299](#) *Shivabharat*, 24:14-15, 18-20, 28.

[1300](#) *Select Articles*, pp. 158-61.

[1301](#) *Shivabharat*, 24:18-23.

[1302](#) *Shivabharat*, 24:25-27.

[1303](#) *Shivabharat*, 24:29-78; *Jedhe* and *Shivapur* and *Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronologies* (*SCP*, pp.21, 50, 57-58). See also English letter from Rajapur to Surat dated 4<sup>th</sup> February 1660 (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 3); Dutch letter from Vengurle dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.479); *Alamgir Nama*, p. 578; *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp. 81-82.

[1304](#) *Jedhe Chronology* (*SCP*, p. 21). The Dutch letter from Vengurle, dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660, states that “Rustum-i Zaman lost 12 elephants, 1000 horses, and a party of foot-soldiers.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.479.)

[1305](#) *Shivabharat*, 25:1-9.

[1306](#) *Shivabharat*, 25:1-9; *Jedhe* and *Shivapur Chronologies* (*SCP*, pp.20-21, 50). See also Fazil Afzal Khan’s letter to Krishnagauda, *desai* of the Terdal Pargana (*SCP*, pp.84-85); letter of the Portuguese Viceroy to the King of Portugal dated 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1660 (*The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.5-6); The Dutch

letter from Vengurle dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.479-80.)

[1307](#) English letters from Rajapur to Surat, dated 10<sup>th</sup> December 1659 and 4<sup>th</sup> February 1660. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 1, 3.)

[1308](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.3.

[1309](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 3-4.

[1310](#) Dutch letter from Vengurle dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 481-83.)

[1311](#) *EFI* (1655-1660). p. 236.

[1312](#) *Ibid.*, pp.243-45, 250-51.

[1313](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 243, 250.

[1314](#) For this widespread belief see, for instance, Cosme da Guarda and Carré (*FBS*, pp. 9, 18, 222-25); *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 10, 126 (pp.111-12); Dutch letters (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 480, 507-09).

[1315](#) *Ibid.*, pp.237-38, 359-61.

[1316](#) *Ibid.*, 238, 362-63.

[1317](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.1 (p.4).

[1318](#) Mint. During their meeting at Hukkeri, Revington had sought Rustum-i Zaman's permission to start a mint at Rajapur

for striking silver coins.

[1319](#) It seems that Dabhol was held in *mukasa* by Fazil Khan or his father Afzal Khan.

[1320](#) The narrative of the events at Rajapur and Jaitapur is taken from the English letter from Rajapur to Surat dated 4<sup>th</sup> February 1660. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 3.)

[1321](#) Rajapur was held in *mukasa* by Rustum-i Zaman.

[1322](#) The transaction in brief was as follows: The broker of the English at Rajapur had spent 700 pagodas to build their factory at Rajapur. Besides, their shroff, Timoji, had lent 2,000 pagodas to Rustum-i Zaman in lieu of which he had taken an order of payment from him in favour of the English without their knowledge. Later, when Rustum-i Zaman imprisoned Timoji at Raibag, he had sent the order of payment to the English factors at Rajapur. Abdul Karim being Rustum-i Zaman's representative at Rajapur, the Englishmen held him responsible for the payment of 2,700 pagodas. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 3.)

[1323](#) In 1659 the Englishmen at Surat had sent in a ship, the *London*, a gunner named Burgess with a mortar and some shells to Rajapur. As the Englishmen at Rajapur found Burgess to be incompetent, they employed William Mingham, who was serving on the *London* as a gunner's assistant, at an annual salary of £30. They had planned to send him to Rustum-i Zaman. See *EFI* (1655-1660), pp.251-52.

[1324](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 3. (pp. 8-9)

[1325](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 4. This is a copy preserved in the Rajapur factory records. The one sent to Shivaji is not extant and there is

no way of knowing in what language it was written. Most probably, it would be a Marathi rendering of this English draft. It is also not known whether Shivaji ever received this letter. It was enclosed with the one of the same date which Revington had written to Rustum-i Zaman requesting him to forward it to Shivaji. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 6.) It was because of their belief that Rustum-i Zaman was secretly allied with Shivaji that a letter meant for the latter was sent to the former for forwarding.

[1326](#) *EFI* (1655-1660), p.358.

[1327](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.7.

[1328](#) *Ibid.*, No. 8.

[1329](#) The accuracy of this information in the English letters is doubtful, but there is no other source to draw upon for the events narrated here.

[1330](#) *Ibid.*, No. 9.

[1331](#) *Ibid.*, No. 12.

[1332](#) A space before the word ‘pagodas’ is left blank in the original.

[1333](#) This refers to his high-handed behaviour, not actual war.

[1334](#) This refers to a quarrel of the Englishmen at Madras with Mir Jumla. For details see *EFI* volumes for 1655-1660, 1661-1664, 1665-1667.

[1335](#) *Ibid.* See also *EFI* (1655-1660), p.369.

[1336](#) *EFI (1655-1660)*, pp.364-65.

[1337](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.13. This resolution of the Surat Council, dated 16<sup>th</sup> April 1660 mentions that the factors at Rajapur were detained in their house, but does not say that the factory was burnt down and horses were seized.

[1338](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 13.

[1339](#) *EFI (1655-1660)*, p.370.

[1340](#) *Ibid.*

[1341](#) *Ibid.*, p. 372.

[1342](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 376-78, 380.

[1343](#) *Ibid.*, p. 387.

[1344](#) *Ibid.*

[1345](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp. 82-85; *Ali Nama*, c.11; *Shivabharat*, 25:10-12; Dutch dispatch from Vengurle, dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.480); English letter from Rajapur to Surat dated 16<sup>th</sup> April 1660 [*EFI (1655-1660)*, p.372].

[1346](#) *Basatin*, Ch.7, Section 12

[1347](#) *Ali Nama*, c.11; *Basatin*, Ch. 7. See also *AFS*, Vol. II, Nos. 24, 34; *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, p. 82; *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 20; Dutch letter

from Vengurle, dated 15<sup>th</sup> September 1660 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 485-86).

[1348](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.480. The English letter from Rajapur to Surat, dated 16<sup>th</sup> April 1660, speaks of “about 15,000 men.” The Sabhasad Chronicle, which gives a very muddled account of the campaign, puts the figure at 20,000 horse. (Siva Chhatrapati, p.78.) Shivabharat (25:13-14) says Jauhar’s army comprised several thousand horsemen of his race, Karnataki infantry and elephants.

[1349](#) Shivabharat, 25:15-23.

[1350](#) In this farman Sayyid Abdulla son of Sayyid Muhammad is styled “Desai of Fort Rohida.” We know that the fort was the headquarters of Rohid Khore which comprised two subdivisions: Taraf Bhor and Taraf Utravali. The office of the deshmukh of the first was vested in the Jedhe family and that of the second, in the Khopade family and both were Hindus. There is no way of knowing why this Sayyid Abdulla is styled “Desai of Fort Rohida.” Perhaps, the Adilshah might have confiscated the deshmukhi of Taraf Bhor from the Jedes as a punishment, because they were staunch adherents of Shivaji, and conferred it upon this Sayyid Abdulla. But this is not a fully satisfactory answer, because both Kedarji and Khandoji Khopade, the deshmukhs of Taraf Utravali, had joined Afzal Khan. (Jedhe Chronicle – SCP, p.45; SCS, Vol. V, No. 762.) As for Sayyid Abdulla, we know nothing about him; but it is certain that he never enjoyed the deshmukhi of Fort Rohida.

[1351](#) SCS, Vol. IV, No.688.

[1352](#) In this farman Gondaji Pasalkar is styled deshmukh of Mose Khore. The Pasalkars were deshmukhs of Mose Khore. But this Gondaji does not seem to have belonged to that family. (See

their family tree printed in my Marathi biography of Shivaji, Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati, Part II, p. 966.) Perhaps, the deshmukhi of Mose Khore might have been taken from the former incumbents and conferred upon this Gondaji as an enticement. But, he too never enjoyed it except on paper.

[1353](#) AFS, Vol. II, No. 34.

[1354](#) See pp.149-51 above.

[1355](#) Ibid., No. 24.

[1356](#) This too mentions Sayyid Abdulla as the intermediary, but not as “Desai of Fort Rohida.”

[1357](#) Ibid., No. 25.

[1358](#) For Wai see SCS, Vol. VI, p.67 and MIS, Vol. XX, No. 109. For Khatav see SCS, Vol. IV, No. 698.

[1359](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.479-80.

[1360](#) Marathi translation in Nivadak Lekh, p.188 and English translation in House of Shivaji, pp.84-85. I have used both.

[1361](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.21). See also Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.480

[1362](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.21); Shivabharat, 25:19-24; ERS, Vol. I, No. 20; Ali Nama, c.11.

[1363](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.484.

[1364](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 20.

[1365](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol.I, Part II, p. 484.

[1366](#) Alamgir Nama, p.578; Shivabharat, 25:32-34.

[1367](#) Shivabharat, 24:21-24; 25:11, 29-34; 27:5. See also Haft Anjuman vide the Military Dispatches, p.76.

[1368](#) For birth date see horoscope of Shayista Khan (Bharat-Kaumudi, Part II, p.755). For other information in this paragraph see Maathir-ul-Umara, Vol. II, pp.825-32.

[1369](#) Shivabharat, 25:27-59. See also Ibid., 28:51 and Sambhaji's Sanskrit deed of grant, dated 27<sup>th</sup> August 1680 (SCS, Vol. XIV, p. 67).

[1370](#) Shivabharat (25:36-55) has mentioned 55 and Alamgir Nama (pp. 578-88) 20. Of the 55 names in the Shivabharat 9 are corroborated by the Alamgir Nama and a few more by the Tarikh-i Dilkusha, Maathir-ul-Umara and some cotemporaneous documents.

[1371](#) Alamgir Nama, p.578; Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p. 21).

[1372](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 482-83.

[1373](#) That this sideshow should be ignored, not only by chronicles but even by contemporaneous sources, when their attention was focused on the mighty invasions of Siddi Jauhar and Shayista Khan, is understandable. But the events took place

almost before the eyes of the Dutch and the English residing at Vengurle and Rajapur respectively and are therefore recorded in their correspondence.

[1374](#) Ibid., pp. 483-84.

[1375](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.10.

[1376](#) Alamgir Nama, pp.578-84.

[1377](#) Shivabharat (26:1-2) states that the Mughal army captured Supe and Indapur. Fatanji's Ballad too mentions that Shayista Khan captured Supe on his way to Pune. (ASN, Vol.VIII, p.18.) The memorandum regarding administrations over Supe district records under 1071 A.H. (28<sup>th</sup> August 1660 to 16<sup>th</sup> August 1661) that when Shayista Khan came all the country was devastated, the Khan then captured Chakan and thereafter gave command of the post of Supe to Siddi Hilal. (MIS, Vol. XX, p.71.) Obviously the year refers to the appointment of Siddi Hilal. That he was indeed appointed there, is also proved by some contemporaneous Marathi documents. (See, for instance, MIS, Vol. XX, No. 245; SCS, Vol. VII, No. 47.)

[1378](#) Shivabharat (26:1) mentions that Saswad was plundered by the Mughal army. Fatanji's Ballad too mentions that Shayista Khan captured Saswad on his way to Pune. (ASN, Vol.VIII, p.18.)

[1379](#) Jamaatdar is a Persian word meaning a leader of troops; in India, equivalent of a non-commissioned officer.

[1380](#) A mahzar about the ownership of a house in Pune, dated Fasli year 1078 (24<sup>th</sup> May 1668 to 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1669) records that

when Shayista Khan came people fled away and at that time a house of one Gondaji perished in a fire.

[1381](#) MIS, Vol. XX, p. 71.

[1382](#) Shivabharat, 25:57-62

[1383](#) The Shivakavya (15:16) too mentions that the Muslim army demolished ancient temples.

[1384](#) Named after Fabius Maximus, the Roman statesman and general, who harassed Hannibal's army without risking a pitched battle.

[1385](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 480-81.

[1386](#) He was son of Khan Muhammad murdered in 1657.

[1387](#) Ibid., p.485.

[1388](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.11.

[1389](#) A village, now in Rajapur Taluka of Ratnagiri District, 20 km northeast of Rajapur.

[1390](#) A village near a pass of the same name, 45 km west of Kolhapur.

[1391](#) Ibid., No.14.

[1392](#) Shivabharat, 26:6-10.

[1393](#) Shivabharat, 26:6-39.

[1394](#) Shivabharat, 26:40.

[1395](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos.1 (p.4), 10.

[1396](#) EFI (1655-1660), p. 372.

[1397](#) EFI (1655-1660), p.372. Other Englishmen who later joined the siege might have brought with them additional supplies of shells. At this time the English had three mortar pieces and 1000 shells at Rajapur. (Ibid., p.375.)

[1398](#) bid. See also the Dutch letter from Vengurle, dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 1660. (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.481).

[1399](#) EFI (1655-1660), pp.372, 374-75. Ali Nama (c.16) mentions that the Firangis (Europeans) shelled the fort on behalf of the Adilshahi army. It is to be regretted that Revington's account of his experiences in the siege, which must have been interesting, is not extant. In their letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1660 to Revington, his colleagues wrote from Rajapur: "We are sorry you have received so much prejudice by the badness of that water, and wish we could contribute anything to ease you thereof; but your having the doctor with you, we can only pray for a blessing on those means which he may use for your recovery." [EFI (1655-1660), p.375.] Revington had taken a doctor with him while going from Surat to Rajapur. This is shown by the Company's letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> April 1660 to him, in reply to his of February 1659 from Swally, expressing their "disapproval for being appointed at Rajapur. In their letter, the Company's directors had expressed their disapproval that he intended to take a doctor with him at their expense, without obtaining the

President's permission; but intimated that, if the Surat Council concurred in this measure, the charge would be allowed." (Ibid., pp.385-86.) The doctor (called surgeon elsewhere) was, probably, one Robert Ward. [EFI (1655-660), p.140; (1661-1664), p.27.]

[1400](#) EFI (1655-1660), pp.376-78, 381.

[1401](#) The letter from Kolhapur to Fort St. George (Madras, now Chennai), dated 5<sup>th</sup> June 1660, is signed, among others, by Napier. (Ibid., p.377.) It would seem therefore that only Randolph Taylor (who was 'Second' at the Rajapur factory) and Robert Farrand were left at Rajapur. (Ibid., p.235.)

[1402](#) EFI (1655-1660), pp.378-83. Garway was very ill since before 15<sup>th</sup> June 1660 and died at Panhala about 4<sup>th</sup> July 1660. (Ibid., p.379.)

[1403](#) Wasota, a hill fort now in Jawali Taluka of Satara District. Evidently, the Adilshahi garrison had held out even after Shivaji's army had captured all the surrounding territory.

[1404](#) SCP, p. 21.

[1405](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 (p.23)

[1406](#) SCS, Vol. III, No. 439

[1407](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol.I, Part II, pp.484-85.

[1408](#) Shivabharat, 26:71, 77.

[1409](#) Dutch resident's letter from Vengurle, dated 15<sup>th</sup> September 1660. (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.486.)

[1410](#) Shivabharat, 26:54-55, 63-64, 66.

[1411](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p. 21); Shivabharat, 26:66-77; and Dutch letter of 15<sup>th</sup> September 1660 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.486.)

[1412](#) Shivabharat, 26:67, 27:1.

[1413](#) Khelna, renamed Vishalgad by Shivaji, a hill fort about 40 km west by north of Panhala.

[1414](#) Shivabharat, 27:14.

[1415](#) Shivabharat, 28:23 and Dutch letter of 15<sup>th</sup> September 1660 (Shivaji the Great, Vol.I, Part II, p.486.) For Siddi Masud's relationship Jauhar see Basatin, Chs. 7 and 8.

[1416](#) SCP. p. 21.

[1417](#) The Bandals were deshmukhs of Hirdas Maval.

[1418](#) SCP, p. 46.

[1419](#) The A.K.Chronicle (pp.76-80) states that Shivaji with 60,000 men was beleaguered in Panhala, that he escaped from the fort with 40,000, that Baji Prabhu was stationed in a pass with 20,000, and that, though wounded, held the enemy at bay and breathed his last only when he heard the prearranged signal of gun fire announcing Shivaji's safe arrival at Vishalgad. Borrowing from the A.K.Chronicle, the Chitnis and Shri

Shivdigvijay Chronicles have further embellished and distorted the story. The story has stuck in popular imagination and even some historians have not been able to resist the temptation to accept it as credible. But the A.K. Chronicle is notoriously unreliable and must be rejected altogether. The second story, recently floated and popularized, has its seed in the Dutch letter from Vengurle dated 15<sup>th</sup> September 1660. According to the letter, Shivaji divided his party into two groups one of which included his barber, who was also his namesake, carried in a palanquin. This group marched by the usual route, fell into the hands of the pursuers and was brought into the besiegers' camp. Only then did the enemy learn to his utter dismay that they had been fooled. Meanwhile, Shivaji, with the other group, went to Purandar fort. (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.486-87.) This account is not corroborated by any other source.

Recently one Mr. M. G. Gulavani, with a romantic bent of mind, has 'discovered' — or rather invented — that the name of the barber was Shiva Kashid, that he was a resident of a village named Nebapur (on the route from Kolhapur to Panhala), and that a cenotaph (samadhi, thade, a small memorial) erected, presumably in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, to commemorate his memory is still extant in the village. (Aitihasik Maulik Samshodhane, pp.1-5.) No documentary evidence has been produced by Mr. Gulavani to substantiate his claim, about which the less said the better.

[1420](#) A small fief with its headquarters at a village of the same name (also called Prabhavali in old Marathi documents) in Lanja Taluka of Ratnagiri District.

[1421](#) A small fief with its headquarters at a village named Palavani in Mandangad Taluka of Ratnagiri District.

[1422](#) *Shivabharat*, 27:26-28.

[<sup>1423</sup>](#) Ibid. No other source has mentioned this action.

[<sup>1424</sup>](#) Five yojanas in seven prahars. (Shivabharat, 27:13.)

[<sup>1425</sup>](#) Shivabharat, 27:29-43.

[<sup>1426</sup>](#) Shivabharat, 27:44-45.

[<sup>1427</sup>](#) Jedhe Chronicle (SCP, p. 46).

[<sup>1428</sup>](#) Jedhe Chronicle (SCP, p. 45).

[<sup>1429</sup>](#) SCS, Vol. II, No. 239 (p.233); V, No. 769, 788.

[<sup>1430</sup>](#) Alamgir Nama, pp.584-85.

[<sup>1431</sup>](#) Shivabharat (25:65, 28:46) refers to this fort as Sangramdurg. No other source calls it by this name.

[<sup>1432</sup>](#) Pune District Gazetteer, p.614.

[<sup>1433</sup>](#) Alamgir Nama, pp. 585-88.

[<sup>1434</sup>](#) The E.K.Chronicle (pp.82-84) states that one Firangoji Narasale was the commandant of the fort. Chitnis Chronicle (p.130), too, gives the same name.

[<sup>1435</sup>](#) By the treaty of 1614, the Rana of Mewar had agreed to supply a contingent of 1,000 troopers to serve with the Mughal army in the Deccan. (Waris, pp.90b-91a.)

[1436](#) The French jeweller Tavernier, who had come to visit Shayista Khan to sell him some jewels, was in the Khan's camp at this time. He writes: "In consequence of the news which I had received [at Surat] that the Nawab had departed from Aurangabad, I found him with the army in the Deccan, where he had besieged Choupar [Chakan], one of the towns of Raja Shivaji....During this time the Nawab [Shayista Khan] fired a mine, which so much alarmed the inhabitants of Choupar [Chakan] that they yielded by agreement, by which account the soldiers, who thought to take the town by assault, were much annoyed, seeing themselves deprived of the hope of the loot which they had anticipated." (Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.325-26. See also Ibid. pp.26-27.) Tavernier is notorious for misspelling place names. His Choupar at one place, and Choupart at another, is certainly Chakan. His statement that the town was captured without assault is also incorrect.

[1437](#) SCP, p.21.

[1438](#) SWD, Persian section, p.31.

[1439](#) Alamgir Nama, p.584; SDAR, pp. 4-9 (A.R.No. 969, Persian text).

[1440](#) Ibid. p.590.

[1441](#) In August 1661 we find him holding court in Aurangabad. (SDAR, p.18) So it seems that he was not engaged in the campaign against Shivaji, but was staying in Aurangabad in place of Shayista Khan.

[1442](#) Ibid., pp.832-33, 837, 849-50.

[1443](#) Shivabharat, 28:2-8

[1444](#) SCP, p.21.

[1445](#) According to the Tarikh-i Ali, Shivaji secretly met Salabat Khan, planned a revolt in conjunction with him and returned to the fort. Having learnt this through his spies Ali Adilshah set out from Bijapur on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1660 to suppress them. Lacking bravery and courage, Shivaji could not withstand the valour of the Adilshahi troops and fled from the fort at night. Then the Adilshah captured the fort and returned to Bijapur. (Tarikh-i Adilshahi, pp.86-92.) This is pure fabrication. Shivaji had certainly escaped from Panhala before 17<sup>th</sup> August 1660. Ali Nama (c.11-15) makes no mention of the alleged conspiracy between Shivaji and Siddi Jauhar Salabat Khan. It states: When Shivaji escaped from Panhala Ali Adilshah decided to go there in person. But Salabat Khan captured the fort before the Adilshah's arrival. The garrison begged for quarter which was granted and Shivaji and his army fled away.

[1446](#) SCP, p.21.

[1447](#) Alamgir Nama, pp.596-98. See also Jedhe chronology (SCP, p.21); Basatin, Ch. 7; Shivabharat, 28:54.

[1448](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.499-500.

[1449](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 111, 393, 401, 411.

[1450](#) Ibid., No. 111.

[1451](#) Bernier, pp.197-98.

[1452](#) The Military Despatches, p.77.

[1453](#) Ali Nama, c.17; Basatin, Ch. 7.

[1454](#) Shivabharat, 28:15-19.

[1455](#) Tarikh-i Adilshahi, pp. 86-90.

[1456](#) Shivabharat, 28:13-15, 22-24.

[1457](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.73-74. According to the Alamgir Nama (p.626) Siddi Jauhar had sent his envoy to the Court to submit his wish to join the Imperial service, and, in July 1661, the Emperor sent the envoy back with a robe of honour and a farman conveying the Emperor's favour for the Siddi. But, by then, it was too late.

[1458](#) Tarikh-i Adilshahi, Ch. VI (for date see p. 106); Ali Nama, c.17-23.

[1459](#) Tarikh-i Adilshahi, Ch. VI; Ali Nama, c.17-23; Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.22).

[1460](#) Tarikh-i Adilshahi, p.137; Ali Nama, c.17-23; Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.22). Kelosi in the Chronology is evidently a mistake for Kurnool.

[1461](#) Shivabharat, 28:21; ERS, Vol. I, No. 67 (p.58).

[1462](#) Tarikh-i Adilshahi, pp.137-41. See also Ali Nama; ERS, Vol. I, No. 67 (p.58).

[1463](#) SWD, English section, pp.9-10.

[1464](#) Shivabharat, 28:59.

[1465](#) Shivabharat, 28:60-62. The Shivabharat does not mention the given names of Kachhwah and Chauhan. The latter might be Chaturbhuj Chauhan who was in the Deccan in 1662. (SWD, p. 87.) Amar Singh must be Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat. (SDAR, pp.18-19.) Rai Baghan (Royal Tigress) was a lady. She was wife of Udaji Ram and her name was Savitri. When Udaji Ram died in 1633, his son, Jagajivan, though he was then a minor, was given the mansab of 3,000 dhat/2,000 sawar. (Badshah Nama, Vol. I, Part I, p. 510; Part II, p. 64.) Later his father's name was awarded to him as a title. (Ibid., pp.136, 299.) This Udaji Ram died in 1658. (BISM Quarterly, Vol. II, pp.45, 48, 50, 51.) His son, named Baburao, being a minor, Savitri took the affairs of his estate, and the duties of the mansabdari, in her own hands. Because of her ability she was known by the title Rai Baghan. (Ibid.) According to family tradition Savitri is said to be Jagjivan's wife and Baburao's mother. (BISM Quarterly, Vol. IV, pp. 49-50.) But Shivabharat (25:52) specifically says that she was Udaji Ram's wife and Jagjivan's mother.

[1466](#) Shivabharat, 28:65-66.

[1467](#) Shivabharat, 28:67-71, 74, 76-79. Udumbarkhand is the Sanskritized form of Umbarkhind.

[1468](#) The credit for identifying this area as the probable site of the battle goes to Mr. Y.G.Phaphe, a noted Sanskrit scholar. (See his article in BISM Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, Nos. I-II, pp.69-71.) But a couple of corrections are called for. First, the pass he is referring to is not called the Ambenali Pass. The Ambenali Pass — or as the British called it, the Fitzgerald Pass — lies a little to the south of Pratapgad Fort. It is evident from the details which Mr. Phaphe gives that the pass he is speaking of is the one that is

situated between the village named Kuruwande (in the Maval taluka of Pune District) in the uplands and the one named Chavani in the lowlands (Konkan). This pass is known as the Kuruwande pass. (Kolaba District Gazetteer, p.6. Karondah mentioned there is a corruption of Kuruwande.) The Amba River rises near this pass. Secondly, Durshet village lies about eight kilometers south of Umbare and I doubt whether the Umbare-Durshet track is unavoidable for a traveller going towards Panvel from the Kuruwande pass, which Mr. Phaphe has erroneously called the Ambenali Pass. The stretch common to any traveller going north or south after crossing the Kuruwande pass is the one between the pass and Umbare village. This is one of the probable sites of the battle. The other site, viz., the Umbare-Durshet track, is probable only if Kartalab Khan had turned south towards Nagothane or Chaul and not if he had turned north towards Panvel, Kalyan and Bhiwandi. Here also the ground is extremely broken and undulating and provides a good site for an ambush. In the map inserted in the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol.XI, Kolaba and Janjira, Umbarkhind is marked about 25 km east of Pen.

[<sup>1469</sup>](#) Umbarkhind in Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.21). Khand (in Sanskrit), and Khind in Marathi, means a chasm, a gorge.

[<sup>1470</sup>](#) Shivabharat, 28:65 to 29:59.

[<sup>1471</sup>](#) The Shivabharat does not tell us how he could cover the intervening ground, through showers of arrows and musket balls, and come close enough to explain his business to enemy troops. In modern times such an emissary would be identified by the white flag he would carry with him. I do not know whether any such convention existed in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century. A Sanskrit as well as Marathi and Hindi figure of speech which is often used to describe those who had come to surrender literally means “holding grass in one’s teeth.” (See, for instance, Shivabharat, 13:123; Sabhasad Chronicle, pp.61-62; Sampurn

Bhushan, pp.65, 88.) I do not know whether it is a mere figure of speech indicating utter helplessness, or describes an actual procedure. Perhaps Kartalab Khan's emissary might have kept on shouting his intention to parley till he came close enough to Maratha troops hoping all the while that some chance arrow or musket ball would not strike him down or the first Maratha he would encounter would not cut him down without asking questions.

[1472](#) The Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.21) contains the following entry under Shaka 1582: "On Tuesday the fourteenth of the Bright [fortnight of the month of] Magha, a battle was fought with Kartalab Khan in Umbarkhind. Shivaji attained victory. After taking a ransom from him [i.e. from Kartalab Khan] he was granted safe passage." But there is some mistake in this entry because Magha Bright 14 of Shaka Year 1582 (2<sup>nd</sup> February 1661) coincides with Saturday, not Tuesday. The entry of this event in the Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology (SCP, p.58) is different. It records under Shaka year 1582: "In the month of Pausha [23<sup>rd</sup> December 1660 to 20<sup>th</sup> January 1661], a battle was fought between Kartalab Khan and Raja Shivaji. The battle was fought in Umbarkhind. The Raja was victorious. [He] took a ransom from them [i.e. from the enemy]. Correction Magha Bright 14, Tuesday". The Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p.51) adds to this confusion in dates. It records under Shaka year 1582: "Magh, Bright 4 [24<sup>th</sup> January 1661]: A battle was fought at Umarkhandi in the Konkan." Here 4 is evidently a mistake for 14. The Jedhe and Deshpande Chronologies state the date in words whereas the Shivapur Chronology records it in figures and is therefore more susceptible to a copying error. Furthermore Magh Bright 4 of Shaka year 1582 does not correspond with Tuesday – the day recorded in the Jedhe and the Deshpande Chronologies – but with Thursday. I suppose the date given in the Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology first, viz. the month of Pausha, is correct, it being a correction for Magh Bright 14. As we know that Kartalab Khan along with Ghalib met Shayista Khan on 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1660, the battle must have

been fought at least a few days after that date, say about 15<sup>th</sup> January 1661.

[1473](#) Unless otherwise stated, the account in this section is taken from the Shivabharat,

[1474](#) EFI (1661-1664), p.4.

[1475](#) The Jedhe Chronology (SCP. p.21) records under Shaka 1582: “In the month of Magha [21<sup>st</sup> January to 18<sup>th</sup> February] Shivaji plundered Nijampur and captured Dabhol and Prabhavali.” The entry in the Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology (SCP, p.58) is slightly different. It states under Shaka 1582: “In the month of Magha [21<sup>st</sup> January to 18<sup>th</sup> February] the Raja [Shivaji] plundered Rajapur and captured Babhuli and Prabhavali.” The village named Nijampur is near Raigad and was undoubtedly within Shivaji’s dominions. So it is improbable that he would plunder it. So Nijampur in the Jedhe Chronology is incorrect. It should be Rajapur as in the Shivapurkar Deshpande Chronology. Babhuli in the printed text of that chronology is a mistake, quite normal in reading Modi script in which these chronologies are written, for Dabhuli or Dabhol. According to the Shivabharat, Shivaji occupied Dabhol first, then plundered Rajapur and thereafter occupied Prabhavali. Rajapur was plundered in early March. So the date in the chronologies (month of Magha) must be referring to the capture of Dabhol.

[1476](#) The Shivabharat does not give the date. It is provided by the dispatches of the Dutch Resident at Vengurle as summarized in the Dagh Register of 1661 (p.215) cited in EFI (1661-664), p.4. It says that “about the middle of March” — i.e. about 15<sup>th</sup> March by the New Style calendar — Shivaji sent 1,000 cavalry and about 3,000 infantry to take possession of Rajapur. By the Old Style the date would be about 5<sup>th</sup> March.” The last extant letter from the English factory at Rajapur before this event is dated 16<sup>th</sup>

February 1661. (*Ibid.*, p.3.) Though the Dagh Register says that Shivaji “sent” this force to Rajapur the *Shivabharat* (29:88 to 31:1) specifically states that Shivaji in person had arrived there. In their letter to Surat written from Songad prison Revington and his colleagues wrote that they had not seen Shivaji since they passed Rajapur. (*ERS*, Vol. I, p. 25.) This implies that they had seen him at Rajapur.

[1477](#) The Dagh register for 1661 (p.215) records: “The robbers [i.e. Shivaji’s troops] also plundered many foreign merchants, who yearly bring goods to Rajapur from Persia and Muscat.” Vide *EFI* (1661-664), p.4.

[1478](#) The *Shivabharat* does not mention the captivity of the Englishmen, but the English and the Dutch sources do. The digging up of the English factory is mentioned in an English letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1664 from Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. I, p.74.) The Dutch letter dated 17<sup>th</sup> December 1661 from Surat to Lords Seventeen states that “Mr. Henry Revington with six of his subordinates” was taken into captivity and that Shivaji “had the factory robbed of all cash, merchandise and whatever else was found there and caused the floors to be dug up to see if any thing was concealed underneath.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.488.) But English records show that the number of Englishmen taken into captivity, including Revington, was eight. Of them one, who was very ill since his arrival from England died at Rajapur, in May 1661; three, including Revington, were released earlier than others and arrived at Surat in October 1661; the remaining four were released early in February 1663. For details of their imprisonment see Appendix VIII

[1479](#) One Sambul was among the captives taken at Rajapur. He was a servant of Haji Zahid Beg (a rich merchant) of Surat and was captured along with “2,000 dollars worth of goods” of his master. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No.26 – p.27.) A Spanish silver coin named the Real was also called ‘Dollar’. [See *EFI* (1618-1621), p.333 (n.4).] One Real was worth about Rs.2 of the time.

[1480](#) *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 4-5.

[1481](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.26 (p.27).

[1482](#) EFI (1661-1664), p.3.

[1483](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.26 (pp.28-29).

[1484](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.26 (pp.28-29).

[1485](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.26 (p.28).

[1486](#) he *Shivabharat* (31:24-26) states that Shivaji built a wall around the summit of Chitradurg hill near Palavani, named it Mandangad and put a garrison in it. Mandangad town, now the headquarters of Mandangad Taluka in Ratnagiri district is 8 km north of Palavani.

[1487](#) SCP, p.22. This is corroborated by the Shivapur Chronology which records that Shringarpur was captured [by Shivaji] on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1661 and that [Jaswantrao] Dalvi was there at that time. (SCP, p. 51.) See also Shivaji's letters dated 21<sup>st</sup> January 1662 and 21<sup>st</sup> April 1662 to Pilaji Nilakanthrao, the subadar of Prabhavali Muamala. (SCS, Vol. II, No. 344; MIS, Vol. XXI, No. 3.)

[1488](#) The *Shivabharat* gives the name as Pratigad, but the fort is usually known as Prachitgad.

[1489](#) The portion of the *Shivabharat* that has survived ends here.

[1490](#) Henry Revington's letter dated June 1661 from Songad prison shows that Shivaji had halted at Mahad for about two days in that month. (ERS, Vol. I, p.31.) The letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> August 1661 of Pilaji Nilakanthrao, the subadar, to a subordinate officer mentions that a petitioner had met Shivaji

at Rajgad and returned with his letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1661.  
(MIS, Vol. XXI, No. 2.)

[1491](#) MIS, Vol. XXI, Nos. 2 and 3.

[1492](#) See, for instance, SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 340-43.

[1493](#) See, for instance, SCS, Vol. II, No.344; MIS, Vol. VIII, No. 26;  
XXI, Nos. 2-3.

[1494](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 53 (p.45).

[1495](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 53 (pp.47-48).

[1496](#) FBS, p.62.

[1497](#) FBS, p.59.

[1498](#) FBS, p.174.

[1499](#) Chitnis Chronicle, pp.129-30.

[1500](#) SCS, Vol. V, No.762.

[1501](#) Fort Deiri, about 22 km east of Vasai

[1502](#) SCP, p.22.

[1503](#) SWD, p.61.

[1504](#) SWD, Persian section, p.161.

[1505](#) Ibid.

[1506](#) SWD, Persian section, p. 47.

[1507](#) SDAR, p.27 (Persian text).

[1508](#) Alamgir Nama, p. 647. See also Dutch letter from Surat, dated 14<sup>th</sup> January 1662 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.489); SWD, p. 87 (News report dated 5<sup>th</sup> January 1662 from Bagalan)

[1509](#) Shiv-Charitra-Samshodhan-Vritt, Part II, pp.16-17

[1510](#) SWD, Persian section, pp.120-22. The list includes 65 items captured from Netoji, most of them being various types of cloth. It is interesting to note that it includes 34 *sers* of soap!

[1511](#) SWD, Persian section, p.119.

[1512](#) SCP, p.22. Corroborated by an undated Marathi memorandum. (SCS, Vol. IV, No.717.)

[1513](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No. 276.

[1514](#) SDAR, p.37 (Persian text).

[1515](#) SWD, p.36. See also p.37.

[1516](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 56.

[1517](#) Ibid., No. 58.

[1518](#) IHRC, Proceedings of Meetings, Vol. IX, p.111.

[1519](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, p.7.

[1520](#) Maratas em Baçaim, pp.2-3 vide SPSS, Vol. III, No. 2803.

[1521](#) Portuguese word for a type of ship between 100 and 300 tons.

[1522](#) Portuguese-Mahratta Relations, p.36.

[1523](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.22); Khafi Khan, pp.210-11.

[1524](#) Khafi Khan, pp.210-11.

[1525](#) Cosme da Guarda observes: "The Moorish armies are like big cities, as many people follow thence and come to the camp at all hours and without being questioned. (*FBS*, p.15.)

[1526](#) Tarikh-i Dilkusha, p.36.

[1527](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.22-23). Khafi Khan (pp.210-11) correctly states that the raid took place in the month of Ramazan of the Sixth year of Aurangzeb's reign [31<sup>st</sup> March to 28<sup>th</sup> April 1663].

[1528](#) Ibid.

[1529](#) Khafi Khan, p.210.

[1530](#) Sabhasad Chronicle, p.30

[1531](#) Khafi Khan, pp.210-11. See also Tarikh-i Dilkusha, pp.36-37; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.104-06.

[1532](#) Khafi Khan, p.210; Tarikh-i Dilkusha, p.36.

[1533](#) Khafi Khan, pp.210-11 (thumb); Sabhasad Chronicle, pp.30-33 (three fingers of the right hand); ERS, Vol. I, No.60 (wounded); Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.28 (forefinger). The statement in the Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p. 51) that Shayista Khan was killed in the raid is incorrect, though the date of the raid given in it is correct.

[1534](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos.60, 62, 63; Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.22-23); Maasir-i- Alamgiri, p.28. See also Sampurn Bhushan, p.113; Parnal, 2:33-35; Dutch letter from Surat, dated 5<sup>th</sup> June 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.496).

[1535](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 63.

[1536](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 60. Khafi Khan's statement (pp.210-110) that two Marathas fell into a tank full of water, finds corroboration from an unexpected quarter; Cosme da Guarda (FBS, pp.66-67) too states that two Marathas fell into a well. Guarda adds that the Marathas had no knowledge of it because it was [newly] opened by Shayista Khan's order for use by the women.

[1537](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.22-23).

[1538](#) Jedhe Chronicle (SCP, p.46). *The Chitnis Chronicle* (pp.133-34) narrates the following apocryphal story: When the raiding party got out of the camp they blew a horn to give the prearranged signal. Whereupon the men posted at the Katraj pass blew their horns and lighted torches tied to trees and the horns of oxen and went away. Thinking that these were the torches of the raiders, the Mughal troops went in

that direction while the raiders safely reached Sinhgad. (Hannibal is said to have used the same stratagem, of tying torches to horns of cattle as a diversion, against the Romans.)

[1539](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos.60, 63, 64; Dutch letter from Surat, dated 5<sup>th</sup> June 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.496); Khafi Khan, pp.210-11; Tarikh-i Dilkusha, pp. 36-37; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.104-06.

[1540](#) Tarikh-i Dilkusha, pp. 36-37; Jedhe Chronicle (SCP, p.46).

[1541](#) He was only 20 years old then, being born on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1643. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 319.) At the time of his appointment the Emperor, giving him an increment of 3,000 *dhat*/5,000 *sawar*, promoted him to the rank of 15,000 *dhat*/10,000 *sawar*. (*Alamgir Nama*, p. 819.)

[1542](#) Alamgir Nama, pp. 890-91.

[1543](#) This is evident from the fact that it is recounted in such diverse sources as, for instance: English letters from Rajapur to Surat, Kolhapur to Surat, Surat to Madras and Goa to Surat (ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 60, 63, 64, 66); Dutch letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> June 1663 from Surat, to the Governor general of the Dutch East Indies (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.496); Dagh Register entry, dated 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, No. 96); Cosme the Guarda (FBS, pp. 66-72); Bernier (p.187); Thevenot (FBS, pp.174-76); Carré (FBS, pp.193-97), and Keladi-nripa-vijayam.

[1544](#) Alamgir Nama, p.815.

[1545](#) Alamgir Nama, p.819.

[1546](#) All the Englishmen had been released from prison by then.

[1547](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 60.

[1548](#) Raoji Somanath, Shivaji's chief officer at Rajapur.

[1549](#) The Rajapur reparations, which the English were demanding from Shivaji for their losses at Rajapur during the sack.

[1550](#) It is evident that from here onwards Giffard is merely repeating the account Raoji gave them from Shivaji's letter.

[1551](#) Arabic for salutation, greeting. Here the term is used sarcastically. Though Giffard uses the term 'tent', I think, he does so loosely in the sense of residence, as a rendering of Marathi *dera* (camp). Shayista Khan was residing in the Lal Mahal, which was a proper building.

[1552](#) Though this is not impossible, I do not think it was probable to sort out who killed or wounded whom during such a night attack. The Jedhe Chronology does not say Shivaji wounded Shayista Khan with his own hand. But that is what popular imagination would have liked to believe in those days as, I think, it does now.

[1553](#) Italics mine. I suppose the italicized portion is merely bazaar gossip, not part of Shivaji's letter.

[1554](#) A corrupt form of the Sanskrit (and Marathi) word *Parameshvar*, Supreme God, especially Shiva. The statement is certainly from Shivaji's letter.

[1555](#) Alamgir Nama, p.848.

[1556](#) Khutut-i Shivaji, pp. 2-4; Photocopy of Durj-ul Gawahir incorporated in Tarabai Papers: A collection of Persian letters, pp.2-3 (Photograph No. 7, line 10 to Photograph No. 10, line 3). The text of the letter in both copies is almost identical.

[1557](#) An English translation of the text in Khutut-i Shivaji made by Sir Jadunath Sarkar has been published in The Modern Review, Vol. I, No. I (January 1907). An English translation of the text in Durj-ul Gawahir made by Prof. B.D. Varma has been published in Tarabai Papers: A collection of Persian letters, pp. xvi-a, xvi-b. The translation presented here is made by me from the Persian text in Durj-ul Gawahir.

[1558](#) Nil Prabhu was a Persian scribe of Shivaji and his son Sambhaji. (See *Tarabai Papers: A collection of Persian letters*, p.2 (photograph No. 7 of *Durj-ul Gawahir*.)

[1559](#) An allusion to the forts won by Aurangzeb in 1657.

[1560](#) Keladi-nripa-vijayam, c. 8; Tarikh-i Adilshahi, pp.143; ERS, Vol. I, No. 51.

[1561](#) Tarikh-i Adilshahi, pp.143-44; Ali Nama, c.30-32; ERS, Vol. I, No. 51.

[1562](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 55.

[1563](#) The narrative in this paragraph is based on Tarikh-i Adilshahi, Ch. VII; Ali Nama, c. 30-32; Keladi-nripa-vijayam, c. 8. See also AFS, Vol. V, No. 97; ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 56, 58, 62, 67, 70, 72, 82; Dagh Register entries of 12<sup>th</sup> May and 13<sup>th</sup> August 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.100).

[1564](#) In Shimoga District of Karnataka.

[1565](#) Dagh Register entry of 13<sup>th</sup> August 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.100).

[1566](#) Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p. 51)

[1567](#) Dagh Register entry of 14<sup>th</sup> November 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.92).

[1568](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 63, 65, 66; Dagh Register entries of 21<sup>st</sup> June and 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.90, 96); The Portuguese and the Marathas, p.8.

[1569](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp.8-9. See also Dagh Register entry of 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.96).

[1570](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp.8-9; Dagh Register entry of 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.96-97).

[1571](#) Dagh Register entry of 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.92).

[1572](#) Dagh Register entry of 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.97).

[1573](#) Dutch letter from Vengurle to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 501-04).

[1574](#) The following account of this siege is based on a few lines in the Tarikh-i Dilkusha (p.39), and two laconic entries in the Jedhe Chronology and four in the Shivapur Chronology (SCP, pp.22-23, 51).

[1575](#) Quotation from Cosme da Guarda (FBS, p. 73).

[1576](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, p.5; ERS, Vol. I, No.79 (P.71-72); Manucci, Vol. I, p. 61.

[1577](#) The following description of the castle is taken from Tavernier, Vol. I, p.6; Mundy, Vol. II, pp.29-30; Thevenot (Indian Travels, p.22); Pelsaert (Jahangir's India, p.39).

[1578](#) Thevenot (Indian Travels, p. 38).

[1579](#) Godinho (IHC, Vol. XIII, p. 181).

[1580](#) Godinho (IHC, Vol. XIII, pp. 181-82).

[1581](#) For Viraji Vora see Mundy, Vol. II, p. 139; Thevenot (Indian Travels, p. 22); EFI (1655-1660), 72, 159, 215, 360, 368-69. Sir Jadunath Sarkar incorrectly calls him Baharji Borah. (Shivaji and His Times, p. 96.) He was a Hindu, not a Muslim. For Haji Zahid Beg see EFI (1642-645), p.161; (1646-1650), p.169.

[1582](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p.78); Thevenot (Indian Travels, p.22).

[1583](#) Godinho (IHC, Vol. XIII, pp. 181-82).

[1584](#) Carré (FBS, p. 198); Manucci, Vol. I, p.161; Godinho (IHC, Vol. XIII, p.182); Pelsaert (Jahangir's India, p.39).

[1585](#) Iversen's account (ERS, Vol. II, p.343-44); EFI (1661-1664), p.205. L'Escalot, in his letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1664 from Surat says the city commandant pocketed the amount instead of maintaining 500 men out of it as ordered by the Emperor. (ERS, Vol. I, p.72.) The English letter from Surat, dated 14<sup>th</sup> November 1663, says "Our new governor [i.e. the city commander]... and likewise a person of honour. His quality [i.e. rank] is 2,000 horse pay." [See EFI (1661-1664), p.203.] So Inayat Khan was holding a rank of 2000 dhat and therefore, by the rule of one fourth, the stipulated strength of his contingent would be 500 horsemen.

[1586](#) SCP, p.51.

[1587](#) SCP, p.22.

[1588](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 76; Dutch Diary (FBS, p.373); Valentine (FBS, p.359); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 343); letter of the Portuguese Viceroy, dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1666 (The Portuguese and the Marathas, p.10). François Valentine (or Valentyn) is the author

of Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien (5 volumes, 1724-26). He had lived in the East Indies for many years and made good use of the unpublished material placed at his disposal by the Dutch Company. (The Dutch Seaborne Empire, p.164.)

[1589](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 74, 79, 80; Valentine (FBS, pp.359-60); Dutch Diary (FBS, pp.372-76).

[1590](#) ERS, Vol. II, p.343.

[1591](#) This date is in the New Style; it is 5<sup>th</sup> January by the Old Style.

[1592](#) Bernier, p.188.

[1593](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p. 71). See also Valentine (FBS, p.359); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.375).

[1594](#) Patan, 100 km northwest of Ahmedabad, was a centre of the weaving industry. Mahabat Khan was then *subadar* of Gujarat. *EFI* (1661-664), pp. 106, 311.

[1595](#) Valentine (FBS, p.359); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.375); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 345). L'Escalot, in his letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> January 1664 from Surat says that the messenger was sent on 5<sup>th</sup> January to negotiate terms of ransom, but Shivaji retained him and continued his advance. (ERS, Vol. I, p.71.)

[1596](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 78 (p.66). See also Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 345).

[1597](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 84, 86; Valentine (FBS, p.360); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, pp. 343-45). The Dutch Diary of 10<sup>th</sup> January records the receipt of a

letter from their factory at Bharuch informing them that thousands of fugitives had arrived there. (FBS, p.381.)

[1598](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.79 (p.71).

[1599](#) Peter Mundy (Vol. II, p.25) describes the house thus: “Surat House [of the East India Company] is the best sort in town, very fair and strongly built, the roofs in general flat and terraced aloft to walk on, very substantially done with lime etc., so that no rain can pierce it, and below a fair hall, chambers and rooms for the President and Council etc. merchants, with complete warehouses, walks [etc.] below.”

[1600](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp.91-92

[1601](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos.78 (pp.69-70), 84.

[1602](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.73.

[1603](#) FBS, p.373.

[1604](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 78 (p.66), 79 (p.75), 83

[1605](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 75, 86.

[1606](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp. 198, 202, 315-16.

[1607](#) Later on, the Surat Council recommended one Mr. Grosse to Bantam for the reinforcements provided by him. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 84.) This Grosse was Robert Grosse who was captain of a ship called the Surat Frigate. [EFI (1661-1664), p. 317.] It was a small ship which was placed at the disposal of the Company’s Agent at Bantam and appears to have been owned by the Company. (Ibid., pp. 20, 24, 72, 206-07, 211, 317, 330.)

[1608](#) *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.206-07, 317.

[1609](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28, 206, 222.

[1610](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 78, 79, 80, 83.

[1611](#) For this and other preparations see *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 79, 84.

[1612](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.76.

[1613](#) *Ibid.*, No. 79 (p.75).

[1614](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 74.

[1615](#) He was an Armenian merchant of Surat. See *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 189, 207.

[1616](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 74, 78, 84.

[1617](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 74.

[1618](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 73 and 78. See also the Dutch Diary (*FBS*, p.375).

[1619](#) *FBS*, pp.375-76.

[1620](#) *Ibid.*, No. 78 (p.66).

[1621](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 73.

[1622](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 78, 79, 80, 83. For marine reinforcements see also Ibid., Nos. 76, 80, 84.

[1623](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 83.

[1624](#) For these preparations, unless otherwise mentioned, see Dutch Diary (FBS, pp.373-76).

[1625](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (pp.74-75). ‘Their dwelling was in the southern part of the city, not far from the castle.’ [EFI (1661-1664), p. 309.]

[1626](#) Valentine and Iversen state that the English and the Dutch had “only 30 to 40 men of each nation” and on 5<sup>th</sup> January each of them enlisted some 70-80 Muslims. (FBS, p. 359 and ERS, Vol. II, p. 343.) Their information about the strength of the English house is incorrect as shown by the Log of the Loyal Merchant and the Surat letter of 16<sup>th</sup> February. (ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 83.) But it may be correct about the strength of the Dutch house. So “6 Moorish soldiers” in the Dutch Diary might be a mistake for “60 Moorish soldiers.”

[1627](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, p.375); Valentine (FBS, p. 360); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 343).

[1628](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p.74); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376). See also ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 76, 80; Valentine (FBS, p. 360); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, pp.343-44).

[1629](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376); Valentine (FBS, p. 360).

[1630](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p.74). Corroborated by Valentine (FBS, p. 360); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, pp.343-44).

[1631](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 78 (p.66); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376); Valentine (FBS, p. 360); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 344).

[1632](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376). See also Valentine (FBS, p. 360); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 344); Carré (FBS, p. 202).

[1633](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos.79, 80, 83. Bernier (p.188) also says that Shivaji burnt what he could not take away.

[1634](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 75, 78, 80. See also Valentine (FBS, p. 360); Dutch Diary (FBS, p.376); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, p. 344).

[1635](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar says: “He was mistaken for an Armenian or Turk.” (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.102.) None of the sources says so. It is Sir Jadunath’s own imagination.

[1636](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 76, 78, 79, 83.

[1637](#) The Surat letter of 19<sup>th</sup> March says: “His design was not altogether riches but a revenge upon this King [i.e. the Mughal Emperor].” (ERS, Vol. I, No. 84.)

[1638](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.79 (pp.75-76).

[1639](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 79, 83.

[1640](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 76, 78, 79, 83, 84, 86.

[1641](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 78, 79. Zahid Beg’s house consisted of a house and several warehouses.

[1642](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.79 (p.77).

[1643](#) Ibid.

[1644](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 79 (p.79).

[1645](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes: “But on his hat being taken off, he was recognized as an Englishman and spared.” (*Shivaji and His Times*, p. 98.) This is incorrect. The only authority for the incident of the cancellation of the order to behead Smith is Reverend L’Escalot’s letter of 28<sup>th</sup> January 1664. His exact words are as follows: “It comes to Mr. Smith[’s] turn, and his right hand being commanded to be cut off, he cried out in Indostan to cut off his head, unto which end his hat was taken off, but Shivaji stopped [the] execution, and so ( praised be God) he [i.e. Smith] escaped.” (ERS, Vol. I, p.79.) So L’Escalot does not say that Smith’s life was spared because he was recognized as an Englishman. Secondly, Shivaji already knew that Smith was an Englishman. See what Shivaji is said to have told him in the events of 6<sup>th</sup> January narrated above. Thirdly, I cannot see how the nationality of a person can be identified by merely taking off his hat and not till then. The Log of the Loyal Merchant of 10<sup>th</sup> January 1664 also records the incident briefly. But it does not mention that Smith’s hat was removed or that he was spared because he was recognized as an Englishman. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 73.) So the only authority for Sir Jadunath’s statement quoted above is again, his own imagination.

[1646](#) Henry Gary’s letter of 25<sup>th</sup> January 1664 says that Smith saw 26 hands and many heads cut off in one morning but does not mention the attempt on Shivaji’s life. (ERS, Vol. I, No.76.) The Surat Council’s letter of 28<sup>th</sup> January 1664 says that Smith saw 26 hands and many heads cut off in one day, but is silent about the attempt on Shivaji’s life. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 78.)

[1647](#) For the incident narrated in this paragraph see ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 78, 79, 83, 84.

[1648](#) Only L’Escalot mentions his name and spells it as “Gerrurd Aungier.” (ERS, Vol. I, p.76.) He also relates there that this “Gerrurd Aungier” was the brother of Lord

Aungier. In a summary given in *EFI* (1661-1664), p. 308, his first name is spelt Gerard. But there is no reference to any “Aungier, Gerard” in the index of that volume. On the other hand, the references under the heading “Aungier, Gerald” include the following entry: “helps to defend the factory at Surat, p.308.” [*EFI* (1661-1664), p.410.] As no Gerald Aungier is mentioned in p. 308 of that volume, it is evident that the editor of *EFI* (1661-1664) treats Gerard Aungier mentioned in p. 308 and Gerald Aungier as one and the same person, and rightly so, because this Gerald Aungier was a brother of Lord Aungier. [*EFI* (1670-1677), pp. vi-vii.] The difference in spelling could easily be explained by the inconsistency in spelling which was quite common in those days. So this “Gerrurd Aungier” of L’Escalot, who led the sortie and whom we shall now call Gerald Aungier, was a member of the President’s Council at this time. [*EFI* (1661-1664), p. 186.] He later rose to be the President in 1670 and remained in that office till his death in 1677. [*EFI* (1670-1677), p.279.]

[1649](#) Later on in England, Thomas Paine, the sailor “who was shot in the leg on shore” received £5 as compensation. *EFI* (1661-1664), p. 216.

[1650](#) Letters of the Surat Council and L’Escalot mention only this sortie. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 78, 79, 83, 84.) Gary’s letter magnifies it into several sorties. (*Ibid.*, No. 76.) The Dutch also heard of several English sorties. (*Dutch Diary, FBS*, p.378.)

[1651](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.78 (p. 67).

[1652](#) For the Dutch account of this day see the Dutch Diary (*FBS*, pp. 376-79); Valentine (*FBS*, p.361); Iversen (*ERS*, Vol. II, p.344). The English records make no mention of this merchant.

[1653](#) Shah Shuja was Aurangzeb’s brother. Defeated in the War of Succession, he fled to Arakan and died there.

[1654](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, p. 344.

[1655](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 78 (p.68) says that the Dutch house was in great danger of fire on 11<sup>th</sup> January.

[1656](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 78 (p.67), 79 (pp. 77-78); EFI (1661-1664), pp.312-13.

[1657](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 76, 78, 79, 83.

[1658](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p.80). See also Valentine (FBS, p. 362); Dutch Diary (FBS, pp.381-82); Iversen (ERS, Vol. II, pp.345-46); Manucci, Vol. II, pp.109-14. Bernier (pp.134-38) also says that the lodgings of the two envoys whom the King of Ethiopia had sent to visit Aurangzeb was plundered and burnt soon after their arrival at Surat. During his travels Bernier had struck acquaintance with one of them at Mocha. He again met him and his colleague at Delhi where they arrived after the plunder of Surat.

[1659](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, p.379).

[1660](#) ERS, Vol. II, p. 345.

[1661](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.79 (p. 80).

[1662](#) A Dutch merchant wrote to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies on 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1664 that seven padres who had come from Vasai reported that Shivaji "had hurriedly sent off in 36 ships to his ports a large part of the spoil taken [at Surat]." (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.498-99.) Earlier L'Escalot, too, had reported that there was credible information that Shivaji had shipped his treasure to carry into his own country and that the President had sent a frigate in pursuit. (ERS, Vol. I, p.80.) But it was no more than a rumour. The letters of the Surat Council mention no such incident. The origin of this rumour probably lay in the capture of a boat, which belonged to a Muslim, in the Tapi River by the Malabar pirates. (Log of the Loyal Merchant, 17<sup>th</sup> January 1664 — ERS, Vol. I, No. 73.)

[1663](#) FBS, p.362.

[1664](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, p.379). See also Iverson (ERS, Vol. II, p.345).

[1665](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, pp.379-80); Iverson (ERS, Vol. II, p.345).

[1666](#) The discrepancies in various accounts about the date of Shivaji's departure from Surat are due to his short withdrawal from the city on 8<sup>th</sup> January and his final departure on 9<sup>th</sup> January. See ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 76, 79; Dutch diary (FBS, p.381). The Shivapur Chronology's laconic entry (SCP, p. 51) — “10<sup>th</sup> January 1664: Returned” — refers to his departure from Surat.

[1667](#) ERS, Vol. II, p.346.

[1668](#) Dutch Diary (FBS, p.380).

[1669](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.78 (p.68).

[1670](#) FBS, p.361.

[1671](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 80.

[1672](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 76.

[1673](#) This was called the new *serai*, the old one being occupied by the Ethiopian ambassador and his retinue. [EFI (1661-1664), p.308, n1.] The serais were defendable buildings. For instance, Manoel Godinho, who had visited Surat in 1663, states: “Not the least sumptuous of the buildings [in Surat] are the two caravanserais (that is to say public inns) built in the style of cloisters with living rooms on the side. The caravanserais have only one door which is closed at night and opened at daybreak so that the goods of the merchants who lodge in them may be more secure.” (*Proceedings of the IHC*, Vol. XIII, p.182.)

[1674](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 76, 78, 79, 84.

[1675](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 75, 76, 78, 84; Bernier, p.189.

[1676](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p.78).

[1677](#) Here, ‘ton’ is not a measure of weight. The Dutch ‘ton’ of any kind of goods represented 100,000 gulden (guilders) in value and, at this rate, Viraji Vora’s loss would amount to about 50,000 pounds sterling. [EFI (1661-1664), pp.309-10. For this meaning see also *The Dutch in India*, p.219; *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, p. 304.] For Viraji Vora this was not a very great loss. The Surat Council’s letter to the Company, dated 26<sup>th</sup> November 1664 states: “Haji Zahid Beg and Viraji Vora, the two great merchants of this town, hold up their heads still and are for great bargains; so that it seems Shivaji has not carried away all, but left them a competency to carry on their trade.” [EFI (1661-1664), p.313.]

[1678](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp. 309-10. In the translation given in ERS, Vol. II (p. 345) “six barrels” in place of “six tons” and “thirty casks” in place of “thirty tons.”

[1679](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 75. Other Surat letters say “many hundreds of thousand pounds.” (Ibid., Nos. 78, 83.)

[1680](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 76.

[1681](#) EFI (1661-1664), p. 307.

[1682](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 114. The date of the newsletter —Tuesday, 15<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 13<sup>th</sup> Year of Aurangzeb’s reign — corresponds with 27<sup>th</sup> January 1670. But the day of the week on that date was Thursday, not Tuesday. Moreover Shivaji plundered Surat for the second time in October 1670. The 13<sup>th</sup> year of

Aurangzeb's reign ended on 30th Shaban (2<sup>nd</sup> January 1670). I think therefore that the scribe had incorrectly written that year, which had ended only a few days before, in the date of the newsletter and that its correct date is Tuesday, 15<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 14<sup>th</sup> year of Aurangzeb's reign which corresponds with 17<sup>th</sup> January 1671. That date coincided with Tuesday.

[1683](#) Bernier, pp. 188-90.

[1684](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, p.159.

[1685](#) FBS, p.199.

[1686](#) FBS, pp. 179-80.

[1687](#) For the arrival of the Mughal forces see ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 78. 83. The quotation is from No. 83.

[1688](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 73. See also Ibid., Nos. 76, 78.

[1689](#) For his efforts narrated hereafter, see ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 78, 85, 88, 92.

[1690](#) Mustafa Khan was commandant of Surat till 1663 when, according to an English letter, he was promoted to be the King's steward. The English had a very high opinion of him. While departing from Surat, he had promised them that he would be their solicitor at the Mughal Court whenever they required his assistance. [EFI (1661-1664), pp.203, 205.]

[1691](#) Dutch letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1664 from Surat to the Board of Directors of the Company. (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.493.)

[1692](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 85, 86, 88; Dutch letters (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 201-02, 235, 493, 495). The Governor General of the Dutch East India Company wrote to the Board of Directors of the Company on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1664 that this exemption would mean a gain of 50,000 florins to the Company, so that this catastrophe would bring them a profit. (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II. p.202.)

[1693](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 85.

[1694](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 88.

[1695](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp. 312-14.

[1696](#) For a contemporaneous English translation of this decree see EFI (1661-1664), pp.314-15. See also Dagh Register entry of 15<sup>th</sup> October 1664 and Dutch letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1664 from Surat to the Board of Directors of the Company. (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 235, 493-94); The Diaries of Streynsham Master, Vol. II, p.292.

[1697](#) EFI (1661-1664), p. 315.

[1698](#) In their letter of 5<sup>th</sup> March 1663, the Surat Council had informed the Company that in their imports and exports at Surat they had never paid customs for less than ninety to one hundred thousand pounds sterling. EFI (1661-1664), p.193.

[1699](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 493-94.

[1700](#) The Diaries of Streynsham Master, Vol. II, p.292.

[1701](#) EFI (1661-1664), p.315. For positions held by Goodier, Gary, and Aungier see Ibid., pp. 85 (n.1), 186.

[1702](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp.315-16.

[1703](#) Dutch letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> August 1664 from Batavia and Dagh Register dated 15<sup>th</sup> October 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 201-02, 234).

[1704](#) Dutch letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> August 1664 from Batavia (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 201-02); Thevenot and Carreri (Indian Travels, pp.21, 163).

[1705](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 75, 78.

[1706](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 78 (p.70).

[1707](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (SCP, pp. 22, 51).

[1708](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, p.10.

[1709](#) Letter dated 31<sup>st</sup> March 1665 of the Portuguese Viceroy to Mirza Raja Jai Singh (The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp.11-12).

[1710](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 89.

[1711](#) The Sabarmati River which flows into the Bay of Khambayat.

[1712](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 91.

[1713](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 495-96.

[1714](#) The narrative of Anthony Smith's background till 10<sup>th</sup> December 1663 is taken from EFI (1655-1660), pp. 146-47, 195-96, 305; (1661-1664), pp. 22, 23, 27, 78, 188-92, 207.

[1715](#) Mocha, not to be confused with Mecca, is just inside the strait of Bab el Mandeb (between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden). Mecca is further north in Arabia

[1716](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 110.

[1717](#) EFI (1670-1677), pp. 216-17 n, 285

[1718](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar states in his *Shivaji and His Times*, p.102: "A modern writer has tried to discredit Smith's evidence on the ground that the President of the Surat English factory reported to the Company in London that Smith injured the Company's interests by telling some lies to the Marathas during his captivity. Evidently the charge was disproved, for we find Smith still in the service of the Company three years after this date. (This information was traced by Sir W. Foster among the India Office records, at my request.) Therefore Smith's veracity as to what Shivaji did in his camp at the time cannot be questioned. These atrocities are inevitable in the sack of cities. Smith's evidence is corroborated by Rustam Manakji, whose Persian life (the *Qissah*) by J. Kaikubad has been printed. (Dr. J. J. Modi in his Asiatic Papers, Part IV, 281-309)." The modern writer referred to in the above passage is undoubtedly Dr. Surendra Nath Sen. (See *FBS*, introduction, pp. xxxii-xxxvi.) Sir Jadunath's statement that this "modern writer has tried to discredit Smith's evidence on the ground . . . that Smith injured the Company's interests by telling some lies to the Marathas during his captivity" is incorrect. The President had not made any such report to the Company. What he did report has been quoted above. Secondly, contrary to Sir Jadunath's assumption, Smith was indeed dismissed from the Company's service. Sir Jadunath's third statement that "Smith's evidence is corroborated by Rustam Manakji" is also incorrect as can be seen from the next section in this chapter.

[1719](#) These letters are: ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 73, 75, 78 (p.68), 79, 80, 84.

[1720](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p. 79).

[1721](#) The poem was written by one Jamshed Kaikobad, tutor to one of the sons of Rustam Manak. The original poem is not extant. Rustam Manak's descendant, Manakji Merwanji Seth, possessed several copies of the original poem. As these were found to be faulty from the point of view of the meter he asked one Minochehr Edalji to prepare a corrected text. This was done in 1845. The editor, Minochehr Edalji, says that in so doing he has "adorned the old bride with ornaments." (*Asiatic Papers*, Part IV, p.123.) There is no way of knowing how far he has tampered with the original text. A Gujarati transliteration and translation of this revised and corrected text was printed in 1900 in a booklet form for private circulation. Dr. Jivanji Jamshedji Modi's monograph entitled 'Rustum Manock (1635-1621 A.C.), the Broker of the English East India Company (1699 A.C.) and the Persian Qisseh (History) by Rustam Manock: A Study', was published in Dr. Modi's *Asiatic Papers*, Part IV (pp. 101-320). Full Persian text of *Qissa-i Rustam Manak*, as reproduced from its Gujarati transliteration, is appended to this monograph (pp. 281-309). The poem comprises 610 couplets. Of these, 22 in the introduction and 23 of the epilogue are entirely from the pen of Minochehr Edalji. When Shivaji plundered Surat, Rustam Manak paid a ransom of Rs. 10,000 for the release of several captives. This incident is narrated in the poem in 50 couplets (pp. 289-91). Shivaji plundered Surat twice, first in 1664 and then in 1670. It is not mentioned in the poem in which of these two sacks the incident narrated in it occurred. But as Dr. Modi has reasoned (p.196) had it been the second sack there would have been some reference to the first. So, it may be assumed that the incident occurred during the first sack.

[1722](#) *Asiatic Papers*, Part IV, pp.289-91 for Persian text. For an English summary by Dr. Modi, *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28, 179-81. I have mainly followed him though I have gone through the Persian text.

[1723](#) The reader can see for himself that the poem — or rather its revised version — does not corroborate Smith's account. It does not mention mutilations of any kind. That hostages were taken for ransom is true. The Governor General of the Dutch East India Company wrote to the Director Board of the Company on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1664: "The

Company's property has not suffered in any way. However as a great many creditors of the Company have been carried off by the invaders, it is very doubtful they will ever be able to pay their debts, but the loss is far below 20,000 florins at which it was calculated at first." (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.201-02.) Dirck van Adrichem, the Dutch Resident at Surat, reported to the Directors of the Company on 7<sup>th</sup> December 1664 that the raid caused a loss of florins 11134:12 st. to the Company, but the friends of the principal purveyor, who was still imprisoned by Shivaji, had accepted and settled his debt to the Company, otherwise it would have been a grievous loss. (Ibid., p.493. See also p.495.)

[1724](#) FBS, p.201.

[1725](#) Bernier, p.188.

[1726](#) FBS, p.75.

[1727](#) FBS, pp.75-76.

[1728](#) FBS, introduction, p. xxxii.

[1729](#) SCP, p.22.

[1730](#) SCP, p.51.

[1731](#) Sabhasad Chronicle, p.63; Chitnis Chronicle, p.135.

[1732](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.509.

[1733](#) House of Shivaji, p.90.

[1734](#) Now in Davangere District (carved out of Chitradurga District in 1997) of Karnataka State.

[1735](#) Sanads and Letters, p.107. The cenotaph was then situated in a neighbouring village, but now falls within the boundaries of Hodigere. See BISM Varshik Itivritta (Annual Report) for Shaka 1837, pp.135-38.

[1736](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.89.

[1737](#) Assentos, Vol. IV, No.44.

[1738](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 89. (See p.- above.)

[1739](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 495-96. (See p.- above.)

[1740](#) Ibid., pp.234-3

[1741](#) St. John, St. Joan, St. Jean, and St. Gens are corrupt forms used in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century by the English, the Dutch, the French and the Portuguese respectively for Sanjan, a port about 100 km. south of Surat.

[1742](#) In the days of sailing ships, sea-going vessels were not usually taken far into the Red Sea because the prevailing southerly winds made the return journey very difficult. They usually stopped at Mocha. Pilgrims went to Mecca by the overland route from there. (*Relations of Golconda*, p. 37, fn 1.)

[1743](#) Ibid., p.235.

[1744](#) Ibid., pp.493-85

[1745](#) Ibid., pp.513-14.

[1746](#) Ibid., p.114.

[1747](#) Congo is a corrupt form of Kung, a port in the Persian Gulf.

[1748](#) Assentos, Vol. IV, p.141.

[1749](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.116.

[1750](#) Ibid., pp.117-18.

[1751](#) Ibid., pp.529-30.

[1752](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.145-47.

[1753](#) MIS, Vol. VIII, No.22.

[1754](#) PYVL, No. 13. See also Chitragupta Chronicle, pp.132-35.

[1755](#) SCS, Vol. III, No.426.

[1756](#) Ali Nama, c. 35

[1757](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.115.

[1758](#) Ibid., pp.115-16.

[1759](#) Ibid., pp. 511-13.

[1760](#) Who this “Tais” Khan was we do not know. When the campaign opened in May 1664, the Adilshahi forces in south Konkan, as we shall see, were commanded by Aziz

Khan. “Tais” might be a distortion of Taj who might have been temporarily in charge till Aziz Khan’s arrival. Perhaps “Tais” might be a distortion of Aziz. In any case, this “Tais” is not mentioned again.

[1761](#) An unpublished document in B.I.S.M. It is noticed in SCSV, Part III, p.20.

[1762](#) An unpublished document in B.I.S.M. It is noticed in SCSV, Part III, p.20-21.

[1763](#) An unpublished document in B.I.S.M. It is noticed in SCSV, Part III, p.20-21

[1764](#) “Corollee” seems to be a corruption of Kudal.

[1765](#) ERS, Vol. I, letter No.87

[1766](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.517.

[1767](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.114-16.

[1768](#) Assentos, Vol. IV, No.14. [To be verified. GBM]

[1769](#) Dagh Register entry dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.114).

[1770](#) According to an English letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1664 from Karwar to Surat, Aziz Khan was poisoned by Shivaji. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 90.)

[1771](#) Dagh Register entries dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664 and 17<sup>th</sup> December 1664 (Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 114-17). See also AFS, Vol. V, letter No.98.

[1772](#) Dagh Register entries dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 1664 and 17<sup>th</sup> December 1664 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 114-16).

[1773](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 114-15.

[1774](#) I cannot identify this Pratapgad (“Pratapagury” in the original). It cannot be the Pratapgad where Shivaji killed Afzal Khan. It is too far in the north.

[1775](#) “Pattagor” in the original seems to be a corruption of Patgaon.

[1776](#) Dutch letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665 from Vengurle (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 516-17).

[1777](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 117-18.

[1778](#) The arrival of Rustum-i Zaman’s son is mentioned in an English letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1664 from Karwar to Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. I, letter No.90.)

[1779](#) Dutch letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665 from Vengurle (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 517). See also *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.13 (fn. 34); *Jedhe Chronology* (SCP, p. 23).

[1780](#) Parnal, 3:8.

[1781](#) AFS, Vol. III, letter No.27; Dutch letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665 from Vengurle (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.517).

[1782](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, p.128.

[1783](#) SCP, p.23.

[1784](#) Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 95-96.

[1785](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle* (p. 66) says that Lakham Sawant fled to “Baher Desh in Firangan”. Mr. Sen (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.96) translates these words as “foreign provinces in the Portuguese dominions.” For once he errs. “Baher Desh” is a distortion of Bardesh which was a district in the Portuguese colony of Goa. Firangan, derived from Firangi (Portuguese), means Portuguese territory.

[1786](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.532-33.

[1787](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.526-28.

[1788](#) This is the earliest reference to Darya Sarang. “Mocquery” is a distortion of a name, but I cannot imagine of which name.

[1789](#) In his dispatch dated 7<sup>th</sup> January 1665 to the King of Portugal, the Portuguese viceroy reports the campaign. He writes: “Khawas Khan had camped in the vicinity of our territory with 2,000 horse and a copious infantry.” (*The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.14-15. For the date of the letter, see note 362 of this chapter.) I feel both the Dutch and Portuguese letters had underestimated Khawas Khan’s cavalry strength.

[1790](#) It may be inferred from this that this exchange of rockets took place on 30<sup>th</sup> October (N.S.), i.e. 20<sup>th</sup> October (O.S.), 1664.

[1791](#) Chandgad, 100 km south of Kolhapur

[1792](#) In his letter of 11<sup>th</sup> November 1664 to Keshav Naik and Keshav Prabhu, the desais of Pedne, the Portuguese viceroy acknowledges the receipt of their letter which, he states, informed him of the battle between Shivaji and Khawas Khan. (*The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.13, f.n. 35.) The English

letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> October 1664 from Karwar to Surat states: “Shivaji..., this day we are advised, has lately burnt Vengurle to the ground, and repulsed the King of Deccan’s [i.e. the Adilshah’s] forces that were sent that way against him.(ERS, Vol. I, letter No. 95.) That Shivaji had defeated the Adilshahi forces is correct, but that he had burnt Vengurle to the ground is not. Had he done so, the Dutch letters from the town would have certainly mentioned it. They have not done so.

[1793](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp. 14-15. There the date of the letter is given as 7<sup>th</sup> December 1665. But, as has been pointed out by Dr. Pissurlencar elsewhere, it is a misprint; the correct date is 7<sup>th</sup> January 1665. (Antigualhas, Vol. I, fasciculo I, pp. 112-13 and note 15.)

[1794](#) Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 95-96; Guarda (FBS, pp. 30-31).

[1795](#) Portuguese viceroy’s letter dated 11<sup>th</sup> November 1664 to Krishna Sawant  
(The Portuguese and the Marathas, p.44).

[1796](#) Unpublished letter in B.I.S.M., noticed in SCSV, Part III, p. 22.

[1797](#) Ibid.

[1798](#) Muhammad Ikhlas Khan was a brother of Khawas Khan.

[1799](#) Portuguese-Mahratta Relations, p.43.

[1800](#) Ibid.

[1801](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 506-7.

[1802](#) Ibid, p.538.

[1803](#) ERS, Vol. I, letter No. 98; EFI (1661-1664), pp. 350-51; Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 523-24 (Dutch letter).

[1804](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p. 524.

[1805](#) Ibid, p.536.

[1806](#) Ali Nama, c.37-38.

[1807](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.98.

[1808](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp. 328, 348-49.

[1809](#) Ibid. p. 349.

[1810](#) ERS, Vol. I, letter No. 99.

[1811](#) Ibid., letter No. 102.

[1812](#) Khanapur in Belgaum District in Karnataka. Bommasamudra (Bomsemoender in the original), 12 km south-southwest of Hubli, is mentioned in a Marathi document of 1723 A.D. as a place in Hubli Muamala (SCS, Vol. VI, No.12.) Now it is in Dharwad District.

[1813](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p. 533.

[1814](#) Ibid., pp.523, 534.

[1815](#) Ibid., p.507.

[1816](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 99, 102

[1817](#) Ibid., letter No.102.

[1818](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p. 533

[1819](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp. 14-15. For date see note 362 above.

[1820](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.518.

[1821](#) Ibid., p.506.

[1822](#) Ibid., pp.529-32.

[1823](#) This remark, I suppose, refers to the rowers in the Maratha ships. It was a new navy with little experience of sea warfare.

[1824](#) It seems Shivaji was in correspondence with the Imam of Muscat who was an inveterate enemy of the Portuguese. See *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.32.

[1825](#) Ibid., pp.536-37.

[1826](#) Ibid, p. 528.

[1827](#) Ibid., p.534.

[1828](#) Ibid., pp.532-33.

[1829](#) Ibid. p.518.

[1830](#) The fleet was to go to take over the coastal forts of Canara. Shivappa Nayak, the King of Ikkeri, had dislodged the Portuguese from these forts in 1653-54. Now his son and the reigning king, Somshukhar, had offered to cede these forts to the Portuguese in return for some petty commercial concessions. [See *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 516-17; *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.342-44, 346, 348-49.] The plan, however, did not come to fruition. The Portuguese did take possession of Gangolli on 13<sup>th</sup> November 1664. But when they were about to take possession of Basrur on the following day, some Dutch warships arrived there and raised objection, for there was a clause in the treaty concluded on 12<sup>th</sup> November 1663 between the Dutch and the Portuguese , that the Portuguese would not have a fort or factory wherever there would be a Dutch factory. Somshukhar had already given permission to the Dutch to establish a factory at Basrur. So the Portuguese fleet returned to Goa. Soon thereafter the pro-Dutch faction became ascendant in the court of Somshukhar and the plan to hand over the coastal forts to the Portuguese was cancelled. In 1667, the Portuguese again sent a fleet to take possession of those forts by force. But it was recalled when Shivaji attacked Bardesh in November 1667. As soon as it was gone, Somshukhar recaptured the fort of Gangolli from them. (*Goa-Kanara Portuguese Relations*, pp.207-221.)

[1831](#) Ibid., p.517.

[1832](#) Ibid., p. 506.

[1833](#) The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp. 14-15. For date, see note 362 above.

[1834](#) Dutch Resident's dispatch dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665 from Vengurle (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.518).

[1835](#) Dutch Resident's dispatch dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 from Vengurle(*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.538).

[1836](#) Dutch Resident's dispatch dated 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1665 from Vengurle(Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.519).

[1837](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, p.534.

[1838](#) SCP, p.23.

[1839](#) Ibid.

[1840](#) Assentos, Vol. IV, pp.347-48.

[1841](#) EFI (1661-1664), pp.358.

[1842](#) SCP., p.23.

[1843](#) SCP., p 51.

[1844](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.107.

[1845](#) "Mawlunda" in the original. About the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century a creek about 2.5 km north of Malvan was navigable up to a place called Maland. See *Ratnagiri District Gazetteer*, p.772.

[1846](#) Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part II, pp.543-4

[1847](#) About Rs.250,000 of those days.

[1848](#) Siva Chhatrapati, pp.97-98.

[1849](#) Portuguese-Mahratta Relations, p.38.

[1850](#) FBS, pp.137-40.

[1851](#) Portuguese-Mahratta Relations, pp.37-38.

[1852](#) Ibid., p.38 and note 26 (p. 64).

[1853](#) Mirza is a Persian word meaning a prince, son of a great lord. Mirza Raja was a unique title among Mughal nobility bestowed upon the Chiefs of Amber, just as Maharaja was a unique title bestowed upon the Chiefs of Jodhpur.

[1854](#) He had been an Adilshahi nobleman. Having defected to the Mughals, he arrived at the Court early in 1664 and was given the rank of 2000 *dhat*/1000 *sawar*. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 850, 860.)

[1855](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 866-68.

[1856](#) For instance: Rai Singh Shisodiya was with Shayista Khan during the siege of Chakan; but had later returned to his *watan*. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 583, 586, 623.) Biramdev Shisodiya who was with Shayista Khan had continued there. (Ibid., pp.585, 888.) For reinforcements, see *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 606, 619, 634-35.

[1857](#) His birth date is given in his horoscope found in an old collection of horoscopes preserved in the institute Rajasthani Shodh Sansthan, Jodhpur. The collection contains horoscopes — of Mughal Emperors and princes such as Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and Murad Bakhsh, and of *mansabdars* such as Shayista Khan, Jaswant Singh and Jai Singh — which are generally reliable. (*Studies in Shivaji's Times*, p.17.) Jai Singh's horoscope in this collection is printed in *Munhata Nainasi-ri Likhi Marawad-ra Parganan-ri Vigat*, Part III, p.346.

[1858](#) *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp. 144, 266, 377.

[1859](#) Ibid., p. 266.

[1860](#) Ibid., pp.297, 377.

[1861](#) Ibid., p. 389. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri* says that Jai Singh was 12 years old at that time. But according to his birth date given in his horoscope, he must have been 7 years old then. See note 3 above.

[1862](#) *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. II, pp. 218-19.

[1863](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 120.

[1864](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.145.

[1865](#) *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 240, 242-43.

[1866](#) Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 677-78.

[1867](#) *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp.144-45.

[1868](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.489-92

[1869](#) In Himachal Pradesh.

[1870](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.271-73.

[1871](#) *Maasir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, pp. 731-34.

[1872](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.30-31; *Maasir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, p. 733.

[1873](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.138-39.

[1874](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.146. This was an *inam* (donative, gratuity, gift, present); so Jai Singh would not have required to render any service in return, of course only as long as he remained loyal to Aurangzeb.

[1875](#) Deorai (or Dorai), 8 km south of Ajmer

[1876](#) Ibid., pp. 331, 413-15, 418-19.

[1877](#) The narrative in this paragraph is based on *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 887-88; Haft Anjuman ( Pagadi, p. 85 and *Shivaji and His Times*, pp.103-04); Rajasthani letter No. 1 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzeb at Agra*.

[1878](#) The Sabhasad Chronicle tells us that Jai Singh performed religious sacrifices, spending three months and a sum of Rs.20 million to propitiate the gods to grant him success in the forthcoming campaign against Shivaji! (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.48.) This, however, is not corroborated by any other source and is certainly a figment of the author's imagination. (It bears notice that the estimated annual revenue of the Mughal Empire was Rs.220 million; the actual realization was less than that.)

[1879](#) A document, purported to be Shivaji's letter to Jai Singh in Persian verse, was published — Persian text and Hindi translation — for the first time in the Hindi journal, *Kashi Nagari Pracharini Patrika*, Vol. III, No.2, Shravan, Samvat, 1979, in an article (pp. 141-63) by Babu Jagannathdas. This letter, supposedly sent by Shivaji, makes an appeal to Jai Singh as a

Hindu to rise up against the religious fanatic Aurangzeb. However, it goes without saying that this is a forgery. Its Devnagari transliteration and Hindi and English translations have been published in the *Shivaji Souvenir*. But the story of how that document was found is narrated only in the *Kashi Nagari Pracharini Patrika*. Briefly, it is as follows: About 30 or 32 years before the article was written [i.e. about 1892] the author came across two Persian letters in verse, written in Gurumukhi script, which were in the possession of Baba Sumersinhji who was then the *Mahant* of the Sikh Harmandir Gurudwara at Patna. Of those two letters one was purportedly written by Guru Gobind Singh to Aurangzeb and the other by Shivaji to Jai Singh. The Baba read those letters (in Gurumukhi script) to Babu Jagannathdas and he wrote them down in Persian script. He kept those copies in a book and forgot all about them. Then, after some 30 years, while writing a commentary on a work by Bihari [a poet patronized by Jai Singh] he remembered those copies, but was unable to find them. After inquiry he learnt that the Baba had died in Punjab and that the books and other papers which the Baba had taken with him had gone astray after his death. But, after a while, Babu Jagannathdas found one of those two letters — the one supposedly written by Shivaji — among his books. Towards the end of this letter the writer (supposedly Shivaji) tells Jai Singh that if he received a suitable reply he would come alone at night to see the Raja and would show him those secret letters which he (Shivaji) had taken out of Shayista Khan's pocket. For lack of space I cannot discuss the full letter here, but it goes without saying that it is spurious, or, if a most charitable view is to be taken, a piece of fiction.

[1880](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p.130).

[1881](#) The narrative in this paragraph is based on the *Alamgir Nama*, p. 888 and Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, pp. 87-88.)

[1882](#) Nardurg in *Alamgir Nama* (p. 888) and Taddurg (or Tardurg) in Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.87). In the Persian script, the symbol representing ‘n’ is quite likely to be misread as one representing ‘r’, and vice versa. From references elsewhere in the Haft Anjuman, Nardurg seems to be the correct name.

[1883](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.88).

[1884](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.888; Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.88).

[1885](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, pp.106-07).

[1886](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp. 51, 77); *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 114 (p.104), 115; Dutch letter from Vengurle, dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1665 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.546-47. See also *Alamgir Nama*, p.912. According to a Dutch letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> March 1666 from Vengurle, Shivaji’s protégée Krishna Sawant was murdered by Lakham Sawant during this period. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 550-52.)

[1887](#) Photocopy (preserved in Government Archives at Aurangabad) of Sir Jadunath Sarkar’s copy (now preserved in National Library, Calcutta) of Haft Anjuman, Paris MS, pp.112a-114b.

[1888](#) *Zamindar* is Persian for landlord. The Mughals used the term for *deshmukhs* and even for petty Chiefs and Rajas.

[1889](#) Manucci states he was sent as an envoy by Jai Singh to the chiefs of Ramnagar, Peint and Chauthia (“Chottia”). (Manucci, Vol. II, pp.131-32.) The background of his association with the Mughals may be gleaned from his book. He became acquainted with Jai Singh’s son, Kirat Singh, and taught him a game of cards. On Jai Singh’s insistence, he taught the game to him as

well. (Ibid., p. 121.) After Aurangzeb assigned Jai Singh to the campaign against Shivaji, the latter appointed Manucci, so he says, as the chief of his artillery at Rs.10 per day. (Ibid., pp.121-22.) After Jai Singh had reached Aurangabad via Burhanpur, says Manucci, he sent him with 30 horsemen and some foot soldiers to visit the Chiefs of Ramnagar, Peint and Chauthia, charging him with tasks like dissuading them from siding with Shivaji, convincing them to join forces with the Mughal Emperor against Shivaji and to send their sons to meet Jai Singh in person as surety. All the three chiefs agreed to cooperate.

According to Manucci, the Chiefs of Ramnagar and Peint sent their sons to Jai Singh and since the Chief of Chauthia had no son, he sent his brother instead. (Ibid., pp. 125, 131-33.)

Manucci says he had to spend almost seven months to accomplish this task, after which he joined Jai Singh in the siege of Purandar. (Ibid., pp.133-35.) However, all the information he provides need not necessarily be taken as true. There is sufficient reason to believe that he is much given in his narration to exaggeration or fabrication. Manucci says that he was assigned the task of winning over the three chiefs of Ramnagar, Peint and Chauthia. In actual fact, the Chief of Ramnagar was also known as Chauthia. (*Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.58; *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p. 42.) Also, Jai Singh reached Aurangabad on 10<sup>th</sup> February 1665. The treaty between Shivaji and Jai Singh was concluded on 11<sup>th</sup> June 1665, or about four months from the day Jai Singh reached Aurangabad. The contradiction in Manucci's account ought to be plain. He says, on the one hand, that Shivaji met Jai Singh a few days after Manucci joined Jai Singh in the siege of Purandar and, on the other, that he (Manucci) took about seven months to complete the diplomatic task assigned to him and then return to Jai Singh who had invested the Purandar fort. Moreover, it is quite unlikely that an alien like Manucci was sent as an envoy to native chiefs like Ramnagar and Peint. Is it not more plausible that Jai Singh would have entrusted the delicate task to someone with intimate knowledge of local politics in preference to a comparative stranger like Manucci who, having come to

India barely a few years ago, could not be expected to be familiar with political and social conditions in Maharashtra? In short, considering Manucci's compulsive penchant for spinning yarns, the contradictory statements made by him in his narrative and the improbability of Jai Singh selecting Manucci as an envoy to those chiefs, we must conclude that the account of the episode given by Manucci is imaginary. (Peint was a petty principality near Nashik.)

[1890](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.89).

[1891](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.90).

[1892](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, pp.92-93).

[1893](#) Baji Chandrarao is evidently the son of Yesaji Chandrarao from whom Shivaji conquered Jawali. 'Govindrao' was used as a title by the chief of one of the junior branches of the House of Chandrarao. (See my Marathi biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part II, p.956.)

[1894](#) Nilanga, 100 km east-northeast of Solapur.

[1895](#) Not to be confused with Siddi Jauhar Salabat Khan who had died in 1661.

[1896](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.99).

[1897](#) Shivappa, the King of Ikkeri, had died in 1660 and the reigning king in 1665 was his son Somashekara. But, sometimes, successors of so illustrious a ruler were known by his name.

[1898](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.86); *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.11.

[1899](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp. 11-12.

[1900](#) *IHRC: Proceedings of Meetings*, Vol. IX, p.112.

[1901](#) *Ibid.*, pp.112-13.

[1902](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.91)

[1903](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.91).

[1904](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.91); *Alamgir Nama*, pp.888-89.

[1905](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.92).

[1906](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.93); *Alamgir Nama*, p. 889.

[1907](#) The Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p. 23) says that Shivaji came to Purandar on 31<sup>st</sup> March 1665. But here it is incorrect. The Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, p.51) correctly gives it as the date of the arrival of the Mughals at Purandar.

[1908](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.93); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 889-90.

[1909](#) For description of the fort, see *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vol. XVIII, Part III, pp. 428-29.

[1910](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 890-91.

[1911](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi. pp. 94-95); *Alamgir Nama*, p. 891.

[1912](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 891.

[1913](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi. p. 95).

[1914](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 892.

[1915](#) According to the Shivapur Chronology, and a Rajasthani letter from the siege, Rudramal was captured on 15<sup>th</sup> April 1665. (*SCP*, p.51; Rajasthani letter No.5 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.)

[1916](#) Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.95); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 892-93; Rajasthani letter Nos. 4 and 5 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzeb at Agra*

[1917](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 893; Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, pp. 96, 99-100)

[1918](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, p. 115).

[1919](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 893-94; Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p. 100).

[1920](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 895-96; Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, pp.100-101).

[1921](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 896; Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.101).

[1922](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 896-97; Haft Anjuman (Pagadi, p.101).

[1923](#) For the progress of the siege till the capture of Kala Burj, see *Alamgir Nama*, pp.894, 897-99

[1924](#) ‘Spiking a gun’ is rendering it unusable by driving a metal spike into the touchhole.

[1925](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.53-54.

[1926](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p. 131).

[1927](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p. 130).

[1928](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, pp. 131-32)

[1929](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, pp. 132-33); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 900-01.

[1930](#) From here onwards, the narrative till the conclusion of the treaty is based on Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, pp. 133-142), *Alamgir Nama*, pp.901-05.

[1931](#) According to the Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p.51.) Shivaji met Jai Singh on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1665.

[1932](#) Manucci’s account of Shivaji’s visit to Jai Singh’s camp is, in brief, as follows: Shivaji came into Jai Singh’s camp a few days after Manucci’s arrival from the embassy on which Jai Singh had sent him. Dilar Khan and Kirat Singh had gone forward to meet him and when he came near, Jai Singh himself went out to welcome him. Manucci often went at night to converse and play (cards) with Jai Singh. One night, while Jai Singh, his Brahmin and Manucci were engaged in a game of cards, in came Shivaji, whereupon all three of them stood up. Noticing Manucci,

Shivaji asked Jai Singh, “Of which land is he the Raja?” Jai Singh replied that Manucci was a *Firangi* (European) Raja. On this Shivaji said that he had several *Firangis* in his service. Manucci and Shivaji had occasions to meet and engage in conversation a number of times after that because Manucci knew the Persian and Hindustani languages. Manucci spoke with Shivaji about the greatness of several European kings, because Shivaji believed that Europe had no king other than the king of Portugal. Manucci also spoke with Shivaji about Christianity. (Manucci, Vol. II, pp.136-37.) It is beyond doubt that a large part of the account given by Manucci is imaginary. Manucci writes that when Shivaji approached the Mughal camp, Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh went forward to welcome him and then Jai Singh himself came out of his tent to receive him. The account of this episode given in both the *Alamgir Nama* (p.902) and *Haft Anjuman* (*House of Shivaji*, p.133) makes it clear that Manucci’s statements are incorrect. It does not seem unlikely that Manucci was in the service of Jai Singh and used to play cards with him. However, it is doubtful whether he really had occasion to converse with Shivaji. Shivaji went to the Mughal camp to meet Jai Singh in the morning on 11<sup>th</sup> June 1665 and left in the morning on 14<sup>th</sup> June. The night of 11<sup>th</sup> June was spent in discussing the terms of the treaty. Thereafter he spent two nights (12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> June) in the Mughal camp. How can it be believed that Manucci conversed with Shivaji a number of times during Shivaji’s two-day stay at the Mughal camp? Considering Manucci’s predilection for concocting fictitious tales, and since his account is at odds with the information found in authentic sources, it must be concluded that his story of Shivaji’s visit cannot be considered true. However, it is quite likely that Manucci saw Shivaji in Jai Singh’s camp. In any event, Manucci’s account does not tell us anything about Shivaji’s personality.

<sup>1933</sup> 4,000/1,000,000 hons in *Haft Anjuman* (*House of Shivaji*, pp.134, 141), but ten lakh hons in *Alamgir Nama* (p. 904). The former figure seems correct.

[1934](#) This was exactly the concession that had been granted to the Maharana of Mewar.

[1935](#) The forts which Shivaji ceded are listed in the *Alamgir Nama* (p.905) and also in the Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, pp.136-40, or *The Military Despatches*, pp. 54-55, 58-59, 63). But the lists are not identical; there are a few discrepancies. I shall first give those names which are common in both lists, giving in parentheses first the *taluka* and then the district in which they are situated at present: (1) Purandar (Purandar, Pune) (2) Rudramal (Purandar, Pune) (3) Kondhana (Haveli, Pune) (4) Lohagad (Mawal, Pune) (5) Isagad i.e. Visapur (Mawal, Pune) (6) Tungi i.e. Tung. Patki in *Alamgir Nama* is an error for Tungi. See *Ibid*, p.896 n. (Mawal, Pune.) (7) Tikona (Mawal, Pune) (8) Rohida (Bhor, Pune) (9) Mahuli (Shahapur, Thane) (10) Bhandardurg ((Shahapur, Thane) (11) Palaskhol. Tulsi Khul in Haft Anjuman is an error for Palaskhol. (Shahapur, Thane.) (12) Muranjan, alias Prabalgad (Panvel, Raigad) (13) Mrugagad (Sudhagad, Raigad) (14) Songad, i.e. Songiri (Roha, Raigad) (15) Mangad (Mangaon, Raigad) (16) Khandakala or Khadakala. According to the Haft Anjuman, a part of Purandar was called Khadakala. (*House of Shivaji*, pp.138-39.) But at one place it mentions Khandakala as being near Kondhana. (*House of Shivaji*, p.140.) While unable to resolve this discrepancy, I am assuming for the time being that Khadakala, which was a part of Purandar, is counted as a separate fort in the list of ceded forts. (17) Nardurg. In a letter in the Haft Anjuman Jai Singh says: "His [i.e. Shivaji's] journey through Nardurg, Mahuli, Kohaj, through the *zamindaris* of his neighbourhood and Ramnagar ... to attack Surat was obvious." (*The Military Despatches*, p.62.) So it would seem that Nardurg was situated somewhere south or east of Mahuli. In the *tarah* (sketch) mentioned below, one "Garh Nartakka, also known as Siddhgarh", is mentioned as one of the forts ceded to the Emperor. (In the *tarah* the suffix *takka* has sometimes been used for *durg*, i.e. fort.) One Siddhgarh fort is

situated in the Murbad Taluka of Thane District. The village at its base is called Narivali. It is possible that it was after that village that the fort was called Nardurg, before being renamed Siddhgad. (18) Ankola in *Alamgir Nama* and “Khaigad, also known as Ankola” in Haft Anjuman. The village of Ekole in Mulshi Taluka of Pune District is situated at the foot of fort Ghangad. In the Persian script, Ekole could have been misread as Ankole or Ankola and the fort might have been called after the name of the village. Other forts are: (19) Sagargad in *Alamgir Nama* is a new name, probably given by Shivaji, for Khirdurg, i.e. Khed-durg in the Haft Anjuman. (Alibag, Raigad.). (20) Sarupgad in *Alamgir Nama* is probably Karnala mentioned in the Haft Anjuman. (Panvel, Raigad.) This is corroborated by a contemporary *tarah*. See the webpage [chhatrapatishivajirajebhosale.blogspot.com/2009\\_11\\_01archive.html](http://chhatrapatishivajirajebhosale.blogspot.com/2009_11_01archive.html) Karmala in the *House of Shivaji* (p.140) is an error for Karnala. See *The Military Despatches*, p.63. (21) Basant [gad] in the Haft Anjuman seems to be an error for Bikatgad in the *Alamgir Nama*. Bikatgad is a distortion of Vikatgad (whose old name is Peb). (Panvel, Raigad.) (22) Nang in the Haft Anjuman is probably the scribe’s error for Manikgad in *Alamgir Nama*. (Panvel, Raigad.) (23) By a process of elimination I assume that Rupgad in the *Alamgir Nama* is but a new name given to Kohoj in Haft Anjuman. (Palghar, Thane.) Shivaji had given new names to several forts. Sometimes only one name remained in use, sometimes both

1936 he list of 12 forts in the old Nizamshahi territory which Shivaji was allowed to retain is given in Aurangzeb’s *farman* to Shivaji dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1665. The original *farman* is not extant. An old Marathi translation thereof is published in *MIS* (letter No. 14) and Sir Jadunath Sarkar has given in his *House of Shivaji* (pp.146-49) an English translation made from a Persian copy. The lists in the Marathi and English translations are not identical; there are a few discrepancies because of problems in transliterating from Persian. I shall first give those names which are common in both lists: (1) Rajgad (2) Torana (3) Rairi,

i.e. Raigad (4) Lingana (5) Ghosala (6) Palgad (Should be Pali). Its new name is Sarasgad. Situated in Sudhagad Taluka of Raigad District. (7) Bhorap. Its new name is Sudhagad. Situated in the Sudhagad Taluka of Raigad District. (8) Kumari or Kori, in Pune District. The remaining four forts are: (9) Paligad in the English translation is an error for Talegad in its Marathi translation. Situated near Ghosala. (10) Mahargad in the English translation and Mahadgad in the Marathi translation. There used to be a fort at Mahad which is perhaps meant here. If this assumption is correct, this would be the only fort in these lists which was not a hill fort. (11) Udaidurg in the English translation and Udhedurg in the Marathi translation. The Rajmachi fort comprises two fortified peaks, Shrivardhan and Manranjan, on a plateau. The village on the plateau is called Udhewadi. Perhaps this fort might have been called Udhedurg after the name of the village. The name, however, has not been used in other documents. (12) Asheri in the English translation and Alvari in the Marathi translation. This cannot be the Asheri fort in Palghar Taluka of Thane District because it was certainly within Portuguese domain then. In the *tarah* cited in the above footnote, the fort is named Anasvari. In the Modi script of the Marathi language the letters representing 'l' and 'n' are quite similar and one could be easily misread for the other. I have not been able to identify this fort.

[1937](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, pp. 140-43); Aurangzeb's *farman* dated 5<sup>th</sup> September 1665 to Shivaji, (*House of Shivaji*, pp. 146-48).

[1938](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p. 135); *Alamgir Nama*, p. 903.

[1939](#) According to the Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p.51) Shivaji visited Dilir Khan on 14<sup>th</sup> June 1665.

[1940](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p. 136); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 903-04.

[1941](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.904.

[1942](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 905; Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p.136).

[1943](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p.135.) In 1689, the Mughals captured Shivaji's son and successor Sambhaji, and Aurangzeb caused him to be humiliated, tortured and executed. But the Mughals failed to extinguish Maratha resistance

[1944](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 905; Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p.136). This was, of course, a symbolic gesture.

[1945](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p. 64 and Pagadi, p.88.).

[1946](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 907; Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp. 62-63).

[1947](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.907-08; Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.63).

[1948](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.58, 63.).

[1949](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.906.

[1950](#) Ibid. For an English translation of the *farman*, see *House of Shivaji*, pp.146-49. Jai Singh had requested that the title 'Raja' should be conferred upon Shivaji. [Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp. 81,91).] But it is evident that the Emperor had

not granted the request, for the *farman* says nothing about the title.

[1951](#) After the victory over Shivaji, the Emperor had conferred the title of Khan on Jani Beg on Jai Singh's recommendation. (Haft Anjuman — *The Military Despatches*, pp.60, 120.)

[1952](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.89). For the text of Shivaji's letter to Aurangzeb, see *House of Shivaji*, pp.149-50.

[1953](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 907.

[1954](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p. 89).

[1955](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p. 102); ERS, Vol. I, No. 116.

[1956](#) Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p.141.) According to the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies, Umaji, son of Shivaji's elder brother Sambhaji, was born on 25<sup>th</sup> Nov 1654. (SCP, pp.17, 50.)

[1957](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.83). The Prince reached the Court on 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1666. (*Alamgir Nama*, p. 924.) It is evident that Jai Singh was *in charge* of the *subadari* of the Deccan since then. But it has not been specifically stated in the *Alamgir Nama*, *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, or Haft Anjuman that he was appointed to that office. The first mention that he had been appointed to the *subadari* of the four *subas* of the Deccan is found in a Rajasthani letter of 18<sup>th</sup> October 1666 and it is evident from it that that it had been a recent appointment. (*Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*, Rajasthani letter No. 52.) On 4<sup>th</sup> September 1666, Aurangzeb sent Prince Muhammad Muazzam along with Maharaja Jaswant Singh to Kabul in response to a threatened Persian invasion. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.

975; *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*, Rajasthani letter No. 48.) Jai Singh seems to have been formally appointed as the *subadar* of the Deccan only thereafter. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar's statement in *The Military Despatches*, p.37 that the Rajasthani letter mentions "a farman regarding the continuance of the four Deccan *subahs*" to Jai Singh is incorrect. The letter says nothing about continuance. In fact, the *Alamgir Nama* (p. 1036) specifically states that though after Prince Muhammad Muazzam's arrival at the Court, the administration of the Deccan, as well as other responsibilities, was entrusted to Jai Singh, who was engaged in chastising the Adil Khan, the *subadari*, in fact, retained with the prince

[1958](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.69, 78-79, 80-81); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 913, 988.

[1959](#) The account of the campaign against the Adilshahi Sultanate is based on *Alamgir Nama* ( pp.988-1021), Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.100-126), Tarikh-i Ali, (*Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, Ch. VIII) and *Ali Nama* (c. 41-55).

[1960](#) Bahlul Khan had two sons, Abdul Qadir and Abd-ur Rahim. After Bahlul Khan's death, his name was conferred upon Abdul Qadir as his title. After Abdul Qadir Bahlul Khan's death, the title passed on to his brother. He, Abd-ur Rahim Bahlul Khan, died in 1665. Ali Adilshah then gave the title and the headship of the family to Abd-ur Rahim's son Abdul Karim. Disaffected by this, Abdul Qadir Bahlul Khan's son, Abul Muhammad, joined the Mughals. Aurangzeb conferred upon him the title Ikhlas Khan [Compiled from Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.105-6); *Basatin*, Ch. VII; ERS, Vol. I, No.114; *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 990, 1004; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.51. He is called Abdul Muhammad in Haft Anjuman, but Abul Muhammad in *Alamgir Nama* and *Maasir-i Alamgiri*.]

[1961](#) Shivaji had already written to him at Jai Singh's instance. [Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.95).] He was brother of Shivaji's wife Saibai

[1962](#) For his services in Capturing Phaltan and Tathawada, the Emperor, on Jai Singh's recommendation, sent a *farman* dated 25<sup>th</sup> Dec 1665 to Shivaji with a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger. But Shivaji had left Jai Singh's camp by the time the *farman* arrived there. (Haft Anjuman vide *The Military Despatches*, pp. 103, 109. For an English translation of the *farman* see. *House of Shivaji*, p.153.)

[1963](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar says there are hints in Haft Anjuman that a deeper motive lay behind taking this decision. The party hostile to Jai Singh, led by Dilir Khan, was pressing him to imprison Shivaji, claiming that their failure before Bijapur was due to his tepidness or treachery. Thus, it was to protect Shivaji and put him out of reach of his enemies as much as to create a diversion against the Bijapur army, that Jai Singh had accepted Shivaji's proposal. (*Shivaji and His Times*, pp.130-31.)

[1964](#) The Adilshah conferred the title 'Sharza Khan' upon both the sons of Sayyid Ilyas Sharza Khan - Sayyid Makhdum and Sayyid Habib. (Basatin, Ch. VII, Section 47.)

[1965](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1020-21.

[1966](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p. 109); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1002-03; *ERS*, Vol. I, No.126.

[1967](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p. 109); *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 126.

[1968](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.45; *ERS*, Vol. I, No.126 (largely bazaar gossip).

[1969](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 128.

[1970](#) We shall see that an Adilshahi force laid siege to it in April-May 1667. (*Jedhe Chronology* in *SCP*, p. 24.)

[1971](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.124-25); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1003, 1007; *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 126. The cause of Netoji's disaffection is not known. Sabhasad says that Shivaji dismissed Netoji — saying “Why did you not come in time?” — as he failed to come to his relief when he was besieged in Panhala by Jauhar and appointed Kadtoji Gujar in his place as Commander-in-Chief. (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.78.) This is incorrect. We know that Netoji was Commander-in-Chief of Shivaji's cavalry till January 1666; he deserted Shivaji soon after the debacle at Panhala in January 1666. It is possible that Sabhasad is confusing the two events and that Shivaji was displeased with Netoji for some reason connected with the second event. In a letter to Aurangzeb, Jai Singh had mentioned that Netoji was called “Second Shivaji”. [Haft Anjuman (*House of Shivaji*, p.141).] He was the only prominent person who ever deserted Shivaji.

[1972](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.124-25); *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1009.

[1973](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.53).

[1974](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.81).

[1975](#) Ibid.

[1976](#) *Shivaji and His Times*, p.134; Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, p.126).

[1977](#) For his aversion for bowing before a Muslim ruler, see Chitnis and Shri Shiva-Digvijaya Chronicles. English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.158-60.

[1978](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.59.

[1979](#) About Shivaji's reasons for going to Agra, Sidney J. Owen rightly observes in his *Fall of the Mogul Empire* (p.66): "To ingratiate himself with Aurangzeb; to distinguish himself, as he had done at Bijapur, in active service, in a command for which he had proved his competence; to acquire influence and wield resources, which he might insidiously and abruptly divert to his own purposes, and employ *against* his employer: would be quite in accordance with his profound subtlety, his unscrupulousness, his personal ambition, and his national aspirations — in short with the whole bent of his peculiar genius."

[1980](#) Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 51, 56, 60); Rajasthani letter Nos.17, 22 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra; Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.37; Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.148).

[1981](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp. 146-47. See also Shri Shiva-Digvijaya Chronicle (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.220-21).

[1982](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.148).

[1983](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 931-32.

[1984](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 938, 978; Rajasthani letter Nos.12 and 51 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[1985](#) For date, see Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.23). For the names of the officers who accompanied him, see *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.61.

[1986](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.47-49.

[1987](#) Rajasthani letter No.14 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[1988](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.48.

[1989](#) *House of Shivaji*, pp.153-54 and *Shivaji and His Times*, p.137.

[1990](#) Rajasthani letter No.21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[1991](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.962.

[1992](#) Ram Singh had sent him a letter asking him to arrive at Agra on 12<sup>th</sup> May 1666. See Rajasthani letter No.14 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[1993](#) Rajasthani letter No.14 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[1994](#) Rajasthani letter No.16 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[1995](#) bid.

[1996](#) bid.

[1997](#) Ibid., for the events narrated in this paragraph,

[1998](#) His tomb is extant, a few kilometers from the centre of Agra.

[1999](#) This is how the letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1666 from Parkaldas to Kalyandas describes the incident: Tej Singh said to Shivaji, “That is Ram Sing ji”. Then he went forward and said to Ram Singh, “[That is] Shivaji.” (Rajasthani letter No.16 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.)

[2000](#) For the events in the Court on 12<sup>th</sup> May, Ibid. See also *Alamgir Nama*, pp.968-69.

[2001](#) He is called *Bakhshi* in Rajasthani letter No. 16 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra* which describes this scene. Actually he was *Bakhshi Duwum* i.e. Second Bakhshi. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 843, 965.) Muhammad Amin Khan was *Mir Bakhshi* (Chief Bakhshi). (Ibid. pp. 917, 1036.)

[2002](#) The word used in the *Alamgir Nama* (p.968) as well as in Rajasthani letter No. 16 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzeb at Agra* is *mulazamat* (paying respects to a superior). For the manner of paying one's respects to the Emperor see p. -above. The Sabhasad Chronicle says that while offering the three customary salutes to the Emperor, Shivaji in his mind meant that the first was for Shambhu Mahadeo (Shiva), the second for goddess Bhavani and the third for his father, the Maharaja (Shahji). (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.62-63.)

[2003](#) *Nisar* means money presented to a superior to be distributed as alms. The *Alamgir Nama* (pp. 963-64) says that Shivaji presented 1500 ashrafis as *nazar* and 6000 rupees as *nisar*.

[2004](#) The *Alamgir Nama* is silent on this point.

[2005](#) Only a fortnight previously Tahir Khan, with an increment of 500 *sawars*, was promoted to the rank of 5000 *dhat* / 3000 *sawars*. (*Alamgir Nama*, p. 960.) Raja Rai Singh Shisodiya held the rank of 5000 *dhat*/5000 *sawar*. (*Alamgir Nama*, p. 1033; *Maathir-ul-Umara*, Vol. II, p.574.)

[2006](#) Rajasthani letter No.16 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2007](#) This was also the condition on which the Rana of Mewar had acknowledged Mughal suzerainty.

[2008](#) Khafi Khan states: “Raja Jai Singh had flattered Shivaji with promises; but as the Raja knew the Emperor to have a strong feeling against Shivaji, he artfully refrained from making known the promises he had held out.” (*The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, p.276.)

[2009](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar believes that Shivaji’s audience with Aurangzeb went wrong because of a series of mishaps, the first of which, according to him, was Shivaji’s late arrival at Agra. (*Shivaji and His Times*, pp.140-41.) He writes: “Shivaji could enter Agra only about noon on the 12<sup>th</sup> [May], and he had therefore to be rushed immediately to the fort for his audience, without being taught the Court etiquette beforehand. This was *the real seed of all the trouble* that followed.” (Ibid. p.140. Italics mine.) So, Sir Jadunath wants us to believe that it was Shivaji’s ignorance of Mughal Court etiquette that was the root cause of all that followed. As if proper instruction in these etiquettes would have made Shivaji as meek as a lamb! Mountstuart Elphinstone says: “Aurangzeb now had an opportunity of uniting Shivaji’s interests to his own by liberal treatment, and of turning a formidable enemy into zealous servant, as had been done before with so many other Hindu princes: but his views in politics were as narrow as in religion; and although he could easily suppress his feelings to gain any immediate advantage,

he was incapable of laying aside his prejudice, or making such full and free concessions, as might secure permanent attachment." (*The History of India*, Vol. II, pp. 440-41.) As if a few kind words, a robe of honour and a place in the front rank of Mughal nobility would have induced Shivaji to give up his aim and become a Mughal *mansabdar*, a "zealous servant" of Aurangzeb! Elphinstone certainly knew his Aurangzeb, but he had not understood the character of Shivaji. (He might have gauged it from Shivaji's political successors of his own time.) "*The real seed of all the trouble*" was that Aurangzeb was Aurangzeb and Shivaji was Shivaji; their interests could never have been united; they were diametrically opposite and "never the twain could meet." Shivaji's aim was to establish his own kingdom. How Aurangzeb treated him was unimportant. Perhaps, the scene that occurred in the Court could have been avoided had Aurangzeb shown that magnanimity which was alien to his character, or had Shivaji succeeded in hiding his true emotions. But the ultimate result would have been the same. Shivaji would not have remained under Mughal overlordship for long.

[2010](#) Ibid.

[2011](#) Ibid.

[2012](#) Ibid.

[2013](#) According to the Rajasthani letter, the Begam Sahiba further said on the occasion: "He has plundered Surat, carried away Shayista Khan's daughter, and now behaves with such insolence. How far it is proper to overlook this?" Of course our Rajasthani correspondent could not have been present there when the Begum Sahiba is supposed to have said this to Aurangzeb in *private*. As a Muslim lady in a Muslim theocracy, especially hailing from royalty, we can naturally not expect her

to appear in public. It was of course rumoured that Shivaji had carried away Shayista Khan's daughter. (See, for instance, Thevenot in *FBS*, p. 176; *Ishwardas Nagar's Futuhat-i Alamgiri*, p.75. *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 79, though confused, undoubtedly refers to the same incident. *Ibid.*, pp.73-74. See also Dutch letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> June 1663 from Surat vide *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.496.) But no reliable source makes this accusation.

[2014](#) He is also called Fulad Khan in some Rajasthani letters and in the *Alamgir Nama*. He was *shahna* (head of police, a prefect, provost) of Agra. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.969. See also Rajasthani letter Nos. 42 and 47 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.)

[2015](#) Rad-andaz Khan was *faujdar* and fort commandant of Agra and held the rank of 2000 *dhat*/1500 *sawar*/500 *du aspa sih aspa*. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp.839, 932.)

[2016](#) Muhammad Amin Khan was *Mir Bakhshi* (paymaster). See *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 917, 1036.

[2017](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 16<sup>th</sup> May 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.17 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2018](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 29<sup>th</sup> May 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*)

[2019](#) Dutch letter from Swally to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company, 21<sup>st</sup> February 1667 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.566-67); Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 20<sup>th</sup> May 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.18 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2020](#) Ballu to Kalyandas, 20<sup>th</sup> May 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.19 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*)

[2021](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 29<sup>th</sup> May 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2022](#) Ibid.

[2023](#) Ibid.

[2024](#) SCP, pp.23-24.

[2025](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.22 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*); Dutch letter from Swally to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company, 21<sup>st</sup> February 1667 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.567).

[2026](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.22 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2027](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.22 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2028](#) Ibid.

[2029](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> June 1666 (Rajasthani letter Nos.22 and 23 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2030](#) Rajasthani letter No.21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2031](#) Rajasthani letter No.27 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2032](#) The term Rajput was often used in the sense of “a kshatriya, a member of the Hindu warrior caste” and it is in that sense that it is used here.

[2033](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 9<sup>th</sup> June 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.23 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2034](#) Ibid.

[2035](#) Dutch letter from Swally to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company, 21<sup>st</sup> February 1667 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.569).

[2036](#) Ballushah to Kalyandas, 16<sup>th</sup> June 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.25 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2037](#) Rajasthani letter No.24 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2038](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 13<sup>th</sup> July 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.26 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*); *Alamgir Nama*, pp.969-70.

[2039](#) Had the Emperor's *farman* been dispatched on 12<sup>th</sup> May, and had Jai Singh promptly replied to it, his letter would have reached the court about 12<sup>th</sup> June.

[2040](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes: "... Aurangzeb wrote to Jai Singh asking him to *report fully and exactly what promises he had made* [to Shivaji]. The Rajah replied by *repeating and explaining the clauses of the Treaty of Purandar, and solemnly asserting that nothing beyond them had been promised*. (A. N. [i.e. *Alamgir Nama*] 970. But H. A. [i.e. *Haft Anjuman*] does not contain Jai Singh's reply.)" (*Shivaji and His Times*, p. 148.) The italics are mine and the italicized portion in the quotation is baseless. The *Alamgir Nama* does not say anything of the kind.

[2041](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.970-71.

[2042](#) *Haft Anjuman* vide *Shivaji and His Times*, P.148 and Jadunath Sarkar's article in *Commemorative Essays Presented to Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar*, p.302.

[2043](#) *Haft Anjuman* vide *Shivaji and His Times*, P.149.;

[2044](#) *Haft Anjuman* vide *Shivaji and His Times*, P.149.

[2045](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 7<sup>th</sup> June, 9<sup>th</sup> June, 13<sup>th</sup> July, c.18<sup>th</sup> July 1666 (Rajasthani letter Nos. 22, 23, 26, 27 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*); Newsletter of the Court, dated 16<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (AFS, Vol. VI, No.5).

[2046](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 13<sup>th</sup> July 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.26 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2047](#) Jai Singh had coveted the Tonk Pargana, which had formerly been given in *jagir* to Raja Rai Singh Rathod, (younger brother of Maharaja Jaswant Singh), for a long time. (*The Military Despatches*, p, 43.) After the successful conclusion of the campaign against Shivaji, the Emperor had promoted Jai Singh and had given him that *pargana in jagir*. (Ibid.; Rajasthani letter No.11 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.) Tonk now is the headquarters of a district in Rajasthan.

[2048](#) Ibid. There are at least two places named Toda in Rajasthan; one is called Toda Bhim and the other, Toda Raisingh.

[2049](#) Shivaji had purchased elephants worth Rs.15,000 from Imam-virdi Khan after his arrival at Agra. (AFS, Vol. VI, No.3.) The price of a good elephant was about Rs.5,000.

[2050](#) Ibid. There are at least two places named Toda in Rajasthan; one is called Toda Bhim and the other, Toda Raisingh.

[2051](#) Ibid.

[2052](#) Rajasthani letter No.27 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2053](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, c. 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.33 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2054](#) Newsletter of the Mughal Court, 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (AFS, Vol. VI, No. 6); Ballushah to Kalyandas, 18<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (Rajasthani letter No. 29 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2055](#) Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.67-69); Khafi Khan (*History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, pp. 279-81); Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.23); Rajasthani letter No.44 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*; EFI (1665-1667), p.165; *Portuguese-Maratha Relations*, p.45.

[2056](#) Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 67-69); Khafi Khan (*The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, pp.279-81).

[2057](#) The only evidence for the now well known story of Madari Mehtar is an undated and anonymous statement found at Satara and published in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. IV, pp.34-40. Its purport, in italics, is as follows: *When Shahji was an Adilshahi nobleman and Shivaji was at Raigad, the Emperor of Delhi sent Sawai Jai Singh, Mirza Raja, and Diler Khan to Shivaji with an offer of Deshmukhi. So he went with them to Delhi where the Emperor kept him in detention. Then Shivaji started sending out baskets of sweetmeats with the Emperor's permission. The first one*

*was sent to the Emperor himself, the second to the Raja of Udaipur, the third to the Raja of Jainagar, and thereafter to other Rajas and noblemen. This continued for six months. Then one day, having revealed his plan to Hiroji Farzand and Madari Mehatar, the Farrash [a servant who spreads the carpets or cushions], he crouched in a basket and escaped while Hiroji slept in his place. When the fact of his escape became known, Hiroji was taken to the Emperor whom he told that Shivaji had gone to his country six months back. When the Emperor ordered to decapitate him he exclaimed that he was glad to give his life for Shivaji. Pleased with his loyalty the Emperor gave both Hiroji and Madari leave to depart. After their arrival at Raigad Shivaji rewarded them, gave Hiroji the charge of all buildings in the fort and Madari the charge of [daily] worship of the throne. Madari's descendants continued to serve Shivaji's successors. It seems that the statement might have been made by the son of the great grandson of Madari. The statement is so full of inaccuracies and anachronisms that it has to be rejected. For instance, Sawai Jai Singh was great grandson of Mirza Raja Jai Singh.*

[2058](#) SCP, p.23.

[2059](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 6.

[2060](#) Rajasthani letter No.29 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2061](#) Trimbakpant was the son of Sonopant Dabir and, after his father's death, was Shivaji's minister for External Affairs. Raghunathpant was Shivaji's minister for Religious Endowments.

[2062](#) Kishanrai held the rank of 300 *dhat*. (AFS, Vol. VI, No. 8.)

[2063](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.24); Newsletter of the Court, 20<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (*AFS*, Vol. VI, No.8); Parkaldas to Kalyandas, c. 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.33 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*). Harsatrai in *AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 8 is evidently an error for Pratitrai.

[2064](#) Newsletter of the Court, 20<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (*AFS*, Vol. VI, No.8).

[2065](#) Pratitrai was reduced from the rank of 400 *dhat*/50 *sawar* to 300 *dhat*/30 *sawar*. (*AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 8.)

[2066](#) Itimad Khan held the rank of 2500 *dhat* / 400 *swar*. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.856.)

[2067](#) Ibid.

[2068](#) Ibid.

[2069](#) Quoted in Newsletter of the Court, 20<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (*AFS*, Vol. VI, No.9).

[2070](#) Newsletter of the Court 21<sup>st</sup> August 1666 (*AFS*, Vol. VI, No.10).

[2071](#) Newsletter of the Court 26<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (*AFS*, Vol. VI, No.14).

[2072](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 11.See also Ran Singh and Ballushah to Kalyandas, 26<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (Rajasthani letter No. 35 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2073](#) Fidai Khan, elder brother of Khan Jahan Bahadur Kokaltash, and Aurangzeb's foster brother (because his mother had nursed Aurangzeb), was *Mir Atish* (or *Darogha-i Topkhana*, Chief of Artillery) since the 4<sup>th</sup> year of Aurangzeb's reign. He held the rank of 4000 *dhat*/2500 *sawar*. (*Maathir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, pp. 311-13, 783; *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 634, 828-29, 847.)

[2074](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, c. 27<sup>th</sup> August 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.36 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2075](#) Rajasthani letter No.33 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2076](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No.19. See also Ibid., Nos. 20-21.

[2077](#) Rajasthani letter No.44 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2078](#) Newsletter of the Court, 7<sup>th</sup> October 1666 (AFS, Vol. VI, No.30).

[2079](#) Parkaldas to Kalyandas, c.12<sup>th</sup> October 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.51 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2080](#) The officer in charge of Imperial property, workshops, gardens, etc.

[2081](#) Newsletter of the Mughal Court, 6<sup>th</sup> February 1667 (AFS, Vol. VI, No.40). For Iftikhar Khan's post, see *Alamgir Nama*, p.908.

[2082](#) *Haft Anjuman* vide *Shivaji and His Times*, p.154.

[2083](#) *Haft Anjuman* vide *Shivaji and His Times*, p.155.

[2084](#) Harnath to Kalyandas from Jai Singh's camp near Bid, 18<sup>th</sup> October 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.52 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2085](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No.32.

[2086](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No.33.

[2087](#) Ballushah to Kalyandas (Rajasthani letter No.57 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2088](#) The Portuguese Viceroy's letter dated 15<sup>th</sup> July 1667 to Shivaji congratulates Shivaji on his safe arrival in his dominion. It also mentions his grave illness. (*The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.17-18.)

[2089](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.71.

[2090](#) *Ibid.*, pp.71-72, 75.

[2091](#) In the cold and rainy autumn of 1925, 29 year old Georgi Zhukov (later, Marshal of the Soviet Union) and two other cavalry officers rode from Leningrad to Minsk, a distance of 963 km by country roads, in seven days, without changing horses. They had undertaken this exercise voluntarily to test themselves. No special facilities were provided *en route*. They mostly walked and trotted and sometimes galloped. Zhukov's mount was 12 years old, which is a considerable age for a horse. (*Reminiscences and Reflections* by G. Zhukov, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, Ch. 4, pp.109-10.)

[2092](#) *SCP*, pp.23-24.

[2093](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.72.

[2094](#) *Haft Anjuman* vide *Shivaji and His Times*, p.156.

[2095](#) Rajasthani letter No.28 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2096](#) Rajasthani letter No.32 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2097](#) Headquarters of a district in Rajasthan, east of Jaipur.

[2098](#) Rajasthani letter No.61 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2099](#) Rajasthani letter Nos. 58, 60, 61 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2100](#) Rajasthani letter No.61 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2101](#) Ibid.

[2102](#) Ibid.

[2103](#) *Parnal*, 4:16-19. The Marathi translation given there of v.16-17 is incorrect. For the correct Marathi translation see *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, Nos. I-II, pp.51-56.

[2104](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.971-72, 1021.

[2105](#) The Mughals had given this name to Dharur.

[2106](#) Ibid. See also Rajasthani letter No.49 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*; *AFS*, Vol. VI, No.26.

[2107](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.1021.

[2108](#) Ibid., p.987.

[2109](#) Ibid., pp.1033-34.

[2110](#) Newsletter of the Mughal Court, 6<sup>th</sup> May 1667 (*House of Shivaji*, p.173); Newsletter of the Mughal Court, 24<sup>th</sup> July 1667 (AFS, Vol. VI, No.74)

[2111](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.1057. See also AFS, Vol. VI, Nos. 43, 49, 97,100, 106.

[2112](#) Ibid., p.1062.

[2113](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.1036-37; *The Military Despatches*, p.39.

[2114](#) *The Military Despatches*, pp.41-42.

[2115](#) *Tarikh-I Dilkusha* (p.53) gives the name of the *subadar* as Daud Khan. But he had been replaced in that post by Khan Zaman in August 1666, i.e. before Jai Singh's death. (*Alamgir Nama*, p. 972.)

[2116](#) *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha*, p.53.

[2117](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 9, 13; Parkaldas to Kalyandas, 18<sup>th</sup> September 1666 (Rajasthani letter No.48 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2118](#) Newsletter of the Court dated 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1667 (AFS, Vol. VI, No. 89); Ajitdas to Kalyandas, 14<sup>th</sup> September 1667 (Rajasthani letter No.68 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2119](#) Ajitdas to Kalyandas, 14<sup>th</sup> September 1667 (Rajasthani letter No.68 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*).

[2120](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.1051. See also Newsletter of the Court, 8<sup>th</sup> September 1667 (AFS, Vol., VI, No. 91).

[2121](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.1051-52.

[2122](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp.1068-69.

[2123](#) *A History of Jaipur*, pp.145-50.

[2124](#) *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, Anecdote No.8.

[2125](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. I, p.105.

[2126](#) For Budaq Beg's embassy and the treatment accorded to him by Aurangzeb, see

*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 614-16, 621-23, 628. A Persian letter book contains a composition which is styled as a letter Shah Abbas II is supposed to have sent with Budaq Beg to Aurangzeb. Therein, the Shah congratulates Aurangzeb on his accession, offers his help whenever the Emperor would need it, reminding him how Shah Tahmasp had helped Humayun to recover his throne, and wishes that though he had most reluctantly used force to wrest the fort of Kandahar from Shah Jahan's hands, "relations between them might continue to be friendly in future in spite of his retaining that fort." (*History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p.108.)

[2127](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 844-45. Another composition in the letter book cited above is styled as Aurangzeb's reply to Shah Abbas sent with Tarbiyat Khan. Aurangzeb thanks the Shah for

his offer of help but declines it remarking that he needs no man's help as he depends solely on God's favour, and then boasts about his own victories against his brothers. (*History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, pp. 109-10.)

[2128](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 974.

[2129](#) Ibid.

[2130](#) Ibid., pp. 974-75.

[2131](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 975; Rajasthani letter No. 48 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[2132](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p. 975.

[2133](#) An English translation of the 'letter' attributed to Shah Abbas II, from the text given in a letter book entitled *Faiyaz-ul-Qawanin*, is published in *History of Aurangzib* (Vol. III, pp.110-12). In another Persian manuscript, the same letter is attributed to Shah Sulaiman, son of Shah Abbas II. Its Persian text, with an English rendering, is published in *IHRC, Proceedings of Meetings*, Vol. II, pp.8-18. I have followed the Persian text.

[2134](#) Ibid., pp. 977-79.

[2135](#) Ibid., p.984.

[2136](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.38.

[2137](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1031, 1036-37.

[2138](#) *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, Nos. 49, 50, 32.

[2139](#) The narrative in this section is based on the *Alamgir Nama*, pp.1039-46, 1052-56, 1058-60.

[2140](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, pp.155-56).

[2141](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.155).

[2142](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.154).

[2143](#) Rajasthani letter No.57 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzeb at Agra*.

[2144](#) Haft Anjuman (*Shivaji and His Times*, p.156).

[2145](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p. 46.

[2146](#) Ibid.

[2147](#) *SCP*, p.24.

[2148](#) Ibid.

[2149](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 55. *Jumdat-ul Mulk* is a title applied to very high ranking noblemen. Here it seems to have been applied to Jafar Khan, the *Diwan*. By this time, as we shall presently see, Shivaji had made peace with Aurangzeb; that is why his envoy had arrived at the Mughal Court. Nothing more is known about the Subhansing mentioned here. I have not been able to identify fort Ankar.

[2150](#) *Portugej-Marathe Sambandh*, p.57 (English translation in *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p. 46.)

[2151](#) *SCP*, p.24.

[2152](#) *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 895.

[2153](#) Mahadaji was Bajaji's son and Shivaji's son-in-law. Bajaji was brother of Shivaji's wife Saibai.

[2154](#) *AFS*, Vol. V, No.141.

[2155](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 43.

[2156](#) *Ibid.*, No. 45.

[2157](#) *SCP*, p.24.

[2158](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 48.

[2159](#) *Ibid.* No. 50.

[2160](#) *Ibid.*, No.53.

[2161](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar translates the word *khanazad* as 'I' i.e. the petitioner Shivaji himself. The literal meaning of *khanazad* is 'one born in the family'. By extension, it is taken to mean 'the child of a slave', 'a hereditary servant'. Here it should be taken to mean Sambhaji, not Shivaji. Aurangzeb, in his letters to Shah Jahan, often referred to his son Muhammad Sultan as *khanazad*.

[2162](#) *Ibid.*, No.84.

[2163](#) SCS, Vol. VIII, No.57; MIS, Vol. XX, No.199.

[2164](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 99.

[2165](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p. 24). See also Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, pp. 50-51).

[2166](#) See Ch. VIII, note 73.

[2167](#) *House of Shivaji*, pp. 176-77.

[2168](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p. 24). See also *SDAR*, pp. 66-67 (A.R.No. 762), Persian text; Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, p.51); *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.81; *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha*, p.58.

[2169](#) *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha*, p.58.

[2170](#) English letter from Karwar to Surat, 16<sup>th</sup> September 1668 (*ERS*, Vol. I, No.146); *SDAR*, p. 65 (A.R.No. 4984/1).

[2171](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.17.

[2172](#) Clause 2 of the treaty says: “The Portuguese should not give asylum to anyone who might rebel against the Mughal Emperor and should regard him as a rebel against the King of Portugal. (*Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, pp.44-45 and note 78 in p.66.) Photograph of the Persian version of the treaty is inserted after p.54 of *Portugej-Marathe Sambandh* and also at the end of *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*.

[2173](#) *SCP*, [English section], p.9.

[<sup>2174</sup>](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.17-18.

[<sup>2175</sup>](#) Ibid., p.18 (n.51).

[<sup>2176</sup>](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, pp. 47-48; Dutch letter from Vengurle to the Directors of the Company, dated 28<sup>th</sup> November 1667 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.572);

[<sup>2177</sup>](#) The Ranes were Maratha *watandars* of the villages of Revade, Nanode and Pirn in Portuguese territory. Some of them had become Christians. (*Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.49.)

[<sup>2178</sup>](#) Ibid., p.49.

[<sup>2179</sup>](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp. 22-23; *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, pp.48-49; Dutch letter from Vengurle to the Directors of the Company, dated 28<sup>th</sup> November 1667 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.573-74); ERS, I, No.139. The charge in the Dutch letter that he "sells to his soldiers" women taken captive in war cannot be taken at its face value. Not only Sabhasad, a Maratha chronicler, but Cosme de Guarda, a Portuguese, Khafi Khan, a hostile Muslim who misses no chance to pour vituperations upon him and Thevenot, an independent French observer, bear testimony about Shivaji's chivalry towards women. Even Portuguese documents do not record any such incident. Therefore it appears that the Dutchman, who wrote this letter, was merely reproducing, perhaps adding spice of his own, baseless rumours that might have been in circulation. In fact, the reader shall presently see that the women taken captive from Bardesh were not sold to Shivaji's soldiers or to any one else.

[2180](#) This was true. (See *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, pp.46-47.)

[2181](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), p. 286.

[2182](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.51.

[2183](#) Portuguese for nobleman.

[2184](#) *Ibid.*, p.49.

[2185](#) *Ibid.*, pp.48-49. The report was written by Franciscan Padres of Goa in 1724. But there is no reason to doubt its veracity, for it seems to have been based on contemporary documents in their archives.

[2186](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.18-25.

[2187](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

[2188](#) *Ibid.*, pp.25-26.

[2189](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.55.

[2190](#) *Ibid.*

[2191](#) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[2192](#) *SPSS*, Vol. I, No.1184.

[2193](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp. 26-27.

[2194](#) Ibid., p.27.

[2195](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.55. See also *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.96-97.

[2196](#) *SCP*, [English section], p.10.

[2197](#) Not to be confused with his namesake who was viceroy from 14<sup>th</sup> December 1662 to 17<sup>th</sup> October 1666.

[2198](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.28.

[2199](#) A stone slab bearing a Sanskrit inscription is embedded above the main door of the temple. Its purport is that the building of the temple of Saptakotishvara was commenced by the order of Raja Shivaji on Monday, Kartik Krishna 5, Shaka 1590. (*Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj*, p.156 n. Photographs of the temple and of the inscription are printed in the same book, facing pp. 156-57.) There is an error in the date given in the inscription; the *tithi* (i.e. the date as per the Hindu calendar) given (which corresponds with 13<sup>th</sup> November 1668) coincided with Friday, not Monday. It seems that the inscription is of a much later date. But there is no doubt that Shivaji built the temple about this time. That he renovated the temple is mentioned in *Shivaraj-rajyabhishek-kalptaru*. (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. I, p.30.)

[2200](#) *Gazetteer of the Union Territory: Goa, Daman and Diu*, Part I, *Goa*, p.794.

[2201](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.56.

[2202](#) *Gazetteer of the Union Territory: Goa, Daman and Diu, Part I, Goa*, p.794.

[2203](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.56.

[2204](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.29.

[2205](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.152.

[2206](#) *Portuguese–Mahratta Relations*, p.39; *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.30; *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No.75.

[2207](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.30-31.

[2208](#) *Ibid.*, p.31 (fn 74).

[2209](#) *Ibid.*

[2210](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.166.

[2211](#) *Ibid.*, No. 167.

[2212](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 303-04. See also *EFI* (1668-1669), PP.242-43.

[2213](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.305. See also *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 172.

[2214](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.173.

[2215](#) *Ibid.* No. 174.

[2216](#) *Livro 2<sup>do</sup> de Pazes* [i.e. 2<sup>nd</sup> Book of Treaties], p.190 vide *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.33-36. This draft put forward by the Portuguese Governors has been represented, incorrectly, as the treaty in *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.33-36.

[2217](#) *Livro 2<sup>do</sup> de Pazes* [i.e. 2<sup>nd</sup> Book of Treaties], pp.191-92 vide *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.31-33.

[2218](#) At that time the Portuguese were at war with the Imam of Muscat. Article 5 of the draft proposed by Shivaji's envoy carried an implied threat that though Shivaji had desisted, in view of his friendship with the Portuguese, from providing base facilities or active naval assistance to the Imam's fleet, he might not do so in future if the Portuguese did not care to maintain that friendship.

[2219](#) *Administrative System of the Marathas*, p.17.

[2220](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 10. The date written in the document is (month of) Rabilakhar, Shuhur year. The space where the figure of the date was to be written is left blank. The month of Rabilakhar of Shuhur year 1061 began on 25<sup>th</sup> November and ended on 23<sup>rd</sup> December, 1660. But the contents of the document, of which only a part is quoted here, leaves no doubt that the document was written in Shuhur year 1070. The month of Rabilakhar of that year commenced on 6<sup>th</sup> August and closed on 5<sup>th</sup> September, 1670.

[2221](#) *Administrative System of the Marathas*, p.21.

[2222](#) The terms *deshmukh* and *desai* are synonymous and the term *zamindar*, too, is often used in that sense. Here all three are used, perhaps for emphasis.

[2223](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 26-27. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.37-38.) Here and elsewhere I have largely followed Surendra Nath Sen's translation in *Siva Chhatrapati* but have made a few changes without, of course, changing the sense.

[2224](#) *MIS*, Vol. XXI, No. 3.

[2225](#) *MSGI*, Vol. I, Part II, No. 46 (pp.24-26).

[2226](#) The contents of the document, of which only a part is quoted here, show that here the term *kailaswasi swami* [His late Majesty] refers to Shivaji and not to his son and Rajaram's predecessor Sambhaji

[2227](#) *SCS*, Vol. VIII, No. 47 (p.52).

[2228](#) *SCS*, Vol. III, No. 586.

[2229](#) A similar policy had been followed by Henry II (1133-1189) in England and Ferdinand V (1452-1516) in Spain. Both of them demolished the castles of recalcitrant noblemen.

[2230](#) Now in Kundgol Taluka of Dharwad District in the state of Karnataka.

[2231](#) *SCS*, Vol. VI, No. 17.

[2232](#) *Miras* and *watan* are synonymous terms, as are *mirasdars* (or *mirasis*) and *watandars*.

[2233](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, Nos.55-56; II, No. 112; III, Nos. 400-01; V, No. 953; *MIS*, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (p.12).

[2234](#) *SCS*, Vol. I, No.55.

[2235](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, letter Nos. 275-281; X, No. 12; *MIS*, Vol. VIII, letter No. 30.

[2236](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 24-25. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.33-34.)

[2237](#) In Shivaji's government commander-in-chief was called *Sarnaubat* and the finance secretary was called *muzumdar*. *Karkuns* were officers, especially civil officers.

[2238](#) See, for instance, *MIS*, Vol. VIII, Nos.28, 33-36.

[2239](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.35.

[2240](#) See for instance *SCS*, Vol. I, No.52 (1667); II, No.220 (1668). In the Nizamshahi Sultanate several *parganas* were grouped into a higher unit called *sammats*. (See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. IX, No. 10; *MIS*, Vol. XV, Nos. 369- 70, 393.)

[2241](#) *Ibid.*

[2242](#) *Ibid.*

[2243](#) *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp.57-59.

[2244](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

[2245](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.3.

[2246](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2247](#) *A.K. Chronicle*, p. 80; *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.42.

[2248](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.22). But the seal of Samraj, and then that of his son Mahadeo, was used for several years in place of that of the *Peshwa*. (See the chart of Shivaji's letters in *Shivachhatrapatinchi Patre*.) Mahadeo (or Mahadaji) served in high office. As we shall see, he was a *Surnis* for a while. In 1675 he was *subadar* of *Suba Mawale*. (*SCS*, Vol. II, NOS. 275-77, 280-81.)

[2249](#) Jedhe chronology (*SCP*, p.22).

[2250](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 27.

[2251](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, pp.29-30).

[2252](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.3.

[2253](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2254](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.21).

[2255](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.22).

[2256](#) *SCS*, Vol. III, No, 427 (p.41).

[2257](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.116. But, the Chronicle states that as Naro was not intelligent and Ramchandra, the younger son of

Nilo Sondev, was intelligent, Naro was appointed only as nominal Mujumdar, implying that the real power of the office was vested in Ramchandra. (Ibid., p.108.) In the description of the coronation both Naro and Ramchandra have been styled as Mujumdar. (Ibid.p.116.)

[2258](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No. 57.

[2259](#) A few letters sent jointly by Moro Trimal and Nilo Sondev are extant. See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, No.111; *MIS*, Vol. XV, No. 13. In both of these their designations are not mentioned. There is one sent jointly to them by Shivaji. (*MIS*, Vol. XV, No.12.) Their designations are mentioned in it.

[2260](#) *Jedhe Chronology* (*SCP*, p.29). See also *Siva Chhatrapati*, 127; *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.182.

[2261](#) *SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2095; *Chitnis Chronicle*, p. 202.

[2262](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2263](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.7.

[2264](#) *Jedhe Chronology* (*SCP*, p.22).

[2265](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 486 (p.373).

[2266](#) *Jedhe Chronology* (*SCP*, p.22).

[2267](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 7-8, 76.

[2268](#) *SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2708.

[2269](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29). Pantajipant Vaknis in the Chronology is evidently a mistake for Dattajipant Vaknis.

[2270](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.3.

[2271](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2272](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.28).

[2273](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.116.

[2274](#) As we shall see there were two *sarnaubats*, one for cavalry and one for infantry. But only the former was included among the ministers, or rather the heads of departments, and was re-designated Senapati (commander-in-chief).

[2275](#) *Ibid.*, p.4.

[2276](#) *Ibid.*, p.5.

[2277](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2278](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, p. 43.

[2279](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.78.

[2280](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

[2281](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.24).

[2282](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.116.

[2283](#) *SCS*, Vol. XIV, p.69.

[2284](#) *ASS*, Vol. V, p.3 (No. 3).

[2285](#) *Ibid.*, pp.3-4 (No. 4).

[2286](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.116.

[2287](#) He kept on using his father's seal. See, for instance, *ASS*, Vol. V, pp.3-4 (Nos. 3-4); *SCS*, Vol. IX, Nos. 54, 57.

[2288](#) *SCS*, Vol. XIV, p.69.

[2289](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.106-07.

[2290](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 60 (p.29).

[2291](#) The point has been discussed at length by V.K.Rajwade in the introduction to the eighth volume of his *Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhane* (Sources of the History of the Marathas).

[2292](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 239 (p.240).

[2293](#) Preamble to *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, v.81-82 (*SCP*, p.143).

[2294](#) Epilogue of *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, v.1 (*SCP*, p.175).

[2295](#) Raghunathpant Hanmante joined Shivaji's government in 1676.

[2296](#) See, for instance, *SSK*, No. 14 (31<sup>st</sup> March 1676); *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No. 30 (15<sup>th</sup> February 1677); *SCS*, Vol. XIV, No. 37 (15<sup>th</sup> February 1677).

[2297](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.116.

[2298](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, introduction, p.24.

[2299](#) See Chapter 2.

[2300](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.26 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 37).

[2301](#) *SCS*, Vol. IX, No.55.

[2302](#) See, for instance, *Studies in Mughal India*, pp. 168-97.

[2303](#) *SCS*, Vol. XI, No.100.

[2304](#) *Studies in Mughal India*, p.171.

[2305](#) *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp. 142-43.

[2306](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.30, 114.

[2307](#) *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[2308](#) *MIS*, Vol. XX, Nos. 55 (Nhavi village), 56 (Khandale village), 58 (Madaki village).

[2309](#) SSK [vol. I], No. 21.

[2310](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No. 340 (pp. 268-270). English translation in *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp. 72-73.

[2311](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 26

[2312](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.24).

[2313](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No. 340 (pp. 268-270); *Lekhanaprashasti*, No. 1 (pp.29, 31).

[2314](#) SCS, Vol. X, No. 41 (p.55).

[2315](#) SCS, Vol. IV, Nos. 683 (pp.12-13), 684.

[2316](#) Ibid., No. 684.

[2317](#) Ibid., No. 683 (pp.12-13).

[2318](#) Ibid., No. 685.

[2319](#) MIS, Vol. XX, No. 58 (pp. 100, 101, 104, 106).

[2320](#) SCS, Vol. VIII, No. 54 (15<sup>th</sup> February 1671). Pages 82, 85 and 89 for exchange rate and pp. 83-84 for price.

[2321](#) FBS, pp. 204-06.

[2322](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.429 (Mumbai to Company, 15<sup>th</sup> December 1673).

[2323](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 77.

[2324](#) *Ibid.* No. 123.

[2325](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.156.

[2326](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.55.

[2327](#) *A Royal Edict*, pp.31-32.

[2328](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 52.

[2329](#) *Ibid.*, No. 53.

[2330](#) *Ibid.*, No. 106.

[2331](#) *Ibid.*, No. 170.

[2332](#) *Ibid.*, No. 352.

[2333](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 11.

[2334](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 27.

[2335](#) For his copper coins see *JBBRAS*, Vol. XX (1902), PP.109-30. These are found in various denominations by weight. (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. I, pp.26-28.) Fabrications have also been found. (*Poona District Gazetteer*, edition of 1885, Part II, p.104.) In modern times his gold coin first came to light in 1919. (*Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Western*

*Circle, for the year ending 31<sup>st</sup> March 1919, pp.5-6.)* I believe it is the one now preserved in the Prince of Wales Museum, Mumbai. Its diameter is about 1.3 cm and weight about 2.8 grams. Fabrications abound now and the only piece of whose authenticity I am convinced is the one in the Prince of Wales Museum. A few other types of gold coins attributed to Shivaji have come to light in recent years. I cannot vouchsafe for their authenticity; in fact I am highly doubtful of it. A few silver coins, attributed to Shivaji, have cropped up now. (For instance see *Mudra*, No.1, 1990, published by Coin Study Circle, Kolikata 12.) The ones I know are fabrications.

[2336](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 480.

[2337](#) Gold coins called *Shivarai* Hons were in circulation since before Shivaji' coronation. (See, for instance, *SWD*, Persian section, pp.33-34, 75. 1661-62.) These had nothing to do with Shivaji. They were struck by Sadashivarai of Vijayanagar. After narrating the first sack of Surat and Shahji's death (1664) Grant Duff states: "He [Shivaji] spent some months revising and arranging, the departments and affairs of his government, assisted by his principal officers; and on this occasion, first assumed the title of raja, and struck coins in his own name." (*History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, Ch. VI) And again just before giving an account of Shivaji's coronation he says" "Shivaji, who had long struck coins, and styled himself raja and maharaja, was at this time consulting many learned Brahmins on the propriety of declaring his independence, assuming the ensigns of royalty, and establishing an era from the day of his ascending the throne." (Ibid., Ch. VIII.) So, if we are to believe Grant Duff, Shivaji struck coins in his own name in 1664 or 1665. But the Englishman has not given any evidence for his statement to that effect. Shivaji has styled himself as Raja at least since 1646. (See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 239 (p.240), 260; III, No. 661.) That had nothing to do with the striking of coins. The title Raja

had been much devaluated by that time and did not signify sovereignty.

[2338](#) Fryer, Letter III, Ch. IV p.127. (Also quoted in *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp. 59-60.)

[2339](#) *Administrative System of the Marathas*, p.59.

[2340](#) “But the expression ‘corruption’ as used of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has been extended and applied to the whole range of official perquisites gifts and favours; and the structure of society and government has thereby been obscured. For, in many cases, these gifts were virtually fees, and no more than another face of that indirect and inefficient taxation upon which the governments perforce depended. In all cases they were a double sign, of the rudimentary and incomplete control of the crown over its civil service and of the gross inadequacy of the public revenue to provide sufficient taxes to sustain its civil service by direct salaries. It is true that many of these gifts were to obtain favour at public expense. But far more were routine payments, made by all and taken by all. This was not corruption but something inherent in the faulty revenue system....But what happened when the recipients of gifts were not civil servants but royal favourites — the *mignons* of Henry III of France, the Carrs and Villiers of James I of England? It was only then that the system was indeed distorted into corruption. It was only then that these indirect revenues seeped away into the thirsty soil of luxury and greed. Then the system became barren and twisted; and national interests were sacrificed to a decadent court.” (*The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. III, pp. 144-45.)

[2341](#) FBS, p.244.

[2342](#) Ibid., pp.249-50.

[2343](#) Fryer, Letter IV, Ch. I, p.146 (Also quoted in *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp.60-61.)

[2344](#) Fryer, Letter IV, Ch. I, pp. 146-47. (Also quoted in *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp.61-62.)

[2345](#) MIS, Vol. XV, No.276.

[2346](#) MIS, Vol. VIII, No. 28.

[2347](#) SCS, Vol. IX, No.55.

[2348](#) SCS, Vol. IV, Nos. 683 (pp.12-13), 684; IX, Nos. 54, 57; SPSS, Vol. II, Nos. 1897-99.

[2349](#) For references to Dadaji in Shivaji's letters see SCS, Vol. II, No. 110 (1675); BISM Quarterly, Vol. VII, p. 45 (1671); BISM, Annual Report for Shaka 1835, p.41 (1678).

**118.** *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.32.

[2350](#) Of his ministers only the *Sarnaubat* was a Maratha by caste; all others were Brahmins. The list of his Brahmin *subadars* is too long to give here.

[2351](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.32.

[2352](#) MIS, Vol. VIII, No. 24.

[2353](#) SSK [Vol.I]. No.10.

[2354](#) See, for instance, *ASS*, Vol. V, pp.3-4 (Nos. 3-4); *SCS*, Vol. IX, Nos. 54, 57; *SPSS*, Vol. II, Nos.1897-99.

[2355](#) *FBS*, p. 50.

[2356](#) *FBS*, p.52.

[2357](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.22. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 30.)

[2358](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.98. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 136-37.)

[2359](#) *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha*, p.127

[2360](#) *FBS*, p. 316.

[2361](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 22-23. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 30-31.)

[2362](#) A Portuguese account narrating events of 1683: “The weapons of these Negroes [Marathas] that fight on horseback are: a round shield, a large-bladed sword and a throw-spear [javelin?] of fourteen palms in length, called *berchi*, having a sharp-edged end that may pass even through a steel chest.” (*The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p. 103.) Dutch letter from Vengurle, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1665 describing Shivaji’s campaign against Khawas Khan: “Netoji’s horsemen, some of whom carried carbines.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.528.)

[2363](#) *FBS*, p.316.

[2364](#) *Tarikh-I Dilkusha*, p.127.

[2365](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 28, 32.

[2366](#) See Chapter 2.

[2367](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.24. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.33.)

[2368](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2369](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.6. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.8.)

[2370](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 2-6, 24, 43, 52, 70-72, 99. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 8, 22, 23, 33, 61, 72-73, 75, 85, 102-04, 106, 139.)

[2371](#) Henry Gary from Goa to Surat, 6<sup>th</sup> December 1664. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 98.)

[2372](#) Fryer, Letter IV, Ch. IV (p.175).

[2373](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 76-78. Probably these are the units which have been referred to as *khaskhail* in Shivaji's letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1663. He had received intelligence of treason at Sinhgad. So he wrote this letter to Moro Trimal, the *Peshwa*, and Nilo Sondev, the *Muzumdar*, ordering them to go to the fort with cavalry and *khaskhail* infantry. (*MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 12.)

[2374](#) About the reservations of the English see *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 370, 419, 424, 428; II, Nos. 43-44.

[2375](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 424.

[2376](#) *Ibid.* No. 434.

[2377](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 467.

[2378](#) *Ibid.*, No. 135.

[2379](#) *Ibid.*, No. 259.

[2380](#) *FBS*, p.17.

[2381](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, Book I, Ch.12.

[2382](#) *FBS*, p. 318.

[2383](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 35.

[2384](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 30-31, 33.

[2385](#) See Ch. 2 where some of the figures are given. For full details see *SDSR*, No.37. An English translation of this document has been printed in *Mughal Archives*, Vol. I, pp. 277-80.

[2386](#) It seems that the cause of Netoji's defection was his mercurial temperament and personal grudge, not avarice. He returned to the fold ten years later.

[2387](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.31-32.

[2388](#) *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha*, p.127.

[2389](#) *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, Vol. II, p.119.

[2390](#) *FBS*, pp.16-17.

[2391](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 32.

[2392](#) *Muntakhab-al Lubab*, Vol. II, pp. 118-19.

[2393](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.31.

[2394](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 28.

[2395](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 32.

[2396](#) Fryer, Letter IV, Ch. IV (p.174).

[2397](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, p.345.

[2398](#) *FBS*, p.306.

[2399](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.33.

[2400](#) *Ibid.*, pp.24-25.

[2401](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, Book I, Ch.12.

[2402](#) For quotation see *FBS*, P. 168.

[2403](#) *FBS*, pp.50-51.

[2404](#) *FBS*, pp. 245-46.

[2405](#) *Historical Miscellany*, p.13.

[2406](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 22.

[2407](#) Siva Chhatrapati, pp.140-48. Sabhasad has given a full list. Many of these must have been small hill forts containing a garrison of less than 100 men. The list includes island forts like Sindhudurg also.

[2408](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.29.

[2409](#) Ibid. pp.29-30; *Raja-vyavahara-kosha* (*SCP*, p.160); *MIS*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 33, 35.

[2410](#) *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp. 78-82. See also *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.29.

[2411](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.29; *MIS*, Vol. VIII, Nos.33, 35.

[2412](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, Nos.33-36.

[2413](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.106, 146.

[2414](#) Ibid., pp.146-47.

[2415](#) *SCP*, pp.50-51.

[2416](#) MIS, Vol. VIII, No.13. The letter bears the date of the month, but not the year.

[2417](#) Phonda (1675) and Vellore (1678) are the two exceptions. Both were Adilshahi forts.

[2418](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.31.

[2419](#) *FBS*, p.55.

[2420](#) *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.85-86.

[2421](#) *FBS*, p.177.

[2422](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.85.

[2423](#) *FBS*, Introduction, p.XXXI.

[2424](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No.119. Shah Hilal there is obviously a mistake for Siddi Hilal.

[2425](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 322. *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* (p.90) says that Jadhavrao and Siddi Hilal were censured by Bahadur Khan for their failure to stop Maratha depredations and therefore they defected to Shivaji.

[2426](#) *FBS*, pp.245-46.

[2427](#) *FBS*, pp. 256-58.

[2428](#) *FBS*, p. 316.

[2429](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.255.

[2430](#) *Ibid.*, No. 288.

[2431](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 92. The translation in *Siva Chhatrapati* (p.130) is slightly incorrect.

[2432](#) *A History of the Maratha Navy and Merchantships*, p.181.

[2433](#) *Ibid.* pp. 271-72,

[2434](#) *Ibid.*, pp.120-21, 129-37, 180, 194, 271-72.

[2435](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 271-72.

[2436](#) *Ibid.*, pp.131, 136-37, 180.

[2437](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 31.

[2438](#) Khafi Khan mentions that Kulaba Fort was built by Shivaji. (*Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, p.255.) Its earliest mention is found in Marathi document of Shuhur year 1086 (1685-86). (*SCS*, Vol. IX, No. 66.)

[2439](#) Sabhasad says that the navy was organized into two divisions (*subas*), each of 200 ships, and that these were placed under two *subadars*, viz. Darya Sarang and May Naik Bhandari. (*Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.65. English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 93-94.) This is not corroborated by any other source.

[2440](#) See for instance, *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 107; II, Nos. 397, 411.

[2441](#) Fryer, Book IV, Ch. IV (p.174).

[2442](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 98-105. The figure of Mavalas (10,000) given in the English translation (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.139) is incorrect.

[2443](#) For rate of exchange see *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, p. 80; *SCS*, Vol. VII, p.117; VIII, p.100.

[2444](#) *FBS*, p.316.

[2445](#) *The Ain-I Akbari*, Vol. I, Book 2, Ain 2 (pp.233-35 of first edition). The expenses given there are in *dams* and are converted here at the rate, which too is given there, of 40 *dams* to a rupee. They include all expenses such as those on feed, shoeing, harness, and salaries of grooms.

[2446](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.107. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.149.) Sabhasad has given the figure in Hons only.

[2447](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 21.

[2448](#) For Zaina Khan see *ASS*, Vol. I, No. 136 (1654); *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No. 23 (1655). For Siddi Ambar Baghdad see *SCS*, Vol. I, No.30 (1647); II, No. 129 (1654); *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No. 10 (1651).

[2449](#) See Chapter 5.

[2450](#) The list is too long to print here. A list of about 200 officers, most of them of civil service, is printed in *SPSS*, Vol. III, pp.211-12. But no source is cited there. I have not counted Qazi Haidar

in civil service officers. He was a Persian scribe, and had nothing to do with administration, in Shivaji's service. In 1683 he defected to the Mughals. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.143.)

[2451](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No. 10.

[2452](#) Sabhasad puts his appointment as *sarnobat* of the Mavalas (infantry) after the conquest of Shrungarpur. (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.8.) But he might have been appointed to that office much earlier. Sabhasad is not a reliable authority as far as sequence of events is concerned.

[2453](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 98-100. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.136-40.)

[2454](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 97.

[2455](#) *Shivabharat*, 21:70-72, 79-80.

[2456](#) *Shivabharat*, 24:52; 26:6, 7, 28, 32-39; *Parnal*, 5:56, 77-78.

[2457](#) *Tarikh-i-Dilkusha*, p.79.

[2458](#) *Lekhanaprashasti*, No. 1 (p.25); *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.143; *Parnal*, 2:52. There was at least one more Persian scribe in Shivaji's service. His name was Nil Prabhu. (*Tarabai Papers: A Collection of Persian Letters*, Introduction, p.7.) He was a Hindu.

[2459](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.137, 238, 481 (p.364); II, Nos. 60 (p.30) 310 (p.369), 341, 369 (p.202), 446. Sabhasad says that Daryasarang was a Muslim. (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.93-94.) For his imprisonment see *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 341

[2460](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.138.

[2461](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 251.

[2462](#) Chinapatam (a distortion of Chinapatan) was another name of Madras (now Chennai). (See Chinapatam in *Hobson-Jobson*.)

[2463](#) *Ibid.* No. 255.

[2464](#) *SCS*, Vol. VII, No. 23 (p.39). Deos of Chinchvad (near Pune) were descendants of Moraya Gosavi, a great devotee of the Hindu god Ganesha, and his successors at the temple. Contemporaneous sources show that Shivaji held them in great reverence. See, for instance, *Sanads and Letters*, p.133 (No.19); *SCS*, Vol. IV, Nos. 683 (pp.12-13), 684-86; *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, preamble, v.66 (*SCP*, pp.141-42).

[2465](#) *The Military System of the Marathas*, p. 18.

[2466](#) For religious intolerance and persecution of Hindus by Muslim rulers, see Ch. 2.

[2467](#) An order dated 18<sup>th</sup> December 1660 issued by Shivaji confirms the continuation of grants, to both Hindus and Muslims, that were in existence in his former *jagir* lands in Pune, Indapur, Chakan, Supe and Baramati regions from before Afzal Khan's invasion. (*MIS*, Vol.VIII, No.11.) For old grants continued to mosques, see *SCS*, Vol III, Nos. 661; VII, p.92; *Sanads and letters*, p. 114 (Nos. 5-6), p.121 (No.14); *SPD*, Vol. XXXI, No. 18; *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.38-39.

[2468](#) *SCS*, Vol. III, Nos. 533-34; IV, Nos. 733,735; IX, Nos. 54, 57; *SSK* [Vol. I], Nos. 14, 17-22, 24, 28, 33-35; *Potdar Commemoration Volume*, pp.32-34; *Shivachhatrapatinchi Patre*,

pp.-. Old grants to Hindu institutions were of course continued. Several examples will be found in *SCS* volumes.

[2469](#) *SSK* [Vol. I], No. 10. The term ‘Turk’ used there means Muslim in Marathi parlance of the time. This letter of Shivaji is quoted in his son Sambhaji’s letter of 18<sup>th</sup> October 1680 with this difference that the word Turk in the original is replaced by the word Musalman in the quotation. (*Ibid.*, No. 37.)

[2470](#) *SSK* [Vol. I], Nos.24, 25, 30, 31, 32

[2471](#) *Religious Policy of the Muslim Emperors*, p. 169.

[2472](#) *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.126, 130-31.

[2473](#) For Ramdas see, for instance, *SSK* [Vol. I], Nos.10, 11, 15, 16-19. For Mauni Baba see *SCS*, Vol. IV, Nos. 733, 735. For Deo of Chinchvad see, for instance, *Sanads and Letters*, p.133 (No.19); *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, preamble, v.66 (*SCP*, pp.141-42).

[2474](#) The temple of Shiva at Thiruvannamalai, headquarters of the district of the same name in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, is situated at the foot of a hill known as Arunachalam or Shonachalam (Sonachalam). Arunachalapati or Shonachalapati means Lord of Arunachal or Lord of Shonachal. The statement that the temple was in a state of destruction (*utsáditám*) seems to be an exaggeration; it seems more probable that it was desecrated and then just converted into a mosque.

[2475](#) Shrimushnam (or Srimushnam) is in Cuddalore district of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. It is famous for the temple of Lord Vishnu known as Bhavarah because the image represents the Varaha incarnation of the Lord. Vriddhgirishvara (or Vriddhgiriswarar) temple of Shiva is at Vridhhachalam in

Cuddalore district. Rukmasabhadhip needs a little more explanation. Shiva (in the form of Nataraja) is said to have performed his divine dance at five famous temples in Tamil Nadu: at Kanakasabha (Hall of Gold) in Chidambaram, Rajatasabha (Hall of Silver) in Madurai, Ratnasabha (Hall of Jewels) in Thruvalamgadu, Tamrasabha (Hall of Copper) in Tirunelveli and Chitrasabha (Hall of Pictures) in Kurtalam. Kanakasabha is a hall in the Shiva temple at Chidambaram. Kanaka means gold, so does Rukma; so Kanakasabha may also be called Rukmasabha. Rukmasabhadhip means Lord of Rukmasabha (Shiva who performed his divine dance in Rukmasabha at Chidambaram). The rites and rituals in these temples might have been stopped due to Muslim persecution.

[2476](#) *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, preamble, v.78-82 (SCP, p.143).

[2477](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.244.

[2478](#) *Histoire Détailée des Rois du Carnatic*, p.71. Here too I think it more probable that the temples were desecrated and then converted into mosques rather than destroyed. In Tamil Nadu Lord Vishnu is known as Perumal. There is a temple of Perumal in Thiruvannamalai. I have not understood the significance of Samottir (Samouttira in the French book).

[2479](#) *Historical Miscellany*, p. 13.

[2480](#) Fryer, Letter III, Ch. IV (pp.123-24 of first edition).

[2481](#) Like the terms *mlechhas* and *yavanas* the terms Turks and *Turushkas* too were used to denote Muslims. See end note 225 to this chapter.

[2482](#) *SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332 (p.715).

[2483](#) The term is used here in the sense of the then respected norms of the Hindu religion.

[2484](#) *The Budhabhusana of King Sambhu*, p. x.

[2485](#) *SCS*, Vol. XIV, p. 67.

[2486](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:12.

[2487](#) *Shivabharat*, 17:21. Compare Sambhaji's deed of grant cited above.

[2488](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:52. Compare Fryer cited above.

[2489](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:54.

[2490](#) See, for instance, *Shivabharat*, 1:24-27, 36-41, 5:24-60, 8:19-38, 18:15-36. In the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, the cow and the Brahmin (being priests), among some others, were regarded as symbols of the Hindu religion.

[2491](#) *Parnal*, 1:19, 5:6-7.

[2492](#) *Radhamadhava-vilas*, p.232.

[2493](#) *Sampoorn Bhooshan*, v.12, 61-62, 73, 169, 245, 252, 275, 293, 295, 326, 337, 348

[2494](#) All these examples are from *Shivarajbhooshan* printed in *Sampoorna Bhooshan*.

[2495](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 25, 153.

[2496](#) At Shikhar Shingnapur in Satara district.

[2497](#) *Ibid.*, p.2.

[2498](#) *A Royal Edict*, p.8.

[2499](#) *Ibid.*, p.12.

[2500](#) *Ibid.*, p.13,

[2501](#) Several copies of the poem have survived. Here I have used the one given in the *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.62.

[2502](#) *Tarikh-i Adilshahi*, pp.74-76.

[2503](#) *Sadhan-chikitsa*, photograph between pp. 287-88. English translation in *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, pp. 142-43.

[2504](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 4.

[2505](#) *FBS*, pp.17-18.

[2506](#) *Manucci*, Vol. II, p. 119.

[2507](#) BISM Annual Report, Shaka 1835, pp. 211-13.

[2508](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. III, No. 478; IV, No. 726; VIII, No. 47.

[2509](#) MIS, Vol. VI, No.270 (p.356).

[2510](#) SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 290, 311, 312, 314; *Nasik District Gazetteer*, p. 934.

[2511](#) Documents in *Trimbak Daftar, Rumals* 9 and 10 in Pune Archives, searched and copied for me by P.N. Balkawde. See also New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 325, Note 3

[2512](#) *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, pp.136, 167, 267.

[2513](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp. 16, 31-33, 35, 56, 114-15, 151.

[2514](#) *Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, p. 169.

[2515](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 51-52.

[2516](#) For the events narrated in this paragraph see *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 53, 57-58.

[2517](#) Ibid., p.55. See also Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p. 24).

[2518](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 60.

[2519](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.82-84.

[2520](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.59.

[2521](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.178.

[2522](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp. 58-59. See also *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.48.

[2523](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No.109.

[2524](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.59.

[2525](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 125.

[2526](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.73. Udaybhan Rathod is mentioned as commandant of fort Kondhana (Sinhgad) in some Marathi documents. (See, for instance, *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No. 22.)

[2527](#) The account given in this paragraph is based on the Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.72-74); the date is from the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp. 24, 52).

[2528](#) According to the Ballad of Sinhgad this escalade was made near the Kalyan gates, but according to the gazetteer, presumably based on local tradition, it was made through the gorge on the western side. (*Aitihasik Powade*, Part I, p.48; *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vol. XVIII, part III, p.443.).

[2529](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar's statement in his *Shivaji and His Times* (p.166) that Shivaji "named it [the fort] Singh-garh [Sinhgad] after the lion-heart that had won it" is wrong. The name Sinhgad occurs four times in a letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1663 which Shivaji sent to Moro Trimal, the *Peshwa*, and Nilo Sondev, the *Muzumdar*. (*MIS*, Vol. VIII, No.12.) The letter was published in *MIS*, Vol. VIII in 1903 which is listed in the bibliography of the first edition of Sir Jadunath's *Shivaji and His Times* published in 1919. He persists in that error through all the five editions of his work!

[2530](#) English letters dated 21<sup>st</sup> March and 11<sup>th</sup> June 1670 from Mumbai to Surat (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.182, 198); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.54.

[2531](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.183-85, 187, 189-92, 194, 197

[2532](#) English letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1670 from Mumbai to Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 204.)

[2533](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp. 24, 52); *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, Persian text, p. 99. See also English letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> March 1670 from Mumbai to Surat (*ERS*, Vol. I, No.183).

[2534](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No.124; *ERS*, Vol. II, No.538.

[2535](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, Nos.121, 123, 126; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.54-55. See also *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 192, 194-95, 197.

[2536](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.25, 52). See also the English letter dated 11<sup>th</sup>June 1670 from Mumbai to Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No.198.)

[2537](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.182.

[2538](#) “Kerridrew” in the original. It should be Khed-durg, renamed Sagargad. The capture of Khed-durg (“Kerridrug”) is also mentioned in *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 208. See also *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.209 and 210, where the fort is mentioned as “Kendria” and “Rerradrug” [Kerradrug?] respectively.

[2539](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.198.

[2540](#) Hindola is mentioned only in the Shivapur Chronology. (*SCP*, p.52). No fort of that name is known to exist in the region today. Perhaps, Hindola is an error for Sindola in the Junnar Taluka of Pune District.

[2541](#) For Mahuli and Rohida, Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.25, 52) For Hindola and Karnala, Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, p.52). For Mahuli, see also English letters dated 28<sup>th</sup> June and 11<sup>th</sup> July 1670 from Mumbai to Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.199, 203.)

[2542](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.72-75.

[2543](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.199.

[2544](#) *Ibid.*, No.200.

[2545](#) Some English letters from Karwar to Surat (16<sup>th</sup> September and 16<sup>th</sup> December 1668, and 9<sup>th</sup> March 1669) and some entries in the Jedhe Chronology show that till the beginning of 1670 Shivaji's usual place of residence was Rajgad. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 146, 156, 160; *SCP*, p.25.) Some English letters from Mumbai to Surat and some entries in the Jedhe Chronology show that in 1670 it was shifted to Rairi alias Raigad. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 275, 282; *SCP*, p.26.) See also Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.115).

[2546](#) *Ibid.*, No.211.

[2547](#) The following account has been compiled from *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.62-63, 65, 67-68; *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 251; *AFS*, Vol. VI, Nos. 96, 120, 124; *Futuhat-i-Alamgiri*, pp.91-93; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, Persian text, pp. 100-102.

[2548](#) Quotation from a letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> December 1679 sent by John Trotter, an English gunner in Mughal service, from Aurangabad to the President and Council at Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 251.)

[2549](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 185, 217, 224.

[2550](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 180, 181, 185, 191.

[2551](#) Each file comprised six soldiers. (*Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, Home Series*, Vol. I, p.96; *EFI*, Vol. I, p.154.)

[2552](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 181, 183.

[2553](#) *Ibid.*, No. 183.

[2554](#) *EFI* (1670-1677), p.189.

[2555](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.195.

[2556](#) *Ibid.*, No. 214.

[2557](#) *Ibid.*, No. 215.

[2558](#) For the strength of the force, see English letters, one dated 12<sup>th</sup> November 1670 from Surat to Persia and the other dated 20<sup>th</sup> November 1670 from Surat to the Company. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 233, 237.) For route, see Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.86); English letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> October 1670 from Mumbai to Surat. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.318.)

[2559](#) For the following account of the experiences of the Englishmen, see *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 216, 218, 219, 220, 233, 237. The first four are consultations of the Surat Council at Swally Marine and the other two are letters from Surat. See also consultation at Swally Marine dated 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1670. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.316.)

[2560](#) The former president, Sir George Oxenden, died on 14<sup>th</sup> July 1669 whereupon Gerald Aungier, being the senior member in the Council, became President. *EFI* (1668-1669), pp. 182-83.

[2561](#) For the ownership of this ship (merely called *Oxinden* sometimes) see *EFI* (1670-1677), pp.44, 220.

[2562](#) Streynsham Master was a member of the Surat Council and on Aungier's becoming President he was made 'Second' in Council. [*EFI* (1668-1669), pp. 37, 183.] The Dutch letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1670 from Surat says: "On board the English vessels were plenty of whites to defend their factory. They were sent on shore, numbering 110, among whom was a colonel, on his way from the King of England to the King of Persia. This colonel did good service." (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, p.330.) This seems to be incorrect; in any case, it is not corroborated by English sources.

[2563](#) Aurangzeb had ordered the building a wall round Surat after Shivaji's first sack of the city. (Chapter 7.) But the work had not been completed when Fryer visited the city in 1675. It was completed by 1679. (Fryer, Letter III, Ch. I and Letter VI, Ch. I, pp.99, 412.) The first sack of Surat has not been mentioned in the *Alamgir Nama* at all. The second is dismissed in one sentence in the *Maasir-i Alamgiri* (Persian text, p.106) under 29<sup>th</sup> October 1670 thus: "It was reported to the Emperor that the on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1670 the accursed Shivaji attacked the port

of Surat, burnt the city and plundered its inhabitants for some hours, and then retired."

[2564](#) Kashgar is in the western extremity of China. Abdullah Khan, The Sultan of Kashgar, was deposed by his son and, with his family and a few servants, had sought asylum with Aurangzeb. He met the Emperor at Delhi in March 1668. In October 1668, he left Delhi on a pilgrimage to Mecca by way of Surat. He had returned to Surat two months before Shivaji's sack of the town. He reached Delhi in December 1671 and died there in 1675. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 42, 45-46, 48, 69-70, 88; *EFI*, Vol. I, p.195; Manucci, Vol. II, pp. 190-93.)

[2565](#) He was a merchant from Rajapur. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 237 – p. 176.) Perhaps Shivaji might have brought him along as an interpreter.

[2566](#) It is not clear whether these 20 men were counted among the 30 who were sent for the defence of the factory.

[2567](#) These villages are on the right bank of the river.

[2568](#) For the experiences of the Dutchmen, see Dutch letter from Surat dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1670. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 330-31.)

[2569](#) According to the Surat letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> November 1670: "The Dutch house standing out of the way and among the poor Baniyas' houses was never assaulted, so that they had not any dispute with the enemy."

[2570](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, p.330.

[2571](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 237 (p.175).

[2572](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, p.330; *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 233 (p.169).

[2573](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 233 – p.170. The Dutch letter from Surat dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 1670 says that the French “quietly suffered two of their black servants to be shot before their eyes, notwithstanding with valuable presents they had obtained from Shivaji’s representative the declaration that they should be free from molestation.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, p.330.) The English letter does not mention whether those who were shot were European or Indian.

[2574](#) *FBS*, p. 213.

[2575](#) Dutch letter cited above. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, p.331); *ERS*, Vol. I, No.237 (p.177).

[2576](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 237 (p.177).

[2577](#) *Ibid.*

[2578](#) *Ibid.*, No. 225.

[2579](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p.59.

[2580](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p.59 n. Marshal’s papers, under the heading ‘An Account of the Services Done for the East India Company by Streynsham Master, 1659-1678’, contain the following entry: “The beginning of October, 1670. Defended the house against Sevagee [Shivaji]. Sevagee came a second time to plunder the town of Surat. The President and Council then at Swally Marine sent me up to Surat with only 30 men out of the ships to defend

the house which (praised be God), I did, whereby the nation gained honour, the Company saved a year's customs, and they presented me with a gold medal after my return into England." (*The Diaries of Streynsham Master*, Vol. I, p. 192.) This concern for the honour of the nation as well as for the security of the Company's estate recurs in many English letters of the time. (See, for instance, *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 216, 233, 237.)

[2581](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 114. For date see Ch. 7, end note 271.

[2582](#) See, for instance, *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 222, 253, 266, 291, 323, 325, 326, 327, 400; II, Nos. 25, 34, 40, 126, 129, 163, 216, 227, 331, 357.

[2583](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 291.

[2584](#) *Ibid.*, No. 323.

[2585](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 34.

[2586](#) *Ibid.*, No. 129.

[2587](#) *Ibid.*, No. 216.

[2588](#) *Ibid.*, No. 227.

[2589](#) *Ibid.*, No. 231.

[2590](#) *Ibid.*, No. 357.

[2591](#) Letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> November 1670 from Surat Council to the Company (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.325)

[2592](#) The account in this section is mainly taken from *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* (pp. 68-73) with a few details from the Sabhasad Chronicle (*Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 87-88) and date from Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.25).

[2593](#) Abul Muhammad, a son of the deceased Adilshahi nobleman Abdul Qadir Bahlul Khan, had defected to the Mughals in 1665. (See Chapter 8.) In 1669, Aurangzeb conferred upon him the rank of 5000 *dhat*/4000 *sawar* and the title of Ikhlas Khan. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.51.)

[2594](#) I assume that the battle must have been fought within 25-30 km of the Kanchan-Manchan Pass, somewhere northeast of Vani. I have used  $\frac{1}{4}$  inch (one inch to four miles) topo-sheets 46 L (1951) and 46 H (1947) for description of the ground.

[2595](#) Mir Abdul Mabood's appointment as *Darogha of Topkhana* (Artillery) of the provinces of the Deccan is mentioned in *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.27.

[2596](#) Kunjargad in Ahmednagar district.

[2597](#) SCP, p.25. Parnal (1:30) too mentions the capture of Trimbak in the same campaign (i.e. sack of Surat).

[2598](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 235, 238 (Mumbai to Surat, 17<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> November 1670).

[2599](#) Ibid., No. 238.

[2600](#) Ibid., No.242 (Mumbai to Surat, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1670).

[2601](#) Ibid., No.249.

[2602](#) Ibid., No. 235.

[2603](#) Ibid., No. 249.

[2604](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.105 (English translation in *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VI, pp.65-66).

[2605](#) In Washim District of Maharashtra. Also called Karanja Lad.

[2606](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.25); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp.68-69 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.98, 101); *Parnal*, 1:31, 35-36; *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 250-51 (for sack of Karanja and other towns only).

[2607](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.251 John Trotter, English gunner in Mughal service, from Aurangabad to Surat, 20<sup>th</sup> December 1670).

[2608](#) Ibid., No. 250 (Surat to Swally, 19<sup>th</sup> December 1670).

[2609](#) Ibid., No.251.

[2610](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.78. See also *ERS*, Vol. I, No.250.

[2611](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 250.

[2612](#) *AFS*, Vol. VI, No. 115; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.25); *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 256 (Mumbai to Surat, 6<sup>th</sup> February 1671); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.80; *Parnal*, 1:32-34.

[2613](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 115. The date given in the newsletter is Thursday, 17<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb. If we disregard the day of the week, the date matches with 29<sup>th</sup> January 1670. But the Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.25) records, under Shaka 1592, that Salher was captured in the month of Pausha (3<sup>rd</sup> December 1670 to 1<sup>st</sup> January 1671). Besides, 17<sup>th</sup> Ramazan of the 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb falls on Saturday. If we correct the year as 14<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb, the date matches 19<sup>th</sup> January 1671 which falls on Thursday. As the 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb ended only a few days earlier — on 30<sup>th</sup> Shaban, i.e. 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1671 — it is evident that the scribe had mistakenly written that year instead of the correct one. (The same error has occurred in a few more newsletters of the 14<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb. Compare Ch. 7, end note 271.)

[2614](#) In one newsletter, the fort has been mentioned as “Sultangad alias Mulher.” (*SDAR*, p. 82, Persian text.) It is incorrect. Salher and Mulher had been renamed by the Mughals as Sultangad and Aurang-gad respectively. (See, for instance, *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.11, 79.)

[2615](#) Asad Khan, the Second *Bakhshi*, was made the First *Bakhshi* (*Mir Bakhshi*) in February 1671. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 67.)

[2616](#) Chavalgad and Holgad in Persian text are evidently scribe's mistakes for Javalagad and Ravalagad. These two were already captured by the Marathas.

[2617](#) *Parnal*, 1: 35, 37-38. *Parnal* (1:37) also mentions Mahish (Mahishgad) among the forts captured by Shivaji about this time. Perhaps it is a mistake for Haris (or Harshgad) which is about 10 km west of Trimbak.

[2618](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp. 75, 78-80.



[2619](#) SDAR, pp.76-78, Persian text.

[2620](#) Fryer, Letter III, Ch. V (p. 137). That only the commandant and the women were left in the fort seems to be exaggeration. The name of the commandant was Abdul Aziz Khan. (*Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.120.) Fryer calls him “Hagiess Caun” and tells us that the fort was garrisoned by a thousand swordsmen. He also tells us of one more Maratha attempt on the fort. In brief it is as follows: The commandant accepted a bribe given by Shivaji. But when Shivaji’s men came to take delivery of the fort, the Governor, Bahadur Khan, whom the commandant had kept informed, caught them in an ambush. Then Fryer adds: “That which makes Shivaji so intent on this more than the forementioned advantages, is, because it was his birth-place.” (Ibid., p.138.) Fryer does not give us the dates of these attempts and I regard the second story doubtful. Bhimsen, too, gives us an account of a failed Maratha attempt on the fort. He places it in his account of the 20<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb (1676-77). According to him, 300 Marathas scaled the fort by means of a rope during the night, but Abdul Aziz Khan, though left with a small force, put all of them to death. Then he sent a message to Shivaji not to turn his attention to that fort as long as he was the commandant there. (*Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.120. Though Bhimsen calls it the fort of Junnar, there is no doubt that the hill fort of Shivneri near that town is meant there.) Bhimsen is not very accurate as far as dates are concerned and there is no assurance that the incident described by him took place in the 20<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb.

[2621](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No.117. The date given in the newsletter is Sunday, 20<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb. It corresponds with 1<sup>st</sup> February 1670, but it was a Tuesday, not Sunday. So correcting the regnal year as 14<sup>th</sup> instead of 13<sup>th</sup>, the date corresponds with 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1671 which was a Sunday.

[2622](#) According to *Maasir-ul Umara* (Persian text, Vol. I, p.144), Khan Zaman was appointed *subadar* of Varhad in 1675. So, at this time he must have been holding a senior position in that province.

[2623](#) He held the rank of 2000 *dhat*/ 2000 *sawar*. (*SDAR*, p.74, Persian text.)

[2624](#) AFS, Vol. No.112. The date given in the newsletter is Saturday, 12<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb. The date corresponds with 24<sup>th</sup> January 1670, but it was a Monday, not Saturday. So, correcting the regnal year as 14<sup>th</sup> instead of 13<sup>th</sup>, the date corresponds with 14<sup>th</sup> January 1671 which was a Saturday.

[2625](#) He held the rank of 1500 *dhat*/ 900 *sawar*. (*SDAR*, pp.74-75, Persian text.)

[2626](#) *SDAR*, pp. 86-88, A.R.No. 30, Persian text.

[2627](#) He was *faujdar* of Nanded. (AFS, Vol. VI, No. 118.)

[2628](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 118. The date given in the newsletter is Wednesday, 13<sup>th</sup> Zil-qada, 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb. The date corresponds with 25<sup>th</sup> March 1670, but it was a Friday, not Wednesday. So, correcting the regnal year as 14<sup>th</sup> instead of 13<sup>th</sup>, the date corresponds with 15<sup>th</sup> March 1671 which was a Wednesday.

[2629](#) AFS, Vol. VI, No. 113. The date given in the newsletter is Sunday, 13<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 13<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb. The date corresponds with 25<sup>th</sup> January 1670, but it was a Tuesday, not Sunday. So, correcting the regnal year as 14<sup>th</sup> instead of 13<sup>th</sup>, the date corresponds with 15<sup>th</sup> January 1671 which was a Sunday.

[2630](#) He was son of Mahabat Khan the elder, the conqueror of Daulatabad. His given name was Mirza Lahrasp. In 1638, Shah Jahan gave him the title Khan, thus making him Lahrasp Khan, and in 1652 the title ‘Mahabat Khan’ of his father, who had died in 1634. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.37, Waris, 58a.) He was promoted to the rank of 6000 *dhat*/5000 *sawar*/3000 *du aspa sih aspa* in 1662 and seems to have held the same rank at the time of his appointment against Shivaji. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 754-55; *The Maathir-ul-Umara*, Vol. II, pp. 28-31.) *The Maathir-ul-Umara* (Vol. II, p.31) tells the following anecdote about him: Aurangzeb had entrusted the issue of most of the legal orders to the *Qazi-al Quzat*, Abdul Wahab, who had a great influence over him. So great was his authority that even the most senior *mansabdars* were afraid of him. When Aurangzeb decided to appoint Mahabat Khan against Shivaji, he said to Mahabat Khan, in open Court, “It is necessary for the protection of Islam that this bandit be extirpated.” The Khan, who resembled his father in arrogance, at once replied, “It is not necessary to appoint an army, a proclamation of the Qazi will be sufficient.” The Emperor was greatly displeased at this insolence and ordered Jafar Khan, the *diwan*, to tell Mahabat Khan that it was not proper to jest in the Emperor’s Presence.

[2631](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, (Persian text, p.107) states that Mahabat Khan, the ex-*Subadar* of Kabul, came and had audience with the Emperor and that he was sent on the Deccan expedition on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1670. But his appointment was known, or at least rumoured, more than a month before that. An English letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> October 1670 from Mumbai mentions: “We hear Mahabat Khan is made General against Shivaji.” (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 226. The same letter is again printed in that volume under No. 276 with the date 26<sup>th</sup> October 1671. The second of these must be an error for, by then, Mahabat Khan had been recalled.)

[2632](#) For date, a newsletter of the Court vide *Shivaji and His Times*, pp.182-83. See also *ERS*, Vol. I, No..251. For reinforcements brought by Mahabat Khan see *ERS*, Vol. I, No.256 (Mumbai to Surat, 6<sup>th</sup> February 1671).

[2633](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p. 81.

[2634](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 256.

[2635](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, 25). See also *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 260, 262 (Mumbai to Surat, 8<sup>th</sup> April and 29<sup>th</sup> May, 1670). A letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 1670 says that Mahabat Khan “has taken four castles: Huturant [Ahiwant] and Salleere [Salher] are the names of two of them.” But, as we shall see, he had not taken Salher. A letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> May 1670 says that he had taken five castles, but does not give their names. The Jedhe Chronology gives their names as Ahiwant, Achalagiri, Markanda and Javala.

[2636](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp. 82, 84.

[2637](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 262-63. He had been appointed *subadar* of Gujarat in 1667. (*Alamgir Nama*, pp. 1056-57.)

[2638](#) His given name was Mir Malik Husain. His mother had nursed Aurangzeb. (*The Maathir-ul-Umara* ,Vol. I, p. 783.) When, in 1658, Aurangzeb was marching towards Agra during the Mughal War of Succession, he conferred the title of Bahadur Khan on Mir Malik Husain. (*Alamgir Nama*, p.51.) For his participation during that war, see *The Maathir-ul-Umara* ,Vol. I, pp. 784-85. For his rank, see *Alamgir Nama*, p.981 and *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.76.

[2639](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 263.

[2640](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, 25); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p. 84.

[2641](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 74, 79-80; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp. 84, 96.

[2642](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p. 84; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, 25); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.70 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 101-02).

[2643](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 287-88 (Mumbai to Surat, 13<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> January 1672).

[2644](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 288. The letter calls him “Curtage Goodier”, a distortion of Kadtoji Gujar. Kadtoji, indeed, was his given name and Prataprao, the title conferred upon him by Shivaji.

[2645](#) *Ibid.*, No. 292.

[2646](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 287-88 (13<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> January 1672).

[2647](#) Sabhasad states: “Twenty-two noblemen of note were taken prisoner.” (*Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.71.) But here the number should not be taken in the literal sense, for, in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries, the word twenty-two (*bavis, bais*) was used in the sense of ‘many’ not only in Marathi, but also in Hindi and, on a few occasions at least, had crept in that sense in the English language (as used in India), evidently while copying from the vernacular. [For use in English see *EFI* (1655-1660), pp. 64, 73. I have quoted several examples from Marathi in my Marathi biography of Shivaji *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part I, p. 886-87, fn 13.] Sabhasad includes “Ikhlas Khan and Bahlul Khan” among the prisoners. (*Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.71.) It seems that Sabhasad knows that Ikhlas Khan was son of Abdul Qadir Bahlul Khan and therefore he is referring to him by both titles — Ikhlas Khan given by Aurangzeb and Bahlul Khan which was

his father's. Surendranath Sen translates the sentence thus: "Ikhlas Khan and Bahlol Khan themselves were captured." (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.104.) It would be better to replace 'themselves' (*khasa*) by 'himself'.

[2648](#) The account of the battle is based on the Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.25), the *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp.70-71 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 102-05); *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 293, 300 (letters from Swally and Surat, 15th February and 6<sup>th</sup> April 1672); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp. 84-85, 90. See also *Futuhat-i-Alamgiri*, p.93; *Parnal*, 2:5-8; *Shivarajbhooshan*, v.97, 103, 161, 226, 292, 331, 355 in *Sampoorn Bhooshan*.

[2649](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.293 (Swally to Mumbai, 15<sup>th</sup> February 1672).

[2650](#) Our chief authority for this section is *Chhatraprakas*, a laudatory poem in Braj dialect of Hindi by Lal Kavi, a courtier of Chhatrasal. For a concise and coherent account see *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, pp. 26-30; V, pp. 390-99.

[2651](#) The region known as Bundelkhand lies partly in Madhya Pradesh and partly in Uttar Pradesh. Jhansi, Mahoba, Datia and Sagar are some of the principal towns in the region.

[2652](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. II, p.29 n; III, p.27.

[2653](#) *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp.26-30.

[2654](#) Haft Anjuman (*The Military Despatches*, pp.65, 85).

[2655](#) *Chhatraprakas*, c. 11. Bhimsen mentions Chhatrasal's visit to Shivaji and says: "But since he [Shivaji] had little confidence and faith in the men of Hindustan [i.e. North India], he showed him [Chhatrasal] some favours and affections but sent him back."

(*Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.101.) But *Chhatraprakas*, written at the behest of Chhatrasal himself, makes no such accusation.

[2656](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. V, pp.390-99.

[2657](#) See, for instance, Cosme da Guarda and Carré (*FBS*, pp. 9, 18, 222-25); *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 10, 126 (pp.111-12); Dutch letters (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 480, 507-09).

[2658](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.128.

[2659](#) *Ibid.*, No.269.

[2660](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.304.

[2661](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 277.

[2662](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.304.

[2663](#) *The Travels of the Abbé Carré*, Vol. I, p. 230. Carré says that the King of Bijapur had sent Rustum-i Zaman against Shivaji with a large army but the latter bribed him, which caused him to withdraw his army, and places Afzal Khan's appointment against Shivaji after that event. (*Ibid.*, pp. 229-30. He makes a similar statement in his book. See *FBS*, pp.222-225.) His chronology is, of course, totally incorrect. But I believe that his statement, that the King of Bijapur beheaded Rustum-i Zaman on the charge of collusion with Shivaji, is correct in view of the fact that he had met that nobleman's son and successor at Hukeri and had conversed with him. Carré calls Rustum-i Zaman's son "young Rustam." (*The Travels of the Abbé Carré*, Vol. I, p. 230.)

[2664](#) English letters from Karwar to Surat (22<sup>nd</sup> April and 27<sup>th</sup> October 1674) and to Mumbai (22<sup>nd</sup> April and 25<sup>th</sup> May 1675). *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 461; II, Nos. 39, 82, 89.

[2665](#) For this treaty, see Chapter 10.

[2666](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 89.

[2667](#) Luis Mendonça Furtado de Albuquerque, the Count of Lavradio, had taken charge as Viceroy on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1671 and retained that office till 30<sup>th</sup> October 1677.

[2668](#) *Ibid.*, No. 92 (pp.225-26).

[2669](#) We have no information about his antecedents. Evidently he must have been one of the lieutenants of Siddi Fath Khan.

[2670](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.321.

[2671](#) *Ibid.*, No. 338.

[2672](#) Khafi Khan (Vol II, pp.223-28) gives the following account of the Siddis: After gaining possession of the Nizamshahi Konkan, the Adilshah appointed as governor of that territory an Afghan named Fath Khan who posted himself in the fort of Danda Rajpuri. When Shivaji captured seven forts in the neighbourhood, Fath Khan lost courage, abandoned Danda Rajpuri and took refuge in the island fort of Janjira. Later, he was reduced to such dire straits that he started contemplating surrendering the fort to Shivaji upon a pledge of security. But his three Abyssinian lieutenants — Siddi Sambul, Siddi Yaqt and Siddi Khairiyat — were against handing over the fort to an infidel. So, in the 14<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb [3<sup>rd</sup> January to 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1671] they arrested and imprisoned Fath Khan,

made Siddi Sambul their chief and wrote to Khan Jahan [i.e. Bahadur Khan], the Mughal *subadar* of the Deccan, offering to enter Imperial service and asking for succour. Khan Jahan responded by conferring upon them *mansabs* and a fertile *jagir* near Surat. Heartened by this they repaired and collected war ships and commenced war against Shivaji. After a while Siddi Sambul died after appointing Siddi Yaqut to succeed him. Siddi Yaqut began drawing up plans to recapture Danda Rajpuri. Finally, on the day of the festival of Holi he sent Siddi Khairiyat with four or five hundred men to attack the fort from the land side and he himself reached the foot of the fort with 30 or 40 boats full of war material. The garrison was drunk and unconscious. At the prearranged signal, Siddi Khairiyat raised the clamour of attack from the land side. As the Marathas rushed to that side, Siddi Yaqut and his followers scaled the walls from the seaside by means of long ladders and ropes and attacked the garrison. At this moment, a chance spark exploded the magazine in the fort. In the resulting confusion, Siddi Yaqut pressed home the attack with his cant word [or war cry] *khasu khasu* and, assisted by Siddi Khairiyat who also in the meanwhile had scaled the fortress from its landward side, overwhelmed the Maratha garrison. The fortress of Danda-Rajpuri was thus lost forever to the Marathas. Khafi Khan says that he had heard from the people of that place and from Yaqut Khan [Siddi Yaqut] himself that when the powder magazine of Danda exploded, Shivaji, who was fast asleep in his camp several *kos* from Danda, suddenly woke up with a start and exclaimed to his officers, "Certainly some misfortune has befallen the fort of Danda-Rajpuri." Since Shivaji's army had gone to Surat at that time, he was unable to succour other forts in the vicinity of Danda Rajpuri and, seizing that opportunity, the Siddi captured seven of these in a few days. Such is the account given by Khafi Khan which I do not regard as reliable. It is not corroborated by any other source and has several anachronisms and other errors in it. For instance, Fath Khan was a Siddi, not an Afghan. At least two contemporary English letters show that Siddi Fath Khan was ruling at least till 1674.

(ERS, Vol I, Nos. 451, 476.) Shivaji plundered Surat for the second and the last time in 1670. According to Anees Jahan Syed, Khafi Khan has copied this account from an unnamed work attributed to one Mamuri. (*Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, pp. XXII-XXIII, 254 n.) Still, the objections against its reliability remain the same.

[2673](#) Aurangzeb's eldest son Muhammad Sultan had defected to his uncle Shuja during the Mughal War of Succession, deserted him soon afterwards and was kept imprisoned in the fort of Gwalior. He was brought back to the Court in 1672, restored to a *mansab* two years later, and died in 1676. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 14-15, 17, 64, 74, 86, 98.) There is no truth in the report that he was sent with an army against Shivaji. He was not given any active duty till his death.

[2674](#) Ibid., No. 336.

[2675](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.37-39. The Portuguese Captain has also narrated at length, probably with much exaggeration, how Shivaji's envoy tried to tempt him to join Shivaji's service. But what is really amazing is the statement in the letter that Shivaji's envoy told the Captain that Shivaji had desired to be a vassal of the King of Portugal! Surely, there must have been some misunderstanding in interpreting what the envoy said. But jubilant at this 'offer', the Portuguese Viceroy enclosed a copy of the letter in his dispatch dated 19<sup>th</sup> January 1673 to the King of Portugal. The King was wiser than his overexcited servant and replied in his letter of 26<sup>th</sup> June 1674: "I feel I have to advise you to have every care and precaution in dealing with the designs of Shivaji and to treat him cautiously and watchfully." (Ibid., p. 40.)

[2676](#) *The Travels of the Abbé Carré*, Vol. I, pp. 195-98.

[2677](#) In English documents of the time, these islands were jointly called Hendry Kendry or Henry Kenry and, quite often, only Khanderi was referred to by these joint names.

[2678](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 302.

[2679](#) *Ibid.*, No.303.

[2680](#) This, it seems, refers to the newsletters of the Imperial Court.

[2681](#) *Nakhuda* is a Persian word which means master or commandant of a ship. We know nothing about this Nakhuda Ahmad and he is not mentioned again in any surviving documents.

[2682](#) *Ibid.*, No.321.

[2683](#) For shortage of water on Khanderi, see *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 387.

[2684](#) The account in this section is based on the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp.71-72; *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, pp.273-75; *Futuhat-i-Alamgiri*, pp.94-95; Manucci, Vol. II, pp 167-68.

[2685](#) The account in this section is based on the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp.72, 74, 79-82, 84-85, 89-91, 93-94, 97, 102, 240; *Futuhat-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 103-14; *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, pp.260, 263; *Maathir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, pp. 248-50; II, pp.29-31; Manucci, Vol. II, pp. 199-203.

[2686](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.73; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.86. Bahadur Khan thus became the *subadar* of the Deccan, all but in name. He was formally appointed to that office in January 1673. At

that time he was also promoted to the rank of 6000 *dhat*/6000 *sawar*/5000 *du aspa sih aspa* and was given the title of Khan Jahan Bahadur. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.76.)

[2687](#) *Hadiqat-ul Alam* (English translation in *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, p. 67).

[2688](#) See Chapter 5.

[2689](#) Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p.26). See also *Parnal*, 2:15. According to the Sabhasad Chronicle, Shivaji kept Niraji's son Pralhadpant as his envoy at Bhaganagar. (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.118.) In their letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> January 1676 the Surat Council wrote to Mumbai: "The Deputy Governor did lately send the President a bill of exchange drawn by Shivaji Raja upon his correspondent in Golconda, part whereof being on account of moneys due to the Company for cloth and perpituanos [a sort of cloth] sold him, and part to some merchants of Bombay for corn and other goods sold to Shivaji's *subadars* by his own order, and the remainder of the money was to be invested in corn for Shivaji's own account. This said bill was accordingly sent up, but it again returned unto us, the person on whom it was drawn being departed from Golconda before its arrival." (ERS, Vol. II, No. 141.) Later Moropant, the Peshwa, wrote to the Deputy Governor that the bill of exchange was returned because of "the departure of the person on whom it was drawn, and that he was now arrived to Shivaji with the money." (Ibid., No.145. Mumbai Consultation, 19<sup>th</sup> February 1676.) It is evident that the person upon whom the bill of exchange was drawn was Shivaji's envoy residing at Golconda (or Hyderabad) to receive the subsidy.

[2690](#) *Hadiqat-ul Alam* (English translation in *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, pp.90-91).

[2691](#) *Tarikh-i Zafara*, pp.35-36.

[2692](#) *Tarikh-i Zafara*, pp.35-39.

[2693](#) Ibid., No.223.

[2694](#) Ibid., No.228.

[2695](#) Ibid., No.265.

[2696](#) Ibid., No.267.

[2697](#) Ibid., No.268

[2698](#) Ustick was secretary to the Mumbai Council. According to the Company's instructions, he was posted as Lieutenant to Captain Shaxton's company at four shillings per day. He held both these posts for a short period and, in their dispatch of 7<sup>th</sup> November 1671, the Surat Council informed Mumbai that as it was not possible for him to hold both posts, they had released him of the secretarial duties and were sending George Wilcox to succeed him in that office. (*ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 279, 281.) Ram Shenavi was a "scrivan." (Ibid., No. 282. Scrivan is an old word for a clerk or writer. See *Hobson-Jobson*.) He knew the Portuguese as well as the vernacular. (Ibid., Nos. 267-68.)

[2699](#) Ibid., No.273.

[2700](#) Ibid., No.271 ("Instructions to be observed by Mr. Stephen Ustick in his treaty with Shivaji", Surat, 25<sup>th</sup> September 1671.

[2701](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.282 (Mumbai to Surat, 8<sup>th</sup> November 1671). Negotiations were carried out by Ram Shenavi for several days,

the English not being able to do it themselves for want of a “linguist” and the Deputy Governor being indisposed.

[2702](#) Ibid., No. 282.

[2703](#) Ibid., No. 283.

[2704](#) Ibid., No. 284 (Mumbai to Surat, 15<sup>th</sup> December 1671).

[2705](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 274-75, 284, 287-88 (Letters from Mumbai to Surat, 13<sup>th</sup> October, 23<sup>rd</sup> October, and 15<sup>th</sup> December, 1671 and 13<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> January, 1672.) The last one of these states that Ustick was about to set forth when the Mumbai Council “received advice from Shivaji he should not set out till he [Shivaji] wrote for him, he being now otherwise employed.” Perhaps, Shivaji might have been busy making preparations for the campaign which culminated in the Battle of Salher.

[2706](#) Ibid., No. 295.

[2707](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 297-98, 304. According to the Mumbai consultation dated 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1672, Ustick was to be accompanied by two Englishmen, ten Bhandaris as his guard, coolies for his palanquin and a couple of horses. Presents worth Rs.600 were to be sent with him for Shivaji and worth Rs. 150 for Shivaji’s officers and servants. (*Ibid.*, No. 295.) The total expenses of this mission, including presents, were estimated at Rs. 1000. (*Ibid.*, No. 297.)

[2708](#) Evidently that minister was Moropant, the Peshwa.

[2709](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 304, 336. See also No. 305 (Mumbai to Company, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1672).

[2710](#) Ibid., No.399 (p.289). Also see No. 336.

[2711](#) Ramnagar, 50 km south-southeast of Valsad, is now known as Nagar. (*Surat District Gazetteer*, p.940.) In 1766 Dharamdeo, the Chief of the principality moved the capital to Dharampur. The principality was known by that name since then.

[2712](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, pp.25-26), *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.307, 308, 313; *Assentos*, Vol. IV, p.557; *Parnal*, 1:39.

[2713](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.25); *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 307, 310, 313; *Parnal*, 1:40.

[2714](#) *FBS*, pp.233-36.

[2715](#) *The Travels of the Abbé Carré*, Vol. I, pp. 169-71. He had left Surat by a merchant ship on 19<sup>th</sup> November 1672 and reached Daman the next day. He left Daman on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1672, continuing his journey by land. (Ibid., pp.166, 172.)

[2716](#) It is evident that Carré means the Chiefs of Jawhar and Ramnagar, but has confounded the two. The Chief of Jawhar belonged to the Koli tribe. According to the Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, pp. 25-26) the Chief of Jawhar had taken refuge in Mughal territory and the Chief of Ramnagar at Daman.

[2717](#) Koli and Chauthia. The subsidy paid to the Chief of Ramnagar was called *Chauth* and therefore he was called Chauthia.

[2718](#) The Jesuits were commonly called Paulist in India because their establishments here were formerly always dedicated to St.

Paul. (See the entry Paulist in *Hobson-Jobson; Indian Travels*, pp. 193, 342 (note 46). See also Mundy, Vol. III, Part I, p.163.) In Portuguese colonies, they had been awarded the monopoly of all the munitions of war and earned great profits from it. (*The Travels of the Abbé Carré*, Vol. I, p.132; *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.93-94 and note 8.)

[2719](#) In 1669. See *The Travels of the Abbé Carré*, Vol. I, p. 132; *EFI* (1668-1669), p.257 read with pp.36-37.

[2720](#) Carré says in his book: “The Governor received the ambassador and, out of fear, granted all that was demanded of him with respect to the money the Portuguese were accustomed to pay to spare themselves the injury that otherwise their neighbours would not have failed to cause.” (*FBS*, pp. 240-41.)

[2721](#) Carré says in his book that he was a witness to this incident! (*FBS*, pp. 238, 239.)

[2722](#) It is shocking to observe these pious ‘men of God’, as they portrayed themselves, indulging in commercial activity in goods that were clearly intended for violence. One is left wondering whether this reflects on their doctrine or their lust for lucre!

[2723](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.44-48; *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, pp.59-60.

[2724](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.51-52; *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.60.

[2725](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, p.53 (n.116); *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.60.

[2726](#) Mirza Muazzam was quite an influential merchant in Surat. (*EFI*, Vol. I, pp.283-84.)

[2727](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.307.

[2728](#) *Ibid.*, No. 310.

[2729](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 7.59 and 8.1, pp. 486-87,489; *Jedhe Chronology (SCP*, p.26);  
*ERS*, Vol. I, No.342.

[2730](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8.1, pp. 490-91; *ERS*, Vol. I, Letter No.342

[2731](#) *Jedhe Chronology (SCP*, p.26); *Parnal*, 3:15-16.

[2732](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p.49.

[2733](#) *Ibid.*

[2734](#) *Ibid.* pp.51, 60.

[2735](#) *Ibid.* pp. 6, 7, 40, 72.

[2736](#) For the force available at Mumbai, including garrison, militia, etc., see *EFI*, Vol. I, pp.viii, ix, 9, 28, 29, 33, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 73, 84.

[2737](#) The *Bhandaris* are a warlike caste (the *Bhandari*) inhabiting the coastal strip (Konkan) of Maharashtra. Their main occupation in the bygone days was to extract spirituous liquors from palm trees.

[2738](#) For the naval force at Mumbai see *EFI*, Vol.I, pp. 61-62; see also pp. 31, 53, 67, 74, 83,

[2739](#) For events till 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1677, see *EFI*, Vol.I, pp. 61-63.

[2740](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.345.

[2741](#) For the sequel, see *EFI*, Vol.I, pp. 63, 71.

[2742](#) *Ibid.*, p. xi.

[2743](#) The narrative of the capture of Panhala is from *Parnal*, c. 3 and 4. The dates are from the Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp. 26, 52). See also *Basatin*, Ch. 8.1, p. 491.

[2744](#) He met his mother and received her blessings at the village of Pachad, below Raigad. (*Parnal*, 4:5-6. In the Marathi translation the word ‘Amber’ has been rendered as ‘Goddess Amba’. It would be more appropriate to translate it as ‘mother’ since the village is not known for a temple to Amba and we do know, from an English letter of the time, that Shivaji’s mother used to reside at the foot of the fort. See *ERS*, Vol. I, No.358 – p.253. See also Jedhe Chronology – *SCP*, p.27.) Shivaji met his biographer and poet laureate Paramanand at Poladpur. (*Parnal*, 4:16-18. Here, too, the Marathi translation needs correction. See *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. 29, Nos.1-2, pp. 51-56.)

[2745](#) *SCP*, p. 26.

[2746](#) For the narrative in this section, see *Parnal*, c. 4-5; *Tarikh-i Iskandari*, c. 3-5; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.26); *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.107-08; *Basatin*, Ch. 8.2, pp. 492-93.

[2747](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.362, 415.

[2748](#) *Ibid.*, No. 365. See also letter Nos. 346, 373, 374, 398, 429.

[2749](#) Several types of pagodas or Hons, usually named after rulers or mint towns, were then in circulation. I do not know the origin of the name “Sungre.” Juttal (or Jittal) was probably not a coin but a money of account only. It was a 48<sup>th</sup> part of a “Sungre” pagoda. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 346. See also Fryer, Vol. II, p.128.)

[2750](#) *SCP*, p. 26. The Jedhe Chronology again states that Satara was captured [by Shivaji] on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1675. (*SCP*, p. 27.) This is not corroborated by any other source and is certainly incorrect. The Shivapur Chronology says that Shivaji came to Satara in Shaka year 1597 (17<sup>th</sup> March 1675 to 4<sup>th</sup> March 1676) and was taken ill. (*SCP*, p.53.) Reports in a number of English letters of January 1676 say he had been very ill and had even died. (*ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 137, 139, 141, 142.) So the statement in the Shivapur Chronology seems to be correct and the Jedhe Chronology has evidently confounded his arrival at Satara with the capture of that fort.

[2751](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 392.

[2752](#) *Ibid.*, No. 398.

[2753](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.38.

[2754](#) *SCP*, p.52

[2755](#) *Ibid.*

[2756](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 339, 399 (p. 289).

[2757](#) *Ibid.*, No. 340; see also No. 342.

[2758](#) For the account of Pilaji's mission, see *ERS*, Vol. I, letter Nos. 343,399. See also letter No. 339.

[2759](#) *Ibid.*, No. 348.

[2760](#) *Ibid.*

[2761](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 351, 354, 385.

[2762](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 351, 354, 385.

[2763](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 351, 385.

[2764](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 351, 356, 361, 363.

[2765](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 350,354.

[2766](#) *Ibid.*, No. 352.

[2767](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 352,353, 356.

[2768](#) *Ibid.*, No. 355

[2769](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 355-57, 358 (p. 251), 360.

[2770](#) For the account of Nicolls' mission to Shivaji, see *ERS*, Vol. I, No.358 (p. 253-55) and *EFI*, Vol. I, pp.68-69.

[2771](#) Ibid., No. 366.

[2772](#) Ibid., No. 363. See also Letter No. 418.

[2773](#) Sion (Anglicized form of Sheev) is a part of Mumbai. I have not been able to identify "Mochimbo". Could it be an old form of Matunga which is a part of Mumbai?

[2774](#) Ibid., No. 367.

[2775](#) Ibid.

[2776](#) Ibid., Nos. 358 (p. 256), 367, 369-71, 399(p. 290).

[2777](#) Ibid., Nos. 369, 399 (p. 290).

[2778](#) Ibid., Nos. 368-69, 399 (p. 290).

[2779](#) Ibid., Nos. 375, 392 (p. 286). 399 (p. 290).

[2780](#) Ibid., No. 382. See also Letter Nos. 388, 407, 409.

[2781](#) Ibid., Nos. 382, 384.

[2782](#) Ibid., Nos. 382-84.

[2783](#) Ibid., No. 382.

[2784](#) Ibid., No. 374.

[2785](#) Ibid., Nos. 392. See also Letter No. 386.

[2786](#) Ibid., No.392.

[2787](#) Ibid.

[2788](#) Ibid.

[2789](#) Ibid., Nos. 393, 399 (p. 290).

[2790](#) Ibid., Nos. 395, 399 (p. 290).

[2791](#) Ibid., Nos. 393, 395; *EFI* (1670-1677), P.70.

[2792](#) For the account of the first meeting see *ERS*, Vol. I, Letter No.399 (pp. 290-93).

[2793](#) I do not know the origin of the name Tipkee. Dabhol laris were of course coins minted at Dabhol. But the lari was a silver coin. The inclusion of laris in gold seems to be an error.

[2794](#) Ibid., No. 399(p. 293).

[2795](#) Ibid., No. 390 (pp. 293-94).

[2796](#) Actually 10,000 as can be seen from the breakup given below. It was, and to some extent still is, a practice in India not to make transactions with zero as the last digit. Thus, for instance, one would pay Rs. 1001 instead of 1000.

[2797](#) Ibid., No. 399 (p. 294).

[2798](#) Ibid., No. 407.

[2799](#) Ibid., No. 429.

[2800](#) Ibid.

[2801](#) Ibid., No. 418.

[2802](#) Ibid., Nos. 402, 403, 409.

[2803](#) Ibid., Nos. 402-04, 409-10, 418; *EFI*, Vol.I, pp. 66-67

[2804](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 402, 408, 409, 410, 418.

[2805](#) Ibid., Nos. 402, 409, 412, 418.

[2806](#) Ibid., Nos. 402, 403, 409, 410.

[2807](#) Ibid., Nos. 402, 403, 409, 410.

[2808](#) Ibid., No. 413.

[2809](#) Ibid., No. 414.

[2810](#) Cajan or Cadjan are matted coconut leaves used for thatch. (See *Cadjan* in *Hobson-Jobson*.) Kunbi is Marathi for peasant.

[2811](#) Ibid., No. 418.

[2812](#) Kolis, i.e. fishermen. But the sentence also mentions fishermen separately.

[2813](#) Ibid., No. 417.

[2814](#) Ibid., No. 424.

[2815](#) Ibid., No. 419 (Mumbai to Surat, 13<sup>th</sup> November 1673).

[2816](#) *SCP*, p.26. Vijaya Dashami (or Dasara) is an auspicious day for Hindus and their armies often opened the campaigning season on that day.

[2817](#) *SCP*, p.52.

[2818](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.403.

[2819](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 403; *EFI* (1670-1677), p.229.

[2820](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 414.

[2821](#) Ibid., No.429.

[2822](#) Ibid., No.427.

[2823](#) Ibid., No.431.

[2824](#) *SCP*, p.26.

[2825](#) He was the younger son of Sayyid Ilyas Sharza Khan who was killed in 1665 during Jai Singh's invasion of the Adilshahi Sultanate. After the latter's death both his sons, Sayyid Makhdum (the elder) and Sayyid Habib, were given their father's title, Sharza Khan. (*Basatin*, Ch. 7, sec. 42, 46-47; *Ali Nama*, c. 53-55.)

[2826](#) *SCP*, p.64

[2827](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 446.

[2828](#) *Ibid.*, No. 441.

[2829](#) *Ibid.*, No. 451 (p.328)

[2830](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.97. Fryer visited Mukhlis Khan, the Mughal commander at Junnar, in May 1675. About the castle of Junnar he writes: "In my passage through the castle they seemed rather encamped than fortified; wherefore if Shivaji brings any power, they betake themselves to speedy flight or retire to the body of the army under Bahadur Khan, Generalissimo of these marches; being ill prepared to endure a siege and more able to defend themselves joined to an host of forty thousand horse always at Pergom [Pedgaon], three days journey hence." (Fryer, Vol. I, p. 325. 'Marches' is used here in the sense of border districts.) So, according to Fryer, the Mughal army of the Deccan under Bahadur Khan, comprising 40,000 cavalry, was always encamped at Pedgaon.

[2831](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.3.

[2832](#) *FBS*, pp.56-59. It is because of Guarda's mistaken belief that the incident took place during Shayista Khan's invasion that

Netoji has been mentioned in this passage. But in 1674 Netoji was in Mughal service.

[2833](#) Ibid., No.11.

[2834](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.76 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.109).

[2835](#) Ibid. Jesari in the printed version is evidently a mistake for Nesari which is in Kolhapur District, about 65 km south-southeast of Kolhapur.

[2836](#) *SCP*, pp. 26, 52. In the Jedhe Chronology the name of the place is given as Nivate. But it seems it is an error for Nesari, quite possible in the *modi* script of Marathi in which it is written. In the Deshpande Chronology (*SCP*, p.64), which is another copy of the same chronology, the name of the place is given as Nevari. The correct name is Nesari. (See note 94.)

[2837](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 451 (pp. 328-29).

[2838](#) For instance, Jadunath Sarkar in *Shivaji and His Times* p.196; Bal Krishna in *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.128.

[2839](#) *SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 1709.

[2840](#) *SCP*, p.26.

[2841](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.27); *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 109-10.

[2842](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.27).

[2843](#) Harihareshwar, about 35 km south of Rajpuri. Now it falls in the group *gram-panchayat* of Maral and Deoghar in Raigad district. I have not been able to identify Vessing.

[2844](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 451 (pp. 329-30).

[2845](#) *Ibid.*, No. 446.

[2846](#) *Ibid.*

[2847](#) Henry Oxenden, a member of the Surat council, was specially sent to Mumbai for concluding the treaty. There he was admitted to the Bombay council. See *EFI* (1670-1677), pp. 83-88; *ERS*, Vol. I, letter No. 451.

[2848](#) *Ibid.*

[2849](#) For an account of Narayan Shenavi's mission, see his letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> April 1674 from Raigad to Mumbai. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 451. It is a contemporaneous English translation of the Portuguese original.) See also *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 456, 458.

[2850](#) Niraji Raoji, chief justice in Shivaji's administration.

[2851](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 457.

[2852](#) *Ibid.*, No. 459.

[2853](#) *Ibid.*, No. 462, 464; *EFI* (1670-1677), P. 86.

[2854](#) *Ibid.*, No. 462.

[2855](#) A Zoroastrian (Parsee) businessman at Mumbai.

[2856](#) Ibid., No. 464.

[2857](#) Ibid.

[2858](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p.87; *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 467.

[2859](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos. 468-69.

[2860](#) Ibid., No. 471.

[2861](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 87-88.

[2862](#) Ibid., p.88.

[2863](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 470.

[2864](#) Ibid.

[2865](#) Ibid., No. 473. Printed under the title, “Consultation at Surat”. This is an error. It was a consultation at Mumbai as is clear from a perusal of its source which is F.R. Bombay, Vol. I, pp. 30-31. See also *EFI*, Vol. I, p.89, fn 3.

[2866](#) Though the Englishmen viewed this amount of 10,000 hons as reparations for their losses at Rajapur, the Marathas regarded it as “bucksiss”, i.e. an *ex-gratia* payment. (*ERS*, vol. II, Nos. 198, 265, 295, 336, 487, 488, 509, 510.)

[2867](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 470.

[2868](#) Ibid., No. 486 (pp.370-71).

[2869](#) For an account of Oxenden's mission, see *ERS*, Vol. I, No.486.

[2870](#) Here, 'signed' merely means sealed. In 17<sup>th</sup> Century Maharashtra, documents were not 'signed' in the modern sense of the term.

[2871](#) Shivaji had not forbidden the passing of English coins in his dominions. All that he meant was that he would not force his subjects to accept English coins; they might accept them if they thought them good in quality and weight. See *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 486 (pp. 374-75).

[2872](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:44-46, 64.

[2873](#) *Shivabharat*, 18:55-57

[2874](#) Dr. G. T .Kulkarni, on the basis of a document purported to be Shah Jahan's *farman* to Shivaji, draws the inference that Shivaji was in Mughal service. The document is spurious. It is examined in Appendix -.

[2875](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.80 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 113-14.)

[2876](#) *BISM Varshik Itivritta* [Annual Report] for Shaka 1835, pp. 293-305.

[2877](#) *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part I, pp.3-14

[2878](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.451 (p. 327). Narayan Shenavi went up on 29<sup>th</sup> March 1674. The mourning period among Hindus is 13 days. So Shivaji's wife mentioned in the letter might have died about 16<sup>th</sup> March 1674. We know from *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru* that Shivaji's wife Kashibai had died shortly before his coronation. (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. I, p. 31.) She must be the one Shenavi mentions in his letter.

[2879](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 451 (p.328).

[2880](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 451 (p.330).

[2881](#) *Ibid.*, No. 456.

[2882](#) *Ibid.*, No. 457.

[2883](#) *Ibid.*, No. 460.

[2884](#) In those days it was common practice in India to insure goods in transit, the rates depending upon various factors. See, for instance, *EFI* (1622-1623), pp. xl, 101; (1642-1645), pp.92, 161; (1646-1650), pp. 88, 103, 259; (1651-1654), pp.177, 224, 251; (1655-1660), 42, 121; (1665-1667), pp.100, 202; Vol. I, p. 285. The insurers were private shroffs. [See for instance *EFI* (1655-1660), pp. 15n, 62, 71, 74.] Insurance was called 'beema' in the vernacular. See *EFI* (1661-64), p.86

[2885](#) *Ibid.*, No. 470.

[2886](#) *Ibid.*, No. 474.

[2887](#) *Ibid.*, No. 486.

[2888](#) This could be a crown or a canopy.

[2889](#) Ibid., No. 486 (p.371).

[2890](#) Ibid., No. 486 (p.372).

[2891](#) Ibid., No. 486 (pp.372-73).

[2892](#) Ibid., No. 486 (p.373).

[2893](#) For *Maunjibandhanam*, see Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp. 27, 52). For marriages, see *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru* (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. I, p.32.) *Maunjibandhanam* (or *Upanayanam*) means investiture with the sacred thread. Men of the three higher castes (according to the then prevalent belief) were required to undergo this ceremony before marriage. But in Maharashtra the practice had fallen into disuse except among the Brahmins. Being a *Kshatriya* Shivaji was required to be invested with the sacred thread before his enthronement.

[2894](#) *SCP*, pp.27, 52.

[2895](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 480.

[2896](#) A follower of *Tantra*, i.e. cult teaching magical and mystical formularies for the worship of deities or the attainment of superhuman power.

[2897](#) *Rajabhishekapravayoga* published under the title *Shrishivrajabhishekapravayogah*; Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.27, 52); Oxenden's narrative (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 486); *Shivaraj-Rajyabhishek-Kalptaru* published in *BISM Quarterly*,

Vol. X, No. I, pp.29-40; Abraham Le Feber's letter (English translation in *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp.32-35).

2898 He does not say he was at Raigad in his letter and Oxenden does not mention him in his account. But Abraham Le Feber had visited Shivaji late in 1671 or early in 1672. The Dutch letter dated 31<sup>st</sup> July 1672 from Batavia to the Dutch Company's headquarters in the Netherlands reports: "The accountant Abraham Lefeper [? Le Feber] had gone with a letter and a present to the town Ragery [Rairi] to salute Shivaji, who civilly received him, but would have been more satisfied with somewhat richer presents, ours amounting to the value of 450 pagodas only. Whether we have gained his goodwill time will show; meantime we reckon not much upon it." (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 305-06. Also see SPSS, Vol. II, No.1485.)

2899 He writes Shivaji made known his intention to the principal and most learned persons, and said that he could not be crowned until he has abandoned his present caste of Bhonsla [Bhosale] and taken the caste of Kettery [Kshatriya], and that it was fitting that they should initiate him into that caste. Thereupon the learned men answered that that could hardly be, as his ancestors had always been Bhonslas. Shivaji replied that the Bhonslas were descended from the Kettery caste, and that what he wished could certainly be done. So the other party, taking into consideration that Shivaji could not be crowned unless he first became a Kettery, and that he had promised not to act or rule tyrannically and badly as before, on the 8<sup>th</sup> of June last, with great ceremony, they granted him the caste of Kettery and intended also to initiate him into the rules of the caste; but he demanded to be taught the Brahman rule. This, however, they refused, but one of the chief among them complied, and Shivaji ordered 7,000 pagodas to be given to him as a present. This day was given up to the ceremony and a sum of 17,000 pagodas distributed to the crowd collected for it." (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 32-33.) The date, 8<sup>th</sup> June, given in the

letter is in New Style. It corresponds with 29<sup>th</sup> May of Old Style. On that date, according to Le Feber, Shivaji was granted the Kshatriya caste. By that he evidently meant Shivaji's *Maunjibandhanam*.

[2900](#) Oxenden records under 29<sup>th</sup> May: "This day the Rajah according to the Hindu custom was weighed in gold and poised about 16,000 pagodas, which money together with one hundred thousand more, is to be distributed after his coronation unto the Brahmins who in great number are flocked hither from all the adjacent countries." (*ERS*, Vol. I, p.374.) Le Feber states: "On the 14<sup>th</sup> June Shivaji made a great distribution to the learned men, for the washing away of the sins he had committed, of gold to the weight of his body (weighing 17,000 pagodas or about 160 pounds)." The date given by Le Feber, 14<sup>th</sup> June, is in New Style; it corresponds with 4<sup>th</sup> June in Old Style. The *Tula* was performed for atonement of sins such as *Brahmhatya* (killing a Brahmin) which might have occurred during war. (See *Shrishivrajabhishekapravayogah*, editor's introduction, pp.23-25; Le Feber's letter.)

[2901](#) Both these rites are performed at the commencement of religious ceremonies.

[2902](#) It needs to be noted that the day changes at sunrise according to the Hindu calendar.

[2903](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 486 (p. 375).

[2904](#) *Ibid.*

[2905](#) *Kshatriyakulawatansa* means crest of the Kshatriya caste.

[2906](#) He writes: “This distribution [of largess] continued for 12 days, and every day Shivaji feasted the people; it is said that this ceremony and distribution of largess cost 150,000 pagodas.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.34.)

[2907](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.82 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.117).

[2908](#) See Chapter 11.

[2909](#) *Shivapur Chronology* (SCP, p.52). Jedhe Chronology states that Jijabai died at Pachad on Wednesday, Chaitra Vadya 9, Shaka 1596. (SCP, p. 27.) It corresponds with 19<sup>th</sup> April 1674 and it was a Sunday. Evidently, Chaitra in that entry is a mistake for Jyeshtha. Wednesday, Jyeshtha Vadya 9, Shaka 1596 corresponds with 17<sup>th</sup> June 1674 and it was a Wednesday.

[2910](#) Shivaji's father, Shahji, was born on 15<sup>th</sup> March 1599. (See Chapter 4.) Customarily among Hindus, the wife is younger than her husband. So Jijabai could not have been more than 74 years old at the time of her death. Of course, Le Feber has not given her exact age. He merely says that she was about 80 years old.

[2911](#) For full text, see *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. I, pp.29-40.

[2912](#) Ashwin Shuddha 5 is called Lalitapanchami.

[2913](#) SCP, p.52.

[2914](#) Bahadur Khan was the *subadar* of the Deccan. His mother having nursed Aurangzeb, he was Aurangzeb's foster brother (*koka* in Persian).

[2915](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp.82-83 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.117-18)

[2916](#) See Chapter 13.

[2917](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 16.

[2918](#) *Ibid.*, No. 19.

[2919](#) From Portuguese ‘*Povo*’ (People). Used in the sense of people’s representatives. (See *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 76.)

[2920](#) *Ibid.*, No. 28.

[2921](#) That is, for the Company’s commercial interests in the Mughal Empire.

[2922](#) For description of fort, see *Kolaba District Gazetteer*, p. 906.

[2923](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No.31.

[2924](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 30 (Mumbai to Surat, 6<sup>th</sup> October 1674).

[2925](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 31-32 (Mumbai to Surat, 10<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> October 1674).

[2926](#) *Ibid.*, No. 32.

[2927](#) *Ibid.*, No.34 (Surat to Mumbai, 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1674).

[2928](#) Ibid., No. 40 (Surat to Mumbai, 28<sup>th</sup> October 1674).

[2929](#) Ibid., No. 43.

[2930](#) The following account of the sack of Dharangaon is taken from *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 56 (Surat, 20<sup>th</sup> January 1675), 77 (Mumbai, 24<sup>th</sup> march 1675), 122 (Austen's narrative, August-September 1675), 143 (Surat, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1676); *EFI*, Vol. I, p.254 (Surat, 13<sup>th</sup> February 1675).

[2931](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 77.

[2932](#) Ibid., No. 56.

[2933](#) Ibid., Nos. 67-68 (Mumbai Council consultation, 19<sup>th</sup> February 1675; Mumbai to Surat, 20<sup>th</sup> February 1675).

[2934](#) Ibid. No., 77.

[2935](#) Ibid. Nos. 115, 122 (p.69).

[2936](#) Ibid. No. 122 (p.70).

[2937](#) Pralhad was son of Niraji Raoji, Chief justice in Shivaji's government. The account of this interview is taken from Austen's narrative. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 122, pp. 70-71.)

[2938](#) Though this is what has been stated in Austen's narrative, the following extract from a letter dated 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1677 sent by the Surat Council to Mumbai shows that Shivaji did give him an order of payment of Rs.1,000 on Kalyan-Bhiwandi: "Mr. Samuel Austen has desired us to remind you of the 1,000 Rupees Rajah Shivaji has given him on Kalyan Bhiwandi, that

when you recover the Company's money you would also seek the recovery of his, which we desire you to endeavour, in regard he has been a great sufferer by Shivaji." (*ERS*, Vo. II, No. 213.) Perhaps this pay order was granted *ex-gratia*, not as compensation.

[2939](#) Arabic 'qaul' (word, promise).

[2940](#) *Ibid.*, No. 143.

[2941](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* does not give the date of this event. But it is mentioned in an English letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> October 1672 from Mumbai. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No.322.) See also *Parnal*, 2:42-44, 5:56, 81.

[2942](#) He was Inspector of Branding and Inspection (of the contingents of *mansabdars*) in the Deccan. (*Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.102.)

[2943](#) Gangaram was on the personal staff of Bahadur Khan. (*Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.100, 107.)

[2944](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.90, 103.

[2945](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 57.

[2946](#) By this was evidently meant the rank of 5000 or 6000 *Dhat*.

[2947](#) *Ibid.*, No. 63.

[2948](#) *Ibid.*, No. 72. Also see Nos. 77, 86.

[2949](#) *Ibid.*, No. 78.

[2950](#) He was ‘Customer’ (i.e. Customs officer) at Surat. (*EFI*, Vol. I, p. 239.)

[2951](#) *Ibid.*, No. 97.

[2952](#) *Ibid.*, No. 63, 101; *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Sec. 5.

[2953](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.63; *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Sec. 5.

[2954](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.101; *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Sec. 5.

[2955](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, Persian text, p. 142. (English translation in *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.88.) I have adopted the English translation with a few changes in the interest of accuracy.

[2956](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 60 (p.33).

[2957](#) *SCP*, p.27. According to Abraham Le Feber’s letter dated 13<sup>th</sup> October 1674 from Vengurle to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, an earlier attempt to take the fort by a surprise attack had been made. He writes: “In the beginning of September last, in Kudal, about four miles from here, one of Shivaji’s generals, called Amasy [?Anaji]came with 3,000 soldiers to surprise the fortress Phonda, but Muhammad Khan who was there, being informed of his coming, armed himself against him, so the aforesaid Pundit had no luck and has accomplished nothing.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part II, p.35.)

[2958](#) A village 10 km southeast of Lanja in the Lanja Taluka of Ratnagiri District.

[2959](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 81 (pp.43-44).

[2960](#) Ibid., No. 81 (p.44).

[2961](#) Ibid.

[2962](#) Wig (short for periwig), shoulder-length or longer, was part of the gentlemen's costume in England, France, and some other European countries. See, for instance, portrait of George Oxenden included as frontispiece in *EFI* (1661-1664).

[2963](#) Ibid., No. 81 (pp.44-45).

[2964](#) Ibid., No. 81 (p.46).

[2965](#) Wig (short for periwig), shoulder-length or longer, was part of the gentlemen's costume in England, France, and some other European countries. See, for instance, portrait of George Oxenden included as frontispiece in *EFI* (1661-1664).

[2966](#) I have not been able to trace this Sarup Nayak. Probably he was Chief of some minor principality in the region, possibly Sonda.

[2967](#) Ibid., No. 79.

[2968](#) Ibid., No. 80.

[2969](#) His envoy had indeed arrived at Goa. (*Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 103.)

[2970](#) Ibid., No. 81 (pp.47-48).

[2971](#) This was Abu Khan, son of Rustam-i Zaman II, who had been executed for treason.

[2972](#) Ibid. No. 82.

[2973](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 103.

[2974](#) The date is given in the Jedhe Chronology and the *Basatin-us Salatin*. The Chronology records under Shaka 1597: "Vaishakh Shuddha 2 [17<sup>th</sup> April 1675] His Majesty blew up the castle of Phonda by a mine." (*SCP*, p. 27.) The *Basatin-us Salatin* (Ch. 8, Sec.5) states that Shivaji captured the fort on 15<sup>th</sup> Safar, 1086 A.H. [1<sup>st</sup> May 1675]. In its Marathi translation the year is given as 1082 A. H. But it is obvious that it is a mistake for 1086 A.H. In the printed Persian text (pp. 6-7 of Ch. 8) the date is given as 15<sup>th</sup> Safar 1086 A.H. If we assume, as I do, that the Shuddha in the entry in the Jedhe Chronology is a mistake for Vadya, then the date (Vaishakh Vadya 2, Shaka 1597) corresponds with that in the *Basatin-us Salatin*, viz. 1<sup>st</sup> May 1675. The reports in the English letters suggest that it is the correct date.

[2975](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 83.

[2976](#) Ibid., No. 85.

[2977](#) Ibid., No. 88.

[2978](#) The Jedhe Chronology records under Shaka 1597 that Shivaji captured Karwar, Shiveshvar and Ankola in the month of Jyeshtha [15<sup>th</sup> May to 13<sup>th</sup> June 1675]. (*SCP*, p. 27.)

[2979](#) Ibid., No. 89.

[2980](#) Ibid., No. 91.

[2981](#) Ibid., No. 94.

[2982](#) Ibid., No. 96.

[2983](#) Fryer, Vol. II, p.2.

[2984](#) Ibid., p. 32.

[2985](#) Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[2986](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 106.

[2987](#) Ibid., No. 107 (22<sup>nd</sup> July 1675).

[2988](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.103-04.

[2989](#) Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights, commences on Ashwin Vadya 13 and ends on Kartik Shuddha 2. In 1675 it commenced on 6<sup>th</sup> October and ended on 10<sup>th</sup> October.

[2990](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.110.

[2991](#) Ibid., Nos. 27, 35.

[2992](#) EFI, Vol. I, p. 105. See also ERS, Vol. II, Nos. 37, 58.

[2993](#) Ibid., No. 60 (p.29).

[2994](#) Ibid., No. 37.

[2995](#) Ibid., No. 27.

[2996](#) Ibid, No. 60; *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 255.

[2997](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 60 (pp.30-31).

[2998](#) Ibid., No. 60 (pp.31-32).

[2999](#) Ibid., No. 81 (p.42).

[3000](#) Shivaji also gave the Company a letter to that effect. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No.336.) It would be remembered that according to the original agreement, the Company was to get goods worth 5,000 Hons for which they were to pay only 2,500 Hons. Now, as per Shivaji's new order, they were to get goods worth 2,500 Hons and were not to pay anything against them.

[3001](#) Ibid., No. 81 (p.46).

[3002](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 257.

[3003](#) Ibid., pp. 149, 271.

[3004](#) Ibid., p.287.

[3005](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 72.

[3006](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 122.

[3007](#) Mayboom, being very leaky, was hauled ashore for repairs. *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 257.

[3008](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 112.

[3009](#) *Ibid.*, No.113.

[3010](#) *Ibid.*, No. 119.

[3011](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 122.

[3012](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 118.

[3013](#) *Ibid.*, Nos.125, 131.

[3014](#) *Ibid.*, No. 123.

[3015](#) *Ibid.*, No. 125.

[3016](#) *Ibid.*, No. 127.

[3017](#) I think “ashore” here means at Danda Rajpuri as reinforcements.

[3018](#) *Ibid.*, No. 131; Dagh Register entry of 31<sup>st</sup> May 1676 based on reports from Vengurle (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.522); Fryer, Vol. II, p.18.

[3019](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.131. The Dagh Register records in its entry of 31<sup>st</sup> May 1676, based on reports from Vengurle: “A Mughal fleet of 6 yachts and 11 frigates plundered Vengurle and the environs on 20<sup>th</sup> November 1675... After this there was also a battle with

Shivaji's fleet, which was also completely routed." (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 522. The date in the entry is in New Style.) It seems the naval action fought at Vengurle was not one between the two fleets, but only between parts of them.

[3020](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Sections, 3, 4, 6; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.104-05.

[3021](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 7; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.105. The Jedhe Chronology (SCP, p. 27) states that Khawas Khan arrested Bahlul Khan on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1675 and himself became the regent. The date is correct; but it was Bahlul Khan who arrested Khawas Khan and not vice versa. See also *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 137, 162.

[3022](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Sections 8-9; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp. 105-06. The dates are from *Basatin*; but for other details I have followed the *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*. The *Basatin* does not say that Bahlul Khan had a plan to eliminate Shaikh Minhaj.

[3023](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p. 107. A document purported to be a *copy* of Shivaji's letter to his step brother Ekoji mentions this raid. (*Aitihasik Sadhane*, No.18.) But the very language and style of the letter are enough to show any one familiar with Shivaji's letters that it is an obvious fabrication.

[3024](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 89 (Surat to Karwar, 26<sup>th</sup> June 1664).

[3025](#) *Ibid.*, No. 137.

[3026](#) There were repeated rumours of his serious illness and even death early in 1676. (*ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 137, 141, 144, 152, 159; *Dagh Register* vide *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p.168.) That he was very ill at Satara was indeed true. (Shivapur Chronology in SCP, p.53.)

[3027](#) Ibid., No.150. See also Nos. 152, 159.

[3028](#) Dagh Register entry for 30<sup>th</sup> June 1676 (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 168-69).

[3029](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 159.

[3030](#) Ibid. No. 198 (p.105).

[3031](#) Ibid., No. 293.

[3032](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 362.

[3033](#) Ibid., No. 363.

[3034](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.107.

[3035](#) Ibid., p.106; *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Section 10; *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 161.

[3036](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.107.

[3037](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Section 10; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.108-09; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.28); *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.93. All these sources mention that Islam Khan Rumi, the *subadar* of Malwa, was killed in this battle. The date of the battle is given as 1<sup>st</sup> June 1676 in *Basatin* and the Jedhe Chronology, but as 13<sup>th</sup> June 1676 in *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*.

[3038](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.110.

[3039](#) Ibid., pp.110-11.

[3040](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No.107; *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.60.

[3041](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 156 (p.85).

[3042](#) Ibid., No. 163.

[3043](#) Pindval, about 22 km east of Dharampur. “*Painecah* is probably either *Panva*, 5 m. w. of Pindval, or *Panaj*, 9 m. n. of Dharampur.” (*Shivaji and His times*, p.219 n.)

[3044](#) Ibid., No. 164.

[3045](#) Ibid., Nos. 163, 164, 166, 182.

[3046](#) Ibid., No. 173 (Surat to Mumbai, 4<sup>th</sup> July 1676).

[3047](#) Ibid. No. 166.

[3048](#) Ibid. No. 157.

[3049](#) Ibid. No. 164.

[3050](#) Ibid. No. 168.

[3051](#) Ibid. No. 173.

[3052](#) Manucci, Vol. II, p.201.

[3053](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.28). See also *SCS*, Vol. VIII, pp. 78, 82. He was not given a high office in Shivaji's government again.

[3054](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.175.

[3055](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.168.

[3056](#) *Ibid.*

[3057](#) *Ibid.*, No. 172.

[3058](#) *Ibid.*, No. 177.

[3059](#) *Ibid.*, No. 193. Mumbai to Surat, 1<sup>st</sup> December 1675.

[3060](#) *Ibid.*, No. 220.

[3061](#) *Ibid.*, No. 218.

[3062](#) *Ibid.*, No. 221; *EFI*, Vol. I, p.172.

[3063](#) *ERS*, Vol II, No. 235. Mumbai to Surat, 27<sup>th</sup> June 1677.

[3064](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 256-57.

[3065](#) *EFI*, Vol. I, p.176.

[3066](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 289-90.

[3067](#) *Ibid.*, No. 302.

[3068](#) Ibid., No. 308.

[3069](#) Ibid., No. 309 and note.

[3070](#) *Manchua* was a large cargo-boat with a single mast and a sail. (See *Hobson-Jobson*.)

[3071](#) Ibid., No. 310. The title “Bombay to the Company” given there is incorrect. The letter was sent to Surat, not to the Company’s headquarters in England, as is evident from certain part of the contents. (Omitted in the quotation given here.) The letter is also printed in *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 359-61.

[3072](#) Kaffir, a member of the black tribes in Africa. (See *Caffer* in *Hobson-Jobson*.)

[3073](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 311-13, 324.

[3074](#) Ibid., No. 314, 316-17.

[3075](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 83-84 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 119).

[3076](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 194 (p.103).

[3077](#) Ibid., No. 196.

[3078](#) Ibid., No. 212.

[3079](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.111.

[3080](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 83-84 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 119).

[3081](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, no. 272.

[3082](#) In the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, the term ‘Karnataka’ included a large part of South India, including what is now called Tamil Nadu. Therefore, though most of the territory which Shivaji conquered in this campaign, including Vellore and Gingee, lies in present day Tamil Nadu, south of Chennai, and not in the present day state of Karnataka, the campaign is usually known as the ‘Karnataka Campaign’.

[3083](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.111.

[3084](#) Ibid., pp. 193-94. Aurangzeb had described the richness of the Qutbshahi Karnatak in his letters to Shah Jahan in 1656. (See, for instance, *Adab-i Alamgiri*, Vol. I, pp. 229-32, 249-52.) The same would have been applicable to the adjoining province of Adilshahi Karnatak.

[3085](#) “Hindustan is in need of a considerable number of foreign horses, receiving annually more than five-and-twenty thousand from Uzbek, a great many from Persia by way of Kandahar, and several from Ethiopia, Arabia and Persia by sea through the ports of Mocha, Basra, and Bandar-Abbas.” (Bernier, p. 203)

[3086](#) Fryer, Vol. II, p.58. It would be interesting to note that in 1681-82, i.e. soon after the Maratha conquest of the Adilshahi Karnataka, orders were issued to Mughal officers on the border that they were not to allow merchants dealing in horses, weapons and war materials to pass into the territories of Bijapur and Hyderabad without requisite permit.(SDAR, pp.131-33.) Were these orders issued as a result of Bijapur’s attempt to

obtain its vital horse supply across the Mughal land frontier, necessitated by its loss of the Coromandel Coast? The question must await the discovery of more documents on the subject before a definite answer can be found. I have come across very few references about import of horses into India by the sea route. There is no doubt that they were being imported through ports on west coast. For instance, the English factors at Rajapur wrote to Mumbai on 6<sup>th</sup> February 1675: "Yesterday arrived at this port from Muscat a vessel whose chiefest lading is about 60 horses." (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 60 – p.33.) The question that needs an answer is how many horses were being imported into India each year by sea.

[3087](#) Martin's Diary (*India in the 17<sup>TH</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.510-11, 528, 531-32, 534-556.

[3088](#) *FBS*, pp.261-262.

[3089](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.162.

[3090](#) *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, pp.163-171, 279-280.

[3091](#) M. Baron was the Director General of the French East India Company at Surat. De la Haye was the commander of the French fleet which had visited India in 1671 and was on the Indian Coast till about September 1674. By 1675 he was back in France.

[3092](#) *FBS*, introduction, p. xli-xlii based on Archives Coloniales Inde, C<sup>2</sup> — 62, fol 316-317.

[3093](#) *S SVV*, Vol. III, pp.20-39.

[3094](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp.3, 77 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 3, 110).

[3095](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp. 178-79 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.221-22).

[3096](#) *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.280.

[3097](#) *A. K. Chronicle*, p. 134; *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp. 179-82.

[3098](#) In Marathi sources like the Sabhasad Chronicle and the Jedhe Chronology, it is usually referred to by its other name, Bhaganagar.

[3099](#) *Decisions from the Shahu and Peshwa Dafter*, No.10 (p. 47).

[3100](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.185. Shivaji had given to the Company a “bill of exchange” (pay order) drawn upon his agent at Golconda for some cloth sold to him by the Company and corn and other goods sold by some merchants at Mumbai. It was forwarded to Golconda, but was returned because by the time it arrived the agent had departed from there. (See p.- n.) The Mumbai Council then sent Narayan Shenavi and Khawas Modi to recover the money, but they got nothing more than promises of payment for which Narayan stayed behind. As the President, Gerald Aungier, doubted his ability, it was decided to send an Englishman. The Mumbai Council initially chose Lieutenant Richard Adams for the mission but as he was indisposed, Francis Mauleverer was sent instead. Shivaji offered to pay either in wrought plate (gold or silver) obtained in plunder or by pay orders on Kalyan and issued instructions to that effect while leaving. But Mauleverer came without taking anything as the plate was overvalued and would have resulted in a loss of 20 per cent or more, and pay orders would have meant a delay of two or three years. At last, in October, the Company decided to accept plate rather than prolong the uncertainty, and issued

orders to Narayan accordingly. (See *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 156, 158, 165, 169, 174, 177, 179, 180, 183, 185, 186, 190, 191; *EFI*, Vol. I, p. 149.)

[3101](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 180, 183, 185.

[3102](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 486 (p. 376).

[3103](#) I have not been able to identify this place.

[3104](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 186.

[3105](#) *SCS*, Vol. VI, p. 69. The date given is 18<sup>th</sup> Shaban, Shuhur year 1077, additionally stating that it was Vijaya Dashami. That date corresponds with 16<sup>th</sup> October 1676, but it was *not* Vijaya Dashami (i. e. Ashwin Shuddha 10), which that year coincided with 6<sup>th</sup> October (8<sup>th</sup> Shaban). I assume, however, that the date is correct. The earliest letter of Shivaji's *subadar* of the Wai Pargana is dated 9<sup>th</sup> December 1676. (*MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 152.)

[3106](#) *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 181 (pp. 266-67). The document is a statement submitted by the Patil of Umbraj, Kaloji son of Jogoji Jadhav. He says therein that his grandfather, Kaloji (son of Ambaji Jadhav) was killed in the fighting at Khatav. That Kaloji (son of Ambaji) Jadhav was killed in the fight against Muslims at Khatav is mentioned in a grant dated 20<sup>th</sup> August 1729 issued to Kaloji son of Jogoji Jadhav by Shivaji's grandson Sambhaji. (*Ibid.*, No. 184.)

[3107](#) *SPD*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (p.20). The document is a revenue statement about the Khatav Pargana. It mentions that the Emperor (Aurangzeb) captured Bijapur on 13<sup>th</sup> September 1686.

[3108](#) *SCS*, Vol. VII, No.23 (p.39).

[3109](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos.193, 197.

[3110](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.198 (p.106).

[3111](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.232. All the dates are in the New Style. So, by the Old Style calendar, Shivaji met the Qutbshah on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1677. This is corroborated by the Jedhe Chronology which records under Shaka 1598 that Shivaji went to Bhaganagar (i.e. Hyderabad) and met the Qutbshah in the month of Falgun (22<sup>nd</sup> February to 23<sup>rd</sup> March, 1677). See *SCP*, p.28.

[3112](#) *SCP*, p. 28. I have not been able to identify “Yalgedala.”

[3113](#) For Hambirrao see *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 86, 90-91 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 122-23, 127); Shivaji’s letter to Ekoji (*Aitihasik Sphuta Lekh*, Part IV, pp.3-9 in *Itihas-Sangraha*, Vol. VII, Nos. I-III, August-October 1915.)

[3114](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.222.

[3115](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.232.

[3116](#) *SPSS*, Vol. II, No.1954

[3117](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 119.

[3118](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.539.

[3119](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 120-121.

[3120](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.539.

[3121](#) That Shivaji gave them coffee would indeed seem strange to a modern reader. The narrative was written 10 years after the event and the mention of coffee might have been due to faulty recollection. But coffee was not unknown in India then. It was called was called *qahwa* in Persian. (See, for instance, *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, Persian text, p.289; English translation, p.177. The incident narrated there took place in 1687.) But I have not found mention of coffee in Marathi records of the period. Tea, too, was quite well known in India then.

[3122](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.121.

[3123](#) Ibid.

[3124](#) Ibid.

[3125](#) Ibid., pp.121-122.

[3126](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.539 (p.350).

[3127](#) He was the leader of the revolt against Spanish rule in Naples (Italy) in 1647. However, He was murdered in the same year.

[3128](#) Ibid., No. 232.

[3129](#) SCP, p.28.

[3130](#) FBS, p.264.

[3131](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.232.

[3132](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.124.

[3133](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.232.

[3134](#) *FBS*, p.291.

[3135](#) *Ibid.*

[3136](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 240.

[3137](#) *Ibid.*, No.241.

[3138](#) *Ibid.*, No.252.

[3139](#) *Ibid.*, No.253.

[3140](#) *Aitihasik Sphuta Lekh*, Part IV, pp.3-9 in *Itihas-Sangraha*, Vol. VII, Nos. I-III, August-October 1915.

[3141](#) For Madanna's antecedents, see *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, pp. 80, 187-89.

[3142](#) *History of the Qutbshahi Dynasty*, pp. 601-02.

[3143](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 14-15, 17, 64, 74, 86, 98.

[3144](#) *Hadiqat-ul Alam* (vide *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, pp.89-90).

[3145](#) *History of the Qutbshahi Dynasty*, pp. 625-26.

[3146](#) *Hadiqat-ul Alam* (English translation in *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, p.91); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 85 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.121); *Tarikh-i Zafara*, p.35.

[3147](#) *History of the Qutbshahi Dynasty*, pp. 627-28.

[3148](#) *Hadiqat-ul Alam* (English translation in *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, p.92).

[3149](#) English translation of an old Telugu manuscript in *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, pp.194-95.

[3150](#) *FBS*, pp.261-64.

[3151](#) A Mughal army under Prince Shah Alam (Muhammad Muazzam) captured Hyderabad in 1686, whereupon Abul Hasan Qutbshah took refuge in the fort of Golconda and sued for peace. Shah Alam demanded an indemnity of 12 million rupees and the dismissal and imprisonment of Madanna and Akkanna. Abul Hasan was hesitant to imprison the two brothers, but some palace officials killed them, dragged their bodies through the streets and sent their severed heads to the Mughal Prince who sent them to Aurangzeb. This, however, did not save Abul Hasan. The following year, Aurangzeb himself marched against the Qutbshahi Sultanate. Some of the charges he made against Abul Hasan were that he had entrusted the sole authority of his country to an infidel (Madanna), had helped the damned infidel Sambhaji and had recently sent him one lakh of Hons. Golconda was captured and Abul Hasan was taken prisoner. He was kept in confinement at Daulatabad where he died in 1700. (*Hadiqat-ul Alam* – English translation in *Qutbshahi of Golcondah*, pp.111, 126-27, 172, 181-82; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 167, 174-83, 187;

Journal of a contemporaneous Dutchman – vide *JIH*, Vol. X, Part II, August 1931, p. 92 and illustration facing it.)

[3152](#) Published in the periodical *Saraswati Mandir*, Year 5, Nos. 5-6 (months of Margashirsha and Magha, Shaka 1827). Reprinted in *SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 1901.

[3153](#) Badshah and Badshahi are Persian terms for Sultan and Sultanate respectively.

[3154](#) *Wazirs* in the Adilshahi Sultanate were equivalent to *mansabdars* in the Mughal Empire. Officers appointed by the *wazirs* in their contingents were called *sardars*. *Sardars* were private servants of the *wazirs* and were therefore much lower in status.

[3155](#) According to the report of the Dutch factors at Hyderabad, they accompanied Shivaji for a short distance when he left Hyderabad on 11<sup>th</sup> April 1677 (N.S.). (Dutch letter from Pulicat to Batavia, 30<sup>th</sup> July 1677 vide *Xenophobia in Seventeenth Century India*, pp.173-74.) Sabhasad states that Shivaji stayed at Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) for about a month and then set out for Gingee. (*Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 87, English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.124.)

[3156](#) See Chapter 3.

[3157](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.124.

[3158](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.222.

[3159](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 271).

[3160](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 261).

[3161](#) *FBS*, p.272. One écu was equivalent to two rupees at the time. (Tavernier, Vol. I, p.15; Thevenot in *Indian Travels* p.26.) Martin records in his memoirs that Qutbshahi authorities refused to confer upon Nasir Khan the territory that was promised to him by the agreement of Gingee, on the plea that Shivaji had not handed over that fort to them and that, soon afterwards, Nasir Khan died a disappointed man. (*FBS*, pp.275-76.) Martin's story that Nasir Khan was promised some territory in the Qutbshahi Sultanate is not corroborated by any other source and we cannot therefore presume its veracity.

[3162](#) *SCP*, p.28

[3163](#) *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.124.

[3164](#) *Historical Miscellany*, p.11. (Compare *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.282.) English translation of these Jesuit letters given in J. Bertrand's *La Mission du Maduré* has been used in the *History of the Nayaks of Madura*. But Bertrand's French translation of original letters written in Italian, Portuguese or Latin is defective. (See *The Aravidu Dynasty*, Bibliographical introduction, p.20; *Jesuit Letters and Indian History*, p. 65, 87.) Therefore, I have used the English translation by H. Heras done from photocopies of original letters and printed in *Historical Miscellany*. For the sake of comparison, I have also cited the relevant page numbers from the *History of the Nayaks of Madura*. Heras does not give the name of the correspondent; I have taken it from the *History of the Nayaks of Madura*.

[3165](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 226.

[3166](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp.274-275); Fort St. George Records (vide *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 258-60); *Basatin*, Ch. 8, section 28 (Persian text, pp.476-77). Marathi translation of the relevant passage in *Basatin* is incorrect but the errors in it could easily be discerned.

[3167](#) *FBS*, p.270.

[3168](#) A village in Villupuram District of Tamil Nadu, on the road from Chennai to Tiruchirapalli.

[3169](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p.279).

[3170](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p.277).

[3171](#) Ibid.

[3172](#) See Chapter 2.

[3173](#) Martin's journal (*India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 516-18, 521-22, 562-66).

[3174](#) Martin's journal (*India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.531-32, 534-39).

[3175](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp.277-78).

[3176](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p.278).

[3177](#) The 'Cordial stone' was probably a stimulating medicine and also a counter poison. But I have no more information about it.

[3178](#) ERS, Vol. II, letter Nos. 224, 226.

[3179](#) Maldivian Coconuts and Bezoar stones were regarded as counter poisons. The Maldivian coconut is not a coconut as we know it. It is a large nut which looks like two coconuts joined together. It grew only in the then uninhabited Seychelles. The palms which bear this fruit being close to the sea-shore, the fruit floated across the Indian Ocean and was occasionally picked up at the Maldives and had to be given up to the Sultan of those islands. It fetched a high price as it was supposed to be a counter poison. It was not known where the palms bearing these fruit grew. But as the fruit was exported from the Maldives it came to be called Maldivian coconut. The source of the fruit was discovered only in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. (Pyrard, Vol. I, pp.230-31 and n.) Bezoar is a corruption of Persian *pazahr* (counter poison). The term was applied to certain hard concretions, to which antidotal virtues were ascribed, found in the stomach of herbivorous animals. (See Bezoar in *Hobson-Jobson*.)

[3180](#) Ibid., No. 226.

[3181](#) Ibid, Nos. 231, 233.

[3182](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 288).

[3183](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 262-65).

[3184](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 284).

[3185](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 285).

[3186](#) Ibid.

[3187](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 285-86).

[3188](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 287).

[3189](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 280-81).

[3190](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 288-89); *ERS*, Vol. II, No.234.

[3191](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 288).

[3192](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 290).

[3193](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.234.

[3194](#) Ibid.

[3195](#) Ibid.

[3196](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 297-98).

[3197](#) *SCP*, p.28. It puts the battle and Sher Khan's capture in the month of Ashadha, Shaka 1599 (21<sup>st</sup> June to 19<sup>th</sup> July 1677).

[3198](#) Baba Sahib was a Muslim Qutbshahi nobleman. (See *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, pp.353, 391; Carré, Vol II, pp. 448, 477-78; *India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.128-29, 295.) We know that one Mirza Muhammad Amin was commander of the Qutbshahi contingent which accompanied Shivaji. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No.232.) Perhaps, Baba Sahib might have been his sobriquet. Savarumwar, as the name suggests, was probably a Hindu Qutbshahi nobleman

[3199](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.234.

[3200](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 289-90).

[3201](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 290).

[3202](#) *Ibid.*

[3203](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 293-95, 297). The figure 2,000 in *FBS*, p.295, seems to be a printing error; it is 20,000 in the translation of the same passage in *India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 590.

[3204](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 297).

[3205](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 294, 311, 318, 321-24, 326, 328-29, 332-33).

[3206](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 311).

[3207](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 293).

[3208](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 293-94, 297-99).

[3209](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 299).

[3210](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 300).

[3211](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 295).

[3212](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, p. 297).

[3213](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 240.

[3214](#) *Ibid.*

[3215](#) These might be Pardaos. Pardao is Portuguese corruption of Pratap, a Vijayanagar coin worth half a Hon. But the Portuguese used it for a Xeraphin. (See Pardao in *Hobson-Jobson*) The rate of exchange was 10 rupees for 13 xeraphins. See *EFI* (1665-1667), pp. 69-73, 306-07.

[3216](#) *Ibid.* No. 241.

[3217](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332); Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 202-03); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.88.

[3218](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 241; Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 88 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.125); Andre Freire's letter in *Historical Miscellany*, p.14 (Compare *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.282); Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp.302-03); Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.28); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.88.

[3219](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 241.

[3220](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332); *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 241; Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp.302-03); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.88.

[3221](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.28); Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp.303-04); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 89 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.126); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.88-89.

[3222](#) Andre Freire's letter in *Historical Miscellany*, pp.14-15 (Compare *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p.282).

[3223](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3224](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 241.

[3225](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp.88-89 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp125-26); Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3226](#) *SCP*, p. 28.

[3227](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 244.

[3228](#) *FBS*, p. 304.

[3229](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 301-02).

[3230](#) Martin's journal (*FBS*, pp. 299, 306-07).

[3231](#) *SCSV*, Rajyabhiseka Shaka 300, p.13.

[3232](#) This account of the audience is taken from the letter of the Dutch envoys. (*SCSV*, Rajyabhiseka Shaka 300, pp.14-15. The letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> August 1677 was sent from Valikandapuram to Pulicat by Jager and Clement. See *Xenophobia in Seventeenth Century India*, pp.162, 164 and note 18.) Martin wrote (*FBS*, p.306) that one of the two Dutchmen was the Chief of their factory at Devanampattinam and the other was a merchant skilled in the oriental languages. Nellore Ramanna, too,

reported in his letter of 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1677: “Seignior Deagor and the Chief of Devanampattinam came hither to visit Shivaji Raja. (ERS, Vol. II, No. 244.) Deagor is evidently a corruption of de Jager. So, both Martin and Nellore Ramanna had thought that Clement was the Dutch Chief and both were wrong. The Dutch Chief, Albert van Weede, had not arrived. Herbert de Jager was indeed a great linguist and knew Persian, Tamil, Telugu, and Sanskrit. (SCSV, Rajyabhiseka Shaka 300, p. 11; *India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 598, n.6. )

[3233](#) *Xenophobia in Seventeenth-Century India*, p.175.

[3234](#) FBS, p. 306. Here the term ‘prime minister’ evidently refers to Raghunathpant Hanmante. He was not Shivaji’s prime minister, but was certainly his chief lieutenant in the province.

[3235](#) ERS, Vol. II, Nos. 241, 244.

[3236](#) Ibid., No.244.

[3237](#) Ibid.

[3238](#) Ibid., No. 251.

[3239](#) Ibid., No. 255.

[3240](#) Ibid., No. 247.

[3241](#) Ibid., No. 263.

[3242](#) FBS, p. 299.

[3243](#) *FBS*, p. 316.

[3244](#) *FBS*, p. 310.

[3245](#) *FBS*, p. 322.

[3246](#) *Historical Miscellany*, p.13. (Compare *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 283-284.)

[3247](#) *Xenophobia in Seventeenth-Century India*, p.188. This is from a contemporaneous Dutch translation of the original letter of assurance. A somewhat different Dutch version of the same letter is also extant, but there is no difference in sense. For that version see *Ibid*, p.188, n. 92. The import of the last sentence in the passage quoted above seems to be that the Dutch may keep slaves *in their house* but, if they should indulge in *slave trafficking* within Shivaji's dominion, even that concession would be withdrawn. This becomes clearer in the second version in which the last sentence reads: "If you would, however, still want to do it they [my people] will also not allow that you will bring the same [i.e. slaves] in your house or ship, but they [my people] will take them [the slaves] from you and set them free." (*Ibid.*)

[3248](#) *Xenophobia in Seventeenth-Century India*, pp. 175-76.

[3249](#) It may be noted in this context that slavery as such was not abolished in Shivaji's dominions. What was prohibited was the purchase of slaves in his dominions by foreigners. Dr.Gijs Kruijzer has pointed out: "Only a few lines before the injunction against slave procurement it is written in Shivaji's *qaul* [letter of assurance] that the *kotwals* ... of the harbour towns are responsible for retrieving any runaway slaves belonging to the Dutch." (*Xenophobia in Seventeenth-Century*

*India*, p.188, n.92.) In 1676 some dancing women who had fled from Shivaji's domain to Mumbai were demanded to be handed over by Moropant, the Peshwa, according to the treaty between Shivaji and the English, whereupon the Mumbai Council resolved on 4<sup>th</sup> May 1676 that if they were found they should be restored to the persons whom he might send. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No.60.) These women were of course slaves of a kind. Though slavery of any kind is reprehensible it is pertinent to note that the one that was practiced in India, especially among the Hindus, was far less inhumane than that which was prevalent in America.

[3250](#) See chapter 11.

[3251](#) *Xenophobia in Seventeenth-Century India*, p.175.

[3252](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 232.

[3253](#) *FBS*, pp.309-10.

[3254](#) *FBS*, p. 314.

[3255](#) Martin's journal (*India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 109-11).

[3256](#) *FBS*, pp. 299-300.

[3257](#) *FBS*, pp. 296-97.

[3258](#) Hindu ascetic mendicants of the (so called) lower castes in South India. (*Hobson-Jobson*, p. 666.)

[3259](#) *FBS*, pp. 327-28.

[3260](#) See Chapter 11.

[3261](#) *FBS*, pp. 339-41.

[3262](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.113-14.

[3263](#) Ibid., p.113.

[3264](#) Ibid., p.114.

[3265](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Section10.

[3266](#) *SCP*, p. 28.

[3267](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.99; *Basatin*, Ch.8, section 10. Shahdurg in *Basatin* is but another name of Naldurg.

[3268](#) *SCP*, pp. 28-29.

[3269](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.115; *Basatin*, Ch. 8, Section10.

[3270](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.99; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.28); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.116; *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 272; *Basatin*, Ch. 8, section 10. Aurangzeb was highly displeased with Bahadur Khan and, when he reached the Court, punished him, according to *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, “for some serious offences and for his tyranny in extorting *peshkash* (presents)”, by depriving him of his rank, title and property. But, it adds, the Emperor graciously overlooked the offences of that old servant, granted him an audience on 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1678 and restored him to his former rank and title. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.104.) It seems, however, though

the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* does not say so, that the real reason of the Emperor's displeasure was that time and again the Khan was politically as well as militarily outwitted by Shivaji. The Emperor also suspected, or perhaps knew, that he was being bribed by the Maratha King. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 272.) After Bahadur Khan's recall, Asad Khan was sent to the Deccan with a large army and a vast store of materials, evidently to take charge as *subadar*. (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.99; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.121.) But he was recalled while on the way to his new office. (*Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.121.) Then, on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1678, Prince Shah Alam Bahadur (Muhammad Muazzam) was appointed as the *subadar* of the Deccan. (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.99; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.121.) According to the Jedhe Chronology, he arrived at Aurangabad on 25<sup>th</sup> February 1679. (*SCP*, p. 29. See also *ERS*, Vol. II, No.355.)

[3271](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 236, 248.

[3272](#) Ibid., Nos. 236, 248, 250; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, pp.28-29); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.116; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.102

[3273](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.90 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.127). Martin calls him Governor General of the province. (*FBS*, p.339). See also Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3274](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 90 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.127). See also Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29); Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3275](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.89 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 126-127); Martin (*FBS*, p.318); Jesuit letter (*Historical Miscellany*, p.16); *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 264; Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3276](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 255.

[3277](#) *Ibid.*, No. 264.

[3278](#) *Historical Miscellany*, p.16.

[3279](#) *FBS*, p.312.

[3280](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 259.

[3281](#) Martin (*FBS*, p.313).

[3282](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 264 (Fort St. George to Surat, 20<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> November 1677); Martin (*FBS*, pp.313, 317); Jesuit letter (*Historical Miscellany*, pp.16-17); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 91 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 128-29); Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29); Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332). I have taken the figures for the strength of armies from the English letter. Some of the other sources too have given varying figures. Martin gives the date of the battle as 26<sup>th</sup> November 1677 (N. S.) which corresponds with 16<sup>th</sup> November 1677 (O. S.). The Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29) gives it as the month of Kartik, Shaka 1599 (17<sup>th</sup> October to 14<sup>th</sup> November 1677).

[3283](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3284](#) *SCP*, p.29.

[3285](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 264.

[3286](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 88 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 125). The chronicle mentions the capture of Pratapji Raja and Bhivaji Raja. (*Siva Chhatrapati*, p.129). The Jesuit letter, too, says that one of the prisoners was Ekoji's general and younger brother. (*Historical Miscellany*, p.17). This younger brother must be one of Shahji's natural sons.

[3287](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 264; Jesuit letter (*Historical Miscellany*, p.17).

[3288](#) *Historical Miscellany*, pp.16-17. Compare *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 282-83.

[3289](#) *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, p. 282.

[3290](#) *FBS*, pp. 271-72.

[3291](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.234.

[3292](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No. 2332).

[3293](#) *SCP*, p.29.

[3294](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 91 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 129).

[3295](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp.268-69. See also *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 299.

[3296](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 269.

[3297](#) *FBS*, pp. 318-19.

[3298](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 91 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 129).

[3299](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, sections 11-14; Martin (*FBS*, pp.319-20).

[3300](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, section 15; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29); *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.118; Martin (*FBS*, p.320).

[3301](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, section 16; Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29).

[3302](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos.273, 276.

[3303](#) *Ibid.*, No.292.

[3304](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 296, 322, 325, 341.

[3305](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, section 20.

[3306](#) *Ibid.*

[3307](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, sections 17-18.

[3308](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.255.

[3309](#) *SCP*, p.29.

[3310](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 266, 268.

[3311](#) *Ibid.*, No. 262.

[3312](#) *Ibid.*, No. 272.

[3313](#) SCS, Vol. VI, No.70 (22 June 1678) shows that it was in possession of the Adilshahi Sultanate then.

[3314](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.322 (Hubli to Surat, 19<sup>th</sup> August 1678) shows that Hubli was in possession of the Adilshahi Sultanate then.

[3315](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 90 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.128); *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.192; *A. K. Chronicle*, pp. 143-44.

[3316](#) Sabhasad does not give her name; Chitnis gives it as Malawai, and the *A. K.Chronicle* as Savitribai. According to local tradition, her name was Mallawwa. (*Chhatrapati Shivajimaharaj Smritigrantha*, p.24.)

[3317](#) Recently, in 1989, a small Marathi book entitled *Shivaji-Mallammaji Samarotsava* was published by the Kannada Department of Mumbai University. The editor, Dr. K. N. Chitnis, calls it “An early 18<sup>th</sup> Century Manuscript.” The original, it is said in the manuscript, was written by one Shesho Shrinivas Mutualik for a competition which Tarabai, Shivaji’s daughter-in-law and the then regent of the Maratha Kingdom, had declared for a biography of Shivaji. Shesho’s book won third prize. The story narrated in the manuscript is briefly as follows: Mallamma, the daughter of Madhulinga Nayak of Sonda was married to one Ishaprabhu of Belavadi. While Shivaji was returning from the Karnataka campaign his soldiers carried off some cows belonging to the inhabitants of Belavadi. This led to a conflict during which Ishaprabhu died of wounds. Mallamma continued the fight and laid an ambush in which Shivaji was trapped with only a handful of followers. When his companions were killed he was frightened, fell at Mallamma’s feet and begged for forgiveness, which the brave lady granted. The original manuscript is not extant, but a copy in the Marathi

language but Kannada script made after Mallamma's death in 1717, is said to have been found at Belavadi. The editor admits that the language seems modern, that there are several interpolations, and that the claim in the manuscript of Mallamma's victory over Shivaji is false. Yet he seems to believe that such a story was indeed written in early 18<sup>th</sup> Century. (*Shivaji–Mallammaji Samarotsava*, introduction, pp.12-13.) I have no doubt that is a modern fabrication and as certain details in it are without doubt taken from Shri-Shivadigvijaya Chronicle, it could not have been written before 1818. I am inclined to believe, from certain modern Marathi phrases it contains, that it was written much later, say after 1900.

[3318](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 285.

[3319](#) *Chhatrapati Shivajimaharaj Smritigrantha*, pp. 23-25.

[3320](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 292.

[3321](#) *Ibid.*, No. 296.

[3322](#) *SCP*, p.29.

[3323](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 301.

[3324](#) See, for instance, *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 279 (Mumbai to Company, 14<sup>th</sup> February 1678, Bijapur and the Mughals against Shivaji, also Bijapur, Golconda and Shivaji against the Mughals), 283 (Mumbai to Surat, 21<sup>st</sup> February 1678, Bijapur, Golconda and Shivaji against the Mughals), 292 (Rajapur to Surat, 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1678, Bijapur and Golconda against Shivaji); *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.254 (Golconda to Fort St. George, 12<sup>th</sup> February 1678, Bijapur and Golconda against Shivaji).

[3325](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29). Corroborated by *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 303.

[3326](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 272.

[3327](#) *Ibid.*, No. 283.

[3328](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.120.

[3329](#) *Ibid.*

[3330](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.102.

[3331](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.120.

[3332](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29).

[3333](#) *FBS*, p.336.

[3334](#) Podili Linganna was nephew of Madanna and governor of the Poonamallee District.

[3335](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, pp.257-58.

[3336](#) *Ibid.*, pp.259-60.

[3337](#) *Basatin*, Ch. 8, section 28 (Persian text, pp.476-77). Marathi translation of the relevant passage in *Basatin* is incorrect; but the errors in it could be easily discerned.

[3338](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 272.

[3339](#) It seems there is an error in this reckoning. It equates one pound sterling to four pagodas. The rate of exchange, gleaned from other sources, was one pound for nine rupees and one Hon (i.e. Pagoda) for 3.75 rupees. So, either the amount stated in pounds sterling is too less or the amount stated in Pagodas is too great. If a pardoe is held as a corruption of Pratap (half a Pagoda) then, at 5 shillings per pardoe, each pound sterling would be equal to two Pagodas.

[3340](#) *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.258.

[3341](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 90 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.127).

[3342](#) Ibid. I think the English translation “One hundred such new forts were constructed in that province” is incorrect; the figure 100 includes old as well as new forts.

[3343](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 104-05 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.145-48).

[3344](#) Dagh Register, 15<sup>th</sup> November 1680 vide *SPSS*, Vol. II, No.2294.

[3345](#) Dagh Register, 21<sup>st</sup> December 1680 vide *SPSS*, Vol. II, No.2301.

[3346](#) Manucci, Vol. II, p.204.

[3347](#) For a summary of this campaign, see *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 418, 439, 477 (last paragraph), 499. No.499 (Surat to Company, 8<sup>th</sup> April 1680) states that the Siddi had fortified the island of

Kendry (Khanderi) near that of Hendry (Underi). This is incorrect. Shivaji's forces had occupied Khanderi whereupon the Siddi occupied Underi. See note (2) below.

[3348](#) See Chapter 12. In contemporaneous English records, the islands of Khanderi and Underi are generally referred to jointly as Hendry-Kendry, 'Hendry' being a corruption of Underi and 'Kendry', that of Khanderi; e.g. See *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 365, 369, 387, 488, 439, 448, 451. Khanderi alone is also erroneously called by the joint name Hendry-Kendry. (*Ibid.*, Nos. 472, 474, 475 etc.) For their correct and distinct mention see *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 470, 472, 476, 481, 494, 529.

[3349](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.439.

[3350](#) *Ibid.*, No. 364; also 367.

[3351](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 364. Italics mine. See also No. 367.

[3352](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos.369, 377, 439. The English called the Maratha officer "Mia Naique a Bandareen of the Rajah's" in No.369. In others they called him "Mea Naique" (No. 377), "Michell Nake" (No. 446), and "Mynaqae Caperson" and "Minaque" (No. 447). In No. 439 he is merely referred to as "the chief person that had the command." Caperson appears to be a distortion of some Marathi word which I cannot imagine. The Mumbai letter (No.447) dated 29<sup>th</sup> November 1679 says the Deputy Governor of Mumbai (who was John Child at that time) was acquainted with "the *subadar*, one Mynaque Caperson" when he was at Rajapur. John Child was at Rajapur as Chief of the English factory there from January 1675 to December 1676 and went to Surat about December 1676. He returned soon afterwards to Mumbai and in March-April 1677 went to Rajapur where he remained till about the end of 1677. (*ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 58, 60, 66, 71, 81, 99, 136, 144, 147, 193, 197, 204, 205, 210, 214, 350.)

[3353](#) ERS, Vol. II, Nos. 369, 370.

[3354](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.370.

[3355](#). ERS, Vol. II, Nos. 364, 369. Also Nos. 365, 367, 377, 418, 437, 448, 477

[3356](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.365. One ‘file’ comprised six soldiers. The Shibad was a kind of cargo ship.

[3357](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.366; also 365, 369, 379, 439

[3358](#) For these orders, see ERS, Vol. II, No.366. Also Nos. 369, 439.

[3359](#) ERS, Vol. II, Nos. 367, 377.

[3360](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 367.

[3361](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 368. This letter had not reached Mumbai till 12<sup>th</sup> September. (Ibid., No. 376.)

[3362](#) Delphi was the site of a famous temple in the classical Greek world where divine guidance known as the ‘oracle’ was sought through a priestess. It goes without saying that such guidance was often given in very cryptic terms. When a general consulted the oracle about his fate in the forthcoming battle, he received the answer (translated into Latin) “*Ibis et redibis numquam per bella peribis.*” The sentence has a double meaning depending upon the punctuation. *Ibis et redibis, numquam per bella peribis* means “You will go and you will return, never in war will you perish.” On the other hand *Ibis et redibis numquam, per bella peribis* means “You will go and you will return never, in war will

you perish." So the phrase *Ibis redibis* came to mean ambiguous, confusing. What the Mumbai Council meant was that they wanted unambiguous, clear-cut instructions. There was friction between Thomas Rolt, the President (and ex-officio Governor of Mumbai), who was at Surat and Henry Oxenden, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai. (*EFI*, Vol. III, pp. 1, 5-6, 10-14, 19-23, 25-28, 30, 33-34.) Hence this taunt. To it, Rolt retorted that advices received from other quarters assured them that Shivaji's men were actually on Khanderi in August while Oxenden had reported that they merely intended to fortify it "which seems to us very strange that an affair so near and that consequence to the welfare of Bombay should be so much neglected by you as not to be concerned to give us as true and timely an account thereof as persons less concerned [had given]. (*Ibid.*, p.39.)

[3363](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 369

[3364](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 377.

[3365](#) *Ibid*

[3366](#) *Ibid*

[3367](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 382.

[3368](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 486.

[3369](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 133. There the island is called "*ilheo de Vndry Candry*." But it is evident that, as in English, only the Khanderi Island is meant.

[3370](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, pp.346-47 (note 1, Governor's letter, 15<sup>th</sup> November 1680).

[3371](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 373, 380, 381, 384.

[3372](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 383, 399, 404, 413, 441, 463, 472.

[3373](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.370.

[3374](#) *Ibid.*

[3375](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 371, 378, 439.

[3376](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 371.

[3377](#) In January 1672, the Surat Council undertook the building of two frigates at Surat for use at Mumbai. Of these the *Hunter* was completed in April 1672 and the *Revenge* in November 1673. (*EFI*, Vol. I, pp.31, 39-40, 218, 222-23.) The measurements of the *Revenge* were, in *coveds* (or *covids*): length 30, breadth 7.5, depth in hold 2.5. Its carrying capacity was 75 tons. (*Selections from the Letters*, Home Series, Vol. I, pp. 67-68. The short *coved* was of 27 inches and the long one of 36. See *Covid* in *Hobson-Jobson*.)

[3378](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 373, 375, 378.

[3379](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 378, 379, 439.

[3380](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 378.

[3381](#) *ERS*, Vol.II, Nos. 381, 383, 384, 409, 411, 417, 418, 422, 432, 439, 442. (Between 20<sup>th</sup> September and 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 1679.)

[3382](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 384, 417, 424, 429.

[3383](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 379, 380, 439. The Mumbai Council's order to Thorpe is dated 17<sup>th</sup> September (No. 379). He was definitely there on "Thursday night" which was the night of 18<sup>th</sup> September, as mentioned in Minchin's dispatch of 19<sup>th</sup> September. (No. 380)

[3384](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 380.

[3385](#) Sergeant Giles commanded one of the *shibads*. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No.381.) Nash must have been in command of the other.

[3386](#) In all, about 15 Christians including the English, the Dutch, the French, and the Topazes were killed or taken prisoner in this action. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 439. Also see No.529.) In his letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> September 1679, Oxenden remarked that the loss of European soldiers could not easily be replaced. (*EFI*, Vol. III, p. 38.)

[3387](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 380-81. The name of the captured *shibad* was Lyon. (*Ibid.*, No.481.)

[3388](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.381.

[3389](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.439.

[3390](#) The company blamed the President and the Council of Surat for not giving them "the grounds and reasons" for Shivaji's difference with them "for those (till then) disregarded and barren rocks" and also for Thorpe's abortive attack on the island. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 529.) The President and Council of Surat wrote a reply that the trouble was caused by Shivaji's "ambitions and politick aim" and they were unaware of Shivaji's possession of the island until they learnt of Thorpe's abortive attack (*Ibid.*) The latter statement is incorrect. The Mumbai dispatch of 27<sup>th</sup> August 1679

had informed the Surat Council of Shivaji's intention to fortify Khanderi, and of 6<sup>th</sup> September 1679 that Maynak Bhandari had landed on the island with over 150 men and four small guns at the end of August. (*Ibid.*, Nos. 364, 369.) The Surat Council had received the latter dispatch before 15<sup>th</sup> September 1679. (*Ibid.*, No.377.)

[3391](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 380-381.

[3392](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 381.

[3393](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 383.

[3394](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.38. See also *ERS*, Vol.II Nos. 381, 383-85.

[3395](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 384.

[3396](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 385-87, 389, 439; also No.374.

[3397](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.385; *EFI*, Vol. III, pp. 39-40.

[3398](#) *ERS*, Vol. II ,No.385; *EFI*, Vol. III, pp. 39-40.

[3399](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 386-89, 439; *EFI*, Vol. III, p.40.

[3400](#) *ERS*, Vol.II, No. 439.

[3401](#) Fryer, Vol. I, p.154.

[3402](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 439.

[3403](#) *ERS*, Vol.II, Nos. 336-87.

[3404](#) *ERS*, Vol.II, Nos. 386-87.

[3405](#) *ERS*, Vol.II, No 389. Also Nos. 385, 439. These orders were in line with the Surat letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> September. (*ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 377, 382.)

[3406](#) *ERS*, Vol.II, No. 389.

[3407](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 396.

[3408](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 387.

[3409](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.41.

[3410](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 387-388. The troop means the troop of horsemen. Its sanctioned strength was fifty. (*EFI*, Vol.I, p.44; III, pp.15-16.) But it used to have only about 25 to 30 horsemen. (*EFI*, Vol. I, pp. 28, 155, 157-58. 178; III, p. 17 – n.2.) The decision to recruit more men was taken in spite of the Company's orders for retrenchment. The Company's letter dated 28<sup>th</sup> February 1679 reached the Surat Council in August 1679. The Company had ordered retrenchment because the expenditure on Mumbai Island exceeded the revenue. The Surat Council had enclosed a copy of the clauses in the Company's dispatch relating to Mumbai with their letter of 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1679 to the Mumbai Council. The latter had received it before 12<sup>th</sup> September 1679. (*EFI*, Vol. III, pp.30-34.) Therefore, the Mumbai letter of 6<sup>th</sup> October 1679 which informed Surat of their decision to recruit 50 more men states: "We lament we cannot comply with our Masters' regulation, for their orders, and your commands to set out a fleet, are incompatible." (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 387.)

[3411](#) For the Maratha threat to Mumbai, the Portuguese refusal to grant them passage, and measures taken by the English, see *ERS*, Vol. II, No.390-91.

[3412](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.394.

[3413](#) *Ibid.*

[3414](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 390, 471, 476, 490-91, 494, 499, 529.

[3415](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.41; *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 395.

[3416](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.42. It is “Nagoun” in the original documents; the editor of *EFI* takes it to mean “Nagotna.” This is incorrect. The place is Nagaon.

[3417](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.42.

[3418](#) *Ibid.*; *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 396, 413.

[3419](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.42.

[3420](#) The account of the engagement narrated below is taken from *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 399, 489; also 397, 400, 401, 439. Of these, No. 399 is Keigwin’s dispatch written on the same day the battle was fought.

[3421](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 399, 448.

[3422](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3423](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 409.

[3424](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 416.

[3425](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3426](#) The prisoners were confined in fort Sagargad. (*EFI*, Vol. III, pp.53-54.)

[3427](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 448; also No. 465.

[3428](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 401.

[3429](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 399.

[3430](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 397, 400, 405.

[3431](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 400, 437; also Nos. 415, 481, 448, 450, 457.

[3432](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 402.

[3433](#) *Ibid.*

[3434](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 414.

[3435](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 403-4.

[3436](#) The ‘chamber-piece’ was a small breach-loading (as against muzzle-loading) gun.

[3437](#) For these reinforcements and their armament etc., see *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 397, 400, 401, 405, 407-9, 411, 437.

[3438](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 405.

[3439](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 409, 423, also 437.

[3440](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 410.

[3441](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 402.

[3442](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 410.

[3443](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 411.

[3444](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 413.

[3445](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 411, 417.

[3446](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 417.

[3447](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 419.

[3448](#) *Ibid.*

[3449](#) *Ibid.*

[3450](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 420.

[3451](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 422.

[3452](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 422, 437.

[3453](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 422. This extract omits some words after Hendry. The English referred to Khanderi by the joint name of Khanderi-Underi. Therefore, the word Hendry should have been followed by Kendry in the original. It may have been dropped by mistake in the *ERS*. In any case it is beyond doubt that Keigwin is referring to Khanderi.

[3454](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 422.

[3455](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 424.

[3456](#) *Ibid.*

[3457](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 409.

[3458](#) *ERS*, Vol. II No. 418.

[3459](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 398. (Italics mine)

[3460](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 412.

[3461](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 415.

[3462](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 415 (minutes), 421 (letter).

[3463](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 423.

[3464](#) *Ibid.*

[3465](#) *Ibid.*

[3466](#) Ibid.

[3467](#) The *New London* (sometimes merely called the *London*) and the *Bengal Merchant* (also called *Bengal* for short) had arrived at Mumbai on 11<sup>th</sup> August and the *Ann* on 21<sup>st</sup> August. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 439.) The *New London* had reached Surat before 3<sup>rd</sup> November. (Ibid., No. 427.) The *Bengal Merchant* and the *Ann* had gone down the coast of India either directly from Mumbai or after calling at Surat. (Ibid., Nos. 439, 529.) Captains Cooke and Goldsborough were commanders of these two ships. The commission issued in their names was sent to Mumbai and the Mumbai Council was to give it to them when they stopped at the port on their way up the coast. (Ibid., Nos. 428, 433; *EFI*, Vol. III, p. 47.)

[3468](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 427. Italics mine.

[3469](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 450, Surat to Mumbai, dated 4<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1679, says “... as for the President's letter to the Rajah [i.e. Shivaji], formerly sent you, we do approve of your suspending the sending of it.” This suggests that either the Surat Council had now sent the original of the President's letter addressed to Shivaji (and not a mere copy of it as mentioned in *ERS*, Vol. II, No 427) for forwarding it to the Maratha King, or one more and original letter, addressed by the President to Shivaji, was dispatched earlier to the Mumbai Council to be forwarded by them. This second letter, if written, is not mentioned in the published correspondence. The first letter appears to have been forwarded by the Mumbai council to Shivaji before 8<sup>th</sup> December because on that date, they reported to Surat: “We are now in expectation of two servants *sent with your Hons. letters to him* [i.e. Shivaji] and one from the Deputy Governor.” (*ERS*, Vol. II, No.455.) (Emphasis added)

[3470](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 428.

[3471](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 433.

[3472](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 437, 447. No.437 is dated 17<sup>th</sup> November but from *ERS*, Vol. II, No.447 (Mumbai to Surat, 29<sup>th</sup> November) and No.448 (Surat consultation, 3<sup>rd</sup> December), it appears that it should have been 15<sup>th</sup> November.

[3473](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 448, 450, 457, 460.

[3474](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 439.

[3475](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 429.

[3476](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 432, Keigwin to Mumbai, 5<sup>th</sup> November.

[3477](#) The Hunter was armed with 14 guns. (Fryer, Vol. I, p.154.)

[3478](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 430; also 431.

[3479](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 431.

[3480](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 432. The Maratha force, according to Keigwin, comprised 15 *gurabs* and 20 galiots.

[3481](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3482](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 432, 434.

[3483](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.434.

[3484](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos.434-35.

[3485](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos.434-35, 437.

[3486](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 434, 436.

[3487](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3488](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 435-36.

[3489](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p. 48 (fn 3). *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 481. The figure “53 mast frigates” in No. 481 is evidently an error. It should be “5 three-masted frigates” as in *EFI*, Vol. III, p. 48 (fn 3).

[3490](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3491](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 435; also Nos.441, 445.

[3492](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3493](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 436, 438, 440, 442, 446.

[3494](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 436

[3495](#) *Ibid.*

[3496](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 438, 440-42, 447, 452, 462, 470, 472, 474-75. (No.438 dt. 17<sup>th</sup> November 1679 and No.475 dt. 15<sup>th</sup> January. 1680.)

[3497](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 440, 442, 462, 472, 474.

[3498](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 440.

[3499](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 440; also 442.

[3500](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 437.

[3501](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 437, 438, 441.

[3502](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 438.

[3503](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 440.

[3504](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 441-42.

[3505](#) The words in Keigwin's dispatch of 21<sup>st</sup> November are "Sergeant Cully, a Dutchman that formerly [served] them, and a Portuguese." (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 442.) Charles Fawcett interprets this, and correctly I believe, to mean that "he [Keigwin] sent a Dutch sergeant who used to be in Maratha service." *EFI*, Vol. III, p.49. We know that Shivaji had several Europeans in his service, evidently as gunners, engineers, and seamen. But this is the only one who has been referred to by name.

[3506](#) For this entire incident, see *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 442, 447.

[3507](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 446.

[3508](#) Ibid. "They have 560 men, two hundred firearms and 300 swordsmen." Here 560 is evidently a misprint for 500."

[3509](#) Ibid.

[3510](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 447.

[3511](#) Ibid.

[3512](#) So, Child, the Deputy Governor of Mumbai, thought it useless to detain the *Bengal Merchant* any longer and dispatched her on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1679. (EFI, Vol. III, p.59.)

[3513](#) Ibid.

[3514](#) Ibid.

[3515](#) Ibid.

[3516](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 457. Italics mine. It is clear that the Surat Council was not authorized to issue orders to Europe ships. In their dispatch dated 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1682, the Surat Council wrote to the Company: To employ the Europe ships to batter the island [Khanderi] “was found more difficult; for this King’s [Shivaji’s] fleet consisting of several ships of good force, with diverse small vessels well manned, your guns could neither damage them ashore nor hinder recruits or provisions from the main. The place being so situated and inaccessible for large shipping and [having] but one small place with security for boats to land at so that whatever should have been done in that particular would have proved but a dangerous attempt, and wherein [we] found ourselves not fully empowered though provided for on charter partly.” (ERS, Vol. II, No. 529.)

[3517](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 460.

[3518](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 453.

[3519](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 449.

[3520](#) *Ibid.*

[3521](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 451.

[3522](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 447, also 437.

[3523](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 451. That they replied to Shivaji's letter is shown by Shivaji's letter received at the end of December in which he acknowledged the two letters from the Mumbai Council. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 469.) The first appears to have been the one dispatched on 20<sup>th</sup> November. (*Ibid.*, No. 447.) The second must have been the one which the Mumbai Council proposed to send on 4<sup>th</sup> December.

[3524](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 455.

[3525](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 456.

[3526](#) *Ibid.*, also No. 456, also 458.

[3527](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 458.

[3528](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 458, 461.

[3529](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 461.

[3530](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, pp. 51-53. The date given there (15<sup>th</sup> December) is incorrect. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 462.) One of the reasons for this

change might have been the friction between Keigwin and Deputy Governor John Child. Captain Stephen Adderton was commanding the *Fortune*. (*Ibid.*, Nos. 405-06, 408, 462-63.)

[3531](#) *ERS*, Vol. II Nos. 462-63.

[3532](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 462.

[3533](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 463.

[3534](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 465.

[3535](#) *Ibid.*

[3536](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 469.

[3537](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 470. Captain Adderton was called to Mumbai on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1680 due to the death of his wife. He rejoined the blockading squadron on 9<sup>th</sup> January. (*EFI*, Vol. III, p. 60.) During his absence, Captain Minchin seems to have been in command of the squadron.

[3538](#) *EFI*, Vol. III, p.60.

[3539](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 472.

[3540](#) *Ibid.*

[3541](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 474. I cannot say why this letter was sent by Adams instead of Adderton. Adams was evidently the commander of one of the larger ships in the squadron, probably the *Hunter*.

[3542](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 475. The crew of the galiots might have used *apanā*, a Hindi word, to create the impression that the vessels belonged to the Siddi.

[3543](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 470, 472, 474, 475.

[3544](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 475.

[3545](#) *Ibid.*

[3546](#) *Ibid.*

[3547](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 475, 481.

[3548](#) The figures of losses must have been provided by the Siddi. The Maratha losses were probably exaggerated and the Siddi's played down. Another account says that the Siddi killed *and* wounded 137 men. (*EFI*, Vol. III, p.61 – fn 4.)

[3549](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 465.

[3550](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 469.

[3551](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 471.

[3552](#) *Ibid.*

[3553](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 476.

[3554](#) *Ibid.*

[3555](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 481.

[3556](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 476.

[3557](#) *Ibid.*

[3558](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 476, 479.

[3559](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 476.

[3560](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 479.

[3561](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 479, also No. 481.

[3562](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 481.

[3563](#) *Ibid.*

[3564](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 477.

[3565](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 484.

[3566](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 487. As we have seen, what the English considered as compensation for the plunder of their factory, the Marathas considered as a *bucksis* (from Persian *bakhshish*, donative, gratuity).

[3567](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 495.

[3568](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 486.

[3569](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 493, also Nos. 495, 499.

[3570](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 490.

[3571](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 489, also No. 499.

[3572](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 481, 495.

[3573](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 497, 499.

[3574](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 481. Hull is an error for Tull (Thal).

[3575](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 482.

[3576](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 482.

[3577](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 483.

[3578](#) *Ibid.*; also Nos. 494, 498.

[3579](#) A large canoe, a barge. (See Baloon in *Hobson-Jobson*.)

[3580](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 481-83.

[3581](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 483.

[3582](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 491, 499.

[3583](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 491, 493.

[3584](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 493, also No. 491.

[3585](#) *ERS*, Vol. II No. 494. Contemporaneous translation of the Siddi's letter, March 1680.

[3586](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 498.

[3587](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 497.

[3588](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 524.

[3589](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 505, 513, 515, 516, 520-21, 524, 526-27; *EFI*, Vol. III, pp.64-65.

[3590](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 499. The dispatch says that the Siddi had occupied the island of Kendry (Khanderi) near that of Hendry (Underi). This is incorrect. The Siddi had occupied Hendry.

[3591](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.529.

[3592](#) This statement is based upon the *extract* of this letter printed in *ERS*, Vol. II, No.467.

[3593](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 480. Rajapur to Surat.

[3594](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 453, 467, 480.

[3595](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 484.

[3596](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 486-88.

[3597](#) Here “signed” does not mean signed in the modern sense of the term; it merely means sealed. “Red paper” probably meant a paper marked in red.

[3598](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 487-88, 492, 500.

[3599](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 509-10.

[3600](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 519-20.

[3601](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 519-20.

[3602](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 444.

[3603](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 499.

[3604](#) Siddi Masud was given the title Masud Khan for his distinguished services during the campaign against Shivaji led by his father-in-law, Siddi Jauhar, in 1660. (*Basatin*, Chapter 7, Section 26).

[3605](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 20-23, 25-28.

[3606](#) For date, Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.18). For mother’s name see *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 6 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 8).

[3607](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p. 19).

[3608](#) See Chapter 8.

[3609](#) See Chapter 9.

[3610](#) See Chapter 10.

[3611](#) *SCP*, p.52.

[3612](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.358 (pp.252-53).

[3613](#) We have a few letters of Sambhaji showing his involvement in the administration of the kingdom. [See *SCS*, Vol. III, Nos. 400 and 401 (4<sup>th</sup> May 1675); *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.142 (3<sup>rd</sup> November 1678).] Apart from practical training, the Prince was also given formal education. While still a prince, he had composed a small Sanskrit work on statecraft entitled *Budhabhushanam*. It has been published under the title *The Budhabhusana of King Sambhu*. Apart from a short preamble and a few connecting sentences, it is mainly a collection of passages from other works on topics such as duties of the King and his ministers and the education of princes.

[3614](#) *Ibid.* No. 486 (p.373).

[3615](#) *Ibid.* No. 486 (p.375).

[3616](#) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No.122.

[3617](#) *Ibid.*, No.198 (p.105). Italics mine.

[3618](#) *Ibid.*, No.200 (p.108).

[3619](#) *SCP*, p. 29.

[3620](#) *FBS*, p.348.

[3621](#) A distortion of *Umara* — plural of Arabic *Amir*, a nobleman, here used in the singular.

[3622](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 352.

[3623](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 92 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.130).

[3624](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.121-22. Parnal is a sanskritized form of Panhala. Here, it seems to be a mistake for Parali.

[3625](#) *Basatin-us Salatin*, Chapter 8, Section 24. In their letter of 17<sup>th</sup> January 1676, the Mumbai Council repeated a report to Surat that Shivaji had died, being poisoned by his son, whom the father had commanded to be thrown down over the walls of Rairi if he did not stop meeting a daughter of one of his ministers whom he had seduced. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 139.) Shivaji was certainly not dead then; the rumour seems to have very little truth in it. The Chitnis Chronicle (p.236) accuses him of having molested a woman. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.236.) The charge is serious indeed and, as there is no corroboration, cannot be relied upon.

[3626](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.121-22; *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 24.

[3627](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (*SPSS*, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3628](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.29-30, 53). See also *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p. 78 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.111-12).

[3629](#) Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, p. 53.) The fort is called Bahadur Bande in the *Official Website of Koppal District* ([koppal.nic.in/](http://koppal.nic.in/)).

[3630](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, pp. 29-30). Thorale Anandrao in Jedhe Chronology is evidently a mistake for Thorale Balapur i.e. Doddaballapur.

[3631](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 29; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.123 and *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.236-37 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 237). Only *Basatin* and *Chitnis Chronicle* mention mutilations.

[3632](#) *SCP*, p.29.

[3633](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp.236-37 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 237).

[3634](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 29; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.123.

[3635](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 30.

[3636](#) See Chapter 12.

[3637](#) See, for instance, *Livro dos Reis Vizinhos*, No.3, ff. 2, 4, 5, 6, 457 (vide *SPK*, Nos.44, 45, 50 51, 65). For the system of *cartazes* see Chapter 2.

[3638](#) See, for instance, *Livro dos Reis Vizinhos*, No. 3, ff. 3, 6-7, 11, 16, 18-19, 457 (vide *SPK*, Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 57, 59, 61).

[3639](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 129 (11<sup>th</sup> January 1679). The river is called “Rio de Zanguizara” in the Portuguese document. The editor Dr. Pissurlencar takes Zanguizara to be a corruption of Sankeshwar. It is evidently an error for Sangameshwar. Sankeshwar is in the Hukkeri Taluka of the Belgaum District.

[3640](#) This Portuguese admiral, Joseph de Melo de Castro, in his letter of 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1679, reported the receipt of a letter from Shivaji warning him not to molest the Arabs in his river as they were his guests and he was going to support them. (*Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p.111, note 5.)

[3641](#) *Ibid.*, Nos. 130 (26<sup>th</sup> January 1679), 131 (8<sup>th</sup> March 1679).

[3642](#) *The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.48-49. Dr. Pissurlencar has called it the river Sankeshwar. It should be the river Sangameshwar. See note 30 above.

[3643](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, pp.2, 123. The Portuguese abolished their system of *cartazes* by law in 1774. By then they were powerless to enforce it; in fact it had fallen into disuse for many years. (*Ibid.*, p.2.)

[3644](#) This assertion of the Portuguese was incorrect. One of the clauses proposed by the Portuguese for the treaty concluded with Shivaji in 1670 was that the Raja would not construct a fortress on the borders of the lands that he had conquered in the vicinity of those of the King of Portugal, notwithstanding their separation by a river. But Shivaji had not given his consent to it. (See chapter 10.)

[3645](#) *Assentos*, Vol. IV, No. 132. See also *Livro dos Reis Vizinhos*, No. 3, f.32 (vide *SPK*, No. 72).

[3646](#) The narrative in this Section is taken from *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 31-36.

[3647](#) This Siddi Jauhar, of course, is entirely different from the one who had laid siege to Panhala in 1660 and had died in 1661.

[3648](#) She reached the Court on, or shortly before, 4<sup>th</sup> March 1680 and was married to Prince Muhammad Azam on 26<sup>th</sup> July 1681. (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp.117, 129.) See also *Basatin*, Chapter 8, section 35.

[3649](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 38-39.

[3650](#) *Maasir-i Alamgiri* (p.112) records the event thus: “On the 5<sup>th</sup> October 1679 a letter was received from Dilir Khan stating that the fort of Mangalvedhe had been wrested from Shivaji....A farman of praise was sent to Sujan Singh for his having captured Shivaji’s fort.” (The date, 19<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, given in English translation is not correct. It is 9<sup>th</sup> Ramazan, 23<sup>rd</sup> Regnal year of Aurangzeb, i.e. 5<sup>th</sup> October 1679. See Persian text of *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.182.) But the statement in the *Maasir-i Alamgiri* that the fort was wrested from Shivaji is incorrect. It was certainly not in possession of Shivaji; it was held by an Adilshahi garrison.

[3651](#) In the absence of mention by the chronicler of any ‘other’ Sambhaji, it may be said with certainty that it was the Maratha Prince that Sabaji encountered.

[3652](#) The place where Shivaji pitched his camp is named Parsalja in the Marathi translation of the *Basatin* (p.555) and Parsalka in the Persian text (p.497). Sir Jadunath Sarkar identifies it as “Selgur, midway between Panhala and Bijapur.” (*Shivaji and His*

*Times*, p.325.) I have not been able to identify any of these places.

[3653](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. January 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3654](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 39-40.

[3655](#) The date in the Persian text (p.497) is 10<sup>th</sup> Shawwal, 1090 A.H. which corresponds with 5<sup>th</sup> November 1679. That given in Marathi translation (p.556) is 10<sup>th</sup> Shaban 1090 A.H. which corresponds with 6<sup>th</sup> September 1679, and is obviously incorrect.

[3656](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 39.

[3657](#) In Marathi *gao* means village or town. But it is also a very loose measure of distance, probably varying from place to place. Jalnapur is now known merely as Jalna.

[3658](#) This Ranmast Khan, an Afghan whose given name was Ali, was a brother of the Adilshahi nobleman Khizr Khan Panni. He entered Mughal service in the 7<sup>th</sup> Regnal year of Aurangzeb (1664-65) and obtained the rank of 1500 *dhat*. He gradually rose to the rank of 5000 *dhat* and was given the title of Ranmast Khan. Later, in 1683, he was given the title of Bahadur Khan. (*The Maathir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, p.459; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.143; *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.113, 137.)

[3659](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3660](#) SCP, p.30. Sabhasad, too, mentions in his account of the expedition that Sidoji Nimbalkar was killed. His statement that Ranmast Khan was taken prisoner is incorrect. He also states

that when Shivaji's army was being pursued by the enemy, Bahirji (chief of spies) brought it to safety by (unfrequented) hill-tracks. (*Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.92; English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.129-30.)

[3661](#) *Mutakhab-ul Lubab*, Vol. II (Persian text), p.271. English translation in *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, p.290.

[3662](#) Baglana in the English translation in *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, p.290 is an error for Balaghat (uplands).

[3663](#) That the monastery was plundered is corroborated by some versions of the *A.K.Chronicle* (pp.150-51).

[3664](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3665](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 46.

[3666](#) *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, p.290.

[3667](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.454.

[3668](#) From Arabic *qafla*, a caravan.

[3669](#) Khafi Khan, too, says Khan Zaman was *subadar* of Burhanpur at that time. (*Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, p.290.)

[3670](#) *Ibid.*, No.459.

[3671](#) *Ibid.*, No.485.

[3672](#) Ibid., No.447 (pp.262-63).

[3673](#) Ibid., No.460.

[3674](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 40-42.

[3675](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* (p.125) too states that Shivaji's men used to have secret contacts with Sambhaji and that the latter fled while the Mughal army was in the jungle of Athani.

[3676](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3677](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.469.

[3678](#) *SCP*, p.30.

[3679](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 43.

[3680](#) *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, p.125.

[3681](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 44.

[3682](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 43. Rasulpur was a suburb to the west of the city. Begam Hauz was a large reservoir to the south of the city. Afzal Khan's mansion was to the west and Allapur gate was to the east.

[3683](#) *Ahadis* were special troopers in Imperial service. See Chapter 2.

[3684](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3685](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 45-48.

[3686](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3687](#) Unless otherwise mentioned, the narrative in this section is taken from *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Sections 48-52. It is corroborated by *Tarikh-i Dilkusha*, pp.125-26.

[3688](#) Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No.2236).

[3689](#) For Dilir Khan's retirement to Pedgaon, see Shivaji's letter to Ekoji, c. March 1680 (SPSS, Vol. II, No. 2236). For treaty, see *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 54; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.119.

[3690](#) *Basatin*, Chapter 8, Section 54.

[3691](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 117.

[3692](#) Ibid., p.119.

[3693](#) *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol.I, p.213. He then gives its translation in a footnote on pp. 213-14.

[3694](#) Translated from the original Marathi text given in *Tanjavachen Rajagharanen*, pp.42-43

[3695](#) SCP, p.30.

[3696](#) Shivapur Chronology (SCP, p.53). The Portuguese Governor, Antonio Pais de Sande, wrote to the King of Portugal on 24<sup>th</sup> January 1681 that Shivaji had died on 13<sup>th</sup> April of the previous

year. (*The Portuguese and the Marathas*, pp.50-51 – note 112.) The date is in New Style and corresponds with 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1680 of the Old Style. The news of Shivaji's death is mentioned in several English letters. The earliest among these is the one dated April 19, 1680 from Rajapur to Surat. (*ERS*, Vol. II, No. 501.) For other letters, see *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 502-04, 506-08, 525. See also Martin (*FBS*, p.354.)

[3697](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, Persian text, p. 194. In its English translation, Sir Jadunath Sarkar interpolates the day of the week and the words “dismounted from his horse.” (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.120.)

[3698](#) *Mutakhab-ul Lubab*, Vol. II (Persian text), p.271. English translation in *Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab*, p.290.

[3699](#) Chronograms are formed by arranging a phrase to denote a specific event in such a way that the total of the numerical values of the letters in it corresponds with the Hijri year in which the event takes place. The values of letters are fixed. This particular chronogram is incorrect because Shivaji died in 1091 A.H.

[3700](#) *FBS*, p. 168.

[3701](#) *FBS*, p.169. Guarda believed that a sad destiny awaited Shivaji because he was not Christian, especially Catholic.

[3702](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No.504. To Surat.

[3703](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p. 61 and note 208 in p.76.

[3704](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.107 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.149); *A.K.Chronicle*, pp.152-53.

[3705](#) ERS, Vol. II, No. 506.

[3706](#) Ibid., No. 507.

[3707](#) Ibid., No. 525 (p.320).

[3708](#) In 1673, Carré had occasion to meet the governor of Chaul in Shivaji's dominion. After his business was finished the Frenchman entered into a conversation with the Maratha officer. Narrating the incident in his book, he states: "I then asked him about Shivaji, his master, and he told me that that hero intended to push his conquests from the river Indus, which forms the boundary of the kingdom [province] of Khambayat, to the Ganges, far beyond the rich provinces of Bengal." (*FBS*, p.245.)

[3709](#) *FBS*, p. 206.

[3710](#) I have borrowed the term 'inner front' from J. F. C. Fuller's *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*, p.267.

[3711](#) *FBS*, pp.50-51.

[3712](#) *FBS*, pp. 51-52.

[3713](#) *FBS*, pp. 154-55.

[3714](#) *FBS*, pp. 230-31.

[3715](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.131

[3716](#) Several English editions of Sun Tzu's *Art of War* are available in the market. I have not given page references as it is rather a small book.

[3717](#) *Strategy: the Indirect Approach*, p.335

[3718](#) *On War* by Clausewitz (Vol. I, Book III, chapter 1) quoted in *Strategy: the Indirect Approach*, p.333.

[3719](#) Though the phrase 'principles of war' had been used before, what exactly these were had not been enumerated anywhere. This was first done by Captain (later Major General) J. F. C. Fuller in a little book entitled *Training Soldiers for War* which was published in 1914. These were, according to him, Mass (Concentration), Offensive, Security, Surprise, and Movement (Mobility). These were incorporated in 1920 in the *Field Service Regulations* of the British Army. He later added a few more to these. He lists seven in his *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*, first published in 1958. These are: Maintenance of the aim, Security, Mobility, Offensive, Economy of Force, Concentration of Force and Surprise. Following in the footsteps of the British Army, the armies all over the world incorporated the principles of war in their training manuals, of course with a few variations in the list and nomenclature from country to country. For instance, principles such as Morale and Cooperation have been added to the list by some armies.

[3720](#) There is evidence that Shivaji did have a long term goal in mind — viz. the capture of Daulatabad, the Mughal Capital of the Deccan — which, he thought, was attainable within his own lifetime. In a memorandum about the responsibilities and remuneration of his *Muzumdar*, Nilo Sondev, drawn up in the month of Rabi-ul Akhir, Shuhur year 1071 (23<sup>rd</sup> November to 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1670), Shivaji mentions in passing that Moropant, the Peshwa, would make an attempt on and capture

“Surgiri”. (*MIS*, Vol. VIII, No. 10. The year given in the date of the letter is Shuhur year 1061. But it is evident from internal evidence — for instance, the designations of Moropant and Nilo Sondev mentioned as *Peshwa* and *Muzumdar* — that it is the scribe’s error for 1071.) It is well known that Surgiri or Devgiri (both meaning ‘fort of god’) is the original Sanskrit name of Daulatabad. Shivaji’s policy of restoring original Sanskrit names of places which Muslim rulers had replaced by Persian ones (such as Daulatabad) is well known. (See Ch. 7 and 11.) The fact that Shivaji used the name ‘Surgiri’ for Daulatabad is noticed by V. K. Rajwade, the editor of *MIS*, Vol. VIII. (*Ibid.*, introduction, p.114.)

[3721](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.89, Surat to Karwar.

[3722](#) *Ibid.*

[3723](#) *FBS*, pp.10-11.

[3724](#) *The History of India*, Volume II, Book XI, Ch. III, p. 496-97.

[3725](#) *Ibid.*, Ch. IV, p.502.

[3726](#) *Shivadigvijay Chronicle*, pp.179-80.

[3727](#) He has devoted an entire book on the theme entitled *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*.

[3728](#) *Portuguese-Mahratta Relations*, p. 46 and note 87 in p.67.

[3729](#) *FBS*, p.187.

[3730](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 272. Mumbai to Company.

[3731](#) ERS, Vol. II, No.279. Mumbai to Company. Quintus Sertorius (123 B.C TO 72 B.C.), a Roman general, rebelled against the Roman Republic and took refuge in Spain. There he raised, trained, and equipped an army from among the barbaric Spaniards as well as the Romans who joined him. He was a master of stratagems and repeatedly defeated the numerically superior Roman armies. He was murdered by a Roman colleague out of jealousy. His life has been included in Plutarch's famous *Parallel Lives*. However, Shivaji's comparison with Sertorius is not very apt.

[3732](#) "War of detachment" is a phrase used by Lawrence in his *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Book III, Ch. XIII, p. 200). He meant avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere.

[3733](#) ERS, Vol. I, No.310. Surat to Mumbai, 25<sup>th</sup> June 1672.

[3734](#) The function of grand strategy is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of the state — military, economic and political/psychological — towards the attainment of the political object of the war.

[3735](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 79 (p. 73); Thevenot in *FBS*, p. 184; Rajasthani letter No. 21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*; Shivaji's portraits (see Appendix, -).

[3736](#) *Shivabharat*, 21:23; Rajasthani letter No. 21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*; Shivaji's portraits (see Appendix, -)

[3737](#) ERS, Vol. I, letter No. 96 (p. 92); Carre and Martin in *FBS*, p. 245, 306.

[3738](#) *FBS*, p.184.

[3739](#) Martin in *FBS*, p. 312, *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.79 (p.73), 96 (p.92), 198, 243, 313, 407 (p.299); II, No. 119.

[3740](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, Nos.79 (p.73), 96 (p.92); Guarda in *FBS*, p. 50-52.

[3741](#) Rajasthani letter Nos. 21 and 27 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[3742](#) Guarda in *FBS*, pp. 14, 17, 50-51, 141-42.

[3743](#) *On Heroes, Hero-worship and the Heroic in History*, p.322.

[3744](#) Khafi Khan in *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, p. 260; *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.23 (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, 32 ).

[3745](#) *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, p.305.

[3746](#) This refers to the story in the Chitnis Chronicle, supposed to have taken place at the very beginning of Shivaji's career. (See chapter 5.)

[3747](#) *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, Ch. IX, p. 215.

[3748](#) *The History of India*, Volume II, Book XI, Ch. I, p. 432.

[3749](#) *Ibid.*, Ch. III, p. 474.

[3750](#) *Ballads of the Marathas*, introduction, pp. xviii-xx.

[3751](#) *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. X, Ch. LII, p.32.

[3752](#) For original Hindi text see *Sampoorn Bhooshan*, pp. 148-49.

[3753](#) Bernier, p.331.

[3754](#) See, for instance, *Sampurn Bhushan*, pp 4, 27, 59; *Sabhasad chronicle*, pp.19, 110 ( English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, p.25, 153 ); *Shivabharat*, 1:12, 5:24, 6:8,41,7:37, 26:16; *Rajavyavahara-kosha* (SCP, p.140). Grant Duff says “Shivaji’s admirers among his own nation speak of him as an incarnation of the Deity, setting an example of wisdom, fortitude, and piety.” (*History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, Ch. IX, pp. 215-16.)

[3755](#) “From the Gutpurtie manuscript in the Mackenzie collection, supposed to have been written about 1646, such prophesies have frequently appeared in subsequent times, and one of them had a wide circulation in the south in the year 1805.” – Wilks

[3756](#) “*Mussulmans – Turk* is the name by which they are distinguished in all the languages of the south, written or vernacular, at this day. The earliest *Mussulman* invasion was of Afghans or Pathans, from the Indian Caucasus [Hindukush], and the name seems to point to invasions from Turkomania at more remote periods. The ‘kine-slaying’ is the epithet usually prefixed to the name of Turk in most of the manuscripts.” – Wilks

[3757](#) In a Telugu book of prophesies, entitled *Kalagnanam* (Knowledge of the Kali Age), written by Shri Veera Brahmendra Swami, an incarnation of Vishnu called Lord Kalki or Veera

Bhoga Vasantha Raya would appear towards the end of the Kali Age to restore *dharma* and peace on the earth. He must be the Veer Vasunta in the above quotation. Kalki is the tenth and final incarnation of Vishnu.

[3758](#) *Historical Sketches of the South of India*, Vol. I, p. 42.

[3759](#) *Shivaji and His Times*, pp.389-90.

[3760](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. II, pp.314-15; *The Military Despatches of a Seventeenth Century Indian General*, introduction, pp.5-7; *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X, No.III, pp.467-69.

[3761](#) See Appendix IX.

[3762](#) Since 1982, the India Office Records are administered by the British Library, London.

[3763](#) The first 13 volumes of this collection contain documents of the period 1618-1669. They are not numbered volume wise. The period which they cover is indicated in the name of the particular volume. The next four volumes bear serial numbers, starting from 'I'.

[3764](#) *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, Bibliographical introduction, p.20; *Jesuit Letters and Indian History*, pp. 65, 87.

[3765](#) About 25 years ago, this photocopy was in one of the four bundles (*rumals*) of Persian documents in the Pune Archives. A few years later these four bundles were shifted to the Aurangabad Archives. The manuscript in the Bijapur museum seems to be a copy of another which was in the library of the princely state of Kapurthala. A handwritten copy thereof made

for Sir Jadunath Sarkar is now preserved in the National Library, Kolkata.

[3766](#) A mixture of Hindi, Persian and Marathi, Deccani Urdu was a variety of Urdu (which may be called ‘proto-Urdu’) prevalent among Muslims in the Adilshahi Sultanate.

[3767](#) This photocopy was in one of the four bundles mentioned in note 3 above.

[3768](#) *Tarikhe Iskandari*, introduction by Professor G. H. Khare, p.5.

[3769](#) *House of Shivaji*, pp. 116-17.

[3770](#) Sarkar defines state-papers thus: “By state-papers of a historical nature we understand the despatches sent by provincial governors and commanders of field armies, the orders issued to them, administrative circulars and directions, royal proclamations to the public, trade reports, traders’ petitions and orders on them, minutes of council consultations, correspondence with foreign Governments, reports from spies and ambassadors, etc.” (*The Modern Review*, May 1924, p. 565.) In short, Sarkar uses the term ‘state-papers’ for documents produced in the highest tier of the government.

[3771](#) Incidentally, Datto Vaman Potdar, a Marathi historian of repute, had challenged Sarkar to prove which Marathi documents were altered or counterfeit. (*Sahyadri* magazine, February 1937, pp.135-36.)

[3772](#) *Shivaji and His times*, second edition, p.338 n; *The Modern Review*, May 1924, p.566.

[3773](#) *The Modern Review*, May 1924, p.566 n; Shivaji and His Times, p. 308. What he calls “the story”, and rejects it as apocryphal in the latter source, are actually two letters. This is one of the many examples of his habit of making vague statements.

[3774](#) AFS, Vol. I, no.67 is spurious and mentioned as such by the editor..

[3775](#) *Marathyanchya Itihaasachi Sadhane*, preface, pp.5-27.

[3776](#) SCS, Vol. I, No.22 (p.40).

[3777](#) Ibid., introduction, pp.17-19.

[3778](#) *Shivabharat*, 5:1-16, 15:11, 17:24.

[3779](#) *Paramanandakavyam*, p.63 (v.42-46).

[3780](#) *Futuhat-I Adilshahi*, p.319 b. Sarkar’s statement (*House of Shivaji*, p. 27) that Fuzuni Astarabadi has not mentioned Shahji is incorrect. Fuzuni Astarabadi is the author of *Futuhat-I Adilshahi*.

[3781](#) *Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Persian section, pp.26-28. For an English translation, see Sarkar’s *House of Shivaji*, pp.86-88.

[3782](#) See his articles ‘Early Life of Shahji’ and ‘Later Life of Shahji Bhonsle’ in his *House of Shivaji*, pp.26-47 and 48-76.

[3783](#) SCS, Vol. V, No.761.

[3784](#) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol.VII, p.104.

[3785](#) *MIS*, Vol. XVII, No.11.

[3786](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 26-27. (English translation in *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp.37-38.)

[3787](#) *Shivaji and His times*, first edition, p. 503; second, pp. 452-53; third, p. 414; fourth, pp. 377-78; fifth, pp. 395-96.

[3788](#) *Shivaji and His times*, first edition, preface, p.7; second, preface, p.7.

[3789](#) Ibid., first edition, preface, p.3; second, preface, p.5.

[3790](#) Ibid., first edition, pp. 30, 32, 36, 46, 71, 382, 431-32, 465; second, pp. 26, 28, 31, 40, 66, 338, 352, 381, 414; third, pp. 27, 30, 32, 37, 61, 315, 374; fourth, pp. 27, 36, 40, 46, 59, 60, 296, 346; fifth, pp. 27, 37, 40, 46-47, 60-61, 308, 362.

[3791](#) “He [Shivaji] mourned the death of Tanaji as too high a price for the fort, and named it *Singh-garh* [sic.] after the lion-heart that had won it.” (*Shivaji and His Times*, first edition, p.209; second, p. 189; third, p.168; fourth, p.163; fifth, p.166.) It is Sinhgad, not *Singh-garh* as Sarkar calls it. Sinh means lion.

[3792](#) Sarkar has accepted that date. See Ibid., p.165.

[3793](#) *MIS*, Vol. VIII, No.12. That volume was published in 1903. The first edition of Sarkar’s *Shivaji and His Times* was published in 1919 and its bibliography includes *MIS*, Vol. VIII. Even Grant Duff knew that the fort was named Sinhgad before Tanaji

captured it. He writes: “The preconcerted signal of success was setting on fire a thatched house in the fort, a joyful intimation to Shivaji: but when he heard that Tanaji Malusare was killed he was deeply concerned, and afterwards, on being congratulated, mournfully replied, in allusion to the name he had given the fort, ‘the den is taken but the lion is slain; we have gained a fort, but, alas! I have lost Tanaji Malusare!’” (*History of the Mahrattas*, Ch.8, p.178.)

[3794](#) *Shivaji and His Times*, p.218. For that paragraph, he cites as his authorities “F. R. Surat, Vol. 89, Rajapur to Surat, 11 Jan, and 9 May 1676; O.C. 4202.” Of these, the letters dated 11<sup>th</sup> January and 9<sup>th</sup> May 1676 are published in *ERS*, Vol. II as letter Nos. 137 and 161 respectively. They contain nothing about the sack of Athani. O.C. (Original Correspondence) 4202, a letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> April 1676 sent from Surat to the Company, is published in *ERS*, Vol. II as letter No. 152. It mentions that Shivaji’s army had recently plundered Athani, but does not mention the date of the event.

[3795](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 362.

[3796](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 150.

[3797](#) *Life and Letters of Sir Jadunath Sarkar*, p. 151.

[3798](#) *SCP*, p.18.

[3799](#) *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, p.8.

[3800](#) *SCP*, p.20.

[3801](#) *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, p.11.

[3802](#) *SCP*, p.22.

[3803](#) *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, p. 14.

[3804](#) *Ibid.*, p.18.

[3805](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.25).

[3806](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.29).

[3807](#) *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section, p. 23.

[3808](#) *Making of a Princely Historian*, p.203.

[3809](#) Sometimes we find lamentations about the miserable condition of the people, and their apathy to foreign rule, in the poetry of Ramdas. *Dasabodh* (by Ramdas), 14:7:31-36. But these are very rare.

[3810](#) *Rise of the Maratha Power*, pp. 6-11, 52-53.

[3811](#) See Chapter 2.

[3812](#) A recital of a story from Hindu scriptures interspersed with devotional songs, usually performed late in the evening.

[3813](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, pp. 57-58.

[3814](#) Several of these have been published in *Shri-Samarth-Sampradayachi Kagadpatre*, Vol. I.

[3815](#) *Shri-Samarth-Sampradayachi Kagadpatre*, Vol. I, Nos. 15-16.

[3816](#) See colour photographs of these letters in *Shivachhatrapatinchi Patre*, The custom was to leave blank the places where their names would occur in the text and write them at the top of the document. See, for instance, SCS, Vol. I, No. 12; II, Nos. 138, 170, 359, 363; III, No. 439; IV, No. 699, 739. Shivaji's letters – SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 139, 277-78, 684; VII, No. 35; SPD, Vol. XXXI, No. 31.

[3817](#) Article by J. S. Karandikar in *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part I, Marathi section, pp. 105-32; *Shri-samarthanchi Don Juni Charitre*, introduction, pp.41-44.

[3818](#) It may be noted that Ramdas is not mentioned in the *Shivabharat*, the Jedhe Chronology and the Sabhasad Chronicle.

[3819](#) *Shri-samarthanchi Don Juni Charitre*, introduction, pp.38-40.

[3820](#) The chronicle was published under the title *Shri Ramdas-swamiche Charitranchi Bakhar*.

[3821](#) Published in *Shri Sampradayik Vividh Vishay*, Vol. I, pp. 116-22.

[3822](#) Those who do not subscribe to the view that Ramdas was Shivaji's political guru cite a document dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1672, found among the papers of the descendant of Divakar, a disciple of Ramdas. It is a letter written by Keshav, another disciple of Ramdas, to Divakar giving instructions for preparations to be made for Shivaji's visit and stating that it was Shivaji's "first visit" to Samarth [Ramdas]. (*Shri-samarthanchi Don Juni Charitre*, introduction, pp. 46-47.) However, that document is

spurious. Without going into finer nuances of the Marathi language of Shivaji's times, I would only draw the attention of readers familiar with contemporaneous usage to the phrase “*majakur samajala*” appearing in the letter, which was hardly, if ever, used at the time the letter is purportedly written. The document mentions towards the end that 200 Hons received from Dattajipant for the fete of Rama have been sent to the recipient. There is another document in the same lot dated 14<sup>th</sup> February 1659. It is purported to be a letter addressed by one Bhaskar to Divakar. It states that Bhaskar had gone to Shivaji for alms and that Shivaji has sent a letter to Dattajipant the *Vaknis* instructing him to give 200 Hons for the fete of Rama every year. (*Ibid.*, pp. 45-56.) The authenticity of this letter, too, is doubtful, for the available evidence shows Dattaji was appointed to the post of *Vaknis* after 1661, or, most probably, after 1667. (See Chapter 11.) This leaves the question of the first meeting of Shivaji and Ramdas undecided.

[3823](#) See, for instance, *Sajjangad wa Samarth Ramdas*, p.115.

[3824](#) *SCP*, pp. 137 (v.6), 141-42 (v. 66).

[3825](#) One of these is in the form of an address to Shivaji and the other in the form of an address to his son Sambhaji. The former is quoted in the *Chitnis Chronicle*, p. 62. An English translation (in prose) is given in *A History of the Maratha People*, pp. 183-84. Though correct as a translation, it is insipid and lacks the forcefulness of the original Marathi.

[3826](#) *SCS*, Vol. IV, Nos. 733-35.

[3827](#) *E. K. Chronicle*, p. 26.

[3828](#) See Chapter 4.

[3829](#) Ibid.

[3830](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.23.

[3831](#) For instance, a chronology called the Dhadaphale Yadi published in BISM Annual Report for Shaka 1835, p.377; *Shivadigvijaya Chronicle*, pp.53-54.

[3832](#) *SCP*, p. 16.

[3833](#) He published it in 1927.

[3834](#) *Shivabharat*, 6:26-31

[3835](#) Reprinted in *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part I, Marathi-Hindi section, pp.133-40.

[3836](#) For the Baneda chart, see *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part I, Marathi-Hindi section, p.140, and *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. III, p.125 and photograph facing p. 113. For Bikaner chart, see G. H. Khare's article in the Marathi daily *Kesari* of 5<sup>th</sup> March 1935 (p.6) and *ASN*, Vol. IX, pp.93-96.

[3837](#) Why these horoscopes were found in the collections of astrologer families is not difficult to imagine. While Shivaji was confined at Agra, he or his followers might have consulted these astrologers.

[3838](#) The committee's report has been published in a small Marathi book entitled *Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Janmtithi Nirnay Samiti: Ahawal va Nivedane* (Committee for resolving the

controversy about the birth date of Maharaja Chhatrapati Shivaji: Report and statements).

[3839](#) *Radhamadhav-Vilas*, p.232; *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 2 (fn.4), 3 (fn. 6); *Bhosal-Vamshavali*, v.13 (SCP, p.131). *Bhosal-Vamshavali* is a Sanskrit eulogy of 35 verses written in praise of Shahji's progeny.

[3840](#) See chapter 5.

[3841](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.2.

[3842](#) *Radhamadhav-Vilas*, p.267; *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 77, 88-89; *Bhosal-Vamshavali*, v.13-21 (SCP, p.131). In his letters to Ekoji, Shivaji uses the term *chiranjiv* (May you live for ever!) which is a form used by the elders in their letters to address or mention the younger ones in the family. (See, for instance, *Tanjavarache Rajagharane*, pp.42-43.)

[3843](#) SCP, p.33.

[3844](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, pp. 88-89; *Shedgaokar Chronicle*, p.54.

[3845](#) SPSS, Vol. II, No.2332.

[3846](#) Tanjore Inscription (*Bhonsal Vamsha Charitra*, p.47).

[3847](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.6.

[3848](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (SCP, pp.18, 50); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.6.

[3849](#) Jedhe Chronology (*SCP*, p.19).

[3850](#) Jedhe and Shivapur Chronologies (*SCP*, pp.24, 52); *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p.69.

[3851](#) *Tanjauracha Shilalekh*, p.48; *A History of Maratha people*, Vol. I, pp.277-78 (Based on an old genealogy). See also, *Tarikh-I Dilkusha*, p.53; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.271; Martin (*India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, part II, pp.729, 769; Vol. II, Part I, p.1025).

[3852](#) Shivapur Chronology (*SCP*, p.53); *Chitnis Chronicle*, p.250.

[3853](#) See, for instance, *Shakakarte Shivaray*, Vol. I, p. 275.

[3854](#) For Kanhoji's wives see *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 239 (p.231).

[3855](#) *History of the Mahrattas*, Ch. 3, p.94.

[3856](#) *BISM, Shanmasik Vritta*, Shaka 1834 (Ashwin-Falgun), p.303.

[3857](#) *Purandare Daftar*, Part III, p.136.

[3858](#) Handwritings of these and many others may be found in their letters, photocopies of which are published in *Marathekalin Prasiddha Vyaktinchchi Hastaksharyukt Patre*. How the handwriting of a person is identified will be explained presently.

[3859](#) Here is an example of such evidence: Jahangir, Akbar's son, states that Akbar was illiterate (*Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p.33). Akbar's Court chronicler Abul Fazl also mentions, albeit rather indirectly and metaphorically, that Akbar was illiterate. (*The Akbar Nama*, Vol. I, pp.518-21, 588-89.) Antonio Montserrate, a

Spanish missionary, who had resided at Akbar's court for several months, also notes that Akbar could not read and write at all. (Montserrat, p.201.)

[3860](#) *Shivaji and his Times*, p. 25.

[3861](#) Such accounts have been noticed in the preceding pages.

[3862](#) *Shiva-Charitra-Sanshodhan Vritta*, Rajyabhishek Shaka 300, p. 15.

[3863](#) Manucci, Vol. II, p.121.

[3864](#) *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 81 (p.46), Letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> April 1676.

[3865](#) See, for instance, Bernier, p.268 (Mughal Court); *JIH*, Vol. 34, Part II (August 1656), pp. 125-26 (Johan van Twist's visit to the Adilshahi Court, 1637).

[3866](#) *Alamgir Nama*, p.1101-02.

[3867](#) I have seen some: originals as well as photocopies. The writing in Aurangzeb's hand has been given separately in *Adab-i Alamgiri*. (See Vol. I, pp. 173-74, 228-29, 234-35, 251-52.)

[3868](#) See, for instance, *Marathekalin Prasiddha Vyaktinchi Hastaksharyukt Patre*, Nos. 4, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 23, 25, 30, 32, 35, 37, 44, 47, 49, 52, 53.

[3869](#) For instance, the following letters contain some words in the Maratha King Shahu's handwriting: (1) *Shri Shivashahicha Lekhanalankar*, No. 4 in plate 2 facing page 36. (2) Photocopy facing page 1 of *SPD*, Vol. XI. (3) *Marathekalin Prasiddha*

*Vyaktinchi Hastaksharyukt Patre*, No. 8. The following letters are entirely in Shahu's hand: (1) and (2) *Itihas-Sangraha* magazine, Vol. VII, Nos. IV-VII, frontispiece. (3) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No.I, frontispiece.

[3870](#) A comprehensive list is given in *Shivachhatrapatinchi Patre*.

[3871](#) For instance, *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.338 (to Kanhoji Jedhe); *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 785 (to Dasopant, a saintly and prolific author); *Tanjavarche Rajgharane*, pp.42-43 (to Ekoji).

[3872](#) Of the letters which could be expected to have Shivaji's handwriting, a few have been photographed and the whereabouts of a few are known. But none of these bear Shivaji's handwriting. For instance, the photograph of a letter to Ekoji has been published in *Itihas-Sangraha* magazine, Vol. VII, Parts I-III. Some authors have claimed to have found Shivaji's handwriting in certain letters. I have examined these and have found all such claims baseless. A detailed analysis is given in my Marathi biography of Shivaji, *Shri Raja Shivachhatrapati*, Part II, Appendix 20.

[3873](#) *Radhamadhav-Vilas*, pp. 227-33.

[3874](#) Ibid., p.241.

[3875](#) Ibid., pp. 244-45.

[3876](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, pp.182-83.

[3877](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.26 (p.33).

[3878](#) *FBS*, pp. 48-49.

[3879](#) *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, p.281.

[3880](#) *Chitnis Chronicle*, p. 29.

[3881](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.399 (p.292). Italics mine.

[3882](#) *Shivabharat*, 9:70-74.

[3883](#) The account contains events such as the Battle of Umbarkhind, sack of Rajapur, and defeat of Jaswantrao Dalvi and Suryarao Surve. These are absent in the first two editions of Sir Jadunath Sarkar's *Shivaji and his Times* (1919, 1920) because the *Shivabharat* had not come to light till then. In all future editions these events have been narrated at length. (Third edition, pp.83-86; fourth edition, pp. 80-84; fifth edition, pp. 82-86.) In a footnote towards the end of that narrative, Sarkar says: "Several details of this campaign in the Ratnagiri district have been taken from the *Surya-vamsham*. The dates are from *Jedhe S.*" *Shivabharat* is the name under which the *Surya-vamsham* was published by Mr. S. M. Divekar in 1927 and Sarkar prefers to refer to it by the latter name. (*Shivaji and his Times*, p.394.) *Jedhe S.* means Jedhe Shakavali i.e. Jedhe Chronology. The fact is that not several but all the details in that narrative, except the dates, have been taken from the *Shivabharat*. These details are not available in any other source.

[3884](#) *IHRC, Proceedings of the Fifty-third Session*, Vol. LIII, p. 20.

[3885](#) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[3886](#) *Ibid.*, p.19 for the first quotation and p.23 for the second.

[3887](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 257, 260, 717; (English translation in *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. VII, p.68); Manrique, Vol. II, p. 243.

[3888](#) Note the words “*azm-i rasidan pesh-i shuma darad*” in the third line from the bottom in the photocopy. ‘Shuma’ in Persian is like *Sie* (as against *du*) in German or *Vous* (as against *tu*) in French.

[3889](#) For instance, Shah Jahan’s *farman* of 5<sup>th</sup> February 1632 addressed to Kheloji Bhosale refers to him in the third person singular. (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. I, pp. 26-29.) Even the Adilshah and Qutbshah are addressed in third person singular in Shah Jahan’s *farmans* to them. [See, for instance, *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 124-30 (to Adilshah), 130-33 (to Qutbshah), 167-74 (to Adilshah).] Exceptions to this practice were extremely rare. For instance, in a *farman* to Asaf Khan, Shah Jahan has addressed him in second person plural, i.e. as *shuma*. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 114-15.) But Asaf Khan was not only Shah Jahan’s father-in-law, but had also played a crucial role in Shah Jahan’s accession to the throne.

[3890](#) Sitamau copy, pp.6a-7b (1658); *BISM, Chaturtha Sammelan Vritta*, pp.73-77, also Sitamau copy, pp.8a-9a (1659).

[3891](#) Printed texts are quite often deceptive in this respect. For instance: (1) In *Selected Waqai of the Deccan*, Persian section, the words “*pati pan dada rukhsat namud*” occur in document No. 16, pp. 8-9, where the lingual ‘t’ is printed for the ‘t’ in *pati*. But a photograph of the document facing page 9 shows that a dental ‘t’ is written for the ‘t’ in *pati* in that manuscript. (2) In the Persian section of the same book, the words “*bandar Machhalipatan*” occur in document No. 12 in p.7, where the lingual ‘t’ is printed for the ‘t’ in *Machhalipatan*. But a

photograph of the document facing page 7 shows that the dental ‘t’ is written for the ‘t’ in Machhalipatan in that manuscript. Therefore, my contention that the lingual ‘t’ is unlikely to occur in a 17<sup>th</sup> Century Persian document may be examined for its veracity only in original manuscripts and not their modern printed texts.

[3892](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.62-63.

[3893](#) *Ibid.*, pp.205-06.

[3894](#) See, for instance, *Some Farmans, Sanads and Parwanas*, between pages 1 to 16, Nos. 5 (1648), 21 (1658), 24 (1657), 35(1647), 51(1658), 58 (1646), 73 (1650), 74 (1654). Figures in parentheses denote the years.

[3895](#) See, for instance, Sitamau copy, pp.6a-7b (Aurangzeb to Shivaji, 1658); BISM, *Chaturtha Sammelan Vritta*, pp.73-77, also Sitamau copy, pp.8a-9a (Aurangzeb to Shivaji, 1659); AFS, Vol. II, Nos. 4-7 (Shah Jahan’s *farmans*); *Ruqat-i Alamgir*, pp.315-16 (letter No. 2/119, 3/200); *Faramin-i Salatin*, p. 63(No. 43).

[3896](#) For instance, “*hasb-ul dast-ras*” in seventh line. It is strange that the Arabic article is followed by a Persian word (*dast-ras*) rather than an Arabic one. Such a construction is unlikely to occur in a Mughal *farman*, though one need not be surprised if it occurs in an Adilshahi *farman*.

[3897](#) *The Agrarian System of Mughal India 1556-1707*, No. 74 on pp.475-76. This *farman* bears Shah Jahan’s round seal. Considering the subject of its present text, it should have born Shah Jahan’s *auzak* seal. This is an important indication of forgery. The *auzak* seal was imprinted on *farmans* relating to *watans*, *inams*, *jagirs* and appointments. (See *The Ain-i Akbari*,

Vol. I, Book II, Ain 11 and 20. See also *Badshah Nama*, Vol.I, Part I, pp. 91, 148, 406; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p.18.) Shah Jahan's *auzak* seal was square in shape. (See, for instance, *Some Farmans, Sanads and Parwanas*, Illustration 2 A facing p.14; Mughal Archives, Vol. I, Plates I and II and No.6-7 – pp.7-9.) His other seal (called the *bayazi* seal) was round in shape. (See, for instance, *Some Farmans, Sanads and Parwanas*, Illustration 1 A facing p. 10; *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. I, pp. 26-29.)

[3898](#) *Allah Hu Akbar* (God is great) written at the top.

[3899](#) A monogram written in ornate style. In Muslim polity *Tughra* was one of the prerogatives of sovereignty.

[3900](#) Through the mediation of Asaf khan, the humblest of the faithful [servants].

[3901](#) *Zimn* is Arabic for endorsement. Most of the Mughal *farmans* have several endorsements on the back made by officers of different departments.

[3902](#) *Vakil* is Arabic for deputy, representative. It was the highest office in the Mughal Empire below that of the Emperor.

[3903](#) *Shikasta* is 'broken' or cursive style of hand used for writing quickly. *Shikasta-amez* means mixed or mingled with *shikasta*.

[3904](#) A kind of Persian writing.

[3905](#) *Farman* II, occurring twice is obviously a mistake for *Farman* I.

[3906](#) See Chapter 7.

[3907](#) ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 26 (pp. 26, 29, 33), 30

[3908](#) Randolph Tailor has signed the letter that he sent as a prisoner in Songad. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 26-p.33). He is mentioned in a Surat letter of 28th January 1664 as formerly in being in prison. (Ibid., No. 77.)

[3909](#) He, too, is mentioned in a Surat letter of 28th January 1664 as formerly in being in prison. (Ibid., No. 77.) See also EFI(1661 - 1664), pp. 28, 229, 234.

[3910](#) ERS, Vol I, No. 26 (p.27); EFI (1661 - 1664), pp. 3,8

[3911](#) Randolph Tailor has signed the letter that he sent as a prisoner in Songad. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 26-p.33). He is mentioned in a Surat letter of 28th January 1664 as formerly in being in prison. (Ibid., No. 77.)

[3912](#) Randolph Tailor has signed the letter that he sent as a prisoner in Songad. (ERS, Vol. I, No. 26-p.33). He is mentioned in a Surat letter of 28th January 1664 as formerly in being in prison. (Ibid., No. 77.)

[3913](#) Revington had taken a doctor with him while going from Surat to Rajapur. This is shown by the Company's letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> April 1660 to him in which the directors had expressed their "disapproval that he intended to take a doctor with him at their expense, without obtaining the President's permission; but intimated that, if the latter and his Council now concurred in this measure, the charge would be allowed." [EFI (1655-1660), pp. 385-86.] The doctor (called surgeon elsewhere) was, probably, one Robert Ward. [EFI (1655-1660), p.140; (1661-1664), p.27.]

[3914](#) Rajapur to Surat, 19th November 1659. See EFI (1655 - 1660), pp. 251 - 252

[3915](#) Rajapur to Surat, 4<sup>th</sup> February 1660. Ibid., p.356. The ship had remained at Rajapur because the factors had no money to provision her or to pay her crew's salary. All the lascars except four or five deserted her for want of money. When Rustam-i Zaman's forces returned to Rajapur, his governor of the town Abdul Karim took possession of the *Rajapur Merchant*. [Rajapur to Surat, 24<sup>th</sup> March 1660. *EFI (1655-1660)*, pp. 364-65.] Thus, by the time the English detachment that had gone to Panhala and returned to Rajapur, the *Rajapur Merchant* was no more in their possession.

[3916](#) Rajapur to Surat, 16th April 1660. Ibid., p. 372

[3917](#) Mith Bandar literally means salt port. In a letter of the Maratha King Shahu, written in 1725, the following five places are listed under the title Mith Bandare (Mith Bandars): Port Pen, Port Kalyan, Port Panvel, Port Talon, and Port Bhiwandi. (*BISM Quarterly*, Vol. VI, pp.91-93.)

[3918](#) Letter of the English prisoners from Songad to Surat, 10th June 1661. (ERS, Vol I, Nos. 26 - p.23)

[3919](#) EFI (1661 - 1664), p.3.

[3920](#) Later, the English prisoners wrote from Songad to Surat on 10<sup>th</sup> June 1661 that "Mr. Napier died about a month since in Rajapur." (ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 – p.27.) There is a statement in the Dagh Register that the Englishmen were tortured and that one of them died under torture. [EFI (1661-1664), pp.4-5.] It is evidently false. The English records do not make the accusation

of torture. The Englishman who the Dagh Register alleges to have died under torture must be Napier. He was mortally ill before being taken captive by the Marathas and even the English records do not say that he was tortured.

[3921](#) Songad (also called Songiri or Mirgad) is situated about 12 km southeast of Pen.

[3922](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 (p.23)

[3923](#) For this interview see ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 (pp. 29 - 31).

[3924](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 (p.31)

[3925](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 (p.24)

[3926](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 26 (p.32 - 33)

[3927](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 30

[3928](#) Relating the imprisonment of the Rajapur factors, the Dutch letter written from Surat on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1661 states that Shivaji “took into custody the English Chief Resident Mr. Henry Revington with six of his subordinates”, that Revington, being ill, was released together with “a surgeon and a sailor” and that the remaining four English prisoners were confined in fort Songad. (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 488.) The four Englishmen who remained imprisoned after Revington’s release “with a surgeon and a sailor”, were Randolph Taylor, Richard Taylor, Philip Giffard and Robert Ferrand. [ERS, Vol. I, Nos. 41, 45-49, 53-54; *EFI* (1661-1664), pp.27-28, 234, 236.] In their letter dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1661 to the Company, the Surat Council refers to “Henry Revington’s imprisonment by Shivaji...who kept him and seven other Englishmen in prison.”

(ERS, Vol. I, No. 30.) It further states that as Revington was sick he was released “leaving all the rest but his surgeon behind him” and has arrived at Surat on 17<sup>th</sup> October 1661. [EFI (1661-1664), p.3. See also Dutch letter dated 17<sup>th</sup> December 1661 from Surat cited above.] But the Dutch letter cited above clearly states that a sailor was also released along with Revington and the surgeon. Evidently the Surat Council’s letter has not referred to the sailor because he was not in the Company’s service.

[3929](#) Dutch letter dated 14th January, 1662 from Surat (Shivaji the Great - Vol. I, No. II, pp. 488 - 89); EFI (1661 - 1664) No. 12

[3930](#) EFI (1661 - 1664) No. 12

[3931](#) These letters are mentioned in the Surat letter of 19th March 1662 addressed to “The disconsolate at Rairi castle” (ERS, Vol. I, No. 36; also Nos. 41, 44, 45, 48, 49.)

[3932](#) Ibid., No. 36

[3933](#) This ship of 370 tons was owned by the Company. See *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 24, 79.

[3934](#) Ibid., No. 38

[3935](#) Ibid., No. 41

[3936](#) This ship, too, was owned by the Company. See *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 117-19.

[3937](#) Dowager Queen of the Adilshahi Sultanate. She was expected to return from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The Surat

Council's belief that capturing her would bring pressure on Shivaji was misplaced as they realized later.

[3938](#) Ibid., No. 42

[3939](#) Ibid., No. 43; *EFI* (1661 - 1664), p.88

[3940](#) ERS, Vol. 44, No. 45

[3941](#) Ibid., No. 46

[3942](#) Ibid., No. 48

[3943](#) Benidas and Velji were the Company's brokers at Surat. See *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 29, 30, 32, 107 (and n.2), 120.

[3944](#) On 19<sup>th</sup> September 1662, Sir George Oxenden took charge from Matthew Andrews as President. See *EFI* (1661-1664), p. 91.

[3945](#) It seems he was the Company's broker there.

[3946](#) Ibid., No. 49

[3947](#) The *Convertine*, a 40-gun ship of the Royal Navy, was part of the English force that had arrived to take possession of Mumbai from the Portuguese. According to an agreement between the Company and commissioners of the Navy, ships of the Royal Navy that had arrived in India to take possession of Mumbai were to be placed at the disposal of the President and Council of Surat. See *EFI* (1661-1664), pp. 106, 127-28.

[3948](#) Ibid., No. 52

[3949](#) The following account of the prisoners' release and their subsequent discourse with Raoji is taken from *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 53 (pp.45-47). Grant Duff says: "The unfortunate Englishmen were not finally released without paying a ransom." (*History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, Chapter 5, p.134, footnote.) He errs; no ransom was paid.

[3950](#) Ibid., No. 53 (p.48)

[3951](#) Ibid., No. 54, 57

[3952](#) EFI (1661 - 1664), pp. 233-34

[3953](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 54 (p.51); EFI (1661 - 1664), p.234

[3954](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 57; EFI (1661 - 1664), p.234-35

[3955](#) EFI (1661 - 1664), p.234-35

[3956](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 57

[3957](#) Ibid., No. 63

[3958](#) EFI (1661 - 1664), p.241

[3959](#) Ibid., pp.257-58

[3960](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 69; EFI (1661 - 1664), p.257

[3961](#) ERS, Vol. I, No. 70; EFI (1661 - 1664), pp. 259-60

[3962](#) *Quran*, 9:29 vide *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 268. See also *A Dictionary of Islam*, p.248; *Quran-e-Karim*, p.297 (Arabic text with English translation).

[3963](#) *A Dictionary of Islam*, p.248. In Arabic, Jews and Christians are called *ahl-ul kitab* (people of the Book) because their Scriptures — the Old and the New Testament respectively — are regarded as divine revelations. They are, therefore, not guilty of an absolute denial, but only of a partial perversion of the Truth. Hence the concession granted to them of security of life and property on payment of the *jizya*.

[3964](#) Pronounced *Dhimmis* in Arabic and *Zimmis* in Persian. From Arabic *zimma* (security, compact, contract).

[3965](#) *A Dictionary of Islam*, p.710

[3966](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, pp. 268-69.

[3967](#) *Ibid.*, p.270.

[3968](#) *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 316-17.

[3969](#) *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 108. Government servants were exempt from the *jizya*. (*Futuhat-i-Alamgiri*, p.117.) In their letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> September 1679, the Surat Council wrote to the Company: “The great zeal of the King [Aurangzeb] for the propagation of the Muhammadan religion has likewise moved him to put a general tax [*jizya*] upon all persons residing in his country as well as strangers as natives not of that persuasion.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part II, pp.215-16.)

[3970](#) *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. LX, pp.372-73.

Mountstuart Elphinstone states: “A translation of this letter is given in ‘Orme’s *Fragments*,’ p.252. A closer translation, with the Persian, was published by Mr. Weston in 1803.” (*The History of India*, Vol. II, Book XI, Ch. II, p.459 n.)

[3971](#) *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire*, Note LV, pp. 252-56.

[3972](#) *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. I (Second Edition), p. 295-96 n. (Ch. XIII in the section entitled *Annals of Mewar*).

[3973](#) Ibid.

[3974](#) Noticed in Appendix 1. The name is a misnomer, for of the 32 letters in the collection only two — the first and the last — are attributed to Shivaji. There is no particular order in the collection, chronological or otherwise. The latest one is perhaps the one attributed to the Maratha King Shahu which might have been written about 1735. The collection may have been compiled in late 18<sup>th</sup> Century.

[3975](#) *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, pp.286-90.

[3976](#) Grant Duff holds that the letter was written by Jaswant Singh. He states: “His [Jaswant Singh’s] well known letter to Aurangzeb concerning the *jizya* or poll-tax, on all persons not professing Mahomedanism, is preserved by the Raja of Kolhapur as the production of Shivaji.” Dr. Bal Krishna’s says: “Grant Duff has left the testimony that the Raja of Kolhapur had the original letter....It is a pity that the original is not now to be traced in the state papers at Kolhapur.” (*Shivaji the Great*, Vol. II, Part I, p.219, note 1.) But Grant Duff does not say that it was the

original. I think that the copy that was preserved at Kolhapur might be an old Marathi rendering of the Persian original. An old Marathi translation of the letter is incorporated in the *Shedgaokar Chronicle* (pp. 101-02). This Marathi Chronicle gives an account of Shivaji and his heirs till 1854. It was found among the Bhosale family of Shedgaon (near Pedgaon in Ahmednagar District of Maharashtra). A large portion of the chronicle is borrowed from the Sabhasad Chronicle. This letter, however, is not referred to in any other chronicle of Shivaji. The chronicle was published in 1917 under the title *Marathi Daftari, Rumal Pahila: Shrimant Maharaj Bhosale yanchi Bakhar*.

[3977](#) This is the last letter in the manuscript, which consists of 34 un-numbered folios. An English translation of the letter, given in an old manuscript preserved at the British Museum, is published in the *Tarabai Papers: A Collection of Persian Letters*. (Ibid, Preface, pp. v, viii-ix, xvi-d to xvi-f.) However, as it is inaccurate in a couple of places, I have preferred to give my own rendering. I am obliged to Rajendra Joshi, a Persian scholar, for emendations in three or four places

[3978](#) This heading is in the Persian text. It seems from previously published translations that other versions do not have this heading.

[3979](#) The translation given in Orme's *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire* does not mention Shivaji's or anyone else's name as the author of the letter. The version in The Asiatic Society of Bengal contains the name of Shambhuji (Sambhaji) in place of Shivaji. (*History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p.290.) The Marathi version in the *Shedgaokar Chronicle* gives Shivaji's name as the author of the letter.

[3980](#) Mahmudi in Persian. I suppose this is an error for Muhammadi (Muslims). Rajendra Joshi suggests 'Mahmudiyah',

a Shia sect whose members on being expelled from Persia were given refuge by Akbar. (*A Dictionary of Islam*, p. 307.)

[3981](#) Gujarati *Shewado*, a Jain mendicant.

[3982](#) Shah Jahan finds mention hereafter in other versions, but it is absent in this. For instance: “The Emperor Shah Jahan for 32 years cast his blessed shade on the head of the world.” (*History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p.287.)

[3983](#) In the English translation in the British Museum manuscript, the following words are added in brackets as interpretation: “They are distressed but conceal their poverty from pride.”

[3984](#) Actually, he was following in Timur’s footsteps; he is unsurpassed in cruelty. Sanyasis are Hindu monks and Bairagis are mendicants.

[3985](#) The words in Persian are “*Dar kitab-i asmani wa kalam-i rabbani ast rabb-ul-alamin wa ya rabb-ul Musalmin.*” Other English translations say ‘*Rabb-ul-alamin*, the Lord of all men and not *rabb-ul-musalmin*, the Lord of the Muhammadans only’. The Persian text in the Royal Asiatic Society does not contain words meaning ‘and not’ here. But it is probably the scribe’s error. We may also translate the sentence as a rhetorical question: Is it the Lord of All Men or the Lord of Muslims in the Divine Book and the Word of God?

[3986](#) *Kufr* (Infidelity) is the word used here. Sarkar and others translate it as Hinduism. Of course Hinduism is meant there; but that is not the word used in the Persian text.

[3987](#) It was unjust; however, in a Muslim theocracy it was not only lawful but also obligatory. The following sentences appear after this in Sir Jadunath Sarkar's translation: "From the political point of view it can be allowed only if a beautiful woman wearing gold ornaments can pass from one country to another without fear of molestation. [But] in these days even the cities are being plundered, what shall I say of the open country? Apart from its injustice, the imposition of the *jizya* is an innovation in India and inexpedient." These are absent in the Royal Asiatic Society copy. In Rouse's translation, too, it is called "an innovation and an infringement of the laws of Hindustan."

[3988](#) Ahmad III, the Sultan of Gujarat (1554-1561), is meant here. He plotted to murder his *wazir*, Itimad Khan, under whose tutelage he was living. The plot was discovered and the Khan caused the Sultan to be whipped to death. (*Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, English translation, pp. 74-78.) He is not mentioned in other known versions of the letter.

[3989](#) Raj Singh was the Rana of Mewar. Sir Jadunath Sarkar's translation says, "Rana Raj Singh, who is the head of the Hindus." In the Royal Asiatic Society copy he is merely called Raj Singh, without the appellations 'Rana' and 'the head of the Hindus.' The translation given by Orme says "Ram Singh, who is esteemed the principal amongst the Hindus" in place of Raj Singh.

[3990](#) This is what the Royal Asiatic Society version says. The translation given by Orme says: "Then let your well-wisher be called upon, with whom you will have less difficulty to encounter." The sense intended seems to be 'called upon to pay the *jizya*.' Sir Jadunath specifically says in his translation: "Then it will not be so very difficult to collect it [*jizya*] from me, as I am at your service." But that is not what the Persian text says.

[3991](#) See Ch. 10.

[3992](#) An English translation of the letter done by Sir Jadunath Sarkar is given in his *Studies in Mughal India* (pp. 98-105) and also in *Studies in Aurangzib's Reign* (pp.66-71). It is indeed strange that Manucci gives a translation of this letter in his memoirs. (Manucci, Vol. IV, pp. 171-77.)

[3993](#) *Arsh-ashyani* (nestling at the foot of the divine throne), *firdaus-makani* (located in paradise), and *sahib-qiran sani* (second lord of the happy conjunction) were titles of Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan respectively. The first two were assigned by Jahangir and Shah Jahan respectively when they succeeded to the throne after the death of their fathers. Shah Jahan was called “second lord of the happy conjunction”, presumably because he was born on an auspicious occasion; ‘second’ because Timur before him was called *sahib-qiran* (lord of the happy conjunction).

[3994](#) Afterwards, in a letter to the Maratha King Sambhaji, Muhammad Akbar wrote: “From the beginning of his reign it was in Alamgir’s mind to absolutely destroy the Hindus. This became manifest after the death of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. The campaign against the Rana, too, was undertaken with this object. All human beings are creation of God and He is the protector of all.... Because Emperor Alamgir carried the matters beyond limit, it became clear to me that if these men are uprooted, Hindustan would not remain in the hands of our august family. Therefore with a view to my heritage, and taking pity on this race [of Rajput Rajas] who have been loyal to us since former times, I decided at the request of Rana Raj Singh and Durgadas Rathod to march to Ajmer and fight for the [possession of] the Empire.” (*Khutut-i Shivaji*, ff. 25 a-b, 26 a. An English translation of the letter done by Sir Jadunath Sarkar has been given in *Studies in Mughal India*, pp. 108-10 and also in *Studies in Aurangzib's Reign*, pp.73-75.) Muhammad Akbar

crowned himself on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1681. (*History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p.357.)

[3995](#) He says: “The Hindu community is facing two calamities: imposition of *jizya* in the city and despotism of mean men in the plains [i.e. out of the cities and towns, in the countryside].” (*Khutut-i Shivaji*, f19a.)

[3996](#) For the treaty, see Ch. 15. For Dilir Khan’s *subadari* of Multan, see *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp. 87, 92.

[3997](#) *Aurangzeb and His Times*, p. 160.

[3998](#) *The History of India*, Vol. II, Book XI, Ch. II, p.458 n. In *Aurangzeb and His Times* (p. 160), Faruki incorrectly attributes this remark to Elliot (*The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*), Vol. VII, p.294.

[3999](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No.79 (p.73).

[4000](#) *FBS*, p.184.

[4001](#) Rajasthani letter No.21 in *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*.

[4002](#) *Shivabharat*, 21:23.

[4003](#) *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. I, editor’s introduction, pp. xxviii-xxix, xxxiv-xxxvi.

[4004](#) *Ibid.*, p. liv.

[4005](#) *Ibid.*, pp. lii-liv.

[4006](#) I am obliged to Dr. Gijs Kruijzer who read and translated these Dutch inscriptions for me.

[4007](#) Also spelt ‘Valentijn’ or Latinized as ‘Franciscus Valentinus’.

[4008](#) *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, pp. vii, xxxvii.

[4009](#) Sir Jadunath Sarkar says: “The fine steel engraving given in Orme’s *Fragments* (1782) is this portrait as retouched by a European etcher.” (Note entitled ‘Portraits of Shivaji’ at the beginning of *Shivaji and His Times*.) The copy of the 1782 edition of Orme’s *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire* that I have seen does not contain Shivaji’s portrait; perhaps it had been removed by someone. My copy of the 1805 edition of Orme’s *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire* contains Shivaji’s portrait between pages 6 and 7. It is evidently adopted from the portrait in Valentyn’s book. The outline of Shivaji’s portrait used in chapter headings of this biography is adopted from a reprint of the one in Valentyn’s book.

[4010](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, pp.7-14, 19-20.

[4011](#) Ibid., pp.22-23.

[4012](#) Ibid., Vol. II, p.71.

[4013](#) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, Nos. III-IV, pp. 89-93.

[4014](#) *Barat* is a Persian word. In Marathi it was corrupted to *Varat* and in English Burratt, Bratte, etc. See, for instance, *AFS*, Vol. V, Part I, Nos. 44, 46, 54, 132; *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 127; VIII, No. 41; *EFI* (1618-16210, pp.201, 322; (1622-23), pp. 67, 95, 112, 176, 187,

237, 347. In English, it was also called a bill or a bill of exchange. See, for instance, *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 141, 186.

[4015](#) *EFI* (1622-23), P. 67; *ERS*, Vol. II, Nos. 185, 186, 189.

[4016](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.396; Mundy, Vol. II, pp.290, 310-11; Tavernier, Vol. I, p.15;  
*Indian Travels*, pp.25, 253; *The Diaries of Streyntsham Master*, Vol. II, pp.304, 307.

[4017](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, Book I, Ain 10; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.374-75; *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 710, 715; *SCS*, Vol. VII, No. 67 (p.117).

[4018](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, editor's Appendix, p.327.

[4019](#) Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, p. 26); Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 15.

[4020](#) *Raja-vyavahara-kosha*, 2:41 (*SCP*, p.147).

[4021](#) *Relations of Golconda*, pp.3, 10, 54, 55, 61, 85; *EFI* (1640-1645), p.109; (1655-1660), p.103.

[4022](#) Fryer, Vol. I, p.106; *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, pp.193-94, 505.

[4023](#) *Senapati Dabhade Daftar*, Vol. I, No. 6 and introduction, pp. 2-4

[4024](#) *The Dutch in India*, p. 219.

[4025](#) *Ibid.*; Pelsaert, p.42.

[4026](#) Hobson-Jobson, pp. 655-67.

[4027](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, p. 70.

[4028](#) AFS, Vol. V, No.85.

[4029](#) Bijapur and Its Architectural remains, p.128; *The Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*, Vol. XVI, Part I, p.130.

[4030](#) SCS, Vol. II, Nos. 269, 397; IV, Nos. 737 (p.92); VIII, No. 63; SWD, Persian section, pp. 108, 147, 149, 150-51.

[4031](#) EFI (1624-1629), pp. 129, 135; (1655-1660), pp. 34, 260, 268, 398, 401; *Vestiges of old Madras*, Vol. I, pp. 17, 193-94; Bowrey, pp. 114-15; Tavernier, Vol. II, p. 70; Fryer, Vol. I, p.106; *The Dutch in India*, pp.46-47; SWD, Persian section, p. 34 (English section, p.25).

[4032](#) *Vestiges of old Madras*, Vol. I, pp. 193, 195; EFI (1655-1660), p. 34; *The Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*, Vol. XXXXV, p.79.

[4033](#) EFI (1618-1621), p. 262; (1646-1650), p. 308; (1655-1660), pp. 42, 102-03; (1665-1667), p. 327.

[4034](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, p.71.

[4035](#) EFI (1665-1667), p.327.

[4036](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.178-80, 209-10

[<sup>4037</sup>](#) Aurangzeb's letter to the Qutbshah (*Adab*, Vol. I, pp. 275-78). See also Waris, pp. 112 b-113a.

[<sup>4038</sup>](#) *SWD*, Persian section, Nos. 9, 13, 21, 25, 35, 38, 47 between pp.6-21 (English section, pp.5-15).

[<sup>4039</sup>](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), p.327. One hundred old pagodas were worth 125 new pagodas in 1651, 145 in 1657, 146 in January 1667, and 170 in December 1667. See *EFI* (1651-1654), p. 15; (1655-1660), p.103; (1665-667), pp. 327-28.

[<sup>4040</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. II, no. 239 (p.240), 269, 397; IV, No. 737 (p.92); V, No. 772; VIII, No. 63, 84 (p.100); *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No.57 (pp. 78-81).

[<sup>4041</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. IV, Nos. 735, 737 (pp. 92-94), 738-39; XIII, Nos. 20-25. Hons minted at Bankapur were called Nishani Hons. See *EFI* (1655-1660), p. 243.

[<sup>4042</sup>](#) . See, for instance, *MIS*, Vol. XVIII, No.57 (p. 80); *SCS*, Vol. II, No. 99; VII, No. 60 (p. 117); VIII, No. 84 (p.100).

[<sup>4043</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. IV, No. 737 (p.92).

[<sup>4044</sup>](#) See, for instance, *SWD*, Persian section, pp. 33-34 (1661), 75 (1662), English section, pp.25, 50.

[<sup>4045</sup>](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, Book I, Ain 10.

[<sup>4046</sup>](#) *ERS*, Vol. I, No. 346.

[<sup>4047</sup>](#) Fryer, Vol. II, p. 128.

[4048](#) *EFI* (1646-1650), p. 249 (footnote 3).

[4049](#) *Mandalatil Nani*, p.11; *Bijapur and Its Architectural Remains*, pp.128; *Hobson-Jobson*, p. 506.

[4050](#) See, for instance, the documents published in *Shiv-charitrasahitya*.

[4051](#) Quoted in *Hobson-Jobson*, p. 506.

[4052](#) See, for instance, *SCS*, Vol. III, Nos. 516, 520-21, 525-26; IX, No. 25; X, no. 33.

[4053](#) Mundy, Vol. V, p.55; *SCS*, Vol. X, No. 33.

[4054](#) *Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics*, pp.118-19.

[4055](#) *EFI* (1618-1621), pp.85, 102, 106, 146; (1630-1633), pp. 208-09; (1642-1645), p. 17; (1646-1650), p. 293; Fryer, Vol. II, p.126; Terry, p.113.

[4056](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.211; *EFI* (1618-21), p.8; (1642-1645), p.17; (1646-1650), pp. 191, 214, 293; (1651-1654), p.93, 105, 108, 142; (1655-1660), p. 164, 408; *The Diaries of Streyntsham Master*, Vol. II, pp. 34, 255.

[4057](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 19, 21, *Indian Travels*, p. 253; *EFI* (1643-1645), pp.17, 43; (1649-1650), p.191; (1655-1660), pp.192, 198, 408; *The Diaries of Streyntsham Master*, Vol. II, pp. 298, 303-04.

[4058](#) For rupees and sherafins, see *EFI* (1618-1621), pp. 8, 314; (1646), p.12; (1655-1660), pp. 192, 198; *The Diaries of Streynsham Master*, Vol. II, pp. 298, 303; Tavernier, Vol. I, p.21; Mundy, Vol. III, Part I, pp.64-65.

[4059](#) *Hobson-Jobson*, pp. 677-78 (under Pardao).

[4060](#) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No I, pp.31-32.

[4061](#) *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos. 127, 134; IV, No. 737 (pp. 92-93); VII, Nos.13, 54 (pp.82, 84, 85, 89); VIII, No. 84 (p.100).

[4062](#) *EFI* (1665-1667), pp.69-73, 306-07.

[4063](#) *JBBRAS*, Vol. XX, pp.109-130.

[4064](#) *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No.I, pp.26-28; *Mandalatil Nani*, p.23; *Poona District Gazetteer*, edition of 1885, Part II, p.104.

[4065](#) *SCS*, Vol. IV, No. 737 (p. 93).

[4066](#) See, for instance, *Mudra* (1990, issue No. 1), pp. 13-17; *Shiv-vijay*, p.178.

[4067](#) “Maund comes from the Indian word *man* which the Portuguese following their usual practice, pronounced māo, and apparently the English fused this form with ‘maund’, the name of measure which is now obsolete in England.” (*Relations of Golconda*, Appendix by editor, p.89.)

[4068](#) *Jahangir's India*, p.29.

<sup>4069</sup> Ibid.; Mundy, Vol. II, p. 156; *Relations of Golconda*, p. 84; SSK, Vol. I, No. 34. (In the last document, the figure 11, printed against *kanik*, i.e. flour, on p.55 should be corrected to  $11\frac{1}{2}$ .) Pelsaert says: "There used to be a custom that in weighing indigo a bag of doubled cloth containing 152 pice was reckoned as 5 *ser*, giving an excess of quite one *ser* in the *maund*...while by an old custom the *maund* was reckoned at 41 *ser*." (*Jahangir's India*, pp.16-17.) He is speaking of Indigo grown in the Agra district and the surrounding country. Akbar's *ser* weighed 30 dams or *pice* (*paisas*). Thus in every lot of 5 *sers* buyers got an excess of the weight of two dams plus the bag. The weight of 16 extra *dams* in the *maund* would be equal to about half *ser* and presumably that of the bags would account for half a *ser*. Furthermore, the *maund* was reckoned at 41 instead of 40 *sers*. Hence the *maund* contained 42 instead of 40 *sers*.

<sup>4070</sup> For instance, Schorer states that a *viss* (of five *sers*) was equal to  $2\frac{7}{8}$  pounds at Tegenapatnam (i.e. Devanampattinam),  $3\frac{1}{8}$  pounds at Nizamapatanam, and 3 pounds at Machilipatnam. (*Relations of Golconda*, pp. 52, 55, 61. One *viss* was equal to five *sers* and forty *sers* or eight *viss* made a *maund*. Ibid., p. 61.) Thus we have a uniform scale (40 *sers* = 1 *man*) with varying units (i.e. *sers* of varying capacities).

<sup>4071</sup> *Jahangir's India*, p. 42.

<sup>4072</sup> One Dutch or Holland pound was equal to about 1.09 English pounds (avoirdupois), i.e. about 0.494 kilograms. (*Jan Company in Coromandel*, pp. x, 223; *The Dutch in India*, p.220; *Relations of Golconda*, Appendix by editor, p.90.)

<sup>4073</sup> *EFI* (1630-1633), p. 165.

<sup>4074</sup> Ibid., p.165 (fn 1).

[4075](#) *EFI* (1642-1645), pp. 94-95 (and fn 1, p. 95).

[4076](#) *EFI* (1646-1650), p. 8 (and fn 1).

[4077](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, p.7.

[4078](#) One *livre* = about 1 lb. 1oz. (avoirdupois), i.e. about 17 oz. (Tavernier, Vol. I, Appendix by editor, p. 331.) A French *livre*, too, contained 16 ounces. (Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 32; II, p.208.) Thus a French ounce (spelt *once*) was equal to about  $1\frac{1}{16}$  of an English ounce.

[4079](#) Vide Tavernier, Vol. I, Appendix by the editor, p.334.

[4080](#) *Indian Travels*, p. 25.

[4081](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. I, p.142.

[4082](#) *Jahangir's India*, p. 29, Also see p.22 (and fn 2) with p.21 (fn 2).

[4083](#) Ibid., pp.7, 23, 28.

[4084](#) Ibid., pp. 29 (fn 1), 42.

[4085](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, p.32.

[4086](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, p.7. His statement is: "The *maund* in these regions [i.e. Agra] weighs 60 *sers*, which are equal to  $51\frac{3}{4}$  of our *livres*." What he seems to mean is that the *maund* was equal to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  *maunds* of Surat and therefore equal to 60 *sers* of Surat. A

Surat *maund* according to him was  $34 \frac{1}{2}$  livres. This makes an Agra *maund* equal to exactly  $1 \frac{1}{2}$  *maunds* of Surat. But the statement would not hold good if we take *sers*, instead of *mans*, into consideration because the Surat *man* which Tavernier meant was one of 42 *sers*. Perhaps he might have overlooked this.

[4087](#) *Jahangir's India*, p. 29, also p. 45.

[4088](#) Mundy, Vol. II, p.237.

[4089](#) Ibid., p. 156. At another place, he states that the weight of a *ser* [at Patna] was equal to 37 'pice' [i.e. paisas]. It was used in that case to weigh vermillion. (Ibid., p.149.)

[4090](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 32.

[4091](#) *Jan Company in Coromandel*, p.223.

[4092](#) *EFI* (1642-1645), p.72.

[4093](#) *Relations of Golconda*, p.84. There "2 *maunds*" is evidently a misprint, as the editor states, for 20 *maunds*. (Ibid., Appendix, p. 88.)

[4094](#) *Relations of Golconda*, pp. 52, 54-55, 61.

[4095](#) *EFI* (1618-1621), p.153.

[4096](#) Ibid., p. 262.

[4097](#) Ibid., pp.70-71.

[4098](#) Ibid., p. 289.

[4099](#) *Relations of Golconda*, p. 33.

[4100](#) Ibid., pp. 52, 55, 61.

[4101](#) *Jahangir's India*, p.22 (and fn 2), also fn 2 on p. 21.

[4102](#) *Relations of Golconda*, Appendix by editor, p. 88.

[4103](#) *The Diaries of Streynsham Master*, Vol. II, pp. 304-05.

[4104](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, p.

[4105](#) For grains, see *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos. 130, 242; VII, Nos. 56, 60, 62; X, No. 20 (p.30); XI, No. 89; *MIS*, Vol. XV, Nos. 62, 68, 95, 97, 114; XX, Nos. 58 (pp.99, 105), 109; *SSK*, Vol. I, No.19. For sugar, see *SCS*, Vol. X, No. 20 (p.30). For jaggery, see *MIS*, Vol. XX, Nos. 175 (p.232); *SSK*, Vol. I, No. 19; *SCS*, Vol. X, No. 20 (p.30). For oil, see *SCS*, Vol. II, Nos. 152, 160, 163; III, Nos. 659, 663; VIII, No. 52, 59, X, Nos. 12, 20 (p.30); XII, Nos. 16 (p.27), 18; *SSK*, Vol. I, No. 19. For measurement of ghee by volume, see *SCS*, Vol. IV, Nos. 683 (pp.12-13), 684; *RSP*, No. 17 (pp.27-29, 36, 43, 47). For its measurement by weight, see *MIS*, Vol. XX, No. 58 (pp. 99-100); *SSK*, Vol. I, No. 19; *SCS*, Vol. X, No. 20 (p.30).

[4106](#) *SCS*, Vol. VII, Nos. 54 (p. 83), 62, 67 (p.110).

[4107](#) Ibid., No. 62, 67 (p.110).

[4108](#) *SCS*, Vol. X, No. 33.

[4109](#) See, for instance, *SSK*, Vol. I, Nos. 32, 35; *SCS*, Vol. IV, Nos. 733, 737.

[4110](#) The Europeans gave this name to whatever local unit they found in use. On the east coast of India, it denoted the *hasta* or true cubit. The *hasta* or *cavad* of Machilipatnam was about 18.7 inches, (*Relations of Golconda*, Appendix by editor, p.88.)

[4111](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, pp. 1-2.

[4112](#) *EFI* (1618-1621), p.205; Tavernier, Vol. II, p.1; Mundy, Vol. II, p.156, Appendix D, p.370. But any type of *gaz* was divided into 24 *tasus*, the length of the *tasu* being different in each case. (*The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.64.) Thus the scale was uniform (24 *tasus* to a *gaz*), but the units differed from place to place.

[4113](#) The *tasu* graphically illustrated by Tavernier (Vol. II, pp. 1-2) is equal to about 1.15 inch or 2.9 cm. An English letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> August 1619 from Surat to Machilipatnam says: “There is very little difference twixt our inch and the *tasu* of this place, thirty-seven whereof contain one English yard.” [*EFI* (1618-1621), p.116.] This makes a *tasu* equal to 0.97 inch.

[4114](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, Appendix, p. and Vol. II, p.

[4115](#) *EFI* (1618-1621), pp. 192, 197, 236. See also Tavernier, Vol. I, Appendix, p.

[4116](#) Ibid. pp. 197, 236; Pelsaert (*Jahangir's India*, p.29) and *Relations of Golconda*, Appendix by editor, p. 88.

[4117](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p, 26; *Aitihasik Sadhane*, p.111.

[4118](#) Mundy, Vol. II, pp.66-67; Tavernier, Vol. I, p. 47.

[4119](#) Pelsaert (*Jahangir's India*, pp. 2 (and fn 1), 38, 58; Mundy, Vol. II, p. 67; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 39 (and fn 2), 47. Bernier (p.284) mentions that small *minars* (towers) were erected after every *kos* between Delhi and Agra. Actual measurement between five pairs of these *kos minars* near Delhi gave a mean of 2 miles, 4 furlongs and 158 yards to the *kos*. (*ibid.*, p. 284, fn 3.) Mundy (Vol. II, pp.66-67) says that the *kos* used by the common people was equivalent to about 1½ miles or rather more and the one used by the King and great men was equal to  $2 \frac{2}{5}$  English miles. But he takes the mile equal to 5,000 feet. See also *Hobson-Jobson*, pp.261-62.

[4120](#) *Hobson-Jobson*, p. 391. See also *The Diaries of Streynsham master*, Vol. II, pp.132-35; Tavernier, Vol. I, pp. 39, 142, Appendix, p.334.

[4121](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p. 67.

[4122](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p, 26; *Aitihasik Sadhane*, p.111.

[4123](#) *Sabhasad Chronicle*, p, 26;

[4124](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.132; Mundy, Vol. II, pp. 130,152.

[4125](#) *Alamgir Nama*, pp. 940-56.

[4126](#) Tavernier, Vol. I, p.257; *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.130; *The History of Bengal*, pp.242-43.

<sup>4127</sup> *A History of Assam*, pp.301-07; *The History of Bengal*, pp. 281-83, 290-91.

<sup>4128</sup> *The History of Bengal*, p. 377; *A History of Assam*, pp.311-16.

<sup>4129</sup> *The History of Bengal*, pp. 273-81.

<sup>4130</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 273-81, 377.

<sup>4131</sup> *Alamgir Nama*, p.704.

<sup>4132</sup> *Alamgir Nama*, p.722; *A History of Assam*, pp.144-47.

<sup>4133</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.128, 144-47, 156, 172-73.

<sup>4134</sup> *A History of Assam*, pp.70, 120-21; *The History of Bengal*, p. 331. The village of Kajali was on the boundary of Assam and the river of Kajali (*aab-i Kajali*) was the boundary between Assam and the Mughal Empire. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, p.89.) Guwahati is on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra. The village of Kajali is situated opposite Guwahati on the northern bank of the river. There, the Bar River, coming from the north, joins the Brahmaputra. So the river mentioned as *aab-i Kajali* is evidently the Bar River. (It has not been shown in the map.) The *Alamgir Nama* (p. 722) states that Guwahati was on the Mughal boundary.

<sup>4135</sup> See chapter 1.

<sup>4136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4137</sup> *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, p.1067. Tirhat ( $26^{\circ} 25' N$ ,  $86^{\circ} 15' E$ ) is the name of a town as well as that of a region. There was a

*sarkar* named Tirhat in the *suba* of Bihar. (*The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.1680.) During the British rule, the district of Tirhat was divided into two districts named Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur. (*Bengal District Gazetteers: Darbhanga*, pp. 1-2, 157-58.) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.132. *The Ain-i Akbari* (Vol. II, p.168), too, states that Darbhanga was a part of the *sarkar* of Tirhat.

[4138](#) Tavernier (Vol. I, p. 257; II, pp. 202, 206) mentions the kingdom of Bhutan.

[4139](#) *The Himalayan Gateway*, pp.22-23, 32-33.

[4140](#) Darjiling was ceded to the East India Company in 1835. (*The Himalayan Gateway*, pp.59-62, 68-69.)

[4141](#) See Chapter 1.

[4142](#) Tavernier, Vol. II, p. 202.

[4143](#) *Badshah Nama* does not mention Garhwal. It calls the Raja the *zamindar* of Srinagar.  
(Vol. I, Part II, pp. 90-93.)

[4144](#) *Padshah Nama* of Waris, pp. 92 b, 98 b-99 b.

[4145](#) . *The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, pp. 770, 827, 955-56; *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. II, pp. 141-42.

[4146](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 281-88; Vol. II, pp.93, 98, 159.

[4147](#) *Ladak: Physical, Statistical and Historical*, pp.34, 36. It is called Kurd in *Padshah Nama* of Waris (pp. 52b-53a).

[4148](#) *Ladak: Physical, Statistical and Historical*, pp. 325, 327-29.

[4149](#) *The Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, p.36.

[4150](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp. 416, 462-68, 479, 492, 502, 520-65, 572-77, 613-14; *Padshah Nama* of Waris, pp. 2b- 4a, 6b-9a.

[4151](#) *Padshah Nama* of Waris, pp. 20b-29a, 33b-38a, 59a-66b, 69b-71a, 74a-79a.

[4152](#) Bocarro, PP. 135-36; Monserrate, p.5. Monserrate has called the river Pahamera, where he must have intended Parnera, a village near the Par River.

[4153](#) SWD, Persian section, Nos.18 (p.10), 30-31 (pp. 14-15), 44 (p.20), 48 (p.21); English section Nos.18 (p.8), 31-32 (pp. 11), 44 (p.14), 48 (p.15). It is mentioned in Nos. 18 and 32 that Kaulas was on the boundary of Udgir. Udgir was in the Mughal Empire. (See ---). No. 44 shows that Vempalli, near Kaulas, was in the Qutbshahi Sultanate. I have not been able to identify it. Vempalle ( $14^{\circ} 22' N$   $78^{\circ} 30' E$ ) in Kadapa District of Andhra Pradesh is, of course, different.

[4154](#) Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, pp.108, 112, 130-31). That Indalwai was on the Mughal boundary has also been mentioned in the *Padshahnama* of Waris (p.112 b).

[4155](#) See chapter 5.

[4156](#) Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, p.148); SWD, Persian section, Nos. 8 (pp.5-6), 32 (pp.14-15); English section, Nos. 8 (p.5), 32 (pp.11). Thevenot calls the place “Cicacola”; he says that it is the

last town in the Kingdom of Golconda on the side of Bengal.  
(*Indian Travels*, 148.)

[4157](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.110-11; *Jabalpur District Gazetteer*, p.92.

[4158](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.230-33.

[4159](#) See, for instance, *AFS*, Vol. VI, No.104 (1667).

[4160](#) Shivaji captured it in 1657, evidently from the Adilshahi garrison. (See chapter 5.)

[4161](#) For Kaulas, see note 30 above. For Koilkonda, see *SWD*, Persian section, Nos. 4 (p.4), 52 (pp.23-24). For Jatpol, see *Ibid.*, No. 15 (p.8). It mentions that Jatpol ( $16^{\circ} 00' N$ ,  $78^{\circ} 10' E$ , Mahbubnagar District of Andhra Pradesh) and Sugur ( $16^{\circ} 05' N$ ,  $77^{\circ} 55' E$ ) as being on the border of Kurnool.

[4162](#) *Indian Travels*, p.150.

[4163](#) Martin (*India in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.766-67).

[4164](#) Carré, Vol. II, pp. 325-26 (“Joyvigny”); *ERS*, Vol. II, No. 261 (p.144, “Giviny”).

[4165](#) A condensed English translation of the *Muhammadnama*, made by Prof. B.D. Verma is given in *Shivaji Nibandhavali*, Part II.

[4166](#) Fryer, Vol. II, p.56.

[4167](#) EFI (1642-1645), PP.44-45, 80, 193-4; (1646-1650), pp. 25-26; Muhammad Nama, pp.385-98. See also *History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty*, pp. 455-59.

[4168](#) Cosme da Guarda (*FBS*, p.147). He calls it the “Merizen” River. Europeans generally called it after the town of Mirjan situated on its northern bank. Fryer (Vol. II, p.41) states that the Gangavali River forms the boundary of Canara. An English letter dated 17<sup>th</sup> February 1673 from Karwar states that the fort of Mirjan had been captured by the Raja of Canara. (*ERS*, Vol. I, No. 344. See also Fryer, Vol. II, p.40.)

[4169](#) *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, pp.110-12. It is recorded in the *Dagh Register* (1664, p.174) that the boundary of the Kingdom of Kolattiri adjoins that of the kingdom of Shivappa Nayak at Niricheraen. (*SPSS*, Vol. I, No. 990.) It seems that Niricheraen is a corruption of Nileshwar ( $12^{\circ} 15' N$ ,  $75^{\circ} 05' E$ ) which was near Kasargod. *EFI* (1668-1669), p. 264, too, shows that Nileshwar was on the border between Canara and Kolattiri.

[4170](#) See *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, Chs. 6 to 8. In 1650 Ikkeri, Sorab, Udagani, Mahadevpur and Ambaligoll were not in the kingdom of Ikkeri.

[4171](#) *Muhammad Nama*, pp.150-78, 263-332.

[4172](#) *Kanthirav-narasraj-vijayam* (vide *SCVS*, Vol. II, pp.18-21).

[4173](#) *History of Mysore*, Vol. I, pp.230, 274.

[4174](#) *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, pp.89-93, 96, 103, 105, 113-14, 120-26, 139, 151, 324-25, 330.

<sup>4175</sup> *The Nayaks of Tanjore*, pp.98-101, 103-04, 107, 148, 155, 159.

<sup>4176</sup> The kingdom of Kolattiri joins the kingdom of Zamorin at the village of Kunjali (“Conjaly”). (*Dagh Register*, 1664, p. 174 vide SPSS, Vol. I, No.990.) The Portuguese called the fort of Kottakkal “Fortaleza do Cunale” (fort of Kunjali). Kottakkal (11° N, 76° E) is situated on the north bank of the Kotta River.

<sup>4177</sup> *The Nayaks of Ikkeri*, pp. 110-12.

<sup>4178</sup> *The Dutch in India*, pp. 171-72, 176.

<sup>4179</sup> Ibid., pp. 171, 175-76; *History of Kerala*, Vol. II, Notes, pp. 91-92, 117-21.

<sup>4180</sup> *The Dutch in India*, p. 177; *History of Kerala*, Vol. II, Notes, pp.63-65.

<sup>4181</sup> *History of the Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 120-21, 298, 324.

<sup>4182</sup> For these developments, see *The Rise of Bombay*, pp. 40, 157, 191, 204-05, 231-32, 265; *Greater Bombay District Gazetteer*, Vol. I, pp. 4, 16-17, 22, 30, 38, 167, 229, 236, 249, 263, 594-95.

<sup>4183</sup> *Badshah Nama*, Vol. II, pp.105-09.

<sup>4184</sup> Ibid., p.106.

<sup>4185</sup> *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.138-39, 146-48; *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica* (1937-38), pp.11-12.

[<sup>4186</sup>](#) For Galana, see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp.300-01, 441-44. For Antur, see *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica* (1919-20), pp.12-15. For Sutonda and Taltam, see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, 368, 370. For Paithan, see *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica* (1949-50), p.6.

[<sup>4187</sup>](#) For Shahgad and Jafarnagar, see *Epigraphia Indica: Arabic and Persian Supplement* (1669), pp. 29-31, 33-36. Ahmednagar was captured by the Mughals in 1600, recharged by the Nizamshahi in 1610, and again captured by the Mughals in 1617. (*The Akbar Nama*, Vol. III, p.1157-59; *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp.181-82, 380.) For Beed, see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.271-73. Chambhargonda was situated in the Nizamshahi *pargana* of Pande-Pedgaon. (*MIS*, Vol. XV, Nos. 372, 400, 406-07, 410.) The Nizamshahi forts of Dharur and Kandhar were captured by the Mughals in 1631. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 339-43, 374-78.)

[<sup>4188</sup>](#) Ramgir was ceded to the Mughals in 1656. See chapter 5.

[<sup>4189</sup>](#) Mughals captured Deglur in 1633 and Udgir in 1636. (*Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p.534; Part II, pp.217-21.) Malik Ambar captured Solapur from the Adilshahi Sultanate in Shaka 1546 (1624-25). (Jedhe Chronology – *SCP*, p.16.) For Indapur see AFS, Vol. I, No.34. The Nizamshahi *parganas* of Indapur, Shirwal and Pune were plundered by the Adilshahi general Murar Jagdeo in 1629. (See chapter 4.) For Wai see *MIS*, Vol. XV, No.67; XX, No. 73; *SCS*, Vol. V, No. 887. For Naldurg see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, p. - -; *Antigualhas*, Vol.I, Fasciculo I, p.50; *SCS*, Vol. XI, No. 94. The fort is called Shahdurg in the last two sources. It was a name given to Naldurg. (*Basatin*, p.82.) For Bhalki see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part I, pp.382, 413.

[<sup>4190</sup>](#) For Chaul see *Aitihasik Sadhane*, Nos. 3, 6; *SCS*, Vol. IX, No. 21; *Della Valle*, Vol. I, pp. 140-41, 145; *EFI* (1624-1629), p.71.

For Dabhol see Della Valle, Vol. I, pp.153, 443; *EFI* (1624-1629), pp. 192, 254-57. For Danda Rajpuri see Della Valle, Vol. I, p.143; *EFI* (1624-1629), pp. 243, 252.

[<sup>4191</sup>](#) For Mahuli see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 160-61.

[<sup>4192</sup>](#) *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 167-74. (Wangi is in Karmala taluka of Solapur District.) The *parganas* of Chakan, Pune and Indapur were assigned to Shahji as *jagir* when he entered the Adilshahi service in 1636. (See chapter 5.) For Paranda and Nilanga see also *Antigualhas*, Vol.I, Fasciculo I, pp.52-53. For Chambhargonda see *Adab*, Vol. II, pp. 722-23. For Udgir and Ausa see *Badshah Nama*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 217-21.

[<sup>4193</sup>](#) *MIS*, Vol. XV, Nos.153-56; XX, No. 175.

[<sup>4194</sup>](#) See chapter 5.

[<sup>4195</sup>](#) See, for instance, *MIS*, Vol. XV, Nos. 90, 91, 102.

[<sup>4196</sup>](#) See, for instance, *Shri-Ramdasichi Aitihasik Tipane*, pp.1-2