

Network Security

Project 1

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Task 1:

- a. How many unique MAC addresses were on the network?

12

- b. How many unique IP addresses were on the network (IPv4 and IPv6)?


9 of IPv4 and 5 of IPv6

- c. What were the two UDP protocols used?


LLMNR and NBNS

- d. Which Ethernet address was shared between an IPv4 and IPv6 address?


Step 1: I went on the Endpoints tab under Statistics and displayed all the IPv6 addresses.



Step 2: I applied each IPv6 address as a filter and noted down the ethernet address associated with it.



Step 3: I applied each IPv4 address as a filter and checked if it was sharing a MAC address with an IPv6 address.




IPv4	IPv6	MAC Address
172.16.192.50	fe80::bdb7:226e:14ef:5c24	38:2c:4a:6e:19:6b
172.16.192.200	fe80::6090:beb3:9385:1c79	00:0c:29:16:ae:a4

- e. It seems that there is a **Human-Machine Interface (HMI)** server that interacts with multiple devices in the network through **Modbus**. What is the IP address of the server?

172.16.192.200

Task 2:



The screenshot shows the Shodan search engine interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links like 'Shodan', 'Developers', 'Monitor', 'View All...', 'Explore', 'Downloads', 'Reports', 'Pricing', 'Enterprise Access', 'My Account', and 'Upgrade'. Below the navigation bar is a map of the Zurich region. The main content area displays search results for the IP address 37.209.190.29, identified as 'dhclient-37-209.190-29.flashcable.ch'. A table lists various metadata fields: City (Uttikon), Country (Switzerland), Organization (GIB-Solutions AG), ISP (GIB-Solutions AG), Last Update (2019-11-06T15:26:10.482364), Hostnames (dhclient-37-209.190-29.flashcable.ch), and ASN (AS41872). To the right of the table, there are sections for 'Ports' (showing 23, 80, and 502) and 'Services' (showing HTTP/1.1 200 OK on port 80). The 'Services' section also displays headers like 'Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 01:38:10 GMT', 'Server: IPC@CHIP', 'Content-Type: text/html', 'Cache-control: public', 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked', and 'Last-Modified: Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:07:08 GMT'.


Field	Value
City	Uttikon
Country	Switzerland
Organization	GIB-Solutions AG
ISP	GIB-Solutions AG
Last Update	2019-11-06T15:26:10.482364
Hostnames	dhclient-37-209.190-29.flashcable.ch
ASN	AS41872

Ports

- 23
- 80
- 502

Services

- 80: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 01:38:10 GMT
Server: IPC@CHIP
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: public
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Last-Modified: Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:07:08 GMT



This screenshot is similar to the one above, but it highlights the '502' port and 'modbus' service. The 'Services' section now shows '502: modbus' with a list of device identifications: 'Unit ID: 0', 'Unit ID: 1', 'Unit ID: 2', 'Unit ID: 3', 'Unit ID: 4', and 'Unit ID: 5'. Each unit ID is followed by the text '-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00'.

Field	Value
City	Uttikon
Country	Switzerland
Organization	GIB-Solutions AG
ISP	GIB-Solutions AG
Last Update	2019-11-06T15:26:10.482364
Hostnames	dhclient-37-209.190-29.flashcable.ch
ASN	AS41872

Ports

- 23
- 80
- 502

Services

- 502: modbus
Unit ID: 0
-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00
Unit ID: 1
-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00
Unit ID: 2
-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00
Unit ID: 3
-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00
Unit ID: 4
-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00
Unit ID: 5
-- Device Identification: Solare Datensysteme GmbH xxxxxxxx V1.00

Solare Datensysteme GmbH vulnerabilities:

There are 7 vulnerabilities of this device and they are explained below:

1. Unauthenticated Download of Configuration including Device-Password (present at least on firmware 2.8.4-56)

An attacker can download configuration file and extract the password and later login as an administrator, gaining full access to the device without any prior authentication.

2. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (present at least on firmware 3.5.2-85)

Enables an attacker to remove/modify a password of a device by luring an authenticated user to click on a crafted link.

3. Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload (present at least on firmware 3.5.2-85)

Any files can be uploaded on the Solar-Log by using a crafted POST request. An attacker can start a malicious website or store illegal contents on the Solar-Log.

4. Information Disclosure (CVE-2001-1341) (present in firmware 2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)

The network configuration of the internal network including the gateway and the MAC address of the device are leaked.

5. Unauthenticated Change of Network-Configuration (present in firmware 2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)

The server allows to change the IP configuration over a specific UDP port. This functionality can be protected with a password, but this is not set in the affected firmware versions.

6. Unauthenticated Denial of Service (present in firmware 2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)

The Beck IPC UDP configuration server on Solar-Log device can be attacked with arbitrary UDP packets to permanently disable the Solar-Log until a manual reboot is triggered.

7. Potential Unauthenticated Reprogram of IPC@CHIP Flash Memory (present in firmware 2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)

The “CHIPTOOL” from BECK IPC enables a developer to reprogram the chip over the network via UDP. A missing password in this case, can enable an attacker to perform this on a Solar-Log device (exploit-db).

References:

1. Exploit-db: <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41671>