

# Tutorial 03

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## Security

# Contents

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- Frequent mistakes in Exercise Sheet 2
- Quiz
- Canaries and Format String
- ROP Chain
- Time for Clarifications/Mistakes in Marking

# Frequent Mistakes in Exercise Sheet 2

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- E 2.2 (a)
  - Captured packets given. Which is the used TLS version in the communication?
- TLS Record Version
  - Version: TLS 1.0
  - This field shows minimum supported TLS version
- Extension: supported\_versions
  - Supported Version: TLS 1.3
  - Supported Version: TLS 1.2
  - Values used by TLS 1.3 implementations

# Frequent Mistakes in Exercise Sheet 2

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- E 2.2 (d)
  - Captured packets given. Which is the Domain Name that the client attempts to connect to?
- Frequent answer: webuni.rz.uni-saarland.de
- Correct answer: [www.uni-saarland.de](http://www.uni-saarland.de) or statistics.uni-saarland.de
- Show Client Hello

# DNS queries to www.uni-saarland.de

16	1.952650509	192.168.5.192	192.168.5.1	DNS	90 Standard query 0x46a4 A www.uni-saarland.de OPT
17	1.952788554	192.168.5.192	192.168.5.1	DNS	90 Standard query 0xea6d AAAA www.uni-saarland.de OPT
18	1.971377845	192.168.5.1	192.168.5.192	DNS	130 Standard query response 0x46a4 A www.uni-saarland.de CNAME webuni.rz.uni-saarland.de A 134.96.7.179 OPT
19	1.975680959	192.168.5.1	192.168.5.192	DNS	157 Standard query response 0xea6d AAAA www.uni-saarland.de CNAME webuni.rz.uni-saarland.de SOA ns.rz.uni-saarland.de OPT
20	1.976333395	192.168.5.192	192.168.5.1	DNS	96 Standard query 0x99fc AAAA webuni.rz.uni-saarland.de OPT
21	1.993629509	192.168.5.1	192.168.5.192	DNS	139 Standard query response 0x99fc AAAA webuni.rz.uni-saarland.de SOA ns.rz.uni-saarland.de OPT
22	1.994458657	192.168.5.192	134.96.7.179	TCP	74 60736 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=2881232836 TSecr=0 WS=128
23	2.017118379	134.96.7.179	192.168.5.192	TCP	66 443 → 60736 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1420 SACK_PERM=1 WS=128
24	2.017311607	192.168.5.192	134.96.7.179	TCP	54 60736 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0
25	2.017868232	192.168.5.192	134.96.7.179	TLSv1.3	571 Client Hello
26	2.043978652	134.96.7.179	192.168.5.192	TCP	60 443 → 60736 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=30336 Len=0
27	2.045926780	134.96.7.179	192.168.5.192	TLSv1.3	1474 Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Application Data

- A and AAAA queries -> response
- Misleading DNS packet in original capture.

# Quiz

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Buffer-overflows that don't overwrite any pointers:

- a. Don't exist.
- b. Are insignificant.
- c. Only matter on the stack.
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- a. The size of the buffer where the shellcode is placed.
- b. Network difficulties.
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Why is implementing your own stack protection mechanisms usually not a good idea:

- a. An attacker can reverse engineer it easily.
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- a. Removing all ROP-gadgets.
- b. CFI.
- c. ASLR.
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- a. An integer container on the stack is used to overflow into the return pointer.
- b. The size limit of an integer is exceeded.
- c. A program crashes because it was given too much integers as parameters.
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# Canary and Format Strings

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- Have a look at demo1.c
- Two executables:
  - `gcc demo1.c -Wall -o demo1`
  - `gcc demo1.c -fstack-protector-all -Wall -o demo1_sp`



# Canary and Format Strings

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- Prologue/Epilogue
- Stack frame
- Same canary is used, one leaked all leaked
- If buffer overflow present:
  - Can overwrite return address
  - Normally canary would prevent this
  - But we also know canary value, so we can pass check

# ROP Chains

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- Try to spawn a shell via */bin/sh*
- Recap:
  - Last week we saw how to use systemcalls
  - In order to spawn a shell we need *execve(/bin/sh, 0, 0)*
  - Plenty of gadgets available in binary
  - Buffer Overflow present [Show how to detect]

# ROP Chains

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- In order to use *execve*, we need to prepare registers
  - [Link](#)
  - `rax => syscall number = 59`
  - `rdi => *filename = /bin/sh`
  - `rsi => *argv = 0`
  - `rdx => *envp = 0`
- How to find gadgets:
  - Can use **ropper**: `pip3 install ropper`
  - Usage: `ropper --file rop_n_roll --search "pop rdx"`

# Time for Clarifications/Mistakes in Marking

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- Any gripes?

# Feedback Form

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- Would like to see anything different?
- Liked it, hated it, something can be improved?
- Link: <https://forms.gle/JqMrDToQgf1Utyp16>