Tutorial 04

Security

Introduction

- Browser tools demo
 - Elements
 - Console
 - Network
 - Storage
- Refer: MDN Web Docs (https://developer.mozilla.org/)
 - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies

What are you watching?

- When a website is only using HTTPS, your ISP can know which of the following:
- 1. Cookies
- 2. Entered passwords
- 3. Visited website
- 4. Pages you visit on this website
- 5. Other servers you communicate with

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Also: Consider relooking at E2.3 TLS Forensics. What is visible without keylog file?

What do I know?

You are visiting: www.foo.com/dir/index.html#top

The server knows that you are visiting (select most complete answer)

- 1. www.foo.com
- 2. www.foo.com/dir
- 3. www.foo.com/dir/index.html
- 4. www.foo.com/dir/index.html#top

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- 4. www.foo.com/dir/index.html#top

Fragment is not communicated to the server.

"Do Not Track"

 You enable "Do Not Track" in your browser (i.e. Send websites a signal that you don't want to be tracked; navigator.doNotTrack is set to 1)

Does this website still use Google Analytics when you visit the page?

```
if(window.doNotTrack === "1" || navigator.doNotTrack === "1") {
  // code to add google analytics
}
```

- 1. True
- 2. False

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With DNT you only "signal". It is upto the website to consider it or not.

Cookies

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- 2. Request/Response Headers
- 3. URL
- 4. Including JavaScript code

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Look at network requests in browser: set-cookie and cookie

Same Origin Policy (SOP)

Do these two URLs have same origin?

http://store.company.com/dir/page.html

http://news.company.com/dir/page.html

- 1. True
- 2. False

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Same Origin Policy considers: Protocol + Host + Port Here, hosts are different.

Cookie Attributes

- Match cookie attributes with the kind of attack they prevent:
- 1. Secure
- 2. HttpOnly
- 3. SameSite

- A. Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
- B. Man in the middle (MITM) attacks over network
- C. Cookie theft via JavaScript

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- 2. HttpOnly \rightarrow Cookie theft via JavaScript
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Someone told me

- Same Origin Policy prevents CSRF?
- 1. True
- 2. False

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You can not access the response to cross site request but the request is still sent, which is enough for the attack

What are you watching?

• One of the tutors proposes a new CSRF defense mechanism for CMS. This JavaScript snippet is added to every page by CMS server:

```
document.write("<input id=csrf_token value="+Math.random()+">")
```

It adds random CSRF token on client side. This is then sent to back to server with every request. Should this be used? Why/Why not?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

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- 1. Yes
- 2. No

The token is random but the server has no way to know what number was actually generated on client side.

• We are www.example.com

We need to run following code on our website:

```
<html>
<body>
<!-- external code -->
<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.0.js"></script>
</body>
</html>
```

• We are <u>www.example.com</u>

We need to run following code on our website:

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src
https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.0.js
```

• We are www.example.com

Further, we need to run following code:

```
<html>
<body>
<!-- external code -->
<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.0.js"></script>
<script>
alert("Hello World");
</script>
</body>
</html>
```

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src
https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.0.js 'unsafe-inline'
```

Malicious Input

- Which of the following can be used by attacker to inject arbitrary input to a web server?
- 1. Visible form fields
- 2. Hidden form fields
- 3. GET parameters
- 4. Cookies
- 5. HTTP headers

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SQLi

There is a server that interacts with a database using user input:

```
mysql_query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='".$_GET["name"]."'
AND password='".$_GET["password"]."'")
```

If we enter: example.com/login?name=lol&password=secret
We have SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='lol' AND password='secret'

Attack by using: example.com/login?name=' OR TRUE #&password=secret We have: SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='' OR TRUE #' AND password='secret'

Is filtering ' from user inputs good fix?

SQLi

• No, it is not a good fix.

We can do: example.com/login?name=\&password= OR TRUE #

We will have: SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='\' AND password=' OR TRUE #'

Fix blind SQL

- A student proposes to fix blind SQL injections by fixing the amount of time taken by query to provide results. Does this fix blind injections? What is still possible?
- 1. Yes
- 2. No

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It might be difficult to infer information using timing based attacks but applications might still leak information by the means of:

- 1. Different error codes
- 2. Metadata about the response

Demo Time

- Client side reflected XSS using fragments.
 - Use file: secret_location_ex1.html
 - Walkthrough: ex1_walkthrough.txt

Demo Time

- Client side persistent XSS using local storage.
 - Use file: cat_viewer_ex2.html

cat_loader_ex2.html

Walkthrough: ex2_walkthrough.txt

Feedback Form

- Would like to see anything different?
- Liked it, hated it, something can be improved?

• Link: https://forms.gle/JqMrDToQgf1Utyp16