

Key Distribution Using Asymmetric Encryption

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Section 3.5

Distributed symmetric key

Recall: ways to achieve symmetric key distribution

- A key could be selected by A and physically delivered to B
- A third party could select the key and physically deliver it to A and B
- If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one party could transmit the new key to the other, using the old key to encrypt the new key
- If A and B each have an encrypted connection to a third-party C, C could deliver a key on the encrypted links to A and B

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Solve the problem of distributing a symmetric key between A and B over unsecure channel without the assistance of third party
- There is no pre-shared secret either.




Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Invented by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976
- Allows Alice and Bob to exchange a key even with Eve learning it
- No third party involved
- After DHKE, a common shared key, $\alpha^{X_A X_B}$ is established, it can be used to encrypt message
- A common shared key is symmetric


The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

$\alpha^x \bmod q \in [1, q-1]$
 generator $x = [1, \dots, n]$
 $x \in \mathbb{Z}$

- From A's view
- $K = Y_B^{X_A} \bmod q$
 $= (\alpha^{X_B} \bmod q)^{X_A} \bmod q$
 $= \alpha^{X_B X_A} \bmod q$



Example of the Diffie -Hellman algorithm



Note: $X_A, X_B, K1, K2$ are Private

Analysis of DHKE - Attack

$$Y_B = \alpha^{x_A} \bmod q.$$

- Adversary gets q, α, Y_A, Y_B .
- She needs to compute either X_A or $X_B = \underline{dlog_{\alpha, q} Y_B}$
- Secure?

Discrete Log Problem

$y = \alpha^{x_A}$ safe to ~~encrypt~~ ~~encrypting~~


Cryptographic assumptions:

- **Discrete logarithm problem (discrete log problem):** Given $\alpha, q, \alpha^{x_A} \bmod q$ for random x_A , it is computationally hard to find x_A
- **Diffie-Hellman assumption:** Given $\alpha, q, \alpha^{x_A} \bmod q$, and $\alpha^{x_B} \bmod q$ for random x_A, x_B , no polynomial time attacker can distinguish between a random value R and $\alpha^{x_A x_B} \bmod q$.
 - Intuition: The best known algorithm is to first calculate x_A and then compute $(\alpha^{x_B})^{x_A} \bmod q$, but this requires solving the discrete log problem, which is hard!
- **Note:** Multiplying the values doesn't work, since you get $\alpha^{x_A + x_B} \bmod p \neq \alpha^{x_A x_B} \bmod p$
 $\alpha^{x_A} \cdot \alpha^{x_B} = \alpha^{x_A + x_B}$

Given α, q, y_A, y_B
 $\nrightarrow \alpha^{x_A x_B} \bmod q$

Ephemerality of Diffie-Hellman

TLS $P(K_1 | K_3) = 0 \rightarrow \text{forward}$



- Diffie-Hellman can be used ephemerally (called Diffie-Hellman ephemeral, or DHE)

$P(K_1 | K_3) = 0$
backward
 $i > 3$

- Ephemeral:** Short-term and temporary, not permanent
 - Alice and Bob discard X_A, X_B and $K = \alpha^{X_A X_B} \bmod q$ when they're done
 - Because you need X_A and X_B to derive K , you can never derive K again!
 - Sometimes K is called a **session key**, because it's only used for an ephemeral session
- Forward & back-forward*
- Eve can't decrypt any messages she recorded: Nobody saved X_A, X_B or K , and her recording only has $\alpha^{X_A} \bmod q$ and $\alpha^{X_B} \bmod q$!

Diffie-Hellman is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks

- David can alter messages, block messages, and send her own messages
- **DH is not** secure against a MITM attacker: David can just do a DH with both sides!

Diffie-Hellman: Security

