

## Lab 1: Secret – Key Encryption Lab

### Task 1. Frequency Analysis

**Step 1:** We used Python console to generate a permutation of a-z:

```
>>> import random
>>> s = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
>>> ''.join(random.sample(s,len(s)))
'gndskrxlhqeyivmaojtpufwbc'
```

**Step 2:** We converted all upper cases to lower cases, removing punctuations and numbers:

```
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../Files$ tr [:upper:] [:lower:] < words.txt > lowercase.txt
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../Files$ tr -cd '[a-z][\n][:space:]' < lowercase.txt > words.txt
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../Files$
```

**Step 3:** We used `tr` command to do encryption, encrypting letters and leaving spaces:

```
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../Files$ tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'sxtrwinqbepvgkfmalhyojzc' \  
< words.txt > ciphertext.txt
```

Using Online frequency analysis tool (<https://www.dcode.fr/frequency-analysis>), we were able to find frequencies of repeated characters in our ciphertext:


N	488x	12.41%
Y	373x	9.49%
V	348x	8.85%
X	291x	7.4%
U	280x	7.12%
Q	276x	7.02%
M	264x	6.72%
H	235x	5.98%
T	183x	4.66%
I	166x	4.22%
P	156x	3.97%
A	116x	2.95%
C	104x	2.65%
Z	95x	2.42%
L	90x	2.29%
G	83x	2.11%
B	83x	2.11%
R	82x	2.09%
E	76x	1.93%
D	59x	1.5%
F	49x	1.25%
S	19x	0.48%
K	5x	0.13%
J	5x	0.13%
O	4x	0.1%
W	1x	0.03%

By single letter frequency, the letters in ciphertext sorted by frequency are:  
 nyvxuqmh tipaczlgbredfskjow. Compared to modern English, letter frequency found in Wikipedia is  
 eothasinrdluymwfgcbpkvjqxz.

## Task 2. Encryption using Different Ciphers and Modes

We replaced the `cipher-type` with `-aes-128-cbc`, `-aes-128-cfb`, `-aes-128-ofb`.

**Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)** – each block of plaintext gets XOR-ed with the preceding cipher block.



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

Encryption:


```
[10/27/22] seed@VM:~/Documents$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plaintext.txt -out cbc_cipher.bin \
> -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \
> -iv 0102030405060708
```

Decryption:

```
[10/27/22] seed@VM:~/Documents$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cbc_cipher.bin -out cbc_plain.txt \
> -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddff \
> -iv 0102030405060708
```

Validation: `$diff plaintext.txt cbc_plain.txt`

**Cipher Feedback (CFB)** – encryption of the block cipher that takes in the ciphertext of preceding block is XOR-ed with the plaintext, generating the final ciphertext.



Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode decryption

Encryption:


```
[10/27/22] seed@VM:~/Documents$ openssl enc -aes-128-cfb -e -in plaintext.txt -out cfb_cipher.bin \
> -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \
> -iv 0102030405060708
```

Decryption:

```
[10/27/22] seed@VM:~/Documents$ openssl enc -aes-128-cfb -d -in cfb_cipher.bin -out cfb_plain.txt \
> -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff \
> iv 0102030405060708
```

Validation: \$diff plaintext.txt cbc\_plain.txt

**Output Feedback (OFB)** – the block cipher that takes in the ciphertext of preceding block is XOR-ed with the plaintext, generating the final ciphertext after being encrypted.



### Output Feedback (OFB) mode encryption

Encryption: [10/27/22]seed@VM:~/Documents\$ openssl enc -aes-128-ofb -e -in plaintext.txt -out ofb\_cipher.bin \  
> -K 00112233445566778899aabcccddeeff \  
> -iv 0102030405060708

Decryption: [10/27/22]seed@VM:~/Documents\$ openssl enc -aes-128-ofb -d -in ofb\_cipher.bin -out ofb\_plain.txt \  
> -K 00112233445566778899aabcccddeeff \  
> -iv 0102030405060708


Validation: \$diff plaintext.txt cbc\_plain.txt

### Task 3. Encryption Mode – ECB vs. CBC

We noticed that with the ECB encryption, the image was still recognizable. We could gather what the initial shapes in the image were and get a general idea of their colors. With the CBC encryption, there was nothing but noise. The picture was unrecognizable, and we could gather no information from it regarding the original image. With our personal image (Great Wave Off Kanagawa), both encryption methods produced images consisting of pure noise and were unrecognizable.

```
seed@VM:~/Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in GreatWaveOffKanagawa.bmp -out GreatWaveOffKanagawa_encrypted.bmp  
enter aes-128-ecb encryption password:  
Verifying - enter aes-128-ecb encryption password:  
*** WARNING : deprecated key derivation used.  
Using -iter or -pbkdf2 would be better.  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:~/Files$ head -c 54 GreatWaveOffKanagawa.bmp > header  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:~/Files$ tail -c +55 GreatWaveOffKanagawa_encrypted.bmp > body  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:~/Files$ cat header body > GreatWaveOffKanagawa_viewableEncrypted.bmp
```

ECB Encryption:



CBC Encryption:

```
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in pic_original.bmp -o  
ut pic_encrypted.bmp  
enter aes-128-ecb encryption password:  
Verifying - enter aes-128-ecb encryption password:  
*** WARNING : deprecated key derivation used.  
Using -iter or -pbkdf2 would be better.  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ head -c 54 pic_original.bmp > header  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ tail -c +55 pic_encrypted.bmp > body  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ cat header body > pic_viewableEncrypted.bmp
```



#### Task 4. Padding

```
seed@VM: .../Files
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ echo -n "ABCDEF" > test.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld test.txt
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 6 Dec 1 21:51 test.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in test.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld output.bin
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 16 Dec 1 21:52 output.bin
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in test.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld output.bin
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 16 Dec 1 21:54 output.bin
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cfb -e -in test.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld output.bin
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 6 Dec 1 21:54 output.bin
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ofb -e -in test.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld output.bin
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 6 Dec 1 21:55 output.bin
```

CBC and ECB contain padding (16 bytes). This is because they are block ciphers; so, they use padding.

CFB and OFB lacked padding. This is because they are stream ciphers; so, they don't use padding.

Following are the screenshots we used for decrypting the padding:

```
seed@VM: .../Files
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ echo -n "12345" > f1.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ echo -n "123456789A" > f2.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ echo -n "123456789ABCDEFG" > f3.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld f1.txt
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 5 Dec 1 21:48 f1.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld f2.txt
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 10 Dec 1 21:48 f2.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld f3.txt
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 16 Dec 1 21:49 f3.txt
```

```
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in f1.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in output.bin -out f1Decrypted.txt -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708 -nopad  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ xxd -g 1 f1.txt  
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 12345  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ xxd -g 1 f1Decrypted.txt  
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 0b 12345.....
```

```
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in f2.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in output.bin -out f2Decrypted.txt -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708 -nopad  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ xxd -g 1 f2.txt  
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41 123456789A  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ xxd -g 1 f2Decrypted.txt  
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41 06 06 06 06 06 123456789A.....
```

```
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in f3.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in output.bin -out f3Decrypted.txt -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF -iv 0102030405060708 -nopad  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ xxd -g 1 f3.txt  
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 123456789ABCDEFG  
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ xxd -g 1 f3Decrypted.txt  
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 123456789ABCDEFG  
00000010: 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 .....
```

## Task 5. Error Propagation – Corrupted Cipher Text

### Predictions:

- ECB: We would expect only the block containing the effected byte to be unrecoverable due to ECB encrypting block-by-block.
  - CBC: Because CBC is probabilistic, we would expect all blocks after the effected block to be unrecoverable.
  - CFB: Because every bit in CFB effects all others, we would expect the corrupted bit to propagate throughout the data during decryption, rendering it all corrupted.
  - OFB: We would not expect to see the corruption propagate as bad as CFB, but it should be similar due to them both using stream encryption.

We made a file that was at least 1000 bytes:

```
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ python3 -c "print ('123456789a'*100)" > thousandBytes.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ ls -ld thousandBytes.txt
-rwxrwx--- 1 root vboxsf 1001 Dec 1 22:25 thousandBytes.txt
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in thousandBytes.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
```

We then used ECB encryption to encrypt the file and used bless to corrupt the 55<sup>th</sup> byte:

```
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in thousandBytes.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ bless output.bin
```

/mnt/Labsetup/Files/output.bin - Bless

	File	Edit	View	Search	Tools	Help
output.bin						
00000000	84 66 E0 B0 0D 07 1D E3 06 3B 1C 47 44 .f.....; .GD					
0000000d	72 20 9A 56 90 9D 9F D5 6E 36 A7 F2 C1 r .V....n6...					
0000001a	71 FE 59 F5 DA BB 9B E5 6F 16 CF 9F D5 q.Y.....o....					
00000027	04 05 CC 35 10 0B 49 70 7C 18 79 99 AA ...5..Ip y..					
00000034	11 BE D2 5C D5 12 3A 5D 32 DB A5 69 36 ...\\.:]2..i6					
00000041	A0 02 4B 72 D8 E4 D8 3E 00 F7 64 3C D2 ..Kr...>..d<					
0000004e	F0 4B 84 66 E0 B0 0D 07 1D E3 06 3B 1C .K.f.....; .					
0000005b	47 44 72 20 9A 56 90 9D 9F D5 6E 36 A7 GDr .V....n6.					
00000068	F2 C1 71 FE 59 F5 DA BB 9B E5 6F 16 CF ..q.Y.....o..					
00000075	9F D5 04 05 CC 35 10 0B 49 70 7C 18 79 .....5..Ip y					
00000082	99 AA 11 BE D2 5C D5 12 3A 5D 32 DB A5 .....\\.:]2..					
0000008f	69 36 A0 02 4B 72 D8 E4 D8 3E 00 F7 64 i6..Kr...>..d					
0000009c	3C D2 F0 4B 84 66 E0 B0 0D 07 1D E3 06 <..K.f.....					
000000a9	3B 1C 47 44 72 20 9A 56 90 9D 9F D5 6E ;.GDr .V....n					
000000b6	36 A7 F2 C1 71 FE 59 F5 DA BB 9B E5 6F 6...q.Y.....o					
000000c3	16 CF 9F D5 04 05 CC 35 10 0B 49 70 7C .....5..Ip					
000000d0	18 79 99 AA 11 BE D2 5C D5 12 3A 5D 32 .y.....\\.:]2					
000000dd	DB A5 69 36 A0 02 4B 72 D8 E4 D8 3E 00 ..i6..Kr...>.					

Offset: 067 / 01757 Selection: None INS

The screenshot shows a hex editor window titled "/mnt/Labsetup/Files/output.bin - Bless". The menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Search, Tools, and Help. The current file is "output.bin". The main area displays memory starting at address 0x00000000. The first few bytes are 84, 66, E0, B0, 0D, 07, 1D, E3, 06, 3B, 1C, 47, 44, followed by a series of dots and a ".GD" suffix. Subsequent bytes include 72, 20, 9A, 56, 90, 9D, 9F, D5, 6E, 36, A7, F2, C1, r, .V..., n6..., and so on. The bottom status bar shows "Offset: 0x37 / 0x3ef" and "Selection: None".

We decrypted the text:

```
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -d -in output.bin -out decryptedECB.txt -K 00112233445566778899aabbcdddeeff
```

The we viewed the text:

Open decryptedECB.txt /mnt/Labsetup/Files Save

We did this in all four decryption styles.

GBG

```
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in thousandBytes.txt -  
out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length  
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ bless output.bin
```

/mnt/Labsetup/Files/output.bin - Bless

File Edit View Search Tools Help

output.bin x

00000000	A9	74	03	12	3F	78	9B	79	4F	D8	7A	BC	D6	.t..?x.yO.z..
0000000d	39	B8	28	FA	BA	C0	A4	73	DB	D4	41	F0	0E	9.(....s..A..
0000001a	78	0C	40	FB	26	99	7B	FD	FE	CA	2A	5C	C3	x.@.&.{....*`.
00000027	EC	21	1A	E1	E1	8B	34	9E	BC	F9	6C	16	2F	.!....4...l./
00000034	5B	9A	3C	64	66	C4	3D	DE	83	B6	7F	E9	53	[.<df.=....S
00000041	68	75	07	A6	36	E8	8E	05	AA	18	2A	96	2C	hu..6.....*,,
0000004e	81	B0	74	88	CD	CA	50	98	92	DB	41	64	73	..t...P...Ads
0000005b	1E	F1	CF	EF	98	3E	AF	92	4D	D3	1C	61	3A	.....>..M..a:
00000068	12	8B	63	9A	0E	B0	7F	BB	54	95	F2	31	23	..c.....T..1#
00000075	17	CA	AC	21	FD	2A	35	3F	77	0C	D8	D9	F0	...!.*5?w....
00000082	CB	A1	54	9B	7B	80	E2	CB	B9	0B	91	70	93	..T.{.....p.
0000008f	DB	89	90	91	B7	C7	8D	40	03	EC	AF	0A	46	.....@....F
0000009c	06	BB	FD	45	C9	1A	4A	ED	5E	B6	56	7B	54	...E..J.^..V{T
000000a9	60	AD	4F	3E	BB	9E	35	87	8F	A4	32	FE	57	`..O>..5...2.W
000000b6	B4	F6	BD	2A	F6	7A	99	F3	84	D3	E9	3C	2A	...*..z.....<*
000000c3	1B	E1	E4	EB	3C	F2	FE	34	F0	90	6B	9E	8B	....<..4..k..
000000d0	F2	BF	2B	8C	AC	C4	7F	E3	02	6F	A3	2A	D2	..+.....o.*.
000000dd	92	A4	8B	EF	02	50	C3	6F	A3	30	29	74	05	.....P.o.0)t.

Offset: 0x0 / 0x3ef Selection: None INS

/mnt/Labsetup/Files/output.bin \* - Bless

File Edit View Search Tools Help

output.bin\* x

00000000	A9	74	03	12	3F	78	9B	79	4F	D8	7A	BC	D6	.t..?x.yO.z..
0000000d	39	B8	28	FA	BA	C0	A4	73	DB	D4	41	F0	0E	9.(....s..A..
0000001a	78	0C	40	FB	26	99	7B	FD	FE	CA	2A	5C	C3	x.@.&.{....*`.
00000027	EC	21	1A	E1	E1	8B	34	9E	BC	F9	6C	16	2F	.!....4...l./
00000034	5B	9A	3C	00	66	C4	3D	DE	83	B6	7F	E9	53	[.<.f.=....S
00000041	68	75	07	A6	36	E8	8E	05	AA	18	2A	96	2C	hu..6.....*,,
0000004e	81	B0	74	88	CD	CA	50	98	92	DB	41	64	73	..t...P...Ads
0000005b	1E	F1	CF	EF	98	3E	AF	92	4D	D3	1C	61	3A	.....>..M..a:
00000068	12	8B	63	9A	0E	B0	7F	BB	54	95	F2	31	23	..c.....T..1#
00000075	17	CA	AC	21	FD	2A	35	3F	77	0C	D8	D9	F0	...!.*5?w....
00000082	CB	A1	54	9B	7B	80	E2	CB	B9	0B	91	70	93	..T.{.....p.
0000008f	DB	89	90	91	B7	C7	8D	40	03	EC	AF	0A	46	.....@....F
0000009c	06	BB	FD	45	C9	1A	4A	ED	5E	B6	56	7B	54	...E..J.^..V{T
000000a9	60	AD	4F	3E	BB	9E	35	87	8F	A4	32	FE	57	`..O>..5...2.W
000000b6	B4	F6	BD	2A	F6	7A	99	F3	84	D3	E9	3C	2A	...*..z.....<*
000000c3	1B	E1	E4	EB	3C	F2	FE	34	F0	90	6B	9E	8B	....<..4..k..
000000d0	F2	BF	2B	8C	AC	C4	7F	E3	02	6F	A3	2A	D2	..+.....o.*.
000000dd	92	A4	8B	EF	02	50	C3	6F	A3	30	29	74	05	.....P.o.0)t.

Offset: 0x37 / 0x3ef Selection: None INS

```
[12/01/22]seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in output.bin -out decryptedCBC.txt -K 00112233445566778899aabbcdddeeff -iv 0102030405060708  
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
```

CEFB

/mnt/Labsetup/Files/output.bin - Bless

File Edit View Search Tools Help

output.bin x

00000000	90	49	B5	09	35	F0	3A	6C	5C	56	C8	61	05	.I..5.:1\V.a.
0000000d	0F	76	ED	80	DB	FA	26	8A	FB	C3	C2	9D	24	.v.....&.....\$
0000001a	23	E4	E9	95	2B	AC	80	84	0A	A8	83	DF	8F	#...+.....
00000027	BB	7E	21	0B	54	5C	F1	71	2F	AB	20	01	F8	.~!.T\..q/. ...
00000034	78	84	71	00	FD	E1	D0	D5	2B	76	0E	3D	83	x.q.....+v.=.
00000041	D7	A0	8B	EB	F8	A7	96	7C	A8	A3	98	3E	71	..... ...>q
0000004e	B3	57	8A	E4	C6	D6	EA	D5	EC	3F	9E	E4	A6	.W.....?...
0000005b	BF	64	5D	AA	3E	EC	25	17	EC	C7	95	9E	36	.d]>.%.....6
00000068	CC	74	29	38	22	65	98	58	31	7F	9D	E8	B1	.t)8"e.X1....
00000075	98	E3	F2	D8	0E	2A	DB	F0	9D	3D	AF	FB	94	.....*....=...
00000082	3D	D4	2A	72	1A	53	32	71	CF	7F	62	D5	1F	=.*r.S2q..b..
0000008f	A6	4E	39	5D	06	10	71	05	13	7D	6E	8B	20	.N9]..q..}n.
0000009c	6F	12	F4	C4	BF	3A	1E	00	2F	17	D1	9C	26	o.....:/...&
000000a9	20	8D	4F	4F	DE	85	78	5D	B2	E8	1B	59	8C	.OO..x]....Y.
000000b6	8B	6C	98	9E	FA	13	6E	1B	DB	C8	A2	7E	14	.l....n....~.
000000c3	46	7A	8D	1A	50	AD	E1	58	31	17	F9	FB	32	Fz..P..X1...2
000000d0	12	DF	21	DA	89	1E	4A	8B	E4	3C	75	13	91	..!...J.. <u>..</u>
000000dd	F6	E9	9A	DA	1A	D6	78	5B	0D	AF	87	CE	15	.....x[.....

Offset: 0x37 / 0x3e8 Selection: None INS

seed@VM: .../Files

```
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-cfb -d -in output.bin -out decryptedCFB.txt -K 00112233445566778899aabbcdddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
```

OFB:

seed@VM: .../Files

```
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ofb -e -in thousandBytes.txt -out output.bin -K 00112233445566778899aabbcdddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ bless output.bin
```

output.bin															
00000000	90	49	B5	09	35	F0	3A	6C	5C	56	C8	61	05	.I..5.:1\V.a.	
0000000d	0F	76	ED	43	05	C0	57	D6	93	5F	C3	D1	69	.v.C..W..._.i	
0000001a	A0	BD	19	9D	F8	97	F7	59	DD	9B	25	01	92	.....Y...%..	
00000027	94	F7	F8	C1	B8	27	55	D8	0B	DB	2E	F3	13	....'U.....	
00000034	AF	44	58	EE	5D	F0	F1	D0	E3	DD	1E	0D	75	.DX.].....u	
00000041	E5	0A	49	DB	CE	A9	E1	9E	BB	2C	A7	38	BA	.I.....,8.	
0000004e	66	82	84	E8	8C	87	EE	A2	0F	DB	50	75	9A	f.....Pu.	
0000005b	65	61	EE	C9	97	4E	0B	CC	E4	B9	B4	EE	C8	ea...N.....	
00000068	6E	6C	09	B3	6D	22	76	7F	4A	79	E1	A4	98	nl..m"v.Jy...	
00000075	45	48	CD	59	99	83	41	93	7A	DA	1C	F2	25	EH.Y..A.z...%	
00000082	DC	F4	FA	AC	CC	4C	7D	2B	17	9E	12	1F	3F	....L}+....?	
0000008f	40	16	76	5E	F0	FC	8B	1B	09	62	39	F0	AE	@.v^.....b9..	
0000009c	F6	A6	8B	28	96	B0	C8	7D	0A	69	73	10	D1	...(.}.is..	
000000a9	CB	CC	98	9A	EE	F9	54	39	86	D4	D7	65	82	.....T9...e.	
000000b6	CE	29	1B	3F	6D	86	60	E4	99	DC	AA	76	C4	.)..?m.`....v.	
000000c3	13	60	E7	74	AA	B0	20	E3	9D	8E	3B	41	3A	.`..t.. ...;A:	
000000d0	B5	EB	68	D2	DB	E5	FB	01	0B	73	B1	25	18	..h.....s.%.	
000000dd	66	1D	42	35	85	E6	D4	8C	E5	45	9E	D6	88	f.B5.....E...	

Offset: 0x37 / 0x3e8

Selection: None

INS

output.bin															
00000000	90	49	B5	09	35	F0	3A	6C	5C	56	C8	61	05	.I..5.:1\V.a.	
0000000d	0F	76	ED	43	05	C0	57	D6	93	5F	C3	D1	69	.v.C..W..._.i	
0000001a	A0	BD	19	9D	F8	97	F7	59	DD	9B	25	01	92	.....Y...%..	
00000027	94	F7	F8	C1	B8	27	55	D8	0B	DB	2E	F3	13	....'U.....	
00000034	AF	44	58	00	5D	F0	F1	D0	E3	DD	1E	0D	75	.DX.].....u	
00000041	E5	0A	49	DB	CE	A9	E1	9E	BB	2C	A7	38	BA	.I.....,8.	
0000004e	66	82	84	E8	8C	87	EE	A2	0F	DB	50	75	9A	f.....Pu.	
0000005b	65	61	EE	C9	97	4E	0B	CC	E4	B9	B4	EE	C8	ea...N.....	
00000068	6E	6C	09	B3	6D	22	76	7F	4A	79	E1	A4	98	nl..m"v.Jy...	
00000075	45	48	CD	59	99	83	41	93	7A	DA	1C	F2	25	EH.Y..A.z...%	
00000082	DC	F4	FA	AC	CC	4C	7D	2B	17	9E	12	1F	3F	....L}+....?	
0000008f	40	16	76	5E	F0	FC	8B	1B	09	62	39	F0	AE	@.v^.....b9..	
0000009c	F6	A6	8B	28	96	B0	C8	7D	0A	69	73	10	D1	...(.}.is..	
000000a9	CB	CC	98	9A	EE	F9	54	39	86	D4	D7	65	82	.....T9...e.	
000000b6	CE	29	1B	3F	6D	86	60	E4	99	DC	AA	76	C4	.)..?m.`....v.	
000000c3	13	60	E7	74	AA	B0	20	E3	9D	8E	3B	41	3A	.`..t.. ...;A:	
000000d0	B5	EB	68	D2	DB	E5	FB	01	0B	73	B1	25	18	..h.....s.%.	
000000dd	66	1D	42	35	85	E6	D4	8C	E5	45	9E	D6	88	f.B5.....E...	

Offset: 0x37 / 0x3e8

Selection: None

INS

File Edit View Search Tools Help

/mnt/Labsetup/Files/output.bin - Bless

output.bin

```
[12/01/22] seed@VM:.../Files$ openssl enc -aes-128-ofb -d -in output.bin -out decryptedOFB.txt -K 00112233445566778899aabbcdddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
```

Open decryptedOFB.txt /mnt/LabSetup/Files Save

## Results:

ECB: We were correct

CBC: We were correct.

CFB: Our prediction was somewhat correct, but the scope was inaccurate. Not all data was corrupted.

OFB: Our prediction was entirely incorrect. Only the character(s) represented by the data corrupted would be lost.

## Task 6. Initial Vector (IV) and Common Mistakes

## Task 6.1.

When the plaintexts are the same, ciphertext would also be the same if the IV remain unchanged. Therefore, it's important to keep the IV unique and update it for every encryption.

### Task 6.2.

In OFB encryption mode, if the key and the IV are unchanged, there's a great chance of ‘Known-Plaintext’ attack. The output stream is obtained as the result of block-by-block XOR or plaintext and ciphertext. Therefore, to get the plaintext, plaintext and ciphertext can be XOR-ed. In this mode, the output streams of the same key and the IV are identical compared to other encryption modes.

If the plaintext ( $pk$ ) and its OFB ciphertext ( $ck$ ), and another OFB ciphertext ( $co$ ) with same key and IV are known, to find the unknown plaintext ( $po$ ) of  $co$  we need to get the output stream of the encryption of the  $pk$  plaintext:

```
output = pk XOR ck  
po = output XOR co  
po = pk XOR ck XOR co
```

Given following code:

```
Plaintext (P1): This is a known message!
Ciphertext (C1): a469b1c502c1cab966965e50425438e1bb1b5f9037a4c159

Plaintext (P2): (unknown to you)
Ciphertext (C2): bf73bcd3509299d566c35b5d450337e1bb175f903fafc159
```

We used the following python code to de/encrypt the ciphertext:

```
from sys import argv
_, first, second, third = argv
pk = bytearray(first,encoding='utf-8')
ck = bytearray.fromhex(second)
co = bytearray.fromhex(third)
po = bytearray(x^y^z for x, y, z, in zip(pk, ck, co))
print(po.decode('utf-8'))
```

In the CFB mode, the procedure would stay the same for initial block, but the key would remain a secret and the proceeding parts of the ciphertext would not be revealed.

### **Task 6.3.**

Our initial assumption was pk (Bob's initial message) was "Yes."

`po = "Yes" XOR IV XOR IV_NEXT`, where the IV used was the same to generate the ck and IV NEXT, making IV predictable to be used to encrypt the plaintext input.

Encryption mode used: 128-bit AES (CBC mode).

Hex key: 00112233445566778899aabbc0ddeeff

Ciphertext (ck): `bef6556557cce2a9f9553154ed9498`

```
ASCII IV of pk: 1234567890123456
Hex IV of pk: 31323334353637383930313233343536
New ASCII IV: 1234567890123457
New Hex IV: 31323334353637383930313233343537
```

Due to the length of the payload, PKCS#7 padding and code adoption are required:

```
from sys import argv
_, first, second, third = argv
pk = bytearray(first, encoding='utf-8')
padding = 16 - len(pk) % 16
pk.extend([padding] * padding)
IV = bytearray.fromhex(second)
IV_Next = bytearray.fromhex(third)
po = bytearray(x^y^z for x, y, z, in zip(pk, IV, IV_Next))
print(po.decode('utf-8'), end='')
```

Plaintext is denoted as a multiple of 16 bytes; therefore, PKCS#7 padding is required for encryption.

Lastly, we compared ck with co to get the result of the first 16 bites of co the same as ck. Ultimately, our assumption was correct, and Bob's initial message was "Yes."

## Task 7. Programming using the Crypto Library

```
// Author: Nathan Mahnke (with massive credit to stackoverflow for a lot of the algorithms used)
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// This is a helper function for hex_to_ascii. I found this stackoverflow post regarding the concept: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/5403103/hex-to-ascii-string-conversion. This // code receives a character and then returns it's integer value assuming the input was in hex.
int hex_to_int(char c) {
    int first = c / 16 - 3;
    int second = c % 16;
    int result = first * 10 + second;
    if(result > 9) {
        result--;
        return result;
    }
}
// This function receives two hex characters and returns the int value assuming the int returned corresponds to the ASCII value of the incoming hex characters.
int hex_to_ascii(char c, char d) {
    int high = hex_to_int(c) * 16;
    int low = hex_to_int(d);
    return high + low;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    // cipher is a buffer array that is used to store encrypted strings
    unsigned char cipher[1024];
    // outbuf is a buffer array that is used to store output strings
    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
    // temp is a storage variable
```

```

// key is the where the key string used for encryption will be stored when/if it is found
unsigned char temp, key[16];
// These are all various variables used for counting and storage
int outLength, tempLength, l, i, length, count, found = 0, k = 0;
// An input file which will be used to read in the list of English words
FILE *in;
// A char array that will story the initialization vector
unsigned char iv[17];
// Populating the IV
for(i = 0; i < 17; i++) {
    iv[i] = 0;
    iv[16] = '\0';
}
// The text to be encrypted
char intext[] = "This is a top secret.";
// SHA-256 key
char st[] = "8d20e5056a8d24d0462ce74e4904c1b513e10d1df4a2ef2ad4540fae1ca0aa9";
// Conver st[] to all capital letters
i = 0;
while(i < 64) {
    if(st[i] >= 'a' && st[i] <= 'z')
        st[i] = st[i] - 32;
    i++;
}
// Populating cipher[]
length = strlen(st);
char buf = 0;
for(i = 0; i < length; i++) {
    if(i % 2 != 0) {
        cipher[k] = hex_to_ascii(buf, st[i]);
        k++;
    } else {
        buf = st[i];
    }
}
cipher[k] = '\0';
// Opening the file of English words for reference
in = fopen("/mnt/Labsetup/Files/words.txt", "r");
if(in == NULL) {
    printf("\n cannot open file");
    exit(1);
}
// Declaring the EVP cipher
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
// Set values of key and attempt decryption. If successfull, ouput plain text and key,
otherwise output failure.
while(fgets(key, sizeof(key), in) != NULL) {
    l = 0;
    if(strlen(key) < 16) {
        l = strlen(key) - 1;
        while(l < 16) {
            key[l] = ' ';
            l++;
        }
        key[l] = '\0';
    } else {
        key[16] = '\0';
    }
}

```

```
}

// Compare resulting values to that of the input, if they do not match, return 0,
meaning move to the next word
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outLength, intext, strlen(intext))) {
    return 0;
}
if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outLength, &tempLength)){
    return 0;
}
// If this portion of the code executes, the key has been proven valid, thus we
cleanup the EVP cipher addresses,
// write outbuf into cipher, and output the plain text along with the key
outLength += tempLength;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
count = 0;
for(i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
    if(cipher[i] == outbuf[i])
        count++;
}
if(count == 32) {
    printf("Plain text:\n%s\n",intext);
    printf("Key:\n%s\n",key);
    found = 1;
    break;
}
// If this portion of the code executes, a key could not be found within the words.txt
file that results in a matching
// encryption, thus the search failed. The input is closed and the program is terminated
if(found == 0) {
    printf("\nCould not find key\n");
}
fclose(in);
return 0;
}
```