# Computational Economics: Problem Set $2\,$

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### 1 Dynamic Entry and Exit Game

### 1.1 Choice Probabilities

There are a total of (6) distinct choice probabilities which are faced by firms. These represent the probability a particular firm i chooses to take a specific action  $a_{it}$  as a function of the current demand state  $M_t \in s_t = (a_{1t-1}, a_{2t-1}, M_t)$  faced.

Our profit function is additive in our standard normal shock  $\epsilon_{it}$  which is identically and independently distributed, and the former is determined as a function of our opponent's decision  $a_{it}$ .

Equilibrium conditions hold when being active is the best response for expected private information regarding  $\epsilon_{it}(a_{it})$ , and where  $\sigma_i(s)$  denotes ex ante beliefs of firm i that firm  $j \neq i$  will choose to be active in the state s.

$$(1 - \sigma_i(s)) \cdot (\lambda M_t - \delta a_{-i,t} - (1 - a_{i,t-1})\psi + \epsilon_{it}(1)) + \sigma_i(s) \cdot \epsilon_{it}(0) \ge 0 \tag{1}$$

$$p_i(s) = 1 - \Phi[(1 - \sigma_i(s)) \cdot (\lambda M_t - \delta a_{-i,t} - (1 - a_{i,t-1}) \cdot \psi)]$$
(2)

$$\mathbf{p} - \mathbf{\Psi}(\sigma, \theta) = \mathbf{0} \tag{3}$$

Given consistency in beliefs,

$$p_i(s) = 1 - \Phi[(1 - p_i(s)) \cdot (\lambda M_t - \delta a_{-i,t} - (1 - a_{i,t-1}) \cdot \psi)] \tag{4}$$

$$\mathbf{p} - \Psi(\mathbf{p}, \theta) = \mathbf{0} \tag{5}$$

Where  $\mathbf{p}$  is the matrix of conditional probabilities,

$$\mathbf{p} = \Psi(\mathbf{p}, \theta) = (p_i(s)_{i=1}^2)_{s=1}^3 \tag{6}$$

$$\mathbf{p} = \begin{pmatrix} p_1(s=1) & p_2(s=1) \\ p_1(s=2) & p_2(s=2) \\ p_1(s=3) & p_2(s=3) \end{pmatrix}$$
 (7)

### 1.2 Value Function

A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is characterised by  $(\mathbf{a}, \sigma)$  representing a best response  $a_i$  for firm i to the opposite firm's action  $a_{-i}$  given beliefs  $\sigma_i$  across all states s in the state space. Additionally, all firms will employ Markovian strategies and hold beliefs consistent with their strategies.

Given that the profit function is additive in shocks,

$$\Pi_{it}(a_t, s_t, \epsilon_{it}) = \Pi_{it}(a_t, s_t) + \epsilon_{it}(a_{it}) \tag{8}$$

$$\Pi_{it}(a_t, s_t, \epsilon_{it}) = \mathbf{1}(a_{it} = 1) \cdot [\lambda M_t - \delta a_{-i,t} - (1 - a_{i,t-1}) \cdot \psi] + \epsilon_{it}(a_{it})$$

$$\tag{9}$$

$$\bar{\Pi}_{it}(a_t, s_t, \epsilon_{it}) = \mathbf{1}(a_{it} = 1) \cdot [\lambda M_t - \delta a_{-i,t} - (1 - a_{i,t-1}) \cdot \psi]$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^K \epsilon_{it}^k(a_{it}) \cdot \mathbf{1}(a_i^t = k)$$

$$\tag{10}$$

Through simplification we then arrive at our ex ante value function,

$$V_{i}(s,\sigma_{i}) = \sum_{a \in A} \sigma_{i}(a|s) \cdot [\mathbf{1}(a_{it} = 1) \cdot [\lambda M_{t} - \delta a_{-i,t} - (1 - a_{i,t-1}) \cdot \psi]$$

$$+\beta \sum_{s' \in S} g(a,s,s') \cdot V_{i}(s',\sigma_{i})] + \sum_{k=1}^{K} E_{\epsilon}[\epsilon_{i}^{k}|a_{i} = k] \cdot \sigma_{i}(a_{i} = k|s)$$

$$(11)$$

$$V_{i}(s,\sigma_{i}) = \sum_{a \in A} \sigma_{i}(a|s) \cdot \left[\Pi_{i}(a,s) + \beta \sum_{s' \in S} g(a,s,s') \cdot V_{i}(s',\sigma_{i})\right] + \sum_{k=1}^{K} E_{\epsilon}\left[\epsilon_{i}^{k}|a_{i}=k\right] \cdot \sigma_{i}(a_{i}=k|s)$$

$$(12)$$

Subsequent conversion to matrix form yields the closed form solution of the value function,

$$\mathbf{V}_{i}(\sigma_{i}) = \sigma_{i} \mathbf{\Pi}_{i} + \beta \sigma_{i} \mathbf{G} \mathbf{V}_{i}(\sigma_{i}) + \mathbf{D}_{i}(\sigma_{i}) \tag{13}$$

$$\mathbf{V}_{i}(\sigma_{i}) - \beta \sigma_{i} \mathbf{G} \mathbf{V}_{i}(\sigma_{i}) = \sigma_{i} \mathbf{\Pi}_{i} + \mathbf{D}_{i}(\sigma_{i})$$
(14)

$$(\mathbf{I} - \beta \sigma_i \mathbf{G}) \mathbf{V}_i(\sigma_i) = \sigma_i \mathbf{\Pi}_i + \mathbf{D}_i(\sigma_i)$$
(15)

$$\mathbf{V}_{i}(\sigma_{i}) = (\mathbf{I} - \beta \sigma_{i} \mathbf{G})^{-1} [\sigma_{i} \mathbf{\Pi}_{i} + \mathbf{D}_{i}(\sigma_{i})]$$
(16)

Parameters that have been specified include  $\lambda = 2, \delta = 2, \psi = 1.5$ , and  $\beta = 0.95$ . The matrix designated as a component of the state variable vector is as follows,

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} m_1 \\ m_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1.5 \end{pmatrix} \tag{17}$$

The matrix designated as the Markovian state transition probabilities for M is as follows,

$$\mathbf{G} = \begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0.5 & 0.5 \\ 0.4 & 0.6 \end{pmatrix}$$
 (18)