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Sources of respect: the effects of being liked by ingroups and outgroups

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Abstract

*We investigated the effects of ingroup and outgroup sources of respect, defined as positive social evaluations of self, on group members' emotional reactions and collective self-esteem. We used both natural group memberships (Studies 1 and 2) and laboratory groups (Study 3). We expected that the positive effects of respect derived from an ingroup would not hold when derived from an outgroup source. In Study 1 (*N = *294) respect was manipulated as deriving either from ingroup or outgroup. Although respect produced a positive emotional reaction irrespective of source, collective self-esteem was only enhanced by an ingroup source. In Study 2 (*N = *248), we investigated the concurrent effects of ingroup respect and outgroup respect. As in Study 1, ingroup and outgroup respect both produced positive emotional reactions, but collective self-esteem was only affected by ingroup respect. Additionally, outgroup respect intensified the shame people experienced due to lack of ingroup respect. In Study 3 (*N = *66), participants were immersed in experimental groups and ingroup and outgroup respect were manipulated orthogonally. Interactive effects of the two sources of respect indicated that high outgroup respect could not compensate for low ingroup respect, and if anything had an adverse effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

We all like to be liked. The need to belong and to feel wanted seems to be fairly general, even universal (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). For example, if we think back to our school days, having a group of friends (or at least one!) that appreciated us was extremely important, and part of feeling accepted. However, we can probably also remember examples of situations in which the appreciation of others seemed less relevant (as in the case of our parents or teachers, whose judgments simply 'didn't count'), or were even unwelcome—where someone we defined as less desirable (a nerd, a geek, or a no-no) latched onto us like a limpet, even worshipped us, but was just seen as a source of acute embarrassment in front of our 'true' friends.

Although such experiences may now conjure up as much shame for the manner of our rebuffs as they did irritation then, they point to an interesting social psychological phenomenon. This

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phenomenon is probably just as true of adult circles as it is of juvenile culture. Although valuation from others is generally positive, we do seem to be sensitive to the source of this social attraction. Moreover, this is not just an interpersonal issue or a question of personal taste in friends, it has an important intergroup dimension. Put simply, whereas we appreciate feeling valued and respected by members of a group we ourselves value, these same plaudits could well leave us indifferent or even cause problems when forthcoming from an 'outgroup'. For example, a male pop group that fashions itself as the 'heavy-metal band from hell' is probably not interested in giving a concert for teenyboppers or pensioners, and might even be displeased to hear that these are their biggest fans.

The present paper considers the effects of social respect for emotion and collective self-esteem. Our central proposition is that our desire to feel wanted and liked is not unconditional. Whereas respect from ingroup members may induce positive emotions and enhance collective self-esteem, the reactions to respect forthcoming from an outgroup may be quite different, ranging from lack of interest to disgust. In a similar vein, responses to a lack of respect may include negative emotion, indifference, or even relief, again depending on the group source. In the present paper, we report three studies addressing how the source of self-relevant evaluative information (ingroup or outgroup) influences the feelings and perceptions of the individual group member. Based on self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987; see also Tajfel & Turner, 1986), we argue that the extent to which people perceive themselves as members of a particular social group is likely to affect the impact of the self-relevant information received from others who belong to the same or a different group. Our general prediction is that the positive impact of social respect is more pronounced when people are themselves members of the group from which they receive this social evaluative information. Furthermore, we predict that different sources of respect may interact to determine the impact of these evaluative judgments. That is, our analysis in self-categorization terms implies that when respect from the ingroup is not forthcoming, being respected by the outgroup may be seen as compromising the self, instead of compensating for the lack of ingroup respect.

We report three studies designed to test these general propositions, building up the complexity of the situation and the involvement of the self in successive studies. In Study 1 we investigate how members of natural groups judge the effects of differential levels of social respect communicated either by an ingroup or by an outgroup source. Using a similar paradigm, Study 2 investigates the concurrent effects of ingroup and outgroup respect, and examines how they interact to determine the impact on the self. In Study 3 we categorize participants in experimental groups responsible for evaluating them, and investigate effects of the amount of respect actually received from ingroup and outgroup sources.

STUDY 1

In many real life situations, evaluations of social behaviour play an important role. That is, in addition to relative competence or ability, the way in which a person is evaluated by others can constitute an important source of value and collective self-esteem (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Simon & Stürmer, 2003). Indeed, in the absence of objective indicators of self-worth in social interaction, people commonly rely on self-relevant information from others with whom they interact (Festinger, 1954).

The relationship between the extent to which people feel respected by others and the cognitive and behavioural responses they report has previously been examined in the context of the relational model of authority (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). This work

attests to the relevance of perceived respect as a variable of interest that may help us understand intra- and intergroup relations. However, a first difference with the present investigation is that previous work relied on covariations emerging from survey data, while we adopt an experimental approach to examine the causal nature of the hypothesized relations more directly. Second, Tyler and his colleagues have mainly focused on the respect people receive from *authorities*, and the way this relates to their willingness to comply with these authorities. This work has emphasized that relational considerations can play a role (e.g. Tyler, 1999), showing that people respond differently to respect received from ingroup versus outgroup authorities (e.g. Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; see also Duck & Fielding, 2003). The present investigation aims to take this argument one step further, by comparing the effects of different sources of respect in order to examine whether similar effects may occur, even in the absence of asymmetrical power/dependence relations.

We intend to investigate whether issues of *self-definition* may play a role when people respond to respect received from peers. As a consequence of our aim to extend the work of Tyler and colleagues in these directions, we focus on *behavioural evaluations* instead of procedural treatment. This has been proposed as an alternative way in which respect can be conveyed (see also Simon & Stürmer, 2003), and previous research has confirmed that differential evaluations from peers convey the intended differences in perceived respect (Branscombe et al., 2002). In view of our intention to examine how the effects of respect differ, depending on how the source of respect relates to the self, it is important that people have more scope to take on or discard evaluative ratings depending on their perceived relevance to the self, which is less likely to be the case where people's outcomes depend on decisions made by others, and respect is conveyed through differential treatment by those others.

Based on a self-categorization perpective (Turner, 1987), we propose that the relevance of a group to the perception of self is the crucial determinant of the impact that judgments from that group have on one's self-views (see also Simon & Stürmer, 2003; Tyler, 1999). Our argument is that the way people respond to their social environment depends on the extent to which they think they share a common group membership or social identity with others (see Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; Wetherell, 1987, for similar arguments in relation to attitude change). Thus, rather than focusing on the evaluative implications of social judgments *per se*, we predict that it is important for people to know that they are respected by the 'right' others.

Whether a particular individual is regarded as an ingroup member or as an outgroup member may vary across situational contexts and over time (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; see also Guimond, Dif, & Aupy, 2002). Nevertheless, we predict that respect afforded by those who are regarded as fellow ingroup members will tend to be particularly impactful as it not only enhances one's self-image, but also confirms the validity of the salient self-categorization. By contrast, similar respect from (those who are perceived as) outgroup members may either seem irrelevant to one's self-perceptions, or may even be threatening, in the sense that it can be construed as undermining one's existing group identity or calls into question one's loyalty to the ingroup.

Thus, our general assumption is that social-evaluative information about the self is more influential to the extent that the source is more self-relevant. Accordingly, we predict that information from an ingroup is generally more self-relevant and therefore has more pronounced effects on people's collective self-esteem than the same information coming from an outgroup source. Because the source of respect implicates the collective self, responses associated with one's collective self (such as collective self-esteem) should be most sensitive to the group-based source of the feedback. In contrast, the source of respect may be less relevant in determining more general affective and emotional responses to the situation, that is, responses that less explicitly refer to the (collective) self. This differential prediction allows us to distinguish more generalized affective reactions to positive and negative feedback from those tied directly to source-relevant social identity.

Method

Overview

In this experiment, we used a 2 (Level of Respect: High/Low) × 2 (Source of Respect: Ingroup/Outgroup) factorial design. In addition to assessing the resulting effects on emotion and collective self-esteem, we asked participants to indicate the amount of effort they would be willing to invest to improve their image among others.

Participants

Male and female first year psychology students ($N = 294$) at the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment, as part of a mass testing session. They were asked to complete this questionnaire about 'groups', which was embedded in various other questionnaires. Four different versions of the questionnaire, representing the four experimental conditions, were distributed randomly among participants.

Procedure

Participants were presented with a description of an episode in student life. They were instructed to imagine that they were the protagonist in this episode, and to answer the subsequent questions accordingly. In all four conditions, the episode described how—during introduction week—groups of students are walking in town, wearing t-shirts indicating the name of their university. The protagonist sits in a tram, and observes how an old lady is pushed away from the last available seat by a young boy. Upon seeing this happening, the protagonist comments that the old lady wanted to sit there.

The experimental manipulation consisted of the way a group of student bystanders responded to this chain of events. In the Ingroup source condition these were students of the same university that participants attended (the University of Amsterdam), in the Outgroup source condition, they were students at the rival university in Amsterdam (the Free University). Furthermore, in the Low Respect condition, the group of students disapproved of the protagonist's behaviour, by stating that he should mind his own business and that he could offer his own seat to the old lady. In the High Respect condition, the group of students responded favourably to the protagonist's initiative, and joined him in expressing their disapproval of the young boy's behaviour. After having read the vignette, dependent measures were taken, by asking participants to answer a series of questions, as if they were the protagonist in this vignette. All responses were assessed on 7-point scales (1 = 'not at all', 7 = 'very much').

Emotion was tapped by assessing pride and shame as positive and negative instances of self-conscious emotions that are specifically relevant to people's social image (see Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). The first question asked about the amount of pride that would be experienced in response to these ingroup or outgroup judgments; the second question was about the amount of shame that would be experienced as a result of this feedback from the ingroup or outgroup.

Collective self-esteem was assessed with four items from Crocker and Luthanen's (1990, 1991) subscale for membership self-esteem, adapted to refer to self-esteem as a member of this particular ingroup (University of Amsterdam students). Two items assessed positive effects on self-esteem (see self as a valuable group member, perceive self as a cooperative group member), the other two referred to negative effects on self-esteem (feel that self has little to offer to the group, see self as a worthless

group member). The two positive and negative items were presented in mixed order. The two negative items were recoded, so that higher scores always indicated more positive (or less negative) self-esteem. Principal components analyses confirmed that these two components formed separate subscales (cf. Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001).

Effort to improve one's self-image within the ingroup was assessed by asking participants to indicate on a 7-point scale the extent to which they would be willing to invest effort in order to enhance the impression others had of them. We included this measure as an alternative indicator of the degree to which people care about the respect they receive, which not only refers to their evaluation of the current situation, but also suggests how this may affect their future behaviour in the group.

Results

Emotion

In order to examine the effects of our manipulations on particpants' emotional responses, the two emotion questions were subjected to a 2 (Level of Respect: High/Low) by 2 (Source of Respect: Ingroup/Outgroup) by 2 (Item: Pride/Shame) mixed design MANOVA, with Item as a within-participant variable. This only revealed a significant main effect of Level of Respect ($F(1, 288) = 43.42$, $p < 0.001$), and an interaction between Level of Respect and Item ($F(1, 288) = 249.00$, $p < 0.001$). Overall, participants reported more pride and less shame in response to High Respect (means respectively 5.07 and 2.58) as compared to Low Respect (means respectively 2.09 and 4.27).

Collective Self-esteem

The four collective self-esteem questions were subjected to a 2 (Level of Respect: High/Low) by 2 (Source of Respect: Ingroup/Outgroup) by 2 (Item Valence: Positive/Negative) mixed design MANOVA, with Item Valence as a within-participant variable. This revealed two trends and a significant main effect (Level of Respect: $F(1, 287) = 0.23$, $p < 0.08$; Source of Respect: $F(1, 287) = 3.33$, $p < 0.07$; Item Valence: $F(1, 287) = 14.46$, $p < 0.001$). However, these were qualified by a Source of Respect by Item Valence interaction ($F(1, 287) = 5.72$, $p < 0.02$), as well as a nearly significant three-way interaction ($F(1, 287) = 3.59$, $p = 0.059$). In order to understand this complex interaction, we tested the predicted Level by Source interaction separately for the two sets of items. Only the positively phrased items measuring collective self-esteem showed the predicted interaction of Level of Respect by Source of Respect ($F(1, 287) = 5.94$, $p < 0.02$). The relevant means and tests for simple main effects indicate that participants reported more positive collective self-esteem as a result of High (5.01) versus Low (4.47) Ingroup Respect ($F(1, 287) = 8.11$, $p < 0.005$), while there was no comparable effect on collective self-esteem as a result of High (4.75) versus Low (4.88) Levels of Respect received from an Outgroup Source ($F(1, 287) < 1$, *ns*).

Effort

The single item assessing willingness to exert effort in order to improve one's personal image was subjected to a 2 (Level of Respect: High/Low) by 2 (Source of Respect: Ingroup/Outgroup) ANOVA. This resulted in a significant main effect of Level of Respect ($F(1, 288) = 10.43$, $p < 0.001$), which was

qualified by the predicted interaction of Level by Source ($F(1, 288) = 6.39$, $p < 0.02$). In line with the collective self-esteem effects we obtained, the relevant means and tests of simple main effects show that participants were more motivated to improve their image in response to Low Ingroup Respect (5.12) than High Ingroup Respect (4.49), $F(1, 288) = 7.84$, $p < 0.005$. In line with our predictions, and again consistent with the collective self-esteem effects, no comparable effect was observed as a result of Low (4.19) versus High (4.38) Outgroup Respect, $F(1, 288) < 1$, *ns*.

Discussion

The results of this first study corroborate our main prediction, namely that the effects of differential social respect depend on the nature of the source from which this respect is received. Despite this being a vignette study, overall participants reported that they would feel more proud and less ashamed after a positive as compared to a negative evaluation of their social behaviour by others. This attests to the validity of our manipulation, and indicates that the valence of the respect received was interpreted in the intended way, for ingroup as well as outgroup sources.

While the nature of the source seemed less relevant to the more immediate emotional responses to the amount of respect received, the collective self-esteem and effort measures show the predicted interaction, suggesting that only an ingroup source affects group members' collective self-esteem, and motivates them to try to improve their image. That is, whereas similar levels of respect accorded by an outgroup do cause an emotional response, apparently the outgroup is seen as insufficiently relevant to impact upon collective self-esteem, or to elicit behavioural efforts to improve one's image. Thus, the results of this first study converge with our main hypothesis, and provide initial support for our self-categorization argument. Instead of finding overall effects of favourable versus unfavourable social judgments of the self (which would be in line with an interpersonal or exchange perspective on the effects of social respect) it seems that—at least for the collective self-esteem and effort measures—the impact of identical judgments depends on whether or not one shares a social category membership with the source of these judgments.

STUDY 2

The second study aims to replicate these findings in an investigation of the *concurrent effects* of high versus low social respect received from ingroup and outgroup members. By orthogonally manipulating the valence of the feedback coming from members of two groups, we move one step closer to real life situations where people receive self-relevant evaluative information from multiple sources.

In line with the results obtained in Study 1, we predict that people are generally more affected by the respect they receive from an ingroup source than by outgroup respect. However, an interesting situation arises when low respect from the ingroup is conveyed, together with high respect from the outgroup. If people simply attend to that source of self-relevant feedback that is most favourable for the self, in this situation they should focus on the evaluation received from the outgroup, to derive positive emotion and boost their collective self-esteem. On the basis of our assumption that issues of self-definition play a role, we argue that such compensating effects of outgroup respect are unlikely to arise. In fact, group members may even feel compromised by this particular combination of low ingroup respect and high outgroup respect, as it can be seen to undermine their preferred self-definition. The present study, where ingroup and outgroup respect are induced simultaneously, enables us to examine which of these effects arises due to the combined effects of multiple sources of respect.

In sum, we aim to replicate the findings obtained in our first study and extend these to a situation where multiple sources of respect are available simultaneously.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Male and female first year psychology students ($N = 248$) at the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment as part of a mass testing session. In a setup similar to that in Study 1, level of Ingroup Respect (High/Low) and level of Outgroup Respect (High/Low) were crossed to create four experimental conditions, to which participants were randomly assigned. The research procedure was the same as in Study 1, except that this time *two different groups* of student bystanders (representing the ingroup and the outgroup respectively) responded to the events.

Previous investigations indicate that members of natural groups differ in how responsive they are to ingroup versus outgroup manipulations, depending on their level of identification with the ingroup (see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002, for an overview). Therefore, in this study we assessed *a priori* levels of ingroup identification, to be able to correct for individual differences on this variable when testing our predictions. Thus, before presenting participants with the vignettes, we asked them to indicate their level of identification with the ingroup of psychology students at the University of Amsterdam, using six items adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995; e.g. 'I see myself as an UvA psychology student'; $\alpha = 0.88$).

After having read the vignette, two questions were asked (on 7-point scales) to check whether participants thought the vignette was realistic, and whether they are able to imagine that they were the protagonist ($\alpha = 0.82$). The overall mean score on these two questions was 4.65, which deviates significantly from the scale midpoint ($F(1, 238) = 47.89$, $p < 0.0001$) attesting to the vividness of the descriptions we gave. The dependent measures were identical to those used in Study 1, except that the emotion questions were asked twice to separate the emotional responses to the judgments received from the ingroup from responses to the outgroup.

Results

Emotion

The four emotion questions were analysed in a 2 (Ingroup Respect: High/Low) $\times$ 2 (Outgroup Respect: High/Low) MANCOVA, correcting for level of identification as a covariate ($F(4, 238) = 4.84$, $p < 0.001$). This revealed multivariate main effects of Ingroup Respect ($F(4, 239) = 82.29$, $p < 0.0001$), Outgroup Respect ($F(4, 239) = 86.10$, $p < 0.0001$), and a multivariate significant two-way interaction ($F(4, 239) = 2.71$, $p < 0.03$).

At the univariate level, the amount of Ingroup Respect received affected the extent to which participants reported pride ($F(1, 242) = 253.54$, $p < 0.0001$) and shame ($F(1, 242) = 75.73$, $p < 0.0001$). As expected, High Ingroup Respect elicited more pride ($M = 5.00$) and less shame ($M = 1.12$) than Low Ingroup Respect (pride: $M = 2.19$; shame: $M = 2.87$). In a similar vein, High Outgroup Respect caused participants to report more pride ($M = 5.25$) and less shame ($M = 1.02$) than low outgroup respect (pride: $M = 2.35$, $F(1, 242) = 301.38$, $p < 0.0001$; shame: $M = 2.24$, $F(1, 242) = 39.37$, $p < 0.0001$). These effects again indicate that respondents showed the intended responses to the vignettes that were used.

Table 1. The effect of ingroup respect and outgroup respect on shame at the judgment received from the ingroup (Study 2)

		Ingroup respect	
		Low	High
Outgroup respect	Low	2.61[b]	1.31[a]
	High	3.14[c]	0.93[a]

Note: In all tables, means with a different superscript differ significantly from each other ($p < 0.05$), according to least significant difference tests.

Most interesting in view of our main research question, however, is the Ingroup Respect by Outgroup Respect interaction. At the univariate level, the two-way interaction emerged on the amount of shame experienced as a result of the judgment received from the ingroup ($F(1, 242) = 5.18$, $p < 0.024$). The pattern of means and post-hoc contrasts (see Table 1) reveal that the main effect of Ingroup Respect on shame at the judgment of the ingroup is more pronounced under High Outgroup Respect than when Outgroup Respect is Low. That is, instead of compensating for lack of ingroup respect, the affordance of high respect by the outgroup *intensified* the shame participants reported in response to low ingroup respect. This is consistent with our argument that self-definitional concerns affect the impact of evaluative judgments from others.

Collective Self-esteem

The four collective self-esteem questions were subjected to a MANCOVA with Ingroup Respect (High/Low) and Outgroup Respect (High/Low), as between-participants factors, Item Valence (Positive/Negative) as a within-participants factor, and correcting for Ingroup Identification as a covariate ($F(1, 241) = 5.91$, $p < 0.016$). This revealed a significant main effect of Ingroup Respect ($F(1, 241) = 69.09$, $p < 0.0001$), indicating that overall, participants reported higher collective self-esteem in response to High Ingroup Respect ($M = 5.00$) than when Ingroup Respect was Low ($M = 3.97$). We also observed a significant main effect of Item Valence ($F(1, 241) = 38.81$, $p < 0.0001$), and a significant interaction of Item Valence with Ingroup Respect ($F(1, 241) = 10.17$, $p < 0.002$), indicating that the effect of Ingroup Respect was more pronounced for items with a Positive Valence (High: $M = 4.68$; Low: $M = 3.37$) than for Negative items (High: $M = 5.31$; Low: $M = 4.56$). We obtained no main or interactive effects of Outgroup Respect, indicating that participants' collective self-esteem was not affected by the way they were evaluated by the outgroup.

Effort

A 2×2 ANCOVA on the effort to improve one's self-image, after correction for Ingroup Identification as a covariate ($F(1, 240) = 24.10$, $p < 0.0001$), only yielded a significant main effect of Ingroup Respect ($F(1, 240) = 4.20$, $p < 0.042$). The relevant means indicate that respondents reported greater willingness to impress a favourable image on other ingroup members, after they had received High ($M = 4.11$) as compared to Low ($M = 3.71$) Ingroup Respect. There were no other significant effects on this measure, indicating that the level of respect accorded by the outgroup did not affect participants' willingness to improve their self-image.

Discussion

Although this study relied on vignettes to manipulate ingroup and outgroup respect, there are several indications that participants were well able to imagine being in this situation. This is evident not only from the direct questions we asked to check this, but also from the fact that participants' reported emotions and collective self-esteem were affected in the intended way by our manipulations of ingroup and outgroup respect. It is noteworthy that only ingroup respect affected collective self-esteem and effort, although, as in Study 1, outgroup respect did influence reported emotions. This last finding is consistent with our argument that the source of self-relevant feedback should have a more discriminating impact on reactions that specifically refer to the collective self (i.e. collective self-esteem, effort to improve the image of the self), than on more general affective responses to the situation.

These results extend our initial findings, as in this study social evaluations from both ingroup and outgroup sources were provided simultaneously. Thus, Study 2 lends further support to our hypothesis that ingroup sources are particularly likely to affect reactions to evaluative behaviour, when multiple sources of self-relevant information are available. This is in line with self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), as well as empirical findings offered by Mackie and her colleagues in the domain of attitude change (Mackie et al., 1990, 1992), showing that messages stemming from an ingroup were more persuasive than outgroup messages.

The emotion measure showed that—when information from multiple sources is available—effects of one source may depend on evaluations by another source. Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, the interactive effect of the two sources of respect on the experience of shame at the judgment of the ingroup constitutes the most intriguing aspect of the results, and suggests more directly than Study 1 that the collective self is operating here. The fact that respect afforded by the outgroup does not compensate for lack of respect from the ingroup, but instead appears to exacerbate the negative emotion participants experience, is in line with our argument that *self-definitional* concerns (instead of interpersonal interdependence, or evaluative exchange processes) determine the impact of social-evaluative judgments on the self.

Additionally, those who are highly respected by the ingroup report low levels of shame, regardless of the outgroup judgment they received. This suggests that high ingroup respect is primary, in the sense that it renders participants less sensitive to the way they are evaluated by the outgroup. In more general terms, this seems to imply that when people are positively evaluated by the group that is important to them, they are less vulnerable to (unfavourable) judgments from others who are less relevant. This is indeed consistent with recent research among African Americans, showing that rejection from outgroup members does not undermine psychological well-being, as long as people feel accepted by their ingroup (Postmes & Branscombe, 2002). Similar results have been observed in the context of work-related stress, where social support from others only protects people from experiencing negative outcomes (such as occupational burn-out) when these others are seen as ingroup members (for an overview see Haslam, 2004). The results from this second study thus converge with our main hypothesis that the effects of self-relevant feedback depend on how important the source of this feedback is in relation to the self-definition of the person in question, with an ingroup source being of primary importance and impact.

A final result that merits some further discussion, refers to participants' willingness to try to improve their own image within the ingroup. In line with our general argument, and with previous findings concerning group-related effort (e.g. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ouwerkerk, Ellemers, & De Gilder, 1999), the fact that ingroup identification emerged as a significant covariate, indicates that stronger identification with the ingroup is associated with more willingness to exert oneself on behalf of this group. Additionally, we found that willingness to improve one's image

towards the ingroup was greater to the extent that people were more *highly* respected by the ingroup. Both results indicate that willingness to exert oneself is greater among those for whom the group in question is more important: either because they identify strongly with it, or because it affords them high respect.

Although this finding seems to make sense in itself, it is *not* consistent with results from Study 1, where willingness to invest effort appeared to be driven by individually instrumental considerations (group members mainly tried to improve their self-image when ingroup respect was low). This lack of convergence between the effects obtained across these two studies, suggests that outwardly identical displays of behaviour may have been motivated by fundamentally different underlying concerns. To be able to understand whether group members are willing to invest effort because they value the group (as in Study 2) or because they are concerned with their own self-image (as in Study 1), it is important to assess more explicitly group members' willingness to make each of these two kinds of efforts.

The results of this second study (as in Study 1) are (by and large) consistent with our theoretical predictions. However, we have to bear in mind that we used scenarios to induce the intended manipulations. Indeed, it is not self-evident that participants were able to anticipate how they would feel in such a situation without actually experiencing it, in particular in Study 2 where they were asked to take different pieces of information into account at the same time. Thus, suggestive as they may be, we cannot assume that the results we obtained in these two studies offer conclusive evidence of the responses people will display when they actually find themselves in situations such as these. Therefore, we decided to conduct a final experimental study, in order to examine our hypotheses about the effects of ingroup and outgroup respect in a controlled laboratory situation with experimental groups. Even though generally speaking such groups may seem less important to the self than more longstanding group memberships to participants, their identity as group members is a relevant guideline while engaged in the experimental situation (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). An important advantage of this experimental approach is that it enables us to complement the conclusions we may draw from the first two studies with natural groups, as it enables us to observe how participants respond when they are actually immersed in the situation instead of merely imagining it. This third study thus examines the actual effects of the self-relevant information group members receive on their emotions and collective self-esteem, and offers an extended opportunity to examine the validity of our predictions.

STUDY 3

For this study our general argument again is that the way people respond to their social environment depends on how they perceive themselves in relation to the source of evaluation, or more specifically whether they think they share a common group membership or social identity with that source. As in the previous studies we therefore predict that high (versus low) ingroup respect is more likely to affect collective self-esteem and behavioural intentions than similar respect coming from an outgroup source. However, when two different sources of respect are available simultaneously, they may moderate each other's effects.

On the basis of the emotion effects we observed in Study 2, we predict that high ingroup respect may function as a 'buffer', and be sufficient to boost collective self-esteem, so that self-relevant judgments from an outgroup become less important. Conversely, however, when ingroup respect is low people are likely to feel more vulnerable (Ellemers et al., 2002). From a self-categorization perspective, we argue that under these circumstances high respect from the outgroup may be seen as 'compromising' or jeopardizing one's preferred self-definition, instead of compensating for lack of

ingroup respect. Thus, when social evaluative information from multiple sources is available, high outgroup respect—instead of being attractive as an alternative source of positive collective self-esteem—may become a problem when ingroup respect is low. Indeed, low respect from the ingroup can imply that one's position within the group one values most is called into question. The challenge of one's preferred self-definition is exacerbated when finding favour with a rival group. In view of the low ingroup respect received, this cannot be attributed to general popularity, so that there may be the implication that one is a less loyal, or less prototypical ingroup member as a result (cf. Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995). Assuming that people are not willing or able to change groups, when the concurrent effects of ingroup and outgroup respect are incompatible with the existing categorization, we therefore predict that this may negatively affect group members' emotional responses and collective self-esteem, as it emphasizes their vulnerable position within the ingroup.

Method

Overview

In this experimental study, Ingroup Respect (High/Low) and Outgroup Respect (High/Low) were crossed in a factorial design, by asking participants to reveal positive and negative social behaviours they had displayed, and providing them with false feedback concerning the way they were judged by ingroup and outgroup members as a result. Dependent variables assessed emotion, collective self-esteem, and effort.

Participants

Psychology students of the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment on a voluntary basis ($N = 66$), in return for course credits. Among the participants, 45 were women, and 21 were men. Their mean age was 20 years. They were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions, although the proportion of male and female participants was held equal in each condition.

Procedure

Approximately nine students took part in each session. They were seated at computer terminals, which were partially separated from each other with screens. After a brief introduction by the experimenter, indicating that they would only interact with each other via the computer network, all instructions and questions appeared on the computer screen.

Categorization In order to divide the participants into two groups, they first had to perform a so-called 'associations task', consisting of two sets of ten items (see Doosje, Ellemers et al., 1995; Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995, for further details of this task). Participants were led to believe that their performance on this task would inform the experimenter about whether they should be classified as 'inductive' or as 'deductive' thinkers. Upon completion of this task, all participants were allegedly assigned to the group of 'inductive thinkers', which supposedly consisted of half of those present in the session. The other half of the participants were designated as 'deductive thinkers'. Thus, in each session, the relative size of the two groups was equal. Additionally, participants were informed that style of thinking was not systematically related to gender. In order to enhance the meaningfulness of

this categorization, participants then performed a group problem-solving task, on which they allegedly competed with the other group (see Doosje, Ellemers et al., 1995, for further details of this task).

Ingroup and Outgroup Respect Manipulations Each participant was asked to reveal one favourable and one unfavourable interpersonal behaviour that they had performed during the past month, ostensibly for the purpose of getting to know each other better, by typing a brief summary statement on the computer (see Branscombe et al., 2002). Subsequently, they were asked to evaluate the other ingroup and outgroup participants on a 9-point scale (1 = extremely unfavourable; 9 = extremely favourable), on the basis of the behavioural descriptions they had ostensibly provided. In reality, all participants received standardized pre-programmed feedback, containing behavioural episodes that had been rated equally positively (e.g. 'I helped decorate my friend's apartment'), or equally negatively (e.g. 'I forgot the birthday of a close friend') in a pilot study. Then, ingroup and outgroup respect were manipulated by informing participants about the way they themselves had supposedly been evaluated by ingroup and outgroup members, on the basis of the information they had provided. In the case of low ingroup respect, they were informed that the average evaluation they had received from other ingroup members (4.5) fell below the neutral point (5), and was lower than judgments received by other ingroup members (which were stated to be 5.6, 5.8, and 6.9, respectively). In the high ingroup respect condition, participants were led to believe that their score (6.9) was above the neutral point, and higher than the evaluations of fellow ingroup members. High or low outgroup respect was manipulated with similar instructions, although the mean evaluation scores provided were slightly different, to avoid suspicion about the veridical nature of these scores.

Dependent Variables At this point, the dependent measures were taken, by asking participants to answer a series of questions on 9-point scales (1 = 'not at all', 9 = 'very much'). To check the effects of the experimental manipulations, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they were respected by the ingroup and the outgroup, respectively. In addition to the same two self-focused *emotions* that were asked in the first two studies (i.e. pride and shame), in this study where the amount of respect afforded to the self was induced relative to other ingroup members, we also included two other-directed emotions, namely 'envy' and 'compassion' (cf. Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). Thus, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they experienced each of four emotions in response to the evaluations received from the ingroup and the outgroup respectively, resulting in a total of eight emotion questions. *Collective self-esteem* was assessed with the same four items that we used in the previous two studies. To separate different behavioural motives, in this study *effort* was measured by asking participants to indicate on a 9-point scale how willing they were to exert effort to improve the image (a) of them personally, and (b) of the ingroup as a whole.

Results

Manipulation Checks

The questions checking for the manipulation of ingroup and outgroup respect were subjected to 2 (Ingroup Respect: High/Low) × 2 (Outgroup Respect: High/Low) ANOVAs. Participants indicated that they were more respected by the ingroup after having received High Ingroup Respect ($M = 8.09$) than Low Ingroup Respect ($M = 1.98$, $F(1, 62) = 372.26$, $p < 0.0001$). Likewise, they reported that they were more respected by the outgroup in the High Outgroup Respect condition ($M = 7.90$) than in the Low Outgroup Respect condition ($M = 1.91$, $F(1, 62) = 390.87$, $p < 0.0001$). No cross-over or interactive effects were obtained, indicating that both respect manipulations had the intended effect.

Emotion

The eight emotion items were subjected to a 2 (Ingroup Respect: High/Low) × 2 (Outgroup Respect: High/Low) MANOVA. This yielded a multivariate main effect of Ingroup Respect ($F(8, 54) = 6.45$, $p < 0.0001$), a multivariate main effect of Outgroup Respect ($F(8, 54) = 5.79$, $p < 0.0001$), and a multivariate significant two-way interaction ($F(8, 54) = 2.29$, $p < 0.05$).

At the univariate level, this implies that greater *pride* at the ingroup's judgment was reported in the High ($M = 5.06$) as compared to the Low ($M = 2.97$) Ingroup Respect condition ($F(1, 61) = 17.50$, $p < 0.0001$). Conversely, participants in the Low Ingroup Respect condition reported more *envy* ($M = 3.72$) in response to the ingroup's judgment than those in the High Ingroup Respect condition ($M = 1.88$, $F(1, 61) = 16.78$, $p < 0.0001$). In a similar vein, Low Ingroup respect resulted in more *shame* ($M = 4.15$) in response to their evaluation by the ingroup than did High Ingroup Respect ($M = 1.71$, $F(1, 61) = 32.81$, $p < 0.0001$). Additionally, as in Study 2, we obtained an effect of *ingroup* respect on participants' emotional responses to the judgment received from the *outgroup*. That is, High Ingroup respect led participants to report less shame at the way they were evaluated by the outgroup ($M = 2.06$) than Low Ingroup Respect ($M = 3.24$, $F(1, 61) = 7.32$, $p < 0.001$). Thus, again (and regardless of the valence of the judgment received from the outgroup) how people respond emotionally to the way they are evaluated by the *outgroup* depended on the amount of respect accorded by the *ingroup*.

In addition to these Ingroup Respect main effects, we also obtained main effects of Outgroup Respect for the separate emotions that were tapped. Participants reported more *pride* ($M = 5.78$), less *envy* ($M = 1.88$), and less *shame* ($M = 1.88$) in response to High Outgroup Respect, compared to Low Outgroup Respect (*pride*: $M = 3.38$, $F(1, 61) = 21.97$, $p < 0.0001$; *envy*: $M = 2.91$, $F(1, 61) = 7.12$, $p < 0.01$; *shame*: $M = 3.47$, $F(1, 61) = 12.86$, $p < 0.001$).

At the univariate level, the predicted two-way interaction emerged for *pride* and *envy* in response to the ingroup's judgment (see Table 2). The means and post-hoc contrasts indicate that the ingroup respect main effect was much more pronounced with high outgroup respect than with low outgroup respect. That is, participants reported least pride and greatest envy in response to Low Ingroup Respect when this was combined with High Outgroup Respect. Thus, as predicted, when respect from the ingroup is not forthcoming, positive feedback about the self from the outgroup results in negative emotional responses.

Collective Self-esteem

As in the previous studies, we subjected the four collective self-esteem items to a 2 (Ingroup Respect) by 2 (Outgroup Respect) by 2 (Item Valence) mixed design MANOVA, with Item Valence as a

Table 2. Effect of ingroup respect and outgroup respect on emotion (Study 3)

		Ingroup respect	
		Low	High
Pride ($F(1, 61) = 3.24$, $p < 0.08$)			
Outgroup respect	Low	3.25^{a}	4.44^{ab}
	High	2.71^{a}	5.69^{b}
Envy ($F(1, 61) = 6.56$, $p < 0.05$)			
Outgroup respect	Low	3.13^{a}	2.44^{ab}
	High	4.29^{a}	1.31^{b}

within-participants factor. In addition to a (not theoretically interesting) main effect of Item Valence ($F(1, 62) = 58.48$, $p < 0.001$), this only revealed a significant two-way interaction of Ingroup Respect by Outgroup Respect ($F(1, 62) = 4.32$, $p < 0.05$). The relevant means and post-hoc contrasts indicate that for those who were Highly respected by the Ingroup, High Respect from the Outgroup further enhanced collective self-esteem (Low Outgroup Respect: $M = 5.25$; High Outgroup Respect: $M = 6.23$, $F(1, 62) = 4.32$, $p < 0.05$). However, when Ingroup Respect was Low there was no evidence that participants experienced High Outgroup Respect as an alternative source of high collective self-esteem. If anything, the means show a reversed pattern, indicating slightly lower collective self-esteem when Low Ingroup Respect was combined with High Outgroup Respect ($M = 5.45$), than in the condition where participants received Low Respect from both sources ($M = 5.95$), although this difference was not significant ($F(1, 62) < 1$, *ns*). Still, instead of turning to the source that provides the most positive social evaluation of the self, as in the previous studies, participants responded differently to identical self-relevant information depending on whether it was provided by an ingroup or by an outgroup source. This is consistent with our theoretical argument. That is, these results again attest to the fact that self-categorization concerns determine the impact of respect, in the sense that the effects of self-relevant evaluative judgments differ, depending on whether these judgments are made by others who are seen as belonging to the same group as the self or as representing another group.

Effort

The extent to which participants expressed willingness to exert themselves to improve their own image or that of their group, were subjected to a 2 (Ingroup Respect: High/Low) by 2 (Outgroup Respect: High/Low) by 2 (Target of Effort: Self/Ingroup) analysis of variance, in which the last factor constistuted a repeated measure. This yielded a main effect of the Target of Effort ($F(1, 62) = 8.27$, $p < 0.01$). Additionally, we obtained significant two-way interactions of Target of Effort by Ingroup Respect ($F(1, 62) = 8.27$, $p < 0.01$), and of Target of Effort by Outgroup Respect ($F(1, 62) = 5.48$, $p < 0.05$). However, all these lower order effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction ($F(1, 62) = 5.48$, $p < 0.05$). The means and post-hoc contrasts (see Table 3) show that there was an overall tendency for participants to engage in an equal amount of effort to improve their own image and the group's image. However, in deviation from this general pattern, those in the Low Ingroup Respect, High Outgroup Respect condition were willing to exert significantly more effort to improve the image of Self ($M = 5.06$) than the Ingroup image ($M = 3.24$). It can also be seen that, as predicted, when Outgroup Respect was High, those who received Low Ingroup Respect were much more willing to improve the image of Self ($M = 5.06$) than group members who received High Ingroup Respect ($M = 3.31$).

Table 3. Effect of ingroup respect, outgroup respect, and target on improvement effort (Study 3)

		Ingroup respect	
		Low	High
Target is own image			
Outgroup respect	Low	4.75^{ab}	4.35^{a}
	High	5.06^{b}	3.31^{a}
Target is ingroup image			
Outgroup respect	Low	4.56^{a}	4.35^{a}
	High	3.24^{a}	3.31^{a}

Discussion

The main goal of this final study was to examine whether interactive effects of ingroup and outgroup respect emerge when people are actually confronted with self-relevant feedback from multiple sources. Although the combination of different pieces of evaluative information might have various effects, we argued from a self-categorization perspective that group members would respond most negatively to a situation in which they are not respected by other ingroup members but receive high respect from the outgroup. Overall, this prediction is corroborated by our results.

As was the case in Study 1, in itself high outgroup respect elicited more positive emotional responses than did low outgroup respect. However, when we look at the interactions, the results on different dependent measures consistently show the predicted effect, namely that while high ingroup respect can buffer against the effects of low outgroup respect (cf. Postmes & Branscombe, 2002; Haslam, 2004), high outgroup respect does not compensate for the negative effects of low ingroup respect. That is, negative emotional and collective self-esteem consequences of low ingroup respect are not attenuated by high respect from the outgroup. If anything, the threat of low ingroup respect appears to be intensified by high outgroup respect. Thus, importantly, we cannot conclude that outgroup respect is simply discarded as not relevant to the self, as we found that high respect from the outgroup *exacerbates* the negative responses experienced as a result of low ingroup respect.

We argued that receiving low respect from the ingroup can be considered threatening, as it may be seen as jeopardizing the acceptibility of the participant as an ingroup member. High respect from the outgroup may then become undesirable because it can be seen as (further) undermining the categorization of the participant as an ingroup member. In fact, our respect manipulation, that also conveyed how the self was respected *compared to* other ingroup members, may have contributed to this perception (cf. Jetten et al., 2002; Noel et al., 1995; see also Ellemers et al., 2002). Accordingly, the low ingroup respect/high outgroup respect condition is the only situation in which participants are more concerned with their own image than with the image of their group. That is, by separating whether the willingness to invest effort derives from a concern with the group or the self, we were able to resolve the seemingly contradictory findings obtained in Studies 1 and 2 with respect to the effort measure.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In three studies we examined the effects of positive and negative self-relevant feedback on emotions, collective self-esteem and effort. We argued that the effects of identical evaluative information might differ, depending on whether the source of this information constitutes an ingroup or an outgroup. Additionally, we argued that while differential respect may be reflected in participants' immediate emotional responses to the situation relatively independently of the source, social evaluative information will be more consequential for people's self-views and behavioural intentions (i.e. on collective self-esteem or effort investment) to the extent that participants think that they share a common identity with the source of these judgments.

The first study showed that the effects of ingroup evaluations on collective self-esteem and improvement efforts are more pronounced than when identical evaluations are made by an outgroup. The second study confirmed that ingroup evaluations are primary when multiple sources of evaluation are available simultaneously. Furthermore, it revealed that—instead of being discarded as less relevant—outgroup judgments can interact with ingroup judgments, so that high outgroup respect intensifies the shame experienced as a result of low ingroup respect. The third study showed similar

interactive effects of different sources of evaluation, in the sense that, particularly when ingroup respect was low, high respect from the outgroup undermined group-based collective self-esteem and exacerbated group-related emotions, presumably because it further compromised the relation to the ingroup.

Generally speaking, we believe our studies show that, following self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner, 1987), the effects of self-relevant information are dependent upon the relationship between the source and the target. Even in organizational contexts, where performance evaluations are standardized and objective criteria are available, the source of information may influence how people perceive and respond to these evaluations (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003). When focusing on social evaluative information, the source of this information is even more relevant. From a self-categorization perspective, messages from a particular source are expected to be more influential to the extent that source and target perceive that they share a common category membership. From our studies, it is clear that this idea is supported, as ingroup respect was generally more influential in determining collective self-esteem and emotions than outgroup respect.

In the domain of attitude polarization, it has been established that the desire to be regarded as a prototypical ingroup member may cause people to move *away* from attitudes that characterize the outgroup (Wetherell, 1987). In a similar vein, it was inferred that high outgroup respect may be unsolicited and problematic. This appears to be even more true when ingroup respect is lacking than when this is present, because when ingroup respect is present, this may give people a sense of secure group membership, both to themselves, and in terms of their perception by other ingroup members (cf. Postmes & Branscombe, 2002; Haslam, 2004). While people simply seemed to discount outgroup respect as not relevant to the self, when this was the only source of evaluation that was available (Study 1), Studies 2 and 3 which emphasized the intergroup nature of the situation, clearly demonstrated the validity of our analysis, by revealing that respect from multiple sources causes interactive effects. It is important to note too that converging findings were obtained across different experimental methodologies with different manipulations among members of natural as well as artificial groups.

While in the present research we have examined the effects of different sources of respect by comparing ingroup versus outgroup judgments, this is not to say that this distinction is always clear-cut or easy to make. Indeed, self-categorization theory emphasizes that whether a particular individual is perceived as an ingroup member or as an outgroup member represents a subjective assessment of the position of the self in relation to others, which does not necessarily depend on the objective sharing of clearly defined features. As a result, whether or not a particular individual or group is seen as representing a shared identity can vary across situations or over time, and in daily life ingroup/outgroup distinctions are often ambiguous and subject to change. Indeed, this has important applied consequences that should be addressed in future research, for instance when examining the effectiveness of leadership in work settings. Leaders who are successful in building trust may be able to change the perception that they represent an outgroup ('management') into the conviction that the leader is part of the ingroup (as a 'primus inter pares' in the work team), which in turn should increase the impact this leader has (and the way this leader evaluates the contribution of individual workers) on the perceptions and behaviours of work team members (see also Hogg & Martin, 2003; Smith, Tyler, & Huo, 2003).

Obviously, in interpersonal situations positive evaluations of the self will generally result in positive emotions and boost collective self-esteem (Sedikides, 1993). However, the present research emphasizes quite a counterintuitive point about social attraction, namely that in intergroup situations certain forms of liking may seem irrelevant or even antagonizing, depending on the source. Indeed, as we have tried to show in the present paper, such reactions do not have to depend on the individual features of the people involved (as in our studies participants did not even know which individuals did or did not accord them respect), but can come about purely on the basis of how the group they

represent is relevant for the self. Although we all have a need to belong, the nature of social identity, and indeed our identity more generally, implies that we cannot address this need unless we know who we are and *where* we want to belong.

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All authors contributed equally to this paper; Their names are listed in random order. This work was prepared while Russell Spears was at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

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