

This paper uses polling data conducted before 261 elections to construct preference profiles based on respondents' rating of different parties and candidates, and to determine whether there is a Condorcet winner in each election. They find that a Condorcet paradox occurs in only 1% of these elections, suggesting that the issue of indeterminacy is not that prevalent.

My main concern is that the current manuscript looks more like a short technical note addressed to an audience of readers who already know the topic really well, rather than a paper addressed to a broad audience of economists. The results seem interesting and potentially important, but I believe the paper would have to be written completely differently to do them justice. I provide some broad comments along these lines below.

1/ The authors could start by explaining in "simple" words what a Condorcet winner is and provide concrete examples to illustrate the Condorcet paradox. In its current form, the introduction immediately starts with some jargon that many readers who do not work in social choice theory will not know. Although most economists have heard the term Condorcet paradox before, I believe it is worth reminding everyone what that is before testing for its existence.

2/ There is very little information about the empirical strategy. I think it would be important to provide more information on the polling data that is used (e.g., who conducts these surveys, how many respondents there are, what the sampling strategy is, etc). It would also be interesting to know how the parties are classified between the different categories shown in Figure 1. Is it performed by the authors? Based on which sources?

3/ Similarly, it would be valuable to explain in more detail which calculations are performed to determine whether there is a Condorcet winner or not. The authors mention an R package but I think it would be important to explain what this package does exactly.

4/ On a more substantive note, isn't there a risk that the party ratings given by respondents are endogenously influenced by the electoral system in which these respondents vote? It could be nice to defend a bit more the assumption that these ratings can be treated as sincere voter preferences.

5/ The authors find that the "electoral systems employed work well in selecting the Condorcet winner most of the time" (p.7), which I find very interesting. Given the richness of the data, it seems like the authors could push their analysis further and check this propensity to pick the Condorcet winner varies across systems and voting rules. It could be interesting to discuss whether some systems are better at picking the Condorcet winner than others. This could lead to an interesting discussion of the paper's policy implications.

6/ I believe there is an inconsistency in the text as the abstract mentions 351 elections while Section 2 mentions only 221 elections.