
# Insuring Unit Failures in Electricity Markets



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Antonio Conejo
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Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) 2009







- > Introduction
- > Model
- Case study
- > Conclusions







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## Pool market (price volatility)



## Futures market (fixed price)







Risk neutral	Pool		
	Fut.		
Risk	Pool		
averse	Futures		







## Pool market (price volatility)



## Futures market (fixed price)




**Production unit** 


















	Failures neglected		Failures considered		
Risk neutral	Pool			Pool	
	Fut.				
Risk averse	Pool			Pool	
	Futures		Futures		





#### Insurance









## Swiss Re New Markets and Mirant Offer Generator Forced Outage Insurance Product.

Swiss Re's Electricity Price and Outage Protection (ELPRO) is a dual-trigger solution which protects against volume and market price by financially firming up generation whenever:

- Generating units suffer unplanned outages, and
- Electricity price exceeds a pre-agreed strike price.





Sources of uncertainty

**Pool prices** 

Unit availability

Forward contracts





Sources of uncertainty

Pool prices Unit availability

**Forward** contracts

Insurance policy




**Pool Futures** market market

Insurance?













# Analyze the effect of an insurance contract on the decisions of a power producer








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## MODEL












Pool prices








#### Pool prices





## MODEL











Unit availability









#### **Unit availability**

#### Historical data




$$FOR(\%) = \frac{MTTR}{MTTF + MTTF}$$

#### Failure time series = 20, 35, ....



~ exp(MTTF)

#### Repair time series = 12, 8, ....




~ exp(MTTR)








#### **Unit availability**





















Pool prices Unit availability

Scenario tree

### Pool price scenarios



#### **Availability scenarios**




















Forward contracts








#### **Forward contracts**

- Specified quantity (MWh)
- Fixed price
- Future delivery period






















- Initial premium
- Insured power
- Time period covered
- Conditions:
  - Pool price > Strike price
  - Unit unavailable










## MODEL











Risk aversion







**Objective function** 

Maximize CVaR (profit)

**Constraints** 

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 

Forward characteristics







#### **Objective function**

**Maximize**  $CVaR_{\alpha}(profit_{\omega})$ 


#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 

Forward characteristics

#### **Risk aversion**









#### **Objective function**

**Maximize** CVaR <sub>a</sub>(profit<sub>o</sub>)

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{CVaR}_{\alpha} = \zeta - \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \sum_{\omega=1}^{N_W} \pi_{\omega} \eta_{\omega} \\ & - \textit{profit}_{\omega} + \zeta - \eta_{\omega} \leq \mathbf{0} \\ & \eta_{\omega} \geq \mathbf{0} \end{aligned}$$


#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 

Forward characteristics

#### **Risk aversion**









#### **Objective function**

**Maximize** CVaR <sub>q</sub>(profit<sub>w</sub>)

$$\operatorname{profit}_{\omega} = \sum_{t=1}^{N_T} \pi_{\omega} \left( \lambda_{t\omega}^P P_{t\omega}^P T_t - C(P_{t\omega}^G) \right) + \sum_{c=1}^{N_C} \lambda_c P_c T_c + s_I \left( -M_I + P_I \sum_{t \in G_{\omega}} (\lambda_{t\omega}^P - \lambda_I) T_t \right)$$

 $\lambda_{t\omega}^P \to \text{Pool price}$ 

 $P_{t\omega}^P \to \text{Power sold in the pool}$ 

 $T_t \rightarrow \text{Duration of time period}$ 

#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 







#### **Objective function**

**Maximize** CVaR <sub>q</sub>(profit<sub>w</sub>)

$$\operatorname{profit}_{\omega} = \sum_{t=1}^{N_T} \pi_{\omega} \left( \lambda_{t\omega}^P P_{t\omega}^P T_t - C(P_{t\omega}^G) \right) + \sum_{c=1}^{N_C} \lambda_c P_c T_c + s_I \left( -M_I + P_I \sum_{t \in G_{\omega}} (\lambda_{t\omega}^P - \lambda_I) T_t \right)$$

 $C(\cdot) \rightarrow \text{Cost function}$ 

 $P_{t\omega}^G \to \text{Generated power}$ 

#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 







#### **Objective function**

**Maximize** CVaR <sub>a</sub>(profit<sub>o</sub>)

$$\operatorname{profit}_{\omega} = \sum_{t=1}^{N_T} \pi_{\omega} \left( \lambda_{t\omega}^P P_{t\omega}^P T_t - C(P_{t\omega}^G) \right) + \sum_{c=1}^{N_C} \lambda_c P_c T_c + s_I \left( -M_I + P_I \sum_{t \in G_{\omega}} (\lambda_{t\omega}^P - \lambda_I) T_t \right)$$

$$\operatorname{Pool} \quad \operatorname{Cost} \quad \operatorname{Forward}$$

 $\lambda_c \rightarrow$  Forward price

 $P_c \rightarrow$  Power sold through forward contract

 $T_c \rightarrow$  Forward contract duration

#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 







#### **Objective function**

Maximize CVaR q(profit<sub>o</sub>)

$$\operatorname{profit}_{\omega} = \sum_{t=1}^{N_T} \pi_{\omega} \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \lambda_{t\omega}^P P_{t\omega}^P T_t \\ r_{t\omega} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} C(P_{t\omega}^G) \\ cost \end{pmatrix} + \sum_{c=1}^{N_C} \lambda_c P_c T_c \\ \operatorname{Forward} + \left( S_I \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} -M_I + P_I \sum_{t \in G_{\omega}} (\lambda_{t\omega}^P - \lambda_I) T_t \\ r_{t\omega} \end{pmatrix} \right)}_{\operatorname{Insurance}}$$

#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 

$$s_I \rightarrow \text{Binary variable}$$
 $M_I \rightarrow \text{Initial premium}$ 
 $P_I \rightarrow \text{Insured power}$ 
 $t \in G_\omega \Leftrightarrow k_{t\omega} = \mathbf{0} \text{ and } \lambda_{t\omega}^P \geq \lambda_I$ 
 $\lambda_I \rightarrow \text{Strike price}$ 







**Objective function** 

**Maximize**  $CVaR_{\alpha}(profit_{\alpha})$ 

**Constraints** 

**Production unit limits** 

**Balance energy** 







#### **Objective function**

Maximize CVaR <sub>α</sub>(profit<sub>ω</sub>)

#### **Constraints**

**Production unit limits** 

**Energy balance** 

$$P_{t\omega}^{G} = \sum_{c \in F_{t}} P_{c} + P_{t\omega}^{P}$$

$$P_{t\omega}^{P} \geq (k_{tw} - 1) \sum_{c \in F_{t}} P_{c}$$







**Objective function** 

Maximize CVaR (profit)

**Constraints** 

**Production unit limits** 


**Energy balance** 

$$P_c \leq P_c^{\max}$$



### MODEL













Insurance?







- > Introduction
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- Case study
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- > 3 months
- 4 forward contracts (3 monthly and 1 quarterly)
- 1 Insurance contract
  - ▶ Premium: 100,000 €
  - Insured power: 75 MW
  - Strike price: 10 €/MWh
- 300 pool price scenarios reduced to 50
- 10,000 availability scenarios reduced to 200
- Generating unit
  - Pmax = 500 MW & Pmin = 50 MW
  - > Three FOR values: 0, 4 and 8%
  - Piecewise lineal cost function







FOR	$\alpha^{\mathbf{P}}$	Average $P_c$ (MW)	CVaR (/10 <sup>6</sup> €)
0%	0	0	11.7
<b>U</b> %	0.95	150	8.5
40/	0	0	11.2
4%	0.95	150	7.9
00/	0	0	10.7
8%	0.95	125	7.0

FOR	$\alpha^{P}$	Average $P_c(MW)$	CVaR (/10 <sup>6</sup> €)	SI
0%	0	0	11.7	0
0%	0.95	150	8.5	0
4%	0	0	11.2	0
470	0.95	150	8.0	1
00/	0	0	10.7	1
8%	0.95	150	7.4	1







#### **CVaR** Average **FOR** $P_c(MW)$ (/106 €) 11.7 0 0 0% 8.5 0.95 150 11.2 0 4% 0.95 150 7.9 10.7 0 0 8%

125

7.0

0.95

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Critical premium: the maximum amount that a producer is willing to pay in exchange for a given insurance contract.








Critical premium.

CVaR is a coherent risk measure:  $CVaR_{\alpha}(Y+c) = CVaR_{\alpha}(Y)+c$ 








Critical premium.

$$CVaR_{\alpha}(Y+c) = CVaR_{\alpha}(Y)+c$$




 $M_{\rm T}({\rm euro})$ 





### Critical premium.


 $CVaR_{\alpha}(Y+c) = CVaR_{\alpha}(Y)+c$ 



 $CVaR_1^P = CVaR_0^P - M_I$ 

Case 2 ( $s_I = 0$ ):

 $CVaR_2^P = CVaR_\infty^P$ 







### Critical premium.

$$CVaR_{\alpha}(Y+c) = CVaR_{\alpha}(Y)+c$$

Case 1 ( $s_I = 1$ ):

 $CVaR_1^P = CVaR_0^P - M_I$ 


Case 2 ( $s_I = 0$ ):

 $CVaR_2^P = CVaR_\infty^P$ 

 $CVaR_1^P = CVaR_2^P$ 

 $CVaR_0^P - M_I^{P*} = CVaR_\infty^P$ 


 $M_I^{P*} = CVaR_0^P - CVaR_\infty^P$ 

















#### **Producer**

$\alpha^{\mathbf{P}}$	<i>M</i> / <sup>P*</sup> (€)
0	173.275
0.3	196.166
0.5	214.615
0.9	358.210

$\alpha$ s	<i>M</i> <sub>/</sub> <sup>S*</sup> (€)
0	173.275
0.3	242.071
0.5	302.974
0.9	563.779

$$P_I = 75MW$$
  $\lambda_I = 10 \in /MWh$  FOR = 8%







#### **Producer**



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Stochastic programming








Insurance



**†** Futures market











Insurance

Producer

Risk







# Thank you!

# Questions?

www.uclm.es/area/gsee