Individual Study Project - Machines do not die - postmetaphysics through posthumanist philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This essay discusses posthumanism and speculative realism and their existence within the postmetaphysical traditions of the postmodernism. It analyses the sources of such changes in the modernist thought, and criticise these currents and their biases. The goal of this essay is a reaffirmation and a reading of the communicative reason that can allow for posthumanist developments. It also criticises the object/subject-oriented thinking, and rejections of correlationism in philosophy. This is to show the primary biases in such definitions, and thence offer a solution that will continue the task, and do not reject modernity and attempt to go beyond the dominance of the economical/sociological status quo in philosophy. This project looks into the modern writings into how death and limits of human being have been understood to find the aforementioned solution.

1. Introduction

One of the key elements of the modern era is the exponential technological development. It has been visibly determinant in the way of life since the application of the scientific methodology for production and development of new ideas. Then, these changes were used for the higher application of methodological structures of control in society. One of the main currents of thought that centre on technology and its implications is posthumanism. Their thought concentrates on how technology will allow humanity as species to go beyond the contemporary state and what are further results for metaphysics.

I want, therefore, to centre my essay on this connection (of modernity and posthumanism) as I see various issues in a movement that is dependent on the advancements of (post)modernity. To begin with, I want to discuss the elements of modernity that I consider to be sources of these currents and how these sources were partial to the developing power structures. In this, I wish to look firstly at the rising of bureaucracies - that being the dominance of the methodological approach for understanding and controlling the society. They are of import as elements of their approach, I suggest, were partial to the development of further thinking, including posthumanism. Furthermore, in this analysis, I want to look at the side results of the bureaucratic dominance in capitalism - the fall of religious transcendence, structuralism, and the linguistic turn. For this section, the highest import is structuralism as it focuses on the lack of essence in the material world. Thus, it lays a path towards the possibilities of posthumanism and other societies, a connection which I explicate in later sections of this essay.

To further my analysis, I will explicate the early elements of posthumanism and transhumanism and how it is connected with Nietzschean self-transcendence. Thus, I will also look at the conceptual frameworks of Dona Haraway's 'Cyborg Manifesto' (1991) as in my opinion it abandons such methodology and moves into ontologies and epistemologies of the posthuman. Both of these currents will show certain biases of posthumanism, and they will be also addressed. Both of these currents already are impacted by the forces from the prior section, as both are forms of critique of the remains of modernity and attempts at ascending it (within their epistemes).

The principal element of this essay and the core of the readings is the concept of postmetaphysics. Habermas in them manages to unify the majority of postmodern philosophical currents, and notice how their centring on the subject makes their philosophies to not understand the continuity of the Enlightenment. The value of this concept is further amplified as it considers the connection of the development of the society (that includes the aforementioned bureaucracies) and the development of philosophies of such culture. Furthermore, his thought offers a method of ascending the issues of postmetaphysics and silencing, that being the communicative rationality. From it, I will search for solutions for a posthumanism that does not silence and considers other identities.

My critique will also look at speculative realist movements, which are not explicitly posthumanist, but their epistemology and their roots are of posthumanism. Thus, their ways explicate the posthumanist metaphysics which, in my perspective, determine the subject-centredness and the attempts of intersubjectivity with the machine/object that is in itself immortal. I will mainly concentrate on writings of Quentin Meillassoux, as his criticism of correlationism also for noticing the central ontological tenets of the posthuman thought. Also, another concept that I will explicate and further critique is Harman's object-oriented ontology as it explicates how speculative realist philosophy attempts to create philosophies which are beyond the human perspective.

I wish to analyse and criticise this aim using the Kojeve's critique of the realist thinking, and also consider posthumanism within the Kojevian posthistoricity. I will, thenceforth, return to bureaucracies and the linguistic turn as both of these moves remove the temporal existence and use representations for creation of realities that are controllable but only within their frameworks. The communicative reason, thus, is what will allow for solving this issues as it affirms the human nature of philosophy, and notices that there are the goals of philosophy are the goals of humanity (i.e. the Enlightenment).

To close off, the works of Yukio Mishima and Leonid Andreyev allow for a creation of posthumanism that does not marginalise and subjectivise the human aspect of philosophy. I will attempt to allow physicality as the essential part of the communicative reason, and death as part of the physical experience that unites the basic philosophical dualism. I aim, thence, at offering a posthumanism which will allow for the fulfilment of the Enlightenment, and how technology is secondary in this struggle

This essay will give a comprehensive analysis and critique of posthumanism, and then offer a new model of posthumanist thought which is within the Habermas's perspective. I hope this will allow for a more just understanding of these developments, and knowing that technology itself will not allow for positive prospects. I believe that this future can only come from the fulfilment of the goals of Enlightenment and lack of silencing of the other as then we can go beyond the biased representations. Otherwise, the developments will be amplifications of the issues of modernity and even might delimit us from achieving this major task.

2. The Technological Bureaucracies

The main difference in the West after the early 19th century is the dominance of bureaucracy as the basic method of governance. This allowed for a much higher level of economic efficiency, and therefore pushed technological development even further (Weber, 1978:956-958). Weber considered bureaucracy as the greater administrative apparatus, which goal is to define the society. This apparatus is centred mainly on an economic result, as it is partial to the capitalist society. Henceforth, the prior distinctions are of a secondary nature. The definitions are impersonal and thus concentrate on the mass definition and not searching for particular traits but outlining the margins of society.

These modes of thinking and values which came from the Enlightenment contributed towards the ability to understand relations and predict events from the existing data. Thus, the religious affiliations were of lesser importance compared to the social organisation through the bureaucratic and labour factors.[1] I suggest then that the Marcusian 'One-dimensional man' was one of the results of these changes (2013:148-173). As these innovations were aimed at simplification, the identity of such person became also simplified. The feedback loops of bureaucracy reinforced these identities and created a further dependence on themselves.

These changes were contemporaneous with the development of new communication technologies, which quickly became a tool of bureaucracies. With the way of living becoming ubiquitous, the difference of knowledge and disproportions of control required more regulatory efficiency. The central invention of this period was the telegraph, as it allowed for interconnectedness and trading of **pure** information. The industrial society became also a technologico-bureaucratic society. I declare that these developments have continued further, and will be of matter in the understanding of the later issues in this essay.

The behaviour of power, henceforth, became more lifeless as the methodological approach dominated each of its elements. The administrative apparatus even subjugated the nature through, for example, the usage of ecology to transform it into comprehensible models (more worked upon in Zizek, 2008; Ely, 1988). Marx suggested that the process of creating new technologies is not limited by nature (1973). The nature for him was the source of wealth (1970) but the process of development of technology was a part of the **general intellect**. He considered this general intellect to be a major contradiction in capitalism, as it was open and not limited by the scarcity of resources. The copyright laws and bureaucratic control managed to subjugate this discourse. For example, Bill Gates's 'An open letter to hobbyists' (1976) attacked the general intellect behaviour, as it went against the profit interests.

2.1. The fall of classical/religious transcendence

The period's changes were not only limited to economy and technology. A deep philosophical rift was visible, as there was a critique of religion and of the implications of the existence of higher Being. As to understand posthumanism we must consider the aspects of humanism and transcendence that have changed during that period. I want to discuss the decline of transcendence as an acceptable argument or an axiom in philosophy and in the general society. The central philosopher for discussion of this development is Friedrich Nietzsche, as I consider his genealogical critique of metaphysics to be non-transcendental. His outlook was centred on a critique of idealism, and general avoidance of systematic thought (contrary to the post-Kantian outlook). He has stated the death of God as a past event, and the death of God is the implication of how society left the ways in which God was existent and not a matter of individual perception (Nietzsche, 1974:195-197).

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[1] expanded upon in 2.1

Similar can be seen in the process of secularisation. These developments were a result of exponential economic changes and the nature of the protestant soteriology. The predestination with the proof of faith managed to transform the religious performance into mainly labour-centred endeavour (Hughey, 1979). In the Weberian sense, all religions have economic results as they promote certain behaviours, but the protestant soteriology was unique in its affirmation of the accumulation of wealth. The religion, thence, became a part of the economic development and God was secularised for the economic changes. As the economy values the methodological approach, it is entirely related that the bureaucracies were partial in fall of the dominance of religious narratives in Western society.

We must remember that religious values in their materialist sense (i.e. ethical, economic) are still existent. For example, Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is primarily a critique of Christian morality (Risse, 2001). But in the case of death, it is difficult to talk of ethical values beyond cosmology and soteriology, which are both not concrete in capitalism. By that I return to Weber as these elements which were towards soteriology (i.e. puritan asceticism) were reinterpreted by future generations as elements towards the economic benefit (Hughey, 1979). At this point, we can consider that the religious death and transcendence became a secularised belief, which may exist on an individual basis but does not imply pressure on the society.

As can we see, the technological developments which started in the 19th century and highly developed by 20th were correlated with the fall of religion, the linguistic turn, and the changes of methodologies in philosophy. I consider that these changes created a rupture in thinking concerning the positions 'after death'. Critiques and reinterpretations of poststructuralists have further enhanced the issues as their suggestions did not offer any conclusive answers. Thus, the lack of religious post-death transcendence is still an issue and affects the way we conceive of the world and its limits. The transcendence in philosophy and the usage of God as proof (i.e. as in Descartes or Kantian noumenal) became superfluous, therefore, the issues surrounding religious deaths have only focused in the limited non-economic religious discourse, which is prone to change (as I have stated through Weber).

2.2. Anti-metaphysics of structuralism

The philosophical movement which was even of a greater difference than materialism was structuralism (Culler, 1998). Structuralism was outside of the mind/body debate, nor had an explicit critique of metaphysics, nor was a part of the positivist movement. de Saussure was not greatly concentrated on taking part in these discourses but wanted to create a comprehensive analysis of language. Thus, he created a negative network of interrelated meanings without the central origin (ibid). The language was the only point of focus, and his interpretations of languages 'pushed' linguistics onto the forefront of philosophy as the bulk of past critiques of metaphysics relied on their genealogies or their political irrelevancy (i.e. Nietzsche, Marx).

As stated by Gasparov (2013), the sources of de Saussure's views are difficult to trace, as he was a semiotician and not from a philosophical background. Gasparov in his analysis focuses on the relation of de Saussure to early romantic thinkers (Novalis, Schlegel, etc.). Thence, we are still within the bureaucratic spaces of the 19th century, which have been further improved at de Saussure. I consider that besides the linguistic suggestion of such thinkers (i.e. Fichtean Ich bin Ich (ibid)) the technological changes in the society were also affecting the perspective of de Saussure. The structuralist framework, in my opinion, resembles the highly advanced early 20th century bureaucracies with their communicative process. Thus, the transcendence which haws visible in the early Romanticism and the division between pure/practical reason was superfluous. The bureaucracy can only reign supreme through language (which also is its limitation).

Nonetheless, the non-metaphysics of de Saussure — despite their early Romantic inspirations — are influenced by bureaucracies and can be used for bureaucratic related activities. Such is evident in Hayoun's thesis (2019) and how non-essence in de Saussure amplifies (in my interpretation) the bureaucratic processes. The reflexive methodological approach is visible in the Saussurian structures as each meaning is in itself reflexive and without the central essence. It is a methodological approach to philosophy, all mirroring the bureaucratic behaviour. We must remember that non-essence in de Saussure was presential, and through the lack of antecedents allowed for Derrida's critique (1988). The presence is also existent in the bureaucratic apparatus as it always needs to refer to a concrete subject in its definitions.

I believe, therefore, that the grounding for the linguistic turn came not only from philosophy and semiotics but also from the bureaucracy and the technological developments. The suspension of

metaphysics in society expounded the notions of anti-metaphysics. We must remember that de Saussure had not discussed metaphysics in his work, but his methodology is based on the metaphysical statement of the negative definitions and the arbitrariness of the sign. Such notions are required for the understanding of the modern posthumanist and speculative realist movements, as they are affected by this framework and the technological sources of it.

2.3. The 'Lacano-Wittgensteinian turn'

The effects of structuralism and the language-focused thinking were most visible in Jacques Lacan and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The main connection that can be considered is their consideration of language as the source of issues in philosophy and psychology. The Real for Lacan was the primordial chaos in which no understanding or meaning was possible (2007). It was beyond the networks and unable to exist in the post-bureaucratic experience. Similar is visible in both early and late Wittgenstein, and expounded in the new Wittgenstein interpretation (Crary, 2000). It is one of the main points of unity in Wittgenstein's work. Wittgenstein is also a difficult thinker to analyse, as his influences beyond Russel and Frege were not openly visible and his method was much further from the past in similitude to de Saussure.

In my opinion, this is the reason for which both Lacan and Wittgenstein were considered anti-philosophers according to Alain Badiou (2011;2018). The concept of anti-philosophy is for me of great value in the reading of the changes in the metaphysics and humanism in the 20th century. Anti-philosophy is the criticism of the methodological biases of past philosophy and searching for the main reasons for such disruptions. This methodology must accept the risks and paradoxes, which otherwise in 'non-anti-philosophy' would disregard the points. Statements such as Wittgenstein's inability to ascend language (2001), and the 4 discourses of Lacan (Bracher, 1988)) are points which would be considered non-philosophical and inconsiderate in the 'standard' approaches.

These two figures are what grounded the linguistic turn in the continental philosophy, and due Wittgenstein's contribution to the Vienna Circle positivism morph into the modern analytic philosophy. They both created critiques of metaphysics, in which one is unable to consider **any** positive metaphysical definition which would be beyond the language-experience. More similitude is visible between later Wittgenstein and Lacan as the Wittgensteinian 'forms of life' are examples of the lack of the inability to point to the pure experience or non-compartmentalised reality (the Real).

Lacan considered himself an antiphilosopher (Badiou, 2018:96-7), and his psychoanalysis was an antiphilosophical practice, similarly to early Wittgenstein's quietism. We must remember that antiphilosophy is against the other philosophy (Johnston, 2010); that is why I examined de Saussure as anti-metaphysical and not anti-philosopher as there are few philosophical roots of his thought. In the case of Wittgenstein, we can look at the idealisation of mathematics and logical positivism (Badiou, 2011:120-4;134-7) and for Lacan (to put briefly) - *jouissance* 'philosophies' (Badiou, 145-55). We must recognise that these examples do not represent all kinds of philosophies these thinkers were against. Both such attempts were a discussion and critiques of contemporaries, but their points have effectively forced a philosophical reflection on the terms of the metaphysics.

The linguistic turn as formulated by Lacan and Wittgenstein was a detachment from past thought. Its antiphilosophical position forced the metaphysical study to be focused on presenting how language can offer statements. Hereto, I consider that in such reading the relation of a person to physical reality becomes lost, as the intersubjectivity can be reduced to a language game and a psychological predisposition. And both of these philosophies are still, in my opinion, realities of bureaucracies and technologies as both exist primarily through language.

3. The immortality of the technology

Technology's engagement with philosophy was becoming more apparent throughout the 20th century. Bostrom (2005) outlines the development of ideas and technological transcendence. In his short history, he offered an effective description of posthumanist thought. It is deeply embedded within the speculative fiction of various writers (e.g. Aldous Huxley and Isaac Asimov). The origins of transhumanism and not post-biological discussion can be put in the 1960-70s with writers such as Ettinger and FM-2030. His description does not mention ontologies and he utilises a nonmetaphysical approach.

The text lies in the climate of its era and there are valuable developments in post- and transhumanism past its publication. Also, as this history is mainly focused on the aforementioned technological perspective, there are other movements and currents I want to put pressure on. But with the points made by Bostrom, we can see the connection to the beforementioned arguments about bureaucracy affecting the way of thought. Similar applies to the changes of methods of discussion past the predominately secular ages. The term transhumanism came from an essay by Julian Huxley (1968), and the method it states the terms of transhumanism is through self-transcendence and has terms with both Nietzschean philosophy and the biological/technological advances. The discussion is divided into transhumanist and bioconservative definitions, and Bostrom's outline is in favour of the transhumanist perspective.

This correlation would not make a justified critique as there is no ontological regard for the intricacies of the posthumanism. The main methods of critique are through ethical and political regards, as for example Fukuyama's position in terms of maintaining the essential status quo and the effect on human dignity (2002). This form of critique (other examples also mentioned in Bostrom, 2005), in my opinion, is context-based and becoming less valid within changing terms. On such an account, I consider that a fair judgement of posthumanist philosophy can be done solely through the critique of ontology. The *technology* is studied in both cases as a neutral form, which is, in my opinion, often naturalised and its processes are considered in 'evolutionary' terms. Such is apparent in the constant reiteration of Moore's law (1965), and the consideration of the possibility of measuring 'technological development'.

Thus, I will give more focus to the movements which showcase the relation to technology, ontological statements, the impact of the aforementioned 19th century's strains of thought and the rejection of metaphysics[2]. The scientific/positivist approach obscures the methodologies, and as there has been a bulk of thinkers past the publication of Bostrom's history, they will require further explanation. Even in the case of writers which have been mentioned, I wish to look into their ideas as some of them are concerted on creating ontologies and epistemologies for posthumanism. The understanding of posthumanism (and as I reckon any philosophy) is dependent on understanding these axioms, as these axioms are what allows for various technological speculations, which thence create a will for these developments to occur.

3.1. The Cyborgs

The first transhumanist thinker who truly went beyond science-centred/technological terms was Donna Haraway (1991). Her goals were not about the supposed development of civilisation, nor the discussion of future technologies. Instead, she looked at transhumanism as a way of ascending the definitions and the limitations of nature in terms of gender and social relations. Her essay focuses on the feminist transhumanist aspect, but there is the attention given to epistemology which centres on non-essence through transhumanism.

> By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorised and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation.

This quote shows the temporal focus, and how cyborg theory is **primarily** of ontological matter, and it wants to decouple from science-focused movements as states in later parts of the essay. What she aims to achieve through such ontology is to liberate the gender definitions fro the patriarchal structures, through the lack of definite subject of the transhuman. Her ontology, thus, aims at a post-existentialist understanding as through lack of inherent meanings and inability to put the past distinctions into technological limitations.

The text studies the psychological position of the cyborg and the non-truthfulness of the earlier ontological gender structures. By that is implied that the cyborg is to be considered outside of frames of justice, definition, and the oedipal triangle. These all, in my opinion, point to one of the main contradictions of technological being - the lack of connection to the world but with existence in this world. By that, I return to the concept of 'immortality of the technology' as it implies that these structures appear to be beyond the current humanity; their imperfections can be understood are imperfections of the contemporary humanity.

In terms of non-essentiality, we can notice similarities of Haraway's ontology with that of structuralism. The non-essence, in my view, is achieved through the notion that these forms do not require

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[2] as defined by Habermas (1990:83-105), to be further discussed in 3.2.

reinforcement, and therefore, can be liberated from the general power structures and be able for a freer definition. We must remember that Donna Haraway works within the linguistic turn, as she manages to offer new definitions for the existing terms (161-162). These 'informatics' aim to deconstruct the 'natural' existence of the dominant categories. She does not focus on the material implications of such categories, as their dominance is for her mainly through these categories.

Consequently, we can deduce elements of her ontology and how technology affects her ontology. She mainly aims to attack the 'nature' as a term and deconstruct the general naturalist fallacy; a critique with which I fully agree, as I have mentioned with slow but true bureaucratisation of nature. Thence, it is true that society is far beyond nature, but I would not consider such development to by of a novel kind. The problem with Donna Haraway's theories, and as with later is their postmetaphysical notions, and how they utilise their non-human intersubjectivity to consider these structures as forms of critique of the status quo. The same applies to the technological 'wills' (i.e. positions of Bostrom, Ettinger, etc).

3.2. Postmetaphysics

[...] In science phenomena are traced back to more and more fundamental structures whose depth matches the range of explanatory theories; but these structures no longer stand within the referential network of a totality. They no longer throw light upon the individual's position in the cosmos, upon one's place within the architectonic of reason or within the system. Essences elude the knowledge of nature just as they elude the theory of natural law. With the methodological separation of the natural sciences and the humanities, the perspectival difference between outside and inside develops and replaces the difference between essence and appearance. [...] (Habermas, 1992:35)

A critique of a movement which is widely 'postmodern' in nature, in my opinion, requires a discussion of Habermasian postmetaphysics. The centre of Habermas's philosophical project is to study the dominance of post-Nietzschean critique of metaphysics and to attempt to find new forms of metaphysics accepting the changes of the 19th and 20th century. The contributions matter for posthumanist philosophy as they undertake the elemental forms of their analysis and comprehension of the thought and world disclosure past the linguistic turn. The element that makes postmetaphysics unique is that they manage to keep the philosophical enterprise through a rejection of subject-centred reason and Foucauldian episteme (which are widely assessed by Habermas, 1990:238-293).

Habermas as a pragmatician looks at the desubjectivising reason and considers that communication is what allows for the recuperation of metaphysics through postmetaphysics. The post-transcendental reasoning is the group reasoning as then the limitation of language can be abound through the communication, as then, one's limitations can be comprehended in the mutual understanding (1990:295-326). This overcoming is to show that there is a heart of reason which lies in the group effort. This opposes the self-transcendence notion, as individual perspective is unable to be concerned with all possible reason, and/or social development.

The Enlightenment/modernity for Habermas is not finished; he aims to continue the enlightenment project through the before-mentioned communicative reason in the postmetaphysical spectrum (Habermas, 1997). Therefore, he wants to use philosophy as an active critique of scientist and other dominant reasoning through their exclusiveness and being centred upon the positivist project. On the other hand, he attacks the postmodernist philosophy through the aforementioned subject centred reason. It is my contention that this is visible in posthumanism, as the technological development is dependent on the bureaucratic structures, which act through simplification of both subjects, and delimiting one's agency. Therefore, the communicative reason loses its power through the limitation of institutionalised technology and the control of the general intellect.

A thinker of which Habermas's critique matters for posthumanist is Bataille. Bataille's base materialism is Nietzschean subjectivity taken to the point at which the modernity is violently materialist, and thus one ought to self-transcend it through both rejection and aesthetical dominance (1990:209-237). The violence is supposed to envelop both fascism and socialism, and therefore, the will to power offers the sole way to be freed from this dichotomy. Habermas reaction to this is to criticise to subjective and a rejection of modernity, and consider such move as an aesthetical rejection of modernity and forcing general subjectivity

as the main term of action. This for Habermas goes against the postmetaphysical project, as such perspective does not allow for any form of general reason even past the economic limitations.

In 'The Future of Human Nature' (2003) Habermas has engaged with posthumanism. In similitude to Fukuyama, he primarily debates the questions of bioethics and dignity as the work was released in the period where the mainstream posthumanism was defended through such thought. The critique, is nonetheless, through the postmetaphysical perspective. He focuses on the genetic aspects and the issues of humans as species. Habermas also looks into the issue of species, which was visible in the work of the aforementioned Donna Haraway. For him, the ethical issues resulting from the 'liberal eugenics' are bound to create a new identity of the person and limit the communicative reasoning. Beyond health-based views, Habermas is partially a bioconservative as he recognises that the influence of current perspectives might create situations in which certain kinds of people would be barred from the realm of the living (2013:60-67).

In this analysis, thus, he (not explicitly) returns to his points on identity past modernity, as mentioned in this section's quote. The scientific reason considers phenomena to become essential and in such interpretation, the possibility for the development of human life appears to be limitless and leading towards a better and more just society. In my opinion, Habermas would disagree with such a point as it acts through marginalising notions of 'progress'. Hence, communicative reasoning becomes silenced as society develops through their temporal needs.

With such a perspective, I consider, the critique of the biological side of posthumanism can be concluded, as it does reject the visions of humanity and can easily become linked with the currents. This silencing is also visible in the way politics become aestheticised and become an aesthetic vision, which is of high importance for Habermas through Walter Benjamin. Posthumanist politics frequently become aestheticised in their relation to fiction, which will be studied in the further sections. The postmetaphysical thought sees that aesthetics can exist as a group endeavour. It rejects the notions of art for art, as they do not participate in communicative reasoning (Ingram, 1991).

Habermas's project offers a wide variety of positions which do critique posthumanist philosophies. Thus, I want to turn to later thinkers, which decouple from the biological debates of 20th and early 21st century and move onto the posthumanist reading past such elements. In these writers, as we will see, the dependence on the linguistic turn and bureaucratic organisation is more evident as they focus on technology as the root of their thinking. Personally, I view Habermas's position as the way of reading modern posthumanism as a visible rejection of modernity. Both his analysis of the linguistic turn and the post-Bataille postmodernism is a critique of methodologies of posthumanism which I will discuss in further points.

3.3. Speculative turn

The speculative turn caused a major change in the posthumanist thought. Instead of concentrating on the ethical side of the human change resulting in biotechnological changes, they had focused on the **post**human subject. They are primarily a part of the continental tradition, and they attempt to find the way for reason to get past anthropocentrism. This movement is difficult to homogenise, but they all are of import for posthumanism/postanthropocentrism. They also do reject the concept of idealist transcendence, and as suggested by Harman (2013:234):

> Instead of German Idealism, we could have had a "German Realism" that preserved finitude while denying its limitation to the human-world interaction. In other words, the surface agreement among Speculative Realists as to the harmful character of correlationism masks a deeper disagreement on what is wrong with the human-world correlate and how to address that wrong.

Then, we can comprehend their reading of Kant and how, then, they critique the modern philosophical outlook. They look at getting beyond the idealist and nominalist statements, and thus, suggesting not only materialist but a 'realist' ontology. They reject correlationism - the consideration for philosophy to reflect human thought (Golumbia, 2016). They overcome it through (i.e.) Harman's (2017:52-58) object-oriented ontology[3] and Meillassoux's (2010:39-40;79-81) principles of contingency and factiality. The 'speculation' in their thought is from the Kantian speculation, which then is a method of using the pure reason to envision the noumenal (Bryant, 2011). Thence, the realist focus allows for a framework which is upon itself considering humanity as a source of bias in philosophy. Their position attempts to go beyond such bi-

ases and allow for a solution to the aforementioned issues.

The earliest thinkers that can be considered a pre-speculative turn were Nick Land and CCRU (ibid). In them, we can see the major sources of the position, and the critique of human-focused reason. They were greatly inspired by science-fiction writing, and most of their works were in a theory-fiction style (i.e. Land, 2012), and thus, making a clear analysis of their conceptual frameworks difficult. The posthumanism in their thought is visible through accelerationism. It is a political concept which suggests that social change can be consciously affected, and the pressure of technology and its exponential development are essential in such a process (Williams, 2014). Thence a critique of social correlationism is visible, as it implies that the social change was limited by human apparatus and i.e. cognitive limitations.

I suggest that the movement is greatly influenced by the before-mentioned currents[4]. Their philosophy, insomuch as it seems to be separate, in my view, is a deification of bureaucracy and attempt at defining technology as the basis of world disclosure. The posthumanism of_Haraway is also visible, as the definition of species changes and thus the new speculative epistemologies/ontologies emerge. The movement is post-metaphysical as it attempts to be fully fallibilist in their statements, as all of them are based upon the anthropocentric and chronocentric biases (which their thought attempts to overcome).

3.3.1. Technological Infinitude

Meillassoux, in my opinion, offers the most lucid speculative realist position. His speculative materialism, insomuch as it is similar to other movements in the current, is more open with his with as he offers clear principles. Primarily, the principle of contingency is what determines the posthuman focus of his thought. His philosophical contingency is related to the Humean the contingency of the laws of nature and, thence, critiquing the Cartesian principle of sufficient reason (2010:121-128). For posthumanism, it causes the anthropocentric history to be disentangled from its development of nature. Thus, the definition of nature/technology becomes broken and all properties are particularised to kinds of contingent beings.

The contingency, thence, creates a visible link to structuralist arbitrariness of the sign. The arbitrariness of possible networks of meanings transforms into the general contingency of both epistemology and ontology. Henceforth, the freedoms created by Meillassoux are non-human freedoms, and so, the ethical issues arise through the nature of the non-contingent universe. The species of beings become species of understanding; contemporary human thinking becomes a singular methodology out of many. These contingencies are affecting the knowledge of the Absolute, therefore, they are creating species of the Absolute and their negatives (2010:50-55). Such is also evident in his understanding of time, and thus any change of metaphysics might occur in such Chaos. I consider these further extension of the arbitrariness of the sign, as all such understanding relies on the basic connection between structures of metameaning. What Meillassoux in my view posits is the radical structuralism which enables all such spaces to coexist and thence be freed from the dominant post-Kantian transcendental.

The primordial contingent chaos that Meillassoux offers is exemplified by the 'ancestral realm'. The ancestral realm in his definition is observable through the objects that existed in time outside of the human species transcendental perspective (i.e. stars) (2010:10-20). Hagglund (2011) in his critique focuses on this aspect of Meillassoux philosophy and analyses it through radical atheist Derridean lens. He concentrates on the eternity of the sign through hauntology, and the trace of the subject showing its continuous existence.

The constant contingency is resulting from the lack of the 'transcendental subject' and therefore, the subject which would stop the world from being contingent must be immortal. Henceforth, the matter of *spectral dilemma* is of great consequence, and Meillassoux considers it to be the root of the premodern theism. In the atheist world, he considers, that the noncontingency without the Absolute can only exist through immortality (2010:44-46;74-77). Hagglund attacks this through the fact that the spectral dilemma cannot be solved as the dominance of the past and the work of mourning are never limited.

As both of these thinkers utilise subject/object-centred postmetaphysical reasoning, I contend that the continuity and non-contingency are achievable through the communicative reason. The posthuman, in the understanding of Meillassoux, is superfluous for such understanding as the boundless subject will be unable to accept other spaces of meaning nor will participate in reason and will be able to act outside normative

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[3] hereby OOO

[4] from the section 2. and its subsections

ethics (2010:24-30). The post-Nietzschean materialism is still dominant in Meillassoux as he considers all modern laws through contingency and not through their effects and continuous existence. Henceforth, the suggestions of chronocentrism by Meillassoux are fallible as they attempt to do such critique within the chronocentric network. This new structuralism — which through acceptance of transcendence within the material realm — fully denies it as it is contingent. The chaotic materialism creates a world in which the validity of metaphysics is dependent on the validity of the subject's thought. Thus, the fallibility of all claims of Meillassoux's project is creating a false ontological safety. This safety is primarily formal and the praxis of it creates a high possibility of eternal dystopias as they are acceptable within such metaphysics.

3.4. No people

With a vision of what is meant by modern posthumanism and speculative realism, I want to put emphasis on the questions of the end of history and the intersubjective futures. Therefore, I wish to discuss the philosophy of Alexandre Kojeve with the reading of Groys (2016, 2019). Kojeve is generally skipped in the majority of readings of the history of philosophy, but in my opinion, he offers a methodology that highlights the issues within posthumanist movement resulting from their postmetaphysical approach.

Groys analysis, in my view, is essential for a complete comprehension of these issues. As he is primarily focused on aesthetics of thought, he stands in similitude to Harman's centring philosophy on aesthetics. Thence, the observation of Kojeve is not only limited to his body of writing, but also his body of photography, which acts as praxis (Groys, 2019). Kojeve's exemption of Western peoples from images shows the posthuman contemporary reality, as all bureaucratic institutions are already 'posthuman' in their action and act as species. I think that such qualification weakens the posthumanist argument, as the ontological side becomes a wish for the continuation of the bureaucratic status quo and becoming a violent extension of it into the bodily space. The attack on transcendence is partial to the end of history thought, as the postmetaphysical thinking is connected with the dominance of the Hegelian perspective.

How does this view connect to the issue of subject/object-centred metaphysics? Kojeve (1980:157) states the problem as such:

> For there to be "Realism" the concept (knowledge) must be opposed to the thing (the object). Now, it is only human or "subjective" knowledge that opposes itself to the object to which it is related, by being materialized outside of the object in discourse. But this "subjective" knowledge is by definition a knowledge that does not coincide with the object. Therefore, it is a false knowledge. The problem which calls for a "realist" solution, therefore, is the problem of error and not of truth.

Thus, we can see a clear separation between object/subject ontology. The end of history is not stated as the end of the existence of Man as a transcendental subject, but as the end of the human struggle. The difficulty with OOO as any ontology based on realist perspective has to overcome the stated predicament, which (in my view) is impossible to do. As all thinking is a form of human action, a philosophy which deems itself posthuman (in the sense of after human) thence attempts to redefine the subject into forms which it is not (Kojeve:157-60).

Furthermore, the same regards the relation to structuralism and arbitrariness of the sign/contingency in the 'bureaucratic' reflections. The issue of contingency itself is returning to the question of ability to comprehend data in the changing world. This is only likely in the framework of immortal technologies, as machines themselves and structures they are in are free from the hegemony of death. Consequently, the analysis which is intersubjective with the machine will aim at the post-death reality as machines are assumed to exist in such.

But it is reasonable to interpret the end of history as not the end of man, which is Kojeve's perspective. He suggests a view, that is compatible with the communicative reason of Habermas. The reality of the end of history is the reality of freedom and no limitations and of liberation from the will of nature. We must remember that the will of nature is not equivalent to nature itself. The will of nature is the capability of mean to act within the material limitations, and the reality past these limitations is the reality of true freedom. Thus, it is not posthuman, but it is posthistorical. Such is also a view of Marx about the dominance of the general intellect and the liberation from scarcity.

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Full comprehension of Kojevian/Hegelian perspective of posthumanism requires also an understanding of their definition of death. As in Kojeve's (1993) lecture, we can see that the 'anthropological philosophy of Hegel is the final analysis *a philosophy of death* (or, what is the same thing: of atheism)' (1903:321) and thus the human-centred thought which is against transcendence/past-transcendence **must** be death-centred. The finitude and contingency are the acceptances of various deaths, and the will towards a continuity past death is (in my perception) false consciousness. It is because of an implication that the overcoming of biological death captures the Hegelian metaphysical death.

Communicative reason also manages to deal away with such concern, as it does not reject death and is not based upon a realist framework. Henceforth, is it possible to posit a posthumanism which is not post-metaphysical, and is able to manage to the human subject in an ethical framework? I contend that such is viable, and I have already pointed to such possibilities (i.e. communicative general intellect). The machines are primarily a result of human action and cannot be trusted for future understanding. The accelerative principle implies that the capabilities of technology can overcome the will of nature but I suggest all such overcoming is based upon the intersubjectivity to an object. I propose the contrary, and I aim at an antiposthumanist theory that exists within the communicative principle and is not centred on object nor subject.

4. The continuous mortalities: discussion

Master Mo Zi said: "Those who condemn something must have the means of changing it. To condemn something without having the means to change it is like fighting water with water or fire with fire. Their theories will certainly not be admissible." (Johnston, 2010)

Henceforth, how can we supplement an idea of (anti-)posthumanism that will not ignore the aforementioned issues, nor use simplified human subject? The question lies in metaphysics of posthumanism and not the ethics, as the ethical side will come forward through the ontology. I consider that the solution to these issues must be looked upon outside of the Western thought, as — insomuch as I follow Enlightenment ideas — the problems mentioned by the speculative realists are still not void. The correlationism, that is the unity of epistemology and ontology is much less visible in the non-Western strains of thought.

Then, I suggest looking into writings of Yukio Mishima as they were affected by the same historical forces as Kojeve, and were greatly impacted by the modernist change in Japan. To add to this, Mishima's homosexuality and the active participation in the Japanese society in the imperial period shows how these two negating identities could coexist and offer a valuable perspective on the experience for the modernist subject. Mishima's thinking has been influenced by Japanese Buddhism and the changes it has gone through during the before-mentioned era (Inose, 2013:192-218;681-688).

I can only focus on his sole translated non-fiction work, that being 'Sun and Steel' (2003). In it, similarly to Bataille's perspective, the base materiality is evident but — in a difference to Bataille — he considers that this materiality can be transcended through the physical struggle. This paradox, he assumes, comes from the essential difference between writing and physical experience, which (in his experience) were in a great divide. For him, the death was the final proof of existence as the unity was came through a cessation that extended to these both agencies (2003:47-50).

This critique liberates posthumanism from the technological and bureaucratic perspective, as subject leaving these networks is what makes their existence paradoxically real. Thus, the (computable) simplification becomes a falsity, as it was unable to comprehend the negative existence of a subject, nor the extent of suffering and the human duality of being. The cybernetic comprehension reduces these elements within the linguistic/data spectrum and uses an efficient approximation to consider such a reality. On the other hand, Mishima's perspective is greatly influenced by Nietzschean self-transcendence.

In the case of Mishima, this self-transcendence is not a matter of uniqueness and critique of society as it lies in the individual's physicality (2003:36-42). The transcendence is not within the material system, but through the affirmation of idealist perspective onto the phenomenal world. Thenceforth, this perspective allows for the communicative reason as all possible peoples will be affected by the will of death and extinguishing. And as death shows the final supremacy of the idealist perspective as the realist view ceases to have an impact on one's cessation of Being.

Mishima considered that all that the greatness of physical action was through the clear ability of communal perspective (2003:80-90). Also, he wanted such to be more evident in the literature. The

literature, in his view, was always a singular effort and creating an illusion of an author able to represent the reality of its era. In this, I notice a will towards the communicative reason, as then the social effort would not silence nor delimit groups and allow for a modernist reality which gets nearer to the absolute (Wagenaar, 1975). The absolute, which is unachievable through text. The dedication of both language and body to the public constituted the heroism as one could lose their apparent identity in these circumstances.

Nonetheless, the Nietzschean influence of Mishima is greatly visible, and he has still similar fascistic tendencies to Bataille. The unique elements of his project are what allows for overcoming of issues in posthumanism and allowing for a return to the transcendental in its concrete form. The loss of identity is what allows for liberation from the modernist structures, and accordingly an ability to overcome the realist predicament. Thence, we are left with the remaining epistemology of the posthuman and the human limitations contra immortality.

4.1. The Lazarus paradox

Leonid Andreyev in his short story 'Lazarus' (2015) shows the result of the cessation of the death as a transcendental event. In it, he tells the aftermath of the biblical story and explicates that the awareness of death is all that allows for a motivation for the living. The perspective, thus, implicates the psychological repression of immortality as a taboo. Paradoxically, breaking this taboo, in the story, does not result at the end of mourning as implied by Meillassoux's resolve of the spectral dilemma, but it causes dismay at each person experiencing such phenomenon.

In the reading of Kirn (2018), Lazarus in the short stories exemplifies the mood of 1905 in Russia in the 'revolutionary defeat'. The materiality of suffering after the death-event is never free, and the overcoming of death creates an infinite goal at hand, which never could be attained nor fulfilled. I imply, that this predicament is the nature of all posthumanist futures as then the inability of fulfilment, and existence past death is burdened with the physical darkness and lack of reference to the mortal past.

The paradox, in my opinion, results from the nature of lack of reference to post-death. The overcoming of death can only exist in the abstract and not in the concrete, as the concrete reality is beyond the aforementioned simplification. In this, we can return to Hagglund's analysis and how the mourning of death can continue beyond the death itself, as the human being is never beyond the mortal grasps through its lack of pre-existence. As there is no pre-existence, there cannot be a post-existence which would be an active form of being. The active existence must be explicated through the perspective of finitude as then the economies of the living can exist in relation to the human past.

4.2. Posthumanity in the communicative reason

The task left now is to outline what ontology can lead to a fair future. The correlationism is, in my opinion, necessary for any ethical ontology. The connection between epistemology and ontology allows for a consistent argument which cannot dissolve into nihilism nor fascism. This is a result of the equalisation of phenomena and the trust in these perspectives, as through the trust we can develop trust towards the other. Only in such a system, the communicative reason is possible, as then the discourse does not silence.

The computable simplifications work through silencing, and thus any ontology which considers that the model can be without biases is wrongful. The anthropocentrism in philosophy cannot be considered purely negatively as all philosophy is done through a human lens. Humans as species are capable of ethical action, but this ethical action must be defined for humans as otherwise, it would become obscure. Even a critique of the categories of 'the animal' (e.g. Derrida, 2008) is dependent on the human reason. It is a cognitive limitation which is inescapable as evident through the aforementioned Kojeve's analysis. The reformation of categories allows for continuation and expansion of the Enlightenment and finding the inconsistencies which bar the truth.

But these changes not through denying one's humanity but becoming-human of other species of beings, and reading them as human and thence limited. The end of man is not the end of the concept of the human but its full extension. The finitude is what allows for just treatment of beings, and such can occur in the before-mentioned position. The posthumanist concepts achieve the negative of this perspective as they consider the human transcendental as an illusion and a contingency. Therefore, the human predicament will never be left as it is a determinant in readings, and thence, I suggest that we ought to use a positive

humanist view.

This perspective is necessary for the communicative reason as it does not silence the past thinking through its issues. Discoursive methods allow for finding the heart of the argument and understanding one's motives. And the more motives are known, more knowledges are possible and it is possible to analyse and critique them. The non-being of pre-existence and post-existence/ancestral realms is unanalysable and cannot participate in this reasoning, and it is injust to use the pure concept of non-being to attack being. The trace is existent, but trace does participate in the postmetaphysical communicative reason in forms of speech-acts as no person constitutes the absolute. I consider that one must be aware that the communicative reason cannot be bound by limitations of the linguistic turn, as in such a reading, we return to the simplifications and do not accept the finitudes.

Mishima's experiential critique of language as the sole origin of thought shows how the melancholic function of language causes the reality to become distorted and, thence, further from the transcendental. The language and bureaucracies are only capable of representations, models which are unable to show reality and even the aforementioned linguistic completeness cannot go beyond such an understanding. Fractal nature of our reality must include the silence and the unrepresentable which exists in the unspoken and can be only seen in the negative.

The unspoken and the silenced are the pitfall of postsecular posthumanism. It always works on the implication that the representation will be full, but their biases show how the representation cannot be full. Thus, there cannot be a model which will represent the truth and the absolute as both come from the negative space of language and have no economic value. Tha Lazarus paradox shows how these remains of the past can return to economy and politics but their activity in post-existence is base, and show the ends of the communicative rationality. These Beings are recreated in each of the systems through the posthumanist apparatus, but cannot be as biases and economic focus will create reality on the base of efficiency. The recreations of them become definite (as in terms of immortal transhumans, singularities, etc.) and become simulations of negative concepts.

I think the inability of change of the posthuman world is what shows how their ontologies are far from being ultimate. Aidnik (2017) shows ow the task of the dominance of the human exists as long as there is a possibility of ending the *interregnum* and achieving a better society[5]. The communicative reason is, in my view, the only way of overcoming such interregnum as the posthumanism attempts to continue the bureaucratic goal of full efficiency. The posthistorical Kojevian Mischzeit exists as the implication of the dominance of this reality exists in the West. We must remember that in his photos of non-West, Kojeve photographed people and considered, thus, that the historical development is existent.

Posthuman in the communicative reason can only, therefore, exist through the inclusion of realities and ending the subjugation of the general intellect. Then, the definition of technology might change to allow for these developments in the ethical sense, but such can only occur after the achievement of global agreement of humanity and creation of non-silencing values. Thus, the technology can return, but this technology will be far from the structuralist systems which silence and control and hence are impossible to understand through intersubjectivity. Will towards acceleration shows how the technological focus of speculative realism considers that capitalism can fail through its full development, but in my belief, such will only increase the efficiency of the before-mentioned systems. The Mischzeit and the injustices will end in the period in which the communicative rationality will end the silencing and the egalitarian mission of the Enlightenment is fulfiled.

5. Conclusion

The posthumanity has been created upon premises of progress and development but these premises were (at the start) concerned solely with the positivist definition. With the development and bigger influence of these issues, the requirement of higher philosophical precision came about. But this precision, in my opinion, has shown the central issue of posthumanism: transcendence through subjectivity with the machine. This premise permeates all the elements of speculative realism and posthumanism as it shows a continuous relation to a concrete (seemingly) immortal being.

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[5] 'These are times in which the old and familiar ways of doing things have ceased to work and the new that is supposed to replace the old has not yet emerged or has not yet been recognized' (Aidnik, 2017, p. 8)

Developments of 19th-20th century capitalism created a predicament in which this has occurred. Bureaucratic definitions of society, have treated as objects and as forms of life which can be defined and predicted. This methodology and the rising computing power allowed for effective networks of representations which are independent of the real factual state. Nietzschean self-transcendence, henceforth, in the speculative realist focus becomes a parody of itself as it is a self-transcendence as a representation. Singular nature of the experience is a falsity and partial to the bureaucratic discourse.

Structuralist impact also was of matter for posthumanist thinking, and in my opinion, is one of the main sources of the postmetaphysical aspects of speculative realist currents. For them, the lack of original meaning allows for redefinitions and considerations of new societies liberated from the preexistent conditions. Structures are of variables, and thus, can be changed into any model of relation that is possible. This is in my opinion, a move which can easily silence and be used towards control. This move, also, is the reason for which the bioconservative positions of Fukuyama and Habermas attack trans/posthumanism. It is of interest, that it is even more pronounced in the speculative realist thinking which enhances the connection of their metaphysics to the biology-focused transhumanism.

But as stated before, these movements are connected to philosophical currents which are far from being delinked from the past and are forms of critique of past forms of control. But, as bureaucracy is considering the dead as non-elements and mistakes in the system, their ideas are, I hold, parts of the status quo. The posthistorical condition is dependent upon the reading of man as a species, and if enforced it causes a delimitation of the human into such statements. For the communicative reason, humanism is of import as it considers that the voice of a person can offer unique perspectives which can go beyond the representations and, thus, offer the truth in the group vision.

Common rationality which does affirm physicality, in my view, allows for overcoming of both fascism and subject-orientation as the group reality is outside of the silencing and does not attempt to reject the basic humanism and the Enlightenment. Then, the limitations of the representations are witnessable, as the interrelations which have been silenced are given a voice. In this, I do not offer a return to Luddism, as in my view, such just slows down the technological development and never bars it. I suggest, then, that technology is partial to human development but it must not be a blueprint onto which humanity is redefined.

By this, I reiterate my critiques of speculative realism and how the intersubjectivity with an object can change into an attempt of creating a form of subjective knowledge. Such a subjective knowledge is of the most violent kind, as it disguises itself as a knowledge which is outside of the human perspective, and suggests that it participates in more global knowledges which imply non-humanity. But, the human focus of all philosophy bars such radical change as the traces of humanity will dominate all thinking, and, in my opinion, all technology. These mirror elements of human experience which are representable but are incapable of giving a true holistic perspective. I suggest, that the perspective can be only achieved through the aforementioned communicative rationality.

To close off, the goal of this essay was to comprehend the postmetaphysics of posthumanism. The main factor of these is the focus on representations and structures of these representations. These are context-based, as I have stated, and are an amplification of the elements of the contemporary experience. They cannot overcome postmodernity as they are products of the postmodern condition. We cannot overcome this condition by utilisation of the elements of this experience but search for ways in which are parts of human experience and not only partial to the contemporaneity. Only such philosophy, can allow for the inclusion of all human voices, and then, understanding of humans as species which would allow for a just posthumanism.

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