

Name: Samiksha Dharmadhikari


ld: 1001740496

Task 1: Observing HTTP Request.

In this task we need to get familiar with the HTTP header live tool. We need to install this add on to our firefox browser. We also need to start the apache service through the terminal. We capture the POST and GET requests when we login into the Elgg website and this snapshot is given below. Being it a big file i have added only 2 screenshots which show the GET and POST methods. But in GET the data / parameters are attached to the url whereas in POST the data/ parameters are placed in the data field of the HTTP request.









Task 2: CSRF Attack using GET Request

In this task there are 2 people, Alice and Boby. Boby wants to be added to the friend list of alice without alice letting know.


First we need to know the id of Boby which is 43, we get it by adding him as a friend by alice and checking its http header.




Further we see that alice has no friends.




We write a program index.html such that if it is executed then boby becomes alice's friend automatically.



We execute index.html:




We can observe that boby is in alice's friend list.





Task 3: CSRF Attack using POST Request

Here in this task we need to modify the victims profile information and our victim is alice. Alice's profile is initially empty.



We need to write a program index2.html which after executing the alice's profile will have changes. This program will use the POST method to include the parameters in the HTTP header body.






Question 1: The forged HTTP request needs Alice's user id (guid) to work properly. If Boby targets Alice specifically, before the attack, he can find ways to get Alice's user id. Boby does not know Alice's Elgg password, so he cannot log into Alice's account to get the information. Please describe how Boby can solve this problem.

There are 2 ways boby can do this

- 1. He can add alice as a friend and check the http live header, which will display http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=42
- 2. Bob can go into members and use inspect elements to get the id of alice.



Question 2: If Boby would like to launch the attack to anybody who visits his malicious web page. In this case, he does not know who is visiting the web page beforehand. Can he still launch the CSRF attack to modify the victim's Elgg profile? Please explain.

No boby cannot launch the CSRF attack to anybody who visits this malicious web page because user id for each user is different. And only if the user id of logged in user and the id specified in the webpage match the attack will be successful. To perform attacks on other users, we need to change the user id in the web page.

Task 4: Implementing a countermeasure for Elgg

Here we need to turn on the countermeasures of elgg against CSRF. We do this by commenting the return true statement in the ActionsService.php which can be seen below.

We then create an index.html page which will attack the victim's description to edit his profile description. And we give its link in a blog post of alice.


Then we login as boby and click on this blog post link. We get redirected to the profile page of boby which is not modified in its description. We have added the token and timestamp with each request. Here it is checked if the values are valid in the current user session with the user.

Therefore secret token validation fails if we perform the attack when the countermeasure is turned on because it identifies it as a cross site request and not request from user.

```
0
                   public function gatekeeper($action) {
    return true;
                             if (Saction === 'login') {
    if (Sthis->validateActionToken(false)) {
        //return true;
}
                                         Stoken = get_input('_elgg_token');
Sts = (int)get_input('_elgg_ts');
if (Stoken && Sthis->validaterOokenFinestamp(Sts)) {
    // The tokens are present and the time looks valid: this is probably a mismatch due to the
    // loght form being on a different domain.
    register_error(_elgg_services()->translator->translate('actiongatekeeper:crosssitelogin'));
                                                    forward('login', 'csrf');
                                         // let the validator send an appropriate msg
$this->validateActionToken();
                             } else if ($this->validateActionToken()) {
    return true;
                             forward(REFERER, 'csrf');
                  f^{\star\star} . Was the given token generated for the session defined by session_token?


    @param string Stoken CSRF token
    @param int Stimestanp Unix tine
    @param string Ssession_token Session-specific token
                     * @return bool
* @access private
                  return _elgg_services()->crypto->areEqual($token, $required_token);
                   /**
* Generate a token from a session token (specifying the user), the timestamp, and the site key.
                     * @see generate_action_token
                    * Aparam int Stimestamp Univ timestamp
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             PHP ▼ Tab Width: 8 ▼ Ln 332, Col 33 ▼ INS
```






** (gedit:29006): WARNING **: Set document metadata failed: Setting attribute me tadata::gedit-encoding not supported

** (gedit:29006): WARNING **: Set document metadata failed: Setting attribute me tadata::gedit-position not supported [04/03/20]seed@VM:-\$





References:

- https://github.com/aasthayadav/CompSecAttackLabs/blob/master/8.%20CSRF%20AttackLabs/blob/master/8.%20CSRF%20Attack.pdf
- Have also referred the lab description provided.