


ClickJacking

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Clickjacking

- An interface-based attack
- Tricks a user into clicking a webpage element
 - Is invisible or disguised as another element
 - What is achieved?
 - Can unwittingly download malware
 - Visit malicious web pages
 - Provide sensitive information
 - Purchase products online etc
 - Launch other attacks like XSS



Variants

- Likejacking: Like button is manipulated causing users to “like” a page without intending
 - E.g facebook or twitter post
- Cursorjacking: change position of cursor
 - Relies on vulnerabilities in **Flash** which have now been fixed!

Attack-1

- Redirect users to other pages via Exploiting user's mouse clicks

```
<a onMouseUp=window.open("http://www.malicious.com")  
href="http://www.trusted.com/">Claim your gift coupon!</a>
```

- onMouseUp is a javascript function
- mouseup event: Occurs when a mouse button is released after being pressed down over an element
- window.open() function in JavaScript opens a new browser window or tab with a specified URL

- Why redirect?
 - Help increase traffic to a website can result in higher search engine ranking!
 - Facilitate drive-by-download
 - exploits vulnerabilities in the web browser or browser plugins (such as Adobe Flash or Java), or operating system

Attack-2

- Steal login credentials
- Any site can frame another site via **HTML frames**
- If an attacker frames a bank website in his website, and victim enters credentials, who gets the bank login information ?
 - Bank due to **same-origin policy**

- Malicious site frames good site
 - Login box of good site is framed by another **invisible** frame
 - Victim sees login of good site and enters login
 - But entered login goes to invisible frame of malicious-site!

Iframe Demo

- Embedding links
- Positioning
- Opacity
- Z-index

```

<head>
  <style>
    #top-evil {
      position:relative;
      width:128px;
      height:200px;
      opacity:0.0001;
      z-index:2;
    }
    #bottom-victim {
      position:absolute;
      width:200px;
      height:300px;
      z-index:1;
    }
  </style>
</head>
<!-- ... -->
<body>
  <iframe id="bottom-victim"
src="https://www.example.com">
  </iframe>
  <div id="top-evil">
    ...Attacker has to include relevant login fields
    and align properly via styling...
  </div>

</body>

```

Construction

- **z-index** determines the stacking order
 - Vulnerable site is bottom, attacker site on top
 - Elements with a higher z-index will be placed on top of elements with a lower index
- Evil site **opacity** → make it **transparent** (0.0 or close to 0)
- Evil site position so that there is precise overlap of the actions with the victim website
 - Managed using appropriate width and height position value
 - Absolute and relative positions ensure proper overlap regardless of screen size, browser type and platform


Like Jacking



Opacity: 0%; invisible Facebook frame is on top of it



Opacity: 50%; frame is visible



Multistep Click Jacking

- Hijacking one click is relatively easy
- To realize some attacks may need multiple clicks on same or different pages
 - E.g To trick a user into changing email address
 - Email address and password has to be typed in page1
 - “Yes” has to be clicked to confirm change in page2
- Attacker may need to design some activity/game to lure user to click on multiple positions
 - These attacks require considerable precision to be effective!

Point to Note

- Invisible frames (evil frame on top) will not allow users to interact with the bottom frame
→ user may get suspicious
 - Attacker can make top frame small and use it to only cover the relevant portion

Cursorjacking

- Deceives user by using a fake but more prominent cursor
 - Can be made to move via `javascript` to resemble real cursor
- Fake cursor points to something desirable (win a gift coupon!) while real cursor points to something malicious (download malware)
- User thinks he is clicking fake cursor but is clicking real cursor

Example

- <http://koto.github.io/blog-kotowicz-net-examples/cursorjacking/>

Defense: **Frame Busting Script**

- Earlier days, no support from browsers against this attack
- Web developers wrote Javascript code to avoid being framed by others!
 - E.g. **check and enforce that the current application window is the main or top window**

- Sample code:

```
if (self !== top) {top.location = self.location; }
```

- If a page is in an iframe, `windows.top` and `windows.self` will be different (else same)
 - If page displayed is being farmed by another website, above code redirects the entire browser window to the same page outside of that frame
- Javascript protection is not reliable
 - e.g. if a user disabled javascript in browser, no protection possible!
- Outdated defense, no longer used!

Defense: X-Frame-Options

- Best protection: **Server** tells browser what to do
- Originally introduced as an unofficial response header in Internet Explorer 8
 - Rapidly adopted within other browsers
- Header is used to control whether a browser should be allowed to render a page in a <frame>, <iframe>, <embed>, or <object>.

- **X-Frame-Options: DENY**
 - Tells browser not to render the page in a frame under any circumstances
 - Page **cannot be embedded** in any other site
- **X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN**
 - Allows page to be framed only by pages from the same origin (i.e., the same domain)
- **X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM URI**
 - Allows the current page to be displayed in a frame, but only in a specific URI
 - E.g. X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM <https://trustedsite.com>

- In **apache**, this can be configured as

```
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
```

Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"

```
</IfModule> (or)
```

```
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
```

Header always set X-Frame-Options ALLOW-FROM

<https://example.com>

```
</IfModule>
```

(mod_headers is an Apache HTTP Server module; helps manipulate/add HTTP headers in the **server's responses**)

Limitations

- To enable SAMEORIGIN option across a website, X-Frame-Options header needs to be returned with every HTTP response for each individual page
 - Does not apply cross-site by default
- X-Frame-Options does not support a whitelist of allowed domains
- ALLOW-FROM option is not supported by all browsers
- X-Frame-Options is a deprecated option in most browsers

Defense: Content Security Policy (CSP)

- Can protect against clickjacking also
- Incorporate frame-ancestors directive
- frame-ancestors 'none'
 - Same as X-Frame-Options deny directive
- frame-ancestors 'self'
 - Prevents framing altogether
 - Equivalent to X-Frame-Options sameorigin directive

HTTP header

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; style-src 'self'
https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com; **frame-ancestors** 'self';

- CSP is more flexible
 - Can specify multiple domains and use wildcards
 - E.g. frame-ancestors 'self' https://example.com
https://*.robust-website.com
- CSP also validates each frame in the parent frame hierarchy
 - X-Frame-Options only validates the top-level frame.

Clickjacking + XSS

- Historically, clickjacking has been used mostly to do like jacking!
- Clickjacking combined with XSS can lead to powerful attack!
- XSS exploit is combined with iframe target URL
 - User clicks button/link, executes XSS attack!

Clickjacking vs CSRF

- Clickjacking: user is required to perform an action such as a button click
 - Not mitigated through **CSRF token**
- CSRF: forge an entire request without the user's knowledge or input

Real Life Examples

- Clickjacking at ylands.com:
<https://hackerone.com/reports/405342>
- Clickjacking with reflected XSS:
<https://hackerone.com/reports/1221942>

Summary

- Tricks a user into clicking a webpage element or entering some data
 - Redirect to other links, steal credentials, like comments/tweets etc
 - Managed via iframe opacity, z-index and javascript
 - Clickjacking + XSS can lead to powerful attacks
- Defenses: Frambuster, X-Frame-Options, CSP (frame-ancestors)
 - CSP is the latest and best option

References

- <https://portswigger.net/web-security/clickjacking>
- Computer Security: A Hands-on Approach by Wenliang Du, 2022
<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=DI8szwEAC>