
Data Mining and Machine Learning in Cybersecurity

Sumeet Dua and Xian Du





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Preface

In the emerging era of Web 3.0, securing cyberspace has gradually evolved into a critical organizational and national research agenda inviting interest from a multidisciplinary scientific workforce. There are many avenues into this area, and, in recent research, machine-learning and data-mining techniques have been applied to design, develop, and improve algorithms and frameworks for cybersecurity system design. Intellectual products in this domain have appeared under various topics, including machine learning, data mining, cybersecurity, data management and modeling, and privacy preservation. Several conferences, workshops, and journals focus on the fragmented research topics in this area. However, transcendent and interdisciplinary assessment of past and current works in the field and possible paths for future research in the area are essential for consistent research and development.

This interdisciplinary assessment is especially useful for students, who typically learn cybersecurity, machine learning, and data mining in independent courses. Machine learning and data mining play significant roles in cybersecurity, especially as more challenges appear with the rapid development of information discovery techniques, such as those originating from the sheer dimensionality and heterogeneous nature of the network data, the dynamic change of threats, and the severe imbalanced classes of normal and anomalous behaviors. In this book, we attempt to combine all the above knowledge for a single advanced course.

This book surveys cybersecurity problems and state-of-the-art machine-learning and data-mining solutions that address the overarching research problems, and it is designed for students and researchers studying or working on machine learning and data mining in cybersecurity applications. The inclusion of cybersecurity in machine-learning research is important for academic research. Such an inclusion inspires fundamental research in machine learning and data mining, such as research in the subfields of imbalanced learning, feature extraction for data with evolving characteristics, and privacy-preserving data mining.

Organization

In Chapter 1, we introduce the vulnerabilities of cyberinfrastructure and the conventional approaches to cyber defense. Then, we present the vulnerabilities of these conventional cyber protection methods and introduce higher-level methodologies that use advanced machine learning and data mining to build more reliable cyber defense systems. We review the cybersecurity solutions that use machine-learning and data-mining techniques, including privacy-preservation data mining, misuse detection, anomaly detection, hybrid detection, scan detection, and profiling detection. In addition, we list a number of references that address cybersecurity issues using machine-learning and data-mining technology to help readers access the related material easily.

In Chapter 2, we introduce machine-learning paradigms and cybersecurity along with a brief overview of machine-learning formulations and the application of machine-learning methods and data mining/management in cybersecurity. We discuss challenging problems and future research directions that are possible when machine-learning methods are applied to the huge amount of temporal and unbalanced network data.

In Chapter 3, we address misuse/signature detection. We introduce fundamental knowledge, key issues, and challenges in misuse/signature detection systems, such as building efficient rule-based algorithms, feature selection for rule matching and accuracy improvement, and supervised machine-learning classification of attack patterns. We investigate several supervised learning methods in misuse detection. We explore the limitations and difficulties of using these machine-learning methods in misuse detection systems and outline possible problems, such as the inadequate ability to detect a novel attack, irregular performance for different attack types, and requirements of the intelligent feature selection. We guide readers to questions and resources that will help them learn more about the use of advanced machine-learning techniques to solve these problems.

In Chapter 4, we provide an overview of anomaly detection techniques. We investigate and classify a large number of machine-learning methods in anomaly detection. In this chapter, we briefly describe the applications of machine-learning methods in anomaly detection. We focus on the limitations and difficulties that encumber machine-learning methods in anomaly detection systems. Such problems include an inadequate ability to maintain a high detection rate and a low false-alarm rate. As anomaly detection is the most concentrative application area of machine-learning methods, we perform in-depth studies to explain the appropriate learning procedures, e.g., feature selection, in detail.

In Chapter 5, we address hybrid intrusion detection techniques. We describe how hybrid detection methods are designed and employed to detect unknown intrusions and anomaly detection with a lower false-positive rate. We categorize the hybrid intrusion detection techniques into three groups based on combinational methods. We demonstrate several machine-learning hybrids that raise detection accuracies in

the intrusion detection system, including correlation techniques, artificial neural networks, association rules, and random forest classifiers.

In Chapter 6, we address scan detection techniques using machine-learning methods. We explain the dynamics of scan attacks and focus on solving scan detection problems in applications. We provide several examples of machine-learning methods used for scan detection, including the rule-based methods, threshold random walk, association memory learning techniques, and expert knowledge-rule-based learning model. This chapter addresses the issues pertaining to the high percentage of false alarms and the evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness of scan detection.

In Chapter 7, we address machine-learning techniques for profiling network traffic. We illustrate a number of profiling modules that profile normal or anomalous behaviors in cyberinfrastructure for intrusion detection. We introduce and investigate a number of new concepts for clustering methods in intrusion detection systems, including association rules, shared nearest neighbor clustering, EM-based clustering, subspace, and informatics theoretic techniques. In this chapter, we address the difficulties of mining the huge amount of streaming data and the necessity of interpreting the profiling results in an understandable way.

In Chapter 8, we provide a comprehensive overview of available machine-learning technologies in privacy-preserving data mining. In this chapter, we concentrate on how data-mining techniques lead to privacy breach and how privacy-preserving data mining achieves data protection via machine-learning methods. Privacy-preserving data mining is a new area, and we hope to inspire research beyond the foundations of data mining and privacy-preserving data mining.

In Chapter 9, we describe the emerging challenges in fixed computing or mobile applications and existing and potential countermeasures using machine-learning methods in cybersecurity. We also explore how the emerging cyber threats may evolve in the future and what corresponding strategies can combat threats. We describe the emerging issues in network monitoring, profiling, and privacy preservation and the emerging challenges in intrusion detection, especially those challenges for anomaly detection systems.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Many of the nation's essential and emergency services, as well as our critical infrastructure, rely on the uninterrupted use of the Internet and the communications systems, data, monitoring, and control systems that comprise our cyber infrastructure. A cyber attack could be debilitating to our highly interdependent Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) and ultimately to our economy and national security.

Homeland Security Council

National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007

The ubiquity of cyberinfrastructure facilitates beneficial activities through rapid information sharing and utilization, while its vulnerabilities generate opportunities for our adversaries to perform malicious activities within the infrastructure.* Because of these opportunities for malicious activities, nearly every aspect of cyberinfrastructure needs protection (Homeland Security Council, 2007).

Vulnerabilities in cyberinfrastructure can be attacked horizontally or vertically. Hence, cyber threats can be evaluated horizontally from the perspective of the attacker(s) or vertically from the perspective of the victims. First, we look at cyber threats vertically, from the perspective of the victims. A variety of adversarial agents such as nation-states, criminal organizations, terrorists, hackers, and other malicious users can compromise governmental homeland security through networks.

^{*} Cyberinfrastructure consists of digital data, data flows, and the supportive hardware and software. The infrastructure is responsible for data collection, data transformation, traffic flow, data processing, privacy protection, and the supervision, administration, and control of working environments. For example, in our daily activities in cyberspace, we use health Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and the Internet (Chandola et al., 2009).

For example, hackers may utilize personal computers remotely to conspire, proselytize, recruit accomplices, raise funds, and collude during ongoing attacks. Adversarial governments and agencies can launch cyber attacks on the hardware and software of the opponents' cyberinfrastructures by supporting financially and technically malicious network exploitations.

Cyber criminals threaten financial infrastructures, and they could pose threats to national economies if recruited by the adversarial agents or terrorist organizations. Similarly, private organizations, e.g., banks, must protect confidential business or private information from such hackers. For example, the disclosure of business or private financial data to cyber criminals can lead to financial loss via Internet banking and related online resources. In the pharmaceutical industry, disclosure of protected company information can benefit competitors and lead to market-share loss. Individuals must also be vigilant against cyber crimes and malicious use of Internet technology.

As technology has improved, users have become more tech savvy. People communicate and cooperate efficiently through networks, such as the Internet, which are facilitated by the rapid development of digital information technologies, such as personal computers and personal digital assistants (PDAs). Through these digital devices linked by the Internet, hackers also attack personal privacy using a variety of weapons, such as viruses, Trojans, worms, botnet attacks, rootkits, adware, spam, and social engineering platforms.

Next, we look at cyber threats horizontally from the perspective of the victims. We consider any malicious activity in cyberspace as a cyber threat. A cyber threat may result in the loss of or damage to cyber components or physical resources. Most cyber threats are categorized into one of three groups according to the intruder's purpose: stealing confidential information, manipulating the components of cyberinfrastructure, and/or denying the functions of the infrastructure. If we evaluate cyber threats horizontally, we can investigate cyber threats and the subsequent problems. We will focus on intentional cyber crimes and will not address breaches caused by normal users through unintentional operations, such as errors and omissions, since education and proper habits could help to avoid these threats.* We also will not explain cyber threats caused by natural disasters, such as accidental breaches caused by earthquakes, storms, or hurricanes, as these threats happen suddenly and are beyond our control.

1.1 Cybersecurity

To secure cyberinfrastructure against intentional and potentially malicious threats, a growing collaborative effort between cybersecurity professionals and researchers from institutions, private industries, academia, and government agencies has engaged in

^{*} We define a normal cyber user as an individual or group of individuals who do not intend to intrude on the cybersecurity of other individuals.




Figure 1.1 Conventional cybersecurity system.

exploiting and designing a variety of cyber defense systems. Cybersecurity researchers and designers aim to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information management systems through various cyber defense systems that protect computers and networks from hackers who may want to intrude on a system or steal financial, medical, or other identity-based information.*

As shown in Figure 1.1, conventional cybersecurity systems address various cybersecurity threats, including viruses, Trojans, worms, spam, and botnets. These cybersecurity systems combat cybersecurity threats at two levels and provide network- and host-based defenses. Network-based defense systems control network flow by network firewall, spam filter, antivirus, and network intrusion detection techniques. Host-based defense systems control upcoming data in a workstation by firewall, antivirus, and intrusion detection techniques installed in hosts.

Conventional approaches to cyber defense are mechanisms designed in firewalls, authentication tools, and network servers that monitor, track, and block viruses and other malicious cyber attacks. For example, the Microsoft Windows® operating system has a built-in Kerberos cryptography system that protects user information. Antivirus software is designed and installed in personal computers and cyberinfrastructures to ensure customer information is not used maliciously. These approaches create a protective shield for cyberinfrastructure.

However, the vulnerabilities of these methods are ubiquitous in applications because of the flawed design and implementation of software and network

^{*} The three requirements of cybersecurity correspond to the three types of intentional threats: confidentiality signifies the ability to prevent sensitive data from being disclosed to third parties; integrity ensures the infrastructure is complete and accurate, and availability refers to the accessibility of the normal operations of cyberinfrastructures, such as delivering and storing data.

infrastructure. Patches have been developed to protect the cyber systems, but attackers continuously exploit newly discovered flaws. Because of the constantly evolving cyber threats, building defense systems for discovered attacks is not enough to protect users. Higher-level methodologies are also required to discover the embedded and lurking cyber intrusions and cyber intrusion techniques, so that a more reliable security cyberinfrastructure can be utilized.

Many higher-level adaptive cyber defense systems can be partitioned into components as shown in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 outlines the five-step process for those defense systems. We discuss each step below.

Data-capturing tools, such as Libpcap for Linux®, Solaris BSM for SUN®, and Winpcap for Windows®, capture events from the audit trails of resource information sources (e.g., network). Events can be host-based or network-based depending on where they originate. If an event originates with log files, then it is categorized as a host-based event. If it originates with network traffic, then it is categorized as a network-based event. A host-based event includes a sequence of commands executed by a user and a sequence of system calls launched by an application, e.g., send mail. A network-based event includes network traffic data, e.g., a sequence of internet protocol (IP) or transmission control protocol (TCP) network packets. The data-preprocessing module filters out the attacks for which good signatures have been learned.

A feature extractor derives basic features that are useful in event analysis engines, including a sequence of system calls, start time, duration of a network flow, source IP and source port, destination IP and destination port, protocol,




Figure 1.2 Adaptive defense system for cybersecurity.

number of bytes, and number of packets. In an analysis engine, various intrusion detection methods are implemented to investigate the behavior of the cyberinfrastructure, which may or may not have appeared before in the record, e.g., to detect anomalous traffic. The decision of responses is deployed once a cyber attack is identified. As shown in Figure 1.2, analysis engines are the core technologies for the generation of the adaptation ability of the cyber defense system. As discussed above, the solutions to cybersecurity problems include proactive and reactive security solutions.

Proactive approaches anticipate and eliminate vulnerabilities in the cyber system, while remaining prepared to defend effectively and rapidly against attacks. To function correctly, proactive security solutions require user authentication (e.g., user password and biometrics), a system capable of avoiding programming errors, and information protection [e.g., privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM)]. PPDM protects data from being explored by data-mining techniques in cybersecurity applications. We will discuss this technique in detail in Chapter 8. Proactive approaches have been used as the first line of defense against cybersecurity breaches. It is not possible to build a system that has no security vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities in common security components, such as firewalls, are inevitable due to design and programming errors.

The second line of cyber defense is composed of reactive security solutions, such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs). IDSs detect intrusions based on the information from log files and network flow, so that the extent of damage can be determined, hackers can be tracked down, and similar attacks can be prevented in the future.

1.2 Data Mining

Due to the availability of large amounts of data in cyberinfrastructure and the number of cyber criminals attempting to gain access to the data, data mining, machine learning, statistics, and other interdisciplinary capabilities are needed to address the challenges of cybersecurity. Because IDSs use data mining and machine learning, we will focus on these areas. Data mining is the extraction, or "mining," of knowledge from a large amount of data. The strong patterns or rules detected by data-mining techniques can be used for the nontrivial prediction of new data. In nontrivial prediction, information that is implicitly presented in the data, but was previously unknown is discovered. Data-mining techniques use statistics, artificial intelligence, and pattern recognition of data in order to group or extract behaviors or entities. Thus, data mining is an interdisciplinary field that employs the use of analysis tools from statistical models, mathematical algorithms, and machinelearning methods to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets, which are useful for finding hackers and preserving privacy in cybersecurity.

Data mining is used in many domains, including finance, engineering, biomedicine, and cybersecurity. There are two categories of data-mining methods: supervised and unsupervised. Supervised data-mining techniques predict a hidden function using training data. The training data have pairs of input variables and output labels or classes. The output of the method can predict a class label of the input variables. Examples of supervised mining are classification and prediction. Unsupervised data mining is an attempt to identify hidden patterns from given data without introducing training data (i.e., pairs of input and class labels). Typical examples of unsupervised mining are clustering and associative rule mining.

Data mining is also an integral part of knowledge discovery in databases (KDDs), an iterative process of the nontrivial extraction of information from data and can be applied to developing secure cyberinfrastructures. KDD includes several steps from the collection of raw data to the creation of new knowledge. The iterative process consists of the following steps: data cleaning, data integration, data selection, data transformation, data mining, pattern evaluation, and knowledge representation, as described below.

- Step 1. During data cleaning, which is also known as data cleansing, noise and irrelevant data are removed from the collection.
- *Step 2.* Data integration combines data from multiple and heterogeneous sources into one database.
- *Step 3*. Data-selection techniques allow the user to obtain a reduced representation of the data set to keep the integrity of the original data set in a reduced volume.
- Step 4. In data transformation, the selected data is transformed into suitable formats.
- Step 5. Data mining is the stage in which analysis tools are applied to discover potentially useful patterns.
- Step 6. Pattern evaluation identifies interesting and useful patterns using given validation measures.
- Step 7. In knowledge representation, the final phase of the knowledge-discovery process, discovered knowledge is presented to the users in visual forms.

Data-mining techniques are used to aid in the development of predictive models that enable a real-time cyber response after a sequence of cybersecurity processes, which include real-time data sampling, selection, analysis and query, and mining peta-scale data to classify and detect attacks and intrusions on a computer network (Denning, 1987; Lee and Stolfo, 1998; Axelsson, 2000; Chandola et al., 2006; Homeland Security Council, 2007). Learning user patterns and/or behaviors is critical for intrusion detection and attack predictions. Learning these behaviors is important, as they can identify and describe structural patterns in the data automatically and theoretically explain data and predict patterns. Automatic and theoretic learning require complex computation that calls for abundant machine-learning algorithms. We will discuss the concept of machine learning in Section 1.3.

1.3 Machine Learning

Learning is the process of building a scientific model after discovering knowledge from a sample data set or data sets. Generally, machine learning is considered to be the process of applying a computing-based resource to implement learning algorithms. Formally, machine learning is defined as the complex computation process of automatic pattern recognition and intelligent decision making based on training sample data.

Machine-learning methods can be categorized into four groups of learning activities: symbol-based, connectionist-based, behavior-based, and immune system-based activities. Symbol-based machine learning has a hypothesis that all knowledge can be represented in symbols and that machine learning can create new symbols and new knowledge, based on the known symbols. In symbol-based machine learning, decisions are deducted using logical inference procedures. Connectionist-based machine learning is constructed by imitating neuron net connection systems in the brain. In connectionist machine learning, decisions are made after the systems are trained and patterns are recognized. Behavior-based learning has the assumption that there are solutions to behavior identification, and is designed to find the best solution to solve the problem. The immune-system-based approach learns from its encounters with foreign objects and develops the ability to indentify patterns in data. None of these machinelearning methods has noticeable advantages over the others. Thus, it is not necessary to select machine-learning methods based on these fundamental distinctions, and within the machine-learning process, mathematical models are built to describe the data randomly sampled from an unseen probability distribution.

Machine learning has to be evaluated empirically because its performance heavily depends on the type of training experience the learning machine has undergone, the performance evaluation metrics, and the strength of the problem definition. Machine-learning methods are evaluated by comparing the learning results of methods applied on the same data set or quantifying the learning results of the same methods applied on sample data sets. The measure metrics will be discussed in Section 2.2.4. In addition to the accuracy evaluation, the time complexity and feasibility of machine learning are studied (Debar et al., 1999). Generally, the feasibility of a machine-learning method is acceptable when its computation time is polynomial.

Machine-learning methods use training patterns to learn or estimate the form of a classifier model. The models can be parametric or unparametric. The goal of using machine-learning algorithms is to reduce the classification error on the given training sample data. The training data are finite such that the learning theory requires probability bounds on the performance of learning algorithms. Depending on the availability of training data and the desired outcome of the learning algorithms, machine-learning algorithms are categorized into supervised learning and unsupervised learning. The first two groups include most machine-learning applications in cybersecurity. In supervised learning, pairs of input and target output are given to train a function, and a learning model is trained such that the output of the function can be predicted at a minimum cost. The supervised learning methods are

categorized based on the structures and objective functions of learning algorithms. Popular categorizations include artificial neural network (ANN), support vector machine (SVM), and decision trees.

In unsupervised learning, no target or label is given in sample data. Unsupervised learning methods are designed to summarize the key features of the data and to form the natural clusters of input patterns given a particular cost function. The most famous unsupervised learning methods include *k*-means clustering, hierarchical clustering, and self-organization map. Unsupervised learning is difficult to evaluate, because it does not have an explicit teacher and, thus, does not have labeled data for testing.

We will discuss a number of classic machine-learning methods in Chapter 2. Readers who are familiar with this topic may skip that material.

1.4 Review of Cybersecurity Solutions

A number of surveys and review articles have focused on intrusion detection technologies (Debar et al., 1999; Axelsson, 2000; Homeland Security Council, 2007; Patcha and Park, 2007) or data mining in specific applications (Stolfo et al., 2001; Chandola et al., 2006). Hodge and Austin (2004) categorized anomaly detection techniques in statistics, neural networks, machine learning, and hybrid approaches. Meza et al. (2009) highlighted important cybersecurity problems such as cybersecurity for mathematical and statistical solutions. Siddiqui et al. (2008) categorized data-mining techniques for malware detection based on file features and analysis (static or dynamic) and detection types. Lee and Fan (2001) described a data-mining framework for mining audit data using IDSs.

In Section 1.4.1, we provide a broad structural review of the uses of machine learning for data mining in cybersecurity in the past 10 years. Besides the traditional intrusion detection (adaptive defense system) technologies, we also review proactive cybersecurity solutions. We focus on PPDM, which is designed to protect data from being explored by machine learning for data mining in cybersecurity applications. Scan detection, profiling, and hybrid detection are added to the traditional misuse and anomaly detection technologies in reactive security solutions.

1.4.1 Proactive Security Solutions

Traditionally, proactive security solutions (Canetti et al., 1997; Barak et al., 1999) are designed to maintain the overall security of a system, even if individual components of the system have been compromised by an attack.

Recently, the improvement of data-mining techniques and information technology brings unlimited chances for Internet and other media users to explore new information. The new information may include sensitive information and, thus, incur a new research domain where researchers consider data-mining algorithms from the viewpoint of privacy preservation. This new research, called PPDM

Table 1.1 Examples of PPDM

Data-Mining Techniques	Privacy-Preservation Methods	References
A.1 Statistical methods	Heuristic-based	Du et al. (2004)
A.2 Bayesian networks (BNs)	Reconstruction-based	Wright and Yang (2004)
A.3 Unsupervised clustering algorithm	Heuristic-based	Vaidya and Clifton (2003)
A.4 Association rules	Reconstruction-based	Evfimievski et al. (2002)
A.5 ANNs	Cryptography-based	Barni et al. (2006)
A.6 Decision tree	Cryptography-based	Du and Zhan (2002), Agrawal and Srikant (2000)
A.7 k-nearest neighbor (KNN)	Cryptography-based	Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004)
A.8 SVM	Reconstruction-based	Yu et al. (2006)

Note: The privacy-preservation techniques, the most important techniques for the selective modification of the data, are categorized into three groups: heuristic-based techniques, cryptography-based techniques, and reconstruction-based techniques (see details in Verykios et al., 2004).

(Agrawal and Srikant, 2000; Verykios et al., 2004), is designed to protect private data and knowledge in data mining. PPDM methods can be characterized by data distribution, data modification, data-mining algorithms, rule hiding, and privacy-preservation techniques. We categorize the principle PPDM methods in Table 1.1 according to machine-learning algorithms for data mining and present their privacy-preservation methods. We discuss these methods in Chapter 8.

At this point in its research history, PPDM algorithms are developed for individual various machine-learning methods. The PPDM algorithms include privacy-preserving decision tree (Chebrolu et al., 2005), privacy-preserving association rule mining (Evfimievski et al., 2002), privacy-preserving clustering (Vaidya and Clifton, 2003), and privacy-preserving SVM classification (Yu et al., 2006) (see Table 1.1). We address PPDM and its application studies in Chapter 8.

1.4.2 Reactive Security Solutions

Since the principles of intrusion detection were first introduced by Denning in 1987, large numbers of reactive security systems have been developed. Such systems include RIPPER (Lee and Stolfo, 2000), EMERALD (Porras and Neumann, 1997),

MADAM ID (Lee and Stolfo, 2000), LERAD (Mahoney and Chan, 2002), and MINDS (Chandola et al., 2006).

Cyber intrusion is defined as any unauthorized attempt to access, manipulate, modify, or destroy information or to use a computer system remotely to spam, hack, or modify other computers. An IDS intelligently monitors activities that occur in a computing resource, e.g., network traffic and computer usage, to analyze the events and to generate reactions. In IDSs, it is always assumed that an intrusion will manifest itself in a trace of these events, and the trace of an intrusion is different from traces left by normal behaviors. To achieve this purpose, network packets are collected, and the rule violation is checked with pattern recognition methods. An IDS system usually monitors and analyzes user and system activities, accesses the integrity of the system and data, recognizes malicious activity patterns, generates reactions to intrusions, and reports the outcome of detection.

The activities that the IDSs trace can form a variety of patterns or come from a variety of sources. According to the detection principles, we classify intrusion detection into the following modules: misuse/signature detection, anomaly detection algorithms, hybrid detection, and scan detector and profiling modules. Furthermore, IDSs recognize and prevent malicious activities through network- or host-based methods. These IDSs search for specific malicious patterns to identify the underlying suspicious intent. When an IDS searches for malicious patterns in network traffic, we call it a network-based IDS. When an IDS searches for malicious patterns in log files, we call it host-based IDS.

1.4.2.1 Misuse/Signature Detection

Misuse detection, also called signature detection, is an IDS triggering method that generates alarms when a known cyber misuse occurs. A signature detection technique measures the similarity between input events and the signatures of known intrusions. It flags behavior that shares similarities with a predefined pattern of intrusion. Thus, known attacks can be detected immediately and realizably with a lower false-positive rate. However, signature detection cannot detect novel attacks. Examples of data mining in misuse detection are listed in Table 1.2. We address misuse detection techniques in Chapter 3.

1.4.2.2 Anomaly Detection

Anomaly detection triggers alarms when the detected object behaves significantly differently from the predefined normal patterns. Hence, anomaly detection techniques are designed to detect patterns that deviate from an expected normal model built for the data. In cybersecurity, anomaly detection includes the detection of malicious activities, e.g., penetrations and denial of service. The approach consists of two steps: training and detection. In the training step, machine-learning

Table 1.2 Examples of Data Mining and Machine Learning for Misuse/Signature Detection

Technique Used	Input Data Format	Levels	References
B.1 Rule-based signature analysis	Frequency of system calls, off line	Host	Lee et al. (1999)
B.2 ANN	TCP/IP data, offline	Host	Ghosh and Schwartzbard (1999), Cannady (1998)
B.3 Fuzzy association rules	Frequency of system calls, online	Host	Abraham et al. (2007b), Su et al. (2009)
B.4 SVM	TCP/IP data, offline	Network	Mukkamala and Sung (2003)
B.5 Linear genetic programs (LGP)	TCP/IP data, offline	Network	Mukkamala and Sung (2003), Abraham et al. (2007a,b), Srinivas et al. (2004)
B.6 Classification and regression trees	Frequency of system calls, offline	Host	Chebrolu et al. (2005)
B.7 Decision tree	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Kruegel and Toth (2003)
B.8 BN	Frequency of system calls, offline	Host	Chebrolu et al. (2005)
B.9 Statistical method	Executables, offline	Host	Schultz et al. (2001)

techniques are applied to generate a profile of normal patterns in the absence of an attack. In the detection step, the input events are labeled as attacks if the event records deviate significantly from the normal profile. Subsequently, anomaly detection can detect previously unknown attacks. However, anomaly detection is hampered by a high rate of false alarms. Moreover, the selection of inappropriate features can hurt the effectiveness of the detection result, which corresponds to the learned patterns. In extreme cases, a malicious user can use anomaly data as normal data to train an anomaly detection system, so that it will recognize malicious patterns as normal. Examples of data mining in anomaly detection are listed in Table 1.3. We will address anomaly detection techniques in Chapter 4.

Table 1.3 Examples of Data Mining and Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection

	1	1	T .
Technique Used	Input Data Format	Levels	References
C.1 Statistical methods	Sequences of system calls, offline	Host	Ye et al. (2001), Feinstein et al. (2003), Smaha (1988), Ye et al. (2002)
C.2 Statistical methods	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Yamanishi and Takeuchi (2001), Yamanishi et al. (2000), Mahoney and Chan (2002, 2003), Soule et al. (2005)
C.3 Unsupervised clustering algorithm	TCP/IP data, offline	Network	Portnoy et al. (2001), Leung and Leckie (2005), Warrender et al. (1999), Zhang and Zulkernine (2006a,b)
C.4 Subspace	TCP/IP data offline	Network	Li et al. (2006)
C.5 Information theoretic	TCP/IP, online	Network	Lakhina et al. (2005)
C.6 Association rules	Frequency of system calls, online	Host	Lee and Stolfo (1998), Abraham et al. (2007a,b), Su et al. (2009), Lee et al. (1999)
C.7 Kalman filter	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Soule et al. (2005)
C.8 Hidden Markov model (HMM)	Sequences of system calls, offline	Host	Warrender et al. (1999)
C.9 ANN	Sequences of system calls, offline	Host	Ghosh et al. (1998, 1999), Liu et al. (2002)
C.10 Principal component analysis (PCA)	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Lakhina et al. (2004), Ringberg et al. (2007)
C.11 KNN	Frequency of system calls, offline	Host	Liao and Vemuri (2002)
C.12 SVM	TCP/IP data, offline	Network	Hu et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2005)

Technique Used	Input Data Format	Levels	References
D.1 Correlation	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Ning et al. (2004), Cuppens and Miège (2002), Dain and Cunningham (2001a,b)
D.2 Statistical methods	Sequences of system calls, offline	Host	Endler (1998)
D.3 ANN	Sequences of system calls, offline	Host	Endler (1998)
D.4 Association rules	Frequency of system calls, online	Host	Lee and Stolfo (2000)
D.5 ANN	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Ghosh et al. (1999)
D.6 Random forest	TCP/IP data, online	Network	Zhang and Zulkernine (2006a,b)

Table 1.4 Examples of Data Mining for Hybrid Intrusion Detection

1.4.2.3 Hybrid Detection

Most current IDSs employ either misuse detection techniques or anomaly detection techniques. Both of these methods have drawbacks: misuse detection techniques lack the ability to detect unknown intrusions; anomaly detection techniques usually produce a high percentage of false alarms. To improve the techniques of IDSs, researchers have proposed hybrid detection techniques to combine anomaly and misuse detection techniques in IDSs. Examples for hybrid detection techniques are listed in Table 1.4. We address hybrid detection techniques in Chapter 5.

1.4.2.4 Scan Detection

Scan detection generates alerts when attackers scan services or computer components in network systems before launching attacks. A scan detector identifies the precursor of an attack on a network, e.g., destination IPs and the source IPs of Internet connections. Although many scan detection techniques have been proposed and declared to be able to detect the precursors of cyber attacks, the high false-positive rate or the low scan detection rate limits the application of these solutions in practice. Some examples of scan detection techniques are categorized in Table 1.5. We address scan and scan detection techniques in Chapter 6.

1.4.2.5 Profiling Modules

Profiling modules group similar network connections and search for dominant behaviors using clustering algorithms. Examples of profiling are categorized in Table 1.6. We address profiling techniques in Chapter 7.

Table 1.5 Examples of Data Mining for Scan Detection

Technique Used	Granularity	Levels	References
E.1 Statistical methods	Batch	Both	Staniford et al. (2002a,b)
E.2 Rule-based	Batch	Both	Staniford-Chen et al. (1996)
E.3 Threshold random walk	Continues	Host	Jung et al. (2004)
E.4 Expert knowledge—rule based	Batch	Network	Simon et al. (2006)
E.5 Associative memory	Continuous	Network	Muelder et al. (2007)

Table 1.6 Examples of Data Mining for Profiling

Technique Used	Input Data Format	Levels	References
F.1 Association rules	Set of network flow, offline	Network	Apiletti et al. (2008)
F.2 Shared nearest neighbor clustering (SNN)	Set of network flow, offline	Network	Ertöz et al. (2003), Chandola et al. (2006)
F.3 EM-based clustering	Set of network flow, offline	Network	Patcha and Park (2007)
F.4 Subspace	Set of network flow, offline	Network	Lakhina et al. (2004), Erman et al. (2006)
F.5 Information theoretic	Set of network flow, offline	Network	Xu et al. (2008)

1.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have introduced what we believe to be the most important components of cybersecurity, data mining, and machine learning. We provided an overview of types of cyber attacks and cybersecurity solutions and explained that cyber attacks compromise cyberinfrastructures in three ways: They help cyber criminals steal information, impair componential function, and disable services. We have briefly defined cybersecurity defense strategies, which consist of proactive and reactive solutions.

We highlighted proactive PPDM, and the reactive misuse detection, anomaly detection, and hybrid detection techniques. PPDM is rising in popularity as

operative computation and data sharing in cyber space creates more concerns about privacy leaks, and misuse detection, anomaly detection, and hybrid detection techniques compose many IDSs. Misuse detection methods attempt to match test data with the profiled anomalous patterns, while anomalous detection solutions profile normal patterns to search for outliers. Hybrid detection systems combine misuse and anomalous detection techniques to improve the detection rate and reduce the false-alarm rate. In addition, we discuss two specific research areas in cybersecurity: scan detection and network profiling. Scan detection is used to detect the precursor of attacks, such that its use can lead to the earlier deterrence of attacks or defenses. Profiling networks facilitate the administration and monitoring of cybersecurity through extraction, aggregation, and visualization tools.

1.6 Further Reading

Throughout this book, we assume that the readers are familiar with cyberinfrastructures, with network intrusions, and with elementary probability theory, information theory, and linear algebra. Although we present a readable product for readers to solve cybersecurity problems using data-mining and machine-learning paradigms, we will provide further reading that we feel is related to our content to supplement that basic knowledge.

The resources in the areas of data mining and machine learning in cyber security are rich and rapidly growing. We provide a succinct list of the principal references for data mining, machine learning, cybersecurity, and privacy. We also list related books at the end of this chapter for readers to access the related material easily. In the later chapters of the book, we list readings that address the specific problems corresponding to the chapter topics. Our general reading list follows. If you are familiar with the material, you can skip to Chapter 2.

The key important forums on cybersecurity include the ACM International Conference on Computer Security (S&P), the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, the International Conference on Security and Management, the ACM Special Interest Group on Management of Data (SIGMOD), the National Computer Security Conference, the USENIX Security Symposium, the ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), the International Conference on Security in Communication Networks, the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, the International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, the National Information Security Conference, and the Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

The most important data-mining conferences include ACM Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, ACM Special Interest Group on Management of Data, Very Large Data Bases, IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, ACM Special Interest Group on Information Retrieval, IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering, International Conference on Database Theory, and Extending Database Technology.

The most important machine-learning conferences include *American Association* for AI National Conference (AAAI), (NIPS), (IJCAI), CVPR, and ICML.

The most important journals on cybersecurity include ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Journal of Computer Security, and the International Journal of Information Security.

The most important journals on data mining and machine learning include IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Learning, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, IEEE Transactions on Computers, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, Machine Learning Journal, Journal of Machine Learning Research, Neural Computation, Pattern Recognition, and *Pattern Recognition Letters*.

We list a number of books that contain complementary knowledge in data mining, machine learning, and cybersecurity. These books provide readable and explanatory materials for readers to access.

Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd edition), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2009.

Stephen Northcutt and Judy Novak, Network Intrusion Detection (3rd edition), New Riders, Indianapolis, IN, 2003.

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Richard O. Duda, Peter E. Hart, and David G. Stork, Pattern Classification (2nd edition), Wiley, New York, 2001.

Christopher M. Bishop, Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning, Springer, Heidelberg, 2006.

Jiawei Han and Micheline Kamber, Data Mining Concepts and Techniques, Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA, 2001.

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David J. C. MacKay, Information Theory, Inference, and Learning Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2003.

Jaideep Vaidya, Christopher W. Clifton, and Yu Michael Zhu, Privacy Preserving Data Mining, Springer, New York, 2006.

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References

1 Chapter 1: Introduction

- B.1 Rule-based signature analysis Frequency of system calls, off line Host Lee et al. (1999)
- B.2 ANN TCP/IP data, offline Host Ghosh and Schwartzbard (1999), Cannady (1998)
- B.3 Fuzzy association rules Frequency of system calls, online Host Abraham et al. (2007b), Su et al. (2009)
- B.4 SVM TCP/IP data, offline Network Mukkamala and Sung (2003)
- B.5 Linear genetic programs (LGP) TCP/IP data, offline Network Mukkamala and Sung (2003), Abraham et al. (2007a,b), Srinivas et al. (2004)
- B.6 Classification and regression trees Frequency of system calls, offline Host Chebrolu et al. (2005)
- B.7 Decision tree TCP/IP data, online Network Kruegel and Toth (2003)
- B.8 BN Frequency of system calls, offline Host Chebrolu et al. (2005)
- B.9 Statistical method Executables, offline Host Schultz et al. (2001)

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Table 1.3 Examples of Data Mining and Machine Learning

for Anomaly Detection

- C.1 Statistical methods Sequences of system calls, offline Host Ye et al. (2001), Feinstein et al. (2003), Smaha (1988), Ye et al. (2002)
- C.2 Statistical methods TCP/IP data, online Network Yamanishi and Takeuchi (2001), Yamanishi et al. (2000), Mahoney and Chan (2002, 2003), Soule et al. (2005)
- C.3 Unsupervised clustering algorithm TCP/IP data, offline Network Portnoy et al. (2001), Leung and Leckie (2005), Warrender et al. (1999), Zhang and Zulkernine (2006a,b)

- C.4 Subspace TCP/IP data offline Network Li et al. (2006)
- C.5 Information theoretic TCP/IP, online Network Lakhina et al. (2005)
- C.6 Association rules Frequency of system calls, online Host Lee and Stolfo (1998), Abraham et al. (2007a,b), Su et al. (2009), Lee et al. (1999)
- C.7 Kalman filter TCP/IP data, online Network Soule et al.
 (2005)
- C.8 Hidden Markov model (HMM) Sequences of system calls, offline Host Warrender et al. (1999)
- C.9 ANN Sequences of system calls, offline Host Ghosh et al. (1998, 1999), Liu et al. (2002)
- C.10 Principal component analysis (PCA) TCP/IP data, online Network Lakhina et al. (2004), Ringberg et al. (2007)
- C.11 KNN Frequency of system calls, offline Host Liao and Vemuri (2002)
- C.12 SVM TCP/IP data, offline Network Hu et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2005) ■
- 1.4.2.3 Hybrid Detection

Most current IDSs employ either misuse detection techniques or anomaly detection

techniques. Both of these methods have drawbacks: misuse detection techniques

lack the ability to detect unknown intrusions; anomaly detection techniques usu

ally produce a high percentage of false alarms. To improve the techniques of IDSs,

researchers have proposed hybrid detection techniques to combine anomaly and

misuse detection techniques in IDSs. Examples for hybrid detection techniques are

listed in Table 1.4. We address hybrid detection techniques

in Chapter 5.

1.4.2.4 Scan Detection

Scan detection generates alerts when attackers scan services or computer compo

nents in network systems before launching attacks. A scan detector identimes the

precursor of an attack on a network, e.g., destination IPs and the source IPs of

Internet connections. Although many scan detection techniques have been pro

posed and declared to be able to detect the precursors of cyber attacks, the high

false-positive rate or the low scan detection rate limits the application of these solu

tions in practice. Some examples of scan detection techniques are categorized in

Table 1.5. We address scan and scan detection techniques in Chapter 6.

1.4.2.5 Profiling Modules

Pro**@**ling modules group similar network connections and search for dominant

behaviors using clustering algorithms. Examples of pro**B**ling are categorized in

Table 1.6. We address pro⊞ling techniques in Chapter 7.

Table 1.4 Examples of Data Mining for Hybrid Intrusion Detection

- D.1 Correlation TCP/IP data, online Network Ning et al. (2004), Cuppens and Miège (2002), Dain and Cunningham (2001a,b)
- D.2 Statistical methods Sequences of system calls, offline Host Endler (1998)
- D.3 ANN Sequences of system calls, offline Host Endler (1998)

- D.4 Association rules Frequency of system calls, online Host Lee and Stolfo (2000)
- D.5 ANN TCP/IP data, online Network Ghosh et al. (1999)
- D.6 Random forest TCP/IP data, online Network Zhang and Zulkernine (2006a,b)
- 14 .

1.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have introduced what we believe to be the most important

components of cybersecurity, data mining, and machine learning. We provided

an overview of types of cyber attacks and cybersecurity solutions and explained

that cyber attacks compromise cyberinfrastructures in three ways: ⊠ey help cyber

criminals steal information, impair componential function, and disable services.

We have brie¤y de⊠ned cybersecurity defense strategies, which consist of proactive

and reactive solutions. We highlighted proactive PPDM, and the reactive misuse detection, anom

aly detection, and hybrid detection techniques. PPDM is rising in popularity as

- Table 1.5 Examples of Data Mining for Scan Detection
- E.1 Statistical methods Batch Both Staniford et al. (2002a,b)
- E.2 Rule-based Batch Both Staniford-Chen et al. (1996)
- E.3 Threshold random walk Continues Host Jung et al. (2004)
- E.4 Expert knowledge—rule based Batch Network Simon et al. (2006)

E.5 Associative memory Continuous Network Muelder et al. (2007)

Table 1.6 Examples of Data Mining for Profiling

F.1 Association rules Set of network flow, offline Network Apiletti et al. (2008)

F.2 Shared nearest neighbor clustering (SNN) Set of network flow, offline Network Ertöz et al. (2003), Chandola et al. (2006)

F.3 EM-based clustering Set of network flow, offline Network Patcha and Park (2007)

F.4 Subspace Set of network flow, offline Network Lakhina et al. (2004), Erman et al. (2006)

F.5 Information theoretic Set of network flow, offline Network Xu et al. (2008) •

operative computation and data sharing in cyber space creates more concerns about

privacy leaks, and misuse detection, anomaly detection, and hybrid detection tech

niques compose many IDSs. Misuse detection methods attempt to match test data

with the pro**B**led anomalous patterns, while anomalous detection solutions pro**B**le

normal patterns to search for outliers. Hybrid detection systems combine misuse

and anomalous detection techniques to improve the detection rate and reduce the

false-alarm rate. In addition, we discuss two speci⊠c research areas in cybersecurity:

scan detection and network pro⊠ling. Scan detection is used to detect the precursor

of attacks, such that its use can lead to the earlier deterrence of attacks or defenses.

Pro**B**ling networks facilitate the administration and monitoring of cybersecurity

through extraction, aggregation, and visualization tools.

1.6 Further Reading

☑roughout this book, we assume that the readers are familiar with cyberinfra

structures, with network intrusions, and with elementary probability theory, infor

mation theory, and linear algebra. Although we present a readable product for

readers to solve cybersecurity problems using data-mining and machine-learning

paradigms, we will provide further reading that we feel is related to our content to

supplement that basic knowledge. We resources in the areas of data mining and machine learning in cyber secu

rity are rich and rapidly growing. We provide a succinct list of the principal refer

ences for data mining, machine learning, cybersecurity, and privacy. We also list

related books at the end of this chapter for readers to access the related material

easily. In the later chapters of the book, we list readings that address the speci⊠c

problems corresponding to the chapter topics. Our general reading list follows. If

you are familiar with the material, you can skip to Chapter 2. We key important forums on cybersecurity include the ACM International

Conference on Computer Security (S&P), the IEEE Symposium on Security and

Privacy, the International Conference on Security and Management, the ACM Special

Interest Group on Management of Data (SIGMOD), the National Computer Security

Conference, the USENIX Security Symposium, the ISOC Network and Distributed

System Security Symposium (NDSS), the International Conference on Security in

Communication Networks, the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,

the International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, the National

Information Security Conference, and the Computer Security Foundations Workshop. We most important data-mining conferences include ACM Knowledge Discovery

and Data Mining, ACM Special Interest Group on Management of Data, Very Large

Data Bases, IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, ACM Special Interest

Group on Information Retrieval, IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering,

International Conference on Database Meory, and Extending Database Technology. Me most important machine-learning conferences include American Association

for AI National Conference (AAAI), (NIPS), (IJCAI), CVPR, and ICML.

16 ■ Me most important journals on cybersecurity include ACM Transactions on

Information and System Security, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure

Computing, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Journal of

Computer Security, and the International Journal of Information Security. We most important journals on data mining and machine learning include

IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Learning, IEEE Transactions

on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on

Software Engineering,

IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, IEEE Transactions on Computers, IEEE

Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, Machine Learning Journal,

Journal of Machine Learning Research, Neural Computation, Pattern Recognition,

and Pattern Recognition Letters. We list a number of books that contain complementary knowledge in data

mining, machine learning, and cybersecurity. Mese books provide readable and

explanatory materials for readers to access.

Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Arti**©**cial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd

edition), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2009.

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