# Security 1 - Mandatory Hand-in 1

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## Setup

I have decided to implement the assignment in Python, as it is a simple language, yet powerful enough for the purposes of the assignment.

#### Part 1

I start by defining variables g and p, and then define group as a list from 0 to p-1, representing the cyclic group  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .

I then define the function encrypt(pk, m), that uses the ElGamal encryption algorithm to encrypt a plaintext message m with a public key pk, and returns a tuple (c1, c2). The algorithm goes as follows:

- 1. Select a random  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .
- 2. Compute  $c_1 = g^r \mod p$ .
- 3. Compute  $c_2 = pk^r \cdot m \mod p$ .
- 4. Return the ciphertext  $(c_1, c_2)$ .

With this function, Alice encrypts the message 2000 as an integer, using Bob's public key.

### Part 2

For this part, I use a brute-force attack to find Bob's private key. I iterate over group and compare the result of  $g^{sk} \mod p$  with Bob's public key, which is known as 2227, for each sk in group. When an sk is found such that

 $g^{sk} \mod p = 2227$ , the iteration breaks and sk is used as Bob's private key to decrypt Alice's ciphertext, using the function decrypt(sk, c). Eve finds Bob's private key to be 66.

The function takes a private key sk and the ciphertext as the tuple c = (c1, c2), and follows the following decryption algorithm:

- 1. Compute  $s = c_1^{sk} \mod p$ .
- 2. Compute  $m = c_2 \cdot s^{-1} \mod p$ .
- 3. Return m.

Due to type conversion issues occurring when dividing integers in Python, I have utilized Euler's Theorem to instead compute  $m = c_2 \cdot s^{p-2} \mod p$  in step 2.

Using Bob's private key that Eve has found, Alice's ciphertext is successfully decrypted, yielding the original plaintext 2000.

#### Part 3

In this part of the assignment, Mallory is assumed to know that the original plaintext reads 2000.

The ciphertext contains  $(c_1, c_2)$ , where  $c_2 = pk^r \cdot m \mod p$ . By choosing an appropriate modifier d, Mallory can successfully compute a new  $c_2$ , as long as  $d \cdot m < p$  holds. Since Mallory knows the plaintext to be 2000, he can choose d = 3 to compute  $c_2 = pk^r \cdot 3m \mod p$  and modify the ciphertext to  $(c_1, c_2)$ . Since m = 2000 and 3m = 6000, Bob will get the plaintext 6000 when he decrypts the modified ciphertext.